RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED FORCES AND THE POPULATION OF ICELAND

Bertrand M. Roehner

Institute for Theoretical and High Energy Physics, University of Paris 6
Laboratoire de Physique Théorique et Hautes Énergies, UPMC
Working Report
Alle Menschen werden Brüder wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.
[All people become brothers under your tender wing.]

—Friedrich Schiller, Lied an die Freude [Ode to Joy] (1785)

“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“Yes, to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze (1892)

There is a strong family resemblance about the misdeeds, and if you have all the details of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can’t unravel the thousand and first.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Valley of Fear (1915)
RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED FORCES

AND

THE POPULATION OF ICELAND

1940–2006

Bertrand M. Roehner, University of Paris 6, roehner@lpthe.jussieu.fr

Version of 14 April 2009. Comments are welcome.

We hope that these notes will enable us to get in touch with Icelandic scholars. Needless to say, this is an essential condition for the success of this project. Please, if you happen to know people who have a working interest in this kind of historiography do not hesitate to send them a copy of the present draft.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction
2 Incidents
3 British and American interference
4 Censorship
5 Chronology, 1940-2006
6 Quantitative evidence
7 Conclusion
8 Acknowledgments
9 Abbreviations
10 References
11 Appendix A: Expected number of incidents
12 Other occupation episodes and analytical history
Chapter 1
Introduction

In 1940 Iceland had a population of about 150,000. Although still linked to the kingdom of Denmark, it enjoyed a large autonomy. After the outbreak of World War II, Iceland (as well as Denmark) asserted its neutrality but because of its strategic importance in the North Atlantic, it was occupied by British forces in May 1940 and one year later by American forces. The last American troops left in April 1947. There would be no military American presence until May 1951. Thereafter, for more than 50 years, a part of Keflavik airport became a base of the US Air Force. After unsuccessful discussions on a new agreement the American military presence ended for a a second time in October 2006.

The purpose of this study is to analyze the interactions of the British and American forces with the population of Iceland. First of all, we wish to explain what makes this point important.

Contrasting accounts

When reading accounts of the occupation of Iceland, one is faced with a puzzling and somewhat frustrating situation. On the one hand, there are testimonies by journalists or servicemen which mention that soldiers had to walk in Reykjavik “in parties of three, well-armed and on their guards against stabbing and shooting” and to be watchful for “empty bottles aimed at them from the top of the buildings” (see below January 13, 1941 and January 1944). On the other hand, the reports made by military commanders do not mention any events of this kind. Most military reports emphasize the good relations between the troops and the Icelandic population\(^1\). Even more surprising are some declarations made by Icelandic people, but perhaps encouraged by military commanders (see the chronology chapter at the date of 31 July 1940), to the effect that the “behavior of the troops was irreproachable”.

If the contacts between the troops and the Icelandic population had been so satisfac-

\(^1\)Even when incidents are mentioned it is done in a very restrictive way. For instance, Brigadier L. F. Page, the Commander of the Canadian Z force described one incident at the very beginning of the occupation (see below the chronology chapter at the date of 23 June 1940) before adding “no further incident of this nature was reported throughout the remainder of the Canadians’ stay in Iceland”. It will be seen below that this statement is not true.
tory it would be difficult to understand why toward the end of World War II there was so much popular support for terminating the American presence. At that time the United States was willing to keep a base in Iceland. As the Icelandic government was a close ally, the only obstacle was the wish of a large fraction of the population to end the American presence. In 1941 American troops were welcomed by the population\(^2\). What happened between 1941 and 1945 which made the population change its mind\(^3\)? If we don’t have a clear knowledge of the friction and incidents between troops and population we cannot understand the turn of mind of the Icelandic people\(^4\).

**Possible sources**

One may suspect that the contrasting declarations mentioned above largely arose from the fact that reports from Iceland were subject to military censorship during both the British and American occupations. This left a vacuum that historians were (to some extent) free to fill according to their own inclinations. Our objective in these notes is to use the data and records which have become available in the past decades to give a fairly reliable and unbiased account.

One way of finding out which one of the previous descriptions is correct is to resort to quantitative evidence. The simplest and most obvious variable which may allow us to judge the frequency and gravity of incidents between troops and population is the number of deaths which occurred both in the population and among the occupation force as a result of these incidents. In contrast to some other occupation episodes (e.g. Australia or China) for which no fatality data are yet available, in the case of Iceland the deceased soldiers of the Commonwealth force were buried on the island. This has an important consequence because it means that we can get individual dates of deaths (and also names and rank of the deceased, but unfortunately not the causes of the deaths) from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission. On the contrary, because after the war all American dead were transferred to the United States there are no similar fatality data for US forces.

The Commonwealth data are summarized in graphical form in the chapter on quantitative evidence. When analyzing these data, one is confronted to two questions.

- The total number of the deaths, namely 267, is much higher than expected. A clue is provided by the percentages of fatalities belonging to the Army, Air Force and Navy, namely:

---

\(^2\)In contrast to British troops, the American occupation was carried out with the agreement of the Icelandic government.

\(^3\)The feeling of the population against a continuing American presence was substantiated by resolutions passed in the Althing (the Icelandic parliament) urging for the withdrawal of American bases.

\(^4\)Even less if one recalls that by and large the presence of American troops was a factor of economic prosperity.
Army: 33%, Air Force: 47%, Navy: 19%.
The Air Force fatalities total $f_1 = 114^5$.

- It is often said that the Commonwealth troops were progressively replaced by American troops. The first American troops arrived in July 1941, but the replacement process lasted from that date until mid-1942. Yet, the fatality data show that even after 1942 a substantial number of Commonwealth air force personnel (Australians, British, Canadians, New Zealanders) remained in Iceland.

So far, we have not been able to find adequate responses to these questions. In particular, it would be important to know how many were killed in aircraft crashes and how many died from other causes.

Incidentally, it is thanks to the Internet revolution that the data from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission have become easily available which is probably why previous researchers did not address these questions.

Censorship (including auto-censorship) of American news became more strict after Pearl Harbor. The following excerpt of an article on how Icelanders viewed the occupation of their country which was published in *Time Magazine* on 13 October 1941 shows that at this time auto-censorship was still limited:

“Premier Hermann Jonasson of Iceland thought Icelandic conditions last week were approaching the outlandish. If 15,000,000 soldiers were dumped in London, said he, it would not be any worse off than Iceland is now. Further, the British-American occupation has upped living costs for Iceland’s residents 70%, disrupted the island’s foreign trade, upset many an Icelandic lass [girl]. Last week 4 US Marines got 10 to 20 years in Portsmouth (N.H.) prison for rape committed in Iceland.”

The fact that no mention can be found in the *New York Times* either of Premier Jonasson’s feelings or of the court-martial trial suggests differences in self-restraint behavior; a longer excerpt of this article is given in the chronology chapter at the date of 13 October 1941.

For historians or sociologists who would welcome a more detailed and trustworthy account, the most reliable sources would be the records of Allied military courts martial and sentences of trials held in Icelandic courts.

In the case of Iceland there is another valuable source of information namely the records of the Claims Committees. After their occupation the British set up an

---

^5It is interesting to compare this figure to the data given in Bittner (1974, Chart No 7: Deaths: 1940-1946) namely $f_2 = 81$ fliers killed and $f_3 = 15$ missing. $f_1$ corresponds to fliers whose death could be established, but whose remains are not necessarily buried in Iceland; for instance the remains of the crews of aircraft lost overseas usually could not be retrieved. The number of 267 corresponds to personnel buried in Iceland which means that it does not include the crews of aircraft who disappeared during missions over the North Atlantic. However, the fliers who died in crashes which occurred during take off or landing were buried in Iceland.
“Anglo-Icelandic Claims Committee” and a “British-Icelandic Traffic Accident Committee”. Both committees had a 2- or 3-member representation from each side. The British members were empowered to settle for claims not exceeding 100 pounds on any one claim. A similar organization was adopted by American troops. The joint Claim Board established for the purpose of settling claims by Icelanders held its first meeting on December 12, 1941 (see below). On average some 20 incidents were submitted to these committees every month.

Until such records become available we will not know the whole story. Until then we have tried to make the best of whatever sources are presently available. We relied mainly on newspaper articles and accessible military archives. A list of incidents established by the Criminal Judge in Reykjavik shows that in Reykjavik alone there were on average 18 incidents per month in the first year of the American occupation (no similar count is available for the rest of Iceland). The chronology chapter which follows is the result of these researches. Let us point out that this chronology is still highly provisional and will be revised when new sources become available.

Relations between Icelandic girls and soldiers

The main problem of the occupation was the number of the occupation force in comparison with the population. Yearly average figures are as follows (Hunt 1966):

1940 (after May): 20,000
1941: 25,000
1942: 30,000
1943: 30,000
1944: 15,000
1945: 7,000.

However, it is not to the total Icelandic population of 120,000 that the previous numbers should be compared; indeed the soldiers were mostly unmarried males and those numbers should therefore be compared with the same section of the Icelandic population. In Iceland the unmarried population over the age of 16 numbered some 20,000 males and about as many females (Iceland 1966). Because this number also includes aged widows, one can be sure that the number of marriageable females was somewhat under 20,000. Thus, as a rule of thumb, one can retain that in a population the number of marriageable females is of the order of one sixth of the total population. The comparison shows that the troops in fact outnumbered the group of Icelandic marriageable females. As pointed out by Hunt (1966) any substantial number of marriages between US men and Icelandic girls would have represented a serious loss to Iceland as these girls would probably have emigrated to America. One may recall in this respect that about 110,000 British girls got married to American
soldiers and most of them left Britain after the war (Registrar General’s Statistical Review, 1940-1945, Text, Volume 2) In the case of Iceland massive intermarriage would have been a threat to the very existence of Iceland as a nation.

The American Command soon became aware of this problem. Whereas marriages with Icelandic women had been allowed at the beginning of the occupation, when the number of American troops was still fairly small, they were prohibited on March 2, 1942 that is to say at a time when the strength of the American force reached about 15,000. This rule was not strictly enforced however at least as far as officers were concerned (see below October 9, 1943) nor could it prevent soldiers from getting married to Icelandic girls after being demobilized. Nevertheless, on the whole, the prohibition was remarkably effective; according to Hunt (1966, p. 86), by October 1945 only 60 Icelandic women had left Iceland for the United States. One may wonder if such a low estimate is really reliable.

The Wikipedia article entitled “Iceland in World War II” gives the following information (as of May 2016).

The interaction between young Icelandic women and soldiers became known as “Astandid” which means “the condition”. Many of the children born as a result bore the patronymic Hansson (hans means “his”), which was used because the father was unknown or had left the country. In addition a part of them have English surnames.

The main question is of course what was the extent of the relations between Icelandic girls and occupation troops. A Wikipedia article in Icelandic which is entitled “Astandid” gives the following data.

In the fall of 1941 a 3-member committee was established by the Icelandic government to investigate the matter. In its report it is stated that the police had a list of 500 women who had very close contacts with the occupation forces and that 150 of them were under 17. At least 129 of the 500 women had become pregnant. Altogether there were over 255 children. The police chief thought that these data covered only a fraction of the cases and he estimated that for the whole city of Reykjavik the figures should be multiplied by 5.

The estimate of a fivefold multiplicative factor seems an exaggeration for such a high number of additional births would be clearly visible in Icelandic birth statistics. According to the Statistical Office of Iceland the birth numbers are as follows:

---

6On 3 May 2016 the author received the following email from the son of a US officer who took part in the occupation of Iceland. “My late father was an officer sent to Iceland with the first American Army troops. Based on family information shared after the war, we later came to believe he had impregnated the daughter of a high ranking official in Iceland’s government. He was sent home but not discharged from the service. He later returned to the war at Marseille and was near the Brenner pass when the war ended. He would never talk about it and all I ever got was bits and pieces. He died in 2001. Relatives say that his daughter from Iceland came to the US. We looked, but could never find her after his death.” [for confidentiality reasons, the name is omitted]
1939: 2,363 1940: 2,480 1941: 2,634 1942: 3,005 1943: 3,173 1944: 3,213 1945: 3,434

However, the interpretation of these data is less straightforward than could seem at first sight, mainly for two reasons.

- Independently of the presence of troops there are also “natural” medium-term birth rate fluctuations; thus, even after 1945 the births numbers remained at their level of 1945 during several years.
- The birth data do not cover the case of Icelandic girls who left the country with their husband or companion before the birth of their child.

Methodology of this study

This is not an isolated study. It belongs to a set of parallel investigations of various occupation episodes. In this part we wish to describe the methodological framework of this set of comparative studies.

In the first section we explain the rationale of the chronological method of exposition that we have chosen. The second section discusses the reasons for providing a comparative perspective. In the third section we emphasize that this study could not have been carried out, at least not in this form, before the advent of the Internet.

Making historiography into a cumulative body of knowledge

The part devoted to the chronological listing of events represents some 70% of the content of this book. As this is a fairly uncommon feature for an historical account, a few words are in order to explain why, in our opinion, chronologies should be seen as a key element in historiography.

The chronology part and the chapter on quantitative evidence are the core of this report because they contain the information that comes from the sources and documents found in various archives and in primary sources such as newspapers. The other chapters contain comments on the events mentioned in the chronology. The main drawback of these comments is their subjective nature. They concern issues which at the time of writing were considered “important” but 30 years earlier or later historians would probably focus on different points. On the contrary, the chronology part can be seen as an objective list of events in the sense that it is largely (if not completely) independent of the personal interests of the historian. It becomes even more “objective” when it is a collective production of many historians (see below).

Why is the distinction between subjective and objective historical accounts essential?

One of the most basic features of a science is the fact that it is (and must be) a process of accumulation. From Bernard de Chartres to Descartes to Newton, this has been widely recognized:
“We are like dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants” said Bernard de Chartres in 1124. “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” wrote Newton in a famous letter to Robert Hooke (1676).

In Britain the phrase “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants” was even included on the edge of a 2 pound coin issued in 1997.

For subjective comments one can hardly speak of a cumulative process. One set of comments that is found quite interesting at a given moment will be found outdated thirty years later and replaced by another set which will of course experience the same fate a few decades later. On the contrary, chronologies present facts (not opinions) which will have a lasting interest for historians.

Moreover, it is easy to add complementary information to such files. Suppose, for instance, that in 2020 an historian discovers a record (not found or not accessible earlier) that describes a series of events. Thanks to the chronology structure it will be easy to check whether these events are already known or whether they are really “new”. In the later case they will be incorporated at the appropriate dates. In this way, the chronology will grow year by year, always remaining the ultimate source of reference. In the future, it may even be possible to make the primary documents available to readers. This will allow them to judge the degree of reliability of the events which are mentioned, a feature of crucial importance.

The methodology of such multi-layered chronologies has been proposed in Roehner (2002, p. 370-373) where the construction of very large chronicles (VLCs) was advocated. Such VLCs should be seen as huge computerized chronologies resulting from a process of collective production (somehow like the Wikipedia encyclopedia).

Why it is crucial to adopt a comparative perspective

In medical research there are basically three successive phases.

1 First there is the need to describe and categorize the various illnesses. Clearly this phase is of crucial importance. If one cannot make a clear distinction between an attack of bronchitis and a lung cancer, any cure will be hazardous.

---

7This could appear as a fairly cavalier judgment. Unfortunately, it seems to apply even to the work of historians who adopted a comparative perspective. Consider for instance the work of the renowned British historian Arnold Toynbee. Under the title “A study of history” he published a 12-volume study of the rise and fall of civilizations. Naturally, we are not going to argue that forty years after its publication the work is no longer useful. For one thing, it shows how such a synthesis can be done and sets a model for similar attempts: in that respect it is certainly a stimulating answer to the specialising tendency of modern historical research. However, precisely because of its originality and specificity, it would be difficult to link up this work with subsequent studies. Thus, it does not seem to be a step in a cumulative process. Naturally, such monumental studies have also another potential usefulness. Once digitized and made searchable by key-words, they will become valuable pools of facts and references of primary sources.

8The same observation holds for evidence which takes the form of quantitative data.

9Thanks to the possibilities of the hypertext format and to the fact that more and more archive resources will be digitized and made available online.
2 Then one has to identify the mechanisms (bacteria, virus, mutation and so on) which are responsible for the disorder.

3 The last step is to find a cure.

One faces the same kind of challenges for social events. Suppose for instance that one has a detailed account of 10 different riots. The first question is to see if they follow a common pattern. If they do not, a closer examination may perhaps show that there are in fact two different patterns; this opens the way to a classification of riots. As in medicine the second step is to find the mechanisms which are at the root of the different types of riots. Once these mechanisms are well understood, it may become possible to assess the likelihood of riots, may be even to prevent them.

For an isolated event the only thing one can do is to describe it. In order for a phenomenon to be studied scientifically, one needs many observations. This has been well understood by many sociologists and historians. Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Marc Bloch, Ernest Labrousse, Fernand Braudel and many others developed various forms of comparative analysis. Basically, the broader the phenomenon\(^{10}\) the more cases one needs in order to study it in a meaningful way. For instance, economic growth depends upon a staggering number of parameters which explains why it is so difficult to come up with well-defined conclusions. On the contrary, for a sharply defined phenomenon, one can expect to draw clear-cut results even from a relatively small sample of less than 10 observations.

For all these reasons, the present study is not isolated but is part of a set of studies which centers around the phenomenon of military occupation. There have been various occupation episodes during and after World War II; several of them are examined in the various studies which compose this project. All these studies follow the same format and focus on the same variables. They turned out to be more time consuming than was realized when this project was started because we had to pierce the smoke screen of military censorship. As a matter of fact, comparative analysis was instrumental in suggesting which accounts are most affected by censorship. For instance, if one sees a substantial number of incidents in cases \(A, B, C\) and none in a case \(D\) which is similar in other respects, then it can be suspected that censorship was stricter in this last case. Naturally, the obstacle of censorship can be overcome only if access to previously restricted sources has been made possible. Many important files still remain closed\(^{11}\).

We concentrated on post-World War II episodes for in this case archive sources are

\(^{10}\)By which we mean that one needs more parameters to define it.

\(^{11}\)Apart from keeping a file closed there are several other ways of making it inaccessible. If it is not included in the catalog (or if the title under which it is catalogued has no connection with actual content) nobody will be able to request it. Keeping apart a record and its inclosures is a way of making the inclosures inaccessible. Sometimes such problems may occur just by inadvertance but there are also cases in which one suspects that it was done by purpose.
much more numerous than for episodes that occurred in earlier times. In the United States there does not seem to be a 50-year rule for the opening of archives. For instance, most of the files of the “Military Advisory and Assistance Groups” (MAAG) which worked in many countries in the wake of World War II are still closed and it is likely that at least some parts of them will remain closed for ever.

The crucial role of the Internet Revolution

The Internet is not just one additional tool. For the social sciences it truly represents a Revolution. This word is justified by the fact that many investigations which were strictly impossible before the Internet have now become possible. The role of the Internet in the present study can be illustrated by three examples.

- All the studies in the present project are based on the analysis of microsocial events. Such events can only be found in databases of newspapers or news agencies. Selecting these events from a set of many thousands articles would have been a daunting and almost impossible task before these databases had been computerized and made searchable by keywords. For the present studies, the databases of the articles of the “New York Times” and of the “Times” have been searched extensively and this information has provided (at least sometimes) a first insight\(^{12}\).

- The advent of the Internet has completely changed the way we work in archives. Nowadays, the catalogs of many national archives have been computerized\(^ {13}\) and it has become possible to search them by key-words as well as by other characteristics such as “record group” or “file creator”. Once the item in which one is interested has been located it is possible to get photocopies (or files of scanned images) from the archives. It is in this way that we have been able to work with archives located in various countries: Australia, Britain, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, United States without leaving Paris.

- Finally, many documents once available in only a few libraries are now directly accessible on the Internet. This observation also extends to personal testimonies which had never been available in libraries and can now be read on the websites set up by veterans or their descendants.

In the following pages we briefly examine some key points in order to provide a general perspective for the events mentioned in the two chronology chapters.

\(^{12}\)Of course, during wars major newspapers are also subject to censorship (pre-censorship, post-censorship or auto-censorship); in such cases one must find alternative sources of information.

\(^{13}\)At the time of writing (2008) this process is still in progress. For the archives which are the most advanced in this respect, about 50% of the entries have been included in the electronic catalog.
Fig. 1.1 Construction of a Nissen hut. These pictures show different steps in the construction of Nissen huts of different models. Bernhardsson 2000, p. 19. Many thanks to Prof. Eggert Bernhardsson for sending me a copy of his book.
Fig. 1.2 Location of Nissen huts. The drawing shows the disposition of a camp ("Thulekampur"). Bernhardsson 2000, p. 214
Fig. 1.3 Entrance of Camp Knox (US Navy). Camp Knox is number 3 on the map of the next figure. One may wonder if the words “US Navy property” are really appropriate. In other words did the US Navy lease or purchase this land? Source: Bernhardsson 2000, p. 67
Fig. 1.4a  Location of military camps around Reykjavik. Altogether there were some 80 camps. The harbor is in the upper right corner, the airfield is in the lower right corner. Bernhardsson 2000, p. 24
Fig. 1.4b  **Location of military camps.** This picture shows the locations of camps in the countryside around Reykjavik. *Bernhardsson 2000, p. 25*
I verstu húsakynnum í Reykjavík býr fjöldi fólks, sem læknar hafa bannað að búa í vondum húsakynnum vegna heilsubreôsta.

Mægð dæmi um það, að fólk, sem náð hefur hafa í sjákráðamhæð og hólmum, hefur velvit aftur vega svo lendri húsakyns okkilyðra.

I mórgum af verslu vísuverðum, sem fólk í Reykjavík varð þess að skatta sig við og að aðal aðra dómsleva manna eru heilsupplánir hvertum sem er, því fólmargi, sem læknar hafa sæstaklega. Það er það við, að þau Íslensk hafa vaxið hafa sæstaklega.

Bernhardsson 2000, p. 190

Fig. 1.5 The first page of the newspaper Timinn (18 January 1950). The two photographs show that 5 years after the end of the war the Nissen huts were not in good shape.
Chapter 2
Incidents

This chapter contains some general comments about various forms of incidents. For specific examples one should consult the chronology chapter.

Lists of complaints made by Icelanders about the behavior of servicemen are given in the chronology chapter at the dates of 3 October 1941 and 16 April 1942. However, it must be kept in mind that these enumerations represent only a small part of the incidents. As already mentioned it can be estimated that there were about 20 incidents per month. This figure which is based on partial data from the joint “Claim Committee” concerns only the grievances of Icelanders and does not include those expressed by the troops.

Can we try to predict how many serious incidents are to be expected on the basis of other occupation episodes? Appendix A presents a calculation which is based on data for the occupation of Japan in the second half of 1952 that is to say after the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty on 28 April 1952. Based on these data, one gets the following estimates.

- British-Canadian occupation (May 1940 - Dec 1941): 1.7 murder, 50 assaults
- American occupation (Jul 1941 - Dec 1943): 3.4 murders, 100 assaults\(^\text{14}\).

In these estimates, murder and assault means crimes on Icelandic people. There may also have been offenses of Icelanders against occupation troops, but there are no Japanese data for this kind of incidents.

Naturally, one may argue that the conditions of the occupation of Iceland and Japan were very different. While some circumstances were indeed different others were the same; it is precisely in order to decide which effect was dominant that we propose this comparison.

The black market was another disorder which was a direct consequence of the occupation.

The mechanism which brought about black-marketing by servicemen was basically the same in all areas which were occupied by American troops during or after World

\(^{14}\)These figures cannot be directly compared with the average of 20 incidents per month because the latter also includes incidents of a less serious nature such as non-payment of taxi drivers or brawls between servicemen in hotels or cafés which resulted in damages to property.
Incidents

War II.

- As the pay of servicemen was much higher than the salary of the working people, the presence of a substantial number of American troops in a city increased the demand to the point of locally creating a state of scarcity which inflated non-official open-market prices (i.e. prices of goods available on the black-market) even though prices subject to official price-control may have remained unchanged. For instance, in the Chinese port of Tsingtao the arrival of about 25,000 American Marines in September 1945 provoked a huge (twenty-fold) rise in local prices.

- Once the price of black-market goods was higher than the price of canteen goods it made sense for servicemen to buy canteen goods in order to sell them with a profit to local traders.

- Naturally, such sales were even more profitable if military goods or equipment could be misappropriated by servicemen. In contrast to the sale of canteen goods for which one had to wait until local goods had become sufficiently expensive, black marketing in misappropriated goods could start almost immediately after a unit had taken up quarters in a city.

Through this process American servicemen could send home amounts of money in excess to their pay. It has been estimated that in the decade following 1940 the total sent home exceeded the total pay of the GIs by $530 million.

---

15 Needless to say, this effect was stronger in countries such as China, Germany or Japan where industrial facilities had been partially destroyed during the war.

16 This figure is given in Rundell (1961) but the author does not say on which primary source it is based. The article also emphasizes that even when servicemen were paid in local currency (as was for instance the case in Iceland after February 1942) they were entitled to exchange the local currency against dollars which they could send to the United States by money order at no cost.
Chapter 3
British and US interference

It is clear that no country can take major political decisions without caring about their possible implications for other nations. In this sense it can be said that all countries are in fact interdependent. However, as suggested by common sense and confirmed by observation, in the adjustment process between a small and a large country the wishes of the large country usually prevail.

Even before the British occupation the relation between the two countries was fairly unsymmetrical. Why?

The main reason was an economic one. In 1940, the United Kingdom annually exported to Iceland 170,000 tons of coal and 65,000 tons of coke, salt and fertilizers. Apart from Germany there was no other possible source of supply within a distance which would keep transportation costs at a reasonable level. It is true that Iceland in turn exported large quantities of fish to the UK. Although certainly important, these shipments were by no means as crucial for Britain as were the imports of coal, coke and oil for Iceland.

After the US occupation there was a considerable change, not so much in the trade of coal and fish, but rather in the way the transactions were carried out. Instead of being bought directly by Britain, Icelandic exports were first bought by the United States and then sold to the UK and charged on the British defense aid account. This arrangement had two advantages (i) To Icelanders it provided the dollars they needed to import machinery and other industrial products from the United States (ii) It dispensed Britain from spending sterling on its imports from Iceland. During the whole war, Britain imported twice as much as it exported which explains why this

---

17 The source is a despatch from the British Embassy to the Department of State, 29 July 1941, in “Foreign Relations of the United States”, 1941, Vol. 2.
18 New York is 2.5 times more distant from Iceland than Glasgow or Newcastle.
19 This was permitted by the Lend-Lease Act passed by Congress on 11 March 1941, that is to say shortly before the American occupation of Iceland. The program totaled an amount of $ 50 billion (about $ 600 billion in dollars of 2000). In sharp contrast to the American loans to the Allies in World War I, the Lend-Lease Act made no provisions for postwar repayments. However, compensations were provided in different forms. For instance, Britain gave the United States permission to establish military bases in Newfoundland, Bermudas, the British West Indies, India, Sri Lanka. Like the Marshall plan after the war, the Lend-Lease Act was a way to massively subsidize American manufacturers, and at the same time to secure world wide political influence. In that sense, it was a watershed that marked for the United States the end of non-interventionism and the beginning of broad international involvement.
benefit was quite consequential at this time.

The occupation by British and American troops created new bonds between Iceland and these countries. Observation shows that on important questions Iceland had to follow their lead. Illustrations are provided by the following episodes.

- In two letters (20 March and 18 July 1941) to the US Secretary of State (see the chronology at these dates) the American Consul in Reykjavik observed that the trade representative of the British government has developed into “an omnipotent trade tsar with unlimited power over practically the whole of Icelandic trade. As a result, he is probably the most unpopular man in Iceland today”.

- During the largest part of the wartime occupation, Iceland had an extra-parliamentary government (see the chronology chapter at the date of 16 December 1942) of administrators instead of a government representing the majority party in Parliament.

- In the question of independence from Denmark, in spite of the unanimous wish expressed in 1942 by the Icelandic Parliament, the government had to bow to the wish of the United States and postpone independence until 1944 (see the chronology at May 17, 1941 and August-September 1942). At one point, on 21 September 1942, the prime minister (indirectly) appeals to the US government for bolstering its political standing.
Chapter 4
Censorship

When the British occupied Iceland in 1940 they set up a system of mail censorship that, according to Hunt (1966), infuriated both the Icelanders and the US representatives in the island. Basically, all mail coming from or going to Iceland was redirected to Britain where it was examined by military censors. This included all US mail except the communications originating in or addressed to the Department of State. Letters from American and Icelandic importers and exporters were delayed sometimes for as many as 100 days. After the American occupation the Icelandic government accepted a mail censorship which was carried out by censors located on the island thereby reducing the delays. There was also a joint British-American control of telegrams and radio or cable communication.

As far as the present study is concerned the question which is of most significance is whether or not there was a censorship of the local press. With military reports being largely untrustworthy, the local press remains the most important daily source of information from which we can hope to learn what really happened. Unfortunately, it seems that there was at least self-censorship. Indeed, according to Bittner (1975, p. 628), Icelandic newspapers (with the only exception of the Communist paper Thjodviljinn) accepted a gentleman’s agreement with the British Command according to which the papers would print no details concerning the garrison until the specifics were cleared by the Intelligence officer. Although with its circulation of only 1,500, Thjodviljinn had a very small impact on the Icelandic public, the British Command could not get used to this dissenting voice; on April 27, 1941 the paper was eventually banned and its editors deported to Britain. Thjodviljinn was not allowed to reappear before May 13, 1942. At this point it is not clear whether or not there was also a gentleman’s agreement between the local press and the American command. Naturally, there must have been some form of military control in order to prevent important information to be leaked to Germans even inadvertently. For instance we know that, for obvious reasons, the military forbade all talk about weather on the radio (Karlsson 2000, p. 321).
Fatality numbers

Symbols such as (6, 11, 7) signal the incidents marked by fatalities. The three figures total the fatalities since the beginning of the occupation for 3 different categories:
(6: American troops, 11: Commonwealth troops, 7: Icelandic civilians)
Whereas for Allied troops all fatalities (whether by accidents or any other cause) are taken into account, for Icelandic civilians we count only the fatalities which came about as a direct consequence of the occupation, e.g. people killed in traffic accidents due to military vehicles, shot by sentries, killed in explosions brought about by Allied operations, and other similar causes.

1940

Mar 1940: Iceland was granted a one million dollar loan by the US government Export-Import Bank (Chamberlin 1947, p. 93).

May 10, 1940: British troops landed in Iceland (Times May 11, p. 5)

May 10, 1940: (0, 1, 0) A British soldier died from gunshot, allegedly by committing suicide (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

Jun 1940: Shortly after the landing of British troops an unpublished trade agreement was made between the British and Icelandic governments which gave the British the power of exercising a veto over all decisions taken by the Icelandic Import and Currency Exchange Board. All decisions of the Board (and in particular the delivery of import or export licenses) had to be reviewed by a two-man board composed of one Icelander and one Englishman. The Englishman was attached to the British Legation in Reykjavik and received its orders from the British Minister of Economic Warfare. In July 1941, in a dispatch to his government the US consul in Iceland, Kuniholm, stated that the British Legation had unlimited power over practically the whole of Icelandic trade. (Hunt 1966 p. 242-243; Chamberlin 1947, p. 94). It would be interesting to better understand why and how a country like Iceland which
was longing for complete independence from Denmark was induced to accept an arrangement which limited so drastically the liberty of its trade; one of the factors may have been the fact that since the beginning of the war (and the end of trade with Germany) Iceland had become heavily dependent on Britain for its vital coal and oil imports; oil was particularly essential for the Icelandic fishing fleet. The only other possible source would have been the United States which was of course unwilling to cause displeasure to its ally. Naturally, this is only an assumption; it is only through the testimony of Icelandic officials that one would be able to confirm that this was indeed the real reason.

Jun 23, 1940: Some Canadian troops of the “Z” force were talking to some girls near the football grounds when a civilian police motor patrol arrived. The girls ran away and in the ensuing excitement a stone broke a window of the car. Later a rumor circulated that a Canadian soldier had been put in the police cells. As a result a body of Canadian troops arrived at the police station intent on a delivery. This was prevented by a member of the Canadian police who was able to persuade the troops that no Canadian was in jail. The next morning the Commander of the Canadian force called the Chief of Police to express his regrets at the incidents and to offer to pay for the damage. He also advised him strongly against trying to handle Canadian troops with his own men. (Weekly Report of the “Z” Force, 24 June 1940, cited in Report No 33, Historical Section of Army Headquarters, 16 December 1949, p. 27)

Jul 1940: The Icelandic krona was again tied to the British pound at a rate of 27 krona for one pound. In order to understand the signification of this decision one must look back at the monetary events of 1939. On April 4, 1939 the krona was devalued by 22 percent to a rate of 27 krona for one pound. However, after September 1939, fearing that the pound would loose much of its value as a result of the war, the Icelandic government tied the krona to the US dollar at a rate of 6.51 krona for one dollar. As a result of the dollar peg and of a slide of the pound with respect to the dollar, in April 1940 the krona had almost regained its pre-devaluation level of 22 krona to one pound. This decision which was more or less imposed by the British reintroduced the rate of April 1939 as if the peg to the dollar and the slide of the pound had not occurred. (Chamberlin 1947, p. 86)

Jul 4, 1940: ⚫ (0,2,0) A British soldier died from gunshot, allegedly by committing suicide (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

Jul 7, 1940: ⚫ (0,3,0) A British soldier died from gunshot, allegedly by committing suicide (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

[This is the third case of this kind since the arrival of the British Force two months earlier; if we assume that there are 15,000 troops in Iceland at this date these three
suicides would correspond to an annual rate of \( \frac{3}{(0.15 \times 0.16)} = 125 \) per 100,000; for the purpose of comparison the rate in the British male population of age around 20 is about 10 per 100,000. No subsequent suicide is mentioned in Bittner’s chart but this does not mean that there were none for he cautions the reader that his table is restricted to cases that he found mentioned in various unit diaries. No overall official casualty data seem to have been released by the army.]

**Jul 8, 1940:** (0,3,1) Comments made by a Canadian soldier shortly after his landing. “Confronted to a hostile population, we were instructed always to walk in Reykjavik in teams with loaded rifles and 50 rounds. Recently an Icelandic policeman was killed in a brawl with soldiers.” (Dumais 1968)

**Jul 13, 1940:** The British minister 20 in Iceland, Mr Smith, reported to London that General Curtis at his suggestion was preparing a martial law proclamation. Its first section read as follows: “It is hereby declared that all persons in Iceland are now subject to martial law under which they shall be liable to trial by military courts without the right of appeal to the civil courts.” By July 31, 1941 the text of the martial law had been passed to all units but was still being kept secret. Proclamations were printed and kept ready to be posted. (Bittner 1975, p. 648)

[The proclamation of martial law was aimed as a sword of Damocles over the Icelandic authorities; whereas it was not proclaimed in all of Iceland, it is not clear if it was not implemented in some sectors over short time intervals.]

**Jul 25, 1940:** In a letter to the Commanding Officer of the Fusiliers Mont-Royal (belonging to the Canadian force), Major-General L.F. Page wrote:

A complaint has been put forward by His Majesty’s Britannic Minister to Iceland that your troops are drinking “Black Death” [i.e. a strong alcohol] and under its influence are terrorizing the civilians in Hot Springs. Women are afraid to leave their homes and inhabitants are afraid of their homes being broken into. A subsection of British Military Police will be billeted with the Fusiliers Mont Royal to help you.

In his reply, the Commanding Officer of the Fusiliers claimed that the reports were inspired by Communists. As the best way to combat the “Black Death” drink was to prevent its production, some units sent troops into the hills to destroy the stills which produced the beverage. (Bittner 1975, p. 534)

[In the British report cited above (23 June 1940) one reads that after June “no further incident was reported throughout the remainder of the Canadians’ stay in Iceland”. Obviously, in the light of the present episode, this statement was not correct.]

---

20As at this time Iceland is not yet an independent country, the term “minister” does not seem completely appropriate; nevertheless, it is commonly used by the sources.
Jul 31, 1940: The archives of the Department of National Defence of Canada hold the following English translations of two declarations by Icelandic people to the effect that the behavior of Canadian troops of the Fusiliers Mont Royal was good and that any complaints to the Icelandic Police were unfounded:

- As one of the Officers of the Canadian Army have asked me, I am happy to be able to say that the behavior of the Canadian Troops here in Hverargerdi is very good. Their behavior is irreproachable. [Signed:] Halldor Gunnaugsson (oddviti i.e. sheriff.) Hverargerdi, 29 July 1940. Addressed to Lt.-Col Paul Grenier.

- We, the undersigned, apologize for sending the Reykjavik Police Station a letter complaining of the trouble caused by soldiers here in the country. We have found that this was not the truth and hereby state that we have no complaints against the Regiment. [Signed:] Eyjolfur Gislason, Saemundur Eyjolfsson. Hveragerdi 31 July 1940.

(Department of National Defence of Canada, 145.2F1009 (D3) Reports on conduct of FMR in Iceland. Many thanks to Yves Tremblay, National Defence historian, for bringing this document to my attention.)

[The Fusiliers Mont Royal stayed only four months in Iceland, from 1 July 1940 to 31 October when they were transferred to Britain; other Canadian troops stayed longer.]

Aug 21, 1940: Most of the children of Reykjavik either have been or are to be evacuated into the countryside. Accommodation is by no means easy to obtain as the majority of the country people are farmers who often have large families themselves and whose houses are usually small. In addition no one has leisure to care about small children. (Times p. 5)

Aug 21, 1940: Before the war the Nazi government tried to win the adherence of young men by supporting Icelandic flying clubs and by sending instructors in gliding; they also sent teachers in skiing and rock climbing. The increasing number of attacks on British soldiers in cafes and in the streets by young people show the extent to which German propaganda had won over a section of Icelandic youth. Anti-British feeling seems to be growing stronger in many quarters. (Times p. 5)

Oct 11, 1940: A conference on newspaper policy took place at the Headquarters of the British force at which newspaper editors were asked to attend. All Icelandic newspapers accepted the invitation except the editors of the Communist newspaper Thjodivljinn. In a post-conference article the latter wrote that it regarded the British troops as an invading force. (Bittner 1975, p. 630)

Oct 16, 1940: A British soldier was drowned after his stolen motor vehicle was driven off pier (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).
Oct 22, 1940: • (0,5,1) A British soldier fell off pier into the sea and drowned (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

Nov 16, 1940: A guard of the 70 Infantry Brigade fired on Icelanders (Bittner 1975, p. 597, the author does not say if there were casualties).

1941

Jan 6, 1941: In early January the editors of Thjodviljinn became involved in the organization of the strike of Icelandic labor working on British bases. There were at that time about 3,000 Icelanders employed in military construction projects, in particular the establishment of airfields. Leaflets in English were distributed exhorting troops to refuse to obey any orders to break strike picket lines or to do work normally done by the striking Icelanders. The leaflets ended with the words: “Don’t be a scab. Don’t take the job of an Icelandic working man.” The basic issues included a cost of living bonus which would compensate the rise in the cost of living. The distributors of the pamphlets were arrested on January 6, 1941 and handed over to Icelandic authorities. It was made clear to them that a light sentence would not be accepted. Thus, the Consul General Shepherd wrote to the Foreign Office: “The outcome of the trials will be considered a test case. If sentences are incommensurate with the gravity of the offense, the Commanding Officer may wish to take further action such as deportation and he might insist on himself dealing with any offenses against military security”. (Bittner p. 631, 643)
[Under these circumstances a strike of civilian workers can hardly be considered as a direct threat to military security; but this notion was given a broad acceptance in the sense that it included almost any issue regarding occupation forces.]

Jan 13, 1941: The reception of British and Canadian troops in Iceland was anything but warm. The Icelanders so resented them that soldiers had to go out in parties of three, well-armed and on their guard against stabbings and shootings. But the soldiers’ greatest problem was the stubborn womankind of Iceland. About the only word of Icelandic they learned was the word for girl, stulka. They would lounge in the streets, calling “Hi, stulka” to every blonde. But they got no response. If a girl were indiscreet enough to accept an Englishman, she would have all her hair shaved off. (Time Magazine January 13, 1941)

Jan 15, 1941: • (0,6,1) A British medical officer was killed by fractured skull suffered during a gale (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

Feb 24, 1941: The Icelandic representative in London, Mr Benediksson, was called to the Foreign Office and was given the warning that if the Icelandic government did
not take action to prevent activities harmful to the security of the British forces, the Army might take action which would be more severe than handing over offenders to the Icelandic authorities. More specifically, the British government wanted the activities of the Communist party curtailed and its newspaper suppressed. (Bittner 1975 p. 634)

Feb 25, 1941: After the trials of 8 persons in relation with the distribution of leaflets in January, the British minister in Iceland, Mr Smith, wrote to London: “The chief culprits have received heavy sentences and the law has been stretched to detain them in custody pending appeal”. As a matter of fact, the composer and translator of the pamphlet were sentenced to 18 months imprisonment, the two distributors to 6 months imprisonment and loss of civil rights, and the two editors of Thjodviljinn to 3 months. Upon appeal in March, the Icelandic Supreme Court reduced the 18 month sentences to 15 months and annulled the loss of civil rights. The only problem was that one of the editors, Mr Einar Olgeirsson was a member of the Althing and as such enjoyed parliamentary immunity and would not serve his sentence until after the current session of the Althing had ended. (Bittner 1975, p. 634) [It is not clear whether or not Mr Olgeirsson was nonetheless taken into custody for it is said that he wrote letters and columns from his jail.]

Mar 1, 1941: A British sentry was blown off a pier during a gale and drowned (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

Mar 20, 1941: Letter sent by the American Consul to the Secretary of State, [excerpt]
The Anglo-Icelandic Joint Standing Committee consists of 7 members, 2 British and 5 Icelanders. The two British members are the British Consul General (Mr. F.M. Shepherd) and the British Commercial Counselor at Reykjavik (Mr. C.R.S. Harris). Actually, the committee is nothing more than a kind of forum where Icelanders are supposed to be able to air their trade grievances to the British authorities. I have been informed by the Icelanders themselves that Mr. Harris dominates all meetings of the committee, and that his usual reply to requests for concessions of any kind is the monosyllable “no”. The most recent meetings have been concerned principally with endeavors on the part of the Icelandic representatives to obtain from the British the release of dollar exchange for the purchase of goods from the United States. Mr. Harris now advises the Icelanders to let him place their orders in the United States. Such orders under the rigid import control now in operation are bound to be small. (NARA 4)

Mar 21, 1941: A British sentry was blown into the sea and drowned (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).
Apr 7, 1941: Thjodviljinn published an article which charged the British with paying low wages to the Icelanders who worked for them and tolerating poor working and living conditions.

Apr 11, 1941: A US occupation force landed in Greenland after an agreement had been signed with the Danish minister in Washington Henrik de Kauffmann. Kauffmann, however, had acted without the consent of the Danish government and, as a result, Denmark declared the agreement void and dismissed Kauffmann from the Danish diplomatic corps. The United States nevertheless continued to recognize him as a duly authorized Danish minister. President Roosevelt announced that the United States has taken Greenland under its protection and will insure its remaining a Danish colony. (NYT p. 1, Hardarson 1974)

Apr 17, 1941: The control of the price of Icelandic cod which was to come into operation recently has been held up by seasonal difficulties (Times p. 2).

Apr 27, 1941: The Communist newspaper Thjodviljinn was suppressed and the three editors were deported to England. One of them, Einar Olgeirsson was a member of the Althing (Bittner 1975, p. 627).

Apr 29, 1941: In a protest sent to London the Prime minister wrote: “This step was taken contrary to the assurance given as to the non-interference with the sovereignty of the Icelandic people. On behalf of the Icelandic government I hereby protest against the suppression of the Icelandic newspaper Thjodviljinn and the deportation of three members of the editorial staff.” On June 11, 1941 the British government rejected the protest of the Icelandic government. (Bittner 1975)

May 1941: August Lehrman, a German who was in hiding since the British landing was arrested. He had evaded capture for a year with the assistance of some Icelandic families. The 180 Germans who were in Iceland in May 1940 were arrested shortly after the British landing (Bittner 1975, p. 599).

May 2, 1941: The Icelandic Communist newspaper Thjodviljinn has been suppressed for incitement to sabotage and the editors have been deported to Britain; one the deported editors is a member of the Althing (Times p. 3). [In this account the expression “incitement to sabotage” was obviously an overstatement.]

May 17, 1941: The Althing declared unanimously that it considered that Iceland had acquired the right to abrogate entirely the Union with Denmark. According to the Treaty it should not be abrogated before 1944, but the Icelandic government considers that due to the occupation, Denmark has become unable to fulfill its obligations which makes the treaty void. (Foreign Relations p. 15)
May 21, 1941: Iceland has been granted a one million dollar loan by the American Treasury (Times p. 3).

Jun 1941: In Reykjavik a sentry bayoneted and killed the horse of a town clerk who apparently had attempted to run him down (Bittner p. 597; the author does not give the date nor does he say if the clerk was injured).

Jul 1941: Publication of the report of the Afstand Morality Committee. [This report in which the Committee described the bad conduct of the British garrison received considerable publicity. However, it did not affect the judgment of British officers on the behavior of their troops. Thus, in his “History of the Duke of Wellington Regiment, 1919-1952”, Brigadier C.N. Barclay observes: “The Icelanders who had regarded our arrival with little enthusiasm were even less enthusiastic about our departure. This is possibly the best tribute that could have been paid to the behaviour of the British troops”.] (Bittner 1975)

Jul 1941: A British Army truck accidentally killed an Icelandic woman who was walking in a street (Bittner 1975, p. 598; the author does not give the day on which this accident occurred).

Jul 8, 1941: US Navy forces landed in Iceland (NYT p. 1). This first echelon comprises 4,000 Marines.

Jul 8, 1941: In a letter to Prime Minister Jonasson, the British government confirmed a new [and more favorable] agreement that Iceland had been in no position to demand after the British landing 14 months earlier. (Nuechterlein 1961, p. 30)

Jul 11, 1941: The Iceland Parliament approved by a vote of 39 to 3 the government’s agreement to permit United States armed forces to occupy Iceland in cooperation with the British forces already on the island. The three Communist members voted against the agreement notwithstanding the fact that the Soviet Union has been attacked by Germany on June 21, 1941 (NYT p. 6). According to this agreement, military tribunals will have exclusive jurisdiction over military personnel. Icelanders involved in offenses against the US forces should be tried by Icelandic courts and if laws were not available for this the government should enact them; consequently, there will be no provost court trials of Icelandic people by military courts (Hunt 1966, p. 71).

Jul 11, 1941: In a letter to the Commander of the Marine Corps, Brigadier General John Marston wrote: “The claims [settled by the Claims Commission] that the British forces have already paid have amounted to about 5,000 dollars per month. The British members of the Anglo-Icelandic Claim Committee were empowered to settle claims not exceeding 100 pounds (Bittner 1975). At the current exchange rate,
100 pounds was equivalent to 400 dollars; as a rough order of magnitude it can be assumed that the average claim was around 200 dollars; this would mean that there were some 25 incidents per months.

**Jul 18, 1941:** Excerpts of telegram No 136 sent by the American Consul, Bertel E. Kuniholm, to the Secretary of State. This memorandum deals with a broad range of questions related to the occupation: housing, warehouses, procedure for settling claims, organization of military construction projects, relations with the population. The excerpts below focus mainly (but not exclusively) on this last aspect.

- As a result of the British occupation, the British Ministry of Economic Warfare has maintained a staff of several people at Reykjavik under Mr. C.R. Harris who has been given the title of Counselor to the British Legation in Iceland. Mr. Harris has developed into an omnipotent trade tsar with unlimited power over practically the whole of Icelandic trade (see my confidential despatch No 88 of March 20, 1941. He is probably the most unpopular man in Iceland today.
- The British Army of occupation has refused steadfastly to agree to trial of British military personnel by Icelandic courts. In case of altercations, assault, et cetera the regular army court martial have dealt with British personnel.
- The British contribute to road upkeep in Iceland on the basis of gasoline consumed by automotive vehicles. The proportion of British vehicles on the roads at present is two for every three Icelandic vehicles.

(NARA 3)

**Aug 1941:** Negotiations were started in Washington on a trade agreement between the United States and Iceland. Although both parties declared to be in complete agreement on most points, the agreement was not signed by the Department of State until 27 August 1943. Hunt (1966) observes that the Instruction No 41 sent in March 1942 to the American Legation in Iceland became, word for word, the text of the trade agreement (Hunt 1966, p. 247).

**Aug 8, 1941:** President Roosevelt appointed the diplomat Lincoln MacVeagh as the first ambassador to Iceland. He presented his credentials on September 30, 1941 and remained in Reykjavik until 27 June 1942. (Wikipedia, English, article: Lincoln MacVeagh)

[It should be noted that at the time of this appointment Iceland was not an independent country; in fact, MacVeagh’s official title was: “Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary”. The title of the US representative in Iceland was changed to “Ambassador Extraordinary” only after 1955. (Wikipedia, English, article: United States Ambassador to Iceland.)

**Aug 26, 1941:** The ban against the stationing of American reporters in Iceland has
been removed. Such permission has been withheld so far pending an agreement with the British forces. Applications for permission to proceed to Iceland might now be filed with the Navy Department. (NYT p. 3)

**Aug 28, 1941:** Death of a small child in an accident occasioned by British troops (Bittner 1975, p. 598)

[The author does not describe the circumstances of this accident].

**Sep 3, 1941:** President Roosevelt approved allotment for $25,000 settlement of claims [made by Icelandic people]. (NARA 10)

[Unfortunately the file gives no information about the nature of these claims.]

**Sep 15, 1941:** In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations, General Marston, the Commander of the Marines, mentioned that tension between the troops and the population increased markedly after the rape of an Icelandic woman by 4 Marines (Hunt 1966, p. 88).

[The Marines were sentenced to 10-20 years in prison, see below the article of Time Magazine at the date of Oct 13, 1941.]

**Sep 20, 1941:** An Icelander was struck by a soldier on Austurvollur when he walked past a crowd of soldiers. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Sep 23, 1941:** In a meeting with American military commanders, Prime Minister H. Jonasson expressed the hope that Americans “would not take over houses in Reykjavik the way the British had”. (NARA 2)

[What exactly had the Prime Minister in mind? It would be interesting to know.]

**Sep 28, 1941:** A plan for the establishment of a Claim committee was adopted. It combined two procedures. (i) A Primary Board consisting of one officer would attempt to reach an agreement with the claimant and settle the amount of compensation. (ii) If agreement turned out to be impossible the matter would go to the Joint Claims Board, a committee of three persons consisting of one American officer, one representative of the Icelandic government and a justice of the Icelandic Supreme Court as arbitrator. All decisions taken by the board had to be approved by the American Commander. The Board held its first meeting on 12 December 1941. (Conn et al. 1964, Chapter 19, p. 513)

**Sep 30, 1941:** American soldiers on the platform of a truck threw stones at an Icelander, Palmi Ingimundarson, when he walked past the truck. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Sep 30, 1941:** Excerpt of an order issued by the Headquarters of the First Marine Brigade, Icelandic Base Command. Subject: Resisting arrest.

An incident recently occurred in which a number of Marines resisted arrest when the
city police at Reykjavik attempted to take them into custody. Officers and enlisted men should be informed that resistance to arrest constitutes disorderly conduct and will be punished as such. The American military police should be notified at once of their arrest. Every effort will be made by this headquarters to have them released at once to the custody of their organization commander. [Signed:] John Marston, Brigadier General, US Marine Corps. (NARA 2)

[In the covering letter with which this order was transmitted to the State Department, Lincoln MacVeagh notes that prior to the issuance of this order, which by the way was due to General Bonesteel’s insistence, Brigadier Marston used to ask the American legation to protest against any Icelander laying hands upon his men. MacVeagh adds the following observation: “Incidentally, it may be added that the British also had the typical Marine attitude. It has not helped them in their relations with the local population and government.”]

Oct 3, 1941: The Chief of Police, Agnar Kofoed Hansen, gave an oral account of recent incidents to the US consul Kuniholm in a conversation held on 3 October. They were summarized in enclosure 2 of a despatch sent to the State Department on 4 October. These incidents are presented in general terms; in contrast to a second list of incidents established in the spring of 1942 (see NARA 1) no precise dates are given here. This list of complaints included the following instances.

- American soldiers, particularly sailors and the regular army enlisted men, are belligerent with the Icelanders. Very often the soldiers trail Icelanders for several blocks endeavoring all the while to pick a fight. Attacks are usually without provocation and seemingly without motive. The men are quite sober and not under the influence of liquor.
- There have been several instances where taxis have been hired by soldiers for protracted periods of time. The men have not paid for the cab and have simply told the chauffeur that they had no money.
- There have been occasions where soldiers have taken private automobiles and driven off with them damaging them and then have left them beside the road.
- The British soldiers have a very profound disrespect for the Icelandic police and for Icelanders which has been fostered by their officers. American soldiers should not be encouraged to adopt an overbearing attitude toward Icelanders.
- There have been numerous cases of shooting by British soldiers in the city of Reykjavik since the occupation began and much damage has been done. The British seem not to have enough military police and are not really able to patrol the streets effectively.
- Soldiers, particularly the British, have done considerable damage to property while on liberty in the city. This has consisted in smashing furniture and crockery in
cafes and restaurants and breaking windows.

- The worst evil in the city of Reykjavik consists in the isolated Nissen huts that one finds here and there on private property. This is one of the means whereby girls, particularly the younger ones, have been seduced, and there is a large file in the police office dealing with this problem. The Police Chief says that many Icelanders, including very distinguished members of the community, have been in his office time after time broken and sobbing when apprised of the comings and goings of daughters of the family. The Chief of Police feels that these Nissen huts should be removed from the city.

- One very sore point among Icelanders is the shouting and yelling by soldiers in the streets. There is universal anger against this on the part of Icelanders. There have been instances where Icelanders, particularly older men, have asked the soldiers to make less noise and have been attacked and knocked down. The number of such old men attacked is large enough to be regrettable.

- The Icelandic Government inquires if it is possible to have the Icelandic police authorized by the American army authorities to detain, but not arrest, any soldiers who are caught in the act of committing misdemeanors. If this were possible then soldiers could be held on the spot until the military police could arrive and take over. [This point suggests that so far the Icelandic police had hardly ever detained American servicemen.]

- Arrangements must be made to have strong police forces on the spots where trouble is liable to occur such as the Hotel Hekla, the Oddfellows Hall, and popular cafes. This is particularly true on payday and the two days immediately following them.

- Soldiers should be requested not to walk four abreast on sidewalks forcing Icelanders off the sidewalk.

- Icelandic buses which went to Reykjavik were stoned by American and British servicemen simply because they were too overcrowded to transport additional people.

- After several Icelanders had been knocked down the newspaper Thjodalfur, advised men in sports clubs to arm themselves with clubs and suggested that these vigilante groups should follow any soldier seen on the streets with an Icelandic girl.

(NARA 2, Hunt 1966, p. 90-92)

**Oct 3, 1941:** American soldiers who were passengers in a bus asked the driver to transport them to Alafoss. He explained to them that he had no authority to do so. When they left the bus the soldiers threw stones at it and broke a window pane.

(NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 10, 1941:** A taxi driver transported two soldiers to the Mosfells district. The
soldiers struck the driver as they got out of the car, and ran away without making payment. An officer arrived at this moment and forced the soldiers to pay for the hire of the car. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 11, 1941:** An Icelandic taxi driver drove two American soldiers to a camp in the Mosfells district. When the soldiers left the car one of them drew a gun, pointed it at the driver and ordered him to drive off. They then ran away without making payment. The taxi driver then reported this to the guards and appealed to them for assistance which they ignored. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 11, 1941:** A soldier crept in through a kitchen window in Reykjavik (Tjarnagata 41), attacked the mistress of the house and placed over her mouth a rag that smelt strongly of chloroform. She managed to scream which brought some men in from an adjoining room upon which the soldier ran away. (NARA 1: fall list)

**Oct 13, 1941:** Iceland has decided to lay up her entire deep-sea trawler fleet because the owners say the new British price control and import tax render fishing unprofitable. The decision affects some 40 ships which normally carry their catches to Great Britain. Since the occupation, Great Britain has been Iceland’s only market for fish, the country’s staple export. (Times p. 3)

**Oct 13, 1941:** Excerpt of an article published in Time Magazine. Premier Hermann Jonasson of Iceland thought Icelandic conditions last week were approaching the outlandish. If 15,000,000 soldiers were dumped in London, said he, it would not be any worse off than Iceland is now. Further, the British-American occupation has upped living costs for Iceland’s residents 70%, disrupted the island’s foreign trade, upset many an Icelandic lass. Last week four U.S. Marines got 10 to 20 years in Portsmouth (N.H.) prison for rape committed in Iceland. Nevertheless Premier Jonasson was still anxious to cooperate. It was revealed last week that on the heels of the original U.S. force of sailors and Marines a U.S. Army field force had arrived at Reykjavik in mid-September. As they disembarked, General Bonesteel’s men got a rousing welcome from Brigadier General John Marston’s tough Marines: they were barked at (ordinary soldiers are called “dogfaces” by the devil-dog Marines). (Time 13 October 1941, available on the website of Time).

**Oct 15, 1941:** The maximum retail price of fresh salted cod from Iceland will be 9 pence a pound (i.e. 0.083 pound a kilogram) (Times p. 2).

**Oct 16, 1941:** An audit of the US Army Post Office in Iceland revealed that between 3 Oct 1941 and 16 Oct 1941 seven US (Treasury) checks (which were not indorsed) representing a total of $ 67,836 were sent from the US Army Post Office of the
Iceland Base Command to the Postmaster of New York City. (NARA 9) [The other documents in NARA 9 give no real clue which could help us to understand the significance of this incident.]

**Oct 23, 1941:** Iceland Cabinet hands in resignation. The resignation of Premier Jonasson’s government was precipitated by sharp rises in living costs and “unsettled difficulties” in connection with the occupation of Iceland (NYT p. 3).

**Oct 26, 1941:** American soldiers forcibly entered the University of Iceland where a dance was being held. One of them got in a fight with a student. A little later a crowd of shouting soldiers approached the University, struck people that were leaving the dance and intended to force their way into the building, but were stopped by policemen who had arrived by then. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Oct 26, 1941:** A taxi driver transported soldiers to a camp at Hagi. When he demanded payment, an argument arose during which the soldiers threatened and struck him. A guard that was present pointed his gun at him and ordered him to leave. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Oct 31, 1941:** The Regent postponed acceptance of Premier Jonasson resignation. After nine days of useless negotiation, Prime minister Hermann Jonasson and his interim cabinet had to resume office when the Regent postponed acceptance of the resignation which occurred over problems caused by the presence of British and American armies of occupation. (NYT p. 3)

[Apart from mentioning the question of rising living cost the article does not give more precision about the problems which lead to the government’s resignation.]

**Nov 3, 1941:** Soldiers threw stones at an automobile when the car passed them and refused to stop. The driver asked a guard who was stationed close by for assistance but he refused to interfere in the matter. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Nov 6, 1941:** The worst profiteering of the war was made by the carriers who brought fish from Iceland to Britain. (Times p. 2)

[Yet, if the purpose of the price control was only to curtail the profit of the carriers it is difficult to understand why Icelandic fishermen went on strike.]

**Nov 6, 1941:** Supplies of fish from Iceland should now slowly increase. If and when fish reappears in any considerable quantities, customers will not be asked the outrageous prices prevailing before the imposition of price control four months ago (Times p. 5).

**Nov 6, 1941:** Brawling among soldier and other customers at Hotel Hekla. A Norwegian skipper was struck. (NARA 1, fall list)
Nov 9, 1941: The Icelandic government headed by Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson’s resigned for a second time in 16 days. A bill limiting living cost was defeated. The Regent accepted the resignation but as on October 22 he asked the Cabinet to remain in office until a new government is formed. (NYT p. 24) [Incidentally, one may wonder why a bill limiting living cost, in itself a fairly desirable objective, was defeated]

Nov 9, 1941: Violent brawling among Icelanders and soldiers and sailors at Hotel Hekla. (NARA 1, fall list)

Nov 14, 1941: Two American soldiers shot and killed an Icelander fisherman in a brawl outside a cafe Saturday night; he will be tried by a general court-martial. The soldiers were carrying guns in violation of instructions. Thordur Sigurdsson, 22, died with a bullet through the stomach. The shooting caused strong reactions among Icelanders and newspapers advised that natives avoid American soldiers as much as possible to avert further repetition of such incidents. (NYT p. 1)

Nov 15, 1941: War Department authorities delegated full authority to Army heads in Iceland to handle the affair in which two American enlisted men shot and killed a citizen in Iceland as the result of a brawl. They will be tried by general court martial after which the proceedings and the verdict will be reviewed by the Judge Advocate General in Washington. (NYT p. 6)

Nov 21, 1941: Soldiers attacked and struck an Icelander on the Mela Road (NARA 1, fall list).

Nov 21, 1941: Soldiers struck a women who was waitress at a cafe in Reykjavik (NARA 1, fall list).

Nov 22, 1941: Brawls between soldiers and Icelanders on Kirkjustraeti (NARA 1, fall list).

Nov 23, 1941: A soldier attacked an Icelander as he was entering a taxi that he had hired (NARA 1, fall list).

Nov 24, 1941: During October soldiers sent more than 100,000 dollars in money orders to their families; in the same month they sent about 60,000 letters home [which represents some 2 letters per serviceman] (NYT p. 7). [100,000 dollars represents some $ 3 per serviceman. The article does not comment on the origin of the 100,000 dollars. What in this amount were the shares of the soldiers’ pay on the one hand and of the profits earned from black market operations on the other hand. At that time the pay od a private was about $ 21 per month, but this was the gross-pay which was subject to various deductions (e.g. the so-called}
kitchen sink deduction or an optional life insurance).

**Nov 25, 1941:** An Icelandic automobile was shot at on the road near Hagi. The driver heard no warning and saw no guard before the shot was fired. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Nov 27, 1941:** Soldiers attacked an Icelander at a cafe in Reykjavik on Adalstræti (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 27, 1941:** American soldiers attacked British soldiers at the Froda cafe (NARA 1, fall list).

**Nov 30, 1941:** All British and American officers and men were forbidden to enter the city of Reykjavik except on official business on Iceland’s Independence day. The custom was instituted by the British a year ago in deference to Icelanders’ feelings. (NYT p. 51)

**Dec 2, 1941:** A taxi driver drove a soldier to Mosfellveit. An argument arose over the fare. Five guards approached the car, pointed their guns at the driver and forced him to leave without receiving payment. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 7, 1941:** A bus was damaged by soldiers who began fighting in it (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 9, 1941:** Soldiers attacked an Icelander in the corridor of Hotel Hekla when he was on the way to his room (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 11, 1941:** Soldiers fired at a loud speaker in a cafe in Reykjavik (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 12, 1941:** The joint Claim Board established for the purpose of settling claims by Icelanders held its first meeting. The procedure functioned as follows.

- Claims were first received by an American officer who attempted to reach an agreement with the claimant and settle the amount of compensation in accordance with Army regulations.
- In case no agreement could be reached the claim would go to the joint Claims Board which comprised three persons: an American officer, a representative of the Icelandic government and an Icelandic judge.

From an Icelandic perspective this procedure had two main drawbacks: first was the fact that any decision reached by the Board had to be approved by the commanding general and secondly there was the limitation that the Board could not handle claims for actions of soldiers outside their time of service. (Conn et al. 1964, chapter 19)

**Dec 14, 1941:** A taxi driver transported soldiers to Reykir where they left the car
without making payment. The driver applied to a guard for assistance. He pointed his gun at him and ordered him to leave. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 19, 1941:** An Icelander was beaten by soldiers while walking along Reynimel (NARA 1, fall list).

**Dec 25, 1941:** Soldiers broke a window at the house of an Icelandic woman and thrashed her son. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 25, 1941:** A soldier accosted an Icelandic woman, Jakobina Grimsdottir, when she was walking along Karlagata street in Reykjavik. As he received no response, he attacked her, forced her to the ground but retreated when she was able to scream. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 28, 1941:** A taxi driver drove some soldiers to a camp in the Mosfells district. An argument arose over the fare and one of the soldiers stroke the driver. (NARA 1, fall list)

**Dec 28, 1941:** A soldier attacked a 15-year old girl on Laugarnesvegur (NARA 1, fall list).

1942

**Jan 1942:** The Althing passed a law providing for the supervision of people under 21 and the sending of “immoral women” to a reformatory. This concerned especially the girls who were friendly with British troops. (Bittner 1975)

**Jan 1, 1942:** An Icelander was struck over the head with a bottle by a soldier (NARA 1, winter list).

**Jan 11, 1942:** A soldier asked an Icelander for directions, but in the course of their conversation he became very angry and attacked the Icelander. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Jan 12, 1942:** A US Navy 1st class Seaman named William Hon was shot and killed by a sentry at Balbos Beach. (NARA 5)
[This is one of the few mentions that we have found so far of the death of a member of the American Forces (the so-called Indigo Force). It is not clear if he was killed by an American or British sentry.]

**Jan 13, 1942:** Gasoline was set on fire by Icelanders on the aerodrome at Camp Tripoli. (NARA 1, winter list)
[This is one of the few cases of sabotage that are mentioned in the records.]

**Jan 13, 1942:** During the 20 days 26 Sep 1941 – 17 Oct 1941, about $ 100,000 were
sent in money orders from Iceland to the United States. In the 2 months 13 Nov 1941 – 13 Jan 1942, an amount of about $400,000 was sent in money orders from Iceland to the United States. (NARA 9) 
If one assumes that US 20,000 troops were present on average during this period, the previous amounts represent about 10 dollar per month and per serviceman. A previously given figure (see 24 November 1941) was $3 per month and per soldier.

[Unfortunately this file gives only an Index Sheet with the date and the subject; so far we have not been able to find the text. A telegram dated 13 January 1942 explains that this order was sent to the Savage Arms Corporation in Manhattan. A subsequent file (see below) recommends that the order should not be shipped. Note that the name of the company has different spellings: Hoh Olafsson in the telegram of 13 January, John Olafson in the report of 15 January.]

Jan 17, 1942: File No 470-Indigo-(SECRET). Subject: Recommendation that Olafson order be not shipped and also arms to Iceland civilians. (NARA 6) 
The meaning of “arms to Iceland civilians” remains obscure.

Jan 17, 1942: Two Icelanders were attacked by American soldiers on Melavegur after they had approached them and asked them for the time. (NARA 1, winter list)

Jan 19, 1942: As an Icelandic automobile was passed by an American military truck on Mosfellssveitar road the soldiers who stood on the platform threw rocks and snow on the car and broke the windshield. (NARA 1, winter list)

Jan 25, 1942: A porter at Hotel Borg was struck by an American employed by the Army after he refused him entrance because the hotel was crowded. The American was intoxicated. (NARA 1, winter list)

Jan 27, 1942: An Icelandic woman was struck by an American soldier at Hotel Hekla. (NARA 1, winter list)

Jan 27, 1942: As an American military truck passed an Icelandic car the soldiers standing on the platform of the truck threw coke at the car and the windshield. Another Icelandic car that was following behind him met with the same treatment. (NARA 1, winter list)

Jan 31, 1942: American soldiers who were fighting with British soldiers at a cafe struck an Icelander who happened to come in. (NARA 1, winter list)

Feb 1942: Since their arrival in July 1941, American troops had been paid in dollars. Apparently this lead to a great deal of black marketing and in February 1942 the
change to kronur payments was made. (Conn et al. 1964, Chapter 19, p. 510)

**Feb 1, 1942**: Three intoxicated American soldiers attacked Icelanders on Frikirkjuvegur (NARA 1, winter list).

**Feb 13, 1942**: 18 British servicemen were drowned after their two small boats capsized (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

**Feb 14, 1942**: An Icelander was attacked by an American soldier at hotel Hekla; on February 17 a Norwegian was also attacked by an American soldier (NARA 1, winter list).

**Feb 14, 1942**: An Icelandic woman was attacked by an American soldier who visited her (NARA 1, winter list).

**Feb 15, 1942**: Telegram sent by General Bonesteel to the Adjutant General Office at the GHQ of the US Army. Neither I nor General Marston [Marine Commander] have authorized Frederick Leonhard [probably mispelling for Leonard] Kayan any rights or privileges as an officer in the Marine Corps. Surveillance of Kayan was requested by radio 3 February. [Signed Bonesteel] (NARA 7)

[In order to understand this telegram one would need some additional information.]

**Feb 16, 1942**: 8 British soldiers died when caught in blizzard in Iceland during a march (Times p. 3). According to Bittner (1974, chart No 7), the accident occurred on January 20, 1942 but was announced in the Times only one month later.

**Feb 17, 1942**: Fishermen were attacked and threatened with bayonets by American sentries as they were beaching their boat in Gardar parish west of Hafnarfjörður. (This incident is mentioned in a letter of 16 April 1942 by Prime Minister Jonasson: NARA 1)

**Feb 22, 1942**: An Icelander and a Lithuanian seaman were attacked by American soldiers who took their garrison belts off to hit them. (NARA 1, winter list)

**Mar 1942**: In early 1942 (probably in March) an American sentry shot and seriously wounded an Icelander at the port of Hafnarfjörður. (Hunt 1966, NARA 1, the exact date is not given).

**Mar 2, 1942**: Two American soldiers left Leif’s cafe without making payment; a 14-year old boy who tried to hinder their leaving was struck down (NARA 1: winter list).

**Mar 4, 1942**: An Icelander was arrested after he drew a knife on a US soldier. (NARA 1), winter list)
Mar 9, 1942: A merchant marine seaman from the steamship Kingman was found in the Hekla hotel with a knife in his stomach. (NARA 1, winter list)

Mar 14, 1942: A group of Icelanders misunderstood the command of an American sentry whereupon the sentry shot and killed one of them, Gunnar Einarsson (Hunt 1966). The sentry was court-martialed and acquitted (NARA 1, winter list).

Mar 18, 1942: Fishermen were fired upon on Skerjafjordur (NARA 1, winter list).

Mar 30, 1942: Two British servicemen died when caught in blizzard during a training march (Bittner 1974, chart No 7).

Apr 2, 1942: An Icelandic taxi driver was fired upon by an American sentinel near Hagi (NARA 1, winter list).

Apr 6, 1942: Excerpt of a memorandum by General Bonesteel. “I refer to the case of the Icelandic national, I.B. Riis, [the exact name seems to be Ib Arnason Riis] a paid German agent, who departed by submarine from Heligoland, March 29, 1942, landing by rubber boat at Fagranes, North East Iceland, April 6, 1942. He buried short-wave radio and codes in that area as weather forced him to seek shelter. Upon seizure by British Coast Watching Station, he confessed that his plan had been to send information concerning weather, troops and shipping to enemy agents.” (NARA 1)

[This memorandum was sent by General Bonesteel to L. MacVeigh, the American Minister in Iceland at a date which is not specified on the document but which is comprised between 16 April 1942 and 11 May 1942. MacVeigh forwarded a copy of the memorandum to the Department of State as an enclosure attached to his despatch dated 11 May 1942 (see below at 16 April 1942). In that letter he says that he also forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Prime Minister Jonasson. In his statement Gen. Bonesteel does not say that after his arrest Riis accepted to work for British counter intelligence. Probably he did not know, otherwise he would certainly not have revealed that Riis had been arrested. Anyway, for British intelligence it was certainly a risky proposition to use Riis because it may have been tricky to keep his arrest secret in a sparsely populated country like Iceland especially if Riis had some Icelandic contacts which was likely since himself was an Icelander. See below at the date of 27 June 1942 the continuation of this story.]

Apr 14, 1942: An American guard was placed aboard the Icelandic shooner “Artic” and an investigation was initiated of its voyage from Vigo, Spain to Reykjavik where it arrived on on 24 February 1942. According to the American Commander, General Bonesteel, the investigation revealed that reports of shipping movements were sent
by wireless to German agents in Spain and that the wireless set was secretly brought ashore on 9 April 1942 while the ship was in Reykjavik’s harbor. (NARA 1)

**Apr 16, 1942:** Excerpt of a letter addressed by Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson to the American Chargé d’Affaires.

“It is deserving of notice that since the British troops landed here it cannot be proved or even made probable that one single act of sabotage has been done by the Icelanders.” (NARA 1)

[This is a fairly strong statement, but it turns out that it cannot be considered trustworthy as shown by the following comments made by the US representative in Iceland. A copy of Jonasson’s letter was sent to the State Department by Lincoln MacVeagh on 11 May 1942. In his comments, MacVeagh writes: “Two categorical statements made by the Prime Minister are definitely incorrect, according to information supplied to me by the Commanding General [General Charles Bonesteel] namely, that the Icelanders have committed no acts of sabotage and that the representatives of the Icelandic Government are not afforded the opportunity to be present at investigations conducted by the military. Telephone and telegraph communication in the island have certainly been interfered with by Icelanders from time to time.” (NARA 1)]

In a memorandum to MacVeagh General Bonesteel gives evidence of cases of attack on Americans, theft, sabotage and spying. He writes: “The criminal files of the civilian police have many reports of offenses committed by Icelanders who have acted in a hostile manner to us ever since we came on the island; surely, the government is aware of anti-American and pro-Nazi talk, speeches, and activities indulged.” Bonesteel observes that it is a prevalent custom to throw stones at US Army vehicles. More specifically he mentions the following incidents:

(i) On 13 January 1942, gasoline was set on fire by Icelanders on the aerodrome at Camp Tripoli.
(ii) In early March 1942, an Icelander attacked an American civilian in the lobby of the Borg Hotel.
(iii) On 4 March 1942, an Icelander was arrested after he drew a knife on a US soldier.
(iv) On 9 March 1942 a merchant seaman was found in the Hekla hotel with a knife in his stomach.
(v) In April 1942 an Icelander ran over an American soldier and injured him severely.
(vi) On 24 April 1942 the Military Police found that an Icelander had been shooting holes in army huts with a 0.22 caliber rifle.
(vii) The Erlendur case reveals at least one Icelander who stole a pistol, ammunition and was caught when trying to get another weapon from the American Army (the
memorandum does not say if he was tried, by whom and what was the sentence).
(viii) Finally, Gen. Bonesteels reveals two spying episodes: the investigation of a fisherman boat and the arrest of an Icelandic national, Ib Arnason Riis, spying for Germany. For a more detailed account see the dates of April 6 and 14, 1942.

What these episodes suggest is that the statements made at the time by Icelandic officials about the behavior of their nationals with respect to Allied troops were not really trustworthy. It can also be noted that both in Icelandic and American accounts there is a tendency to belittle the significance of the incidents. Almost always Icelanders who attack Americans are said to be drunk and similarly for Americans who assault Icelanders. When stones are thrown at Army vehicles or when military installations are damaged almost always it is specified that it was done by boys. This may of course be true in a number of cases but is it not surprising that these boys are never caught and their age never ascertained?

Apr 16, 1942: Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson presented the American Chargé d’Affaires with a list of 114 incidents ("attacks and bodily hurts") between American troops and the population which occurred from 26 July 1941 to 18 March 1942. This list was established by the Criminal Judge of Reyjavik; an important restriction is that this list mentions only incidents which occurred in Reykjavik. The covering letter mentions some serious incidents that occurred in the rest of Iceland but without giving a systematic count. In Reykjavik over this period of 7.5 months there were on average 18 incidents per month.

The letter of the Prime Minister points out that “many instances of attacks have not been reported to the authorities”. As an example of an incident that was not included he mentioned an attack by American soldiers on two members of the Althing in a car. A memo about these complaints was transmitted by the American minister in Iceland, MacVeagh, to Secretary of State Hull. According to Hunt’s thesis examples of violences mentioned in the report include the following.

- Throwing beer cans at Icelandic men and women.
- Assault with fists and even guns without apparent reason.
- Numerous brawls with Icelanders, with British and with other Americans.
- Much vandalism particularly to autos and windows of buildings.

While these incidents refer to the behavior of soldiers on leave, the Prime minister’s letter also emphasized that American sentinels are “very quick to use their guns” and that Icelanders are “entirely unaccustomed to this kind of treatment”.

The letter notes that when reports of incidents have been sent to the Military Authorities for investigation, the Icelandic Authorities have in most cases been given no information as to how the investigation was conducted and what sentences were passed.
General Bonesteel responded by pointing out that Icelanders were often intoxicated and that Icelandic children frequently threw stones at military vehicles. Anyway, the Americans were able to put off owing to a change of government. (Hunt 1966; State Department Papers 8559 A.20/187, May 11, 1942, National Archives of Iceland)

While Hermann Jonasson’s covering letter was available at the NAI, the “enclosed” list of incidents established by the Criminal Judge was not.

**Apr 18, 1942:** Deportation to Britain of 4 Icelandic fishermen who were allegedly corresponding with Germany (Bittner 1975, p. 555).

**Apr 21, 1942:** Cable from MacVeagh, the Minister in Iceland to the Secretary of State. [excerpt]
The British Commanding General departed this morning and the supreme military command in Iceland passed to [US ] General Bonesteel. He has requested me to inform the Icelandic government secretly that in the event of an attack on this island of a nature sufficiently serious *in his judgment* to warrant such an action, he will instantly proclaim without further recourse to the civil authorities, the existence of a military government. He has furnished me with a copy of his proposed proclamation together with a formidable list of penal laws and penalties taken from the rules of land warfare. The General states that his proclamation has the full authority of the War Department. He also says that he had been definitely instructed [by the War Department] to proclaim military government and not simply martial law as was considered by the British. On account of our promise not to interfere with the Government of Iceland while our troops remain in the country, I believe I should take no action without specific instructions [from the Department of State]. (Foreign Relations p. 6)

In this text, we emphasized *in his judgment* to stress that the procedure does not include any consultation with the Icelandic authorities. It is true that they were informed of the existence of this plan (yet perhaps not of its details, see below at the date of 3 July 1942) but this gave them no say in the way it would be carried out. It can be inferred that the plan for this military government was fairly similar to the one prepared in advance for Hawaii and eventually implemented after December 7, 1941.]

**Apr 24: 1942** The Military Police found that an Icelander had been shooting holes in army huts with a 0.22 caliber rifle. He was arrested and turned over to the civilian police. (NARA 1)

**May 1, 1942:** A negotiation is under way to give the US Command the right to establish two airfields. One point of paramount importance for the Icelandic government is the reversion of ownership of the land and all immovable installations to
Iceland at the end of the war. In return the Department of State is seeking compensations on two counts (i) most-favored nation’s rights for the United States (ii) Post war commercial landing rights favoring US interests.

On 6 May the Icelandic government accepted the principle that “upon reversion US aviation interests will possess unconditional and unrestricted most-favored-nation rights with respect to the use of the [Keflavik] airdrome and also rights equal to those accorded to Icelandic aviation interests.” Some slight modification were made to the agreement on May 19. (Foreign Relations p. 6, 9)

**May 1, 1942:** Until May 1, 1942 the US forces employed a total of 3,000 Icelanders, but after this date the number decreased. In June 1942 it was 1,500, by December 1942 it was down to 480 and a year later it was 80 (Hunt 1966).

**May 7, 1942:** Cable of the Secretary of State to the Minister in Iceland [excerpt:] In lieu of the procedure suggested to you by General Bonesteel (see above 21 April) the President has authorized you to discuss with General Bonesteel and with the Icelandic Government the terms of a proclamation under which the Icelandic Government would itself proclaim martial law and delegate to the US military the full enforcement thereof. [The President fully measured that the proclamation of a Military Government would provoke discontent in Iceland and outweigh its military advantages.] (Foreign Relations p. 8)

**May 16, 1942:** Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau and Icelandic Minister Thor Thors signed an exchange stabilization agreement under which 2 million dollars of the US stabilization fund will be used for stabilizing the US dollar-Icelandic krona rate of exchange (NYT p. 32).

**May 22, 1942:** An American sentry shot and killed an 12-year old Icelandic boy. The new Prime Minister Olafur Thors asked Icelandic papers to tone down their protests (Hunt 1966, p. 105).

**May 22, 1942:** A law was passed in the Althing which instituted a Wage Arbitration Committee; this committee allowed very few increases in basic wages. Labor was of course considerably opposed to this law; it seems that it was not strictly enforced in the sense that Icelandic business and even some government agencies paid wages in excess of the legal limit. As a result, the military forces which were paying only the legal rates experienced difficulty securing labor. In August 1942 the Arbitration law was repealed; however this union victory was short-lived (see below Dec 19, 1942). (Chamberlin 1947, p. 120)

**May 29, 1942:** Three US soldiers were under arrest following the fatal shooting of a 12-year old Icelandic boy, Jan Hinrik Benediktsson, by a sentry at an American
Jun 27, 1942: The convoy PQ17 left Iceland bound for Murmansk on June 27. It comprised 35 merchant ships (including 22 American and 8 British ships) and transported some 600 tanks, 4,200 vehicles and 300 aircraft. According to an article published in the Sunday Times in 2003 and based on recently opened British archives, the convoy was used as a bait to lure out the German battleship Tirpitz from its anchorage in Norway. After his arrest, Ib Arnason Riis (see above at the date of 6 April 1942) accepted to work for the British. He was told to transmit the information about the departure of PQ17 which he did. However, the whole operation ended in disaster: 70% of the tonnage of PQ17 was sunk by German submarines and aircraft; the Tirpitz was not caught: after an initial move it went back to port without taking part in the attack of the convoy. Riis who was 88 years old in 2003 declared after the publication of the article: “The British cannot pin the blame on me. I had no idea what was in the message. Normally, I would code the telegram myself, but this time it was already coded and I had no idea what it was.” Naturally, if the German had learned about Riis’s arrest they would have guessed that his message was a trap. (Sunday Times, 25 May 2003)

Jun 3, 1942: A group of Icelandic fishermen were fired upon by an American sentry at Skerjafjörður (Hunt 1966, p. 108).

Jul 3, 1942: US Chargé in Iceland (Warner) to the US Secretary of State [excerpt:]
Final Icelandic text of the proclamation to be issued by the Commanding General in case it becomes necessary for him to exercise full military control by reason of an imminent serious attack and final text of an appeal by the Prime Minister to the Icelandic people have both been printed secretly by the Icelandic Government. Some 150 copies of each were delivered this morning to General Bonesteel. (Foreign Relations p. 11)
[The expression “imminent serious attack” sounds mysterious. It can hardly refer to a big approaching fleet because Germany did not have such a fleet. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to imagine what kind of major threat Germany could have been able to exercise.]

Jul 6, 1942: A general election took place in July in which the Communist party doubled its number of votes (from 8.5% in 1937 to 16%) and its elected Parliament members (from 3 to 19 out of total of 49). Over the same period the support for the Social-democratic party share dropped slightly from 19% to 16%. (Thorarinsson et al 1943, p. 35)

Jul 21, 1942: The issue which let to the resignation of the government was a bill brought forward by the Independent Party proposing a rearrangement of the electoral
constituencies (Times p. 3).

Jul 22, 1942: Cable of the US Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland (Warner) [excerpt].
[We] learned with regret that certain factions in Iceland seem to be agitating for a premature abrogation of the Act of Union between Denmark and Iceland. While we have no desire to interfere in purely internal Icelandic matters, we suggest that it would be in the best interests of both countries that any active move towards abrogation be quieted. (Foreign Relations p. 13)

Aug, 1942: In August the wage arbitration law was repealed (Chamberlin 1947 p. 120, the exact date is not given in the source)

Aug 8, 1942: In a memorandum handed to the US representative in Reykjavik the Althing announced its unanimous decision to abolish the union with Denmark; the memorandum stated that the process would be continued unless an opposite advice was issued by the US government before August 22. On 18 August the US State Department stressed that the maintenance of the status quo, at the moment, was in the interest of all. This advice was transmitted by the US legation in Reykjavik to the Icelandic government on August 20. As a result the Althing did not put the bill before the current session of the Althing as planned at first but the US request was not made public until October 1942. (Hardarson 1974) The cable of 18 August addressed by the US Secretary of State to the Chargé in Iceland reads: “The Government of the United States has no desire to interfere in the slightest degree with the freedom of action of the Icelandic people [but] repeats the suggestion that the abrogation question be postponed until a more favorable occasion.” (Foreign Relations p. 18)

Aug 30, 1942: Two American soldiers broke into a private home between Reykjavik and Hafnarjördur, assaulted a woman and then raped her (Hunt 1966, p. 112).

Aug 30, 1942: Two US soldiers have been sentenced to 5 years of hard labor for the fatal shooting of an Islander during a cafe brawl. A sentry who shot a 12-year old Icelandic boy has been confined to an insane asylum and another sentry who shot an Islander in the line of duty was acquitted. All four men were tried by general courts martial. (NYT p. 27).

Sep 21, 1942: Memorandum of the acting chief of the Division of European Affairs (Atherton) to the Secretary of State, [excerpt].
The Minister of Iceland tells us informally that his brother, the Prime Minister Olafur Thors, has been under very heavy political attack as the result of his recent action in obtaining, in compliance with the suggestion of the US Government, passage by the Icelandic Parliament of a resolution shelving the independence question. He is
faced with general elections in about three weeks and fears that his political opponents may be able to make some headway with the electorate. His position would be strengthened if the United States would approve that the new parliament pass a resolution declaring that Iceland will become a Republic in 1944. (Foreign Relations p. 21)

**Oct 31, 1942:** Elections in Iceland (NYT p. 2). The number of voters who supported the Communist Party increased from 16% in July 1942 to 19%. In the same time the support for the Social-Democratic party continued to erode: from 16% in July to 14%. The share of the other right-wing parties remained stable. (Thorarinson et al. 1943, p. 35)

**Nov 20, 1942:** A lend-lease agreement was concluded through which the US would furnish to Britain dollars with which the latter would be able to pay its Icelandic fish imports. Iceland would in turn use these dollars to increase its imports from the United States. This agreement (in a sense similar to the Marshall plan which came into effect after the war) indeed boosted US exports to Iceland: US share in Icelandic imports increased from 1.2 percent in 1938 to 67 percent in 1944 while during the same time interval British imports from Iceland increased from 20 percent of all Icelandic exports to 90 percent. (Chamberlin 1947, p. 95; Iceland 1966 p. 208, 209).

**Dec 7, 1942:** Establishment of a Joint American-Icelandic Valuation Board. One of its purpose was to estimate the compensation to be paid to landowners on which military installations were built (NAI 1)

**Dec 16, 1942:** As the political leaders were unable to form a government the Regent formed an extra-parliamentary government which remained in power for two years until October 21, 1944 (Karlsson 2000). Headed by Prime minister Björn Thordarson, this cabinet was named the Coca-Cola rule because two of its ministers received the right to sell the products of major US companies: Björn Olafsson and Vilhjalmur Thor became head of the Coca-Cola and ESSO subsidiaries respectively (Wikipedia, article for Björn Thordarson).

**Dec 18, 1942:** The situation of fish delivery to Britain has been aggravated by the refusal of Icelandic and Faroe Island trawlers to deliver at the ports specified by the British Ministry. About 85 percent of the British supply of fish comes from the Icelandic trawlers and it has been seriously affected by the dispute with the Ministry (Times p. 2).

**Dec 19, 1942:** The Wage Arbitration Committee was reestablished. Since an extra-parliamentary Cabinet was in power, it is not clear whether or not this decision was approved by the Althing. In order to get a better understanding of this event one must
take a look at the evolution of real wages during previous years. The figures given by Chamberlin (1947, p. 109) show that real hourly wage of day labor remained almost unchanged from 1939 to early 1942. Then, it began to rise strongly with an overall increase of about 50 percent in 1942. Naturally, this situation was not satisfactory for the occupation forces which employed a substantial number of Icelanders. The establishment, suppression and reestablishment of wage control that occurred in 1942 illustrate the competition between Icelandic workers and occupation forces with the latter eventually prevailing over the former. (Chamberlin 1947, p. 104, 108, 120)

Dec 28, 1942: Excerpt of a letter of the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Minister in Iceland. [The letter concerns the operation of the Joint Icelandic-American Claims Board which is composed of three persons: one Icelandic member, one American member and an arbitrator who is an Icelander.] “It has been brought to the attention of this Ministry that even in a case in which the American member had declared himself in agreement with the Icelandic members, the United States Military authorities have refused to follow the decision of the board. It would seem from the above that some definite rules need to be established as to the authority of the Joint Icelandic-American Claims Board.” (NAI 1)

[The fact that an unanimous decision of the Board can be overruled by the Commanding General shows that its approval is not just a formality required by US Army rules, but that this right can be used to veto the Board’s decisions.]

Dec 31, 1942: During 1939 and 1942 the price of many foodstuffs tripled approximately. For instance the price of cheese was multiplied by 3.7, the price of beef by 3.1 and the price of eggs by 3.3. (Thorarinsson et al. 1943, p. 58)

1943

Jan 8, 1943: The British Ministry of War Transport has reached an agreement with the Icelandic government regarding the ports of landing of Icelandic trawlers (Times p. 2).

Jan 14, 1943 In a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the American Legation in Reykjavik makes clear that the Joint Icelandic-American Claims Board has no authority to deal with claims against the United States Navy. The Commandant of the US Naval Base in Iceland has established a claim commission consisting of Naval officers in compliance with public law No 393. (NAI 1)

[In contrast to the Icelandic-American Claims Board, the commission established by the US Navy does not seem to comprise representatives of the Icelandic government.]

Apr 3, 1943: Found guilty of fishing in Icelandic territorial water and of resisting
arrest, the skipper of a British trawler was fined 1,500 pounds sterling and ordered to be held in custody for two months. His catch and fishing equipment were confiscated. (Times p. 3)

**May 3, 1943:** A B-24 crashed near the Royal Air Force airdrome at Kaldadarnes in Iceland. Before that the pilot tried to land at Meeks Field. The pilot of the aircraft, Capt. Robert H. Shannon, the copilot Lieutenant General Frank M. Andrews, four additional crewmen and eight passengers were fatally injured. One crewman, the tail gunner, escaped with only minor injuries. The crash occurred under difficult weather conditions: low clouds, rain and reduced visibility. (Website of the Official Museum of the United States Air Force)

**May 28, 1943:** An American aircraft crashed when stalled on takeoff at Reykjavik airport. (1942 USAAF Serial Numbers, website)

**Jun 6, 1943:** An American B-17 aircraft crashed near Meeks Field, Iceland. (May 1943 USAAF Overseas Accident Reports, website)

**Oct 9, 1943:** Weddings took place in New York between two Navy pilots and two Icelandic girls. The brides who are of Norwegian descent speak English fluently but with a slight accent (NYT p. 15).

**Dec 13, 1943:** Excerpts of a letter sent by Mr. Leland Morris, American Legation in Reykjavik, to Mr. Vilhjalmur Thor, Minister of Foreign Affairs. I have the honor to refer to the law which was passed by the Althing on November 26, 1943 providing for the settlement of claims of nationals of Iceland against the armed forces of the United States by Icelandic courts. My government regrets that the Government of Iceland should have seen fit to enact legislation which in effect implies dissatisfaction with Claims Commission established by the US Army. I desire to point out that my government cannot recognize that judgments obtained under this law in any way obligate the United States. (NAI 1)

1944

**Jan 1944:** “For seventeen months, I was in Iceland assigned to working in the Radio Station which was a short distance from the camp known as H.M.S. BALDUR 2 just outside Reykjavik. The Icelandic people were very much anti-British. They would not sit next to you in the local cinema, and as you walked in Reykjavik you could expect empty bottles to be aimed at you from the top of buildings”. (BBC: Archive List, World, Iceland: Second part of Alfred Longbottom’s war time experiences in the Navy as a decoder, 1941 - 1945).
As the stay of Longbottom lasted from January 1944 to May 1945 we do not know more precisely the time period to which he refers.

**Jan 1, 1944:** Activity of the American-Icelandic Claims Board in December 1943. 28 new claims were received. 46 cases were processed; of these 34 claims were accepted, 9 were discarded and 3 serious cases have been returned by the War Department [which means that the War Department in Washington did not accept the proposed settlement and required the Board to work out a new one.] (NAI 2, Letter addressed to Mr Leland Morris, American Minister in Reykjavik)

[The number of new claims in December 1943 is consistent with the average rate of 20 claims by month given in Chapter 1.]

**Feb 1944:** The Althing informed the civil servants in charge of the government in Denmark that it had resolved to establish a republic and abrogate the union with Denmark (Hardarson 1974).

**May 4, 1944:** King Christian X of Denmark sent a message to the Icelandic government in which he expressed the hope that the decision on complete severance of the ties between the two nations would be deferred until after the war. He said that in the present circumstances he could not recognize the changes that had been decided unilaterally by the Althing. (Hardarson 1974)

**Sep 18, 1944:** The Icelandic Cabinet has offered its resignation (Times p. 4).

**Oct 24, 1944:** HMCS 21 Skeena, a destroyer that served in the Royal Canadian Navy, was lost in a storm on the night of 24 October 1944. She was anchored off Reykjavk, Iceland and dragged her anchor and grounded in 15 meter waves off Videy Island with the loss of 15 crewmembers. (Wikipedia, English, article “Skeena”)

**Dec 11, 1944:** An American aircraft was wrecked when a tire burst on takeoff at the RAF base of Kaldadarnes, Iceland (1942 USAAF Serial Numbers, website)

**1945**

**Mar 14, 1945** Iceland students fly to the United States. (NYT p. 6)

**Feb 24, 1945:** Meeting of the Joint American-Icelandic Claims Board [excerpts of the minutes]. Three members were present when the Board convened at 10:00 hours: (i) Mr. Ragnar Jonsson, chairman (ii) Theodor B. Lindal, Lawyer of the Supreme Court (iii) Major Edward Roberts. The chairman presented a letter from the Ministry of Finance dated 22 February 1945 requesting that the Board give the Ministry

---

21Her Majesty Canadian Ship
an accurate report on the evidence in connection with the accident which were at the disposal of the Board and upon which its decision was founded [the document does not give more details about the accident; clearly it was a case examined in an earlier meeting of the Board]. Major Roberts informed the Board that the relevant information was passed to Board members in a confidential relationship. The Icelandic members admit that they have received such information as confidential matter and handled it accordingly; they consider themselves bound to do so in the future.

The Board unanimously held that the request of the Ministry could not be granted as the result of the ruling of the Military and the desire of the Commanding General. The Board adjourned at 11:00 hours to meet again at the call of the chairman.

(NAI 2)

[It should be noted that this meeting occurred as the war against Germany was almost over. Nevertheless, the Board considered that it was impossible to inform the Ministry of Finance of Iceland on the precise circumstances of an accident.]

Aug 27, 1945: The Statue of Liberty gleamed out a welcome to 52 newcomers to America last night as 31 Icelandic war brides and 21 war babies sailed up the bay aboard the Navy transport “Tarazed”. (NYT p. 21)

Oct 1945: Following the US request for bases, Jonas Jonsson devoted several pamphlets and speeches to promoting this cause. A well-known Icelandic writer and former leader of the Progressive Party, Jonsson was the only politician in early 1946 who stated that Iceland should accept US military bases (Nuechterlein 1961). In a cable that Barnes, the US Chargé in Iceland, addressed to the Secretary of State on 25 February 1942, he says that “Jonas Jonsson is the power behind the Prime Minister” and notes that he has frequent contacts with him. (Foreign Relations p. 2)

Nov 1, 1945: 1,260 claims had been investigated by the Joint Claims Commission between Americans and Icelanders and compensations had been paid for 900 (Hunt 1966). 1,260 claims in 51 months represent a rate of 24 cases per month. A rough calculation performed above (see July 11, 1941) for the period of the British occupation gave a rate of some 25 cases per month.

[It would be of great interest to read a description of the cases settled by the Commission; our attempts to get these files from the National Archives of Iceland have been unsuccessful so far.]

1946

Apr 27, 1946: Olafur Thors, Prime Minister of Iceland, said that the United States had approached the Icelandic Government last fall to discuss the possibilities of ac-
quiring military bases in this country on long-term leases. The query is tied up with desired membership in the United Nations. (NYT p. 5)

**Apr 28, 1946:** Iceland rejected the US bid for bases. The decision was announced by the Prime Minister as the State Department confirmed the failure of earlier talks. (NYT p. 8)

**Aug 21, 1946:** Russia endorsed the applications of Iceland and Sweden for membership in the United Nations, thus assuring a favorable recommendation for those nations from the Security Council to the General Assembly. (NYT p. 12)

**Sep 21, 1946:** The State Department announced that American military and naval personnel would be withdrawn from Iceland in 180 days. (NYT p. 1)

**Sep 25, 1946:** Protesting the proposed Icelandic-United States agreement about air bases in Iceland, a crowd of Icelanders attacked the mayor of Reykjavik and threatened Prime Minister Olafur Thors. On 23 September the Federation of Icelandic Trade Unions started a 24 hour general strike in protest against the accord. Mayor Bjarni Benediktsson was attacked as he left a hall in which members of the Icelandic Conservative Party had heard speeches favoring the agreement. The Icelandic Communists have worked in the Cabinet in collaboration with Conservatives and Social Democrats for nearly 2 years but they said that they will leave the government if the agreement is ratified by the Althing. (NYT p. 6)

**Sep 26, 1946:** Iceland strike protesting US bases gets little support (NYT p. 12).

**Oct 4, 1946:** A strong British note supporting the US request for bases in Iceland has been forwarded by the British Foreign Office to the Icelandic government. The note emphasized that rejection would create a bad impression in London. (North China Daily News, p. 6)

**Oct 7, 1946:** By a vote of 32 to 19 the Icelandic Parliament ratified an agreement with the US for the American use of the Keflavik airport. (North China Daily News, p. 1)

**Oct 8, 1946:** The Icelandic parliament passed a law giving the United States the right to use the Keflavik airbase. The law passed 32 against 19. Among the 19 who opposed it were 10 Communists and 9 social-democrats. In protest the Communist ministers left the government. (Humanité p. 3)

**Oct 24, 1946:** American troops are leaving Iceland. The airfield of Keflavik will be transferred to Iceland. The last troops left Iceland in April 1947. (NYT 24 October 22)

---

22 These bases should be manned by civilians.
1946 p. 7; NYT 26 October 1946 p. 7; NYT 3 April 1947 p. 12)

1947-2006

**Feb 5, 1947:** Ending the political crisis a Cabinet is formed in Iceland in which the Communists hold no portfolio. (NYT p. 2)

**Jul 18, 1948:** Iceland was the first nation to receive a loan from the Economic Cooperation Administration, under the Marshall Plan. (NYT p. E8)

**Mar 31, 1949:** Defying club-swinging police, demonstrators hurled stones into the chambers of the Icelandic Parliament while it was voting, 37 to 13, to join the North Atlantic treaty. (NYT p. 2)

**May 31, 1949:** Minutes of the Meeting of the American-Icelandic Claims Board, published 7 June 1949 [excerpts]. Present at the meeting were the two representatives of the Icelandic government Ragnar Jónsson, Theodor Lindal and the United States Army Representative Major Ragnar Stefánsson. No new claims had arisen since the last meeting. It was therefore the unanimous decision of the Board that the American-Icelandic Claims Board will cease to exist as of May 31, 1949. (NAI 2)

**Oct 26, 1949:** At the general election in Iceland the Communists lost their only seat. (NYT p. 2)

**May 1950:** The Icelandic government signed a base treaty with the United States in May 1950. The people of Iceland, however, insisted on a severe policy of separation. American servicemen were not allowed to date or marry Icelandic women. Moreover, commanders could issue only 100 weekend passes at any time to American soldiers visiting Reykjavik. (Baker 2004, p. 53)

**May 8, 1951:** Brig. Gen. Edward J. McGaw landed by air with the first contingent (200 memn) of United States Army, Navy and Air Forces to help defend Iceland. (NYT p. 13)

**Oct 24, 1951:** The US Navy will expand its Icelandic force. (NYT p. 7)

**Nov 2, 1951:** Iceland received a loan of $1 million. (NYT p. 73)

**Nov 1953:** The Defense Agreement obtained by Iceland in its negotiations with the United States contained two important points: (i) The American prime contractor against whom there had been displayed much public dissatisfaction because of violations of Icelandic labor regulations was to cease all construction operations in Iceland. In its place, Icelandic contractors would receive contracts from the Defense
Forces directly. (ii) A fence will be erected around the Keflavik base. The American press commented with displeasure that US forces were being fenced in. (Nuechterlein 1961)

Dec 21, 1953: A US Navy Neptune bomber crashed atop an Icelandic glacier. The 9 crewmen were killed. (NYT p. 8)

Oct 11, 1955: Three American firms were named in an inquiry conducted by the Icelandic police about the biggest currency fraud ever revealed there (NYT p. 77)


Mar 30, 1956: The effect of Parliament’s bid for withdrawal is still under State Department study. United States officials were hopeful today that continued American use of the Keflavik air base in Iceland could be arranged. (NYT p. 30)

Apr 8, 1956: Vigorous labor leadership has gained following even among non-Communists. The ruler and guiding spirit of Iceland’s Communists is a hard-bitten, little old man. (NYT p. 35)

May 17, 1956: All work on an air base to be built for the United States in Iceland has been “temporarily held up.” (NYT p. 1)

Jun 20, 1956: Four Icelandic parties urged an exit of US troops. The United States chances of retaining the big Keflavik air base appeared in grave doubt tonight near the end of Iceland’s parliamentary election campaign. (NYT p. 1)

Jun 26, 1956: Anti-US parties won the Icelandic vote, but they fell short of a clear majority needed to take over the Government. Washington said it would remove troops if asked. (NYT p. 1)

Aug 1, 1956: Iceland’s new Government issued a statement saying its main objective in defense policy was for United States armed forces to withdraw and for Iceland herself to safeguard and maintain the defense installations. (NYT p. 4)

Oct 2, 1956: As bilateral talks on the future of United States troops in Iceland began, Iceland remains firm on their withdrawal. (NYT p. 1)

Oct 19, 1956: The Lower House of the Althing, Iceland’s Parliament, today elected Einar Olgiersson, founder of the Icelandic Communist party, as its speaker. Mr. Olgeirsson has just returned from an annual trip to Moscow. (NYT p. 3)

Nov 20, 1956: Members of the Government of Iceland appear to have changed their minds about sending home the United States troops now manning the big Keflavik
airbase. (NYT p. 10)

[What brought about this change of mind with respect to the position held by the
government less than 2 months earlier? Was it a promise about some economic
compensation?]

**Dec 29, 1956:** The United States granted Iceland a new credit. (NYT p. 10)

**Jan 7, 1958:** Iceland’s foreign commerce in 1957 was characterized by the steady
increase in trade with Eastern Europe, primarily with the Soviet Union, and the rapid
decline in trade with the United States. (NYT p. 66)

**Jul 14, 1959:** US servicemen have been forbidden access to Thingvellir (Plains of
Assembly) where the nation’s parliament was established in 930. Thingvellir, 50
kilometer from Reykjavik, has long been a favorite sight-seeing spot for foreign
tourists and Icelanders. Recently it became a place where American servicemen
held week end parties with Icelandic girls. The area was reported to have been left
littered. After a Lutheran minister had complained Foreign Minister Gudmundsson
forbade further visits by American servicemen. (NYT p. 4)

**Dec 6, 1959:** The United States has decided to withdraw from Iceland a 1,300-man
Army unit. Factor in withdrawal was said to be Lack of harmony in G.I.-citizenry
relations.
The move will leave about 4,000 US soldiers mainly Air Force personnel manning
an air base and radar installation. It is understood that there are two important factors
in this decision (i) It will save money (ii) It was said that the relations between the
US personnel and the Icelanders have not been harmonious. An incident on Septem-
ber 5 forced the withdrawal of the American Commander, Brigadier General Gilbert
L. Pritchard at the request of the Icelandic government. The incident involved a US
sentry who forced two Icelandic Civil Air Defense officials to lie face down on wet
ground while he ascertained their right to enter the base. Yesterday, it became known
that Negro troops have not been sent to Iceland in deference to objections raised by
the Icelandic government. (NYT p. 1)
[Withdrawing some troops and revealing the opposition (made orally) with respect
to Negro troops were probably responses to the demand made by the Icelandic gov-
ernment to remove the US Commander.]

**Feb 21, 1960:** An aid of $ 20 million from the O.E.E.C. will help Iceland implement
its stabilization plan. The krona is pegged at 32 krona to a dollar. The Bank rate was
put at 11%. (NYT 21 February 1960 p. 7, NYT 23 February 1960 p. 6)

**Oct 8, 1961:** The United States will aid Iceland schools. (NYT p. 8)

**Jun 1, 2003:** A fight broke out between Icelanders and Americans, which resulted in
one Icelander being stabbed. (The Reykjavik Grapevine: The United States military base in Iceland, June 13, 2003.)

**Mar 17, 2006:** The United States has told the Icelandic government that it had decided to withdraw most of its service members and all of its fighter jets and helicopters later this year. The US Naval Air Station in Keflavik has about 1,200 American service members. The Pentagon has long said that it wants to reduce the size of the base which costs about 2.5 billion dollar a year to operate. (NYT p. 15)  
[The F-15 fighter squadron left Iceland in October 2006.]
Chapter 6
Quantitative evidence

As already mentioned, there were about 20 incidents each month, which represents a total of about 1,000 incidents over 1940-1944. The information provided by the diplomatic sources cited in the chronology covers about 10% of these cases. A most useful source would be the records of the sessions of the joint Claim Commissions. So far, however, we were not able to locate these records in American or Icelandic archives.

The data given in Fig. 6.1 correspond to military personnel from Commonwealth countries (mainly Britain but also New Zealand and Canada) who died and were buried in Iceland. Unfortunately, this source does not provide the causes of the death.

As an illustration of the anti-submarine protection provided by aircraft based in Iceland to convoys on the North Atlantic route one can mention the following episode. A convoy of 64 ships left New York for the United Kingdom on 25 January 1943. Air cover from West Atlantic bases was provided for the first week of the voyage, which was uneventful. On the morning of 4 February the ships were sighted by a patrolling U-boat, a pack assembled, and during the next two days five vessels were lost. One U-boat was sunk in counter-attacks by the surface escorts. From the morning of the 6th, in spite of rough weather, which at one time caused the convoy to be spread over 50 square miles of ocean, the maximum possible air cover was provided from bases in Iceland and later from the United Kingdom. Ten U-boats were sighted and depth-charged from the air during the following 48 hours, one being sunk outright. The first aircraft to reach the convoy on the 6th was a Liberator from Iceland with Sergeant H. J. Bennett as pilot. Three U-boats were attacked during the escort patrol, the aircraft remaining with the ships for seven hours at a distance of more than 1000 kilometers from its base. After February 6th no further attacks were made on the ships, which reached port four days later. (NORTH ATLANTIC PATROLS, New Zealand Electronic Text Centre)

Anti-submarine patrols were flown out of Kaldadarnes in Iceland.

As an illustration of the difficult sea conditions encountered in Iceland one can men-

23Let us recall that the US Army and US Navy had separate commissions.
The ship proceeded to Reykjavik, Iceland, where she would encounter the most severe weather she would see in her career. One particular day, 15 January 1942, was memorable. She set her special sea, anchor and steaming watches and put out both anchors with 220 meters of chain on the starboard and 110 to port, with her main engines turning over and steam up on all boilers. (VP-52 History)

About 30% of the fatalities listed in Fig. 6.1 correspond to air force personnel. Why such a high proportion? As shown by the previous excerpts, a large number of aircraft were based in Iceland. A number of planes crashed at take off or in the

![Fig. 6.1 Annual number of deaths among Commonwealth troops stationed in Iceland.](image)

These numbers correspond to soldiers buried in Iceland; therefore they do not include the fliers or sailors who perished during missions at sea. Nor do they include those who died from illness or injury after having been repatriated to Britain. The substantial numbers of deaths in 1942, 1943, 1944 and even 1945 is puzzling on account of the fact that British forces were supposed to be relieved by American troops after 1941. The death rate, which is a more significant variable, cannot be calculated in 1942-1945 because we do not know the strength of the Commonwealth force stationed in Iceland over 1942-1945. In 1940 and 1941 the numbers of deaths are 21 and 69 respectively. For 1940, as we do not know precisely the timing of the troop arrival, we cannot estimate the average strength. The peak strength of Commonwealth troops was about 20,000 (Hunt 1966, appendix D). If we assume that for the most part their withdrawal occurred only in late 1941 or early 1942 we get in 1941 a monthly death rate of $90/(12 \times 2) = 3.7$ deaths per month and per 10,000 troops; this rate is comparable to the death rate of American troops in Iraq over 2003-2006. Source: Commonwealth War Graves Commission.
process of landing. A number of cases are mentioned in the chronology. One of the most tragic crashes was the crash of Lieutenant-General Frank Andrews’ plane which cost the lives of 14 people. The list of fatalities also comprises many Navy men. This may possibly be explained by the fact that survivors from sunken ships who were rescued by other vessels in the same convoy may have died subsequently after their arrival in Iceland. So far, however, we did not find direct evidence for that kind of fatalities.
Among the various episodes of military occupation that we considered in our studies, there are two which resemble the occupation of Iceland, namely Australia and Hawaii. In all three cases we have a country which is occupied by the army of an allied country with the agreement of the government of the occupied country\textsuperscript{24}. The parallel between Iceland and Hawaii is particularly interesting because in both cases the residents of the occupied country have strong cultural ties with an enemy country, namely Germany and Japan respectively.

Among the many questions for which we were not able to get satisfactory answers, one can mention the following.

- Based on several testimonies there is ample evidence of offenses committed by Icelanders against occupation troops either during disputes or in retaliation for former actions by servicemen. Once discovered, by whom were these people arrested and tried? If arrested by Military Police were they taken over to Icelandic authorities? If tried by Icelandic tribunals did occupation authorities have a right to appeal the judgment for instance if it was found too lenient?
- The only Icelandic newspapers which questioned the self-censorship policy accepted by others was the leftist paper Thjodviljinn. It would be very interesting to see what Thjodviljinn has to say about these events (at least until its interdiction).
- As already mentioned, one would like to read the minutes of the various Joint Claim Committees. There were (at least) four: two during the British occupation (one for traffic incidents and a second for all other incidents) and two during the American occupation, one for the US Army and one for the US Navy.

\textsuperscript{24}It is true that the British occupation of Iceland was carried out \textit{without} the agreement of the Icelandic or Danish government, but the American occupation received the approbation of the Icelandic government.
Acknowledgments

I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who have provided help, advice and encouragements and in particular to Maureen Annetts (Commonwealth War Graves Commission);
Eggert Bernhardsson (University of Reykjavik);
Agnes Kermin and Gilbert Chambon (Interlibrary Loan Department of University of Paris 6);
Timothy Nenninger (NARA, Washington);
Linda Schweizer (Ralph J. Bunche Library, US Department of State, Washington);

The present draft is still provisional and in many respects unsatisfactory, but I am convinced that with the help and support of my friends and colleagues it will be possible to bring this project to a successful completion.
9

Abbreviations

Althing: It designates the Icelandic Parliament (not an abbreviation)
NAI: National Archives of Iceland
NARA: National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC)
NYT: New York Times
Archives

All the documents used in the “Occupation project” including those listed below (plus a number of others which have not been used yet) are available in the so-called “Fonds Roehner 434 W” belonging to the archive bureau of “University Pierre and Marie Curie” (UPMC), Central Tower, office 810, 4 place Jussieu, 75005 Paris. In addition to archive records there are also several books, for instance a book with many pictures of the 1941-1946 period in Iceland and two big volumes about the occupation of South Korea published by Hallym University. Altogether there are 8 boxes numbered: 434 W 1-8.

- 434 W1-4: Japan
- 434 W5: Hawaii
- 434 W6: South Korea
- 434 W7: South Korea, China, Iceland.
- 434 W8: Germany

In a general way we experienced great difficulties in collecting information from archives. As already mentioned elsewhere, the Icelandic archives either did not really respond (case of the Reykjavik municipal archives) or in the case of the National Archives told us that the documents were unavailable 25.

Our inquiries at the National American archives were more successful but only for foreign affairs (i.e. received or issued by the State Department) documents. As far as documents of military origin (so-called “Icelandic Base Command” files) were concerned our quest was very unsuccesssful. Either the text of the messages was missing (case of NARA 6,7) or the content did not fit with the ARC description (case of NARA 8,9).

NAI 1: National Archives of Iceland, Ministry of Justice, 2002-B345/1

25Even for documents issued by the Icelandic government.
NAI 2: National Archives of Iceland, Ministry of Justice, 2002-B346/2

NARA 1: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Record Group 59, State Department Central File 1940-1944, 859s 20/187, 11 May 1942, Box 5384 250/34/4/6 (Stack 250, Row 34, Compartment 4, Shelf 6)

[This despatch by the US representative in Iceland, Lincoln MacVeagh, contains five enclosures: (i) Copy of a note of the Icelandic Prime Minister Hermann Jonasson. (ii) Copy of a list of offenses by American troops (during 20 Sep - 31 Dec 1941) which was attached to the Prime Minister’s letter. In the chronology it is called the fall list. (iii) Copy of a second list of offenses (during 1 Jan - 18 Mar 1942) which was also attached to the Prime Minister’s letter. In the chronology it is called the winter list. (iv) Copy of MacVeagh’s reply to the Prime Minister. (v) Memorandum containing General Bonesteel’s comments. It can be noted that the National Archive of Iceland holds a copy of the letter of the Prime Minister but, surprisingly enough, it does not hold a copy of any of the attached lists of offenses (as explicitly stated in a letter dated 29 June 2007 from the director of the NAI, Olafur Asgeirsson to the present author).]

NARA 2: U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Record Group 59, State Department Central File 1940-1944, (Stack area 250, Row 34, Compartment 4, Shelf 6, Box 5384).

[This despatch by the US representative in Iceland, Lincoln MacVeagh, contains three enclosures: (i) Memorandum of a conference on the subject of the relations between American Forces and local population held on September 23, 1941 between: Mr. H. Jonasson, Prime Minister of Iceland; Major General C.H. Bonesteel; Brigadier General J. Marston, US Marine Corps; Brigadier General J.L. Homer, US Army; Mr. B.E. Kuniholm, American Consul; Mr. H.B. Wells, American Vice Consul.

(ii) Memorandum of a conversation between Mr. A. Kofoed-Hansen, Chief of Police and Mr. B.E. Kuniholm, American Consul held on 3 October 1941

(iii) Copy of Marine order dated 30 September 1941.]

NARA 3: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), State Department Central File 1940-1944, [This document is a despatch (No 136) sent to the Secretary of State by the US Consul in Iceland, Bertel E. Kuniholm on 18 July 1941. It contains three enclosures: the first one is a memorandum of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, Stephan Stefansson, to the American Consul; the two others are short letters (acknowledgment of receipt).]

NARA 4: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Wash-
CWGC: Commonwealth War Graves Commission

[This source gives the names, ranks and dates of death of the Commonwealth troops (i.e. mainly British and Canadians) who are buried in Iceland. I’m very grateful to Ms. Maureen Annett of the inquiries section of the CWGC for sending me this file. We do not know how many coffins were shipped to Britain to be buried there; another point of interrogation concerns the percentage of the personnel shipped back to British hospitals for treatment who died shortly after and should therefore be included in Icelandic fatalities.]


[In spite of the indication [2 folders], the file that I received from NARA contained only 5 pages which recorded only one death. The number 220.86 refers to the “War Department Decimal File System” (available online at: http://www.archives.gov/research/war-dept/index.html). 210 means “Commissioned officers”, 220 means “Enlisted men”, 86 means “Death”.

NARA 6: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: 319.1 G-2 Reports. Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 183.

ARC Identifier 1140820.

[As the previous one, this file provides only “INDEX SHEET SYNOPSIS” which includes the date, origin, destination and Subject but not the text of the reports. In the “War Department Decimal File System” 319 means “Miscellaneous” and 319.1 means “Miscellaneous.Reports”]


ARC Identifier: 1140817.

[As the previous one this file provides only “INDEX SHEET SYNOPSIS” which includes the date, origin, destination and Subject but not the text of the reports. The file covers the period from November 1941 to February 1942. Most of the reports are about observations of the movements of German submarines.]

NARA 8: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: (383.4) Spies, espionnage [2 folders]. Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 189.
[In spite of the indication “2 folders” the photocopies that we received consisted of only 12 pages, of which not more than 2 contained real information; moreover, this information had nothing to do with “spies or espionage”; it was in fact a letter from the Secretary of War, Henry Stimson to President Roosevelt about a possible extension of Icelandic sea port facilities.]

NARA 9: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command: (015) Courts Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 176.
ARC Identifier: 1140726.
[This file has little to do with “courts”; it reports a financial audit of the Army Post Office (No 810) of the Iceland Base Command established at Camp Tadcaster.]

NARA 10: US National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, Washington DC), Iceland Base Command (167) Claims Record Group 337, Stack area: 190, Row 55, Box 178.
ARC Identifier: 1140754.

Books and articles


[The author mentions that at the time he wrote his thesis, British intelligence records were still completely closed. In Chart No 7 he lists 144 fatalities (from all causes including 15 airmen referred to as missing in action) that occurred during the British occupation; according to the Commonwealth War Graves Commission there are almost 300 members of the Commonwealth force who are buried in Iceland cemeteries, and this number does not include those missing in action.]

[In 1983 the author was holding the rank of Lieutenant Colonel in the Marines as military historian at the Command and Staff College of the US Marine Corps,
Quantico, Virginia.


Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic papers 1942, volume 3, Europe. [This publication contains a selection of diplomatic despatches exchanged between the Department of State and its representatives in Iceland.]


Iceland 1966 handbook. Published by the Central Bank of Iceland, Reykjavik.


Appendix A: Expected number of incidents

After the signature of the Peace Treaty in early 1952 Japanese media were no longer subject to military censorship; of course the Cold War was not over and censorship of Communist or left-wing newspapers was still present. As leftist publications were also those which were the most vocal against occupation forces, one realizes that the censorship which had been in force during the occupation was not completely over. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the data about incidents that are provided by the English language Japanese newspaper “Nippon Times” provide at least lower bounds. These data solely concern offenses committed by occupation troops against Japanese people. Although individual accounts which can be found occasionally in the same newspaper show that there were also cases of offenses against US soldiers by Japanese the data released by Japanese police does not provide global estimates for such incidents.

During the 5 months from May to September 1952 there were 4 murders and 113 assaults of Japanese by US troops (Nippon Times Dec 5, 1952). At that time there were about 172,000 US troops in Japan; this figure does not include American civilians and dependents but it is probably safe to assume that those who were in Japan with their family were less prone to clashes. These data give the following rates:

- Murder: 0.55 per year and per 10,000 troops
- Assault: 15.6 per year and per 10,000 troops.

Under the assumption that the behavior of the occupation troops was similar in Iceland and in Japan, we can apply the same rates to Iceland. Between May 1940 and December 1941 (19 months that is 1.58 year) there were mostly British-Canadian troops numbering on average about 20,000; this gives:

Murder: $0.55 \times 2 \times 1.58 = 1.7$
Assault: $15.6 \times 2 \times 1.58 = 50$

Between July 1941 and December 1943 (30 months that is 2.5 years) there were on average some 30,000 American troops (Hunt 1966, Appendix D) which gives:

Murder: $0.55 \times 3 \times 2.5 = 3.4$
Assault: $15.6 \times 3 \times 2.5 = 97$
In the previous calculation, it was assumed that the number of incidents depends only upon the number of soldiers. This assumption is acceptable when the soldiers represent a small proportion of the total population of the occupied country. This was of course the case in Japan where occupation troops never represented more than 0.3 percent of the Japanese population but it is no longer true in Iceland where the ratio was of the order of 30 percent. Thus, the previous calculation is likely to produce over-estimates (in the extreme situation where the population goes to zero the number of incidents of course goes to zero as well). However the estimate for homicides is in agreement with the number of Icelanders killed.
Occupation episodes and analytical history

By education the present author is a physicist, so it may not be surprising that he tried to transform history into a testable science. How to do that was explained in a book he co-authored with Pr. Tony Syme and which was published by Harvard University Press in 2002.

The main step in transforming history into a testable science is to study not just one case but several similar cases. Indeed, a physicist does not just study the fall of one kind of bodies (e.g. apples), he wants to describe and understand the fall of all kinds of falling objects (e.g. iron balls, drops of water, hailstones, and so on). Actually this requirement is not specific to physics, it is common to all testable sciences. Thus, in medicine one does not wish to describe solely the influenza of Mr. Martin; one wants to understand all cases of influenza whether they occur in China, Europe or the United States.

That is why the present study is part of a series of several books devoted to various occupation episodes.

Studies of “occupation” episodes by the same author

1 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan
2 Relations between Allied forces and the populations of Germany and Austria.
3 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Iceland
4 Relations between US forces and the population of Hawaii
5 Relations between American forces and the population of China
6 Relations between American forces and the population of South Korea
7 Relations between American forces and the population of Australia

All these studies are available on the author’s website at:
http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/roehner/occupation.html

Modules and submodules

What we call modules of a major historical episode are simpler elements. Occupation episodes are modules of the Second World War, but these modules have themselves several aspects that can be called submodules. It turns out that many of these submodules are common to several occupation episodes.

As examples of such submodules one can mention:
- Military tribunals
- Clashes between soldiers and the population
- Looting of art items
- Purge of undesirable elements in education and the medias
- Control of political activity
- Introduction of a special currency
- Creation of new universities
- Establishment of exchange programs for teachers or officers in the police and armed forces

For each submodule the various occupation episodes will provide several realizations. These realizations parallel the repeated experiments conducted by a physicist who wants to study a specific phenomenon.

Of course, defining the submodules and collecting all information about them is only the first step. Once this has been done, the historian is in the same situation as a physicist who has finished a first round of experiments.

The next challenge is to make sense of the data. This means asking the right ques-
tions in order to find some hidden order behind them. Once a regularity has emerged, a new set of observations can be planned which will permit to improve its accuracy.