
Swiss Journal of Sociology
Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Soziologie
Revue suisse de sociologie

Published by the Swiss Sociological Association with the support of the
Swiss Academy of Social Sciences and Humanities

Contents of Volume 23, Number 1 (1997)

Contents

| | |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----------------|
| World Sociology: Two New Debates | 1 |
| Monique Hirschhorn: The Place of The History of Sociology in French Sociology | 3-7 |
| Bernard Valade: Sociology in Quest of its Past | 9-14 |
| Jean Remy: The Concept of Transaction: its Analytical Impact and the Assumptions it Conveys | 15-22 |
| Articles | 23 |
| Bertrand M. Roehner: Spatial and Historical Determinants of Separatism and Integration | 25-59 |
| Norman Braun: Relative Growth: Modeling and an Application to Drug Law Enforcement Data | 61-81 |
| Matthias Grundmann: Socialisation and Individuation. Reflections in Socialisation Theory, based on Alfred Schütz and Jean Piaget | 83-115 |
| Jacques Hamel: Common Sense and Sociological Explanation. Problems and Methodological Reflections | 117-138 |
| Altay Manço: Evolution of the Integration of Young Turks of Immigrant Descent in French-speaking Belgium | 139-164 |
| Andreas Ladner: Local Parties in Switzerland – Pillars of Political Stability | 165-193 |
| Book Reviews | 195-212 |
| Abstracts | 213-221 |
| Erratum | 223 |

Spatial and Historical Determinants of Separatism and Integration
(Bertrand M. Roehner) *

Separatism and integration are examined in a long-run perspective; accordingly, many political or economic factors which may be crucial in dealing with short-term episodes can be safely disregarded. Extending an approach pioneered by J. Jenkins, the paper assesses the role of spatial and historical factors. It shows that the means used to stage a separatist struggle are to a notable extent borrowed from former historical episodes, an analysis which supports and illustrates C. Tilly's thesis. Two indexes are introduced to describe the process of national integration. The spatial (or geographical) index is aimed at characterizing the degree of separateness of a given region with respect to the national state to which it belongs. This index turns out to be closely connected to the number of minority-speakers; it is also correlated with the level of separatist disturbances, at least for samples having the same historical background. The purpose of the second index is precisely to specify the role of past episodes in shaping current separatist outbreaks; to a large extent current episodes seem to be modeled on former ones; this process of semi-replication appears to be characterized by a "memory" that covers a period of (at least) one and a half century. The reader should be cautioned that this study is intended to answer the question "how" rather than the question "why", in other words it concentrates on the occurrence and alternative forms of separatist struggles rather than on their causes. In so doing it follows a methodological track that has been pioneered by Lieberman (1985, the "stardom" paradigm) and Tilly (1993, the "traffic jam" paradigm).

Räumliche und geschichtliche Determinanten von Separatismus und Integration
(Bertrand M. Roehner)*

Separatismus und Integration werden hier in einer langfristigen Perspektive untersucht; daher können zahlreiche politische und wirtschaftliche Faktoren, die kurzfristig von erheblicher Bedeutung sind, ausser Acht gelassen werden. Dieser erstmals von J. Jenkins entwickelte Ansatz erlaubt es, die Rolle räumlicher und geschichtlicher Faktoren einzuschätzen. Der Artikel zeigt, dass die Mittel, mit denen separatistische Bestrebungen zum Ausdruck gebracht werden, weitgehend von vorangegangenen Episoden entlehnt sind. Dies bestätigt und illustriert die These von C. Tilly. Für die Beschreibung des nationalen Integrationsprozesses werden zwei Indices eingeführt. Der räumliche (oder geographische) Index misst den Grad der Isolierung der betreffenden Region von dem Nationalstaat, zu dem sie gehört. Dieser Index ist offenbar weitgehend bestimmt von der Anzahl der Sprecher der Minderheitssprache; er korreliert ferner mit der Häufigkeit separatistischer Unruhen, zumindest bei Stichproben mit dem gleichen geschichtlichen Hintergrund. Der zweite Index zeigt, inwieweit geschichtliche Episoden die Form heutiger separatistischer Unruhen prägen, welche sehr weitgehend ihren historischen Vorbildern folgen. Es handelt sich hier um eine Art Nachbildungsprozess, der durch ein "Gedächtnis" ausgelöst wird, das einen Zeitraum von mindestens eineinhalb Jahrhunderten abdeckt. Es sei angemerkt, dass die vorliegende Studie mehr auf das "Wie" als auf das "Weshalb" eingeht. Sie konzentriert sich also weniger auf die Ursachen als vielmehr auf die Häufigkeit und die Formen separatistischer Kämpfe. Damit folgt sie einer Methode, die von Lieberman (1985, "Filmstar-Paradigma") und Tilly (1993, "Verkehrsstau-Paradigma") entwickelt worden ist.

SPATIAL AND HISTORICAL DETERMINANTS OF SEPARATISM AND INTEGRATION

Bertrand M. Roehner
L.P.T.H.E. University Paris 7

The people are the land, and the land is the people.

Fijian proverb,
cited in Robie (1989)

Language is the essence of human existence.

Maori proverb,
cited in Fleras et al. (1992)


To speak the same language as one's neighbours expresses solidarity with those neighbours; to speak a different language from one's neighbours expresses social distance or even hostility.

Leach (1954)

1. Introduction

In the introduction of "Language and ethnic relations in Canada" S. Lieberman (1970) pointed out that "the book stems from a curiosity about why groups in contact maintain their distinctive languages over the centuries in some countries, but elsewhere give up their native tongues in a few generations". This question is at the heart of the present paper. What makes it perhaps even more important in the late twentieth century is the following observation. Throughout the twentieth century the number of sovereign countries has grown steadily, at first slowly and then, after World War II, more and more rapidly (Figure 1). The current trend sharply contrasts with the evolution during the nineteenth century. Although the latter has been referred to as the century of nationalities, a significant fall in the number of sovereign states occurred between 1850 and 1900, mainly as a result of the formation of the German Empire (and in spite of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire). The obvious question then is whether

Figure 1
Evolution in the number of independent states



The huge decrease that occurred in the first half of the 19th century was mainly due to the progressive unification of Germany. The first step took place in 1803; there were at that time about 500 sovereign or autonomous kingdoms, bishopric and other ecclesiastical territories; a second step was the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. In 1839 there still were 31 states within the German Confederation. *Sources: Statesman Yearbook (various years); Passant (1960); U.N information leaflet about membership and admission dates.*

the current trend will continue or whether a new coalescence cycle will set in.¹ True, especially between 1950 and 1970, the decolonization process accounted for the emergence of a great number of independent states. Yet, a substantial number of new sovereign states came into being through the disintegration of former federations. While being the most obvious illustration, the disintegration of the USSR (Dec 1991) is not the only example; the secession of Iceland (from Denmark, 1944), of Singapore (from Malaysia, 1965), of Bangladesh (from Pakistan, 1971), of Somaliland (from Somalia, 1991) of Eritrea (from Ethiopia, 1992) and the scission of Czechoslovakia (January

¹ Strictly speaking such a question is beyond the scope of the present paper; it requires a dynamic model whereas the one developed here is a static, equilibrium model; preliminary indications on that question can be found in Friedmann (1977), Watkins (1990), Wittman (1991)

1993) are other well known examples. Furthermore, given the number of separatist movements that are currently in progress, there is a substantial probability that the number of sovereign states will continue to increase in the near future. Even countries with a federal system of government, such as India or Nigeria, have been confronted to that problem at an institutional level, as shown by the steady increase in their number of states: from 13 (plus 6 territories) to 25 (plus 7 territories) in India; from 4 to 30 in Nigeria.

In general terms the distinctive features of this paper² are the following.

- 1) The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the implications of what could be called the blend of language and homeland. The last term refers to a territorial base which has been occupied for a "long time" by a people. The importance of those elements is obvious: language is the medium of communication and, especially in rural societies, there is a strong connection between a people and its homeland. One should note that the present model does not apply to minorities characterized by non-linguistic ethnic factors.
- 2) The paper examines the long-term effect of spatial factors. Only little attention has so far been given to the spatial determinants of separatism, a notable exception being the work of Jenkins (1986) about Jura separatism in Switzerland. His conclusion is worth quoting for in a sense it provides the starting point for the present study: "This work [...] concludes that two geographical variables, the physical geography of the Bernese Jura and distance were fundamental during the period of approximately nineteen centuries following the birth of Christ in developing a distinctive identity for the region which became the Bernese Jura in 1815". What tends to hide the impact of spatial factors is the fact that in short intervals (10 or 20 years) the role played by economic, cultural and political factors is so conspicuous that it tends to blur the slow but steady influence of geographical factors. Furthermore, the latter do not usually give rise to many spectacular events, a circumstance which makes them even less visible. They operate at micro- rather than at macro-historical level. Even a life-time may be too short a period to observe any significant effect of geographical factors; it is their steadiness which makes them important: an island remains an island, a peninsula remains a peninsula³. Political and economic factors in contrast are fairly variable; for instance, in the 19th century the French-speaking part of Belgium was economically the leading province; unemployment

2 Let us mention that a more comprehensive version (Roehner, 1995) of this paper may be obtained upon request from the author.

3 Man-made transportation means may of course play a role; yet the effect of such agencies is in general very slow.

was on average much higher in Flanders; by the end of the 20th century the situation is reversed.

- 3) Our approach is very much in line with those of Connor (1972, 1994), Lieberman (1970, 1974, 1975) and Tilly (1986, 1992, 1993). More specifically, it owes much to Connor's and Tilly's emphasis on historical factors and it relies on Lieberman's analysis of language and demographic determinants. At the methodological level our strategy in implementing event analysis follows rather closely the methods pioneered by Tilly and Olzak (1986, 1992).
- 4) Our primary objective is to confront our model with empirical quantitative evidence. It is chiefly for the purpose of testability that our model uses only a small number of parameters. In so doing we do not wish to deny that other causes are present. Many ethnic, cultural or political factors are left aside, not because they are unimportant but because it would be difficult to include them in a comparative analysis based on quantitative data. While being probably unacceptable in a short-term perspective, such a drastic selection is less questionable in a long-run analysis.

We shall particularly investigate the impact of the following factors: (i) The length of the linguistic frontier (along with its "width", see below) (ii) The degree of identification a people has established with its territorial base in the course of history. We posit that these factors account for a large diversity of separatist movements in industrialized as well as in developing countries. The influence of the mobilization parameter which has been thoroughly studied particularly by K. Deutsch is represented in our model by the "width" of the linguistic frontier.

Although there is a vast literature on national integration and separatist movements, the studies focusing on the bond between mother tongue and homeland are not so numerous. It is hardly possible in the framework of this paper to give an account of the various models that have been proposed: comprehensive and very readable reviews are to be found in Connor (1994) and Premdas (1990) for instance. In this paragraph we first give a short account of the pioneering study of Lieberman et al. (1975) and of the work of Rokkan (1983, 1997); then we list a number of other important contributions. Lieberman's study (1975) examines the determinants of mother tongue diversity. It analyzes the evolution of language diversity in 35 states and over periods ranging from a century to a few years, depending on data availability. Various national characteristics are considered in relation to changes in language diversity. Two factors, the spatial isolation of language groups and official educational policies turn out to have a significant influence on language diversity. Spatial isolation was estimated through an index proposed by Bell (1954). In a sense, given the

reliance on indexes and aggregated figures, it can be said that the analysis by Lieberman et al. considered the problem in a macrosociological perspective. In contrast, through its emphasis on basic mechanisms, the present paper rather presents a microsociological view. Stein Rokkan's work laid firm foundations for the development of comparative studies of the process of nation formation. In particular, he devoted much attention to studying the relationship between nation building and languages; see in that respect chapters one to four of Rokkan (1997). Besides Lieberman's and Rokkan's, other works should be mentioned, in particular: Shibutani et al. (1965, L), Henderson et al. (1968, L), Lieberman (1970, T), Connor (1972, L), Snyder et al. (1972, T), Snyder (1976, L), Allardt (1979, T), Deutsch (1979, L-T), Svalastoga (1982, T), Deutsch (1984, L), Horowitz (1985, L-T), Fishman (1986, L), Olzak et al. (1986, T), Lieberman et al. (1988, T), Milne (1988, L), Premdas et al. eds (1990, L), Olzak (1992, T), Gottlieb (1993, L), Gurr (1993, T), McGarry et al. eds (1993, L), Connor (1994, L), Laitin et al. (1994, L); in this list the index L or T indicates whether the approach in the paper is mainly qualitative (L) or quantitative (T).


2. Qualitative analysis

2.1 *Spatial factors*

No better description can be given of what we shall for short call Coupland's diffusion effect than the following excerpt (Coupland, 1954): "Few Englishmen want to anglicise Wales, but the pressure exerted by the mighty neighbourhood to absorb the Welsh into the English way of life is no less powerful because it is unconscious. The age-long invasion never ceases; more and more English tourists are haunting the mountains and the coasts of Wales. Aided by the motor-car they penetrate to those districts where Welsh life has hitherto been least affected by English contact."

Fig. 2 schematically represents the regions in six different countries where there have been active autonomist movements between 1965 and 1995. All the regions are located at the periphery of the countries in a way which minimize the length of the borderline with the rest of the country: two regions are islands (Corsica and Ulster), three are peninsula (Brittany, Scotland, Wales), five are in contact with communities which share the same language (Alsace, Catalonia, Basque Country, Southern Malay province of Thailand, French-speaking areas in Canada's Maritime Provinces, Chiapas state in Mexico).

Figure 2
Areas of communal revivals in six countries



Legend to Figure 2: As a rule these areas are remote from the core of the country and have minimal spatial contact with it. Very often they are part of a linguistic entity straddling the national borderline. For the Canadian Province of New Brunswick, the map shows the zones where the proportion of French-speaking people is higher than 75 percent. *Source: For New Brunswick: Verneix (1979).*

2.2 Historical factors

2.2.1 Parsimony and paronymy in history

History plays a fundamental role in shaping the collective psychology of peoples. For instance, if a nation has had the status of a sovereign state for a long time it will not easily accept to be incorporated in an alien state; Lithuania and Poland are illustrative examples. Similarly, if the conquest of a region has required a protracted and costly war, there is a high likelihood of subsequent rebellions: Algeria, Chechniya and Ireland are illustrative examples. Even once a nation has been subdued, the aspiration to sovereignty will remain strong for centuries. We shall generalize this kind of observations by assuming that those attitudes or actions that have been resorted to several times in the past will tend to repeat themselves in the future. This has become a fairly standard assumption in a number of different contexts as we shall see now.

- 1) Drawing upon a formidable array of empirical evidence, C. Tilly (1986, 390) introduced the conception of a people's repertoire of action: "Any population has a limited repertoire of collective action [...] People tend to act within known limits, to innovate at the margins of existing forms [...] People know the general rules of performance and vary the performance to meet the purpose at hand." For short, innovations are introduced parsimoniously and are closely connected to past history.
- 2) In the field of history, it has been shown (Roehner 1993a, b) that the above principle plays a key role in a wide range of historical actions. For the sake of brevity it has been referred to as the *paronymy assumption* (collusion and collision, or gradation and graduation are paronymic words). Paronymy means that, although not repeating themselves exactly, events tends to occur recurrently and in fairly similar forms.

In mathematical terms the paronymy principle can be stated in the following form: *The probability of a given action is in proportion to the number of its former occurrences.*

- 3) The use of historical analogies by political leaders is a well-known theme in political science (May, 1973; Khong, 1992). In a sense it can be considered as a particular application of the paronymy principle to prospective thinking.
- 4) In the field of operational research our assumption is embodied in the observation that, at least in the start-up phase of the learning curve, the completion of a fairly complex task requires less and less time and effort as it is performed again and again; typically, it takes only half as much time to perform a task for the 10th time than it took for the first time (Baloff, 1971; Hamblin et al., 1973).

2.2.2 *An illustrative example: Basque Provinces versus Catalonia (Spain)*

The following example illustrates how the above notions may be used. The present case has captured the imagination of a number of researchers because, within the same country, terrorist actions have played a major role in the Basque separatist movement while on the contrary political negotiations prevailed in Catalonia. To explain this contrast several mechanisms have been proposed which are reviewed in Laitin (1995). Let us see if there is a definite answer to this paradox in the general framework⁴ of the paronymy assumption. Our contention is that throughout their recent history Basques were more prone to resort to political violence and military solutions than were the Catalans. Obviously, a thorough analysis would require much more space than we can devote to it here. Let us limit ourselves to discussing how both peoples reacted to and took part in the many internal conflicts that affected Spain during the 19th and 20th centuries. There have been five main wars: the four so-called Carlist wars (1833–1839, June 1848–April 1849, 1860, 1872–1874) and the Spanish Civil War (1937–1939). Let us examine them in turn.

- 1) Barres du Molard (1842) who was Charles V's chief of staff gave a detailed account of the battles that have been fought in the First Carlist War (1833–1839). Out of 63 battles, 59 took place in the Basque Provinces (Navarra included) while 4 took place in Castille. In spite of a substantial amount of social agitation in Catalonia no battle was fought there.
- 2) The Carlist attempts which took place in 1848–1849 and in 1860 were not very serious ones. In 1848, Alzda took command of the Carlists in the Basque Provinces; he was captured and shot (Clarke, 1906, 214). At the same time, Cabrera entered Catalonia through French Cerdagne (June 1848); he spend almost one year there without any significant fighting taking

4 Let us emphasize that it would be pointless to propose a specific "mechanism" for this single case; this would be nothing but a tautological explanation. Laitin is well aware of this pitfall since he tests his model on a second case, namely the contrast between Georgia and Ukraine.

place; in April 1849 he abandoned hope and crossed the frontier again. In April 1860, Don Carlos Luis landed with 3'500 troops near Tortosa (mouth of the river Ebro in the south of Catalonia). But the expected rising did not occur and he was captured without putting up any resistance.

- 3) The protracted war of 1872–1874 was marked by the following major battles: Orioquieta (Navarra, May 1872), Estella (Basque Provinces, August 1873), Tolosa (Basque Provinces, November 1873), Vich and Olot (Catalonia, January and March 1874), Teruel and Cuenca (Castille, July 1874), siege of Bilbao and Irun (Basque Provinces, 1874). Thus, out of 9 battles only 2 took place in Catalonia.
- 4) During the Spanish Civil War, the nationalists first subdued the Basque Provinces. From September 1936 to August 1937 nationalist forces proceeded from East (San Sebastian) to West (Santander). The campaign that took place in Catalonia (December 1938–February 1939) was one of the last phases of the war and was much shorter than the struggle in the Basque Provinces. The latter is said to have cost 50'000 deaths (Davant, 1975); we were unable to find a corresponding figure for the war in Catalonia, but it was certainly much lower.

Broadly speaking, on the basis of the previous historical record, one may say that the repertoire of the Catalan people, although it included different varieties of general strikes, urban uprisings or self-promulgated autonomy proclamations was rather poorly endowed in terms of stubborn fighting or military upheaval. This may account for the difference between Basque and Catalan autonomist movements after 1960.

2.2.3 Basic tendencies in the manifestations of separatist disturbances

In the introductory chapter of "European Revolutions" Charles Tilly develops a suggestive parallel between revolutions and traffic jams; he notes that like the latter, revolutions may be difficult to predict but that "once begun, they display recurrent patterns".⁵ In this paragraph we undertake the same kind of analysis: taking the occurrence of separatist struggles for granted we examine if there are some permanent patterns in the variety of their forms. The reader should be cautioned that such a study requires very detailed historical information which may not necessarily be available in every case; consequently, our results may appear somewhat partial and preliminary. From a detailed table published in Roehner (1995) we draw the following conclusions.

5 In the case of traffic jams such patterns are particularly obvious: efforts of those on the periphery to exit from the scene and fierce competition for only small advantages for those in the middle.

- 1) For a given country there is a high level of permanence in the forms assumed by separatist disturbances in the course of time.
- 2) In industrialized countries there is a progressive decrease in the level of violence as one approaches the 20th century.

Let us discuss these two features in some detail. The second observation comes into proper light if one realizes that for the period 1945–1995 there was an obvious impossibility for minority groups in industrialized countries to wage war against the state. Nowadays, open warfare can only be used in tropical or mountainous regions and against rather weak states. The military defeat of the Sikhs in Punjab (1983–1992) in spite of their audacity and courage was just one other illustration of that evidence. These traditional forms of resistance being barred, new ones have to be invented; not surprisingly, this is a lengthy process whose completion may take well over one century.

Regarding the first point one should note that for early periods, before 1850, only *major* disturbances have usually been recorded. It is difficult to avoid such bias in analyzing and documenting non violent forms of separatist protest. Even for those events which are on record, one does usually not have the detailed information that would be required; a demonstration in Wales for instance is not identical to one in Catalonia. For all these reasons we shall have to restrict ourselves to only a few examples.

- 1) The first example concerns the celebration of the national day. Almost all national groups have chosen a specific national day, on which huge gatherings usually take place. In Wales for example the National Eisteddfod (which means session) assembles thousands of Welshmen; founded in 1450, it has become a famous national institution. Similar instances are the Diada Nacional (11 September) in Catalonia, the Day of the Basque Nation (12 April), the Day of the Jurassian People (8 September), the St Jean-Baptiste (24 June) in Quebec. In the 1970s national days were often marked by bitter street fighting between young demonstrators and the police.
- 2) As a second example let us observe that in Breton separatist struggles bomb attacks against French historical memorials constitute a well established tradition. During the last sixty years there have been at least four actions of that kind. (i) 7 August 1932: destruction in Rennes of the memorial commemorating the reunion of Brittany to France in 1532 (Sérant, 1971). (ii) 10 October 1973: destruction of the memorial commemorating the last public speech of general de Gaulle before his resignation in 1969. (iii) 26 June 1978: destruction by a fire bomb of an aisle of the Château of Versailles. (iv) November 1993: destruction of the ancient House of Parliament in Rennes; it was set on fire by demonstrators in doubtful circumstances.

date?

Scotland too showed great interest in historical symbols, but used a different "repertoire"; an example was the theft of the "Lia Fail" (a stone used for the coronation of English kings and queens) in December 1950. Other examples are given in Roehner (1995).

3. Definition of the spatial and historical indexes

3.1 How to characterize spatial separateness?

Spatial separateness will be measured through a normalized index whose magnitude is independent of the size of the region under consideration and defined in the following way.

Definition 1. We consider a region (a) where a minority language is spoken. Let us introduce the following notations:

l_0 : length of the coast-line of a

l_+ : length of the contact zone of a with the rest of the country (B).

l_- : length of the borderline (if any) of a with another a -speaking area (A) belonging to a foreign country.

Then the geographical index of integration for region a is defined as:

$$g = (l_+ w_+ - l_- w_-) / (l_0 + l_+ w_+ + l_- w_-) \quad (1)$$

g is normalized in the sense that it is comprised between -1 and 1 : $g = 1$ corresponds to a high level of integration; $g = 0$ corresponds to a low level of integration; $g = -1$ describes the case of a close link with a foreign country.

w_+ (or w_-) is a parameter characterizing the intensity and frequency of the contacts of region a with B (or A); it will be assigned the following values: 1 for traditional societies, 2 for rural societies, 3 for industrialized societies.

Let us illustrate the reason for subtracting the term $l_- w_-$ by an example. Due to the contact zone between New Brunswick and Quebec it is certainly easier for the Acadians established in New Brunswick to maintain their French mother tongue than it is for those living in other Canadian Maritime Provinces; one only needs to mention the possible contacts with family members who emigrated to Quebec, the availability of local newspapers in French from nearby Quebec, the opportunity to watch Quebec's TV programs, etc.

It may be enlightening to apply the above definition to a few examples. Figure 3a shows a case where: $l_- = 0$, $l_+ \cong 0$; as a result: $g = l_+ w_+ / l_0 \cong 0$.