RELATIONS BETWEEN
US FORCES
AND THE
POPULATION OF SOUTH KOREA

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Working Report
It had been the one song of those who thirst after absolute power that the interest of the state requires that its affairs should be conducted in secret.

—Baruch Spinoza, *Theologico Political Treatise* (1670)

*Published anonymously in the Dutch Republic, the book was officially banned four years after its publication.*

“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“Yes, to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *Silver Blaze* (1892)

There is a strong family resemblance about the misdeeds, and if you have all the details of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can’t unravel the thousand and first.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Valley of Fear* (1915)
RELATIONS BETWEEN US FORCES AND THE POPULATION OF SOUTH KOREA 1945–2010

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Version of 1 August 2014. Comments are welcome.

We hope that these notes will enable us to get in touch with Korean scholars; needless to say, this is an essential condition for the success of this project. Please, if you happen to know people who have a working interest in this kind of historiography do not hesitate to send them a copy of the present draft.

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Prologue

Preface

There have already been many studies about the period 1945-1949 in Korea. What are the specific objectives of the present investigation? First, let me say that this study is not about interpretation, it is about facts. Its ambition is to present new data at least as far as permitted by available sources. Their interpretation will largely be left to the judgment of the reader.

As a disciple of the French historian Marc Bloch (1886-1944), I cherish the truth and think that the best way to put facts in the right light and perspective is by means of comparative historical studies. That is why this study is part of a broader investigation of occupation episodes.

At its beginning the US occupation of South Korea paralleled the American occupation of the Philippines that followed the Spanish-American War of 1898. In both cases the United States took over the power from a colonial lord, and kept in office the colonial governor. In the Philippines Spanish and US troops fought side by side against the Filipinos who wanted their independence. Similarly, the US Military Government in Korea used the police force set up by the Japanese together with its own troops to suppress the organizations fighting for Korean independence. Yet, a crucial difference was that in the Philippines Spanish landowners were to some extent permitted to keep their holdings whereas in Korea Japanese property was taken over by the Military Government.

What are the events that this study tries to investigate particularly?

Questions

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1. Previous studies about China, Hawaii, Iceland and Japan are available on my website.
2. In the Philippines he was kept in office for 6 months whereas in South Korea he remained in office only for a few days.
3. These holdings were partly sold and partly released step by step to the South Korean government established in August 1948.
• We know that during the period of the Military Government (MG) there have been thousands of trials of Koreans by American military courts, either by provost courts or by military commissions. Yet, so far only limited information is available about these trials. There are no systematic data about their number by province and by month and we know very little about charges and sentences. One of the following chapters is devoted to this question. These trials are not only of interest in themselves but also as a major primary source of information because this source provides systematic coverage in time and space and is basically uncensored.

• In Japan all bills had to be approved by the political sections of SCAP before being discussed in the Diet\(^4\). This applied even to amendments or to bills which were very technical in nature. It also applied to all decisions and orders taken by the Japanese government and which did not require a discussion in the Diet.

Did the same situation prevail in South Korea during the period of the interim National Assembly and interim government? It will be seen that during the first half of 1947 many important “laws” (which were in fact ordinances) were published in the “Official Gazette of the USAMGIK” (USAMGIK=US Army Military Government of Korea), a substantial part of which were drafted by US advisers\(^5\). What happened in this respect after August 1948? There were still many US advisers in all government departments. What role did they really play? So far, we have no answer.

• We know that after the capitulation of Japan on 15 August 1945, many “Korean People’s Republic Committees” sprang up throughout South Korea. By 8 September 1945 there were 135 local committees (Henderson 1968 p. 118). They took over the administration and police. The situation was basically the same as in France after the Normandy landing in June 1944. In all French cities representatives of the Provisional Government lead by General de Gaulle took over the powers previously in the hands of the Vichy government or German military authorities. It should be observed that at this time the French provisional government had not been officially recognized by the US government. In other words, the situation was not very different from that which prevailed in South Korea (except for the fact that the Soviet troops were not so close). As a matter of fact, the initial American occupation plan for France was basically the same as the one that would be implemented one year later in South Korea (de Gaulle 1956, p. 268, Coles and Weinberg 1986 p. 665, Roehner 2014). The proclamation whose leaflets were disseminated over France by Allied aircraft on the eve of the Normandy landing (June 1944) (i) asked French authorities, including those who had directly collaborated with the Germans, to keep their positions, (ii) did not mention the existence of the provisional government of General de Gaulle, (iii) promised future elections that were to be organized in a coun-

\(^4\)Many bills were in fact drafted by SCAP officers. See Roehner (2010a).

\(^5\)For instance the “Court Organization Law”.
try under Allied Civil Affairs administrative authority. In addition, (counterfeited) French francs had been printed in the United States for the purpose of being used as a legal currency in France without the endorsement of any French authority. Eventually, the outcome in France was different from what happened in South Korea in the sense that the provisional government was recognized by the US State Department\(^6\). There were two major reasons for this difference. One was the fact that the position of the British government was more sympathetic to French wishes. The other was that because of the strict, unequivocal position taken by Charles de Gaulle American Civil Affairs officers would have found few French military or civilian leaders willing to collaborate with them.

In South Korea the People’s Republic Committees were swept away and replaced by representatives of the Military Government. Many of the People’s Republic committees pledged that they would continue to operate even if martial law was introduced and that they would oppose resistance if force was applied to remove them. Yet, in US military reports their removal is usually described in only one sentence: “US troops ousted the Korean People’s Committees and established Military Government”. Was it really so easy? If there were cases of resistance, what were the casualties? Were the (surviving) committee members taken into custody and for how long?\(^7\) So far, very little information seems to be available to answer these questions? In his unpublished book, Richard Robinson (1947, p. 52) writes “Bloodshed ensued in many communities as local People’s Committees defied Military Government and refused to abandon government offices. Koreans and Americans met in pitched battles, and not a few Koreans met violent death in the struggle”. Robinson does not give more specific information and over 60 years later we still do not know how many Koreans “met violent death”.

- Apart from the question of national independence there was another factor which added to the bitterness of the clashes in the fall of 1945 (Reardon 2008 p. 215). After 15 August, many estates or factories belonging to Japanese had been confiscated by Koreans often with the assent of the People’s Committees. However, General MacArthur issued orders\(^8\) to the Military Government to the effect of recovering confiscated Japanese property. For instance, the confrontation of 15 November in Namwon started when the police was ordered by the MG to recover Japanese property.

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\(^6\) There have been some sharp conflicts, however, particularly regarding the currency issue and the question of how Paris should be liberated.

\(^7\) If they remained free they would have been able to assume power again as soon as US troops would have moved to other places. A source which focuses on South Cholla (Friedrich 1948) says that in one town 46 members of the Korean Republic movement were tried by provost courts.

\(^8\) Unfortunately, Mark Reardon does not give the date of this order. We only know that it was between 1 September and 15 November 1945.
• In October-November 1946 there was a massive uprising in the provinces of North and South Kyongsang and in South Cholla. According to US military sources it affected some 160 cities, towns and villages. In all these places it fell to US troops to restore the authority of the MG because the police was overwhelmed and the Constabulary basically nonexistent. In US reports, these events are usually described in only one sentence: “Tactical troops were sent in and restored order”. It is true that in this case the G-2 (intelligence) reports tell us that 240 Korean insurgents were killed. In contrast, US forces (allegedly) did not have a single casualty. So far, we cannot check whether or not these data are correct. This question should be raised because in one specific case (to be discussed later) in which several accounts are available, the G-2 reports turn out to misrepresent the events by grossly underestimating casualty numbers.

In a general way, the G-2 periodic reports (which have been the main source of information used by historians) belittle US involvement for the obvious reason that it would mean acknowledging a failure of the trusteeship policy. As long as only the police and Constabulary were involved the disturbances could be presented as purely domestic riots.

The main purpose of the present investigation is to unearth sources which will help us to fill such gaps which remain in our knowledge and understanding.

**Korean insurgents were not inept**

In a sense, our research will also rehabilitate the Koreans who fought in these uprisings. They were presented as being Communists which was certainly true for some of them. In the Cold War context (and even nowadays) to be considered a Communist was already bad enough, but in addition US reports describe insurgents as being particularly ineffective, lacking determination and inept in their tactical decisions.

As already mentioned, the People’s Republic Committees were (allegedly) swept away as wisps of straw, the insurgents of October-November 1946 invariably missed their targets whenever they fired on US troops (many examples will be given later on). Even worse, very often the mere appearance of US troops (allegedly) was enough to make insurgents flee or surrender.

Yet, at the same time US sources tell us that the insurgents made hand grenades by filling steel cans with dynamite, blocked roads by drawing steel wires across them or

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9In fact, by looking at the reports closely one finds that there were 4 reported fatalities.

10The October-November disturbances are often seen as hunger riots. Yet, this is not the official thesis of the USAFIK (US Armed Forces in Korea) because it would have implied a bad management of food resources. The official thesis was that the uprising followed “Communist instructions issued by PAK Heun Yung [the leader of the South Korean Communist Party] upon his return from North Korea”. (NARA 4b, p.314).

11This picture is all the more surprising when one recalls that at the same time, in China, the Communist forces were defeating an army that had the full support of the United States in terms of logistics, training and weaponry.
by digging deep ditches, cut US telephone wires in particularly clever ways which made reparation difficult\(^{12}\), hid explosives in the coal tender of locomotives, blew up bridges and wrecked dozens of trains by implementing a broad variety of ingenious sabotage techniques.

In short, the two descriptions do not fit and seem inconsistent with one another. It is likely that once the true facts will be known, it will turn out that insurgents did not always miss their targets, did not surrender at the mere appearance of US troops but, eventually, had to yield in the face of superior fire power.

From the previous observations it is obvious that this study is only a starting point.

**Possible sources**

There are several possible sources which have not yet been used.

- Newspapers are one of them. Of course, almost all newspapers were written in Korean but there was (at least) one, namely the “Seoul Times”, which was in English. Unfortunately it seems that no library in Korea has a collection of this newspaper.

- The personal papers of various actors are another possible source. For instance the personal papers of James Hausman are kept at the Harvard-Yenching Library. Hausman played a leading role in the formation of the Korean Army, in the crushing of the Yosu rebellion and later in the accession to power of President Park Chung-hee.

  The personal papers of John Merrill, an analyst at the State Department, are available at the National Diet Library in Tokyo.

- So far, North Korean sources were completely neglected by South Korean as well as by American researchers. It is clear that North Korean sources are often excessive in their phraseology. US Army G-2 reports seem more reasonable, but this does not necessarily mean that they are more trustful. Careful historians know that any source must be examined with a critical eye.

**The obstacle of the National Security Law**

Back in 2010, when for the first time I visited major university libraries in Seoul I was surprised not to find any books or documents from North Korea. It is only a few months later that I came to realize that Korean people who keep or distribute North Korean books or documents can be charged under the “Korean National Security Law”\(^ {13}\). Passed on 1 December 1948, this law is still in force in 2011, even though no longer enforced as strictly as in previous decades. According to a report by “Amnesty International”, some 400 persons were arrested in 1998 for violation of this law. Simply speaking out in support of North Korea still carries a prison sentence.

\(^{12}\)One method was to join the two severed ends together again so that the sabotage cannot be detected by visual inspection.

\(^{13}\)It should be noted that there are similar “Security laws” in Singapore and Malaysia.
of up to 7 years. In 2001, Kang Jeong Koo, a sociology professor at Dongguk University in Seoul, was arrested for violating the National Security Law after he visited the birth place of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang\(^{14}\). In mid-June 2013, Jong Tae-se, a well-known North Korean international footballer playing in the South was accused by a conservative online pundit Byun Hee-jae of violating the National Security Law by lauding “the North’s self-reliance ideology of juche [political thesis introduced by former North Korean leader Kim Il-sung]” (Korea Times 21 June 2013). The complaint was taken seriously by the authorities and the prosecution released a statement saying that the case is under investigation. If a well-known person can be investigated under such flimsy charges, it is understandable that ordinary citizens prefer to keep a low profile.

In what sense does the “National Security Law” interfere with historical research? According to a decision of the Korean Supreme court (23 June 1987) acts of espionage as described in the National Security Law are not limited to state secrets in the strict sense. If an information is advantageous to North Korea\(^{15}\), even if already widely known, the act of collecting such information is declared to be an act of espionage (Suh 2001, p. 105).

As it is impossible to know in advance what kind of facts constitute “resources advantageous to North Korea”, one sees that almost any historical research which departs from the official version of history can be used to justify an indictment under this law.

In many accounts the police and Constabulary are treated as being independent of the MG although it is of course well known that until the inauguration of the Korean government in August 1948, these forces were under the command of Military Government officers. As a matter of fact, this remained true even after August 1948 because the Rhee-Dodge agreement of 24 August 1948 (see the chronology) extended US control over Korean forces until the withdrawal of American forces. In late May 1949 there were still 7,500 US troops in South Korea.

At first sight the present account may appear one-sided in the sense that it insists on the negative sides of American interference. This is quite natural however because it is this aspect which has received little attention so far. It would be useless to repeat the descriptions of all positive aspects which are so well accounted for in the historical accounts written by SCAP. It is well known that colonial or neo-colonial policies also bring some benefits in terms of medical treatments, improvements in agricultural techniques or creation of industrial infrastructure.

\(^{14}\)Source: French version of the Wikipedia article about this law; Kraft (2005). For other cases see the chronology at the date of 1 December 1948.

\(^{15}\)Instead of “North Korea”, the expression used in the wording of the Court’s decision is “the Northern puppets”.
In the case of South Korea the main legacy was probably in the military field. For the better and for the worse, the Korean Army has kept close ties with the Pentagon. Up to this day, the American bases in South Korea provide a powerful umbrella against any aggression. Yet, these bases also created a gray zone of prostitution. Although it attracted much less attention than the question of Japanese “comfort women” the intent and end-result were not very different\textsuperscript{16}.

**A contribution to the open debate among Koreans**

What will be the fate of this book?

A few years ago I wrote a parallel study (Roehner 2010a) of the occupation of Japan. Available in several major university libraries, the book provides new data and an overall picture which is very different from the one currently accepted by American and Japanese historians (which, by the way, does not much differ from the official version set up by SCAP)\textsuperscript{17}. Yet, so far this alternative perspective has been largely ignored.

Needless to say, we hope that the present study will meet a different fate. There are good reasons to think so.

- Over the past two decades, South Korea has carried out an impressive investi-

\textsuperscript{16}Although prostitution is illegal in South Korea since 1947, US camptown prostitution has been in existence outside US military bases up to the present time (2011). US military police provided for the security in these camptown prostitution sites and detained prostitutes who were thought to be ill. In 1960 the deputy home minister, Lee Sung-woo, declared that the government had made improvements in the “supply of prostitutes” and the “recreational system” for American troops (Sources: Wikipedia article entitled “Prostitution in South Korea”; Moon 1997).

\textsuperscript{17}For instance, it shows that: (i) there were hundreds of clashes between US personnel and Japanese people (ii) there was a total control by SCAP of the activity of the Japanese government and National Diet. (iii) The external trade of Japan was completely controlled by SCAP and severely restricted as a result.
In the following sections we present a series of documents which were important milestones in our research.

**Letter from Sergeant Harry Savage to President Truman**

**Text of the letter by Sergeant Harry Savage**

The letter was written in Yankton, South Dakota, after Sergeant Harry Savage’s return to the United States following his 10-month stay in South Korea. Although the date cannot be read clearly (if there was indeed one on the letter) the stamps show that it was received in early April 1947.

Dear President Truman,

My name is Sergeant Savage. I have just been discharged from the army after spending some ten months in the Occupation Forces in Korea. I am writing this now while I have it fresh in mind and while I am eager to do something about it.

[News blackout on fatalities in Korea]

No doubt you know most of what has been going on in that country from reports that you have already received. But why may I ask you are not these reports getting to the American people. Why were not the American people told of riots that took place in that country and of the hundreds of people who were killed in those riots. I used

18 Nevertheless one should mention that the “National Diet Library” has made available to its readers many documents held at the US archives. However, there was no public debate as was the case in Korea.
to pick newspapers and read where a few people were injured in minor skirmishes in the Philippines while at
the same time hundreds of people were being killed in Korea. I swore to myself that I would find out when I
got back to the States. The situation is rapidly becoming desperate in that country, and unless we remedy
the situation in Korea quickly I’m afraid that all our work there will have been in vain.

[Living conditions of GIs in Korea]
Why were not supplies being sent out to that country? Why were the GI’s in Korea unable to see a hamburger
while at the same time the GI’s in Japan were griping because of the little meat in their hamburgers? In the
Battalion I was in an American broom was just about unheard of and it got to be a Court-Martial offense for
stealing a light bulb. In the summer for the most part we had only two pair of suntan uniforms to our name.
That meant only one uniform per week and it’s pretty hard to wear the same clothes for a week especially
when it gets as hot as it does over there. Until a few months before I got my orders our main diet there consisted
of dehydrated eggs, dehydrated potatoes, and concentrated chili. Most of the GI’s in Japan said that they never
had any dehydrated foods as long as they were overseas.

[Plight of Korean families under occupation]
But in this letter I’m not so much interested in telling you of our troubles, though there were many, as I am
in the Korean people. Their’s was a real plight. I for myself cannot see that the American army has done too
much to help those people, partly because I know of the conditions that exist there make it hard for the army to
take care of themselves. But on top of this I have seen in many cases our MP’s beating up Korean boys; making
them stand at attention for long periods at a time because they thought that these boys had stolen something.
They had no evidence to support these accusations but their own hunches [i.e. suspicions], but in that country
that was all they needed. I have seen Korean boys with tears in their eyes tell of how the MP’s went through
their house forcing their parents at the point of a gun uncover every possession they had, to see if they had any
stolen articles. Furthermore they go through these houses without one stitch of evidence against the persons
involved. I was an MP myself for three months so I know how they work.

[Police in Tongyong left to themselves]
On August 15 [1946] they were expecting a riot in Tongyong [coastal town not far from Pusan], a city about 45
miles south of Masan, the city where I was stationed. I happened to be the Sergeant in charge of that detachment
that was sent to relieve the old detachment that was stationed there. When I got there I talked to the Chief of
Police and he thought it would be best if I’d send a few men to attend the political gatherings that were to
take place the following day. I agreed with this and promised to send a few men to each political gathering.
Because of the expected difficulty our Battalion sent an officer to assume command. I was glad of this because
it relieved me of responsibility. I told him of my plans and he accepted them. That night however we were
visited by our Division Artillery Commander and he had entirely different plans. All of our troops were to
stay in the barracks. They would not be allowed to go anywhere. If anything did happen we were to notify
our Battalion, which was just about impossible because we had no radio communication; they were in turn to
notify Division Artillery, who were in turn to notify Division Headquarters19. They were to give all commands.
I would have felt sorry for us if anything did happen to have to go through that procedure, but nothing did
however. Then we got orders to abandon Tongyong. Policemen came to us and begged us not to leave saying
that our mere presence there meant a great deal, but orders were orders and we obeyed them.

[Repression of an uprising in Tongyong]
The next month [September 1946] a serious railroad strike broke out which tied up all railroads in Korea.
Nothing of this was said in American newspapers. Why? This strike proved to be the forerunner of all the riots
and uprisings that were to follow. The first call that our Battalion received came from Tongyong, the city that
I mentioned earlier. We arrived there at night and by that time the Communists had completely taken over the
city and were actually running the City Hall. We restored law and order alright but scores of people were killed
in those riots and not a word reached the American public. Why? Is it because the army is afraid that it will stir
the American people and lead to an investigation of the army’s policy in that country?

19The governor of South Kyongsang Province was Colonel Gillet. Source: General Paik Sun Yup 1993: From Pusan to
Panmunjom.
Three days later most of us went back to Masan and the next day [7 October 1946, see below] a riot there broke out. Our entire Battalion\(^{20}\) patrolled that town all day with dead bodies lying all over the streets, and we kept our machine guns blazing [i.e. shooting rapidly and continuously].

**Torture by the police**

It was then that I saw atrocities that I have never seen before, but now I know how it must have been to live under the Nazis. In Tongyong I saw an athlete, a boxer, on the suspicion of being a Communist, first beaten by the Korean police until he could no longer stand up and then he was made to push-ups [i.e. exercise performed by raising and lowering the body using the arms]. When he collapsed they turned him over and he was dead. In Masan, the Korean police gathered some 300 persons mostly at random and made them kneel in front of the police station for around four hours with an occasional pat on the back of a policeman’s club. Every now and then they would take a few of them inside and the torture would begin. Many times people would come running out to us and beg us to kill them, shoot them, anything to end this torture.

**Non-intervention of US officers in torture instances**

Many of the GI’s got very angry at this and started beating the policemen which only added to the confusion. Most of the officers however stood calmly by and let these beatings go on without letup. In fact our Division Artillery sent a letter to our Battalion to the effect not to criticize what the police were doing. I was working in Intelligence at the time so I know this to be a fact. Most of us thought surely these things would reach American newspapers. About two weeks later the “Stars and Stripes” had an article about it\(^{21}\). They said that there had been a riot in Masan, “but American troops restored law and order without firing a shot”. I ask you, what kind of propaganda is that. I did not go to Korea with democracy in mind and with the thought that I was there to help the Korean people, to sit idly by and watch these things without wanting to do something about it.

**Mediators**

Therefore, I believe that in order to restore the confidence of the Korean people in the American army and the American way of life that we must send civilians to that country to act more or less as mediators. The jobs of these persons would be to explain to the Korean people why the army does certain things.

For example: in our Battalion Koreans that were working there would take empty beer bottles and want to take them home. We had thrown them away but when a Korean took one of them he was roughly handled and made to throw them in the trash can again. Why Koreans were not allowed to take them, I still do not know, but because of this many Koreans began to mock the army for they did not know why these bottles were kept from them.

Second, these people could help the Korean police get on the right track, by explaining to them the right way and the democratic way of governing a people. This would make the Korean police friends with the public instead of bitter enemies.

Third, and most important these mediators could do, would be to explain the American policy to the Korean people. In this way the Koreans could understand the American attitude toward Korea, and it would help the Koreans understand the American way of life, and what the American people really stand for.

**1947-1948**

But the story does not end there. Before I left that country we got word that the Communists in Northern Korea had reimbursed the Communists in Masan six million yen ($60,000) for their riot on Oct. 7; furthermore, a boatload of hand grenades from Northern Korea was landed on the Southern coast right under our noses. Because of all these occurrences I believe I am safe in saying that the years 1947 and 1948 will be the most crucial in that country.

**Task**

I would undertake the task alone if I could finance it. That is why I am writing this letter to you to see if something could not be done about it. I for myself would like to do something for those people since I have

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\(^{20}\) A battalion has between 500 and 1,000 soldiers.

\(^{21}\) The “Stars and Stripes” is a daily newspaper destined to US servicemen. There were several editions depending on the area.
seen their plight and know a little of how the Oriental mind works. I have already tried Civil Service. But all they want is stenographers and they would me under army control. I would like to undertake this sort of things from the summer of 1947 to 1948.

Please think this over and if anything can be arranged let me know. Answer my questions anyway.

Sincerely,
Harry Savage

After receiving a copy of this letter from NARA I asked the archivists is there were other similar letters written by former soldiers in Korea in the same box no 7389 of Record Group 59. They found none.

**Discrepancy between the Savage letter and G-2 accounts**

This letter gives a picture of uprising suppression in the fall of 1946 that is very different from what can be read in the G-2 reports. The differences concern:

- The number of US soldiers involved: platoons or small patrols of about 10 in the G-2 reports, whole battalions that is to say units of several hundred soldiers in the letter.
- The numbers of shots fired: at most one or two volleys in the G-2 reports, “machine guns kept blazing” in the letter.
- The number of Korean fatalities: always less than 10 in each separate incidents described in the G-2 reports, “scores of people killed” in the letter.

**Is the Savage letter trustworthy?**

This comparison immediately raises an important question: is this letter trustworthy? After all, it may be written by a Communist trying to vilify US occupation troops. In this respect one can make the following observations.

1. The fact that American newspapers gave very little information about the social upheavals occurring in South Korea can easily be checked by using the electronic search engines that are now available online for most national newspapers.
2. That US troops used heavy fire power which resulted in many victims is confirmed by three elements (see the chronology at the date of 2 and 7 October 1946).
   - In Taegu Colonel Potts refused to send in the 1st Infantry Regiment (3,000 soldiers) unless he was given a free hand in suppressing the uprising.
   - An account of the “International News Service” for the night of 2-3 October in Taegu said that the sound of gunfire did not stop throughout the night.
   - In the case of Masan, a US Army report says that “it was one of the bloodiest repulses of rioters” (7 Oct 1946). The same report says that after US troops fired into the crowd “8 rioters were killed and about 150 arrested” but gives no information about the number of wounded.
3. Many of the episodes described by Sgt Savage are confirmed by other sour-
ces. For instance the fact that US officers condoned torture by the Korean police is documented in several episodes and reported by different sources, including military sources (see below). Making Korean people kneel in the street is reported by a journalist of Time Magazine during the repression that followed the uprising of October 1948. The fact that the Korean police and the Korean people were “bitter enemies” is attested by all the outbursts of violence between them.

4 The sentence that Sgt Savage read in “Stars and Stripes” can also be read in many G-2 reports. In such reports US troops really seem to have super-natural powers because their mere appearance is enough to restore order, disperse demonstrators and make insurgents to surrender.

5 Sgt Savage is not overly critical. For instance, in the house searching episode he does not imply that the MP took advantage of such situations to take away clocks or other valuables, a behavior which is attested by other sources both in Japan and in Korea.

6 It should be observed that the letter was not destined to be made public. No copy was published in newspapers which means that it had no impact in terms of public relations and image.

7 Finally, one may wonder if there are other letters written by former GIs in Korea which may confirm the Savage document. As there were some 70,000 US troops in South Korea, one would expect similar letters to have been written. Yet, so far none had turned up. In this respect it can be noted that the Savage letter can be found at NARA in two different archives:

(i) Record Group 59 which contains State Department records.
(ii) Record Group 107 which contains the correspondence of Howard Charles Peterson, who was Assistant Secretary of War between 1945 and 1947.

Distorted account given by the London “Times” newspaper

Just as the “New York Times”, the “Times” of London has almost no articles about the uprisings of October 1946 in South Korea. Then, one late article (14 November p. 5, col F) gives a picture which is incompatible even with G-2 reports not to mention the Savage letter. After putting the blame for all problems of South Korea on the Communists, the article has the following section:

The strikes have led to disturbances so violent that they have come to be referred to locally as the October Revolution. So far, riots have been quelled by American trained Korean police and constabulary while American troops are confined to barracks.

For sensitive historical episodes it is sometimes a good tactic to use sources from a

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22 The name of this person is also written Howard Charles Petersen. In 1946 the two spellings were used in the New York Times for the Assistant Secretary of War. The Wikipedia article about this person uses “Petersen” but NARA seems rather to use “Peterson”. Needless to say, this dual spelling is an unwelcome source of confusion.
country which is not directly involved. Here, however, this tactic fails completely, probably because the accounts were censored at the source and journalists (whether American or non-American) were not allowed into the “critical areas”.

The previous account is not only wrong in its omission of the role of US troops but also in the fact that it mentions the Korean constabulary; in fact the constabulary was completely sidelined because it was still a fairly small force which in addition was hardly trustworthy (as confirmed by later events).

**Why did the letter sent by Mr. Savage get a broad diffusion?**

In documents of the State Department of April 1947 one learns more about the reactions brought about by this letter.

- First, one learns that Mr. Savage addressed the same letter to General Marshall. Although the letters did not reach either President Truman nor General Marshall they raised some interest among persons of the State Department who read it. Why?

- It seems that the State Department did not like the way the War Department managed the occupation of Korea and that it wanted to use the letter for the purpose of “civilianizing” the occupation. This is said very clearly in a message from Mr. Rudin to Mr. Gross. “This is an impressive letter. I would recommend that it be used as ammunition if and when snarks develop with the War Department in the plan to civilianize our administration of the occupation of Korea.”

- Copies of the letter were circulated. As a result the letter was read by General Hilldring (Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas from 1946 to 1947) and Howard G. Peterson (Assistant Secretary of War). This is why it can be found in their personal paper archives.

- In April 1947 Mr. Rhee was also disliked by the State Department. When he visited the United States the State Department sent the following instruction: “He is travelling in a private capacity. No unusual courtesy should be extended to him”. Indeed, for his return flight to Korea he had to use a plane chartered by a group of US businessmen. But Rhee still had the support of General MacArthur for being a staunch anti-Communist.

(STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 5)

**Low aircraft passes and strafing**

What means did occupation troops use against insurgents? This is of course a crucial question. If one believes the previous document to be trustworthy, one would conclude that a substantial amount of fire power was used. The documents in Fig. 1a,b suggest that fighter aircraft were used against “civil disturbances”.

As the documents in Fig. 1a,b are not easy to read, we give their transcription below.
This radiogram uses several abbreviations and code words. For instance the word “Able” belongs to the so-called phonetic alphabet and means just “A”. CMA (comma) and PD (period) are punctuation marks.

Fig. 1a: Radiogram ordering the end of strafing, 7 November 1946. The message number is contained in the parenthesis at the beginning. Although they are not readable on the photocopy, on the microfiche the last three digits of the radiogram number can be read as 038. In the answer (Fig. 2b) one learns that the whole reference number was CX 67038.

The formulation of the reply is somewhat surprising in the sense that the order concerned strafing not low passes. Low passes were fairly common and there would be no real reason for prohibiting them. Incidentally, it can be noted that strafing by aircraft is listed as a possible action against mobs (a mob being defined as a hostile crowd in this report) in the “Basic Field Manual FM 27-15” about “Domestic disturbances”. See in this respect the excerpts given in the chapter about incidents.

Source: Photocopy of a microfiche available at the National Diet Library in Tokyo. The NDL call numbers of the microforms are TS-00030 for 2a and TS-00029 for 2b (Top-secret records of various sections, 091 Korea # 1 to 091 Korea # 4, Box AG-3). The copy of the microfiche was made at the NDL on 8 December 2011. The microfiche is a copy of a document held at NARA (Record Group 331).

The answer to this instruction was sent on 8 November 1946.

Let us now take a broader view to see to what extent and in what circumstances strafing by aircraft is used as a means of crowd control.

**Strafing by aircraft during the Punjab uprising in 1919**

In British India strafing by aircraft was commonly used as a means of crowd control.
Prologue

One of the most well known cases occurred during the Punjab uprising of 1919. Here is a short description\(^\text{23}\).

News of the Amritsar killing of 13 April 1919 reached the town of Gujranwala leading students and migrant labourers from Kashmir to set ablaze the Kachi bridge, the district’s headquarters, the local courts, and the railway station. The local authorities asked for military help, and since the bridges to the town were destroyed, airplanes were used to put down the rebellion. Aircraft from Lahore dropped three bombs on protesting crowds on April 14 and 15, following it up with machine-gun fire. Ar-

\(^{23}\)The source is: http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1422/14220500.htm
moured trains were used to fire at demonstrators in Kasur. The official death toll, just 11 in the Gujranwala bombing and strafing, for example, appears laughable. A total of 334 people were reported killed in the uprising.

**Low level-show-of force flights**

So-called low level show-of-force flights are a common tactic of the US Air Force as attested by the following Internet excerpts.

- The 6th and 39th Bombardment Groups as well as the 40th Bomb Squadron took part in show-of-force flights over Japan before returning to the United States at the end of 1945 or beginning of 1946. (NDL, microfiche TS-91, Wikipedia article entitled “40th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron” and similar articles).
- 1958. During the Lebanon crisis US Air Force warplanes coming from Incirclik in Turkey carried out show-of-force flights over Beirut (Wikipedia article entitled “Incirlik Air Base” which is an US air base in Turkey.) Attack Squadron 83 participated in show-of-force flights over rebel-held parts of the country and up and down the Jordan River Valley in Jordan.
- 25 April 2007. GR-4 planes provided shows of force for coalition forces near a crowd of approximately 250 people near Baghdad. A JTAC (Joint Terminal Attack Controller) confirmed it dispersed the crowd and no attacks were reported.
- 2 May 2007. Near Mosul (Iraq), F-16 planes conducted a show of force to disperse a large group of people. A JTAC confirmed it was successful.
- Near Gereshk (Afghanistan) A-10s provided a show of force for a coalition convoy with a disabled vehicle. A JTAC reported it was successful and there were no attacks on the convoy.

There are also a number of documented cases where strafing and bombing by fighter aircraft was used against civilian insurgents. One of them was during the insurrection in Puerto Rico at the end of October 1950. The purpose of the uprising was to attract the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations on the colonial situation prevailing in Puerto Rico. The attacks by several P-47 Thunderbolt planes occurred in two towns located in the inland mountainous part of the island: Jayuya (17,000 inhabitants in 2010) and Utuado (33,000 inhabitants in 2010). The Wikipedia articles (in Spanish and English) about these towns tell us that they were bombed and strafed in support of a ground attack by the Puerto Rican National Guard. It is said that a substantial part of Jayuya was destroyed. Therefore one would expect fatalities not only among the insurgents but also in the population. However, the accounts24 do not mention any casualties in the population. In the last paragraph of the Wikipedia account of the insurrection in Jayuya it is said that “even though an extensive part

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24 There was a front page article in the newspaper “El Imparcial” of 1 November 1950. However, as the telephone lines had been cut there was no way to get any detailed information.
of the town was destroyed, news of the bombing was not reported outside of Puerto Rico. It was called an incident between Puerto Ricans by the media on the mainland.”

More information about the recourse to strafing can be found in the chronology chapter at the date of 15 November 1946.

**Trials by military tribunals**

As will be explained in more detail later on, there were two kinds of military tribunals: provost courts whose sentences were limited to up to 5 years at hard labor, and Military Commissions whose sentences had no limitation. These tribunals were specifically in charge of trying Koreans who had committed crimes against occupation forces or actions violating the rules set by the Military Government.

Trials by US military tribunals were a common feature of all the occupation episodes during or after World War II, whether in Hawaii (in this case the territory was put under martial law and military administration following the attack against Pearl Harbor), Italy, Germany, Japan or South Korea. For some reason these trials have received little attention from scholars. This is unfortunate because, if adequately documented, they could be a valuable source of information.

In the wake of the uprising of the fall of 1946, there were numerous trials both by provost courts and by Military Commissions. The document below describes the sentences in one of these trials. Unfortunately, all the documents of this kind follow the same stereotype and provide almost no specific information about what really happened.

**Organization of the general election of 1948**

**Interview of Police Chief Chang**

It is not really its content which makes the document shown below of great interest. The fact that the election of May 1948 was rigged is now widely recognized especially in South Korea itself. It was in fact just the first case in a long series of manipulated elections that dotted the following decades. So, if it is not its content, why is this document important? Its importance lies in its date, namely 29 March 1948 that is to say more than one month before the election, in its author, namely the Chief of Police, and in the person to whom the message was addressed, namely the US Secretary of State.

Of course, one knows that in March 1948 the Korean Police was still very officially under the control of the MG. In other words, the tactics used by the police with respect to the election had to be approved by the MG. However, the green light given
HEADQUARTERS XXIV CORPS
MILITARY COMMISSION ORDERS No 2 26 FEBRUARY 1947

Before a Military Commission which convened at Chinju [50 kilometers west of Pusan] on 30 January 1947 were tried:
Kang Dea Chang, Ku Yong Sik, Kang In Jung, Ku Sun Tae, Whang Koon Bong, Hurh Jung Sik, Sohn Duk Cho, Am Chong Jai.

**Charge:** Violation of Proclamation No. 2 of 7 September 1945.

Specification 1: On October 7-9 unlawfully assumed control of many of the residents of the province of Kyong Song Namdo with intent to subvert lawful authority.
Specification 2: Killed Kim Ul Do, a human being, by beating him with fists, clubs, stones and other instruments.
Specification 3: Assembled riotously and disturbed the peace of the place.

**SENTENCE**
As to all accused except Am Chong Jai [acquitted] and Sohn Duk Cho [5 years confinement]: to be hanged by the neck until dead. The execution of the sentence is withheld pending action by the Commander in Chief, Far East Command [i.e. Gen. MacArthur].

**Trial by Military Commission (excerpts).** There were many similar trials in relation with the rebellion of September-November 1946. In the 6 months between January and July 1947 there were 14; unfortunately we do not have similar data for the rest of the year. About 80% of the accused were sentenced to death but most of these sentences were commuted to life imprisonment.

The phrasing of the judgment was very much the same in all cases. It can be observed that all the charges refer to murder rather than any political crime. This is in accordance with the rules set by Field Manual No 31-15 (p. 24) which says.

“Charges of crimes against persons such as murder should be made rather than charges of crimes directly affiliated with the resistance movement that may result in martyrdom and serve as a rallying point for increased irregular activity”. *Source: RG 554, Box 170 (CKCLH).*

by MG officers is one thing and the approval extended by the Secretary of State is quite another thing. One knows that in the following weeks and months the State Department heavily insisted on the fact that it was a free election which attracted a strong participation of the Korean people. The turnout rate was even more important than the outcome because the act of voting meant tacit acceptance of the division of Korea. Eventually, the US government was able to sell this message first to the United Nations Temporary Commission, then to the General Assembly of the United Nations and finally to the rest of the western world.\(^\text{25}\)

In short, the whole operation was a great achievement and success in terms of public relations. It set a precedent for many similar cases that extended from 1948 up to the present time. For instance, one can mention the Egyptian elections under President Mubarak (the last one being in November 2010) or the elections in Afghanistan (e.g. the general election of September 2010).

\(^{25}\)In a subsequent section about the elections we give excerpts of an article published in “National Geographic” in June 1950 which conveys this message without voicing the slightest reservation
Subject: Interview with Metropolitan Police Chief Chang Teik Sang on the Korean political situation.

THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose a memorandum of conversation which a responsible officer of Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge’s staff had on March 22, 1948 with Metropolitan Police Chief CHANG Tai Sang. Police Chief Chang is, as the Department is possibly aware, a rather brusk individual who at times says what he really thinks. On this occasion he burst rather strongly on the situation in Korea which not only exasperates him but also foreign friends of the Korean cause.

[signed] Respectfully yours,

Joseph E. Jacobs, United States Political Adviser.

Enclosure to dispatch No. 71, March 29, 1948.

[transcription of the second paragraph]

In my honest opinion no more than 25% to 30% of the eligible voters will vote in the coming election. Americans fail to realize that 80% of the Koreans are illiterate. Will they walk many miles with a lunch box under their arms to vote for someone they don’t know or care about or for his political program which they will never understand? How does General Hodge think we manage to fill the stadium every time a demonstration is held? Those people didn’t go there willingly nor will they vote willingly.

If the police do not force the people to turn out for the election day the government elected will never be recognized by the General Assembly [of the United Nations]. A government elected by 25% of the people will make nice propaganda for the Soviets and poor propaganda for the Americans when it is declared void by the General Assembly.

It is necessary that the police “interfere” in the election or the majority of the Korean people, who are little more than animals due to their educational deficiencies, will sit in their “bloody, stinking rooms” and not budge one foot to vote. The police should not attempt to tell the people how to vote but if they are not forced to the polls, the Americans are due to be greatly embarrassed.

Prediction made by the US Labor Adviser in 1947

About one year before the election of May 1948, Stewart Meacham, Labor Adviser to General Hodge, made the following prediction (Meacham 1947, p. 31).

According to a check made in late 1946, 80% of the Korean police of rank of captain or better had been trained by and served under the Japanese. These could never survive an election unless somehow the victorious party turned out to be the one that needed Japanese-trained police. Any election held without first having police reform would be an election marred by privately-organized terrorists and police suppression of all campaign efforts hostile to their partisan interest.

In order to fully understand this judgment one should remember that the Japanese police was not only the police of an oppressive colonizer (as are more or less all colonizers) but also a police whose main role was to fight and suppress Commu-
Meacham’s prediction proved indeed correct as shown by the previous testimony of the police chief as well as by a later acknowledgment given below.

**Judgment of the Korea Herald**

Created in 1953, the “Korea Herald” was by no means a leftist newspaper. Yet, its judgment on the elections held during the presidency of Dr. Rhee does not leave any doubt regarding the massive amount of fraud.

Theoretically, parliament democracy requires periodic free elections. This was denied during the general elections conducted under the 12-year rule [1948-1960] of the Liberal regime [that is to say under President Rhee]. It was an open secret that police acquiesced at ballot changing, intimidation, and bribery in every general election which sent overwhelming numbers of Liberals to the National Assembly. On top of this political opponents were brutally suppressed or imprisoned. Even the courts lacked independence and sent political innocents to the chair [probably the electric chair] or to cells. (Korea Herald 15 August 1965 p. 7)

**Open questions**

In the history of the occupation of South Korea there are many crucial points about which there are two different versions.

Some of these issues are summarized below.

- Was strafing by US fighter aircraft used against Korean protesters and rebels particularly in October 1946 as suggested by the official US document presented above?
- Were there really scores of persons killed by US troops in the Masan uprising of 7 October 1948 as suggested by the letter written by Sergeant Savage to president Truman or were there only of the order of 10 as claimed by the official US history? More generally, if the same brutal repression tactic was used in other cities (e.g. Taegu or Kwanju) it would also make the death toll notably higher than stated in the G-2 reports.
- In a book by George Katsiaficas (2012, p. 97) one reads the following statement about the suppression of the Jeju island uprising in 1948-1949.

Some 18 warships provided by the United States to blockade the island bombarded defenseless villages with 39 mm caliber.

Did US warships really shell Jeju island in 1948 or 1949?

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26Incidentally, Meacham also set forth a broader proposition: “When fear of Communism and lack of faith in democracy cohabit they never fail to produce fascism.” In that he was correct too.
• In a book by Harold Sunoo (1979, p. 67) one reads the following statement about the suppression of the Yosu uprising in late October 1948.

  Government troops equipped with tanks and armored cars attacked Yosu on 24 October. They were supported by shell fire from American warships lying off shore.

Did US warships really shell Yosu in October 1948?

Clearly, in order to decide which one of these conflicting versions is correct, one needs more primary (possibly non-US) sources. No serious historian would be satisfied with the short statements cited above. One needs more detailed accounts including the names of the ships involved, the dates of the events, and possibly fatality estimates.
Chapter 1
Introduction

Overview

The second occupation of Korea in the 20th century

After the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, Korea was occupied by Japanese troops. This was the first instance of an occupation of Korea in the 20th century. Then, after the capitulation of Japan on 15 August 1945, Korea was occupied by American troops in the south and by Soviet troops in the North. The US occupation force comprised some 75,000 troops. Within a short time after this dual occupation the division between the two occupation zones along the 38th parallel became a fairly rigid borderline in spite of a strong aspiration for unification in the Korean population.

During 1945-1948 South Korea was governed by a Military Government headquartered in Seoul and by military governors in each of the provinces. The purpose of the present study is to describe this occupation by focusing on the relations between the population and the occupation force.

In 1945 the population of South Korea numbered about 16 millions whereas the population of Japan numbered 72 millions. It is interesting to compare the ratio of occupation troops to population in both countries. In South Korea it was: $\frac{75,000}{16,000,000} \approx 0.50\%$ whereas in Japan it was: $\frac{180,000}{71,000,000} \approx 0.25\%$. In other words, the number of occupation troops with respect to population was twice as high in South Korea than in Japan.

Official history of the US occupation

At first sight the term official history may seem surprising. Most American scholars would contend that in the US there is no official history. This is not true for military history, however. In particular, there is indeed an official history of the US occupation of Japan and Korea. It was the duty of the historical section of SCAP in Japan to write

\[27\] In both countries, the strength of the occupation forces decreased in the course of time. The figures which are given correspond to 1946. For Japan they also include the Commonwealth force.
For Japan this section produced 55 volumes\textsuperscript{28}. Such accounts provide detailed information about some aspects of the occupation but omit others, e.g. the activity of military tribunals or the incidents which occurred between the occupation troops and the population.

Of course, this would not constitute a problem if subsequently these aspects had been explored by other historians, but the fact is that they were not.

In a general way, the occupation of Korea has received much less attention from historians than the occupation of Japan. For instance, the Wikipedia article entitled “United States Army Military Government in Korea” is fairly laconic; less than 10 lines are devoted to the question of the tumultuous relations between the Korean population and the occupation troops.

With the creation of its historical section, the War Department took up the systematic task of writing historical accounts of all the episodes in which US forces were involved\textsuperscript{29}. For instance, the book entitled “Military advisers in Korea: KMAG in war and peace” by Major Robert K. Sawyer was published in 1962 as a project of the “Office of the Chief of Military History” (OCMH). At that time the Chief Historian was Dr. Stetson Corm who had succeeded to Dr. Kent R. Greenfield. Incidentally, it can be observed that in the official Korean history of the ROK Army from 1945 to 1949 (which has been translated from Korean into English) there is a complete disregard of US military advisers (Sawyer 1962, p. 194). This is hardly surprising of course.

Apart from the official history written by military historians, many accounts that may at first sight be attributed to scholars were in fact written by civil servants or by former military. Here are a few examples:

- Grant Meade (1951) who authored one of the earliest studies of the occupation had been a civil affair officer in Korea.
- John Merrill who wrote an account of the Cheju rebellion and a book entitled “Korea: the peninsular origins of the war” was (or became later) an analyst in charge of North Korean affairs at the State Department.
- Gregory Henderson who wrote “The Politics of the Vortex” spent 7 years at the US embassy in Seoul and worked at the State Department in Washington. The thesis of his book, namely that foreign influence is of marginal importance and that the history of Korea can be explained as a purely endogenous process suits remarkably well the needs of the State Department. Of course, we do not imply

\textsuperscript{28}The collection is entitled “History of the non-military activities of the occupation of Japan, 1945-1951”. Issued by General Headquarters, SCAP.

\textsuperscript{29}This is not specific to the United States. In the reference section we mention the official history of the New Zealand involvement in the Vietnam War written by Ian McGibbon (2010), an historian in the employment of the Ministry of Culture which funded the publication of the book.
that this was the author’s acknowledged purpose but the fact that so many Harvard researchers took an interest in the book certainly contributed to its success\(^\text{30}\).

- Alan Millett who wrote several studies about the role of James Hausman and about the Korean War had been a US Marines officer for 30 years.

On the contrary, books whose message was not consistent with the official historical account had but a small diffusion or even would not be published. This is illustrated by the two following cases.

- As Grant Meade, Richard D. Robinson has been working for the Military Government in Korea. Yet, in contrast to Meade, he left Korea in deep disagreement with the policy of the Military Government. He described his experience in a book entitled “Betrayal of a nation”. To this day the book has never been published. In spite of the fact that some copies of the manuscript are available in a few US libraries, the book has not yet been made available on the Internet.

- Richard Robinson was a liberal. Such was also the case of Alfred Hussey who was a civil affairs officer in Japan in charge of political issues. He is well known for the role he played in the writing of the Japanese constitution. Yet, when he tried to publish a book about his experience, he never found a publisher in spite of the fact that Hussey’s wife had close family connections with major New England publishers\(^\text{31}\).

Can one expect authors working for the State Department to give an honest and accurate account of US involvement in South Korea which, ipso facto, would be in contradiction with the non-interference policy claimed by the State Department? A look at Merrill’s study on Cheju Do provides a quick answer. In spite of being very detailed and well researched as far as Korean affairs are concerned, it just ignores all basic facts about US involvement even those which are of prime importance e.g. the agreement of August 1948 between President Rhee and the Commander of US forces (see below).

**Bruce Cumings**

In the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s the main expert on modern Korean history was undoubtedly University of Chicago Professor Bruce Cumings\(^\text{32}\). In 1981 and 1990 he successively published two big volumes (608 and 976 pages respectively) devoted to the period 1945-1950. Subsequently, he published a broader study of Korea’s modern history which covers the whole period 1860-1996 (Cumings 1997, 527 pages).

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\(^{30}\)The book’s preface was written by Samuel Huntington from the Harvard School of Government, an institution which has a strong connection with the State Department.

\(^{31}\)Whereas Robinson published several books after his first unsuccessful attempt, Hussey did not have that opportunity. After his stay in Japan he became a CIA case officer. More details can be found in “Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan” by the present author.

\(^{32}\)This subsection was submitted to Prof. Bruce Cumings on 2 April 2012 to give me the opportunity to correct anything that he might find inappropriate.
Actually, Bruce Cumings was much more than just an historian. As a matter of fact, he took an active part in several episodes of importance in the relationship between South Korea and the United States.

- He first came to Korea as a “Peace Corps” volunteer in 1967-1968, an experience which raised his interest for this country and led him to the writing of a PhD thesis about the occupation period. The thesis was submitted to Columbia University in 1975.
- In 1972 while he was working on his thesis in Seoul one of his friends in Tokyo sent him an article about a South Korean dissident, Suh Sung, who had been arrested in March 1971. The tragedy of Suh’s incarceration and torture had a huge influence on Bruce Cumings subsequent career. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, he worked for his liberation. Suh was eventually released on 28 February 1990 (see below).
- In July 1973 Bruce Cumings came into contact with Kim Dae Jung, (who became president of South Korea in February 1998) when Kim visited the University of Washington and gave a lecture there. It was the beginning of a durable relationship.
- In 1976 Prof. Cumings was invited to testify before Congressman Lester Wolff’s East Asia committee (Cumings 1976).
- In December 1978 Prof. Cumings received a phone call from Professor Thayer’s office inviting him to a conference on North Korea to be held in Washington. As he knew [one wonders how he was able to know that] that Professor Nathaniel Thayer from Johns Hopkins University was at that time the CIA’s chief for East Asia, he asked for a written invitation. After being answered “We never send written invitations”, he decided not to attend. It seems that the main purpose of this conference was to convince the audience that a major North Korean military built up was under way, which was a way to counter plans made by the Carter administration for withdrawing some US troops from Korea.
- In 1983, Prof. Cumings received the John K. Fairbank Prize for the first volume of “The origins of the Korean war” that was published in 1981.
- After the publication of the first volume of “The origins of the Korean War”, the American Embassy in Seoul became convinced that this work was one cause of the anti-American attitude of Korean students (Cumings 1997, p. 385). As Cumings rightly observes in his book of 1997, this was pure nonsense for their hostility had much more to do with the steadfast support that Washington had provided to successive South Korean dictators. In the late 1987-1988 Bruce Cumings was repeatedly solicited by the “Voice of America” and the “US Information Agency” (USIA) to

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33Personal communication, 18 February 2011.
34In Cumings (1997, p. 367) one learns that in 1980 when Kim was indicted for treason his criticism of the Park government in his lecture at the University of Washington was included in the indictment.
give interviews that would then be broadcast in Korea. At one point the American director of the Fulbright program in Seoul told Cumings that he should give lectures to correct and improve the opinion of students about the role of the United States in Korea. Although Cumings says that he refused, he also says that a number of other US historians accepted such invitations (Cumings 1997, p. 386). For more details see below.

It is interesting to observe that there were similar public relation campaigns in the opposite direction as well. In Cumings (1997, p. 367) one learns that many American universities accepted large grants from the “Korean Trader’s Scholarship Foundation”, a front for KCIA [Korean CIA] attempts to influence scholarly studies of Korea in the United States (as shown by a congressional investigation).

- On 8 February 1985 Kim Dae Jung returned to Korea after an exile in the United States. Prof. Cumings was part of the four-member American delegation (including two Congressmen) that accompanied Kim back to Seoul. More details about the scuffle that occurred at Kimpo airport can be found in the chronology.
- Around 1987 the United States Information Agency office in Seoul invited several historians to lecture on Korean history allegedly to counter the views presented by leftist researchers. These included James Matray and Michael Schaller, historians at the University of New Mexico and the University of Arizona respectively, and John Merrill of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence Research (Cumings 1996).
- On 28 February 1990, SUNG Suh was released from prison. In the following months he had the opportunity to meet Nelson Mandela who became president of South Africa in May 1994, Senator Edward Kennedy, Prof. Gavan MacCormak of the Australian National University and Prof. Bruce Cumings.
- In a 1996 paper Prof. Cumings wrote: “During the course of my career thus far, I have been asked several times to consult with the Central Intelligence Agency, or to offer my views on Korea to their agents. I have never done so, except in forums where CIA people may be present among various other specialists and which do not require security clearances to attend (such as conferences at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington)”.
- In May 2007 Prof. Cumings received the first “Kim Dae Jung Academic Award for Outstanding Achievements and Scholarly Contributions to Democracy, Human Rights and Peace”.

In short, from the very start of his research about Korea and up to the present time Prof. Bruce Cumings has had much more contacts with top level politicians (either in

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35 Like “Radio Liberty” or “Radio Free Europe”, the “Voice of America” and the USIA were in charge of what is called “public diplomacy” that is to say the public relations campaigns by which the State Department is successfully promoting the image of the United States across the world.
South Korea or in the United States) than is customary for a history professor. This, of course, is mainly due to the fact that the history of Korea is a highly sensitive topic.

Of course, all these activities and links do not mean that an historian should lose his ability to conduct his investigations in an objective way. As a matter of fact, on account of Bruce Cumings’ critical attitude with respect to lobbying attempts in academic studies, one would expect him to “tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth”.

Did he really search the whole truth, particularly with respect to US involvement in the South Korean civil war?
Here are a few observations.

1 Prof. Cumings conducted extensive investigations in US Military archives. Inevitably one comes across reports of trials by US military tribunals for there have been several thousand trials of that kind during the time of the Military Government. These trials are also mentioned repeatedly in the (unpublished) book by Richard Robinson. Though unpublished, this book is available in manuscript form at the Harvard Yenching library and has been widely used by US historians. It is cited in the bibliography of Cumings (1981). Yet, those trials are hardly ever mentioned in the books written by Prof. Cumings. Even after I mentioned this point to him he was hardly eager to get more information about such trials.

2 Prof. Cumings has read the daily and weekly G-2 intelligence reports with more attention than most other researchers. Inevitably one comes across reports of US soldiers being shot or stabbed by Koreans (for such cases see below). Yet, no such fatalities are reported in Cumings’ books. Once, when I raised this question, he answered (email of 24 January 2008): “I never came across American fatalities as a result of hostile action by Koreans during the occupation of Korea”. He carefully added: “That, of course, doesn’t mean they didn’t happen”.

3 Regarding clashes between US forces and Korean protesters in 1945-1948, Cumings’ accounts are short and basically similar to the descriptions found in G-2 reports, basically “Tactical troops were sent in and restored order”. Such one-sentence descriptions are obviously inadequate for anybody who wishes to understand what really happened. Any serious researcher would try to find more information in other sources than US military reports.

Although Prof. Cumings is able to read Korean, it does not seem that he ever tried to use reports from Korean newspapers (or other Korean sources) to investigate this question more closely. During his visit to Pyongyang in 1987 did he try to use the news archives of the “Korean Central News Agency” (KCNA) to learn more about the clashes in South Korea? It does not seem so\textsuperscript{36}.

\textsuperscript{36}Of course, we do not intend to say that these reports are 100\% reliable (neither are those from other sources) but they
As far as I know none of the documents presented in the Prologue are discussed (or even mentioned) in Cumings’ books.

The letter written by Sergeant Harry Savage (reproduced in the Prologue) has been known since 2003. It raises serious questions about what really happened in Tongyong and Masan in October 1946. Was it rifle fire or, as said in the letter, machine-guns “kept blazing”? It does not seem that Prof. Cumings ever tried to investigate these events as well as similar ones more closely. The same observation applies to possible strafing incidents (also cited in the Prologue).

On many occasions in what follows we will point out that the documents which would be required to draw clear conclusions are in fact not available. For instance, the archives of military tribunals are not yet available. Also, we do not know the the monthly counts of US fatalities (see below in this respect). Clearly any cautious researcher should emphasize such limitations and refrain from giving the impression that what he was able to discover is the definitive truth.

In conclusion, one can say that in some respects the books written by Bruce Cumings give a view which is different from what can be found elsewhere. For instance, the picture of North Korea given in Cumings (1997) greatly differs from other US accounts.

However, when it comes to the role played by US troops in the suppression of Korean uprisings, then his version is basically the same as the one given in the official military history.

We already made the same observation for John Merrill’s book about Jeju Do. Although a pioneering study in many respects, it completely left out the US role.

**Korean studies in American and British universities**

As already said above, in “Korea’s place in the Sun” (p. 367) Prof. Cumings tells his readers that back in the 1970s the “Korean Trader’s Scholarship Foundation”, so to say an arm of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, was trying through its grants to influence scholarly studies of Korea done in American universities. It may be interesting to find out which universities accepted such grants.

Before answering this question it must first be observed that in the late 1970s the “Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation” was renamed “Korea Sanhak Foundation” (KSF). Both the former and the later were arms of the “Korea International Trade Association” (KITA). With 65,000 member companies, KITA is the largest business association in Korea.

Started around 1975, the funding by Korean foundations of Korean research institu-
tions in the United States expanded in the following decades. In a paper published in May 1996, Bruce Cumings observed that “today nearly all funding for studies of Korea in the United States comes from South Korean sources” (Cumings 1996).

The following examples are given for the purpose of illustration; the list does not in any way intend to be exhaustive.

- **Harvard University.** In 1975 Harvard accepted a $13 million grant from the “Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation”. The person who “supervised” the gift to Harvard was Han Pyong-gi, the KCIA chief in the United States at the time and a son-in-law of President Park Chung Hee. The gift has provided for support of junior faculty and for the funding of the Yoon Se Young chair which for some time was occupied by Prof. Carter Eckert who was also acting director of Harvard’s Korea Institute.

In December 2009 there was a new agreement between KITA and Harvard which broadened the previous gift [the announcement does not say by how much]. The new funds may be used for visiting faculty appointments, dissertation research and writing, graduate fellowship support, and research programs in modern Korean economy and society.\(^{37}\)

- **Sheffield University.** Programs in Korean Studies at Sheffield were established in 1979 with a five-year grant from the Sanhak Foundation (formerly the Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation) providing support for a lecturer and an instructor in Korean language. These posts became permanent in 1986, and subsequently two further lectureships have been created and made permanent.\(^{38}\)

- **University of Hawaii.** In spite of demands made by the university, the “Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation” merely handed out individual grants. For example, a listing of their grants for 1979 includes $25,000 to Donald Zagoria for research on “the Soviet Role in Asian Security”. Somehow Professor Zagoria failed to acknowledge that support when he published “Soviet Policy in East Asia” in 1982.

- **1977.** The “Korean Traders Scholarship Foundation” also supported research in scientific fields. For instance, in a mathematical paper entitled “A characterization of the unitary group \(U_4\) by one central involution” published in the “Journal of the Korean Mathematical Society”, the researcher acknowledged support from this organization.

- **Translations.** In 1984 an English translation of “Hanguksa sillon” (A new history of Korea) was published. In the preface to the translation it is said that it was partly funded by the “Foundation of the Korean Traders Association”. As at that time only a highly biased historical account could possibly be published in Korea,

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\(^{37}\) The source is Cumings (1996) and: http://alumni.harvard.edu/stories/kita-and-harvard-connect-advance-korean-scholarship

one realizes why this funding was indispensable. In other words, it was clearly an operation of disinformation.

- Columbia University (1978). A $250,000 contribution of the “Foundation of the Korean Traders Association” will made possible the renovation of the East Asian Library in Kent Hall.

What conclusions should one draw from these cases? Endowed chairs, that is to say chairs whose salaries are paid by the interest of a gift (endowment) made by a sponsor, are nothing new. In “Politics and the academy”, Richard Clogg tells the story of the endowed chair held by the British historian Arnold Toynbee back in 1918 and how he was dismissed after he published a fairly balanced account of the clashes between Greeks and Turks which displeased his sponsors.

Needless to say, this kind of problem is inherent to the very nature of an endowed chair. When wealthy persons and organizations give a lot of money, usually they expect something in return. Often it is claimed that “there are no strings attached” but there may be some secret parts in the agreement which will come to light when there is a problem. This is what happened in Toynbee’s case.

In recent decades endowed chairs have become more common. As a result, lobbying has taken an ever increasing role in universities and especially in private universities. In such a process it is truth that is usually the first casualty.

**About the NPRC data**

There would be a fairly easy way to find out the truth. When servicemen die the Pentagon must keep track of their death in order to pay to their relatives (wife, parents or children) the pensions to which they are entitled. Information of this kind is kept at the NPRC-MPR (National Personnel Records Center, Military Personnel Records). Located in St Louis, Missouri, this Center is the repository of millions of military personnel records of discharged and deceased veterans of all services during the 20th century. I tried to contact this center by mail, by email and by phone. To no avail.

As I am not an American citizen, it is perhaps understandable that I did not get access to this information. Did Prof. Cumings also try to get access to the NPRC data? “No, I didn’t” he replied on 22 January 2008. In response, I suggested that a phone call might be sufficient to learn what information was available to researchers. It

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39The source is a document entitled “Institutions and organizations” on: https://ojs.lib.byu.edu. Incidentally, it can be observed that in Cumings (1996) it is stated that “after the Harvard effort, Columbia University sought similar funding from the Korean Traders but failed because of faculty and student outrage precisely over published details of the Harvard case”. This does not seem to be true.

40In spite of his reservations about endowed chairs, Prof. Cumings is the Gustavus F. and Ann M. Swift Distinguished Professor at the University of Chicago, obviously an endowed chair.

41In fact, I never got a personal answer, only standardized negative replies.

42Needless to say, both Cumings and myself were only interested in numbers, not in personal data; for instance how
is quite possible that the NPRC would have responded that it did not have enough personnel to handle such demands, but surprising as it may seem, the fact is that neither Cumings nor any of the other American colleagues that I solicited ever tried to find out what the NPRC was possibly willing to offer. Such a reluctance to search for “hard data” is regrettable because such data would really throw a new light on occupation episodes.

**Trials by military tribunals**

Even though the NPRC data are out of reach, one can nevertheless try to make some progress. Just as for other occupation episodes, the main alternative source of information is through the accounts of trials before US military tribunals. As one knows, there are two kinds of military tribunals:

- Military Commissions which try serious crimes and can inflict any sentence including the death sentence.
- Provost courts which try smaller offenses and can inflict prison terms of up to 5 years.

The first question one must address is how many trials of each kind have taken place in South Korea. For provost court trials one learns that over the two-year period from September 1945 to June 1947 at least 3,000 persons were sentenced to prison terms comprised between 3 months and 5 years (Korean Independence 25 June 1947). Of course, this figure does not tell us how many provost court trials there have been because a large number of them may have resulted in lighter sentences.

So far, we did not find similar data for the number of trials before military commissions, but some information is available for specific trials. For instance, after the uprisings of September-October 1946, some 1,500 persons were prosecuted of whom 500 had been convicted by the end of 1946. There were many capital sentences. Many of them were commuted to life imprisonment but it is not clear whether all of them were commuted. Another trial before a military commission took place at Chunju on 3 May 1947 at which four men were sentenced to death and 3 to life imprisonment. The 4 death sentences were commuted to life imprisonment in June 1947 (Korean Independence 25 June 1947).

Of course, in all these cases, historians would like to know in a fairly detailed way the crimes with which these persons were charged. For this purpose it would be necessary to have access to the proceedings of the trials. So far, this was not possible. This question of the trials by US military tribunals will be examined in more detail in a subsequent chapter.

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many servicemen died monthly in Korea? And similar questions for Germany, China or Japan.
Comparisons

Another way to get an insight into what really happened in Korea is to make comparisons with episodes which were basically similar, but for which censorship was lighter. In a following chapter we try to estimate respective levels of censorship in different occupation areas. It turns out that the level of censorship was lightest where several powers took part in the occupation and the heaviest when only one power was in charge (as was the case in South Korea). The first situation happened in Germany and also in the area of Japan which was occupied by British and Commonwealth troops. Now, what do we see in these areas?

- Bombs exploded in Allied Headquarters (e.g. in Berlin) or in the buildings housing special courts created by the occupants.
- On several occasions GIs were strangled or shot at and sometimes killed.
- On many occasions shots were fired on special trains transporting Allied troops. Stone throwing on trains or Allied vehicles was also common place.
- Military telephone lines were cut, warehouses or garages for trucks were set afire.

What are the reasons which make us expect similar disturbances in South Korea?

1. In South Korea a substantial part of the population became hostile to US occupation forces as soon as it appeared that they would impose trusteeship, support Syngman Rhee and keep the police force that was organized by the Japanese. In other words, motives of conflict did exist.

2. Was there a structured opposition movement which could translate this hostility into acts against occupation troops? To answer this question one should analyze guerrilla activity during the Japanese occupation. So far, we did not study this question in a detailed way but it would probably appear that armed resistance was strongest in North Korea because this area bordered Manchuria, a region where guerrilla warfare against the Japanese was encouraged from several sides, by the Chinese Nationalist government, by the Chinese Communist Party and by the Soviet Union. In short, at the beginning of the occupation organized resistance was probably at a rather low level but it developed in the following years.

3. A case which parallels fairly closely the case of South Korea is Greece 1944-1949.

As one knows, in 1941 Greece was invaded by Germany and Italy. As in many other occupied countries a strong resistance movement developed in which Communists took a prominent role. After the withdrawal of the Germans in 1944, the leftist groups who had fought the Germans enjoyed a high degree of popularity and were in a position to become the

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43 Mark Gayn (1946) witnessed a brawl between a Korean and an American in the streets of Seoul. His guide told him that such incidents were frequent and that they generated much resentment against the Americans.
natural leaders of the country. Yet, precisely because they were leftists they were considered with much suspicion by the British and the Americans to the point that British troops were sent in to fight and contain them. The British arrived in Greece after the German withdrawal in October 1944 and, just as for American troops in Korea, they were at first welcomed by the ELAS resistance movement. Soon, however, the British allied themselves with the most conservative parties and personalities and began to fight the ELAS.

As the British were not entirely successful in their attempt to suppress the leftist guerrilla, they asked for the help of the United States. From July 1947 weapons and “advisers” began to pour into Greece. After having been a client state of Britain, Greece became a client state of the United States. This produced the same results as in South Korea. As an example, one can mention the emergence of the KYP which was the parallel of the KCIA and used the same kinds of torture methods.

There was also a link between Greece and Korea in terms of personnel. After having been the head of the “Joint United States Military Advisory and Planning Group” (JUSMAPG) in Greece from 1948 to 1950, General James A. Van Fleet became the commander of UN forces in Korea. Similarly, after having gained much counter-insurgency experience in Greece, Lt. Col. Williams A. Dodds became the senior adviser of counter-insurgency in South Korea during the Korean War.

In conclusion one would expect hostile actions against occupation forces similar to those seen in Germany. The chronology chapter shows that this is indeed the case. Moreover, an increase in the frequency of such actions would seem plausible, in line with the growing gulf between the South Korean government and the population. In this respect it should be recalled that the party of Syngman Rhee suffered a crushing defeat in the general election that took place in 1950 just a few weeks before the outbreak of the Korean War.

**Personal interactions**

**Interaction between the MG and the Korean population**

Independently of the political issues and circumstances which brought US military personnel and part of the Korean population against one another, what were the relations at a more personal level? In this regard we have the testimony of Richard Robinson who was a MG officer in 1946-1947 (Robinson 1947 p. 306).

According to the regulations laid down by General Hodge, it was strictly forbidden for an American to go into a Korean home even if invited, to invite Koreans

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44Officially, US advisers took no part in the fighting. When, on 23 January 1949, the plane of Lt Colonel Selden R. Edner was shot down it was emphasized in the New York Times that he was on an unarmed mission. However, the real objective of his mission in flying over a rebel area was not clearly explained.
into his home, to enter Korean restaurants, to ride in a Korean car or date a Korean girl. Special permission in writing from XXIV Corps Headquarters was required for each occasion of this sort. In short, there was no place where Americans and Koreans could mix socially and get to know one another.

The first question that CIC agents asked when inquiring into the loyalty of servicemen or officers was “Do you have any Korean friends”. My wife and I were threatened with court martial for joining a group of American newspapermen in a banquet in a Korean restaurant.

**Interactions between American and Russian military personnel**

According to Robinson there was the same lack of interaction between American and Russian officers stationed in South Korea mainly because the American Command did not want to see friendly relations established between US and Soviet personnel. Such relations were not formally prohibited (at least not until mid-1947) but they were disapproved and considered unwelcome. Robinson gives several stories which illustrate this situation.

- In June 1947, one of the Soviet liaison officers in Seoul commented to Robinson that he had long been a great admirer of all things American but that he could not understand why his own superiors allowed him to see all the American motion pictures he wished but that the American Command would not let any Russian film be shown to interested Americans. “What is your General afraid of?” asked the Russian to Robinson.

- This assertion got confirmation through the experience of an American officer working in the Department of Commerce of the MG. Knowing that the Russians had a collection of motion pictures, the American asked one of his Russian acquaintances to show some films on Soviet agriculture and industry to some of the people in his Department. The Russians did so. Soon after the American officer received an official reprimand from General Hodge.

- A US Army sergeant of Russian extraction conceived the idea of giving English lessons to some of the Soviet liaison personnel living in Seoul. At first he was able to get official permission from XXIV Corps to do so. As a result he became quite friendly with a number of Soviet officers, which in turn lead to a number of social meetings. Then, in mid-June 1947, the sergeant was transferred permanently out of Korea. Why? Robinson learned that it was because he had become the center of the Russian-American social group.

- Robinson says that in 1946 and early 1947 he was personally able to have some discussions with Russian officers but that all this came to an end by mid-1947. After that anyone who looked at a Russian automatically became a “known Communist”. Robinson and his wife left Korea in early September 1947.
Relations between the MG and Korean authorities

Formally, there were four phases.

4. Korean War during which Korean forces were again under UN (i.e. basically US) command.

Korea People’s Republic

Between the Japanese defeat on 15 August 1945 and the arrival of US troops in September the so-called Korea People’s Republic Committees took over the local administration. This process was in a sense similar to what happened in France in the months following June 1944 when the officials appointed by the provisional government of General de Gaulle occupied the positions formerly occupied either by German authorities or by officials of the Vichy government. However, there was also a major difference with the case of France in the sense that the Korea People’s Republic Committees did not represent the Korean Government in exile. As a matter of fact, as soon as Kim Koo and Syngman Rhee would return to Korea they started a power struggle against the People’s Republic with the support of the Military Government.

Whereas in France the administration appointed by the provisional government was eventually recognized by the Allies\textsuperscript{45}, in Korea it was not.

US Military Government

US troops landed in Inchon on 7 September and in following weeks they progressively occupied the whole country, evicted the representatives of the People’s Republic government and replaced them by US officers. This marked the beginning of the United States Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK). However, in many cities this eviction process lead to confrontation and disturbances. Unfortunately, the military sources (for instance the G-2 intelligence periodic reports) give very little details\textsuperscript{46}. It took a few months to establish Military Governors in all provinces of South Korea. Their appointments and those of American officers to the vari-

\textsuperscript{45} Although the provisional government itself was not officially recognized by the Roosevelt administration until September 1944.

\textsuperscript{46} A website (http://www.the7thfire.com/Politics\textunderscore and\textunderscore History) claims that by December 1945 the combination of the KNP (Korean National Police), the newly created Constabulary, the right-wing paramilitary units and US forces had brought down the insurrections in all provinces. Some 1,000 Koreans were killed in the process and about 30,000 were jailed. Local leaders of the popular movement were either dead, in jail, or driven underground. However, no sources are provided in support of these statements. Moreover, it is hardly possible that the Constabulary took an active part because it was set up only in 1946. Even, during the uprisings that occurred in the fall of 1946, it was basically useless as a military force.
ous ministries of the Military Government were published in the “Official Gazette”. For instance in Volume 2 of this publication one reads that on 14 November 1945 Brigadier General Lawrence E. Schick was appointed Director of National Defense of the Military Government of Korea, that is to say Minister of Defense even though the word was not used. Similarly, Colonel Glenn Newman was appointed Acting Secretary of the Intelligence and Information section.

**Proclamations, directives, special orders, ordinances**

During almost three years South Korea was ruled by the US Military Government. During this time a number of proclamations, directives, special orders, ordinances were issued which in a sense paralleled the so-called SCAPINs (Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instructions) that MacArthur’s headquarters wrote and addressed to the Japanese Government.

It would certainly be enlightening to be able to read *all* these instructions and decisions. Unfortunately, we do not yet know of any comprehensive source. As far as the ordinances are concerned there are two sources which give partial information

- The Official Gazette of the USAMGIK (4 volumes) gives the text of the Ordinances number 119 to 218 (Nov 1946–August 1948).

Some specific ordinances are mentioned in the chronology chapter (see for instance 12 November 1947).

**After 15 August 1948**

In fact, after 15 August 1948 there was a change in names. USAMGIK became the Civil Affairs Group of USAFIK and later on USAFIK itself became USMAGIK (US Military Advisory Group in Korea). However, in the mind of the US Command these changes were merely changes in name rather than in substance. This is clearly revealed by a letter sent by the Commanding General to the chiefs of the provincial military government groups on 8 August 1948 (see the text of the letter in the chronology chapter at this date). The enduring US control resulted from four circumstances:

- The personnel selected and recruited by the Military Government both at government and provincial level did keep its positions.
- US civil and military advisers were present at all levels of the Korean administration.
- Command of the Korean police and Constabulary remained in US hands, especially in case of emergency.
- During all the period between 15 August 1948 and the beginning of the Korean
Chapter 1

War there were still American troops in Korea. It is true that their number had been progressively reduced, but in counting them one often tends to forget the Navy and Air Force. For instance on 18 July 1949 (that is to say one year before the Korean War) a US fleet consisting of the cruiser “Manchester” and auxiliary units visited South Korea in replacement of the troops that had been withdrawn. The Korean government put at their disposal the ports of Inchon, Pusan, Yosu, Mukho and the former Japanese Naval Base of Chinhae.

This leads us to the exploration of the connection between the US Army and the South Korean Army, a key point in the history of this period.

**US troops in Cheju Do**

In some accounts it is said that there were no US troops on Cheju Island. This is not true, however. As shown in Document 1 there were US troops on Cheju Island in 1948. In particular, there was a Military Government Company which was supported by tactical troops from the 20th Infantry Regiment. The report about a fire which destroyed the house of a dependent on Cheju Do on 13 January 1948 mentions the “20th Inf. Rgt. assigned to Cheju Do” (NARA, RG 554, Box 129, Reports of fires and other accidents 1948.)

The source in Doc. 1 describes the situation in 1948, but it was similar in previous years. In this respect one should recall that the overall number of US troops in South Korea was larger in 1945-1947 than in 1948. A direct testimony of the presence of US troops on Cheju Island in 1947 is provided on a website of Korean veterans by Mr. Joseph W. Grossman. He posted a message (dated 24 May 2010) which says that the 2nd Battalion [between 500 and 1,000 troops] of the 20th Regiment was sent to Cheju Do in the Spring of 1947 for 6 weeks.

**Attitude of US authorities about brutality of police**

In a book by Shin (1996, p. 147-148) we read the following. A July 1946 report by Lieutenant Colonel Rankin Roberts and Captain Richard Richardson of the Military Government told of widespread police abuse of power, beatings and torture. In August 1946 Colonel William Maglin warned against police unpopularity, advising that “too much torture was still being practiced by police”.

This would suggest that using torture was a traditional way of the Korean police.

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47In an email to the author (dated 8 December 2010) Mr. Grossman kindly gave some precisions. On the mainland his Regiment was based at Anderson Camp at Yosu. The barracks consisted partly of Quonset huts (that is to say half cylindrical metallic housing units) and partly of wooden two-story buildings formerly used by the Japanese army. On Cheju Island Mr. Grossman’s unit was lodged in wooden one-story former Japanese barracks.
(a feature which may have developed during the Japanese occupation) but that US authorities were trying to correct this behavior.

This is perhaps true for some American officers such as Colonel Roberts and Captain Richardson but certainly not for Colonel Maglin. Indeed, Col. Maglin was the Director of the Police and the following excerpt clearly shows that he did not disapprove the use of beatings. On the contrary, he was trying to suppress any investigation of police abuse by officers of USAFIK.

**A case of torture in Masan**

Another confirmation comes from a letter written by a US sergeant (see Harry Savage document) in late 1946. Speaking of the repression which followed the insurrection of October 1946 he describes the following scene in Masan.

“The Korean police gathered some 300 persons mostly at random and made them kneel in front of the police station for around 4 hours. Every now and then they would take a few of them inside and then the torture would begin. Many of the GIs got very angry at this but most of the officers stood calmly by and let the beatings go on. In fact our Division sent a letter to our battalion to the effect not to criticize what the police were doing”.

The author of this letter does not seem to be aware of the fact that in 1946 the Korean police was under the authority of the MG.

**A case of torture in Taegu**

It follows from this account that at the highest level, namely the Director of the Korean Police, the Americans did not disapprove the use of beatings by the police. In the present case because of the high positions occupied by the two victims, it can even be said that the beatings required the approval of American authorities.

The sequence of events was probably the following.

- The two executives criticized the MG; it would of course be interesting to know what they said or wrote.
- The MG decided to fire them but in addition it also wanted to punish them in a way which would deter other managers of the “New Korea Company” to voice any disapproval\(^48\).
- The fact that Lt. Doley was asked to investigate shows that the two men suspected that they would be beaten and were able to inform one of their US protectors. This officer was probably the one who called Lt. Doley and whose name is omitted. From the title of the memorandum and from the distribution list one can infer that the mysterious protector was Colonel Robinson or someone connected with him.

\(^{48}\)The status of the company says that any employee who criticizes the company could be tried by a military court. The punishment inflicted by the Korean police was of course easier and quicker to implement.
The previous file is unusual in two respects. (i) The special agent who wrote it signed with his name. The standard format is: “Special agent 5127” or just “Special agent CIC”. (ii) Usually the distribution list mentions 4 copies to “file CIC-K” and 1 copy to MG. It is rare that a specific officer is mentioned nominally.

The second case is fairly similar to the previous one.

**A case of torture in Pusan**

The account is given by Richard Robinson (1947, p. 155) in his unpublished book.

One day in Pusan during the summer of 1946 I walked into a police station when the water treatment was being applied to a suspect. He was writhing on the floor in agony, tied hand and foot. Acting as any American officer should under the circumstances, I arrested the torturers on the spot under charges of misusing police authority.

The act very nearly netted me a court-martial. According to General Lerch, the matter was none of my concern. The only thing that saved me from court-martial was newspaper publicity and the intervention of friends with General Hodge, General Lerch’s superior.

Robinson does not say precisely what kind of water treatment was used by the police. Was it the water cure in which a large amount of water is poured down the throat of the victim or was it waterboarding in which water is splashed over the face of the victim or was it near drowning by holding the head of the victim under water?

It may be recalled that “water treatment” was used also in more recent times in the wake of September 11 and subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq.

**Torturing family members**

On the issue of torture Robinson has another story which is even more sinister. In October 1946 the police were combing the country for the leaders of the Taegu rebellion. Unable to find one of them the police seized his aged mother. They announced that she would be tortured every day until her son gave himself up. Either he did not chose to do so or was not alive for he failed to show up. A few days later the beaten and bloated body of the mother was delivered to her home for burial.

As many rebel leaders had to be caught and arrested, one may think that this method was used many times, not just once as suggested by Robinson.

**Complacent US attitude regarding the use of torture**

A CIC memorandum of 26 October 1946 describes the arrest of 7 persons in the Inchon area and the results that the police obtained through their interrogations.

The memorandum ends with the following note.

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49US Military Police took part in these arrests which were done by encircling a house on 24 October at 12:30.
“The police interrogation is not altogether reliable as the police were excited and forced the men to talk under pressure. However it makes a plausible story.”

In other words the MG was well aware of the fact that torture was currently used by the police. It must be recalled that in 1946 the Korean police (as well as the constabulary) were under American command.

A further indication of this complacent attitude was provided when these men were interrogated by CIC agents. They denied what they had confessed to the police. However, the CIC agents did not ask them a single question about the interrogation methods used by the police. Or, if they did, they omitted this part in their memorandum. This shows again that nobody on the American side wanted to raise this issue.

Richard Robinson (1947 p. 156) explains that when (on 1 August 1946) he raised the question of torture in the presence of Colonel William Maglin, American Director of the National Police, and Colonel A.S. Champeny, Deputy Military Governor, their answer was that this type of brutal treatment was the only thing Koreans understood. However, he promptly adds that this was only one half of the truth for indeed that kind of brutal treatment was reserved generally only for left-wing agitators.

In confirmation of this opinion he cites the case of Kim Doo Hwan, head of the right-wing Youth Association. On 20 April 1947, Kim had tortured and murdered two members of a left-wing youth association. In July 1947 he was sentenced to a fine of 20,000 yen (about $200).

In a sense, this attitude was similar to the policy followed after the attack of September 11 when suspected terrorists were delivered by the CIA to countries (such as Egypt or Romania) where they would be tortured under the direction and control of American case officers.

Seodaemun prison

In Seoul Koreans or tourists can visit the “Seodaemun Prison History Hall”. This prison was constructed by the Japanese in 1908. It could house 500 prisoners. The presentation leaflet of the museum mentions repeatedly the “patriotic ancestors who were imprisoned at Seodaemon Prison and died for national independence against the Japanese colonization”. The museum shows the rooms where prisoners were tortured or executed.

However, one must read the fine print to learn that the prison continued to be used after 15 August 1945. Only its name was changed. On 21 November 1945 it became the Seoul Hyeongmuso prison\(^\text{50}\). After that date the prisoners were no longer patriots.

\(^\text{50}\)Before that date it was called Seodaemun Hyeongmuso.
who fought against the Japanese occupation but patriots who opposed trusteeship and fought against the Military Government or leftists who were imprisoned, tortured and executed in the name of anti-Communism. The prison was closed only in 1987. Of this part of the story, the presentation leaflet and the guided tour of the prison tell us very little.

A more lucid website about the prison ends with the following words. “What’s disturbing is that after the defeat and removal of the Japanese authorities in 1945, the prison stayed in business under despotic right-wing South Korean presidents until the facility was shut down in 1987. Anti-Communist fervor was high, and the literature and exhibits you see today don’t mention the history of the institution during the 40 years following the fall of Japan.”

As can be seen, even this more lucid description does not say anything about the period of time during which the country was officially ruled by the US Military Government.

From the perspective of comparative history one may observe that such grim detention centers were set up as well by other nations than Japan. Similar prisons can be visited in Dublin, Port Blair (South Andaman Island, India), Algiers or Liège (prison of Saint Léonard). In the first two cases cases the torturers were British, in Algiers they were French and in Liège they were German, but in all those places, including Seoul, the victims had been fighting oppression.

American officers in command of South Korean forces

Basic rules

According to Gregory Henderson (1968 p. 160), by August 1947 there were 3,231 American advisers in Korea. In early 1946 there were 63 American “advisers” in the police force, more than in any other organization (Henderson 1968 p. 142)

The agreement of 24 August 1948 between president Rhee and General Hodge (see the chronology) states that before this date all Korean forces (Constabulary, Police and Coast Guards) were under US authority and that this situation would continue until the complete withdrawal of US Forces.

Before and after August 1948 the American officers who served at the level of Korean regiments or brigades were called “advisers”. What was the real meaning of this term? An episode which occurred in April 1949 shows that US advisers had (de facto) the power to obtain the dismissal of Korean unit commanders. In this episode, Major Arno Mowitz sent a report to General Roberts in which he recommended the


[52]It is unclear whether or not this figure includes personnel belonging to MG Headquarters.
dismissal of Colonel Chae Wan-gai. This report was forwarded by Roberts to the Minister of Defense *the same day* and, as a result, Colonel Chae was quickly replaced (Gibby 2004, p. 107-108). Of course, when an adviser holds such power he is rather a supervisor and the *de facto* real commander. In short, at least for important decisions the Korean unit commander cannot go against the wishes of his adviser. General Roberts explicitly required US advisers to tell him whether or not their Korean counterparts resisted or discarded advice. (Gibby 2004, p. 112)

Another anecdote reveals a similar state of subordination of Korean officers. Captain Edward J. Steward recalled that once he witnessed a Korean lieutenant smack a soldier on the head when he failed to fire his weapon properly. Steward then made the lieutenant fire his rifle and smacked him on the head to make his point. (Gibby 2004, p. 125). Needless to say, in the US Army to smack an officer would be unacceptable.

During the Korean War, the Korean Army (as all other components of the UN force) was under the strategic command of UN Headquarters. However, in one episode that occurred in May 1951 it was even put under UN command at tactical level. After the ROK III Corps was routed by Chinese forces in the mountains of central Korea Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, commanding general of the Eight Army in Korea, addressed the Korean chief of staff, Major General Chung Il-kwon, in the following terms (Gibby 2004 p. 138):

> I hereby abolish ROK Army III Corps. ROK Army Headquarters will no longer exercise any operational control. It shall be limited to personnel, administrative, logistic and training matters.

**Specific command positions**

As far as specific command positions are concerned, American sources provide the following indications.

- Captain (then Colonel) James H. Hausman, adviser to the Korean Constabulary, is widely recognized as the “father” of the Korean Army (Millett 1997). He arrived in Korea in August 1946. His first assignment was as Commander of the 6th Constabulary Regiment (created on 18 February 1946) based at the north central city of Chunchon (Gibby 2004, p. 49).

He was also one of the key-organizers of the suppression of the Yosu uprising (Cumings 1998). In 1949 he obtained the release of Park Chung-hee, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment for conspiracy\(^\text{53}\). In 1961, Hausman was the sponsor of Park Chung-hee in his military coup. Park remained president of South Korea until his assassination on 26 October 1979.

- In May 1946, Colonel Terril E. Price became director of the Department of National Defense which one month later was renamed the Department of Internal

\(^{53}\text{As a member of the “South Korean Labor Party”.}\)
Security.\(^54\) (Gibby 2004, p. 48,51)

- In August 1946, Colonel Russell Barros was the chief of the Korean Constabulary.

- In October 1946 Colonel William H. Maglin was the Director of National Police (NARA 4a, p. 422)\(^55\).

- In October 1946 Major Plezia was the US Army Chief of Police at Taegu (NARA 4a, p. 193). In the same document he is called “Security Officer” (p. 200), a designation which can mean anything. In the same way, American officers are often called advisers even though it was clear for everybody that the Korean officers had to refer to them before any important decision could be made.

- In November 1946, Lt Brown was in command of the Constabulary in the north-eastern province of Kwangwon-Do (also spelled Gangwon-do). More details can be found in the chronology at the date of 5 November 1946.

- In August 1946, Major F.C. Alworth Jr. was the Director of the Police Department of the province of Kangwon-Do. (NARA 4a, p. 123)

- In January 1946 Lt. Col. Walter T. Stone was the Military Head and Chief of Police in the northwestern province of Kyonggi-Do (also spelled Gyeonggi-do). (NARA 4a, p. 45)

- In December 1946 Captain Gervas and Captain Moore were advisers to the Division A of the National Police in Inchon. (NARA 4b, p.43)

- In December 1946, Lieutenant Chesler was adviser to the Korean Coast Guard (NARA 4b, p.31). The report says that for 6 members of the Coast Guard to be tried by a provost court the tribunal needed the permission of Lt. Chesler which strongly suggests that he was in fact in command.

- In December 1946 Colonel Price was in charge of the Department of Internal Security (NARA 4b, p.39,212). It was the Department of Internal Security which controlled the Constabulary. In January 1947, Lt. Col. Russel D. Barrow was the director of the Department of Internal Security. (NARA 4b, p.238)

- In December 1946, Major Parrish was Military Governor of Incheon. In a more general way, all military governors were of course American.

- Kwangju. In February 1947, Captain C.C. De Reus was the American Officer-in-charge of the Korean Constabulary (NARA 4b, p.177).

- In February 1947 Dr. Chough of the Military Government was the Director of the National Police. (NARA 4b, p. 268)

- In February 1947 Captain Reed was at the head of the Division M police.\(^56\)

- In March 1947 the Liaison Committee of the Interim Legislative Assembly

\(^{54}\)In response to Soviet protests about the status implied by the word “National”.

\(^{55}\)On page 309 (as well as in the index) of the same source, Maglin’s name is misspelled as W.H. Naglin and his function is given as “Adviser, Department of Police”.

\(^{56}\)“Division M” meant Seoul Metropolitan.
comprised the following American members: Col. L.J. Lincoln (chairman), Capt John E. McMahon, Dr. Charles Pergler, Brigadier General John Weckerling, Col. Ernest F. Dukes, Major C.N. Weems, Lt. Leonard Bertsch, Dr. A.C. Bunce. The role of the Liaison Committee was to inform the Assembly of the wishes of the MG and vice versa.

- In April 1948 First Lieutenant Robert G. Shakleton, a West point graduate of the class of 1946 became the adviser to the 1st Reconnaissance troop, a cavalry formation comprising horses and armored cars. In late summer 1948 he was joined by Second Lieutenant Ralph Bliss, a 19-year old cavalry officer. (Gibby 2004, p. 117-118)

- In March-April 1948 Richard D. Gilliam, Jr, was an assistant adviser at the Department of Justice. In this capacity he contributed to writing Ordinance 192, also called the “Court Organization Law” because it set up the organization of the Korean judicial system. In spite of being called a law this ordinance was rather discussed by a committee in which Gilliam (along with other advisers) played a key-role. The ordinance was signed by General Dean on 4 May 1948 and became effective on 1 June 1948, just two and a half months before the establishment of the Korean Government.

- On 20 May 1948, Brigadier General William Lynn Roberts replaced Colonel Price. This was a watershed for the Korean Constabulary. (Gibby 2004, p. 57)

- October 1948. The source found at the Hausman Archives (HAUSMAN 1 which describes the Korean response to the Sunchon-Yosu uprising) gives the names of many US advisers:
  
  Capt Alexander, Lt Ralph Bliss, Capt Burgess (on Cheju Island), Captain Campbell, Colonel Charles, First Lt Foster Cowey, Capt Darrow, Lt Greenbaum, Major Greenwood (6th Division), First Lt Minor L. Kelso, Capt Kornhiem, Lt Moore, Major Arno P. Mowitz (senior adviser of the 2nd Division), Lt Myers, First Lt Charles S. Pemberton (assistant adviser G-3, Korean Constabulary), Lt Rose, Capt Smith, Capt Harry C. Symmonds (was killed on 25 Oct 1948), First Lt Charles Wesolowsky.

- After the establishment of the Korean government in August 1948 H.J. Noble became Chief of the Political Liaison Office (NARA, RG 554, Box 306)

- In 1949 First Lieutenant Charles Wesolowsky served on Cheju Island. His task was to supervise the deployment of the 9th Korean Regiment along the island’s perimeter. (Gibby 2004, p. 108). On Cheju-Do Wesolowsky and his fellow advisers took active roles in searching out guerrillas.\(^{57}\)

**Roster of Military Government officers (1 Jan 1947)**

The following table gives the names and ranks of the officers of the Military Govern-

\(^{57}\)In official reports they were called “raiders” instead of “bandits” which had been the term most oftently used elsewhere.
ment. The source is “HAUSMAN 2”. Altogether there are 469 officers. For about 95% of them their assignment is “Civil Affairs Officer, Military Government”. Some had more specific duties of which the listing gives some examples. For instance, one can observe that there were as many as 6 chaplains.

The list comprises: 2 generals, 19 colonels, 38 lieutenant colonels, 98 majors, 185 captains, 99 1st lieutenants and 25 2nd lieutenants. The roster does not include personnel such as Richard D. Robinson who were working for the MG in a civilian capacity.
Fig. 3 Interview of Chief of Police Chang about the organization of the election of May 1948. This memorandum was an enclosure to a message sent by US Political Adviser in Seoul, Joseph E. Jacobs, to the Secretary of State on 22 March 1948. The interview was conducted by a member of General Hodge’s staff. The full Transcript of the second paragraph is given in the text.

The important point is less the content of the memorandum itself (for these facts are also known from other sources) than the fact that it was officially transmitted to the Secretary of State in late March 1948. In other words, one month before the election, the State Department knew that the election would be highly suspicious. Yet, this did not prevent it from putting pressure on the UN representatives in Korea to make them accept this election as the expression of the true will of the Korean people.

On should also remember that on 23 April 1948 (that is to say some two weeks before the election) several important non-Communist South Korean political leaders took part in the “Unity Conference” held in the North Korean city of Pyongyang. Among them were Kim Koo and Kimm Kyu-Sik (also written Kim Kyu-Sik). Kim Koo was in fact a right-wing leader and Kimm Kyu-Sik was a highly respected center-left wing leader. They went to Pyongyang in protest against the organisation of the election in South Korea. With left-wing leaders in jail or in hiding and right-wing leaders in Pyongyang, one realizes that the election of 10 May would be restricted to supporters of Rhee and to so-called “independent candidates”. It is only through a very effective public relations campaign that this election could be presented as the “first democratic election in Korea”.

Chief Chang restricted himself to the coercive measures which ensured high registration and turnout rates. Other sources document the measures which favored official candidates; see in this respect the section about the elections in chapter 1.

It should also be kept in mind that in March 1948, the Korean police was still officially under the control of the Military Government.

Source: Microfiche FOA 5041, National Diet Library, Tokyo. The microfiche is a copy of a document held at NARA (Box 2075)
Chapter 1

Yosu buildings before 1940

Fig. 1a Some buildings in Yosu before 1940. It would be interesting to see pictures of the same buildings after the rebellion. One would not expect such stone buildings to be flattened by a fire. Source: The pictures were published in an article written in Korean after the war. Thank you very much to Dr. Kim, Hak Jae for sending them to me (email of 9 July 2012).

Yosu, after the city was retaken

Fig. 1b Yosu in the days after the city was retaken. Additional pictures are available on the website of Life Magazine. Many thanks to Hak Jae Kim and Charles Hanley for pointing them to my attention.
Fig. 1.1 National Personnel Records Center. Located in the suburbs of St. Louis, Missouri, this center holds the records of servicemen who served in US Armed forces after 1917. There was a fire in July 1973 which destroyed some of the records. In subsequent years these records were reconstructed from primary archives. Moreover the whole database was computerized. *Source: Website of the NPRC-MPR*

Fig. 1.2a Map of South Korea: mountains.
Fig. 1.2b  Map of South Korea
Fig. 1.2c  Map of South Korea: provinces. It is the transcription currently in use which is given on the map. To interpret former transcriptions it is useful to remember that: “buk” means north (similar to Chinese “bei”), “nam” means south (similar to Chinese “nan”), “do” means province or also island. “gun” means county, “gu” means district, “ri” means village.

The transcriptions which were in use in the period 1945-1950 read as follows.
1 Seoul, Seoul
2 Busan, Pusan (or Fusan)
3 Daegu, Taegu (or Taegue)
4 Incheon, Inchon (or Chemulpo)
5 Gwangju, Kwangju
6 Daejeon, Taejeon
7 Ulsan, Ulsan
8 Gyeonggi,
9 Gangwon, Kangwon-Do
10 Chungcheongbuk, Chinchon
11 Chungcheongnam, Chung Chong Nam Do (or South Choon Chung or Onyang)
12 Jeollabuk, Chollabuk (or Iri or Cholla PukTo or North Cholla)
13 Jeollanam, Chollanam (or Cholla Nam Do or South Cholla)
14 Gyeongsangbuk, Kyeongsangbuk (or North Kyongsang)
15 Gyeongsangnam, Kyeongsangnam (or South Kyongsang)
16 Jeju, Cheju

Fig. 1.2d  Map of South Korea: provinces.

Fig. 1.3  Professor Kojubu (Kojubu Samgukji). This manhwa (in Korea “manhwa” is the analog of the Japanese “manga”) character was created by Kim Yong-hwan during the fall of 1945 in the English language newspaper “Seoul Times”. The two editors of the newspaper, Min Won-sik and Palk Nam-chin, received university degrees from France and Germany respectively.
REPORT OF ACTIVITIES AT CHEJU ISLAND
29 April 1948

FROM: Lt. Col. Schewe, G-3
TO: Colonel A.C. Tynchesen, G-3

- Lt Col M.W. Schewe proceeded to Cheju Do by air on 27 April 1948. His main mission was to contact Lt Col John Mansfield, Commanding Officer of the 59th Military Government Company at Cheju Do and to ascertain the proposed plans of Col. Mansfield for the reduction of the guerrilla activities.
- Upon arrival he called upon Colonel Mansfield at his headquarters and together they proceeded to the air strip where they met Colonel Brown [Col. Rothwell H. Brown was the Commander of South Korea Military in Cheju region.] and Major Geist in charge of the 20th Infantry Regiment and Captain C.C. De Reus, Advisor to the 5th Korean Constabulary Regiment.
- Col. Brown gave the instructions of the Commanding General, USAFIK, i.e.: (a) The Constabulary must function at once. (b) All civil disorders must cease. (c) American military forces would not be involved.
- **Operation No 1 (27 April 1948).** Units of the 5th Korean Constabulary swept the designated villages on 27 April. Reports were made from the air by Lt Poindexter. All roads and all exits to the sea were blocked. The National Police, under the supervision of the Korean Constabulary, participated in screening the civilian population. Captain De Reus proceeded to the village by vehicle. It was not desired that too many US military personnel be present in the villages during the operation. The plan was to locate any suspicious characters, organizers and Communists. However, there were few young men in the villages.
- **Operation No 2 (28 April 1948).** The 5th Constabulary was moved by truck to the other villages. Colonel Schewe observed the operation from the air in an L-5. All civilians were stopped and marched to a central collecting point. There were similar operations on 29 April and 30 April.
- All the plans for future operations were thoroughly discussed by Captain De Reus and Captain Bruns, Adviser to the National Police together with Colonel Kim and Major Moon of the Korean Constabulary. Colonel Schewe was also present and he told Colonel Kim that he must not fail. In conclusion, it can be said that present forces on Cheju Do are adequate IF [in capitals in the text] if they are vigorously pushed by the Commanding Officer of the 59th Military Government Company [i.e. Lt Col John Mansfield]. The operations prior to 28 April 1948 had not been as aggressive as the situation warrants.

[signed] M.W. Schewe

**Document 1:** American involvement in the operations on Cheju Island in late April 1948. American involvement took 3 forms: (i) Through US advisers USFIK commanders issued their orders to the Korean police and Constabulary. (ii) American officers supervised and monitored the operations by air and on the ground. (iii) The US Navy and the American units present on Cheju Do certainly provided intelligence (by aerial observation) as well as logistic support in transportation of troops and material. *Source: NARA: RG 554, Box 15 (CKCLH); Cumings (1998)*
Subject: Police brutality in Taegu. (excerpt)

The following telephone message was received from Lt. Doley the officer in charge of the Taegu district.

At 19:00 on 16 October Lt. Doley received a telephone call, caller not named, asking him to come to the National Police in Taegu immediately and be prepared to take pictures. Upon arrival Lt. Doley found that two of the leading citizens of the city had been called to the Police Station. They had come of their free will. They were: KUK, Sang Hi and LEE, Ki Sam respectively manager and chief of general affairs of the “New Korea Company”. Only one question was asked them. “Why did you criticize policies of the Military Government?” The replies failed to satisfy the interrogators. Whereupon the two men were stripped naked, laid face down on the floor and whipped for one half hour with a horse whip upon the back and buttock.

While Lt. Doley was present the Public Safety Officer, Major Slattery, entered and said that the matter was a minor affair. Later, Colonel Maglin, Director of National Police, entered. Upon seeing Lt. Doley he asked “Why are you here? Do you consider this subversive activity. Do you have authority from Seoul to investigate matters as this”. Lt. Doley replied that all that happened in Taegu was of interest to the Counter Intelligence Corps unless shown otherwise.

Lt. Doley thinks that Colonel Maglin might require his removal from the Taegu area and asked for advice and assistance from CIC Headquarters.

Lt. Doley cited two other recent examples of police brutality which he had observed. One case on 13 October 1946 was of a woman kicked to the point of endangering her life by police. Another was a young boy beaten with a club so severely that gangrene set in and it was expected that he would have to lose one or two arms in order to save his life.

[Signed] Special agent Wittwer

Distribution:
2 copies Col. Robinson, G-2 USAFIK 1 copy file CIC-K

Document 2: Attitude of the US command regarding beatings by Korean police. The “New Korea Company” had been created by the MG on 21 February 1946 (see the chronology at this date). It held as assets all the property previously owned by the Japanese and was under the direct control of the MG. In other words, these two executives were undoubtedly important persons for the MG.

Major A.R. Slattery was the Chief of Police for the province of Taegon; we know this from his own signature at the end of a report dated 2 August 1946: “A.R. Slattery, Provincial Chief of Police” (NARA 4a, p.95). Source: NARA 4b, p.423.
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KNAUS W.A. MAJ MCAULIFFE D.P. CAPT
KNEFEL C.A. CAPT MCCOLLY H.A. LT C
KNORR E.A. CAPT MCCORKLE S.A. CAPT
KNOX C.V. CAPT MCFARLAND T.S. MAJ
KOPP E.A. 1 LT MCGINN J.G. CAPT
LAMOUREAUX A.J. COL MCKAGUE B. CAPT
LANG F.E. MAJ MCKINNON W. CAPT
LAPATKA T. CAPT, (Munitions) MCLELLAN J.H. LT C
LAWSON G.A. LT C MCMAHON J.E. CAPT
LAWYER H.L. MAJ MELCHIOR A.W. LT C
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LEE G.H. MAJ MICHELET H.F. LT C
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LERCH A.L. GEN, (Mil. Governor) MILLER J.T. CAPT, (Adjutant Gen.)
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LEWIS E.J. COL MILLIGAM D.R. 1 LT
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LLOYD J.R. CAPT MITCHELL J. CAPT, (Inf.Unit Commander)
LOCKLIER A.B. 1 LT MITCHELL R.J. COL
LOUIS F.W. MAJ MITZNER H.W. CAPT
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LOWE T.S. 1 LT MOORE H.H. CAPT
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MAIER J. 1 LT, (Adjutant Gen.) MOYER C. 1 LT
MANSFIELD J.S. LT C NEAL C.E. CAPT
MARSH W.R. MAJ NEDDS I. CAPT
MARTIN C.F. CAPT NELLIGAN W.J. 1 LT
MARTIN D. 1 LT NELSON A.E. CAPT
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<td>1 LT, (Nurse)</td>
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<td>THOMPSON M.</td>
<td>LT C</td>
<td>YUHAS J.</td>
<td>CAPT, (Adjutant Gen.)</td>
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ZEVIN E.R. CAPT, (Bacteriologist)
The Korean Police

The American Command appointed Dr. Chough Byung Ok as National Director of the Korean Police. He had a doctorate from Columbia University and had taught at Korean schools supported by American missions. On 1 March 1947 one of the top US supervisors of the Korean police told Mr. Richard Robinson that he had enough evidence in his files to hang him several times. He added that the only reason why he had not been removed was because of a direct order from General Hodge not to do so.

Dr. Chough came into office with a very modest personal fortune. Two years later, US Intelligence reported that he had 20 million yen (about $200,000 in dollars of 1947 or $2 million in dollars of 2000) in his bank account.

When Richard Robinson asked a close political adviser to General Hodge why such a venal man should continue to hold power he answered that it was because of his loyalty to the American Command and the fact that he had fought against the Communists at every turn. (Robinson 1947 p. 151, 158)

In December 1946 the American Command appointed Shin Co Kyung as chief of the police on the island of Cheju. He was a former Japanese police agent involved in the repression of anti-Japanese activities. In February 1947 Shin was caught operating in league with smugglers; within three months he had made half a million yen (about $5,000 in comparable purchasing power).

After the Taegu riots in the Fall of 1946, the homes of the murdered policemen were examined. An average of 6.5 hectoliters of rice was found in each. Robinson (1947 p. 151) takes this as a clear indication of the fact that the police was involved in black-market operations. However, the amount is not really enormous. Annual consumption per capita can be estimated at 2 hectoliters. Thus 6.5 hectoliters represented the annual consumption of a family of three persons. So, the real question is whether it was common for a family to store such a large quantity at home rather than to buy it by small quantities as needed.

The police organization was set up on a centralized national basis. Provincial governors and city mayors had no control over the police within their own areas. (Robinson 1947, p. 144-146)

In mid-1947 the police force of Korea was approximately 25,000 strong. At that time the prison population was close to 22,000, almost double the highest number ever held by the Japanese in South Korea. On 16 August 1945, after the capitulation of Japan, as a condition set by Kim Chun Yon for taking power over from the Japanese, 10,000 prisoners were released. While the figure of 10,000 prisoners may be correct for the 1930s and for the time of the war, it is possible that the number had been substantially larger in the wake of the uprising of 1919.

Often the Military Government delegated to the police the power to grant permits for
meetings. As a result, leftist meetings were rarely permitted; in this respect distinction between Communists and leftists was rarely made. On the contrary, whenever right-wing leaders toured the provinces the roads were lined with armed policemen and their meetings were well guarded (Robinson 1947 p. 149).

It was required that a certain percentage of rice harvested by each farmer be turned over to Military Government for a fixed price. The quotas were set some months before the harvest by local boards appointed with American approval. No appeal was allowed. The farmer turned in the amount of grain demanded or went to jail where he was frequently beaten. Richard Robinson found that in most cases farmers accused of hoarding rice in fact did not have enough rice to fill their quotas. (Robinson 1947 p. 147)

It is true that in a number of occasions the Korean police refused to obey the orders given by American officers. This happened during the Taegu uprising of 2 October 1946. At 10:30 in the morning Major Plezia, US Army Chief of Police, addressed the crowd of about 1,000 from a second floor balcony of the police station. The crowd stopped his speech by disorder. He ordered the police who were inside the police station to disperse the crowd but they did not leave the police station. He then gave a direct order to the Inspector of Police, the senior officer present, to take the police out and disperse the crowd. This officer refused. (NARA 4a, p.194)

After this mutiny, the situation was taken over by the US Army. Four M7 tanks and over 200 troops brought the city under control between 17:40 and 19:00.

In his report written on 5 October, Major General A.E. Brown recommended that “Major Plezia be relieved at once”. (NARA 4a, p.200)

Elections

Techniques in election manipulation

When thinking about election manipulation the first thought that comes to the mind of most people is stuffing ballot boxes with ballots for the candidates that the party in power wants to be elected. This is a very narrow view, however. There are many other means which are less visible and yet quite as effective.

The control exerted by parties of international observers on the day of the election is but a poor and inadequate guarantee for the regularity of an election. Many techniques can be used before and after election-day which, without the observers’ knowledge, may be very effective in “guiding” voters into the desired direction. In order to get a better understanding of what determines the fairness of an election it is useful to discuss some of these techniques,

- Selection of candidates  In Japan all people who wanted to be candidates were
screened by a committee. In principle it was the activity of the persons in nationalistic organizations which was examined but this was a very elastic criterion. In South Korea most leftists were either in jail or in hiding.\footnote{Nevertheless “Time Magazine” (24 May 1948) claimed that “Under UN supervision US-occupied South Korea had its first free general election in its 4,000-year history. Communist threats of disruptive violence did not materialize on the scale expected; only 35 people were killed in election disorders.” The actual number of people killed during the election process was over 300. Incidentally, “National Geographic” also published a long article about Korea which presented the election in a better light even than “Time”.}

In short, the first question is whether real or only “sanitized” opposition leaders can be candidate.\footnote{Even in countries that are considered democracies there are limitations on who can be candidate. For instance in France, a candidate at the presidential election must get the backing of 500 deputies, senators or mayors. It is true that as there are about 36,000 mayors this requirement can be met fairly easily. However, revolutionists, separatists or other people “who do not play by the rules” may not obtain this endorsement.}

In the election of March 2010 in Iraq, over 500 candidates were discarded by the electoral commission. Among the candidates discarded were major opponents to US-supported Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, such as for instance the prominent Sunni politicians Salah al-Mutlaq and Dhafer al-Ani. In the election of 2005 almost all major Sunni candidates were discarded with the result that this election was boycotted by Sunni voters.

If one replaces “Nouri al-Maliki” by “Syngman Rhee” and “Sunni” by “leftist” one finds that the the elections of 2005 and 2010 in Iraq were in many respects a repeat of the election of May 1948 in South Korea (see also below the point about so-called independent candidates).

The real difficulty in this kind of operation is to give an appearance of democracy. For instance, there may be an appeal procedure for banned candidates but if the members of the appeal commission have been selected with “care” they will implement the policy expected by occupation forces.

- Assuming that “real opponents” can be candidates, one must make sure that all candidates are given the same chance to be seen and heard in the media.

If, as is the case in Italy under Silvio Berlusconi, all TV channels are controlled by one side the campaign will not be fair.

Another illustration is provided by the election of March 1994 in El Salvador. The press was under the control of the party in power to the point that when one daily paper dared to show a brief independence it was destroyed by bombs (The Guardian 21 March 1986).

- The type of electoral system is of great importance. Although it is the proportional system which is in principle the fairest, it is not used in many countries because it leads to a multitude of political parties. In contrast “take-all” systems (in which only the leading candidate in each district wins a seat) that are used in Britain and in the United States bar small parties from being represented.
• Do all electors have the same weight? In many countries, even those usually considered as being democratic, rural electors have a greater weight than urban electors. What do we mean by this expression? The exact meaning depends upon the technicalities of votes counting but overall it means that two (or more) urban votes are needed to achieve the same result as one rural vote. As an illustration one can mention the fact that in March 2013 the general election of December 2012 in Hiroshima prefecture was declared invalid by the Hiroshima High Court because of disparities in the weight of votes. These disparities were as high as 2.4 to 1. There were similar disparities elsewhere. High courts in Fukuoka, Kanazawa, Nagoya, Sapporo, Sendai and Tokyo made similar rulings except that they did not invalidate the elections altogether (Japan Times, 25 March 2013). Giving greater weight to urban districts usually favors conservative parties. Needless to say, this problem is not specific to Japan.

• One must make sure that the registration process was fair. By discouraging people in poor areas to register one can ensure that they will be under-represented in the election. Gerrymandering (that is to say adjusting the limits of districts so as to dilute the votes of one side) is used in almost all countries including democratic countries. These techniques are particularly effective in countries which have a “take-all” electoral system.

• There is another way to make registration selective. In the election of 1948 in Korea each registration had to be approved by the chairman of the voting district. In order to disqualify a voter the chairman had to state briefly the reasons of the disqualification (NARA, RG 554, Box 309), but it does not seem that disqualified voters could submit a protest in case they did not agree. Most certainly, disqualified voters were not counted as eligible voters which means that they were just discarded and did not affect the 92% registration rate (of eligible voters) achieved for that election.

• Manipulating the registration process is a discrete but very efficient way to influence the result of an election.

In the first post-civil war election that took place in El Salvador in March 1994, the people gave a majority to the very party who had organized the repression (e.g. through death squads) during the civil war. Such a surprising outcome was largely the result of clever manipulation. More than 500,000 people (20% of the electorate) could not vote because they did not receive their voting cards or because they could not get a birth certificate from the city hall of their birth place or because, for some

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61 Election district chairmen were appointed by the Chief Judge of the District court but these appointments could be over-ridden by the Provincial Election Committee within a delay of 10 days. Moreover, the chairmen of the (smaller) voting districts were appointed by the head of the administrative district. (Ordinance No 175 of 17 March 1948, Section 20-22). This guaranteed that they were selected from the conservative class of the population.

62 It would be of interest to know how many voters were disqualified.
reason, their names did not appear in the voter registration list kept in polling stations. Moreover, a substantial fraction of people could not vote because they had no means of transportation to distant polling stations (despite the small area of the country, namely some 200 km times 100 km). All these problems played against the poor, the rural, the less educated who were the base of the opposition party (Blum 2004 p. 367-368).

- Voting regulations may seem fair in appearance while in truth they are not. We have seen an example above with the nomination of the election district chairmen in Korea. To rely on judges may seem fair at first sight but, as we already observed, judges will tend to choose fairly conservative people. If in addition the judges have been appointed by the government (in Korea they were appointed by the MG) they will be even more conservative in their selection.

The composition of the council in charge of the elections has been a crucial factor in many other elections. For instance, the “Supreme Electoral Tribunal” who supervised the election of 20 March 1994 in El Salvador was dominated by the party in power (the Arena party) without a single member representing the opposition (Blum 2004, p. 367-368).

- According to Gregory Henderson (1968 p. 187) a trick used by the CIA to influence the outcome of elections is (i) to infiltrate opposition parties with agents who may disrupt attempts at unity or (ii) to induce added independent opposition candidates which may dilute opposition votes. This technique was used in the election of 1963 in Korea. Although the government party received only 33% of the votes, it was able to obtain 63% of the seats thanks to the great segmentation of the opposition.

In the election of March 2010 in Iraq there were 6,500 candidates for 325 seats in Parliament (called the Council of Representatives), that is to say 20 candidates for each seat. Many of the so-called independent candidates were in fact running under Maliki’s “State of Law” list (Christian Science Monitor 12 February 2010). This was basically the same pattern as in the elections of 1946 and 1950 in South Korea.

- There are many other tricks that can be used to ensure a solid majority to the party in power. For instance, in the Egyptian elections that took place under president Mubarak there was a rule which, under cover of providing more democracy, required that a given number of the assembly members be “workers or farmers” (New York Times 23 November 2011). As the definitions of these terms are fairly imprecise, this requirement could be used to replace opposition candidates by fairly pliable workers or farmers.

In a general way, the more complicated the rules, the most likely it is that some “fool play” will take place.

- Voting rules are of great importance. For instance, the rules which are in use in
Britain and the United States (namely only one vote through which only the winner is elected) make the expression of non-mainstream opinions impossible because, by voting for one of the “smaller” candidates, voters known that their ballots will be just useless. If, in addition, the two main parties have similar programs voters are in fact not given any real choice. The election then becomes a show without political meaning.

- **Economic pressure on voters.** Districts which do not vote as expected can be “punished” in various ways. In countries where food rationing is in force, the allocation of food can be reduced. This threat was used in South Korea. As a matter of fact, in South Korea this kind of pressure was not only used during elections but on a permanent basis. Bruce Cumings (1982, p. 330) reports that the farmers “who cooperated with the police received either lower collections quotas or more ration stamps”

- In some countries (for instance Tunisia in the 2000s) ballots may be of different colors which can be observed through the envelopes.

A similar trick was used in the referendum about the new constitution in 1918 in Haiti. Since the occupation of 1915 by US Marines the island had remained, for all intents and purposes, under American administration (Douglas 1994). Drafted by American advisers, including then Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt, this constitution permitted land to be owned by foreigners and, for that reason, had been rejected by the National Assembly. After the National Assembly had been dissolved (and not reconvened) a plebiscite on the constitution was held on 12 June 1918. While the “Yes” (white) ballots were freely available the “No” (colored) ballots were in charge of a gendarme and the voters had to ask for them. Not surprisingly, the constitution was approved in a landslide but less than 5% of Haiti’s population participated in the vote.

- Public servants and military forces are often “encouraged” to vote for the party in power. An illustration can be given from the general election of November 2010 in Egypt

  At one polling place in a school in the Suyouf district of Alexandria things seemed to be progressing normally with a steady trickle of voters approaching the gates. That is, until you noticed that almost all the voters were coming from a local youth center one block away. On the grounds of that youth center more than 1,000 people were gathered, with more arriving constantly in busses and minivans. Inside a massive tent structure, multiple clusters of people gathered, each of them thrusting their pink voter cards at different men holding highlighter pens. The men would in turn, make a mark on each card and hand it back.

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63Source: Rolling Stone, 1 January 2011: Democracy Inaction, November’s election saw Egyptian democracy sink to new depths. By Ashraf Khalil.
Utterly mystified, I asked a man what was going on. “These are all civil servants like me” he told me. “They’re selling their votes for 50 Egyptian pounds [about $9]”. When I asked the significance of the highlighter mark, he said, “The mark means they will let you in easily at the door of the polling station. If you don’t have that mark, they will make it hard for you to enter”.

- Assuming that the election is fair, one must make sure that the assembly which was elected has real power. In the 2000s Bahrain was one of the few countries of the Persian Gulf which had an elected assembly. However, this assembly had only a consultative role. Similarly, referendums may not be binding. That was the case of the referendums held in Spain and in the Netherlands about the European Constitution in the mid-2000s\footnote{The only referendum which was binding was the one that took place in France. However, some two years later the second version of the constitution was adopted by the French Parliament without this time being approved (or disapproved) through a referendum.}. According to Henderson (1968 p. 189) in the 1960s the Korean Assembly was “little more than a censorial body with consultative powers”.
- Exit polls are usually based on interviews conducted with a sample of voters at polling stations. While exit polls may be conducted in a reliable way there are also many ways in which they can be manipulated, for instance they can be based on small samples in selected districts. After the election such exit polls can be used to question (sometimes with good reasons but possibly also without any good reason) the validity of the official results.

**Election of the interim assembly**

Excerpt of G-2 Weekly Summary (No 60, October 1946, p. 361).

- Because most of the leftist leaders were in detention or in hiding, the leftists showed no interest in the election. Therefore it was a foregone conclusion that an overwhelming majority of rightists would be elected.
- Moreover the Interim Assembly can vote to deny membership to any elected representatives whom it finds ineligible under Ordinance No 118\footnote{In Japan it is the accusation of war crime or of militarism which was used for the same purpose. The example of Korea shows that the same result can be obtained even in a liberated country in which the accusation of militarism did not make any sense especially if one recalls that many rightist groups actively collaborated with the Japanese.}.
- After the election of November 1946, 45 additional members of the interim assembly were chosen by General Hodge (NARA 1, No 74).
- The Military Government had the ability to invalidate elections in those districts that it would determine. This is indeed what General Hodge did on 25 November 1946 when he declared the elections in Seoul and Kangwon Do null and void. They were re-held on 29 November 1946 (NARA 1, No 74).
- There were similar invalidation for the election of May 1948. For instance the
election in one half of the island of Cheju Do was invalidated because the turn out was less than 50%.

The American journalist Mark Gayn (1909-1981) was in Korea at the time of this election. Here are some excepts of his report.

- The electoral campaign lasted only 9 days; in some places the posters announcing the election were posted the day before the election started.
- It was a 4-level election. In the first level, family heads in each village chose 2 representatives to the county meeting. Then these county meetings will select 2 of them who will go to the provincial meeting in Pusan.
- Gayn visited a county meeting on 26 October 1946. He was told that the 15 members included 6 farmers but after interviewing 3 of them it turned out that one was in fact a landlord, another was the president of the “Farm Credit Association”, and the third was the president of an association to suppress disturbances. In short, all of them were partisans of Syngman Rhee.
- The election resulted in an overwhelming victory for the right: Syngman Rhee’s men won 40 of the 45 seats.

**Election of May 1948**

It remains to explain why the registration and turn out were so high (over 90%) in the election of 1948. The answer is provided in a leaflet about the election which says that the government would not distribute any rice if the people did not get registered. The leaflet does not mention voting itself but one can imagine that there was a similar kind of pressure. (RECORDS)

The comparison of two statements (both given in the chronology at the date of 12 April 1948) is quite instructive. One states flatly that Korean people registered because of a threat of revocation of their food rationing credentials. The second one, which is made by the director of the “Office of Civil Information”, emphasizes that no threat was used and that the 92% registration was solely the result of the good educational work done by his service. There could hardly be a sharper contrast in two interpretations!

The resolution of the “United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea” (UNT-COK) was issued on 25 June 1948 that is to say 7 weeks after the election of 10 May. Through United States pressure (particularly on Canada and Australia) and thanks to the absence of two delegates\(^6\), an agreement was reached to declare the elections “a valid expression of the free will of the electorate” (Wikipedia article entitled “South Korean general election, 1948”)

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\(^6\)Namely the Australian and Syrian delegates. Quite surprisingly, despite Australia’s strong ties with the United States, in this specific case the Australian government was strongly opposed to the partition of Korea that would result from the election. Nevertheless, as the commission comprised a majority of US allies, the final outcome could hardly be doubted.
In “Korea’s place in the Sun” (p. 212) Bruce Cumings describes the election in the following terms.

“The National Police and associated right-wing auxiliaries organized the voting, requesting that peasants have their food ration cards stamped at the polls (if they did not vote they would lose their rations)”.

Why does this statement only refer to “peasants”? In the prologue, we give an interview of the Metropolitan Police Chief, that is to say the chief of police for the Seoul area, which shows that this kind of coercive method was also used in the cities. Moreover, by saying that the “National Police organized the voting one misses the important point that as the police was under the control of the MG, it was in fact the MG which either suggested or at least accepted such a method. The fact that the text of the interview was sent to the Secretary of State in late March 1948 suggests that the State Department was well aware of what was going on. Nevertheless, it was able to convince the United Nations Temporary Commission that the election held in the southern zone was a “valid expression of the free will of the electorate” (see the resolution adopted on 25 June 1948).

This version of history was repeated again and again to the point that it became the accepted truth at least in western countries. As an example one can mention the following excerpts from an article published in National Geographic (Chetelat 1950)⁶⁷.

- The 38th parallel: a rigid political barrier between Communist-dominated northern and democratic southern Korea (p. 777).
- Caption of a picture: May 10, 1948: South Koreans flock to the polls for their first free election in their country’s history (p. 793). The same sentence also appears twice on p. 780: “The American Military Government gave all facilities to permit the Korean people to have a really free election”. “For the first time in Korean history a free election was to take place”.
- In Pyongchang [in the north-east of South Korea, some 80 km south of the 38th parallel] a full 99% of the registrants voted (p. 789).
- The only serious incident in my gun was the shooting of a Communist by Korean police at Poll No. 42. During the previous night a band of roving troublemakers had come south from the Russian Zone and clashed with a Korean patrol (p. 789).

Was the author just naive? Probably not. He was not a journalist but a US adviser who has been working in Korea for over a year. Incidentally, a previous article published in “National Geographic” about Korea was written by Lieutenant General Hodge; entitled “With the US Army in Korea”, it appeared in June 1947.

Other historical episodes

⁶⁷The article is certainly a masterpiece in terms of clever misinformation. It sounds so colorful, plausible and realistic!
At the time of writing (June 2012) there is no widespread recognition among American writers that the election of May 1948 in South Korea was manipulated. This is probably because particular care was taken to make it look fair especially in the eyes of the UN inspection team. However, there are many other cases for which effective manipulation techniques have been well described.

For instance, nowadays it is widely recognized even in the United States that Philippines president Magsaysay was “created” by the State Department and particularly by case-officer Edward Lansdale. He was elected on 10 November 1953 with 69% of the votes. Raymond Bonner (1988) documents the extent of US support in his election. Yet, at the time his success was announced in the New York Times in the following terms.

- “Magsaysay called true independent” (New York Times 12 November 1953 p. 4)
- “Democracy at work in the Philippines” (New York Times 15 November 1953)

According to current knowledge of the case (see Bonner 1988), the re-election of Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines on 11 November 1969 was highly fraudulent. Yet, his success was announced in the New York Times in the following terms: “Vicrorious Filipino: Ferdinand Edralin Marcos. The man who was reelected President of the Philippines in an apparent landslide is a puppet for no nation”. (NYT 14 November 1969). A subsequent article (16 November 1969) mentioned charges of fraud but they are attributed to the opponents of Marcos rather than to independent observers.

**Role of US forces against the rebels in Oct-Nov 1948**

According to the US official history the uprising of October 1948 in the southern cities of Yosu and Sunchon was defeated and brought down solely by the Korean army. In other words, US troops remained in their barracks, US aircraft did not take off and US Navy ships remained in harbor. To what extent is this true?

**Direct evidence**

It is fairly easy to show that some US forces took part in the conflict. The following cases can be mentioned.

- In an article of the New York Times of 3 November 1948 one reads that “US troops curbed rebels in Taegu. This second bred-army uprising resulted in death to 14 persons”. There were similar (and in fact almost identical) articles in the “Washington Post” and in the “Chicago Tribune” (see the chronology at the date of 4 November 1948). In fact, all these articles are short and unclear. For instance, they say that “not a shot was fired” but do not tell us how the 14 persons were killed.

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\[68\] For instance, we are told that Magsaysay’s speeches were written by a US speech writer, David Sternberg.
• At least two sources (Song 1989 p. 296, Sunoo 1979 p. 67) mention that the attacks against Sunchon and Yoso involved *tanks*. To our best knowledge, the Korean army did not have any tanks at this time. The second of these sources also mentions shell fire from *American warships* lying off shore. The sources on which these two authors rely are Korean newspapers and the Tass news agency.

• US military sources mention the use of US reconnaissance aircraft (see the chronology) but only of the L1 or L5 type which was a very light aircraft (see a picture in the chronology chapter). Reconnaissance missions were of course the main duty of the US Air Force in Korea throughout the occupation. Yet, it is difficult to understand why the Air Force Command insisted on using only such light aircraft instead of fighter aircraft with special observation devices which would have been much more effective.

So far (18 May 2012), these are the only mentions of direct interventions that we have found. Needless to say, one must also keep in mind that Korean forces were under US operational command, that there were US advisers (several of them are mentioned in the chronology) at the head of all Korean units and that some US advisers took an active part in the fighting. Such was the case of First Lieutenant M.L. Kelso who serviced himself a 81-mm mortar, as mentioned on 26 October 1948.

It is often said that there were no US fatalities. In fact, Captain Harry C. Symmonds was killed when his 1/4 ton jeep overturned. Military sources do not say why his jeep overturned.

**Indirect evidence and questions**

The amount of big buildings which were destroyed gives an indication about the caliber of the guns that were used. Photographs of Yosu show that the people’s homes were small, wooden houses which may have been quickly destroyed by fire. In order to learn more, one should rather examine major brick-made or stone-made buildings.

In its issue of 9 November 1948 the daily Korean newspaper “Seoul Shinmun” (with a distribution of 65,000 it was the most important Korean newspaper) gave a list of the main buildings which were destroyed. The list includes the following buildings.

Police Station, Post office, Land administration office, two banks, Finance association, You-su daily newspaper, Gumgang-Hotel, Yo-su Hotel, Yo-su Theater, Fishing association, Ice manufacturing company, Suncheon-Hospital, Hospital, Iron works, Stores.

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69I would like to express my gratitude to Mr. Hak Jae Kim, currently writing a PhD thesis at the “Berlin Free University”, for bringing this article to my attention.
How were these buildings destroyed?

Another question concerns the presence of American troops in Yosu. Was there a US camp in Yosu or was there an American logistic unit managing the port? From the book “KMAG in war and peace” (p. 39) one learns that two US lieutenants were imprisoned by the rebels in Yosu but that they were able to escape. Were they the only Americans present in Yosu when the mutiny started?

Withdrawal of US troops

Conflicting statements

There are conflicting statements about the withdrawal of US troops. We list some of them below.

1. On 27 May 1949 there were 7,500 American troops in South Korea (Strait Times 27 May 1949 p. 1)

2. From 15 August 1948 to 31 August 1949 Kimpo airport (near Seoul) was operated by the US Air Force. Under a new agreement the US government (instead of the Air Force) will assume responsibility of Kimpo airport from 1 September 1949 on. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, roll 12)

3. On the website of the 7th Infantry Division one reads: “In the fall of 1948, the Korean elections took place, and true to its commitments, the US removed its occupation forces from the country. When the Hourglass Division sailed for Japan in December of 1948, its commander, Major General William Frishe Dean, was the last Military Governor of Korea.”

This excerpt seems to suggest that the last US troops were removed in December 1948. However, the fact that the writer puts the Korean elections in fall suggests that he (or she) may not necessarily be well informed about what happened in Korea.

3. It is often said that after August 1948 the US Military Government was replaced by the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG). Regarding the later, one reads in a letter to “Time Magazine” (4 September 1950) that “KMAG was composed of fewer than 500 officers and men.” According to Sawyer (1962), each division, regiment or battalion commander in the ROK Army had an American officer at his side. Advisers also worked hand in hand with the Korean Ministry of Defense, the Korean Army Chief of Staff and the heads of all technical and administrative services.

The Wikipedia article about KMAG tells us that after 15 August 1948, the United States created the “Provisional Military Advisory Group” (PMAG) to continue the

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70 The letter was written by Major John D. Holland of KMAG.

71 The authority of these advisers stemmed from the fact that all the equipment and weapons were provided by the United States. This system had already been in use in China and was put to work again in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Georgia and Iraq and several other countries.
work of training the South Korean military, that PMAG had only 100 advisers, and that it was renamed KMAG on 1 July 1949 and USAMAGIK (United States Military Advisory Group in Korea) on 25 June 1950 that is to say at the beginning of the Korean War. All these indications seem to suggest that there were only a few hundred Americans in South Korea in 1949. However, this is to forget that even before August 1948 there was a clear difference between USAMGIK and USAFIK. Although the troops of USAFIK were at the service of the MG, they constituted a separate entity. In the same way, there may have been American tactical troops which were not part of KMAG. This would make statement 3 consistent with statement 1.

4 In the New York Times of 29 May 1949 one reads that the last US troops should leave South Korea by the end of July but that this date was given unofficially and that the State Department remained silent on this issue.

**Plan Twinborn**

At the National Diet Library in Tokyo there are copies of NARA documents (see below) which refer to a secret operation called “Plan Twinborn” whose objective was to keep 7,070 men in South Korea apparently from 1 January 1949 to 30 June 1950. These troops comprised the following elements.


2 Logistic and service elements: 2,515 men (225 officers, 2,290 enlisted men)

3 FEAF [Far East Air Force] Air Base Detachment 200 men (14 officers, 186 enlisted men)

Military Advisory Group: 241 men (92 officers, 149 enlisted men)

4 A company named Kosco (based in New York) was asked to operate inland facilities for US Forces for the period 1 January 1949 to 30 June 1950.

These documents belong to a series from the National Diet Library which has a call number beginning with TS for “Top Secret”. The records about Plan Twinborn range from 29 November to 15 December 1948. Some of them are fairly elliptic. Just to give a sense of their style we reproduce one of them which is dated 11 December 1948.

**Operational control of Korean forces**

Even if US Army forces were indeed withdrawn by the end of July 1949, this does not mean that there were no US Navy forces in the ports of South Korea or Air Force squadrons on South Korean airports.

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72At this point we do not know if this contract was discontinued on 30 June 1949 when the headquarters of USAFIK was officially deactivated or if it remained in force until 30 June 1950.
Introduction

11 December 1948

From: CINCFE [Commander in Chief, Far East]
To: Department of Army
Info: CG USAFIK [Commanding General US Army Forces in Korea]

Request authority to publish CHQ FEC [Far East Command] operations instructions implementing directives to retain USAFIK in Korea subsequent to 15 January 1949 under secret classification.

Intelligence annex to remain TOP SECRET per WARX 82083.

[Signed:] Recommend approval, Ward H. Maris, Brigadier General GSC

One of the messages defining Plan Twinborn. So far we were not able to find the meaning of the CHQ and WARX acronyms. It would also be interesting to know to which document WARX 82083 refers. Source: NDL, microfiche TS-00034.

Table 1  Who controlled the South Korean Army and police?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Army controlled by</th>
<th>Police controlled by</th>
<th>Comment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aug 1945 – Aug 1948</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SK was ruled by US Military Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep 1949 (?) – Jun 1950</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SK</td>
<td>No specific information was found so far for this interval</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jul 1950 – 1978</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SK</td>
<td>SK forces under control of UN Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978 – 1990</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SK</td>
<td>Control by the “Combined Forces Command” whose Commander in Chief was a US general.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Legacy of the US occupation

An organization is durably shaped by its creation phase

In the history of any organization it is its birth phase which is crucial. Even though this birth phase usually lasts only a short time, it shapes the framework and working rules of the organization for subsequent years. Indeed, observation demonstrates a kind of inertia principle in the sense that original rules tend to remain in force for a long time. Basically, they will be changed only marginally and will undergo major changes only when there is another period of upheaval.

The same kind of mechanisms seem to rule the evolution of species as recognized by the theory of punctuated equilibrium. The theory suggests that evolution is marked by long periods of stability, which is punctuated by rare instances of rapid branching
A key-observation is the comparison of the diversity of species in the ocean and on earth. Life began in the ocean some 4 billion years ago. For almost 3 billion years it remained confined in the ocean. Yet, there are only 0.25 million known marine species compared with 1 million terrestrial species. In other words, for terrestrial species the diversity/time ratio is 16 times larger than for marine species. One plausible explanation is that the ocean is a much more stable environment. A smaller frequency of “upheavals” may have resulted in less adaptive pressure and therefore less creation of new species.

**Creation of the KCIA**

Observation shows that in all countries which were occupied by American forces after World War II the national secret services have kept strong ties with their US counterparts. The origins of the Korean Central Intelligence agency can be traced back to the Korean Counterintelligence Corps (KCIC), formed under the auspices of the US Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC). The KCIA was founded on 13 June 1961 by Kim Jong-pil, who drew much of the organization’s initial 3,000-strong membership from the KCIC.

Through numerous arrests and torture of students, dissidents, opposition figures, communists, reporters, or anyone perceived to be critical of the government, the actions of the KCIA created a climate of fear and repression. Because its funding (as well as its actions) was secret and not submitted to any control, the agency also played a big role in Korean politics by distributing funds to anti-Communist organizations, unions or individuals.

In 1999 the KCIA was renamed “National Security Service”.

**American influence in East Asia before/after World War II**

In May 1882 a treaty of trade and friendship was signed in Incheon between the United States and the kingdom of Korea. This signature occurred a few decades after China and Japan had been compelled to open their borders to western trade. The Treaty authorized the dispatch to Korea of American missionaries and medical personnel.

In the following years, Methodist missions and churches began to sprang up in Korea along with schools and hospitals. Horace H. Allen, Dr. O.R. Avison, Ms. Mary Scranton, Annie E. Bunker, Dalzell A. Bunker, Horace Underwood, James Scarth Gale, John W. Heron, Charles William Legendre were some of the Americans who settled in Korea in the late 19th century and were buried in Seoul at the “Foreigners
Cemetery”. Created in 1890 this cemetery comprised some 350 graves by 2010.

The late 19th century was marked by an overall expansion of western influence in Eastern Asia. Some landmark events were the colonization of Indochina by France, the colonization of Guam, Hawaii and the Philippines by the United States, the Boxer war and resulting expansion of the concession system in China.

Whereas before World War II there was a united front of western powers (which also included Japan), after the war, only the United States kept and indeed strengthened its influence in Eastern Asia. This period was marked by the following events.

- Britain left India, Sri Lanka and Burma; the Netherlands left Indonesia; France left Indochina, Cambodia and Laos.
- It is true that the United States granted independence to the Philippines and that its influence was greatly reduced in China after the Communists came to power, but several countries, particularly South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam remained in the American zone of influence.
- At the time of writing (May 2011) there is a paradox regarding US influence in Eastern Asia. In China, American cultural influence was far stronger than at any time in previous decades. Many Chinese students want to study in American universities. American TV series, both entertainment series and history series (such as a history of Wall Street shown in October-November 2010), are shown on CCTV (i.e. state-owned China Central Television) channels. Chinese newspapers report the last news in US sport competition whether in basketball, football or baseball.

Yet, in neighboring countries there is a hidden rivalry for influence and leadership. This can be seen from several tumultuous episodes in the Caucasian republics, in Thailand, Outer Mongolia and even to some extent in Japan. As an ever larger percentage of the exports of these countries go to China, there is at the same time an inclination for greater political integration and alignment. Needless to say, the State Department tries its best to reverse this trend.

Since its creation, Pakistan (so far) managed to keep good relations with the United States and friendly relations with China. In this sense, it is a test case.

Methodology of this study

This is not an isolated study. It belongs to a set of parallel investigations of various occupation episodes. In this part we wish to describe the methodological framework of this set of comparative studies.

In the first section we explain the rationale of the chronological method of exposition that we have chosen. The second section discusses the reasons for providing a comparative perspective. In the third section we emphasize that this study could not
have been carried out, at least not in this form, before the advent of the Internet.

**Making historiography into a cumulative body of knowledge**

The part devoted to the chronological listing of events represents some 70% of the content of this book. As this is a fairly uncommon feature for an historical account, a few words are in order to explain why, in our opinion, chronologies should be seen as a key element in historiography.

The chronology part and the chapter on quantitative evidence are the core of this report because they contain the information that comes from the sources and documents found in various archives and in primary sources such as newspapers. The other chapters contain comments on the events mentioned in the chronology. The main drawback of these comments is their subjective nature. They concern issues which at the time of writing were considered “important” but 30 years earlier or later historians would probably focus on different points. On the contrary, the chronology part can be seen as an objective list of events in the sense that it is largely (if not completely) independent of the personal interests of the historian. It becomes even more “objective” when it is a collective production of many historians (see below).

Why is the distinction between subjective and objective historical accounts essential?

One of the most basic features of a science is the fact that it is (and must be) a process of accumulation. From Bernard de Chartres to Descartes to Newton, this has been widely recognized:

“We are like dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants” said Bernard de Chartres in 1124. “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” wrote Newton in a famous letter to Robert Hooke (1676).

In Britain the phrase “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants” was even included on the edge of a 2 pound coin issued in 1997.

For subjective comments one can hardly speak of a cumulative process. One set of comments that is found quite interesting at a given moment will be found outdated thirty years later and replaced by another set which will of course experience the same fate a few decades later.

On the contrary, chronologies present facts (not opinions) which will have a lasting

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73This could appear as a fairly cavalier judgment. Unfortunately, it seems to apply even to the work of historians who adopted a comparative perspective. Consider for instance the work of the renowned British historian Arnold Toynbee. Under the title “A study of history” he published a 12-volume study of the rise and fall of civilizations. Naturally, we are not going to argue that forty years after its publication the work is no longer useful. For one thing, it shows how such a synthesis can be done and sets a model for similar attempts; in that respect it is certainly a stimulating answer to the specialising tendency of modern historical research. However, precisely because of its originality and specificity, it would be difficult to link up this work with subsequent studies. Thus, it does not seem to be a step in a cumulative process. Naturally, such monumental studies have also another potential usefulness. Once digitized and made searchable by key-words, they will become valuable pools of facts and references of primary sources.
interest for historians\textsuperscript{74}. Moreover, it is easy to add complementary information to such files. Suppose, for instance, that in 2020 an historian discovers a record (not found or not accessible earlier) that describes a series of events. Thanks to the chronology structure it will be easy to check whether these events are already known or whether they are really “new”. In the later case they will be incorporated at the appropriate dates. In this way, the chronology will grow year by year, always remaining the ultimate source of reference. In the future\textsuperscript{75}, it may even be possible to make the \textit{primary documents} available to readers. This will allow them to judge the degree of reliability of the events which are mentioned, a feature of crucial importance.

The methodology of such multi-layered chronologies has been proposed in Roehner (2002, p. 370-373) where the construction of very large chronicles (VLCs) was advocated. Such VLCs should be seen as huge computerized chronologies resulting from a process of \textit{collective production} (somehow like the Wikipedia encyclopedia).

\textbf{Why it is crucial to adopt a comparative perspective}

In medical research there are basically three successive phases.

1. First there is the need to describe and categorize the various illnesses. Clearly this phase is of crucial importance. If one cannot make a clear distinction between an attack of bronchitis and a lung cancer, any cure will be hazardous.

2. Then one has to identify the mechanisms (bacteria, virus, mutation and so on) which are responsible for the disorder.

3. The last step is to find a cure.

One faces the same kind of challenges for social events. Suppose for instance that one has a detailed account of 10 different riots. The first question is to see if they follow a common pattern. If they do not, a closer examination may perhaps show that there are in fact two different patterns; this opens the way to a classification of riots. As in medicine the second step is to find the mechanisms which are at the root of the different types of riots. Once these mechanisms are well understood, it may become possible to assess the likelihood of riots, may be even to prevent them.

For an isolated event the only thing one can do is to describe it. In order for a phenomenon to be studied scientifically, one needs many observations. This has been well understood by many sociologists and historians. Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Marc Bloch, Ernest Labrousse, Fernand Braudel and many others developed various forms of comparative analysis. Basically, the broader the phenomenon\textsuperscript{76}

\textsuperscript{74}The same observation holds for evidence which takes the form of quantitative data.

\textsuperscript{75}Thanks to the possibilities of the hypertext format and to the fact that more and more archive resources will be digitized and made available online.

\textsuperscript{76}By which we mean that one needs more parameters to define it.
the more cases one needs in order to study it in a meaningful way. For instance, economic growth depends upon a staggering number of parameters which explains why it is so difficult to come up with well-defined conclusions. On the contrary, for a sharply defined phenomenon, one can expect to draw clear-cut results even from a relatively small sample of less than 10 observations.

For all these reasons, the present study is not isolated but is part of a set of studies which centers around the phenomenon of military occupation. There have been various occupation episodes during and after World War II; several of them are examined in the various studies which compose this project. All these studies follow the same format and focus on the same variables.

They turned out to be more time consuming than was realized when this project was started because we had to pierce the smoke screen of military censorship. As a matter of fact, comparative analysis was instrumental in suggesting which accounts are most affected by censorship. For instance, if one sees a substantial number of incidents in cases A, B, C and none in a case D which is similar in other respects, then it can be suspected that censorship was stricter in this last case. Naturally, the obstacle of censorship can be overcome only if access to previously restricted sources has been made possible. Many important files still remain closed.77

We concentrated on post-World War II episodes for in this case archive sources are much more numerous than for episodes that occurred in earlier times. In the United States there does not seem to be a 50-year rule for the opening of archives. For instance, most of the files of the “Military Advisory and Assistance Groups” (MAAG) which worked in many countries in the wake of World War II are still closed and it is likely that at least some parts of them will remain closed for ever.

**The crucial role of the Internet Revolution**

The Internet is not just one additional tool. For the social sciences it truly represents a Revolution. This word is justified by the fact that many investigations which were strictly impossible before the Internet have now become possible. The role of the Internet in the present study can be illustrated by three examples.

- All the studies in the present project are based on the analysis of *microsocial events*. Such events can only be found in databases of newspapers or news agencies. Selecting these events from a set of many thousands articles would have been a daunting and almost impossible task before these databases had been computerized and made searchable by keywords. For the present studies, the databases of the articles of the “New York Times” and of the “Times” have been searched extensively

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77 Apart from keeping a file closed there are several other ways of making it inaccessible. If it is not included in the catalog (or if the title under which it is catalogued has no connection with actual content) nobody will be able to request it. Keeping apart a record and its inclosures is a way of making the inclosures inaccessible. Sometimes such problems may occur just by inadvertance but there are also cases in which one suspects that it was done by purpose.
and this information has provided (at least sometimes) a first insight\textsuperscript{78}.

- The advent of the Internet has completely changed the way we work in archives. Nowadays, the catalogs of many national archives have been computerized\textsuperscript{79} and it has become possible to search them by key-words as well as by other characteristics such as “record group” or “file creator”. Once the item in which one is interested has been located it is possible to get photocopies (or files of scanned images) from the archives. It is in this way that we have been able to work with archives located in various countries: Australia, Britain, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, United States without leaving Paris.

- Finally, many documents once available in only a few libraries are now directly accessible on the Internet. This observation also extends to personal testimonies which had never been available in libraries and can now be read on the websites set up by veterans or their descendants.

\textsuperscript{78} Of course, during wars major newspapers are also subject to censorship (pre-censorship, post-censorship or auto-censorship); in such cases one must find alternative sources of information.

\textsuperscript{79} At the time of writing (2008) this process is still in progress. For the archives which are the most advanced in this respect, about 50% of the entries have been included in the electronic catalog.
Suppression of leftist organizations

The events in Korea must be seen in a broader perspective. At the same time there was a fierce civil war in China between the Nationalists and the Communists. Similar confrontations took place in the Philippines, Malaysia, Indochina (that is to say Vietnam). In all these conflicts the United States supported anti-Communist forces.

In China a crucial turning point was the victory of the Communists in the war in Manchuria. In 1946 they were able to neutralize the large-scale offensive staged by the Nationalists and in mid-1947 they began to extend their control from the countryside to the cities. For instance, in October 1947, they seized the important rail center of Kongzhuling. With the war in China turning to the advantage of the Communists, the United States became even more intent on keeping South Korea in their zone of influence. As a result, the struggle in Korea sharpened.

In South Korea, far from being neutral in the struggle which opposed left and right, the Military Government led the fight against left-wing forces. This took different forms.

- Shortly after the beginning of the occupation US troops raided the headquarters of leftist organizations (see the chronology for more details).
- Through its ordinance No 88 the Military government outlawed leftist newspapers (Wikipedia article entitled “Media of South Korea”). For instance, on 6 September 1946 four left-wing newspapers were suspended (see at this date in the chronology)
- Many leftist organizations were outlawed as well. One example is the “Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance” (see the chronology at the date of 19 May 1947).
- There were several successive waves of arrests of Communists. (McCune 1950, section entitled “Suppression of Communism”). The first ones took place in the summer and fall of 1946. McCune notes that the Taegu attacks on police of October 1946, in which about 50 police were killed was partially a consequence of the anti-Communist campaign.
A second wave of arrests occurred in the wake of the fall uprisings. 1,500 persons were prosecuted of whom 500 had been tried and convicted by the end of 1946. In March 22, 1947, further arrests were made in the wake of the “flash strike” of March 22. Some 2,700 leftists were arrested.

In the summer of 1947 bands of rightists with the apparent collusion of the Korean police began an anti-Communist campaign. Lyuh Woonhyung, former head of the People’s Republic, was the first victim of the reign of terror. He was assassinated on 19 July 1947 on a Seoul street in broad daylight and in sight of a police box. He had been mentioned as a possible compromise candidate to head the proposed provisional Korean government.

On 22 August 1947 General Hodge disclosed that one hundred ringleaders of activity of a “revolutionary nature” had been arrested in Seoul. Many more had also been apprehended in the rest of the country on charges of interfering with the government’s rice-collection program.

Roger N. Baldwin, Director of the American Civil Liberties Union, on his return from a visit to Korea during the summer of 1947 wrote: “By nurturing the police state we drive moderates into the communist camp”. That is indeed what was happening in China. But, whereas in China the Communists were well served by the Japanese invasion, in South Korea the Korean War spelled the end of Communism in the name of national defense.

- Union leaders and members of professional organizations were jailed (e.g. see the chronology at the date of 15 August 1947). The school teachers or bank clerks who participated in the activities of the “Salaried Worker’s Association” (or other leftist unions) were dismissed, arrested and tried (see the chronology at the date of October 1947)

- Between 1946 and 1948 there was a big increase in the number of inmates. Moreover, the number of inmates largely underestimates the scale of the repression. After its creation on 20 April 1949 the Bodo League organized camps for the “rehabilitation” of leftists. In June 1950 there were about 300,000 inmates in these camps, 10 times more than in regular prisons (see the chronology)

- A convenient way to fight leftist organizations while at the same time keeping an appearance of neutrality was to leave this fight to the police (which was under US command) and to right wing groups which were able to act in tacit conjunction with the police.

Two examples are the attack on the anti-trusteeship demonstration of students in Seoul on 18 January 1946 and the destruction on the offices of left-wing newspapers

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80 During the uprisings in September and October 1946, Military Government suspended publication of all extreme left-wing newspapers.

81 After the beginning of the Korean war in late June 1950 President Rhee ordered the execution of many of these inmates. More details can be found in the chronology at the date of 20 April 1950.
on 12 May 1946 (see the chronology).

- The fact that there were strong ties and an active collaboration between MG and Korean anti-Communist groups is made clear by the account of a conference held on 28 February 1947 between General Weckerling and the leaders of anti-Communist youth organizations (for more details see the chronology).

**US military doctrine about domestic disturbances**

In this section we examine the directives given in the “Basic Field Manual” (FM 27-15) entitled “Military law, domestic disturbances” issued in Washington in 1941. The expression “Military law” applies to South Korea. In another Field Manual entitled “Military police in towns and cities” (FM 19-10) this point is made in the following terms: “In occupied territory, military authority is supreme. Military police have authority to quell all disorders. Assistance of troops is requested when necessary. The tactical principles outlined in FM 27-15 are generally applicable”. In the following lines we give a number of excerpts which provide an outline of these tactical principles.

**The distinction between crowds and mobs**

With respect to amount of force to be applied and weapons to be used, FM 27-15 makes a clear difference between crowds and mobs.

A mob is defined as a crowd which, for some reason, has become hostile. The manual recognizes that this is a highly subjective definition in the sense that a crowd can turn into a mob within an instant for instance if a leader turns up.

Against crowds it is said that weapons fire should be used only as a last resort. On the contrary against mobs “troops must rely on weapons”.

**Bayonets**

Bayonets are effective against rioters but should not be used against men who are prevented by those behind from retreating\(^ {82} \).

**Rifle fire**

The manual says clearly that in combating a mob blank cartridges or volleys fired over the heads should not be used for such things will be regarded as an admission of weakness and “may do much more harm than good”.

On the contrary the aim of rifle fire should be low so as to prevent shots going over the heads of the mob and injuring innocent persons who cannot get away.

If there is firing from the rear of the mob a few marksmen should be so placed as to

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\(^ {82} \) By definition in a crowd the people in the first line always have other people behind them. So it is difficult to understand how bayonets should be used.
be able to return the fire. Other marksmen should be detailed to fire on windows or roofs from which firing may come.

**Machine guns**

When mob action assumes serious proportions machine-gun units are assigned a place in the formation where they are protected by rifle units and from which they can readily go into action.

![Sub machine gun](image1.png)

**Fig. 2.1 Sub machine gun.** MP5 submachine gun. It combines the automatic fire of a machine gun with the cartridge size of a pistol. It can fire 800 rounds per minute. *Source: Wikipedia article entitled “Submachine gun”.*

![Water cooled machine gun](image2.png)

**Fig. 2.2 Water cooled machine gun.** The picture shows a 0.30 inch water-cooled machine gun which was used in World War II. There was also a similar air-cooled 0.30 machine gun. *Source: [http://www.rt66.com/korteng/SmallArms/30calhv.htm](http://www.rt66.com/korteng/SmallArms/30calhv.htm)*

**Scout cars and armored cars**

Scout cars and armored cars constitute valuable means for the suppression or prevention of riots due to their ability to transport fire power quickly from one location to another. By cruising up and down the streets of a city they can effectively prevent the formation of mobs. In case mobs have already formed, the cars are equally effective

![Scout car S1](image3.png)

**Fig. 2.3 Scout car S1.** There is a Browning M2 machine gun on top and two Browning M1921 machine guns in rear. *Source: [http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=7960](http://ww2db.com/image.php?image_id=7960)*

in breaking up and dispersing them. The machine guns, submachine guns, rifles and pistols with which the cars are armed must always be ready for instant use.

**Airplanes**

Airplanes flying low may have a valuable moral effect. Aircraft equipped with machine guns may be used against rioters on roofs of buildings or in open spaces.
Airplanes will be especially valuable to the commander for directing the movements of armored cars when it is necessary to enter a city under opposition.

**Offensive actions against occupied cities**

The manual also explains the tactics to be used to retake cities occupied by rioters. For instance, it says that “such attacks will not differ materially from the attack of a similar place in time of war”. Clearly cases of towns and cities which had been overtaken by rebels and had to be re-occupied occurred in many places in South Korea, particularly in the southern part during the month of October 1946. So far, we do not know exactly when and where the tactics described in this section were used. It is one of the main purposes of this study to find out.

### About sources

Accounts of the events in Korea were made from three sides: (i) The South Koreans themselves. Of course, rightists and leftists gave fairly different pictures. (ii) The North Koreans news agencies (iii) The US occupation forces.

Between 1945 and 1949 several daily national newspapers were published in South Korea, most of them in Seoul. Although submitted to American censorship, they would nevertheless be a useful source of information for small scale daily incidents. Every daily issue of the “G-2 Periodic Report” comprised an attachment giving an English translation of several articles published in Korean newspapers. Unfortunately, these attachments are not included in the edition of the G-2 reports compiled by the “Institute of Asian Culture Studies” of Hallym University. We do not yet know why. However, they are available in the copy of the G-2 reports held at the National Diet Library in Tokyo. Due to censorship and to the fact that most journals did not have enough correspondents in other provinces, these translations do contain only few facts.

In 1946-1947 several of the leftist newspapers were closed either by the occupation authorities or by the (rightist) South Korean authorities. Thus, to get information about the activities of workers and peasants one must rely on North Korean sources. Unfortunately, it seems that few (if any) archives of North Korean news agencies and newspapers are available in South Korea.

Historians who cannot read Korean must rely on Korean newspapers published in English. Apparently, the “Seoul Times” was the only newspaper of that kind. So far we were not able to find a library which holds archives of this paper. It is unavailable at the “Central National Library” whereas at the “National Assembly Library” only

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83Due to the difference in speed, it is difficult to understand how planes can show the way to armored cars. However they can certainly “clean” the streets before ground forces enter the city.
a few (less than 20) daily issues are available.

**Military Government publications**

The US Military Government published several series of documents about its activity. For instance the “Summation of non-military activities” or the G-2 (intelligence) reports. In addition, the historical section of SCAP in Japan produced a history of the occupation of South Korea which comprises several volumes. By and large this official history has become the accepted truth about the occupation in spite of the fact that several important aspects are ignored or belittled. The trials by provost courts or by military commissions as well as the incidents which opposed US troops and Korean people are two facets which received only scant attention in this official history.

**G-2 reports**

The “G-2 Weekly Summary” reports (very briefly) many instances of confrontation between US troops and South Koreans. Here is one example chosen randomly among hundreds of similar instances:

*Seoul, 21 November 1945: 200 Koreans armed with clubs attempted to break up the Korean People’s Convention. MPs broke up the disorder.*

As in this excerpt no information is usually given about casualties whether among Koreans or among US troops.

**US fatalities**

Information about *fatalities* is given in some cases. Most of the deaths are among Koreans but there are a few cases of US fatalities. One can mention the following cases (more details can be found in the chronology chapter).

- **3 February 1946, Inchon.** At 05:30 the body of an American soldier who had been on a jeep patrol was found in Inchon Bay.
- **23 July 1946, Taegu.** At 2:20 an American sentry was killed by an unknown person. He was shot three times by a rifle.
- **9 October 1947, Taejon.** An American soldier was killed with a 45 caliber pistol by an unknown person while he was asleep in a railroad boxcar (i.e. an enclosed railroad car for the transport of freight). Two other soldiers were reportedly sleeping in the same boxcar when the soldier was killed.
- **3 November 1947.** A Korean, Cho Sung Ho, killed Private First Class Charles H. Pierce by shooting him with a shotgun.
- **7 April 1948, Pusan-Tong Highway.** A Korean policeman, Zai In, killed Private First Class Joseph W. Comeau by shooting him with his carbin.
- **19 July 1948.** Some 8 Koreans in civilian clothes ambushed 5 American soldiers. The attack resulted in the killing of one US soldier, Private Charles Labita,
The attackers took the weapons of the Americans with them.
- 19 September 1948. Recruit Dominic Coladonato of Camp Skiworth near Taegu was shot and killed by a Korean policeman.
- 26 October 1948 Captain Harry C. Symmonds was killed in a jeep accident together with two Korean officers during the Yosu uprising.

These accounts are fairly clear but there are numerous accounts which do not sound plausible. This is the issue that we discuss in the next section.

Reliability of US sources

Some accounts sound weird. This can be illustrated by the following examples.

1. Waegwan (50 km north west of Taegu), 3 October 1946.
A patrol of US troops was fired upon by a group of 18 Koreans (not all were armed). The patrol returned fire and the Koreans fled. No casualties were suffered by the patrol. Korean casualties, if any, are unknown. (NARA 1, No 57)

Of course, one would expect that the group of Koreans began to fire from a well chosen, protected position. One must also assume that at least one half of them had rifles, otherwise it would have been pointless to start an attack.

- The first surprise is that all the 9 Koreans who fired missed their targets. This could be the case if they fired from far away (say from over 50m) but only very inexperienced fighters would start an ambush in such conditions.

- The second surprise is that after an exchange of shots, the party who was in a protected position fled, thereby leaving cover at the risk of providing easy targets for the US patrol.

- Finally, there is the fact that “Korean casualties are unknown”. If a Korean had been seriously wounded he would have been unable to flee. Even if his comrades had tried to save him that would have made the retreat of the whole group difficult.

2. Kaesong area (not far from the 38th parallel), 24 October 1946.
About 10:00 some American soldiers and 10 odd police started for Yonan. They met a truck carrying about 20 armed men at a place about 500 meters from Yonan. A skirmish lasted for about an hour between the two parties. As a result 30 to 40 men were arrested and 6 rifles seized. (NARA 4a)

- First there seems to be an inconsistency: there were only 20 men in the truck but “30 to 40” were arrested.

- It is surprising that an exchange of fire which lasted for one hour did not result in a single casualty in either side.

- Finally, if the skirmish lasted one hour why at the end was it so easy to arrest
Incidents

the Koreans. Why did they not use their truck to retreat. The story would become more plausible if the persons arrested (and the riffles seized) were not those who were aboard the truck but rather people from the town of Yonan.

3 Paekchon (near the 38th parallel in the west), 20 October 1946. A US patrol was fired upon by a truckload of 25 Koreans. They fired 5 or 6 rounds high above the patrol and when the troops returned the fire, the Koreans immediately threw down their arms and surrendered. (NARA 1, No 58) This is again a fairly astounding account.

- Why did the Koreans open fire if they just intended to fire above the heads of their opponents.
- Then, why did they surrender so quickly instead of attempting to drive away? By surrendering after opening fire they exposed themselves to a long prison sentence which would prevent them from supporting their families. This was a matter of serious concern.

A possible explanation is provided by a CIC agent; see the chronology at the date of 15 January 1946.

3 Naju (south-west Korea, some 20 km west of Hwasun), 31 October 1946. Three groups of peasants of more than 1,000 each converged on Naju. They were met by a platoon of 20th Infantry, 250 policemen and 80 constabulary soldiers. Two C-47 buzzed the crowds which led angry peasants to climb a hill to throw rocks at them. The police fired numerous volleys into the crowd killing 13 peasants (Cumings 1981 Vol. 1 p. 365).

There are several weird features.

- The C-47 was an unarmed transport aircraft powered by two engines. What was the purpose of buzzing the crowd with such aircraft? If the purpose was to disperse the crowd it obviously failed. If a show-of-force was intended it would have better achieved by using tanks as was done on other similar occasions.
- What was the purpose of throwing rocks at aircraft and climbing a hill especially for doing so?

We do not necessarily imply that the previous accounts are wrong but in the sketchy form in which they are presented they do not sound plausible. In other words, they are at least wrong by omission. In almost all accounts the Korean demonstrators or fighters are presented as being very ineffective and inexperienced. It is not uncommon to see a few US soldiers disperse a demonstration of several hundreds and arrest several dozens. Here are two examples (among many others):

- Myonchon (near the 38th parallel, now in North Korea) 17 October 1946: A
 mob of 200 captured 5 policemen who were jailed. A US patrol dispersed the mob and freed the police. (NARA 1, No 58)

- Paekchon (near the 38th parallel, now in North Korea) 20 October. Communists took over the police headquarters and disarmed the police. 7th Division troops restored order. (NARA 1, No 58)

In both cases the insurgents were armed (otherwise they would not have been able to disarm the police). Therefore the intervention of US troops seems just miraculous. Because there had been many similar cases in 1945 and early 1946 the insurgents knew in advance that there would be an intervention of US troops. So, if they were not prepared to resist, it was pointless to disarm the police. By the way, it is quite by purpose that we have selected cases which occurred near the 38th parallel because one would expect the insurgents to be in a stronger position in this area.

In short, as in the other cases that we cited, to make these accounts become plausible one must suppose that the insurgents were naive, inexperienced and ineffective.

Of course, the US troops had overwhelming firepower but one should not forget that prior to the occupation many Koreans (and especially leftist Koreans) had been fighting the Japanese troops who had similar firepower. In contrast, most of the US troops, especially after 1945, had never seen real war and were therefore fairly inexperienced as was indeed revealed by the first phase of the Korean War.

In the previous section we gave some examples of US soldiers who were killed by Koreans. However all these instances involved only a few individuals. There is not a single case of a US soldier killed by rifle fire in trying to disperse a demonstration or in a skirmish with a group of armed Koreans.

How can one solve the questions raised above? Two solutions come to mind.

- If the US troops used considerably more fire power than described, then the accounts become more plausible. It is clear that heavy machine gun fire or the intervention of tanks would quickly break a demonstration. But in that case one would expect a larger number of Korean victims.
- If the US troops did not use heavy gun fire one would expect them to suffer more casualties; remember that according to the accounts not a single serviceman was killed or injured in “restoring order”.

In conclusion, if we could reliably estimate the number of US soldiers who were killed in clashes that would give us an idea of the level of violence. As mentioned earlier such data are held by the NPRC-MPR but (so far) are not made available to historians.

Medical sources
Medical reports

Medical reports are a very important source for obtaining information about the members of the occupation forces who died or were injured. There are monthly reports and annual reports at the level of each division and also at the level of the whole command. The annual reports are entitled “Annual Report of Medical Department Activities for 1948”. For our purpose their most interesting part is the section entitled “Vital statistics” because it gives the number and causes of death.

Unfortunately, the circumstances of the death are not explained. Thus, for 1948 when one reads that there were 29 deaths by gunshot, 11 of which were homicides and in addition 2 other homicides (not by gunshot) one would like to know the identity of the murderers: were they Americans or Koreans? The only answer that can be given is in statistical terms. In 1948 the homicide rate among males in the United states was about 9 per 100,000 (Historical Statistics of the United states, 1974, p. 414). Thus, for an average strength of about 30,000 in 1948 one would expect \(0.3 \times 9 = 2.7\) homicides. The 11 homicides which occur are 4 times more.

Another obstacle is that, so far (December 2015), we could not find the vital statistics for 1946 and 1947. The Digital Library of the National Library of Korea contains the annual reports for 1948 and 1949 (as well as other medical reports); it has also reports pertaining to 1947 but which do not include the vital statistics section.

The reports entitled “Statistical Health Reports” are weekly tables giving: strength, hospital admissions, deaths and evacuations; these data are given separately for disease and injury. Unfortunately, we could find these tables only for 1947.

Medical reports also give useful information regarding the strength of the XXIV Corps. This is because strength data were needed to compute rates per 1,000 troops. Thus, one learns that in January 1947 there were 62,663 troops, of which 6.1% were “colored”.

Hospital admissions for injury

The evacuation procedure

In fact, one should be aware that the deaths reported in the medical reports of the Korean Command do not include all cases. This is due to the fact to the evacuation procedure which is summarized in the following diagram. Evacuation decisions were based on two elements.

- The estimated length of time \(t\) during which the patient would have to stay in hospital.
- An upper bound \(T\) was set by the evacuation policy of the XXIX Corps. It \(t\) was longer than \(T\) the patient would be evacuated. \(T\) was adjusted by taking into account
Fig. 2.3b Monthly injury hospital admission rate. As the $y$ variable is the annualized rate per 1,000 troops and as the strength in late 1946 was about 60,000, a rate of 93 in December 1946 means that there were: $93 \times \frac{60}{12} = 465$ injury related admissions. Somewhat surprisingly there seems to be a time lag of about one month and a half between the increase in admissions and the most serious clashes between occupation troops and insurgents as reported in USAFIK accounts. Source: USAFIK, Annual Report (http://www.dlibrary.go.kr)

the hospital beds available in Korea. In the fall of 1945 during the first months of the occupation, $T$ was set to one or two months because few hospitals were operational. The same thing occurred toward the end of the occupation in April-June 1949. The rest of the time there was a 120-day evacuation policy in effect.

**Veneral disease infection rates of Korean prostitutes**

A medical report for 1947 (available on www.dlibrary.go.kr) gives the infection rates of three kinds of prostitutes.

- **Taxi dancers: 70%**.

“Taxi dancer” is an American term for dancers who are hired to dance with their customers on a dance-by-dance basis. The term comes from the fact that, as with a taxi-cab driver, the dancer’s pay is proportional to the time spent dancing with the customer. Incidentally, the Wikipedia article entitled “Taxi dancer” makes no
Fig. 2.3c  **Weekly injury hospital admissions.** As the rate is also defined as an annualized rate per 1,000 it can be compared to the rate in the previous graph. *Source: USAFIK, Annual Report (http://www.dlibrary.go.fr)*

reference to any link with prostitution.

- **Kaesong girls: 30%**.

Kaesong is the name of a city that was in South Korea before the Korean war, changed hands 3 times during the war and was eventually attributed to North Korea at the Panmunjom discussions. For some reason (which may have nothing to do with the city itself) the term “Keesang girl” or “Kaesong girl” was used as the Korean name for Japanese geisha[^84].

- **Waitresses 56%**

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[^84]: A US Marine Lieutenant of the First Marine Division gives the following account of one of his visits to a famous restaurant in Inchon. This takes place at the end of the Korean War. “The rice wine was good and flowed smoothly. And then there were the kessang girls. They were the Korean version of Japanese Geisha. A kessang sat beside each of us making giggly (laughing quietly) conversation. For me the conversation was limited, as my Korean was very basic and they did not speak English, but I certainly did enjoy their presence”.

http://www.koreanwar-educator.org/memoirs/hoskins_john/index.htm
In November 1947:
102 evacuations
76 for disease, 26 for injury
8 officers, 85 enlisted men, 9 civilians

The electronic catalog of NARA contains 138 files which describe “fires and other accidents”. Their annual distribution is described in the following table.

**US Forces in Korea: Fires and other accidents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1949</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Electronic catalog of NARA, see the indications given for NARA 7 (ARC Identifier 595596)*

**Participation of the 475th Fighter Group in crowd control**

As an illustration one can mention the participation of fighter aircraft in crowd control during the celebrations of 15 August 1946 (see the chronology chapter at the date of 16 August 1946).

This section is based on sources from the Air Force Historical Research Agency based at Maxwell Air Force, Alabama (AirForce 1)
The 475th Fighter Group comprised three Fighter Squadrons, namely the 431st, 432nd and 433rd. The first two were based at Kimpo Air Base near Seoul, while the 433rd was based at the Itami Air Base near Osaka, Japan. In October 1946 the 475th Fighter Group had 24 P-38s and 21 P-51s (see the two pictures).

Most of the uprisings occurred in the south of Korea. What were the distances from the Kimpo and Itami Air Bases to Pusan? From Kimpo it was about 300 km and 600 km from Itami. As both the P-38 and the P-51 had a range of over 1,500 km these aircraft could easily carry out missions in the southern areas of Korea.

**Fig. 2.4a** P-38 **Fighter aircraft.** The P-38 had 4 Browning machine guns mounted in the nose which could fire about 7 rounds per second. It had a range of about 2,000 km. *Source: Wikipedia, article entitled “Lockheed P-38 Lightning”.*

**Fig. 2.4b** P-51 **Fighter aircraft.** The P-51 had 6 Browning machine guns mounted in the wings which could fire about 7 rounds per second. It had a range of 1,865 km with external tanks. *Source: Wikipedia, article entitled “North American P-51 Mustang”.*
The AT-6 has up to 3 (7.62 mm=0.30 inch) machine guns; its range is 1,175 km. Its first flight was in 1935 and it is still in use in 2012; some 15,500 have been built. Source: Wikipedia, article entitled “North American T-6 Texan”.

October 1946

The total number of missions, namely, 776 sorties, and the total time flown by the Fighter Group, namely 1,652 hours, marked records since the end of the war.

According to the “AirForce 1” source, on 21-23 October 1946, the 475th Fighter Group flew 6 missions, “making low altitude formation passes over 42 towns in South Korea frequently hitting such hot beds as Taegu, Pusan, Waegman and Pohang-dong”. Pilots reported that the immediate effect of buzzing on assembled crowds seemed to be less noticeable than during similar missions in September 1946.

October 1948

In 1950 the Korean Air Force had only 16 planes:
- 13 liaison types
- 3 T6 trainers.

Of its 57 pilots, only 39 were considered to be trained. The same source says that given president Rhee’s aggressive attitude toward North Korea, the official American policy had been to build an indigenous air force just large enough to maintain internal order.

Such slow, basically unarmed planes may have been useful for crowd control but against rebel soldiers armed with machine guns they were almost useless. Therefore one would expect that Korean authorities were tempted to ask for US Air Force support.

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85 The source is:
http://www.scribd.com/xav66ier/d/73886333-Mig-Alley-The-Fight-for-Air-Superiority
At this point and until some new evidence emerges, this is nothing but a working hypothesis.

**Civilians killed by aircraft or naval gunfire in civil wars**

The idea that strafing or naval gunfire may be used in a political struggle which basically involves mostly civilians seems weird at first sight. Therefore, one should examine whether such cases occurred in the past. Naturally, we will not include cases such as South Vietnam where an armed guerrilla force was operating. For instance, the northern part of South Vietnam was declared a free-fire zone by the US command which means that any village could be bombed or strafed for the purpose of fighting Vietminh forces.

The following examples suggest that there are several circumstances under which strafing and bombing of civilians becomes a credible and acceptable means for military commanders.

The purpose of the following list which focuses on strikes directed at unarmed people is to understand the logic behind such military operations.

- In the Dokdo island incident that will be described later on, the fishermen who were strafed by aircraft were said to be smugglers.
- In the early months of 1958, separatist rebellions began to break out in several islands of Indonesia. In an attempt to weaken the government of President Sukarno, the CIA carried out bombing and strafing missions in support of the rebels (Blum 2004 p. 102-103). According to the Indonesian government, bombs dropped by CIA planes in April 1958 demolished a church killing all 700 people who were inside in this single action.
- After 1959, civilian objectives on the island of Cuba were repeatedly fire-bombed by planes coming from Florida. However, the United States maintained the fiction that the planes were operating against the wishes of the federal government.
- According to the commanding officer of the Marine unit in Beirut in September 1983 the United States provided direct naval gunfire support (an action that he strongly opposed) to the Lebanese Army in its intervention against a mountain village called Suq-al-Garb. Through this action the US forces showed that they did not wish to remain neutral and became an actor in the civil war that engulfed Lebanon. This resulted in a truck bomb attack on 23 October 1983 against US Marine barracks located at Beirut airport. It caused 241 fatalities.

It can be noted that shelling of anti-government forces by US naval gunfire continued during the civil war. The Wikipedia article entitled “1983 Beirut barracks bombing” shows a photograph of USS New Jersey firing a salvo against anti-government forces in the Shouf on 9 January 1984. This case shows that using heavy naval guns against lightly armed insurgents was a fairly common means of intervention for the
US Navy.

- Less than 48 hours after the bombing of the US Marine barracks in Beirut, the United States started an invasion of the island of Grenada. Some 7,000 troops went ashore supported by planes that were bombing and machine-gunning basic infrastructure. It is true that they were opposed by a small force of Cuban troops but the actions of the planes was not restricted to military objectives.
- If opponents are suspected to hide in a home or a village it will be attacked by air no matter how many civilians may be killed. This can be illustrated by the following episode which took place in Iraq.

21 May 2004. An Iraqi village near the western borderline with Syria where a wedding was going on was strafed by helicopter gunships and warplanes at 2:45am. At least 40 men, women and children were killed. Brigadier General Mark Klimmitt claimed that the target had been a suspected foreign fighter safe house.

Needless to say, in this attack as well as in all attacks by drones, there is a complete disregard for innocent people living in the same house.

- NATO bombing in Libya (see the article of the New York Times in the box) shows that military planners did not hesitate to target the home of Libyan commanders even though they knew that the bombs would also kill members of their families, including women and children. Here is one example.

On 30 April 2011 three of Qaddafi’s grandchildren, a baby and two toddlers, died in a NATO air strike on Colonel Qaddafi’s compound in which his 29-year-old son Seif al-Arab Qaddafi was also killed. Qaddafi and his wife were in the compound but escaped unharmed. (London Evening Standard, 3 May 2011)

Curiously, this episode is not mentioned in the article that the New York Times devoted to civilian casualties.

An additional discussion about the recourse to strafing in South Korea can be found in the chronology chapter at the date of 15 November 1946.

Traffic accidents

It is well known that many Koreans died in traffic accidents caused by US Army vehicles. In a directive to the troops made by General Hodge on 6 November 1946 (see the chronology), he mentions the fact that American drivers were often taking “joy in making Koreans dive for safety”. Naturally, nothing of the sort is ever mentioned in the reports describing fatal accidents that we have been able to read.

In a general way, it results from these reports that the Koreans who were hit by ve-

86The reports that we read covered mainly the period 15 September - 15 November 1948. In this interval fatal traffic accidents had a frequency of about one or two per week.
Incidents

Civilian casualties in Libya (New York Times 17 December 2011)  When foreign militaries began attacking Libya’s loyalists on 19 March 2011 the United States military, more experienced than NATO at directing large operations, coordinated the campaign. Warplanes from France, Britain, the United States, Italy, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Canada dropped ordnance. Two non-NATO nations, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, participated on a small scale.

France carried out 33% of all strike sorties, Britain 21% and the United States 19%.

“We have carried out this operation very carefully, without confirmed civilian casualties” the secretary general of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, said in November 2011. The reason was that the alliance had created its own definition for “confirmed”: only a death that NATO itself investigated and corroborated could be called confirmed. But because the alliance declined to investigate allegations, its casualty tally by definition could not budge from zero.

The alliance maintained this position even after two independent Western organizations, “Human Rights Watch” and the “Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict”, met privately with NATO officials and shared field research about mistakes.

On-the-ground examination by the “New York Times” of airstrike sites across Libya and the collection of munitions remnants, medical reports, death certificates and photographs found credible accounts of dozens of civilians killed by NATO in many distinct attacks. The victims, including at least 29 women or children, often had been asleep in homes when the ordnance hit.

In a tactic that survivors at several sites recounted warplanes restriked targets minutes after a first attack, a practice that sometimes killed, civilians rushing to the wounded.

Colonel Qaddafi’s officers were considered as valid targets even when they were lodged by friends where it was certain that the bombing would cause innocent victims. Airstrikes on June 20 in Surman leveled homes owned by Major General Hamedi. The attack claimed the lives of 13 civilians whereas General Hamedi was only wounded.

On 2 August 2011, three members of the same family (a mother and her two sons of 3 and 8) were killed in Zlitan because it was thought that military commanders were living in the same house.

In a similar case in the same town on 8 August, over 34 civilians were killed in their homes. So far, Libyan leaders have expressed no interest in examining NATO’s mistakes.

vehicles were always at fault. They were wandering aimlessly on the road or crossed the path of vehicles unexpectedly. Only once does a report say that the vehicle had almost no braking power. The bias in the reports comes principally from the fact that the witnesses are always members of the occupation force. Interpreters were available in other circumstances but were not used to establish traffic accident reports.

Case-study of the reliability of US military sources

The main conclusion of this section is that the G-2 Periodic Reports misrepresent the severity of clashes by understating the number of casualties. This is an important observation because these reports are one of the main sources used by historians.

There is an event for which the source (NARA 4a) gives about 14 different accounts.
This is an exceptional case; in almost all other cases there is only one version. These accounts fall into two categories: military reports produced either by G-2 or by the CIC on the one hand, newspapers and leaflets produced by political parties on the other hand.

As the newspapers even include some from North Korea, one would certainly not be surprised to see discrepancies with the military reports. The surprise comes from the fact that there are also substantial differences between the military reports. For the wounded the numbers range from zero to 93, for the killed they range from zero to one (Table 2.1).

In the previous section we emphasized that some accounts just do not sound plausible. It would be the same here if account number 1 were the only one available. What do we see in this account? A demonstration of about 1,000 fairly determined miners was broken by using tanks, bayonets, rifle butts (and even seven fighter aircraft). Yet, nobody was killed or even wounded.

If only one version were available (as is most often the case) one could only express surprise and incredulity: how can it be that with so many weapons used to control a determined crowd there were no casualties whatsoever? In the present case we are in a better position because thanks to the other accounts we can solve the conundrum.

The toll of 93 wounded and one killed which is eventually acknowledged by military sources sounds much more plausible. However, the language used in this report (number 6) suggests that this is probably also an understatement. It says that the injured people were pricked by bayonets. To prick means that the bayonets made only superficial injuries. Yet, bayonets are very sharp weapons which are designed for killing not just for pricking. It would certainly require considerable skill and self-control for using them in such a way.

What are the circumstances which lead to this incident? On 15 August 1946 for the first anniversary of the Japanese capitulation the Military Government wanted to prevent any parade to be held which would not be under its control. Above all it wanted to suppress any demonstration involving red flags or Communist songs.

The coal mine of Hwasun was located 30 km from Kwangju. The miners had asked the MG for permission to join the parade in Kwangju and, apparently, they got permission. So, they started at 3am on their march to Kwangju. Shortly before reaching their goal they were stopped by US troops. After that the different accounts do not agree. The miners were authorized to enter the city on condition of giving up their red flags. However, instead of joining the official parade, they joined an improvised
### Table 2.1: Degrees of self-censorship in military reports in the case of the Kwanju suppression by US troops of the miner demonstration of 15 August 1946

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>K</th>
<th>M</th>
<th>Weapons used by US Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 G-2 Periodic Report, No 301 (15 Aug)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7 P-51 aircraft, M-7 tanks bayonets, rifle butts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 G-2 Periodic Report, No 305 (19 Aug)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No mention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 CIC Kwangju, Memorandum (15 Aug)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No mention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 G-2, 6th Div to G-2, XXIV Corps</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>several</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Bayonets, rifle butts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 CIC Kwangju, Memorandum (22 Aug)</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Colonel Edwards</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>No mention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 Newspaper, SK, left wing (22 Aug)</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Bayonets, tanks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 Newspaper, SK, 22 Aug</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3 aircraft, 2 tanks, swords, rifle butts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 Moscow Radio</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Planes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Newspaper, NK, (25 Aug)</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>some</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Rifles, swords</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Leaflet, South Cholla Communist party</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>Bayonets</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
This table compares several accounts of the same incident given in different reports. There appear to be major discrepancies even between military reports (number 1-6).

Obviously, the accounts given by the “G-2 Periodic Reports” belittle and misrepresent the casualties of the incident. As the G-2 reports are one of the main sources used by historians, this is a conclusion that is worthwhile to remember.

S: size (number of demonstrators), A: arrests, **W**: wounded, **K**: killed, **M**: missing.

The P-51 Mustang was a fighter aircraft armed with four 7.7mm machine guns, the M-7 was a light tank.

Kwangju is the main city of the province of South Cholla. The different accounts have been arranged by order of increasing reported casualties. They range from nobody wounded, nobody killed to 190 wounded, 20 killed and 7 missing. What is actually the truth remains an open question. At least we know that there were at least 93 wounded and 1 killed (Colonel Edward’s report).

The G-2 (intelligence) reports are from the headquarters of the 6th Infantry Division of which Colonel Edwards was the chief. The XXIXth Corps was the unit which comprised all the occupation troops. CIC is the Counter Intelligence Corps.

SK means South Korea, NK means North Korea.

(1) says “No US Army personnel were injured and no casualties were reported among the civilians. A total of 20 of the leaders were arrested and placed in jail”.

(4) says that the demonstrators were Communist miners who intended to raid the prison in Kwangju and release the Communists held there. It is the only report in which such an allegation is made.

(5) says that according to doctors the deadly head injury suffered by one demonstrator was *not* caused by a bayonet.

(6) says “rioters injured were pricked by bayonets”.

South Korean newspapers may have been subject to military censorship. However, it seems that censorship of Korean newspapers by the Military Government was less strict than in Japan.

(9) says “Six American planes fired at the demonstrators from the air”.

leftist parade. After that it seems that the military wanted to arrest the leaders and to punish the rest of the demonstrators by beating them. As this could hardly be done in the city they were put on trucks and carried to Nunizas, 40 km away.

One military report (NARA 4b, p.520) says: “Seven US Army aircraft (P-51s) sided in the handling of crowds in that they were buzzing (i.e. making low passes over) the town between 11:00 and 11:30”. In an article published in January 1989 by the Korean magazine “Monthly Mal”, the reporter interviewed some surviving demonstrators and they also mentioned the low passes of the aircraft\textsuperscript{88}. It is not immediately clear what was the usefulness of these aircraft. That fighter aircraft might strafe a crowd of protesters (as is said in one leftist report) might (at first sight) seem out of question because this would lead to heavy casualties. Yet this method of crowd control was used by British forces in India in the 1930s.

One can also imagine a kind of gradation. If low passes did not achieve any result there might have been strafing over the heads of the crowd. If this did not make the crowd to disperse the pilots might have aimed at the ground not far from the crowd. Needless to say, there was a high risk of provoking casualties almost accidentally. Incidentally, the article of “Monthly Mal” did not mention any strafing but one may wonder whether this would have been possible in January 1989.

In the case of the Hwasun miners we do not really know what is the truth. The acknowledgment of 93 wounded and 1 killed by the US military is so to say a minimum truth because this source can hardly be suspected of inflating casualty numbers. On the contrary, the figures given by Communist sources cannot be accepted without hesitation. Incidentally, Bruce Cumings (1981, p. 550 note 81) gives the following death toll: “3 demonstrators and 5 policemen died”. He does not say who killed the demonstrators nor does he describe the circumstances under which the policemen were killed.

There are other episodes for which there are several versions.

- One of them is the account of the repression of the insurgency in Masan on 7 October 1946. In this case there are 3 versions: the Army newspaper *Stars and Stripes* reported no fatality; an account given in the G-2 report indicated 8 civilians killed; the third account is from a sergeant who took part in the repression (Harry Savage document) and it mentions “dead bodies lying all over the streets”. For this episode, Cumings (1981, p. 361) indicates between 8 and 15 killed, the first figure being based on the G-2 report and the second on a Korean source: *Siwol inmin hangjaeng* [The October’s People Resistance] published in Seoul in 1947 and therefore most likely subject to some form of censorship.

- Another episode for which there are conflicting versions is the clash of 4

\textsuperscript{88}Many thanks to Prof. Kim Dong-Choon for pointing this reference to my attention.
November 1946 between miners and US forces in Hwasun (see the chronology). In spite of being US military reports they present discrepancies and inconsistencies. The next section gives another illustration of a patent cover up case

**Analysis of a cover-up case**

For the purpose of this illustration we need to leave South Korea and also shift to more recent time. In the New York Times of 5 September 2005 one can read the following story. The title was “New Orleans police kill 4 in shootout.”

New Orleans police officers yesterday shot and killed 4 people and wounded two others who had fired at officers escorting a convoy of contractors across a bridge, the authorities said.

The group of 14 contractors from Boh Brothers Construction, one of New Orleans’s largest construction companies, was working for the Army Corps of Engineers on levee repairs and drainage, said Robert Boh, the president of the company. The convoy, which included officials from the Army Corps of Engineers and was being escorted by a group of police officers on an anti-looting detail, was crossing the Danziger Bridge, 16 kilometer northeast of the French Quarter, when the shots were fired.

W. J. Riley, the assistant superintendent of police in New Orleans, said a gunfight ensued between the police and a group of six men. “All our officers said the assailants all had guns” Mr. Riley said. Later, he said all the assailants were “neighborhood thugs”. “Five of the subjects were shot. Two were killed, three were wounded”. The sixth gunman was arrested and charged with attempted murder of a police officer. The superintendent said that as the shooting broke out, two of the men fled across the bridge and were pursued by officers. “One officer saw one subject go into a building. Another ran around the building. Shots were fired”. Mr. Riley said one of the two was killed and the other was arrested.

None of the contractors were hurt and they were even initially unaware that anyone had been shot, said Mr. Boh, learning of it only later in news reports on the Internet.

What was true in this story? Five years after its publication, it was learned through the own testimonies of some of the police officers involved that almost nothing was true, except that 2 persons had been killed and 4 wounded. The real story can be read in the New York times of 13 July 2010.

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89 The title of the article was not correct. Only two persons were killed.
Mr. Brissette and five members of the Bartholomew family were walking across the bridge to get food and other supplies from a supermarket, when the officers opened fire. Four members of the Bartholomew family were shot. Susan Bartholomew, at the time 38, lost part of her arm; her husband, Leonard Bartholomew III, was shot in the head. Mr. Brissette, who was killed, was shot 7 times.

Some officers then traveled to the other side of the bridge and found two brothers, Ronald and Lance Madison, who were on their way to check on a dentist’s office that belonged to their oldest brother, Dr. Romell Madison. According to the indictment, Mr. Faulcon then shot Ronald Madison to death with a shotgun. Lance Madison was arrested at the scene and later held on 8 counts of attempted murder of a police officer. He was never formally charged and was released after three weeks in custody.

How then did the first story emerge? Lieutenant Lohman who did not take part in the shooting but arrived on the bridge later, encouraged his men to “come up with a plausible story” that would allow him to conclude that the shooting was justified (NYT 24 February 2010).

That is what they did. Apart from inventing a plausible story they also used another trick which, apparently, was fairly common among the New Orleans police. It consisted in planting a pistol on the site which would later be “found” by the police (for another instance of this kind see the NYT of 10 October 1983).

What conclusions can one draw from this case?

- The cover-up story involved a group of officials from the Army Corps of Engineers and 14 contractors\textsuperscript{90}. Clearly, if all these people had come forward to testify that nobody shoot at them the story would have collapsed immediately. However, it seems that the only witnesses who presented a different version were the people who were injured. Why did the contractors and the officials not come forward? We do not know. But unless the police officers were stupid, it can be assumed that they included this group in the story only because they were convinced that nobody would wish to testify against their version\textsuperscript{91}.

- Paradoxically, the real story appears much less plausible than the cover-up story for why, indeed, did these police begin to shoot as soon as they arrived on the bridge? Why did they shoot one of the victims \textit{seven} times? So far, we have no answers. After these events some New Orleans residents explained that for years

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\textsuperscript{90}It is remarkable that the Wikipedia account (entitled “Danziger Bridge shootings”), although overall very detailed, does \textit{not} mention the contractors.

\textsuperscript{91}In the British journal “The Independent” of 5 September 2005 there is a statement made by “John Hall”, a spokesman for the Army Corps of Engineers, according to which the 14 contractors were being escorted across the bridge when they came under fire. He added that none of the contractors were killed. Was this episode real or was it also a fabrication? We do not know.
there has been a latent war between the mainly white police force and the African-American residents. Needless to say, this conflict was sharpened in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. We are told that far from being an isolated event, this shooting was one in a series of similar cases. However, the reasons of these shootings still appear unclear.

- Finally, the last conclusion one must draw is that some stories may be complete falsehoods even though they are quite detailed and (tacitly) confirmed by a large number of witnesses. If such a conclusion holds for the New Orleans police in 2005, it may be true to an even greater degree under the circumstances of the occupation of South Korea. That is perhaps why all the Koreans who were killed either in traffic accidents, in demonstrations or by sentries around military camps were almost always found to be at fault in some way.

Case-study in crowd-handling: Koje Island

The events in prisoner of war camps during the Korean war are of interest in two respects.

Crowd control

In several instances of events mentioned in the chronology one is surprised to see how easily occupation troops are able to break, disperse or arrest demonstrators. As no casualty toll is ever provided, one must assume that these operations did not involve any lethal violence. There is an obvious parallel with the control of prisoners of war in the sense that in both cases the goal is to control a large group of unarmed but basically hostile people.

Because the Geneva Convention of 1929 authorizes visits of prisoner camps by Red Cross teams one has better information about prisoner camps than for the clashes between demonstrators and soldiers during the occupation.

The clashes documented below suggest that cases of harmless crowd-control are rare. Most often non-lethal means prove insufficient with the result that the guards open fire or use even more deadly weapons such as heavy machine guns or tanks with flamethrowers.

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92 Tentatively, one can offer at least a partial explanation. When one looks back in time by using the electronic archives of the New York Times (or another newspaper), one quickly comes across other cases of white policemen beating or shooting black people. For instance one reads that in the wake of Katrina, other black people were riddled with bullets either by police or by vigilante groups. Usually, however, nobody was ever sentenced in such cases because at one point in the judicial process the case was thrown out by a (white) judge on a legal technicality, for instance because of “prosecutorial misconduct”. This happened in the Danziger case on 14 August 2008 and in a similar case on 11 September 1981. The fact that in 2010 the Attorney General, Eric Holder, was himself an African-American may have contributed to making the Department of Justice revisit the case. Of course, this explanation gives no clue as to why the police started to shoot immediately on arriving at the bridge.
Death rate in prisoner camps

The question of the prisoners of war took great political importance during the truce discussions at Panmunjom particularly because some 2,000 US prisoners of war had died during the winter of 1950-1951 due to poor housing conditions in the cold climate of North Korea.

According to US data the overall death rate among US POWs for the whole duration of the war was 40% (that is to say an average of 13% per year). Incidentally, this level of death rate is comparable to the death rate in prisoner camps during the American Civil War either in the Union or in the Confederation. The comparison makes sense because the two wars were approximately of same length.

An interesting observation is to compare the death rate for different groups of prisoners. Whereas about a third of the American prisoners died in captivity, the several hundred Turkish prisoners “held under approximately identical conditions survived almost to a man” (Robinson 1963, p. 167). According to a report by a psychiatrist with the US Army, this difference should be attributed to the fact that the Turkish prisoners reacted to adverse conditions by forming a common front and by helping one another whereas the US prisoners reacted individually and did not take care of their sick in the same way. Whether one agrees with this explanation or not, the comparison shows that the deaths should be attributed to severe conditions rather than to execution or torture.

We were not able to find global data for the death rate in US camps. However there is a figure for the first 18 months. According to a statement made by General Ridgway and reported in Blum (2004) some 6,600 North Korean and Chinese prisoners had died in US camps between the start of the war and December 1951. In order to compute rates one would need data about the number of prisoners and their length of time in captivity. So far, we were not able to find such data.

Because the winter climate on the islands where UN prisoner camps were located was better than in North Korea one would expect a smaller mortality rate in spite of the fact that overcrowding of the Koje camp brought about dysentery and enteric fevers in epidemic proportions (Millett 2009, p. 5).

Most of the US prisoners of war who died in North Korean camps died during the first winter of 1950-1951. According to a US report (Garfinkle 1954) it seems that it was the same for North Korean prisoners in South Korean camps.

After the landings at Inchon a large number of prisoners of war were gathered.

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93 The source used by Robinson is a report by an Army psychiatrist cited in an article of “US News and World Report” of 24 February 1956 (p. 58).

94 On the Internet there are many websites about US prisoners-of-war, but very few websites about North Korean and Chinese prisoners in US camps. One can note that in this instance the expression “US camps” is more appropriate than the expression “UN camps” for most of the camps were indeed managed by the United States.
During the winter of 1950-51 these people were concentrated under the care of the South Korean Army near Pusan, while a semi-permanent camp was being constructed on the island of Koje. During that winter epidemic disease was a major problem, and enteric infections including bacillary dysentery, amebic dysentery, and Salmonella infections were responsible for a high rate of morbidity and mortality. Dispensary statistics indicated as many as 10,000 cases (to be distinguished from deaths) per 1,000 individuals per year [unfortunately the report does not provide any indication about death rates]. Because sulfonamides failed to control many of the most fulminating infections, a clinical study was undertaken to evaluate the effectiveness of the newer broad-spectrum antibiotics.

The epidemic outbreaks which occurred in prisoner camps gave the US military medical service the opportunity to experiment the effectiveness of new kinds of antibiotics. It will be seen below that depending upon the source there are great differences in how the events on Koje-do were described. This suggests that even 60 years after the Panmunjom discussions this question remains a disputed and sensitive issue.


On the website:
one can find a photo gallery about the Koje Island prison camp where some 170,000 South Korean, North Korean and Chinese prisoners of war were guarded. Overall, the 13 photographs provide a peaceful picture of a clean and well-organized camp. One picture shows prisoners washing their clothes. The caption says: “Prisoners had a strict routine including chores and classes.”

Another picture shows a group (allegedly) of Chinese Communist POWs who were erecting a replica of the Statue of Liberty. The caption adds that they had also built a model church which can be seen in the background. In the lower right corner of the picture there is a sign post which says: “Keep your compound clean always”.

A third photograph makes reference to a tragic event in the history of the camp.

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95Excerpt of “History of the Commission on Enteric Infections” by Mary Jane Wood and Richard B. Hornick. “A severe outbreak of diarrheal disease among prisoners of war in Korea was reported to the Commission. A group was organized to travel to the Orient to perform field studies. It was planned to treat the infections with differing combinations of sulfadiazine and chloramphenicol, as well as chlorotetracycline (Aureomycin), Terramycin, and streptomycin. Pharmaceutical firms contributed large quantities of drugs for some of these studies”.

A Far East Command Conference on “Epidemic hemorrhagic fever” was held in Korea in December 1951.

96The South Koreans had (willingly or not) joined the North Korean Army during its first offensive and had been captured in the US offensive. In Koje those who accepted to become anti-Communist were used more or less as auxiliary guards. It is likely that the photographs involve such South Korean prisoners.
The caption says: “A weeping comrade bears a draped likeness [that is to say a picture] of the dead Communist, who was accidentally killed after UN troops invaded Compound 66 to remove flags and other objectionable signs.”

Wikipedia provides the following account (article entitled “Prisoner-of-war camp” on 27 February 2011).

Koje Island was a prison camp where over 170,000 communist and non-communist prisoners were held from December 1950 until June 1952. Throughout 1951 and early 1952, upper-level communist agents infiltrated and conquered much of Koje section-by-section by uniting fellow communists, bending dissenters to their will through staged trials and public executions.

In May 1952, Chinese and North Korean prisoners at Koje Island rioted and took Brigadier General Francis T. Dodd captive. In 1952 the camp’s administration was afraid that the prisoners would riot and demonstrate on May Day (a day honoring Communism) and so US navy ships removed 15,000 North Korean and Chinese prisoners from the island to prison facilities at Ulsan and Cheju-do.

The account is surprising in (at least) two respects.

- It does not mention any death of prisoners
- The removal of the prisoners occurred after the crackdown of 10 June 1952. This makes the argument about May Day irrelevant.

![Prisoner in a Compound of the Koje-do POW Camp](http://www.koreanwar-educator.org)

**Fig. 2.5 Prisoner of war camp of Koje Island.** As the camp housed some 170,000 prisoners, this picture taken in June 1952 shows only a small sector. *Source: Thurman Nichols Photo Album, online at: http://www.koreanwar-educator.org*

**Source No 2: New York Times**

The second part of the experiment consists in reading the headlines of articles about
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Notes: The table is based on US sources. Most large-scale crackdowns were carried out by US troops particularly the First Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Regiment and the 187th Airborne Company. Isolated shootings were mainly done by South Korean guards.

2a: KCNA said that nearly 100 prisoners were killed on 19 July 1951 at compound 62 of the Koje Camp.
2b: Radio Peiping said that 15 prisoners were killed and 40 wounded on 15 August 1951.
8: KCNA said: “800 killed by flamethrowers on May 27 at the 77th POW camp on Koje”.
The KCNA claims (without further proof) that “at least 33,600 POWs of the KPA were killed by GIs”. Sources: *New York Times* except for the following items: 2a,b: Ohmy News (Korea) 9 May 2009; 1-3: Millett (2009); 4: Hermes (1990); 11: Life Magazine; 24: Millett (2009)
this prisoner camp in the New York Time. Selecting the articles can be done easily by entering the key-word “Koje” in the search engine. The picture which emerges is very different from the one provided by the historynet website.

One learns that between 20 February 1952 and 20 April 1953 there were numerous incidents in which some 143 prisoners were shot and killed by guards and at least 670 were wounded\(^{97}\). On one occasion troops entered the camp with fixed bayonets inflicting a great number of deadly injuries.

On 17 December 1952 the Red Cross sent a message to the camp Commander which pointed out that the Geneva Convention on prisoners of war appeared to have been violated\(^{98}\). In April 1952 the prisoners received only one third of their normal food ration (Truce tent, Chapter 11: Koje-Do).

Can one consider that the New York Times provides a fairly accurate casualty toll? No. In such a matter a newspaper is dependent of what the military wish to reveal. We have already observed that some episodes were not reported in the New York Times.

An article of 24 May 1952 throws more light on this issue because its phrasing reveals the intervention of Army censors. It says: “Koje Island. May 17 (Delayed by Censor) (AP) South Korean sources said today that 4 ROK guards and 3 North Korean prisoners were killed and 57 Reds wounded in a riot on 10 April 1952. The Eight Army confirmed the information today, 24 May.”

To understand the different steps one must look closely at the dates. The incident occurred on 10 April, it was revealed by the South Korean side on 17 May but could only be published after the Eight Army gave its green light on 24 May, that is to say about 6 weeks after the incident.

In addition there is the question of the 689 prisoners graves mentioned in an article in “Time Magazine” (2 June 1952). The article says that they were the victims of the civil war between North Koreans and anti-Communist South Koreans inside the camp. In fact, one does not really know. This death toll may also include prisoners who died from disease.

**Source No 3: Life magazine (23 June 1952)**

On 4 and 10 June 1952, US forces stormed compounds No 76-78 with tanks, flamethrowers, concussion grenades, gas-masks and tear-gas. On 10 June the death toll was 30 according to the New York Times but 41 according to Life magazine (which includes wounded who died from their wounds). However the real difference between the New York Times and “Life” lies in the photographs. They show (at least

\(^{97}\)The numbers given in the articles total 535 but in some articles describing a riot only the number of the dead is given.\n
\(^{98}\)Although the United States had not ratified the Geneva Convention of 1949 on prisoners of war, it had volunteered to observe its provisions.
to some extent) what is meant by the sentence “In two and a half hours the compounds was a flaming shambles”.

This was probably the largest operation against the POWs but it was by no means the only one. For instance, on 18 February 1952 there were some 70 dead and an undetermined number of wounded.

Source No 4: Official history of the US Army

A whole chapter of Hermes (1990) is devoted to the events in Koje-Do. Some 10 pages are devoted to the episode during which General Dodd was taken prisoner by the POWs. In contrast the clash and massacre of 18 February 1952 is described in less than 10 lines. Yet, this short account is nevertheless revealing of the fact that crowd-handling is not without risk for the soldiers. Here are the basic facts.

- The 3d Battalion (some 700 soldiers) of the 27th Infantry Regiment moved in during the early hours of 18 February 1952. With bayonets fixed, the soldiers pushed forward in the intend of dividing the compound into four separate segments.
- But the Communists refused to bow to the show-of-force. With knives, axes, and tent poles some 1,500 internees converged on the battalion.
- The soldiers resorted to concussion grenades and when the grenades failed to stop the assault they opened fire.
- 55 prisoners were killed immediately and 22 more died at the hospital; over 140 were wounded. On the US side one soldier was killed and 38 wounded.

This episode raises doubts about the numerous episodes mentioned in G-2 reports in which one reads that “tactical troops were called in and restored order without suffering a single casualty”. To make this possible, armored cars must be used together with machine guns to prevent the insurgents from attacking the vehicles. By the way, this is basically the method described in the letter written by Sergeant Savage. However, that would result in a number of casualties probably in the range of what we see here, that is to say, for a crowd of one thousand, several dozens dead and over one hundred wounded. That would be ten times more than what one reads in the few G-2 accounts in which a death toll is given.

To come back to the account given in Hermes (1990), after the Dodd episode of 7 May the repression of 10 June 1952 is described in a few lines and it gives the same low estimates for the dead and wounded as the New York Times. It does not mention any casualties among the troops. Yet, according to the testimony of a soldier who took part in it, there were 20 casualties among the soldiers: one killed and 19 wounded. Once again, these figures show that crowd control is not without risks even when lethal force is applied.

The chapter closes after this episode. Yet, between this episode and the end of the war
there were other disturbances on Koje Island in which 20 more prisoners were killed and over 200 wounded. In addition there were similar incidents in other prisoner camps.

**Source No 5: Official history of the Canadian Army**

Just to show that it is always interesting to read sources from different origins, we quote excerpts from an account which gives a Canadian perspective (Nusbacher 2000).

[After the Dodd episode], the US Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that General Clark [US Commander in Korea] consider making the American failure to control Koje Island into an international failure by employing other UN Forces along with US Forces.

A Dutch Battalion, a Greek company and a Canadian Battalion were ordered to Koje. The Canadian government was not happy with this order. Through his ambassador in Washington, Prime Minister Louis St-Laurent told the American side that unless the order was countermanded Canada would be reluctant to agree to any additional contribution in Korea. The order was not canceled, however.

As a result in late May, the Canadian Battalion marched into the Koje Island POW camp with its soldiers wearing red berets, singing a Communist marching song, and earning applause from the Communist prisoners. They remained there until 14 July 1952. From an American perspective the important point was probably that they were there on June 10 during the massive repression. Thus, unwillingly or willingly, they became involved in the massacre that would take place on this day.

**Conclusion**

The account provided by “historynet” relies on photographs. Photographs do not lie, isn’t it?

In addition there are testimonies of former soldiers who had served in the camp.

- “I was assigned to Koje-do. We had a lot of riots and I do recall some prisoners being shot and a few killed”.
- “I was in the 187th Airborne company [one of the units which played a great role in the repression]. On 10 June 1952 there were 31 POWs killed and 139 wounded. We had 19 wounded and one killed”.

This seems to be the only testimony which mentions a casualty toll. Like photographs testimonies should (usually) be trusted. And indeed nothing in these testimonies is really wrong. Yet, the overall picture is a far cry from that given in the articles of the New York Times. The casualty toll (for both dead and wounded) is 4 times smaller and none of the testimonies mentions tanks and flame-throwers.

Based on “historynet” and on the official account of Hermes (1990), it becomes
Table 2.3  Comparison of different sources about the Koje-do prisoner camp

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
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<td>Wikipedia article on prisoner camps</td>
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<tr>
<td>Website <a href="http://www.historynet.com">www.historynet.com</a></td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermes, 1990 (Official US military history)</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millett, 2009</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York Times + others (Table 2.2)</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: We have not been able to find sources giving the total death rate. All these sources are US sources. According to its website, “Historynet” is the world’s largest history magazine publisher. We have not yet been able to find estimates from Chinese or North Korean sources. The only non-US report that we know of was written by a British Major, Dawney Bancroft, in August 1952. Released in 2003, it turns out to be fairly critical of US attitude and policy. Unfortunately, it does not give any death rate data.

clear what can be told and what should not be told. The crackdown of 10 June 1952 can be told albeit in sketchy form and with under-estimated figures whereas the recurrent crackdowns and resulting losses of lives should not. Same thing for the the deplorable living conditions in a camp which was over-crowded up to 3 times its planned capacity\(^{99}\).

So far, we have mainly focused on prisoner camps in South Korea. If one tries to find information about US prisoners in North Korea one finds many websites with titles such as “Atrocities against American Pows in Korean War”, “Mass murder of US POWs in the Korean War”.

Were there really atrocities and mass *murder*?

According to the website of the “US Marine Corps” (http://www.leatherneck.com):

- “No cases of physical abuse resulting in the death of American POWs have been proved. 40% of US Army POWs died while confined, but the causes were generally attributed to unchecked disease, untended wounds, malnutrition and extreme cold. Many of these deaths occurred prior to creation of the permanent camps [that is to say prior to mid-1951]”.
- “The term brainwashing obtained notoriety at this time and caused concern to American authorities. Even though some American POWs collaborated with their captors, most of them did so for personal convenience. No confirmed cases of brain-washing came out of the Korean War”.

However, ideological indoctrination was used on both sides.

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\(^{99}\)Originally [in January 1951] intended to hold 700-1,200 men apiece, the compounds were soon jammed to five times their capacity (Hermes 1990).
US fatalities in Korea

The short list (given above) of US soldiers who were killed between 1946 and 1945 leads us to seek more comprehensive sources.

**G-1 reports**

The best documents for information about fatalities would probably be the G-1 reports (G-1 means personnel). According to a copy included in microfiche TS–00051 at the National Diet Library, the “Form #1” of the G-1 Periodic Report should include for each unit, the number of personnel hospitalized, wounded, and the number of battle deaths and non-battle deaths.

So far, however, we were not able to find such documents at NARA or elsewhere. That is why we had to use other sources which are less convenient.

**Provisional cemeteries**

Apart from the NPRC what alternative database can we use? In the 1950s and 1960s the bodies of all American soldiers who were buried in provisional US cemeteries in Japan, Korea and other places scattered across the Pacific were brought back to the United States. Until then, the remains of soldiers were kept in provisional cemeteries for several years. Grave plot charts of these provisional cemeteries may give us information about the number of American soldiers who died abroad.

**Grave plot**

Such a grave plot chart is available for the US Central Cemetery in Seoul (NARA 3). In April 1946 it comprised 110 graves.[100](#) For each grave the grave plot chart of the Seoul Central Cemetery provides the last name, initials of first names and Army serial number.

By using the resources of the Internet it is possible to determine the cause of death in the following cases.

- Two of the dead, namely Captain George C. Brundrett (O-311944, died on 4 July 1945) and Second Lieutenant William M. King (O-890554, died on 14 May 1945) were prisoners of war during the time when Korea was still a Japanese possession. They died in a prisoner camp for American officers located near Inchon.
- 11 of the graves correspond to the crew of a bomber which crashed in Korea on 7 August 1945. Only two of the crew, namely Nicholas M. Simonich and Henry C. Rupert, were identified, whereas the 9 others are indicated as unknown.

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[100](#) On the chart there are 10 graves without a name. The corresponding rectangular cells on the chart are left blank. Were they unoccupied or were they used but with the respective names unrecorded? At this point we do not know what is the correct answer. It should be noted that in the following row some 9 graves are marked as “unknown” probably because the bodies could not be identified (as the result of an aircraft accident) which means that identification problems are not the reason behind the blank cells.
Once these 13 names have been discarded one is left with 97 military personnel for whom one would like to know the date and cause of death. What can be done in this direction?

**Using Internet databases**

One can try the following steps.

- The website of NARA has a database of all enlisted Americans in World War II which can be searched by serial number. In return the database provides the full first name of the person, the place and date of enlistment. Because this database is based on enlistment it does not provide any information about circumstances of death. For instance, if we enter 39591241 we are able to learn that the first name of T.C. Tiedje is Theodore, that he enlisted on 23 June 1944 in San Pedro, California.

Why it is important to know the enlistment date?

Almost all the American soldiers who became prisoners of war of the Japanese were captured at the beginning of the war when the Japanese invaded Shanghai, Guam, Wake Island, the Philippines, Hong Kong, Singapore, Burma and other places where American troops were posted. Thus for a person whose enlistment date is posterior to 1 January 1943 there was a very small likelihood to become a prisoner of war.

- The “National World War II Memorial” offers a database that can be searched by entering the last and first names of the person. In return it gives the hometown, the rank and the “status” of the person; “status” means for instance KIA (Killed In Action) or DNB (Died, Non Battle) or DOW (Died Of Wounds).

If we enter Tiedje Theodore we learn that he was a Private First Class (PFC), that his homeplace was Kent County in Michigan and that his status is DNB.

- So far, we have gained little new information about the death of soldiers. For the soldiers who are buried in one of the cemeteries of the “American Battle Monuments Commission” (ABMC, WWII Registry) one is able to get the date of death. To search the database one must know the last and first name.

If we enter Tiedje Theodore, we get a reply “No Records Found” which means that this soldier is buried elsewhere.

A similar search for E.A. Dominguez turns out to be more successful. First we get his first name from the NARA database by typing in his Army serial number namely 39865742. The first name is “Enrique” and we also learn that he enlisted on 7 January 1944. Then, by using the “American Battle Monuments” (National WWII Memorial Registry) database we get the date of his death, namely 30 November 1945. He belonged to the 6th Infantry Division, 63rd Infantry Regiment. He is also listed in the listing of the fatalities of this regiment (search by entering the reference of the unit).

**Monthly fatality numbers**

When the same search is done for all the names listed in the grave plot chart, the
ABMC website gives the dates of death of 13 soldiers. These dates suggest that (as is indeed natural) the graves were numbered in chronological order. The only exceptions are the graves of the prisoners of war and those of the bomber crew which were probably buried after being located and identified. Therefore we can estimate at least approximately the number of deaths in each of the 7 months from September 1945 to March 1946.

Sep: 2 (Muirhead - Matson)
Oct: 9 (Boylen - Carvell)
Nov: 24 (Leitz - Dominguez)
Dec: 26 (Seeley - Etter)
Jan: 10 (Bennett - Hernandez)
Feb: 14 (Bartlett - McCurdy)
Mar: 9 (Tyler - Lichtenfeld)

The monthly average of the number of deaths was 13.4. As will be shown below, the death rate in a civilian population of young adult American males was in the 1940s of the order of 2 per year and per 1,000. For the whole occupation force of 75,000 such a rate would result in 12 deaths per month. Before one can compare this expected number to the 13.4 average, one needs to know two things.

- Was the Seoul cemetery the only one of this kind or were there also US cemeteries in other cities, for instance in Pusan? For the moment we do not know.
- Did the sick remain and wounded in South Korea or were they evacuated to Japan? The answer is given in NARA 29. The policy was that patients would be evacuated by air to Japan if their expected hospitalization length was longer than 60 days. This threshold did not remain constant from 1945 to 1949. It was only 30 days in the early weeks of the occupation when few medical facilities were available in Korea. Then it was expanded to 45 days and eventually to 60 days. In 1949, a symmetrical process took place. As more and more hospitals were closed, the threshold was reduced to 45 days and then to 30 days.

For a patient in need of evacuation the process involved the following steps. (i) When the illness or accident did not occur in a city the patient was first brought by road from the local medical dispensary (e.g. the dispensary of the 1122nd Engineer unit near Pusan) to the nearest Station Hospital (e.g. the 71st Station Hospital in Pusan). Then, he was transferred by train to Kimpo Air Base near Seoul from where he was evacuated by air to Japan. These steps can be summarized as follows.

\[
\text{Dispensary} \rightarrow \text{Station Hospital} \rightarrow \text{Kimpo Air Base near Seoul} \rightarrow \text{Japan}
\]

In other words, an unknown number of deaths of occupation troops occurred in Japan which means that the cemetery data given below provide only a lower bound of the
Fig. 2.6 Monthly US fatalities. So far we ignore why the fatalities peaked in Nov-Dec 1945. The average of Nov-dec is 25 while the average of Jan-Feb-Mar is 11, which gives a difference of 14. In November-February there were a number of deaths due to smallpox among US soldiers. Nov: 2, Dec: 9, Jan: 2, Feb: 1. In November there was a blast in an ammunition dump which resulted in 5 deaths (the missing should not be included because they were not buried). Another blast in January 1946 resulted in 6 deaths (see the chronology). These deaths cannot completely explain the peak of Nov-Dec.

It can be noted that the number of Korean prisoners almost doubled between 22 December 1945 and 31 January 1946 (from 3,858 to 6,628) which suggests that there were some disturbances. Source: US Central Cemetery in Seoul, see text; Potter 1958.

number of deaths. In addition, after 1946, a growing number of dead were not buried in South Korea but were directly shipped to California.

**Detailed names listing**

The detailed listing of the names is given below. The date of death has been indicated whenever it could be determined.

**List of US soldiers who died in the Seoul area (Sep 1945 - Mar 1946)**

The names are ordered by ascending dates of death (except for the prisoners of war
Each plot had $10 \times 12 = 120$ graves. All the names below correspond to plot 1. Subsequently, plot 2 was opened. For instance, around 1 July 1946 Private First Class James E. Jenkins was buried in Grave No 26 of plot No 2 and on 29 August 1946, technician T/5 John A. Roum was buried in grave No 40 of plot No 2 (NARA 21, NARA 14).

However, it should be noted that, for some reason, instead of being buried at this temporary cemetery, the remains of a number of deceased were shipped to the United States shortly after death. For instance, the body of Private First Class Francisco Armendares (also written Armendarez) who died in Tongyeong (south of Korea, 60 km west of Pusan) on 7 October 1946 was shipped to California on 30 October 1946 (NARA 19).

Source: Grave plot chart, US Central cemetery, Seoul (NARA 3).

MUIRHEAD,
MATSON Died: 23-Sep-45 (1878th Engineer Battalion, Aviation),
BOYLEN,
BRUNDRETT Died: 4 Jul 45 (George C, Captain, 440th Ordnance Company, Aviat, POW),
KING Died: 14 May-45 (William M, 2nd Lt, POW)
MAGEE, DETRICK, MOON, COLEMAN, DUFFICY, TROQUILLE, SIMON,
CARVELL Died: 30-Oct-45 (Rupert L, 1395th Engineer Construction Battalion),
LEITZ, GOSSelin, PENWELL, WILLIAMS, JACKSON,
GIPE Died 7-Nov-45 (Donald W., pilot, his P-38 plane caught fire shortly after take off),
ROYE,
HENDERSON Died: 9-Nov-45 (James C, 7th Infantry Div, 17th Infantry Regt),
COX, GREENE,
STONE Died: 9-Nov-45 (Calvin E, 7th Infantry Div, 184th Infantry Regt),
DAVIS Died: 13-Nov-45 (Harold, 765th Engineer Dump Truck Company),
WESTBERRY, DUNAVAN, MERIWETHER, MYERS, SHARP, MALDONADO, WYATT, STONEBRAKER, WILKINSON, JENKINS, HILLENMEYER,
DOMINGUEZ Died: 30-Nov-45 (Enrique A, 6th Infantry Div, 63rd Infantry Regt),
SEELEY, MARTINI, CONNORS, CLEVENGER, BOUNDS, GEERDES, LESTER, PITTS,
MANDEL Died: 19-Dec-45 (Ernest A, 54th Military Police Company),
POOLE, ROBINSON, TIEDJE, STASKO, HENKINS, CRANE, HOLCOMB, COOPER, PORE, THOMPSON, HORNE, MEINDERS, ALTOM, DECKER, HENRY, WOOLVERTON, ETTER, BENNETT, OTTO,
JACKSON Died: 8-Jan-46 (Lester, 1331st Engineer General Service Regt),
SHELTON, TINGGANG, MEAD, MARTIN, GLADSTONE, WINCK, HERNANDEZ,
BARTLETT Died 4-Apr-46 (Robert E, 432nd Fighter Squadron, on a practice dive bombing mission),
LEON HARD, HOPKINS,
SLINGER Died: 13-Feb-46 (Donald E, 475th Fighter Group, 431st Fighter Squadron),
LOHMAN, ALPERN, DILLARD, SCHAEFER, GONIS, BAIONI, NICHOLS, THAYER, SMITH,
MCCURDY Died: 28-Feb-46 (Raymond D, 475th Fighter Group, 432nd Fighter Squadron),
TYLER, HANES, HUBBEL,
MURRAY Died: 14-Mar-46 (James L, 7th Infantry Div, 31st Field Artillery Batt),
POLLARD,
SIMONICH [Crash 7 Aug 1944] [Nicholas M, 5e Air Force Bomber],
RUPPERT [Crash 7 Aug 1944] [Henry C, 5e Air Force Bomber],
JOHNSON,
LARKIN Died: 19-Mar-46 (Herbert S, 24th Quartermaster Group, Headquarters),
BAIRD, LICHTENFELD.

Were there other temporary cemeteries?

The website of the American Battle Monument Commission allows a fatality-search to be performed by unit name. By entering the names of units which were part of the 6th, 7th and 40th Divisions which took part in the occupation of South Korea we found the following fatality entries. They are listed in chronological order:

1. SIMMONS (Dewayne D) PVT: 15-Sep-45 (108th Inf Reg, 40th Inf Div)
2. BOOKS (Charles T) SSGT: 3-Oct-45 (20th Inf Reg, 6th Inf Div)
3. STEVENS (Jesse L) PFC: 9-Oct-45 (1 Inf Reg, 6th Inf Division)
4. ** HENDERSON (James C) PVT: 9-Nov-45 (17th Inf Reg, 7th Inf Div)
5. CUTTING (Clyde R) SGT: 7-Feb-46 (6th Medical Bat, 6th Inf Div)
6. RUST (Clifton O) PVT: 8-Feb-46 (6th Medical Bat, 6th Inf Div)
7. WAECHTER (Egon) PVT: 22-Jan-46 (6th Medical Bat, 6th Inf Div)
8. SHANKS (Walis H) PFC: 22-Feb-46 (32nd Inf Reg, 7th Inf Div)
9. ** MURRAY (James L) PFC: 14-Mar-46 (31st Field Artil Bat, 7th Inf Div)
10. PURNHAGEN (Joseph M) 1SGT: 26-Mar-46 (6th Medical Bat, 6th Inf Div)

As all these deaths were prior to 1 April 1946 they fall in the time span covered by the Seoul Cemetery listing. However only 2 of the names (marked with a **) in this list were already found in the previous one. This seems to suggest that, apart from the Seoul cemetery, there were other temporary cemeteries.

One should also remember that, as mentioned above, the bodies of some of the deceased were shipped back to the United States within a few weeks after their death.

Deaths that occurred after April 1946

We were not able to find a table-map of the USAFIK temporary cemetery after April

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101 This database contains only the names of the dead buried in the cemeteries of the Battle Commission. The meaning of the acronyms is as follows. PVT: Private, PFC: Private First Class, SGT: Sergeant, 1SGT: First Sergeant, SSGT: Staff Sergeant.
1946. However, death records such as NARA 14, 20, 21, 22 provide names of deceased persons in three different ways:

- First, there is what can be called direct evidence, by which we mean that these files provide the death records of specific persons with date of death, cause of death and other information.
- When these persons were buried at the USAFIK cemetery the burial information also includes the names of the persons buried on the left-hand side and right-hand side. As burials were made more or less in chronological order, the dates of death of these two persons may not be very different from the date of death of the middle-person.
- When a body was sent to the United States on board of a transport ship the radiogram referring to this shipment usually gave the names of all the deceased on board the same ship. While sometimes there may be only one or two other bodies, on some ships there may be as many as ten. In this way one gets the names of other deceased persons. Usually, the bodies are sent about one month after death. However, after 1947 a program was started which provided that the deceased interred at the USAFIK temporary cemetery would be brought back to the United States. Thus, for such cases, the date of death may have been one or two years before shipment.

The following list gives the names of persons who died after April 1946 together with any other information that could be found.

**US soldiers who died in Korea between April 1946 and 1949**

This is a very partial list based on some 200 pages of a set of files which comprises 15,000 pages altogether. When a name appears twice it may be because the person was disinterred and transferred from a temporary cemetery in Korea to a cemetery in the United States.

The ASN identification number is given when the names could not be read clearly enough.

**Sources:** NARA 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

Note: “departed Inchon” means that the casket was put aboard a ship at Inchon harbor.

ARMENDAREZ, Francisco M., died on 7 Oct 1946 (methylism)
BADNER, Stanley, T/4, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
BROWN, Fred M., Pfc, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
CALLO, Raul, 1st Lt, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
COOK, Floyd R., Pvt, died 5 March 1949 (drowned in Inchon)
CRAWFORD, Troy W., civilian, died in March 1949
CRESSING, Gene F., Sgt, departed Inchon 12 Aug. 1947
DOYLE, Bryant, T/5, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
FERGUSON, Alvin, Pfc, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
FLORKOWSKI, Michael L., Cpl, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
FRAZER, Thomas E., Pvt, died in March 1949
HANDBSIDE, Florence, civilian, died in March 1949
HARMES, Glen F., Pfc, departed Inchon 12 Aug. 1947
HERMAN, Herman A., Cpl, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
HOLLOWAY, Arthur R., Pfc, died in March 1949
ICENOGLE, Ray M. Jr, Sgt, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
INDIA, Charles J., Pfc, departed Inchon 12 Aug. 1947
JANETTA, John T., Rct, died in March 1949
JENKINS, James E., Pfc, drowning, died 1 July 1946
JENSEN, Earl F., Pfc, died 10 Oct 1946, 3rd degree burns of entire body
JOHNSON, Florence L., Lt Col L. K. Johnson’s wife, died 14 May 1947, gunshot
KOLLER, Harry F., Pfc, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
LAMBERT, Al J., Pfc, died in March 1949
LARSON, John L., Pfc, departed Inchon 12 Aug. 1947
LUSK, Newell C., Sgt, died in 1949
MCCOY, J. P., Cpl, died 1 Jan 1947, Head and thorax injury
MCGROSKEY, John, Pfc, died 2 Jan 1947, skull fracture
MEADOR, Kenneth F., ASN 6998949, Sgt, departed Inchon 12 Aug. 1947
MOORE, Gordan A., 2nd Lt, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
MOORE, Willie A., died 15 Oct 1946
MOTHERSBAUGH, James, Cpl, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
NIX, Ray A., Pvt, died in 1949
O’CONNOR, Lawrence P., T/5, died 27 Jun 1947, encephalitis
PURTER, Douglas, Pfc, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
RIEPEN, Jerry G., Pfc, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
ROBERTSON, Darell D., Pfc, died in August 1946
ROBERTSON, Darrel D., Pfc, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
ROUM, John A., T/5, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
ROUM, John A., T/5, died 26 Aug 1946, encephalitis
SALAZAR, Ernest, Pvt, died between 11 Jan and 3 Apr 1949
SKILLMAN, William V., 1st Lt, departed Inchon 12 Aug. 1947
SMITH, William R., Pvt, departed Inchon 12 Aug. 1947
SOULE, Rudal F., T/5, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
STENICH, Erwin E., Pfc, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
STOLL, Alphonse A, Pvt, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947
UNDERWOOD, Ethel Van Wagoner, civilian, murdered on 17 March 1949
VAN WINKLE, Don B., T/5, died in August 1946
VAN WINKLE, Don, T/5, departed Inchon on 19 June 1947

Second sample of names from the death records

The following table provides a list of names from the same record file. It suggests the following comments.

Although all these names come from the same source they may turn up in three different ways. The first can be called the main list, the second the extended auxiliary list and the third the small auxiliary list.

1 In the file the persons are listed in succession with about 10 to 15 pages devoted to every person. That is why we call this the main list. One of these pages is the “Report of Interment” (Forms: AR 30-1810 and AR 30-1815). This page gives the time, location and cause of the death. It is filled even when the body is not interred but stored until it can be shipped to San Francisco. In Korea the provisional cemetery established in Seoul was used for less than one year, from September 1945 to October 1946. After that all bodies were directly shipped to the United States. When this cemetery was deactivated it comprised two plots: each plot had 12 rows and 10 graves in each row, Plot 1 was full and plot 2 had about 50 graves. Thus, altogether there were about 170 graves.

2 It is the transfer to the United States which provides an auxiliary list of names. Usually, in the record devoted to a person xxx there is one page which lists the names of all deceased that will be sent to the US in the same ship as xxx. Sometimes there are only 2 or 3 names, sometimes as many as 10. For these persons only names and serial numbers (e.g. RA 12 29 09 58) are listed. However, as the time interval between death and shipment is usually comprised between a few days and one month and a half, one can know in which quarter these persons have died.

3 The small auxiliary list comes along only for those who were interred at the USAFIK Central Cemetery in Seoul. In such cases the “Report of Interment” names the two persons in the graves respectively left and right of the grave of the deceased. In this way, one gets two additional names (sometimes only one when one of the graves is still empty.

US media and Korea We have already observed that US media devoted very little articles to daily events in Korea. This is confirmed once again through this list. It includes the death of three officers none of whom was mentioned in the New York Times. It includes also a train wreck that occurred on 22 November 1946 (with at least one American fatality) that is not mentioned either.
Incidents

Table 2.4: Partial list of US citizens who died in South Korea, 1945-1949.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of death</th>
<th>Month or quarter</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Hour</th>
<th>Place of death</th>
<th>Cause of death</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BISHOP (Earl H.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
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<td>BRINK (George W.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>BROWN (Fred M.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIULLA (Vincenzo)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CLOUSE (Donald B.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>COMEAU (Joseph W.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
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<td>COOK (Floyd R.)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>COSBY (William)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
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<td>CROSLET (Clyde W.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q3</td>
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<td>DELAROSA (Paul M.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
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<td>DIFABIO (Nicholas J.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q1</td>
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<td>FINNERAL (Gilbert F.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q2-3</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRAZER (Thomas E.)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>GILLES (Joseph A.)</td>
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<td>Q1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>GRANT (Emmanuel)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q2-3</td>
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<td>GRESSING (Gene F.)</td>
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<td>HALL (Harry W.)</td>
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<td>Q3</td>
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<td>HANDYSIDE (Florence)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>HARMES (Glen F.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18 : 20</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Drowned</td>
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<td>HEBERT (Henry A.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>09 : 00</td>
<td>Barracks</td>
<td>Asphyxiation</td>
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<td>HERMAN (A. Herman)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td>04</td>
<td>16 : 30</td>
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<td>HERRERA (Wilfred)</td>
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<td>Q1</td>
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<td>HIGGINS (John B.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>HILLMAN (William H.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>02 : 00</td>
<td>Dayroom</td>
<td>Burns</td>
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<tr>
<td>HOLLOWAY (Arthur R.)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOLT (Ernest F.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>22</td>
<td></td>
<td>Won Dang</td>
<td>Train wreck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNICUTT (Lovia E.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>Meningitis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUSICK (William A.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIA (Charles J.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JANNETTA (John T.)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: First part of a list of 72 names of American citizens who died in South Korea. Except for a few civilians who worked for the Army, dependents who were in Korea with their husbands and some US missionaries, all others belonged to US Forces. Sources: NARA 24, NARA 25.

Causes of death Although causes of death are documented they are often baffling. For instance one death (of Henry Hebert) was attributed to “asphyxiation following the aspiration of vomitus”. Although such a cause would sound plausible for a baby it seems strange in the case of a young man.

One GI (William Hillman) died of 3rd degree burns on entire body following a fire in the dayroom of the barracks. Such injuries would be understandable as the result
Table 2.4: Partial list of US citizens who died in South Korea, 1945-1949 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of death</th>
<th>Month or quarter</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Hour</th>
<th>Place of death</th>
<th>Cause of death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JONES (Spencer Jr.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEWLEY (John C.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABITA (Charles</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAMBERT (Al J.)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Q2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LANDGREBE (Beulah L.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LARSON (John L.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEE (Robert L.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MADISON (Archie W.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEADER (Kenneth F.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEADOR (F. Kenneth)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q2-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MICROWSKI (Michael L.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOORE (Gordon A., 2nd Lt)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUNOZ (Louis A.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MURRAY (Francis D.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWENS (Thomas T.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POSTON (Kenneth A.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q2-3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUILTER (Philip E.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REID (R. Bowman)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RIDLEN (Donald M.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBERTSON (Darrel D.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROY (E. Davis)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SKILLMAN (William V., 1st Lt)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMITH (William R.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMONSKY (Anna M.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOULE (Rudolph F.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19:45</td>
<td>Chochiwon</td>
<td>Train wreck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TENNISON (Howard E., 1st Lt)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19:45</td>
<td>Chochiwon</td>
<td>Train wreck</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIBBS (Pearl E.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18:00</td>
<td>Ship</td>
<td>Heart attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOMLINSON (William L.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>12:37</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>Hemorrhage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOWELL (John H.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23:58</td>
<td>Hospital</td>
<td>Heart attack</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TWEEDY (John E.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>22:20</td>
<td>Chinae</td>
<td>Poisoning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Second part of a list of 72 names of American citizens who died in South Korea. Except for a few civilians who worked for the Army, dependents who were in Korea with their husbands and some US missionaries, all others belonged to US Forces. Sources: NARA 24, NARA 25.

of an explosion but seem surprising in the case of a fire in a ground level room that one can leave quickly.

The number of GI who died through drowning is of the order of one third of all the deaths for which the cause is given. That is a proportion that is much higher than among civilians back in the US. Even more surprising is the fact that one drowning
Table 2.4: Partial list of US citizens who died in South Korea, 1945-1949 (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Year of death</th>
<th>Month or quarter</th>
<th>Day</th>
<th>Hour</th>
<th>Place of death</th>
<th>Cause of death</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>URBANOWSKI (Clarence A.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Jun</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>21:45</td>
<td>Yonan</td>
<td>Accident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAN SENN (Boris)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VAN WAGNONER UNDERWOOD (Ethel)</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Mar</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15:40</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td>Homicide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VARNER (William P.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Jul</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>07:30</td>
<td>Kum-gay river</td>
<td>Drowned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERDUGO (Reynaldo M.)</td>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Apr</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
<td>Ascom City</td>
<td>Strangled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICKERMAN (Donald A.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20:45</td>
<td>Inchon</td>
<td>Drowned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOGELGESANG (Alvin S.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALKER (Clyde M.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WARD (Julius J.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHITEHURST (James E.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WILLIE (Waren C.)</td>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Q1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOODWARD (Wilson E.)</td>
<td>1946</td>
<td>Q4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Third part of a list of 72 names of American citizens who died in South Korea. Except for a few civilians who worked for the Army, dependents who were in Korea with their husbands and some US missionaries, all others belonged to US Forces. Sources: NARA 24, NARA 25.

(Glenn Harms) occurred at the swimming pool of Seoul Stadium at 18:20 that is to say at a time when there are many people around. There are also cases of drowning which occur in March or April that is to say at a time when the weather was still too cold for swimming in the sea or in a (non-heated) swimming pool. Moreover, baths were forbidden for sanitary reasons because of water uncleanness.

**Age of soldiers** We have already observed elsewhere that some soldiers were very young. In most cases the age of the deceased is not given. However in a few cases there is a sheet which gives personal information. Through such a sheet we learn that Ernest F. Holt was 18 when he died, and that he had already been in service for one year.

**Rough estimates of the global number of deaths**

The death report series of Record Group 554 consists of 10 boxes, each of which has about 1,500 pages (according to an email received from a NARA archivist on 23 April 2012). For each death there are on average some 12 pages. Therefore, the total number of names of deceased persons should be $\frac{15000}{12} = 1,250$. It is likely that the death reports of RG 554 do not include the deaths in the US Navy. However, as far as we know, there were no Marine troops in Korea, so US Navy deaths can probably be neglected.

In order to compute an average death rate one must know the number of troops in
each year. We know the initial number in September 1945, namely 70,000, and we also know the number in May 1949, namely 7,000. For the sake of simplicity let us assume that the strength decreased linearly between these dates. This assumption leads to the following strength.

1945: 70,000 1946: 55,000 1947: 35,000 1948: 22,000 1949:7,000.

If the average annual death rate per 1,000 troops is denoted by \(d\), the total number of death will be (1945 and 1949 represent about one half of a year):

\[
d \left( \frac{70}{2} + 55 + 35 + 22 + \frac{7}{2} \right) = 150d
\]

Equating 150\(d\) with our estimate one gets the following death rate:

\[
150d = 1,250 \Rightarrow d = \frac{1250}{150} = 8.3 \text{ per 1,000 troops}
\]

In the future, when other data become available it will be possible to see if this estimate is confirmed or not.

**Death rates based on the data from the temporary cemetery in Seoul**

The previous estimate is an average for 1945-1949. It is possible to give partial estimates based on a different source, namely the grave numbers at the temporary cemetery in Seoul that we considered previously. It was observed that plot 1 was filled by 1 April 1946, by 1 July 1946 26 graves of plot No 2 had been used and by 29 August 1946 40 graves of plot No 2 had been used. Our previous assumption of a linear decrease of strength in the course of time, gives a strength of 60,000 in July 1946. If one denotes by \(d_m\), the average monthly death rate per 1,000 troops, the previous figures lead to the following estimates:

- Sep 1945-Apr 1946: \(d_m = \frac{1}{7} \times \frac{120}{70} = 0.24\)
- May 1946-Aug 1946: \(d_m = \frac{1}{4} \times \frac{40}{60} = 0.16\)

It can be noted that the two estimates are fairly consistent with one another. The fact that the second one is lower is in agreement with the fact that more and more deceased were shipped to the United States without being temporarily interred at the Seoul temporary cemetery.

For the period Sep 1945 to Aug 1946 one gets an average of \((0.24 + 0.16)/2 = 0.20\) per month and per 1,000. This gives an annual average of \(0.20 \times 12 = 2.4\). This estimate is 3.4 times smaller than the global estimate of 8.6 obtained above. This can mean two things.

- Either our global estimate is incorrect\(^{102}\)

\(^{102}\)For instance it is possible that the 10 boxes are not full or that apart from the death reports they contain also other documents.
• Or many deceased were buried elsewhere than at the temporary cemetery in Seoul, even in 1945 and first part of 1946.

**Death data from medical sources**

In the reports of the medical department of USAFIK there are data about the number of deaths. They are summarized in the following table. Needless to say, one would like more detailed information about the deaths by gunshot. Did they occur during hunting activities or did they result from clashes with insurgents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Deaths by cause among occupation troops according to medical statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean strength (thousand)</td>
<td>45.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Death (rate per 1,000)</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths by injury</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths by injury (rate per 1,000)</td>
<td>1.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths by gunshot or other weapon</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths by gunshot/other weapon (rate)</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The most striking fact is the high rate of death by injury in 1948; it is 3 times higher than in 1947 and 2 times higher than in 1949. For the main part these excess deaths were due to the train accident of 14 September 1948 which claimed 36 deaths and 69 injured US soldiers. However, the train crash does not explain the high gunshot death rate observed in 1948. It should be remembered that serious cases were air-shipped to Japan. Thus, these death numbers include only the cases for which evacuation was not possible. This is probably why the count includes mostly deaths by injury. The smaller rates in 1949 can be partly explained by a change in the evacuation rule which took place on 15 April 1949. Prior to that date, only patients that had to be hospitalized for over 45 days were evacuated, whereas after 15 April the threshold for evacuation was set to 15 days. The rates are annual rates per 1,000. The number of deaths by gunshot seems fairly high. Of the 31 deaths by gunshot (or other weapon) which occurred in 1948, 6 were suicides, 13 were categorized as homicides and the rest as accidents. The single death by gunshot in 1949 was the result of several gunshots which eliminates the possibility of suicide or accident. One would need more information about these cases. The data for 1945, 1946 and 1947 have not yet been found.

Sources: *Annual Report of Medical Department Activities, USAFIK, 1948. Annual Report of Medical Department Activities, USAFIK, January-June 1949 (NARA 29), the data for 1947 are from “Statistical Health Reports 1947 (weekly).*

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**Expected peace-time death rate for young males**

In any population of young males (such as the one constituting the occupation force) there are a number of fatalities by accidents, suicide or disease. The “Historical Statistics of the United States” tell us that around 1946 the death rate in the age interval 15-35 was about 2 per 1,000. This figure refers to the civilian population residing in the United States. Can it be used to estimate the “natural” mortality rate
among the soldiers of the XXIV Corps\textsuperscript{103}? There are two types of factors which act in opposite directions.

- It is well-known (see for instance our study about the occupation of Japan) that the mortality rate of soldiers staying in the home country is substantially smaller than the mortality rate of civilians. This is due to the fact that in the military a smaller proportion of persons use cars or other vehicles. As a result the mortality due to traffic accidents (one of the leading cause of death in this age interval) will be smaller.

- On the other hand the living conditions in South Korea in the years 1945-1949 were less favorable than in the United States. This may have resulted in an increased mortality rate.

It is difficult to estimate these effects (especially the second one) quantitatively. Until more accurate information becomes available we will consider that the two effects are of same magnitude and therefore cancel one another. In other words, we will take 2 deaths per year and per 1,000 as the “natural” death rate.

Consequently, for the 75,000 troops of the XXIV Corps one would expect: $75 \times \frac{2}{12} = 12$ deaths per month.

In November and December 1945 there were twice as many deaths in the sole Seoul area.

**Geographical areas where incidents were the most frequent**

When one lists the incidents recorded in the G-2 reports one realizes quickly that some regions were more prone to troubles and protests than others. For instance, despite the fact that about one third of the Korean population was concentrated in the Seoul area there were few major troubles there. In contrast more isolated places experienced more troubles. For instance, one can mention the Ongjin peninsula, the province of Kwangju (Gwangju), the areas of Pusan (Busan) and Taegu (Daegu), the island of Cheju Do (Jeju).

1. The Ongjin peninsula north west of Seoul stands out by the frequency of its sabotage actions against US Army telephone lines.

2. Kwanju in the south west of Korea experienced very serious troubles in the fall of 1945, between September and November 1946 and again in 1948 after a mutiny of troops who were about to be shipped to Cheju island.

3. The region of Pusan and Taegu has seen much disturbances especially on 2 October 1946 and in following days.

4. The island of Cheju is located some 100km off the southern coast of Korea. It is about 100km long from east to west and 20km wide from south to north. From

\textsuperscript{103}The expression “natural” mortality rate refers to the rate that would be observed in the absence of any social unrest and confrontation with the population. This later mortality may be called excess-mortality.
1946 to the end of 1948 there was a long conflict between its population and the Military Government. After many unsuccessful attempts carried out by the police and constabulary and orchestrated by the MG the insurgents were eventually crushed by mid-1949.

5 In late October 1948 there was an uprising in the Yosu peninsula and in the neighboring city of Suchon. After it was crushed by the Constabulary many prisoners were executed (see the chronology chapter).

**Withheld information in military reports**

At first sight it may come as a surprise that even military reports give reports which are biased or self-censured. However, closer examination quickly suggests that this could in fact be expected for several reasons.

- At the Headquarters of the XXIV Corps there was a Public Relations Office, a circumstance which shows that the the US Army was well aware of the important role of the media (particularly US newspapers) in shaping the image of the occupation of Korea. One of the roles of the Public Relations Office was to release press reports.

- Most reports written by intelligence units such as the CIC or G-2 have a fairly large diffusion even when they bear a “Confidential” mark. It should be remembered that there are 5 sensitivity levels, namely: unclassified, restricted, confidential, secret, top secret. This means that highly sensitive information will *not* be released in a document marked “confidential”. Because of restrictions in security clearance for secret or top secret information, such documents will have only a small diffusion. In other words, the larger the diffusion, the lower the classification level and the less sensitive information it will contain.

- The role of the CIC in the US Army is similar to the role of the FBI in the United States. CIC agents perform interviews, interrogations and investigations which will lead to the indictment or conviction of defendants. In Korea they provided information that was used by provost courts and military commissions. Their job is *not* to give an objective and reliable account. If in the course of their investigation agents come across unwelcome facts (such as killings of civilians by US troops) these facts will just be omitted.

- The reports about the uprisings of October and November contain tables providing detailed chronological accounts. Three columns give the kind of casualties: killed-wounded-missing and there are such columns for “Police”, “Mob”, “Civilians”. There is not a single column for casualties among US forces. Is this because the writer knew that there were no casualties among US troops and so did not set up such columns? The answer is “No”, for in fact there were at least 4 *reported* casualties (5 Oct (1), 20 Oct (1), 4 Nov (2)). In other words, the fact that there are no
columns for casualties among US troops means that one did not wish to report them.

The Dokdo incident (8 June 1948)

Basic facts
In Korean “do” means island (or province also). The Dok (also spelled Tok) islands are located between Korea and Japan some 200 km east off the coast of Korea. Dokdo is the Korean name but the islands are referred to as Takeshima (or Takejima, with jima meaning island in Japanese) by Japanese people or also Liancourt Rocks by Americans. Sovereignty over the islets is disputed between Japan and South Korea. Whereas the Dok islands are uninhabited, the Ullung Islands located some 70 km to the east are inhabited by Koreans.

In this incident a squadron of B-29 bombers coming from Okinawa bombed and strafed a flotilla of some 30 fishing boats during a training exercise. According to a report made several years later by the South Korean government some 30 fishermen were killed.

Strictly speaking it was not an incident involving the occupation force of South Korea. Nevertheless it clearly resulted from the status of Korea as an occupied country. No sovereign country would be used as a bombing range by another power.

Different accounts
What makes this episode of interest in the framework of the present study is the process by which the historical truth came to light. There were basically 3 phases:

- The account given by Korean newspapers in the days following the incident was basically correct in the sense that they mentioned both bombing from fairly high altitude and strafing from a much lower altitude. This account was chiefly based on the testimony of fishermen who were able to escape.

- In the national indignation that followed the incident the National Assembly considered opening an investigation. The incident occurred shortly before the Korean government of Dr Rhee assumed power. However no official investigation was made. The only investigation which occurred was the one conducted by the Military Government. The publication of its results was delayed until the tension had dropped. Eventually, the version which became accepted was a sanitized version which recognized that there has been an accidental bombing but did not acknowledge the strafing which could hardly be termed accidental. The number of fatalities was given as 14, less than one half of the number given officially by the South Korean government in 1955.
• The investigation was reopened in 1995. The three surviving fishermen were interviewed again and repeated basically what they had already said in 1948. A crew member of one of the bombers was also interviewed which provided a clue of the reason behind the strafing. John Gibson, 83, retired from the US Air Force as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1965 declared that he had indeed seen boats but was told that they were drug-running boats. Once such a reason had been put forward one can better understand why the aircraft had continued their strafing and bombing even after realizing that there were real people in the bombing range.

• In the following years the uncomfortable truth was again forgotten. The Wikipedia article entitled “Liancourt Rocks” does not include a single line about this incident.

Excerpts from American newspapers

In order to illustrate the different versions of the account we give below some excerpts from major US newspapers.

San Francisco Chronicle (11 June 1948) “Korean newspapers charged today that an airplane allegedly American bombed and sank 11 fishing boats off the east coast of Korea Tuesday. 9 Koreans were reported killed and 5 were missing. US Army authorities in Korea denied, however, that any Korean-based planes were in the area.”

This was the first report. It does not mention the strafing and it under-estimates the number of aircraft, boats and dead.

San Francisco Chronicle (12 June 1948) “The Korean national police reported that Tuesday’s bombing of Korean fishing vessels was carried out by 9 four-engined aircraft bearing the star and circle insignia of the US Air Force. The Oolung chief of police reported that the planes bombed and strafed the fishing fleet for 20 minutes killing 14 Koreans and wounding 10.”

This account is more accurate than the previous one in several respects.

San Francisco Chronicle (16 June 1948) “An official statement from Air Force headquarters termed the incident a most unfortunate and regrettable accident. The fishing vessels may have been mistaken for the gray rocks that protrude from the sea. The Air Force flatly denied there had been any strafing and said the mission was carried out by B-29s flying at 7,000 meters.”

Clearly the main issue is whether or not the aircraft have been flying at 7,000 meters. The very fact that both the fishermen and the police declared that they have been able to see the star and circle insignia several days before the Air Force recognized that US Force bombers were involved strongly suggests that these testimonies were

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104 The political climate changed in 1992 when Kim Young-sam was elected president. He was the country’s first civilian president in 30 years.
105 The source is a detailed Korean website http://dokdo-research.com.
reliable. After all, it was not obvious that the planes were American, they could have been Russian or Chinese. Nevertheless, it is the version of the Air Force which became the accepted truth in the following years. This eliminated any mention of strafing.

Suppression of the October-November 1946 revolts

Overview

The revolt in North Kyongsang started on 1 October in Taegu, the main city of the province. It then spread to the rest of the province as well as to the province of South Kyongsang (of which Pusan is the capital). By 16 October the uprising had been crushed almost everywhere except in the mountains of the western part of South Kyongsang.

In 1946 each of the two provinces had about 2.5 million people. During the uprising a total of 115 cities, towns and villages were torn by riots. In many of these places, American tactical troops assumed control for various periods of time. As there were several successive riots in a number of places, the G-2 report totals 140 riots in the two weeks.

In how many of these cases had the troops to fire into the crowd to bring the situation under control? So far, we do not have the answer to this question. There are several non-lethal ways to control and break a demonstration. Yet such means as using rifle butts or tear gas take much more time and are less effective than deadly fire. Because the uprisings were so widespread the troops which had to deal with them may not have the time and resources to try non-lethal crowd control methods.

In this connection one should also recall that in the late 1940s the “War Department Basic Field Manual” (see the chronology at the date of 13 February 1947) advised against firing over the heads of demonstrators.

The uprising was much more massive in North Kyongsang than in South Kyongsang. 80 police were killed in the North but only 2 in the South. Yet, surprisingly, three times as many demonstrators were killed in the South than in the North.

In the New York Times there are very few articles about unrest in Korea and those which are published are buried in the middle of the newspaper. For instance, an article of 6 October 1946 entitled “Korean Province is put under martial law after the killing of policemen by mobs” appeared on p. 43.

Reliability of the source

A report (NARA 4b, p.314-320) published on 1 December 1946 by the Assistant
Chief of Staff of the 6th Infantry Division gives a summary of the role played by US troops in the suppression of this revolt. It is marked “Confidential” and not “Secret” or “Top secret” which means that it had a fairly broad diffusion and therefore may not contain the most sensitive facts.

How reliable are the casualty statistics contained in this report? A first indication is provided by the discrepancy between the data issued by the G-2 reports (i.e. US Army intelligence) on the one hand and the Military Government on the other hand. The first source gives 82 police killed whereas the second gives only 45.

In addition, as we have seen, G-2 reports tend to underestimate casualties, sometimes very drastically. In short, one should keep in mind that although these statistics look accurate, they may be wrong by 50% or more.

**Korean and US forces**

Korean forces in these two provinces were fairly limited. The report says that the Constabulary could not be trusted because about 30% of its soldiers were Communists or leftists. Anyway, the Constabulary was in small number (a few hundred); in other words it played almost no role. For the two provinces there were some 7,700 police. However, the heavy fatalities inflicted on them by insurgents at the beginning of the uprising show that this force was fairly ineffective.

So, the uprising was suppressed mainly by US troops. The report says that two units were particularly involved: the 1st Infantry Regiment (72 officers and 1,485 enlisted men) and the 6th Infantry Division Artillery Regiment consisting of 81 officers and 1,079 enlisted men. However, because the uprising was so widespread the rest of the 6th Infantry Division (300 officers and 4,500 men) also occasionally played a role.

**Weapons used by insurgents**

The insurgents had three sources of weapons (i) home-made, by using explosives taken from US warehouses. (ii) recovered from the Japanese after 15 August 1945 (iii) taken from the Korean police.

- Home-made grenades were made by filling C-ration cans with dynamite and then sealing the top and inserting a fuse.
- Other hand grenades were made by putting a fuse surrounded by dynamite in several sheets of paper and then rolling the paper up and fastening it tightly with string; the fuse protruded from one end of the roll.

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106 As an incidental remark it can be observed that this regiment was reactivated on 1 May 1998 and served in the Philippines against the Muslim uprising in the Jolo province. Its mission was to “suppress the enemy with timely and accurate artillery fires in support to the 6th Infantry Division”. These operations resulted in the neutralization of an undetermined number of Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) rebels, most of which were caused by artillery fires.
• Home-made incendiary bombs were made by placing dampened red phosphorus from several Japanese incendiary hand-grenades into a Japanese steel helmet, when the water dried out the phosphorus burst into flames.

• Initially the insurgents had some (illegal) fire-arms in their possession. These included pistols, rifles, shotguns, machine-guns, knee mortars. After they had overrun the police stations they added several hundred fire-arms and ammunition to their original supply. Only about 50% of the fire-arms seized from the police were recovered.

The report describes in detail the weapons and how they were made but it says almost nothing about how (and against whom) they were used. The only mention we could find was as follows (NARA 4b, p. 316 bottom): “Two home-made incendiary bombs were planted in the Military Government Provincial Headquarters in Pusan” (there is no date and no mention of possible damages).

**Sabotage**

The insurgents tried to prevent the movement of trucks by rolling large boulders into roads or by digging wide ditches across roads. Moreover, at least 7 highway bridges were blown up. Telephone lines were systematically cut.

**Uprising in the province of South Cholla**

This uprising started in Mokpo on 31 October 1946 and ended around 20 November. The population of South Cholla was 2.7 million. It was less serious than the one in North-South Kyongsang.

The G-2 report (NARA 4b, p. 364-370) which summarizes this episode was published on 31 December 1946. It parallels the report for the North-South Kyongsang uprising.

**Casualties**

Whereas no US casualties are mentioned in the October uprising, one casualty is mentioned during the November uprising.

The account of the incident is as follows.

“Hwasun (4 November 1946). Insurgents erected road-blocks and ambushed a US patrol, over-turning a jeep and injuring the driver. The patrol was reinforced by another and after a fire-fight in which 4 rioters were killed and 25 wounded, the two patrols succeeded in getting out of the ambush”.

[One question immediately comes to mind. How could the patrols know that they had killed 4 and wounded 25?]

It is often said that the insurgents avoided confrontations with US troops. On account of the firepower of US troops (remember that one of the regiments who took part in
Table 2.5Casualties in the uprisings of October–November 1946 in the provinces of North-South Kyongsang and South Cholla according to US G-2 sources

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Killed (per thousand)</th>
<th>All casualties including missing (per thousand)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 1946</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>448</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US troops</td>
<td>2,700</td>
<td>0 (?)</td>
<td>0. (?)%</td>
<td>0 (?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>November 1946</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgents</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US troops</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>0 (?)</td>
<td>0. (?)%</td>
<td>1 (?)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: A semi-official publication (Savada 1990) says that 1,000 Koreans died in these events; this is 3 times more than the total of 332 deaths recorded in this table.

The 1-16 October uprising took place in the provinces of North and South Kyongsang whereas the 1-20 November uprising was in the province of South Cholla. The Korean Constabulary played almost no role which is why it is not mentioned in the table. The strength of US troops refers only to the units of the 6th Infantry Division which were the most heavily involved. (i) 2,700 is for the 1st Infantry Regiment and 6th Infantry Division Artillery Regiment. (ii) Similarly, 1,400 refers to the strength of the 20th Infantry Regiment. The figures of 70,000 and 24,000 refer to demonstrators rather than to armed insurgents. That is why the rates per thousand are so low.

It is quite remarkable that US troops did not have a single casualty in the October uprising in spite of the fact that they had to bear the brunt of the revolt. On account of under-estimates noticed elsewhere in other G-2 reports this statement should perhaps not be taken at face value by careful historians. As a matter of fact there were two reported casualties on 5 Oct and 20 Oct respectively (see the chronology). In November there were also 2 reported casualties (see the chronology at the date of 4 Nov 1946).

Source: NARA 4b, p. 314-320, 364-370

the repression was an artillery regiment) it is of course natural that they avoided frontal confrontations. However, the incidents listed below show that they organized ambushes.

- Taegu. Two patrols and one sentry were fired upon by insurgents who fled when their fire was returned. No injuries to US personnel.
- 30 km north of Taegu. A patrol of one officer and 6 enlisted men from the 6th Combat Engineer Battalion were fired upon by 18 Koreans. The fire fight lasted 20 minutes and eventually the Koreans were forced to retire. No injuries to US personnel.

107 The report lists these incidents without giving the dates of the events
• Sonsan. A mob stoned US troops who had to fire into the crowd to escape.
• Masan. The quarters of the Red Cross were stoned by a mob and were rescued by tactical troops. No injuries to US personnel.

**Suppression of the Cheju Island uprising**

In Korean publications the episode of the suppression of the leftist guerrilla on Cheju Island is called the 4.3 Incident because it is considered to have started on 3 April 1948 (in fact, there had already been incidents in earlier years).

This episode has been studied by American and Korean researchers much earlier and in more detail than other incidents which occurred during the occupation.

In 1963, Kim Pong-hyon and Kim Min-ju, two Koreans established in Osaka published a book written in Korean which contains documents about the so-called 4.3 uprising.

To our best knowledge the first English paper on the Cheju-do uprising and its suppression was published by Prof. John Merrill in the 1980 issue of the “Journal Of Korean Studies”. Quite amazingly, the description provided in this pioneering paper of 59 pages is more accurate than many of the accounts published in the three following decades. It gives a death toll of 30,000 which is very close to the figure which is currently accepted. It indicates that the two peak periods in the repression occurred firstly between 1 November and 29 December 1948 and secondly between 1 March and 31 April 1949.

The fact that Prof. Merrill gives almost no details about US involvement is in line with studies done by American scholars. It can be noted that Merrill became a State Department analyst on North Korea (at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research) but only in 1989. Studies done later on by Korean scholars also give very little precisions in this respect.

In 1989 there was the creation of the “Cheju 4.3 Research Institute” which collected materials about the incident by interviewing the victims, gathering newspapers of the time, excavating remains from execution sites, and investigating US military records at the National Archives in Washington D.C. Based on these materials, the Institute published about 20 books of research materials.

In the 1990s the “Jemin Ilbo”, a Chejudo based newspaper, printed a series of articles related to the incident. The reporters collected verbal records from about 6,000 persons, disclosed important documents, investigated important sites of the incident, and collected basic materials from NARA. The articles were published as a five volume book series whose publication started in 1994.
Then in January 2000 a major landmark was the creation of a government supported research commission named “The Commission for Discovering Truth and Recovering Honor of Victims (CDTRHV)”. It published its final report in 2003, that is to say two years before a national Truth Commission was established.

Much has been written about this episode both by Koreans (see the work of the CDTRHV) and by Americans (see Merrill 1980, Cumings 1998, Newsweek 19 June 2000). So one might think that the truth is known. The thesis which is currently accepted by US historians is that large scale massacres of civilians were carried out during the suppression campaign of the guerrilla force. This force was never much larger than about 5,000; the death toll figures which are currently accepted suggest that about 3 civilians were killed for every guerrilla fighter.

Three points seem to have received little attention.

- What strategy was used to crush the rebellion?
- What was the US involvement?
- What was the distribution of the massacres in the course of time? Did they predominantly occur in 1948, 1949 or in 1950 after the outbreak of the Korean War?

These points will now be discussed in more detail.

**Counter-insurgency strategy**

One answer to the first question is that it is the destruction of the mountain villages which proved decisive. We have mentioned above that the campaign which was waged under American supervision in April 1948 was not a success because the guerrilla fraction of the population left the villages before they were encircled by the army and came back days later when the army had moved to another area. Yet, it appears that one year later the guerrilla was duly suppressed. What new element came into play?

“To get rid of all the fishes, it is necessary to drain the pond”. This is a well-known rule of counter-insurgency warfare. It means that in order to suppress the guerrillas one needs to remove the villagers on whose support they rely. There are only two ways to do that: mass killings or relocation into camps. It seems that in Cheju the two methods were used simultaneously.

- Of course, there are a few accounts which tell us that there were no mass-executions. As an illustration one can cite the following testimony by a US Marine Captain who was an adviser of the Constabulary from May to September 1948\(^{108}\).

\(^{108}\)This account can be found on the Website of US Marines at the following address: http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/showthread.php?t=25086)
“I was to assist Park [Colonel Park Jin Gyon head a new unit, the 11th Constabulary that was brought in from the mainland] to protect the coastal villages and move threatened islanders into the protected areas. Although I did not personally witness them, the constabulary did hold kangaroo courts and did shoot some guys. I never personally saw our soldiers beating prisoners or killing them. Korean troop morale was pretty high since there were five women to each male on the island. The communists burned villages, not my Constabulary soldiers.”

- However, there are also testimonies by Americans who say the opposite. Here is an account made by Captain James Hausman. It can be found in Hausman (typescript in Hausman papers) and was reproduced in Clark (2003 p. 332-333). “Then there was the occasion when ROKA personnel on Cheju-do speared to death about 20 civilians (allegedly Communists) without benefit of trial. Unfortunately, a picture was taken and later was given to Ambassador Muccio. I might add, a KMAG sergeant had witnessed this act and he was plainly recognizable in that picture. I was ordered to report to the Ambassador. When confronted with the facts about this incident I told the Ambassador that this was a good sign because in the past, similar groups of 200 or more had been summarily executed, and now the number was down to 20. This was a progress.”

Although at first sight this account seems to contradict the previous one, it should be noted that they do not refer to the same time interval. The previous account ends in September 1948 while the second one refers to a later time. It is known that the repression became much harsher in the fall of 1948. This is illustrated by the following decree (Baik 2007).

- On October 1948 the commander of the Ninth Korean Regiment promulgated a decree which said: “All the people who pass around the inner mountain areas of Jeju farther than 5 km from the seashore after 20 October 1948 will be regarded as rebels and will be shot to death”.

In other words, apart from the coastal area, the whole island was made into a free-fire zone.

- According to testimonies (see Newsweek 19 June 2000) there were villages in which South Korean forces torched the homes and killed everybody including women and children.

- In addition we know that “by early 1949 one third of the population [that is to say between 60,000 and 100,000 people] were packed into the coastline” (Cumings 1998).

In the first case all villagers were killed, in the second case the villagers were herded in camps. One would expect that the population moved to camps was mainly composed of women and children\(^\text{109}\). One would need to know the total population as

\(^{109}\)This strategy was also used during the Boer war in South Africa in the early 1900s. This was probably one of the first
well as the sex ratio in the relocation camps to be able to determine which strategy was used predominantly.

The final report of the CDTRHV contains a table which lists the number of victims by age. We learn that of the 14,373 victims, 5.8% were under 10 and 35% were between 21 and 30 year old. Unfortunately, the table does not give the distribution by sex.

Fig. 2.7a  Key US and Korean military officers at Jeju airfield on 5 May 1948. The photograph was published in the Jeju Weekly (issue of 31 May 2010) but the caption does not give the names of the officers who appear on the picture. The picture also appears on the website of the “National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 2 Incident” which was created by the Korean government on 12 January 2000; the Act was entitled: “Special Act for Investigation of the Jeju April 3 Incident and Recovering the Honor of Victims”.

Source: The Jeju Weekly (31 May 2010)
http://jeju4.3.go.fr/english

**American involvement**

On the website of the CDTRHV there is a somewhat cryptic statement which is excerpted (and translated) from the summary of the final report which is in Korean.

While the final report failed to confirm or spell out a US role, it concluded that 86% of the 14,373 deaths reported were committed by security forces including the National Guard, National Police, and rightist groups.

An obvious question immediately comes to mind: how is it possible to know by whom the people were killed?

What was the level of American involvement? Depending upon researchers different answers were given.

An interesting test is to compare two versions of articles about the Jeju uprising which appeared on the Wikipedia website.


instance in modern times. In South Africa, the population in the camps was mostly composed of women, children, elderly persons and African servants. The outbreak of epidemics in the camps resulted in high mortality rates.
Chapter 2

Fig. 2.7b General William Lynn Roberts with South Korean officers in May 1948. The photograph was published in the Jeju Weekly (issue of 31 May 2010). The caption says: “US Gen. Roberts, center, back, commanded the operation in Jeju,” but is does not give the names of the Korean officers nor does it give the exact date and location. From 1948 to 1949 Brigadier General Roberts was the Head of USAMGIK, then from 1949 to 1950 he was Chief of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG).

Other sources say that Gen. William Frishe Dean took a significant role in the Jeju operation. Gen. Dean was Military Governor of South Korea (deputy to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge) from October 1947 to the end of 1949. Following the US defeats in the battles of Pyongtaek (6 July 1950) and Taejon (19 July 1950) he was separated from his troops of the 24th Infantry Division and eventually taken prisoner by the North Korean Army on 25 August. He was liberated on 4 September 1953.

Sources: The Jeju Weekly (31 May 2010)

- In a subsequent version (12 January 2011) there was a new section entitled “American involvement”. It was a fairly short section which said basically two things. (i) There were almost no American troops on Cheju between April and September 1948\(^{110}\). (ii) The Police and Constabulary were not under American command.

As we have seen above, both statements are incorrect.

Regarding the first point, in 1947 and 1948 there were between 100 (size of a company) and 1,500 (size of a regiment) US troops on Cheju Island. Regarding the second point, the agreement of 24 August 1948 between President Rhee and General Hodge put all Korean forces under American command at least until the departure of US troops in July 1949.

However, in spite of the fact that a lot of NARA files have been published in the volumes mentioned above, it seems that little evidence is available regarding the form and level of American involvement. Here are some of the questions one should try to answer.

1 In China American troops tried not to get involved in the fighting between

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\(^{110}\) Jimmie Leach, then a captain in the American military, was an adviser to the South Korean Constabulary. He claims that there were 6 Americans on the island including himself\(^{1}\). In fact, he only said that he had 5 Americans with him. The fact that these people were the only Americans on the island is not contained in his testimony.
Incidents

Communists and Nationalists. Nevertheless US aid to the Nationalist side took many forms. US troops provided aid in terms of logistics by transporting Nationalist troops by air or by ship, by protecting railway lines and bridges against sabotage, by training Chinese air force, navy and army personnel. Moreover the Nationalist government received much military equipment and was granted loans to be able to pay its troops. On all these aspects it should be possible to find information in the case of Korea.

2 A much more difficult problem is to determine the influence of US “advisers” at the command level. In this respect the situation was somewhat different in Korea than in China. Although there were US advisers in Chinese army headquarters, they were not officially recognized as being in command. Also in China, at least after 1946, there were only few advisers at tactical level. For all these questions it is probably not easy to find evidence in archives.

Timing of the repression

According to an official statement of the South Korean government made on 17 April 1949 (see the chronology at this date) about 80,000 inhabitants of Cheju have been made homeless. This represents almost one third of the island’s population. It is likely that this corresponds to the burning and destruction of a majority of the villages. In other words, it seems that the repression culminated between October 1948 and May 1949. This stands at variance with the Wikipedia article (of 2011) which suggests (without however supporting this claim by quantitative data) that a great part of the fatalities occurred during the Korean War as a result of the infiltration of North Korean guerrillas.

Major Kyengho Son (2008, p. 229) mentions in his thesis that the “Daily Reports of the (Korean) 9th Regiment” are missing for the period from 25 August 1948 to 25 November 1948. The disappearance of these reports if of course unfortunate even though we do know that such military reports often misrepresent the real picture. This means that one must rely on other sources (such as interviews of survivors) to learn what happened.

Suppression of the Chiri-san guerrilla (Dec 1951-Jan 1952)

The tactic used at Cheju-do was used again during the Korean War against South Korean guerrilla fighters. One of these operations took place between December 1951 and January 1952 around the Chiri mountain (some 2000 meter high) located between Kwanju and Pusan. Some 5,600 guerrillas were killed in phase I and II. The number killed in phase III (which was the most important) is not given. As in Cheju,

\[\text{In order to establish this point with more certainty one would need to know the distribution of the population between the main cities and towns on the one hand and the villages on the other hand.}\]
police and youth groups participated in the operation. The following summary is from Chapter 9 entitled “The active defense” (Hermes 1990). It is an official account from the Center of Military History.

The calm on the battlefield permitted more attention to be paid to one troublesome problem that bothered the UN Command almost from the beginning of the Korean War. Behind the lines in South Korea there were over 8,000 guerrillas and bandits [the same word “bandits” was used in China during the 1930s to designate the Communists] 5,400 of whom were reported armed. Concentrated mainly in the mountains of the rugged Chiri-san area of southwestern Korea, they were a constant thorn in the side of the ROK Government.

During November there was an upsurge in raiding operations as the guerrillas launched well-coordinated attacks upon rail lines and installations. Van Fleet [commander of the US Eighth Army and of United Nations forces in Korea] decided that the time had come to eliminate this irritation. In mid-November he ordered the ROK Army to set up a task force composed of the ROK Capital and ROK 8th Divisions, both minus their artillery units. Van Fleet wanted the group organized and ready to stamp out guerrilla activity by the first of December.

On 1 December the ROK Government took the first step by declaring martial law in southwestern Korea. This restricted the movement of civilians, established a curfew, and severed telephone connections between villages. On the following day Task Force Paik, named after the commander, Lt. Gen. Paik Sun Yup, initiated its antiguerilla campaign, sardonically called RAT KILLER. Moving in from a 250 kilometer perimeter, Task Force Paik closed on the Chiri-san. Blocking forces, composed of National Police, youth regiments, and security forces located in the area, were stationed at strategic positions to cut off escape routes. After 12 days, Task Force Paik ended the first phase on 14 December with a total of 1,612 reported killed and 1,842 prisoners.

The hunt shifted to North Cholla Province for Phase II with the mountains around Chonju the chief objectives. From 19 December 1951 to 4 January 1952 the ROK 8th and Capital Divisions ranged the hills and sought to trap the guerrillas and bandits hiding in the rough terrain. By the end of December it was estimated that over 4,000 men had been killed and another 4,000 had been captured.

When Phase III opened on 6 January 1952, the task force returned to the Chiri-san to catch the guerrillas who had filtered back into the area after Phase I. On 19 January, the Capital Division carried out the most significant action of the campaign. What was believed to be the core of the resistance forces in South Korea perished or was taken prisoner during this drive. When Phase III ended at the close of January,
over 19,000 guerrillas and bandits had been killed or captured in the RATKILLER operation. The last phase became a mopping-up effort against light and scattered resistance. The Capital Division’s mobile units sought to catch up with the remnants of the guerrillas. RATKILLER officially terminated on 15 March 1952.
Chapter 3
Trials by military courts

On 18 January 1944 the New York Times published an account of a trial of 12 men and one woman arrested in Trapani, Sicily for plotting a revival of fascism. One of them, 24-year old Salvatore Bramante, was sentenced to be executed after being found guilty on 3 charges (i) Possessing an automatic pistol (ii) Damaging Allied communication lines (iii) Having attended a fascist meeting. The other members were sentenced to terms ranging from one to 10 years.

Why did we mention this trial? The interesting point is that the expression “military tribunal” does not appear anywhere in the article. A military court it was of course and more specifically a “military commission” court (see below). There are similar accounts in other issues of the New York Times (e.g. on 3 January 1944, p. 3) but the expressions “military court” or “military tribunals” usually does not appear except in purely military cases 112.

This omission is in line with the decision of the War Department taken on 26 August 1943 according to which the acronym AMGOT meaning “Allied Military Government of Occupied Territories” should be replaced by AMG, Allied Military Government 113. In the months preceding the Normandy landing (June 1944) the term “AMG” was itself replaced by “Civil Affairs” (or also G-5). Although the objectives and duties of “Civil Affairs” were basically the same as those of AMGOT, the term was of course much less offensive to the citizens of occupied countries.

The previous observations make us understand why records documenting trials by military tribunals are difficult to find. This is true, not only for Italy and South Korea, but indeed for all countries where such tribunals were established. Even when archive documents can be found they are usually sketchy and give little information about charges.

The question

112 For instance, the expression “tried by a military court of the Allied Military Government” appears in an article of 22 January 1944 (p. 3). In this case the two 18-year old Italians were sentenced to death and executed on purely military charges of spying for the Germans.

113 This recommendation was duly followed by the New York Times. The electronic index shows that after this date AMGOT no longer appears.
The US Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) organized two kinds of military courts. (i) The so-called provost courts which could give sentences of up to 5 years confinement at hard labor (CHL) and (ii) The Military Commissions which could inflict any sentence including the death penalty.

The present chapter is the continuation of a paper (in Korean) published in 2006 by Prof. K.-C. Song which was entitled: “A study on the military occupation courts under the military administration of USAMGIK”. This study analyzed the operation rules and legal framework of US military courts in South Korea. The legal framework and procedure rules of such tribunals were fairly similar in all countries where they were implemented. As a matter of fact these rules were defined by the legal branch of the US Army long before the Second World War. It may be recalled that such tribunals played an important role during the American Civil War and in the years following the defeat of the South when the troops of the Union occupied the Confederate states. In the 80 years between 1865 and 1945 there may have been some changes but the basic rules (and in particular the important distinction between provost and military commissions courts) remained unchanged.

However the ways legal rules were actually implemented were very different from one country to another. There were thousands of military commission trials during and after the Civil War but less than 10 in Hawaii in spite of the fact that there were of the order of 60,000 provost court trials. In other words, the total number of trials and the respective weight of each type of jurisdiction were very different in each of the occupation cases mentioned in Table 3.1. These are important features which shaped the way military justice was working. The larger the proportion of military commission trials the more severe the sentences.

As shown by table 1 we have information, at least partial information, for all the cases except for Korea. It is this total lack of knowledge even 60 years after the occupation which gives its importance to this question.

**A sample of cases**

Before we start let us cite a sample of cases which give a kind of perceptive feeling about the whole question. They are found in an unpublished book by Richard Robinson (1947, p. 153-154) who has been working for the Military government in Korea during 1946-1947.

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114 We use the term “occupation” uniformly even though the status of these countries were very different. The Confederation, Germany or Japan were defeated countries, Hawaii was an American Territory occupied by a large number of people of Japanese ancestry who were either US citizens, Japanese citizens or dual citizens (i.e. citizens of both Japan and the US). What was common to all these cases is the fact that all authority and power was concentrated in the hands of the military.
### Table 3.1 Number of provost court trials in different occupation episodes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hawaii (1942-1944)</th>
<th>Japan (1945-1951)</th>
<th>South Korea (1945-1948)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of trials</strong></td>
<td>(\sim 50,000)</td>
<td>(&gt; 32,000)</td>
<td>10,000 ?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trials per year and per million population</strong></td>
<td>(\sim 33,000)</td>
<td>&gt; 70</td>
<td>125 ?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: As far as provost court trials are concerned, South Korea stands out as a *terra incognita* that is to say an unexplored region.

We did not include in this table the data for Military Commissions because their number was largely a matter of policy. Thus, there were over 1,400 trials by Military Commissions during the occupation of the former Confederation by Union troops (1865-1868), but less than 10 in the case of Hawaii. The symbol \(>\) means that we have only partial statistical coverage; in other words the number 32,000 is a minimum. Estimates given in the present chapter show that in South Korea there were at least 10,000 trials.


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### The story of the old man from the hills

The first case occurred in 1946 and involved an old man from the hills. He had taken all his savings to make a trip to Seoul in order to visit a competent dentist. A friend had given him the address of a house where he might live during his stay in the city. The old man was made welcome but in the very first night the police raided the house in search of Communists. The man was arrested along with his hosts.

The group was tried by an American provost court and all were sentenced to imprisonment for a number of years including the old man. His pleas of innocence fell on deaf ears. Eventually he was freed one year later after an interested American officer had carried the case to the highest authorities.

### The story of the three witnesses

In a case tried before a judge who was an American officer (Robinson does not say if it was a provost court or a military commission) the police was hard pressed to prove that a suspect had been involved in a riot. In the perspective of his trial, three witnesses had been shanghaied off the street.

The first witness was called. “Do you recognize this man?” the judge asked. “No I don’t” answered the witness. A police sergeant’s fist shot out and knocked the man to his knees. The process was repeated with the next witness. Again a denial, a brutal slap and the witness was taken out whimpering. Having seen the fate of his two companions, the third witness decided to escape a similar ordeal. Faltering, he recognized the suspect. A conviction quickly followed\(^{115}\).

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\(^{115}\)One may wonder whether this story is really true. It is given by Robinson in order to illustrate the fact that witnesses were often false witnesses, something which was certainly true in a general way. What raises some doubts is the fact that
**Sample of sentences**

In his book Robinson (1947 pp. 157, 293, 301) gives a sample of sentences given by provost courts.

- On 4 October 1946, “writing against the Military Government” netted the author one year at hard labor,
- On 7 November 1946 a sentence of 2 years at hard labor was meted out for “organizing a strike against Military Government”.
- On 9 November 1946, 23 strikers were given sentences ranging from 2 months to 4 years each.
- On 16 November 1946, two men received 6 months at hard labor each for attending an “unauthorized speech”. Three others were given similar sentences for the possession of “illegal” handbills.
- On 31 March 1947, 5 students were sentenced to one year imprisonment for holding an unlicensed meeting at Seoul National University.
- On 5 April 1947, two men received sentences of 2 and one year respectively for fomenting an “illegal” strike.
- After the 24-hour strike of 22 March 1947, 11 strikers were given the following imprisonment sentences in provost courts: 5 years (one), 3 years (two), 2 years (three), 1 year (one), 6 months (three), 3 months (one).

**Objectives of this chapter**

The fact that criminal justice was a major issue in the history of South Korea between 1945 and 1949 is shown by the increase in the number of prisoners from about 2,000 in December 1945 to 22,000 (a 10-fold increase) in July 1948 and 36,000 in October 1949 (RG 554, Box 23, Seo 1996 (p. 106)).

As will be explained below the documents which would enable us to know the monthly number of trials by military tribunals are not yet available.

**Number of sentences**

However we will be able to shed some light on this issue by giving estimates for the number of courts in operation and the monthly number of cases they were able to treat. Here is a brief summary.

- From data published by the newspaper “Korea Independence” (25 June 1947) one learns that between September 1945 and June 1947 some 3,000 Koreans were sentenced to prison terms comprised between 3 months and 5 years. This gives a
monthly average of \( \frac{3000}{22} = 136 \) per month.

- From data released on 10 February 1948 (see the chronology at this date) it can be inferred that from September 1945 to January 1948 there were (at least) 4,715 persons tried by provost courts for offenses against US property and personnel. This gives an average of 160 per month which is consistent with the previous estimate.

Of course, apart from offenses against US property and personnel there were other counts such as rioting, censorship infractions, and so on. That is why the estimate of 160 per month is rather a lower bound. This lower bound is consistent with the global estimate of some 10,000 trials until August 1948 that will be obtained later.

**A neglected issue**

Why will we not manage to give more accurate answers? The reason is very simple. It is because this question has attracted very little attention and interest so far.

- Bruce Cumings’s two volume work (totaling almost 1,600 pages) about the occupation period and the origins of the Korean War omits this topic. The expressions “provost court”, “military commission”, “military tribunals, “trial” are not mentioned in the index.

- The New York Times gives some limited information about trials by provost courts in Japan. For instance one article published on 27 March 1947 gives the number of trials during 1946. However, as can easily be checked by using the electronic search engine available on the website of the journal, provost courts in South Korea are not mentioned (not even once) in the articles of the New York Times.

- No PhD thesis was devoted to this question either in Korea or in the United States and almost no research articles were published.

Why did this question not raise more interest in Korea? Is it because the relevant archive documents are not available in Korea and must be examined at the US National Archives\(^\text{\textsuperscript{116}}\)?

**Extensive investigation of the occupation period in Korea**

This is probably not the real reason at least not for the past twenty years. Indeed, since 1987 Korean scholars devoted great efforts to making available in Korea a large part of the US archives about Korea. Among the organizations which contributed to this effort one can mention the following:

- The “Institute of Asian Culture Studies” of Hallym University (located 70 km north-east of Seoul) compiled and published about 30 volumes of photocopies of

\(^{116}\text{Commonly called NARA (National Archive and Record Administration) the US Archives are located in the suburbs of Washington DC. However it is possible to select documents through the electronic catalog (called ARC=Archival Research Catalog) and then to order the documents. The whole process takes between one and two months. Note that in spite of using the same acronym the so-called “Nara repository” of the Korean archives established in Seongnam has no connection with the United States NARA.}
documents held at NARA. The year 1988 marked a major milestone in this program with the publication of 5 items representing a total of 19 volumes. In a review of this publication that was published in 1992 the reviewer (Lee 1992, p. 940) says that these volumes represent a gold mine for all scholars who wish to study Korea between 1945 and 1950. Surprisingly however, these volumes are available in only a few libraries and are seldom used and cited in papers about Korea.\(^{117}\)

- The “Center for Korean Constitutional Law History\(^{118}\)” of Seoul National University photographed and photocopied thousands of archive documents held at NARA. These documents are not yet publicly available but there are plans to make them available online.

- The “National Assembly Library”, the “National Central Library” and the “National Archives of Korea” have established a website devoted to Korean history\(^{119}\) on which it is possible to find archive documents from NARA. A search engine gives the possibility of searching documents containing specific words. When we tried the words “provost court” we found only a few documents; they all concerned the weekly military reports for the region of Chunchon (capital of the province of Gang-wan, 46th Military Government).

The documents which must be found

**Creation of US military tribunals**

Military Commissions and provost courts were established in Korea in early September 1945 (see Doc. 1a). This went together with the control of Korean courts by USAMGIK as described in Doc. 1b.

**Number of courts**

In contrast to Military Commissions which were in small number, there were many provost courts. There was at least one in each provincial military government. A natural question is whether the Headquarters kept statistics about the number of trials. The answer is “yes”. How do we know? In RG 554 (Box 300) there is a form entitled “Provost Court Monthly Report”. It is reproduced in Doc. 2. In other words, all local data were collected and put on records. Unfortunately, we were not yet able to find these records.

**“Records of trials”**

The form No 12 reproduced in Doc. 2 is a monthly summary of activity. For each trial provost courts had also to provide a summary of the case explaining the charges

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\(^{117}\) For instance none of the Hallym publications is used and referenced in Kim (2007).

\(^{118}\) Subsequently referred to as CKCLH.

\(^{119}\) The address is: http://www.koreanhistory.or.kr
and the circumstances of the violation. This summary was called the “record of trial”. How do we know? In RG 554 (Box 51) there are several letters in which the Headquarters complained to Provincial Government authorities about the fact that the record of trial is too short. For instance, a letter dated 29 October 1946 was sent to the Provincial Military Governor of South Cholla. It notes that the record of trial of the accused (namely Mr. Kong Min Sik) does not have complete factual information on the charge sheet. This letter required the record to be completed.

The fact that records of trials were established is very important because usually the charge does not tell us anything specific about the offense. For instance for all trials related to rebellions, the charges were uniformly expressed as “violation of Proclamation No 2 issued by General Headquarters on 7 September 1945 (see Doc. 3). Such a mention is of little usefulness for our understanding.

One reason which explains why detailed records of trials were indispensable is because they allowed a review of the most serious cases by the Justice Department of the Headquarters. This is what is expressed in a letter of 5 February 1946 addressed to the Commanding General of the 6th Infantry Division: “Information essential for a proper review is not contained in the record” (RG 554, Box 51, Folder 4).

Unfortunately, for the “records of trials” the situation is the same as for the monthly reports in the sense that we have not yet been able to find them. Thus, with the two main documents missing we had to rely on indirect evidence. This is what is

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Document 1a: Creation of Military Commissions and Provost Courts. The Military Commission was composed of 5 persons: two colonels, two majors and one captain. The language used in the creation of the provost courts may seem somewhat bizarre at first sight. It becomes clearer when one realizes that this court was composed of only one person. Source: NARA: RG 554, Box 153 (CKCLH).

---

In his book E. Grant Mead (1951, p. 164) says: “No records [of provost court trials] were kept except bare facts such as names, offenses and punishment.” It turns out that Meade was a member of the Military Government in the province of South Cholla (south west of Korea), precisely the province identified in the above letter as providing wanting reports. In other words, Mead’s statement is perhaps true for this specific province but it is not true in a general way. Moreover, even in this case the reports which were too sketchy had to be completed.
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA
Office of the Military Governor, Seoul, Korea
19 November 1945 Removal Number 38

The following officials are relieved of their duties and offices indicated below in the Bureau of Justice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Relieved of Duty and Office of</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shim Sam Jik</td>
<td>Justice of the Supreme Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim Young Sang</td>
<td>Head of Civil Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koo Cha Kwan</td>
<td>Head of Criminal Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee Chung Hyuk</td>
<td>Judge of the Juvenile Court of Seoul</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL
UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES IN KOREA

A.V. ARNOLD
Major General, United States Army

**Document 1b: Removal of Korean judges by the Military Government.** About 200 judges were removed through this removal order. Were all of them removed because of their collaboration with the Japanese or rather because they were leftists? On account of what was done in the police, the second explanation seems more appropriate. By performing this purge instead of relying on the authority of the provisional Korean government in exile, the Military Government clearly emphasized that henceforth the judges (as well as other civil servants) would be accountable to it rather than to Korean authorities. In this sense, this removal order complemented the General Orders creating the military courts. Taken together, these orders put Korean Justice (whether civil or criminal) into the hands of the Military Government. The purge of 19 November 1945 was completed by “Bureau Order Number 5” of 4 December 1945 which established the “Probationers Committee of the Bureau of Justice”. Its role was to recommend the appointment of new judges. Apart from 6 Korean members, this committee also comprised 3 US officers as “ex-officio members”.

It can be noted that previous removal orders (number 14 of 11 October 1945 and number 26 of 18 October 1945) had removed district governors, judges and other officials including the head of the criminal section who was again removed one month later on 19 November 1945. *Source: NARA: RG 554, Box 21 (CKCLH).*

explained in the next section.

**Documents about trials that we were able to find so far**

**Partial information about the number of provost court trials**

Can we estimate the number of provost courts in operation in South Korea? As already said, the essential documents (namely the provost court monthly reports and


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Cases Pending...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases Tried During Month...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Convictions...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Acquittals...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of Money Received, Fines...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of Money Received, Forfeiture...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following property (other than money) was ordered confiscated or forfeited by this court and disposed of as follows.

* To be filled out in triplicate; one copy to be retained by Provincial Military Governor, two copies to be forwarded to the Department of Justice, Hq. USAMGIK.

Document 2: **Form describing provost court activity.** Such monthly reports had to be filled by all provost courts. So far, however, we were not able to find these documents. *Source: NARA: RG 554, Box 300 (CKCLH)*

the records of trial) are still missing. Yet, there is some fragmentary information which gives at least an insight.

- **Number of prison sentences.** The most useful quantitative information comes from the issue of 25 June 1947 of “Korean Independence”, a weekly magazine published in Los Angeles (partly in Korean and partly in English). It says that from September 1945 to June 1947 at least 3,000 persons were sentenced in provost court trials to prison terms comprised between 3 months and 5 years. We will see below if from this figure we can derive an estimate for the total number of trials.

- **Number of provost courts** The files from the “Center for Korean Constitutional Law History” contain many letters about sentence reductions or clemency petitions. Most often, whether or not the sentence was indeed reduced, the letter gives the date and location of the trial and the initial sentence. In this way we are able to learn something about the location of the courts and about a sample of cases. For instance, on 17 December 1945 Mr. Je Hi Kim was sentenced to 12 months confinement at hard labor (CHL) in Taegu for participating in a riot but he was liberated on parole on 25 July 1946 (RG 554, Box 51, Folder 1).
At this time the US troops comprised 3 divisions: the 6th, 7th and 40th Infantry Division. Each of them had several provost courts. Below we give some of their locations:

6th Division: Andong, Iri, Kwanju, Polgyo.
7th Division: Kongju, Puyo, Seoul, Songdo.
40th Division: Chinae, Pohang, Yengsan.

In addition, provincial Military Governments also had provost courts in the main city of each province. A letter of 3 August 1946 addressed to the Commanding General, USAFIK says that by 1 July 1946 approximately 11 provost courts were in operation and that this number was expected to increase to 25 by 1 September 1946.

In short, by late 1946 there were some 20 provost courts.

**Number of prisoners.** On 22 December 1945 there were 1,910 inmates in Seoul prison of which 291 (i.e. 15%) had been convicted for crimes against the Military Government (RG 554, Box 23). In other words, just for Seoul and in the initial months of the occupation the rate was about 100 convictions per month.

On 22 December 1945 there were 3,858 persons in prison in the whole of South Korea; thus, there was a ratio of two between South Korea and Seoul. It can be noted that the number of prisoners increased markedly in January 1946 with 6,628 persons in prison by the end of January (RG 554, Box 23).

On 31 July 1948 the 18 National prisons held some 22,000 inmates; 78% of them were convicted prisoners while 22% were awaiting trial (RG 554, Box 23). The source does not say what proportion of these prisoners were convicted by military tribunals. If we assume the same proportion of 15% as indicated above one gets 3,300 prisoners convicted by military tribunals. This order of magnitude is consistent with the figure given in “Korean Independence”.

**Weekly activity of provost courts.** A “Weekly Military Occupational Activities Report” (available on the “koreanhistory” website) lists 32 persons tried in the week of 17-22 June 1946 by the provost court of Chunsong Gun (in the 46th Military Government). The sentences ranged from “not guilty” to 6 months. If we assume the same rate per week for the other provost courts, one gets (assuming a total of 20 courts) some $52 \times 32 \times 20 = 33,280$ trials per year. This may appear as a big number but the following point also suggests a number of that order of magnitude.

In the wake of the Taegu uprising 5 courts were established in this city each of which was operating at an average rate of 70 trials per week over a period of 9 weeks. Thus, there were $5 \times 70 \times 9 \sim 3,000$ trials in the Taegu area between mid-October and mid-December 1946 (see the chronology at the date of 24 October 1946). As there were riots in several other locations as well, these data also suggest a total number of trials in excess of 15,000 for the whole year of 1946.

**Case numbers of the Board of Review.** The Board of Review which exam-
ined the petitions for a reduction of sentence numbered the cases that it examined. For instance the case of Lim Kyong Bum is considered in a letter of 20 September 1946 addressed to the Military Governor of the province of South Chungchong. In this letter the case is labeled as “Board of Review No. 2101. Another case whose letter is dated from 26 October 1946 has the number 4883. As it seems unlikely that there were 2,783 cases between 20 September and 26 October this suggests that there were several Boards of Review. Anyways, whether there was one or several Boards the numbering suggests that the number of cases ran in the thousands per year. In other words, for the whole period of the occupation one would expect a number of provost court trials of the order of 10,000\(^{121}\). Such an order of magnitude is confirmed by the estimate obtained in the following section.

**Estimate of the total number of provost court trials**

Between mid-October 1946 and mid-December 1946 some 3,000 persons were tried by 5 provost courts functioning in Taegu (chronology at the date of 24 October 1946)\(^{122}\). This was however a fairly exceptional situation which resulted from the uprising of October 1946. This example suggests that if one could get data for the number of provost court trials by month and by province this would provide a fairly accurate picture of the level of disturbances.

One of the rare sets of provost court sentences for which we have statistical information is for the New Zealand Expeditionary force in Japan which was part of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force. In this case one has the following distribution.

- Terms equal to (or longer than) 3 months: 40%
- Terms equal to (or longer than) 6 months: 20%
- Terms equal to (or longer than) 1 year: 5%
- Terms equal to (or longer than) 2 years: 2%.

If one assumes that these proportions were somewhat the same in Korea\(^{123}\), the figure of 3,000 mentioned above for terms longer than 3 months (given in “Korea Independence”) leads to \(3000/0.4 = 7,500\) provost court trials between September 1945 and June 1947 that is to say for a period of 21 months. If one assumes the same rate for the rest of the period until 15 August 1948\(^{124}\), one gets a total of

\(^{121}\)By the expression “of the order of” we mean that the actual number can be somewhere between (say) 10,000 and 50,000.

\(^{122}\)At first sight this figure may seem in contradiction with the figure of 3,000 mentioned earlier between September 1945 and June 1947. However, one should observe that this last figure is for sentences of 3 months and more.

\(^{123}\)For the 32 cases tried in Chunsong Gun in the week 17-22 June 1946, the percentage of sentences equal to or longer than 3 months was 50%, which is consistent with the 40% given by the New Zealand data. In a more general way, one would expect a larger proportion of long sentences in Korea because the frequency of serious disturbances was higher.

\(^{124}\)In fact we do not know if there were no trials by military tribunals after the nominal transmission of power to the Korean government on 15 August 1948. One piece of evidence we were able to find (RG 554 Box 50) concerns a request
Trials by military courts

7500 × (35/21) = 12,500 trials.

**Sentences**

What was the percentage of trials which led to confinement of the defendant. This question cannot be answered solely on the basis of the sentences. Indeed, even when a sentence consisted only in a fine, if the prisoner was unable (or unwilling) to pay the fine he (or she) would be confined for a duration proportional to the amount to be paid. This is said very clearly in a letter of 15 October 1946: “The Manual of Provost Courts provides that prisoners who cannot pay the fine should serve one month for each 1,250 yen remaining unpaid.”

On 14 January 1946 a letter entitled “Proceedings of Provost Courts” was sent to all units to provide greater uniformity in the sentences. Appended to this letter is a table which gives maximum sentences for different kinds of crimes. An excerpt is provided in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offense</th>
<th>Confinement [year]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uttering speech, singing song, acting in a play, exhibiting banner hostile to the United States, its armed forces or the Military Government</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possession of printed matter disrespectful to the United States</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cutting wires or telecommunication cables</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possession of arms, ammunition or explosives</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault upon any member of the armed forces of the United States</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmission by telegraph of uncensored messages</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Maximum punishment by provost courts. This table was issued by Headquarters on 14 January 1946. Source: RG 554, Box 23.

**Known trials by Military Commission**

One of the first sentences by a Military Commission is mentioned in the G-2 Weekly Summary on 21 November 1946. It says that two leaders of the Taegu rebellion of October 1946 were sentenced to death.

In RG 554, Box 170 (in the CKCLH database) one finds several cases of trials by Military Commissions of Koreans who took part in the rebellions of August-November 1946 and in subsequent rebellions, e.g. 20 April 1947 in Seoul, 14 August 1947 also in Seoul (see Doc. 4). However, the records available so far provide for a military commission made on 12 July 1948. This request does not mention that there would be no trials after 15 August 1948. Nor does the answer made by Headquarters mention this date.
only fragmentary coverage: from January 1947 to July 1947 and from March 1948 to May 1948. As we do not have the remaining records we can only make an educated guess as to the incidents which may have been tried by these (yet unknown) trials. This is the purpose of the list of incidents given in Doc. 5.

7 September 1945
FROM: MILITARY GOVERNOR OF KOREA
TO: CG XXIV CORPS

PROCLAMATION 2  ANY PERSON WHO DOES ANY ACT CALCULATED TO DISTURB PUBLIC PEACE AND ORDER OR PREVENT THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, OR WILFULLY DOES ANY ACT HOSTILE TO THE ALLIED FORCES SHALL UPON CONVICTION BY MILITARY OCCUPATION COURT, SUFFER DEATH OR ANY OTHER PUNISHMENT AS THE COURT MAY DETERMINE.

UNTIL FURTHER ORDERS THE POSTING OF POSTERS AND DISTRIBUTION OF HANDBILLS CONTAINING MATERIAL PREJUDICIAL TO LAW AND ORDER ARE DEEMED ACTS IN CONTRAVENTION OF PROCLAMATION 2. THE MILITARY FORCES AND THE CIVIL POLICE ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO ARREST IMMEDIATELY AND DETAIN EVERY PERSON POSTING OR ATTEMPTING TO POST, DISTRIBUTING OR ATTEMPTING TO DISTRIBUTE ANY HANDBILLS OR POSTERS FOR DISSEMINATION AMONG THE PEOPLE.

SIGNED PRESCOTT

Document 3: Proclamation 2. This proclamation was promulgated by General MacArthur. Most of the charges brought against Korean people in trials by Military Commissions referred to violation of Proclamation 2. This proclamation is so broad and vague that it instituted a fairly arbitrary rule. The acronym “CG” at the top of the message means “Commanding General”. Source: NARA: RG 554, Box 23 (CKCLH).

Likely trials by Military Commission (records not yet found)
Altogether there are 19 trials for which we have records. As these records cover 10 months, this give a rate of about 10 trials per month. It should be noted that at each of these trials there were on average about 5 defendants. By making the assumption that the rate was the same for the periods which are not covered we get the numbers given in table 3.
HEADCUARTERS XXIV CORPS
MILITARY COMMISSION ORDERS No 2 26 FEBRUARY 1947

Before a Military Commission which convened at Chinju [50 kilometers west of Pusan] on 30 January 1947 were tried:
Kang Dea Chang, Ku Yong Sik, Kang In Jung, Ku Sun Tae, Whang Koon Bong, Hurh Jung Sik, Sohn Duk Cho, Am Chong Jai.

Charge: Violation of Proclamation No. 2 of 7 September 1945.
Specification 1: On October 7-9 unlawfully assumed control of many of the residents of the province of Kyong Song Namdo with intent to subvert lawful authority.
Specification 2: Killed Kim Ul Do, a human being, by beating him with fists, clubs, stones and other instruments.
Specification 3: Assembled riotously and disturbed the peace of the place.

SENTENCE
As to all accused except Am Chong Jai [acquitted] and Sohn Duk Cho [5 years confinement]: to be hanged by the neck until dead. The execution of the sentence is withheld pending action by the Commander in Chief, Far East Command [i.e. Gen. MacArthur].

Document 4: Trial by Military Commission (excerpts). There were many similar trials in relation with the rebellion of September-November 1946. Between January and July 1947 there were 14 trials. Unfortunately we do not have similar data for the rest of the year. The “No 2” at the top of the document refers to the year 1947.

About 80% of the accused were sentenced to death but most of these sentences were commuted to life imprisonment.

The phrasing of the judgment was very much the same in all cases. The fact that all the charges involved murder rather than any political motive is in strict accordance with the rules set by Field Manual No 31-15 of which an excerpt reads as follows (p. 24).

“Charges of crimes against persons such as murder should be made rather than charges of crimes directly affiliated with the resistance movement that may result in martyrdom and serve as a rallying point for increased irregular activity”.

Source: RG 554, Box 170 (CKCLH).

Table 3 Number of trials by Military Commission in Korea

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Length of period</th>
<th>Number of trials</th>
<th>Number of persons tried</th>
<th>Number of trials per month</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trials in documented period</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>~ 100</td>
<td>~ 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trials during whole occupation (Expected numbers)</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>~ 110</td>
<td>~ 600</td>
<td>~ 2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The expected numbers in the second line were estimated by assuming the same rate of 2 trials per month as in the known period of 10 months. Source: RG 554 Box 170 (CKCLH)
**Chapter 3**

**Oct 27, 1945: Pusan.** An investigation has been initiated for possible arson at the ASCOM 24 dump. The fire started around 16:00 next to warehouse 14 and quickly resulted in the explosion of a Japanese munition barge. Three buildings were destroyed. [The summary of the subsequent week says that the investigation indicates probable arson because the straw which was used to wrap the ammunition did not burn slowly but burst into flame as though it were saturated with an inflammable agent.]

**Feb 3, 1946: Inchon.** At 05:30 the body of an American soldier who had been on a jeep patrol of the area was found in Inchon Bay.

**Apr 8, 1946: Chinhae [40km west of Pusan].** A US sentry on duty at a warehouse was knocked unconscious by a blow on the head from behind.

**Jul 16, 1946: Seoul.** A US Army guard was stabbed and critically wounded by an armed robber at the 3040th Quartermaster. [“Critically wounded” means that it was a life-threatening wound; the report does not say whether the guard died or not.]

**Jul 23, 1946: Taegu.** At 02:10 an American sentry was killed by an unknown person. He was shot three times through the right side by a rifle.

**Aug 10, 1946: Pusan.** Around 21:00 two US sailors were attacked by a Korean who slashed one sailor on the wrist with a knife. He was taken to hospital where he received a blood transfusion.

**Nov 4, 1946: Hwason (Cholla NamDo).** A convoy of 26 Americans including 4 CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) agents who had apprehended 6 leaders of the Hwason riots were attacked by a crowd of 1,500 miners. A log was thrown through the window of one of the jeeps. It left the road and overturned. The second jeep also overturned. Both vehicles were abandoned and the occupants transferred to the remaining vehicles. At one point the convoy was stoned and fired upon. At another point the convoy was forced to run through a crowd which suffered 3 killed. Two American soldiers were injured.

**Nov 3, 1947: Inchon.** A Korean, Cho Sung Ho, killed Private First Class Charles H. Pierce by shooting him with a shotgun.

**April 7, 1948: Pusan-Tong Highway.** A Korean policeman, Zai In, killed Private First Class Joseph W. Comeau by shooting him with his carbin.

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**Fig. 5:** **Incidents whose perpetrators were probably tried by Military Commissions.** These incidents are so serious (at least 4 US soldiers were killed) that it is highly unlikely that they were left unpunished. Yet, none of the accounts of trials before a Military Commission that we have been able to read so far makes reference to offenses against US troops. Source: USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary (Reference 5 in the references of the publications of Hallym University), RG 554 Box 16 and Box 170 (CKCLH).

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**Conclusion and perspectives**

Our wish is that this study brings about other researches in this direction. We have shown that although not all required information may yet be available it is at least possible to throw some light on this important question.

The main questions which remain unsolved are the following.

i Detailed number of provost court trials by month and by province.

ii Detailed description of the charges related to offenses against US forces.

In order to encourage further research we have listed several Korean data bases which provide copies of NARA documents. Once all these resources will be available online and searchable by keyword the investigation of these issues will become much...
easier than it is today. But in order to shed new light on these issues one needs the archive documents described in this chapter but not yet available.
Chapter 4
Censorship

In the New York Times of 25 July 1943 that is to say during the occupation of Italy which started on 9 July 1943 one can read the following statement.

“AMGOT [Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories] will be regarded as a kind of Santa Claus [i.e. Saint Nicholas] in uniform, very severe but at the same time strictly fair and singularly generous”.

In the same issue there is the following observation.

So far no violation of any kind have come to our attention and it is unnecessary to invoke any punishment because these people are cooperating whole-heartily”.

Is it really true that “no violation of any kind” occurred during the first two weeks of the occupation of Italy? This question would require a further investigation. In South Korea, of course, no such claim can be made.

The previous statements are interesting because they define fairly well what can be called the myth of a benevolent occupation. This was the image that the US State Department wanted to give and one must recognize that it succeeded very well in doing so. It was a remarkable achievement in showing how to rewrite history in a way that will be well accepted by the public.

In the following sections we describe some of the means that were used.

Writing history: the policy of the War Department

The term “censorship” is too narrow to describe the real long term purpose of military organizations. In time of war the immediate goal of censorship is to prevent the diffusion of news which would be prejudicial to the moral of the troops or of the population. Of course, whether in time of war or during occupation episodes, censorship sections maintain a close connection with G-2 intelligence sections in order to identify spies or opponents.

The creation of Historical Branches of G-2

In the present chapter we are more interested in the long-term impact of censorship with regard to the writing of history. Censorship is certainly of prime importance in this respect for if the information is withheld at the source it cannot found its way
into the narrative of historians. However, when it comes to writing history a more effective way for the military to ensure that history is written in accordance with their views is to write their own history. As early as 1943 the War Department in Washington was fully aware of this objective.

On 3 August 1943 a memorandum of the War Department officially announced to major commands in the United States and overseas the establishment of the Historical Branch, G-2, and defined its organization, functions, and objectives. This memorandum substantiated the instructions contained in the directive AR 345-105 of 18 November 1929. This directive is mentioned in all letters submitting historical material to the Historical Branch in Washington.

The responsibilities of the Branch were specified as the preparation of operational monographs, campaign histories, general popular histories, official histories, and documentary works. In other words, its objective was to serve a broad range of readers, from the general public to historians and to the armed forces themselves. Headed by a Chief Historian, the Branch was also charged with editing and approving all historical manuscripts prepared for publication by all War Department agencies.

Just as an illustration of one of the results of this work one can mention that for World War II the “American Forces in Action” series which was destined for the general public reached a total of 14 books, with an aggregate sale of nearly 200,000 by 1956. In addition, thousands of copies were distributed gratis.

In May 1945 the Washington office of the Historical Branch was headed by Lieutenant Colonel J.M. Kemper and comprised several sections such as: Research and Writing, Records Analysis, Cartographic Section, Chronology Section.

Needless to say, the office in Washington would have been useless without the historical sections that were established in all units (roughly speaking above the regiment level). It was the duty of these sections to write historical narratives and to send them to Washington. The letter of transmittal is usually written in the following form.

In fact, the AR 345-105 regulation mentioned in the previous letter dated back to 18 November 1929 but it was modified several times in subsequent decades, in particular on 10 August 1944.

Through this regulation every unit became a supplier of historical narratives. Naturally, it would be naive to think that this was a purely “objective” history. The very idea that there can be an objective history is not straightforward, but in addition both the writers at unit level and the editors in Washington had their own specific agendas. As was already noted, there are many glaring omissions in the the official history of

\[125\text{Most of the information given below comes from the following website: http://warchronicle.com/us/officials/wwii/wwiihistoricalprogram.htm}\]
the occupation of South Korea.
The real challenge was to write these historical accounts in a way which was sufficiently accurate and detailed to make them credible.

The official history of the occupation of Iraq
In many respects the occupation of Iraq was conducted along the same rules as post-World War II occupations. Therefore one is not surprised to discover that an official history of the occupation will be written by Army historians. As of November 2011 the officer in charge of this project was US Army Lieutenant Colonel Jerry Brooks. As a matter of fact, partial histories concerning specific facets of the occupation have already been written but not published because they are not yet declassified.
It can be noted that the dispatch of Agence France Presse which gives this information (cited in “China Daily” of 19 November 2011) does not in any way address the question of how reliable such a history will be.

South Korea
In the “Basic Initial Directive” sent by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) to the Commander in Chief in Korea on 13 October 1945, one reads:
You will establish such minimum control and censorship of civilian communications including the mails, wireless, radio, telephone, telegraph and cables, films and press as may be necessary [for] the accomplishment of the purposes set forth in this directive.
(for more details about this directive see the chronology entry at the date of 13 October 1945).
An article of November 1946 published in the American magazine “Amerasia” makes two observations which are of significance with respect to the publication of news about Korea.

- The publishing and circulation of news which are detrimental to the occupying forces was prohibited by Ordinance 72 which defines the crimes against the Military Government. This regulation basically prevents Koreans from publishing any information which would not fit with the objectives of the Military Government.

- American journalists and other foreign correspondents must operate under army control. This prevents non-Koreans to give any information which would not be in line with the policy of the Military Government. In his “Japan diary” (80 pages of which are devoted to his visit to Korea) the American journalist Mark Gayn explains in detail how little help he received from the military. “I discovered with some surprise that orders had been sent down the chain of command to give me no information.” (p. 351)

- Of course, it would be a misconception to think that all American journalists would have reported in a “objective” way if they had not been prevented from doing so by the occupation authorities. Some of them, like Mark Gayn, tried to be honest, but others quickly understood that, instead of antagonizing US forces it would earn them more gratification to side with them.

As an illustration one can mention that on 27 January 1946, the representatives of nine Korean newspapers issued a joint statement declaring New York Times correspondent Richard J.H. Johnson persona non grata in Korea because of his journalistic dishonesty (Korean Independence 20 February 1946). The specific incident which aroused the furor of the Koreans was that Johnson had attributed to Pak Heun Young, the secretary of the Communist Party of South Korea, a declaration according to which he accepted the trusteeship.

The American left-wing newspaper “Daily Worker” published an article by a soldier named Zepelin who had been serving in Korea. He wrote that members of US intelligence are intensively questioning and searching American soldiers before their departure from Korea in order to prevent transmission of facts to the Americans. (NDL, John Melby Papers, MELBY 3940)

[This statement is confirmed by the account given by Robinson that we mentioned in the first chapter]

A reasonable proxy for the level of censorship existing in Korea can be obtained by examining the articles on some critical issues which were (or were not) published in the New York Times.

For the occupation in Japan there were several articles about provost courts. Readers can learn how and when they were created, they are able to know the number
of trials which took place in the first year and also how these tribunals were working. Of course, the offenses which are mentioned are not those directed against US servicemen but rather those about black market, robberies and so on.

In contrast, in the articles about the occupation of Korea the term “provost court” never appears. Moreover, no mention is made of the trials before military commissions that we described above.

When disturbances occurred and were suppressed by the authorities the New York Times accounts usually mention only the role of the Korean police (and Constabulary). In the few cases in which US troops are said to help the Korean police no real clashes are described. One is left to believe that crowds were dispersed by American troops without any casualty on either side; that trucks carrying insurgents were stopped by US forces without any problem; that insurgents accepted to be taken in custody without offering any resistance (see the chronology chapter for such examples).

As another illustration one can mention that a serious incident (rape of Korean women in a train see the chronology chapter at the date of 12 February 1947) was not mentioned

In summary, it seems that the level of censorship during the occupation of Korea was higher than in Japan. Yet, it was probably lower than in Hawaii during the war. In Hawaii, however, some facts became known after the war. On the contrary, the occupation of Korea was followed by the Korean war and after peace was re-established in 1953, Korea was ruled by successive military dictatorships closely connected with the US government. Needless to say, they did not wish to throw any light on the events of the occupation period.

**A standard technique: removing the journalists**

This technique can be illustrated by two cases that we take from Cumings (1981, p. 302, 337).

- When the Americans arrived in Kwanju in October 1945 they found that the Kwanju People’s Committee was publishing a newspaper called “South Cholla News” (Chollam sinbo). They first shut it down, then reopened it under censorship after “responsible” journalists could be hired.
- On 1 November 1946 the workers’ committee managing the *Taejon ilbo* changed the newspaper’s name to the *Inmin ilbo* (People’s daily). The next day, Lieutenant Colonel William Karp, the American occupation commander of South Chungchong suspended it. It reopened on 13 November 1946 after the shareholders recommended “suitable” journalists to staff it.

A similar method was used for the *Maeil sinbo* in Seoul and also for the “Korea
Censorship

Independence” newspaper in the United States.

Drift to totalitarianism after the Yosu-Sunchon rebellion

In December 1945 the Military Government took over all property formerly held by the Japanese. This gave him almost absolute power in the economic sphere. Thus, the military, political and economic powers were concentrated in the same institution. The French philosopher Montesquieu (1689-1755) warned that such a concentration and imbalance of government power usually opens the door to dictatorships. In mid-1948 power was (at least nominally) transferred from the MG to the Korean government. Yet, if one judges from the succession of military dictatorships that followed in subsequent decades one must recognize that Montesquieu’s judgment was in this case largely confirmed.

In late 1948 began a drift toward totalitarianism in the name of anti-Communism which closely paralleled what had happened in Germany after 1933. There were two main steps: the promulgation of the “National Security Act” on 1 December 1948 and the creation of the Bodo League on 20 April 1949.

The National Security Act

In Germany fear of Communist agitation was used as justification for the “Reichstag Fire Decree” (28 February 1933) and the “Enabling Act” of March 1933. Together they gave gave Hitler his dictatorial powers. At the Nuremberg Trials Hermann Göring testified that the Nazis’ willingness to repress German Communists prompted President Hindenburg and the German business elite to cooperate with the Nazis (Wikipedia article entitled “Anti-communist mass killings” downloaded on 16 February 2011.). As Interior Minister of Prussia, Göring ordered the arrest of several thousands Communists in the days after the Reichstag fire.

The “Enabling Act” gave legislative powers to the government and reduced the Reichstag to a mere stage for Hitler’s speeches. It only met sporadically until the end of World War II.

The “Korean National Security Act” paralleled the “Fire Decree” in the sense that it severely restricted freedom. For more details about this law see the chronology at the date of 1 December 1948.

126 The Fire Decree begins by stating: “The following is ordered in defense against Communist state-endangering acts of violence.” Article 1 of the Decree suspended most of the civil liberties set forth in the Weimar Constitution, including freedom of expression, freedom of the press, the right of free association and public assembly, the secrecy of the post and telephone (the source is Wikipedia’s article entitled “Reichstag Fire Decree” downloaded on 16 February 2011).

127 As shown by the following sentences from Chancellor Hitler’s speech at the Reichstag on 23 March 1933, the passage of the Act capitalized on pro-Christian feelings: “[The government] will be concerned for the sincere cooperation between Church and State. The struggle against the materialistic ideology serves as much the interests of the German nation as of our Christian faith”.

The imprisonment of Communists and Socialists

The first concentration camp was built at Dachau, in March 1933, to imprison German communists, socialists, trade unionists and others opposed to the Nazis. Communists, social democrats and other political prisoners were forced to wear a red triangle.

Whenever the Nazis occupied a new territory, members of Communist, Socialist or anarchist groups were normally to be the first persons detained or executed. Evidence of this is found in Hitler’s infamous “Commissar Order”, in which he ordered the summary execution of all political commissars captured among Soviet soldiers, as well as the execution of all Communist Party members in German held territory.\textsuperscript{128}

The main rationale for the constitution of the Bodo League was also to eliminate Communists, Socialists and in a general way all leftists. As in Germany, this policy eventually led to mass-killings.

Mass-killings came only later on under circumstances of war (whether guerrilla warfare as in Cheju or open war as in the Korean War) but in late 1948 and early 1949 the drift toward totalitarianism involved successive steps which had been typical of pre-war fascist regimes, namely censorship of the press and suppression of all organizations that the government did not control.

**Strengthened censorship**

After the Yosu-Sunchon Rebellion which took place in the fall of 1948 President Rhee privately ordered the censorship of any editorials opposing the American military presence in Korea (Seo 1996 p.88). Moreover, in February 1949, the Minister of Information gave the following instructions to the press (Seo 1996 p.89).

1. The name “People’s Republic of North Korea” shall be referred to as the “North Korean Puppet Regime”.
2. When referring to Kim Il Sung, official titles such as “Premier” or other honorable terms shall not be used.
3. Editorials or articles that slander the US military presence in Korea shall not be published.
4. The term “internal strife” which puts insurgents and police forces on same level shall be no longer permitted.
5. Reports that express sympathy with rebels or with the North Korean army shall be prohibited.

\textsuperscript{128}The “Kommissarbefehl” was a written order given by Adolf Hitler on 6 June 1941, prior to “Operation Barbarossa“. Its official name was “OKW-Guidelines for the Treatment of Political Commissars”. It demanded that any Soviet political commissar identified among captured troops be shot immediately. According to the order, all those prisoners who could be identified “as active representatives of the Bolshevik ideology” should also be killed. The order was canceled on 6 May 1942.
6 Reports on insufficient supplies of rice shall not be published.

Later on in 1949, on 4 August, 29 newsmen were arrested and accused of gathering information for the Reds (New York Times 4 August 1949 p.11).

**Suppression of all non-governmental organizations**

One clear characteristic of totalitarian regime is the fact that all organizations which are not controlled by the state are made illegal and that all citizens are compelled to take part in the official organizations. This process was similar to what happened in Nazi Germany. Although the “Hitlerjugend” (Hitler Youth) had been in existence since 1922 it is only on December 1936 that membership became mandatory for all Germans (more precisely for all Aryan Germans). The Nazis also created a National Socialist German Students’ League which was founded in 1926. In the same process all other youth movements (such as the boy scouts) were forbidden. In Korea there were the following steps.

- In January 1949 there was the creation of the “Korean Youth Corps” with a claimed membership of 8 millions.
- On 22 April 1949 there was the creation of the “Student Defense Forces” which organized the activities of middle school, high school and university students nationwide. On 27 September 1949 all other student organizations were made illegal.
- At about the same time there was the creation of the “Korean Labor Federation”, “Korean Women Association”, “Korean Peasant’s Federation”, “Citizen Protection Corps”. President Rhee was the nominal chief of all these organizations.

**Self-censorship in South Korea**

According to the “National Security Law” which was introduced in December 1948 and has not been changed substantially until now (i.e. March 2011) it is prohibited to introduce North Korean documents into South Korea. As a result, South Korean university libraries do not hold any archive material from North Korea. An obvious consequence is that the North Korean version of the events which occurred in South Korea is not accessible. For a historian it is a good methodological rule to have a look at different versions, not just at one. In the present case it is difficult to follow this rule.

More details about how the “National Security Law” has been implemented in the course of time can be found in the chronology chapter at the date of 1 December 1948. Two conclusions emerge which are of special importance.

- The episode of a Korean woman who, in November 2010, was given a jail sentence for possessing *instrumental* music with composition titles that praised North Korea suggests that this law was still strictly enforced in 2010.
• Different episodes show that this law can also be used against persons who demand an end of US military presence in South Korea. One of these episodes was the trial and conviction of members of the National Assembly in November 1949 for the reason that they had asked for the departure of US advisers. Another episode occurred in June 1982 when several persons were tried and sentenced under the “National Security Law” for having set fire to the US Cultural Center in Pusan. It is worthwhile to note that these persons had no connection with North Korea (in fact they were Christians). These cases suggest that attempting to get a more realistic view of historical events can possibly come under the scrutiny of the National Security Law on the pretext that it may negatively impact the US-South Korean partnership.

• On 4 September 2013 lawmaker Lee, Seok-Ki one of the 6 Parliament members of the “United Progressive Party” was arrested by the “National Intelligence Service” and charged with sedition and praising North Korea in violation of the “National Security Law”. His apartment had been searched on 28 August 2013. Mr. Lee has denied the allegation and said that the NIS fabricated the charges to divert criticism regarding the fact that its agents posted online messages supporting the election of Ms. Park and smearing her main rival. Mr. Lee had already been arrested in 2002 and sentenced to 2.5 years in prison for working with an underground political party. (Wall Street Journal 4 September 2013)

It can be noted that an “Associated Press” dispatch of 28 September 2013 published in the “Japan Times” about the same event does not mention the “National Security Act”.

On 17 February 2014, left-wing lawmaker Lee, Seok-Ki was sentenced to 12 years in prison. It was the first such conviction of a legislator since South Korea transitioned to democracy in the late 1980s. Lee’s six fellow defendants were sentenced to between 4 and 7 years in prison. (Los Angeles Times 17 February 2014, Korea Herald 17 February 2014)

Censorship in archive records

In the chapter about trials by military tribunals we mentioned that so far we were not able to find the two kinds of documents which would provide a real insight into trials by provost courts and Military Commissions. The records of trials would represent a large volume of records and unless they have been destroyed or withdrawn from the archives they should be fairly easy to find.

129 It is of course not necessary to withdraw the documents from the archives; if they are not correctly indexed either in
The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file
Designation: 000.5   Feb 1946   Binder No 2.
8 July 1982

The item has been removed because it contains restricted information.

**Document 1:** Record which has been removed in 1982. Several such mentions are to be found in the same file. Apparently this record was about the Chonju incident of 18 December 1946. One may wonder why it has been removed 36 years after the events. *Source: RG 554 Box 15 (CKCLH)*

Sometimes there is an explicit mention of the fact that a file has been withdrawn. Here is an example.

In RG 554 Box 15 there is a report on the Chonju incident of 18 December 1946. In this file there are several pages which read as shown in Doc. 1.

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a paper catalog or in an electronic catalog nobody will be able to find them.

On ARC (the electronic catalog at NARA) it is not possible to search “records of trials” because the word “of” is a so-called “stop word” of the search engine. A search with the words: record + trial + (USAFIK or USAMGIK or Korea) leads nowhere.
Chapter 5
Economics and black market

According to an Economic Report on South Korea written for the State Department in August 1947, the foreign trade per capita in Korea was in 1939 about the same as in Japan. Unfortunately after 1945 there was an economic collapse. In 1946 the estimated electric power consumption in South Korea was 672 million kWh, down from 1,800 in 1940. In 1949 the consumption was about 1,000 million kWh, still far below the level of 1940\textsuperscript{130}. The main reason of this economic collapse was the interruption of trade with neighboring countries, Japan, North Korea and Manchuria. A US report of September 1949 observes that “child beggary is rampant in Seoul and other cities” (same source as above).

Economic and labor aspects

A report written by Stewart Meacham (1947) for the Secretary of Labor gives a number of interesting data.

Economic situation in 1944

It starts by observing that contrary to the notion widely prevalent among Americans that the bulk of Korean industry is in North Korea, in 1944 244,700 (58%) of the 420,000 employees in manufacturing were in South Korea. It is only for the production of coal, iron ore and electricity that North Korea had a big advantage. Meacham observes that according to the Japanese census of 1944 about 20% of the population were dependent upon wages earned in mining, manufacturing, commerce and transportation. In other words, Korea was not the purely agricultural economy that is sometimes described.

In 1943 (for South and North Korea together) of the 13,300 engineers and technicians only 24% were Koreans. While many Japanese technicians were kept in key-spots in North Korea, in the American zone they were all repatriated. This brought about a drastic reduction in the industrial technician and engineer force. Together with the end of trade with Japan and North Korea this was a sure recipe for a economic

\textsuperscript{130}Source: STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 7
decline. Between 1944 and November 1946 there was a decline of about 60% in the number of persons employed in industry in South Korea.

The Military Government froze wages in vested plants (i.e. plants under US administration, see below) in the summer of 1946. There has been no relaxation of this freeze until February 1947. In the same period the price of cereals (rice, wheat, soy beans) rose by 60%.

Moreover, working less than 20 hour a month became an offence for which people were arrested and tried by provost courts (NARA 37). This regulation shows that employers had a close connection with the Military Government. Exactly the same law had existed in Hawaii during the war (see Roehner: Relations between US military forces and the population of Hawaii).

**Trade unions**

After August 1945 a trade union emerged which was called called “Chung Pyong” (All Korea Council of Labor Unions). On 5 November 1945 Chung Pyong held a convention in Seoul which was attended by representatives from factories throughout South Korea. Chung Pyong remained the only labor organization in South Korea until around mid-1946.

In the middle of 1946 a new organization got under way, namely the “Great Korean Independent Labor League also called “No Chung”. Its funds were supplied by factory managers and business groups whose primary concern was to block rather than foster the formation of real labor unions.

No Chung shares its offices with the National Youth Movement of Li Bum Suk, a paramilitary organization that is is described in the chronology. When Meacham visited the Kaisang offices of No Chung he saw a large poster-picture of Li Bum Suk and uniformed members of the Youth movement.

Around that time, Military Government forces and police began to arrest Chung Pyong labor leaders. There were also gangs of strong-arm men who chased them with the complicity of police. Meacham (1947) cites many cases of that kind.

- May 1946 at the Yong Dong Po Textile Mill
- August 1946 at the Tang Yank Textile Mill
- September 1946 at the Yong San Foundry in Ong Dong Po.
- December 1946 at the Oriental Fibre Industrial Company

What was the attitude of MG? We have already emphasized that, with the exception of some Americans such as Meachan, MG took an active part in the union busting operations. This became particularly clear during the big railroad strike of the end of September 1946. The American director of the Department of Transportation described this episode in the following terms (Meachan 1947):
“We went into that situation just like we would go into battle. We didn’t have time to worry if a few innocent people got hurt. We set up concentration camps outside of town and held strikers there when the jails got too full. It was war and that is the way we fought it.” These are merely words. Needless to say, one would wish to know more precisely what were the facts behind such words.

The idea behind putting so many strikers into concentration camps is clearly explained by Meacham. The police had a comprehensive organizational chart of the Chung Pyong with the names of all leaders and committee men. After being arrested, about 95% of these men were tried in provost courts, found guilty of something (attending an illegal meeting, threatening the police or something else, it did not really matter) and jailed for several months. Only those union leaders who had gone underground were able to remain free. As a result, Chung Pyong was almost broken, but what remained of its members became more radical and more influenced by the Communists.

**Prohibition of trade**

**Between South Korea and Japan**

In 1939 Japan had absorbed 97% of Korea’s exports and in 1944 the percentage was 99%. After August 1945, by order of SCAP and MG in Korea, exports to Japan were reduced to almost nothing (Henderson 1968 p. 138).

In February 1947, eighteen months after the beginning of the occupation, trade of South Korea with the outside world was still prohibited by the Military Government. What was the rationale of such a policy? This is the question which was asked in Washington by a member of the US House of Representatives, Walter Riehlman, on 27 February 1947 (see the chronology at this date).

It is indeed a puzzling question. One knows that the same policy was followed in Japan. Japan, however, was a defeated country and in this case the policy could be understood as a kind of punishment. It seems that in Korea the main result of such a policy was to hamper economic development.

It seems fairly clear that this policy was an important factor in the shortage of goods which led to price inflation, to the development of a black market economy and ultimately to social unrest.

In his statement, Riehlman mentioned the fact that General Hodge visited Washin-
ton a few days ago. Apparently, nobody tried to ask him this question or perhaps, if the question was indeed raised, did he not give a satisfactory answer. Such issues were not resolved at the level of the MG in Korea but rather at the level of the State Department in Washington.

**Between North and South Korea**

After August 1945 there was almost no trade between North and South Korea except for electricity exports from the North to the South. These exports were interrupted by North Korea in mid-1948 because the payments made by the MG became more and more irregular. This severed one of the last links between North and South Korea.

According to a report given by Radio Pyongyang (see the HOOVER reference) the United States had set up a plan for developing electricity production in the South. This plan followed the recommendations of a group of experts lead by Under-Secretary of the Army, William Henry Draper who visited South Korea in late 1947 or early 1948. This plan was based on imported power generating ships and on 5 new plants to be imported from the United States under the advice of a US mission of 7 electrical engineers who remained permanently in South Korea. In October the minimum electric power requirement of South Korea was estimated to be around 160 MW whereas the production was only 50 MW.

**Fall in production and inflation**

As a result of the trade restrictions, there was a sharp fall in industrial production. By September 1947 industrial employment had fallen by 60% with respect to 1944 (Henderson 1968 p. 138). More detailed data are given in the table below and illustrated in the corresponding graph.

The decline was particularly strong for textile which can be explained by the fact that considerable quantities of cotton yarn were imported from Japan and woven into cloth in South Korea. Once these imports were stopped, textile production in South Korea came almost to a standstill. We do not know why the production of machinery fell even more. Perhaps was most of this production destined to Japan.

At the same time there was a big increase in money supply. On 6 August 1945, about 4 billion Bank of Chosen yen notes had been outstanding in Korea (both North and South). By the end of 1948 the government overdraft stood at 38 billion yen\(^{132}\). The conjunction of a fall in production and of a huge increase in money supply naturally led to high inflation. Retail prices rose 10 times between August 1945 and December 1946 (Henderson 1968 p. 138)

\(^{132}\)Because the Korean government was established only in August 1948, most of this overdraft should be attributed to the MG.
Table 5.1: Agricultural and industrial productions in South Korea: 1940–1950

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1940</th>
<th>1946</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1950</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Brown rice (1,000 tons)</td>
<td>2,348</td>
<td>1,958</td>
<td>1,837</td>
<td>2,030</td>
<td>2,280</td>
<td>2,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flour (1,000 tons)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All textiles (yards per capita)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Silk cloth (million yards)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal production (1,000 tons)</td>
<td>1,086</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron (1,000 tons)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel (1,000 tons)</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity consumption (million kWh)</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>990</td>
<td>1,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery (no unit indicated)</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The great interest of these data is the fact that they give post-war South Korean productions compared with pre-war levels derived from Japanese data. In spite of the fact that South Korea suffered few destructions during the war, all industrial productions experienced a sharp fall after 1945. This fall can be explained by the fact that economic exchanges with Japan were stopped by US occupation authorities in Japan and were greatly reduced with North Korea.

Source: NARA, Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, Administrative Service Division, Foreign occupied areas reports; available on microfiches at the National Diet Library, Tokyo, call number FOA 5040.

Fig. 5.1 Production collapse in South Korea in 1946. In 1949 and 1950 industrial productions were still some 20% to 30% below their levels of 1940. In 1947, 55% of the Korean workers were unemployed (see the chronology at the date of July 1947). The source does not give the data for the years 1941-1945. The thin lines are schematic indications based on the belief that during the war most productions (except possibly textiles) increased rather than decreased because Japan more and more had to rely on Korea for non-military production.

It can be noted that standard statistical handbooks of international economic data (such as the volumes published by B.R. Mitchell) do not give pre-1945 data separately for North and South Korea. Sources: Accompanying table.
Economics and black market

Property issues

Through ordinance No 52 of 21 February 1946 the MG took in its hands all the property previously owned by Japan that is to say almost all South Korean industrial facilities and a large part of the land. The company which received all these assets was called (quite aptly) the “New Korea Company”. As shown by the text of the ordinance (see the chronology at the date of 21 February 1946) this company was completely controlled by the Military Government.

The following summary is excerpted from McCune (2007 chapter 6).

- In early December 1945 Ordinance No 33 vested title to all property owned by Japanese on 8 August 1945 in the US Military Government. The Office of the Property Custodian was entrusted with the administration of this property. The MG appointed managers (often former employees of the firm) to act on behalf of the agencies of the MG and responsible to them. Any profits earned by the firms were to be banked to the credit of the Property Custodian. By possessing and controlling the vested property, USAMGIK dominated the Korean civil society.

- In March 1947, the MG tried to sell those parts of the vested property for which customers could be found. Very few customers turned up however. Similar sales were attempted in August-September 1947, also with little success. The sale of former Japanese agricultural land was finally commenced in January 1948, that is to say a few months before the South Korean government was established. McCune does not say how the proceedings of these sales were distributed between the American and the Korean sides.

The currency issue and inflation

This problem occurred in all countries that were occupied by US troops. Here is an excerpt of an American document which illustrates it for the case of France (Letter of 12 May 1944 in Coles and Weinberg 1986 p. 746).

The American Government is fully aware of the extremely precarious state of the French economy at this time. Four years of occupation have stripped the country of most of the consumer goods. On the other hand, the pay of American troops is out of proportion with the standard wages in the country\(^\text{133}\). The daily allowance of an American private converted into francs at the present rate of exchange is higher than the daily salary of a French skilled worker; but whereas the worker has to live on this salary, the American soldier gets free lodging, food and clothing from the army and will therefore have at its disposal in France a very high purchasing power on a market where there are few goods to buy. The

\(^{133}\)In the case of France, the troops were paid with a kind of counterfeited French currency that was printed in the United States. The provisional French government of General de Gaulle raised serious objections against this currency. It was nevertheless used until the end of October 1944 when the provisional government was eventually recognized by the Allies.
Fig. 5.2 Prices versus note issue. The budgetary deficit have been met by the simple expedient of issuing paper currency. No bonds have been issued. In addition, as in all countries occupied by US troops special occupation money was introduced (not included in this graph). As a result, prices were multiplied by 20. Price rises have been particularly sharp in hoardable goods. The spikes correspond to the purchases of the rice recolt. It can be seen that such spikes brought about temporary accelerations of the inflation. Sources: STATE DEPT 1945-1949 reel 8.

consequence will inevitably be a rise in prices and [if prices are regulated by decree] an increase of black market operations.

Between September 1945 and July 1946 the military Japanese yen banknotes printed in the United States (marked with a big “A”) which were heavily introduced in Japan were also legal tender in South Korea\textsuperscript{134}. This provided the occupation force with a cheap purchasing power but at the cost of creating a strong inflation pressure because this purchasing power was not matched by a supply of commodities (either produced in Korea or imported) of the same magnitude. The nullification of these banknotes in Korea (but not in Japan) became effective on 10 July 1946 (see the chronology).

It can be noted that the same policy was used by the United States in almost all countries occupied by its troops whether in Europe or Asia. In Europe the only

\textsuperscript{134}According to the CIC, a Russian military currency was introduced in the Russian zone. The exchange rate was 150 Russian Military currency for 100 yen of the Bank of Chosun.
exceptions may have been Iceland and Britain.

Incidentally, it can be observed that the same policy was followed by Japan during World War II. Following the invasion of the Philippines the Japanese forces introduced pesos banknotes printed in Japan. This was called Japanese Invasion Money or JIM. After the war in an act passed in February 1946 the Philippine Congress decided to recognize the debt and other contracts made in JIM currency. However, before independence (which came on 4 July 1946) the acts of the Philippine Congress in financial matters were subject to approval by the President of the United States. In a statement dated February 7, 1946, President Truman rejected the act of the Philippine Congress that validated payments made in JIM.

It seems that international law recognizes the right of an occupying force to determine what medium will serve as legal tender in the area under occupation.

**Who paid for US grain imports?**

Richard Robinson (1947 p. 283) observes that “the harvest of 1946 was 18% below the five-year average of 1940-1944. This decrease made necessary large imports of cereals from the United States during the latter part of 1946. The American taxpayer paid the bill”.

Did the cost really fall on the American taxpayer? What makes us doubtful is the fact that the same claim was made for imports of grains into Japan but in this case we know that the claim is not true. In fact, the Japanese had to pay for it as they had to pay for the cost of the occupation itself (see in this respect “Relations between Allied Forces and the population of Japan” by the same author).

For South Korea, it is certainly very difficult to say who really paid. As we have seen above, all the land and industrial facilities formerly in Japanese hands were taken over by the occupation force. The return on that capital represented probably of the order of (at least) 50% of the Domestic Product of South Korea. If one assumes that grain imports represented 18% of the total harvest (i.e. the deficit reported by Robinson), this may have represented of the order of 10% of the total agricultural output and, may be, around 7% of the Domestic Product. In other words, to know who really paid for the grain imports would require a close examination of national income data of Korea.

For instance, the rent on former Japanese land had to be paid directly to the Military Government. Robinson says that the maximum rate was set at 33% of the crop. It is clear that changing rent rates just by a small percentage would substantially increase the income received by the Military Government.

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135 Robinson writes that the land taken over by the Military Government represented 2,800 square kilometer or 12.5% of the cultivated area; he adds that these 12.5% included the best rice paddy land.
In 1946 and 1947 statistics about national product and national income were collected and published solely by the Military Government; therefore it is almost impossible to carry out a reliable probe. Incidentally and for the same reason, it is also almost impossible to say who covered the cost of the occupation itself. Was it the American taxpayer or the people of the occupied country?

**Looting of Korean art treasures**

Historically, military occupation and looting went hand in hand. In older times when armies were composed of mercenaries it was clearly understood that the booty to be seized after a city had been taken would be considered a normal reward for the soldiers. This tradition is still alive in modern armies. French revolutionary and Napoleonic armies brought back to France art treasures from Egypt and Italy. Japanese and German armies collected art booty in the countries they invaded. Likewise, soldiers and officers of American forces brought back to the United States souvenirs and art treasures from Germany, Austria, Japan, Korea or Iraq.

More details about the case of Japan can be found in “Relation between Allied forces and the population of Japan” by the present author.

Richard Robinson devotes only a few lines to this question but they clearly indicate that the looting which took place was on a fairly large scale. Here is the excerpt which refers to this point.

South Korea was for the first year or so prohibited from carrying on any commerce with foreign countries. Why? No one at the Department of Commerce seemed to know. The largest shipment of Korean goods during the first year appears to have been one to the United States consisting of over 4,000 cases of art treasures looted by an American Army colonel from museums, shrines, temples and private homes. He was a provincial governor at the time. The Army CID [Criminal Investigation Division] finally caught up with him and he was promptly relieved of duty and sent home on “sick leave”. The Command decided not to prosecute because of the bad publicity which would ensue.

Robinson does not say if and when the looted art treasures were shipped back to Korea\(^{136}\).

**Who paid the occupation costs?**

The occupation of South Korea was not the first US occupation of the Second World War, it was rather the last. So, one should first see what rules were set up in previous

\(^{136}\)More details about looting by US military personnel in the wake of World War II can be found in Hydrick (2004).
cases. In the official history of civil affairs (Coles and Weinberg 1989 p. 712) one finds a fairly clear statement.

Under the mutual aid arrangement which we are making with the other European Allies, they will bear the cost of civil administration and of services and supplies to our soldiers in their respective countries.

As the troops were most often paid with local currencies printed in the United States (see above the case of France), only purely military expenses had to be covered by the occupation forces themselves.

This sets the general framework. Now let us consider the case of Korea.

In our present understanding of this tricky matter, the short answer would be that the main burden fell on the Koreans.

**Normal governmental costs versus occupational costs**

What was the situation in the fall of 1945? The MG took over all the functions previously assumed by the Japanese government and this included of course tax collection and financial administration.

This led the MG to make a distinction between two types of expenses: (i) Normal governmental costs (ii) Occupational costs.

This point is detailed in several directives issued by General Hodge in early 1946 (23 January, 25 January, 10 April, 25 April). Broadly, a normal government cost was an expense made by the MG for the joint benefit of the occupation force and of the Koreans. For instance, when a road was improved which was used both by Koreans and US troops, the expense was considered as a normal government cost. However, if the road was used only by US forces (e.g. a road leading to a gasoline dump or to a warehouse of the US Army) it was considered as an occupational cost.

Similarly, interpreters employed by MG units to assist in the performance of governmental functions were considered as normal government expenses and paid from regular government budgets. On the contrary, interpreters used by tactical units were be paid from occupation allotments. (NARA, RG 554, Box 306, folder 14).

In many cases, the distinction was not easy to make. What about the expenses incident to the repatriation of the Japanese to Japan or the repatriation of Koreans from Japan back to Korea? The directive of 25 April 1946 says that these expenses will be charged against regular governmental budgets.

What about the salaries of the interpreters working for provost courts? The directive does not give a direct answer but it says that special police investigators will be paid on regular governmental budgets, so one would expect that it would be the same for police and court interpreters.
**Who paid?**

If one assumes that the two kinds of expenses have been clearly defined and distinguished, one must now examine how they were covered.

The question is fairly simple for the normal governmental costs. They were covered by the budget that is to say by taxation income.

For occupational costs, the directive says that they will be covered by “allotment of funds for occupational costs”. What does it mean in practice?

Some insight in financial mechanisms between Korea and the United States is provided by the “Initial Financial and Property Agreement with the Government of the Republic of Korea” of 8 August 1948 (see the chronology at this date\(^{137}\)). It shows that there were several financial mechanisms at work.

The mechanism which seems the most relevant to our question is described in the following sentence (Article 8).

> The Korean government relieves the US government of all liability for funds used from the overdraft account of the Bank of Chosun entitled “USAMGIK Funding Account”

This suggests that in Korea the MG used the same procedure as SCAP in Japan, namely it freely drew money from the Central Bank. Whereas on 6 August 1945 there were 4 billion yen in circulation in all Korea, by the end of 1948 the overdraft of the Bank of Chosun stood at 38 billion yen (Henderson 1968). Not surprisingly, such a supply of money which was not matched by a parallel production of goods lead to price inflation. The same phenomenon occurred in Japan, most likely for the same reason.

To get a clearer and more comprehensive picture of all the mechanisms at work would require to find and examine some real cases. Only then would one get a practical understanding of the rules delineated in the document of 8 August.

For the period after August 1948 it is known (see the chronology at the date of 22 September 1948) that the Korean Government offered to pay the salaries of Korean personnel working on American bases and to cover repair and maintenance expenses. The source does not say exactly what kinds of expenses were included under these terms.

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\(^{137}\)The document was signed officially by the two sides on 1 September 1948. Altogether the agreement has 14 articles and covers 23 pages
On 23 November 1948 an “Agreement on aid between the USA and the Republic of Korea” was signed but this aid was subject to close US control by a “US Aid Representative”. Here are some relevant excerpts (STATE DEPT 1945-1949 reel 8).

The US will furnish such assistance as the President may authorize.

**Appointment of a US Aid Representative**

The US Government will appoint an official, hereinafter referred to as the *US Aid Representative*, who will assist the Government of Korea to make the most effective use of Korea’s own resources and of the US aid.

The Korean Government will furnish all practical assistance to the US Aid Representative in order to enable him to discharge his mission and it will recognize his right to make such recommendations as necessary. The export-import program is to be agreed upon by the US Aid Representative.

**Marking the goods** The Korean government will ensure that all commodities made available [through the aid program] shall be marked in such a manner as to indicate to the people of Korea that such commodities have been furnished by the USA. **Special account**

The US Government will notify the Korean Government of the dollar cost of commodities made available. Upon notification, the Korean government will deposit in a special account in its name at the Bank of Chosen a commensurate amount in won which it will use to pay the US Aid Representative the expenses incurred in the discharge of his responsibilities. The remaining sums in the special account may be used only for such purposes as agreed between the Korean Government and the US Aid Representative.

**Korean resources**

The Korean Government will facilitate the transfer to the USA of Korean materials required by the USA upon such reasonable terms of sale as may be agreed. If required, the Korean Government will increase the production of such materials.

Often in tied aid programs the country which receives a loan or an aid must use the money to buy goods from the country which provides the loan or the aid. That was how the Marshall plan was working. However, under the previous agreement Korea had to fulfil many heavy obligations which went far beyond buying from US companies. The role of the “US Aid Representative” is so broadly defined that it leaves the door open to any kind of control by the US government. In contrast, the US Government has no obligation whatsoever in the sense that there no promises are made as to the volume and the nature of the aid.

**Black market**

After World War II black market became widespread in all countries occupied by
American troops. Why?

One main reason was the following. Articles imported in Korea (or in any other country) by US Armed Forces and sold to servicemen in the PX offices were exempt from import duties. This is said very clearly in the case of Korea (see the chronology at the date of 8 October 1946). As there was a tax duty of about 10% for goods imported otherwise, US soldiers could sell the products bought at the PX station with a return around 10%. This could be done even if there was no shortage. Naturally, if demand was higher than supply, then the products bought at the PX station could be sold at a higher price which means a higher profit. In other words, black market operations were brought about merely by market rules. Therefore one should not be surprised that in all occupied countries black market operations were carried out as a well-established activity of US troops.

It may be useful to briefly consider cases from the occupation of France. The official US Army history of civil affairs gives clear indications in this respect.

- Summer of 1944. At the foot of the Eiffel tower, American troops were selling American foodstuff, gasoline, and other things to French civilians. Such activities were growing in scope and spreading to the Arrondissements. The matter was reported to the French police but they were reluctant to interfere because the few police who did interfere were beaten up. More MPs were brought in. Black marketing of American supplies was forced underground. (Coles and Weinberg 1986 p. 744)

- October 1944. According to one source, an estimated 20% of the supplies landed at Marseilles was stolen and sold by members of armed forces and their followers; not only civil affairs supplies but also Army stocks were pilfered. At one point the theft of gasoline threatened to halt the Allied advance up the Rhône (Coles and Weinberg 1986 p. 752).

On the one hand the population experienced shortage of many goods, on the other hand the American troops were well supplied with all kinds of products. In principle GIs were not allowed to sell to the population the goods that they were able to buy in army stores. Nonetheless this was common practice either for the purpose of earning extra-money which could be sent back to the United States or for the purpose of “rewarding” girl friends.

**Organization of black market in occupied or liberated countries**

In the issue of 24 November 1945 of the weekly bulletin of the 475th Fighter Group based in Seoul (US Air Force Archive microfilm BO633) there is an account of a black market case which provides a fairly good overview.

In late October 1945 4 GIs were arrested in Tokyo and charged with organizing a huge black market. In the previous weeks the existence of such a traffic was sus-
pected when the losses of the Army Supply depot run into thousands of dollars. In a few weeks the four GIs had done nearly $1 million worth of business in tinned milk, shoes and underwear. These arrests were also documented in an article published in the New York Times on 1 November 1945 (p. 4).

Even more surprising was the revelation that the leader of the group, private Frank S. Bobst, had already been arrested and convicted of black market dealing as a civilian. He admitted to having learned the ins and outs of the supply racket in the vast GI black market operations in France. In this case he had been able to avoid prison by paying a $27,000 fine and volunteering for the Army.

The CID (Counter Intelligence Division) has also learned that similar supply rackets were set up in the Mediterranean theaters as well as in Burma, China and India. Altogether several hundred GI black marketers were convicted.

**Prostitution**

The development of prostitution followed a similar pattern. Because the economic situation was so difficult for the Koreans and because the GIs had an income which was several times higher than the average salary, girls and women “sold themselves” to soldiers. A gray zone of “recreational facilities” grew around American bases. If one forgets for a moment that prostitution is morally questionable, it must be recognized that from an economic perspective these “transactions” benefited both parties. At the very least this conception helps understand that the phenomenon had deep roots and could not be suppressed just by a formal interdiction. As a matter of fact, either in Korea or Japan, the rules which were taken to this effect were not enforced.
Fatality numbers
Symbols such as • US fatalities: 1 (7). • Korean civilians killed: 3 (14). signal incidents marked by fatalities for two categories of persons: US troops and Korean civilians. For each category the first figure indicates the fatality number in this incident while the number within () totals the fatalities since the beginning of the occupation. Thus, the present notation would mean 1 US soldier and 3 Korean civilians killed in this specific incident whereas 7 and 14 are the respective fatality numbers since the beginning of the occupation.

Whereas for Allied troops all fatalities (whether by accidents or any other cause) are taken into account, for Korean civilians we count only the fatalities which came about as a direct consequence of the occupation, e.g. people killed in traffic accidents caused by military vehicles, shot by sentries, killed in explosions brought about by US operations, and other similar causes.

Missed
Among the entries of the present chronology there will be several telling us that: “A US MP guard was fired upon. The bullets missed. No damage was reported”. “Eighteen Koreans fired on a US patrol. No damage was reported”. In other words, all these entries are about insurgents who missed their target. Such events will be signaled by the special symbol • Missed .

The rationale for counting these events can be explained as follows. Even if one assumes that each insurgent has a small probability \( p \) of hitting his target, the probability \( Q \) for \( n \) successive misses will be \( Q(n) = (1 - p)^n \). This number decreases exponentially when \( n \) increases. For instance, \( p = 0.1, n = 18 \) gives: \( Q(18) = 0.15 \) but for 30 successive misses one gets \( Q(30) = 0.04 \) which means a near-impossibility. In words, whereas nothing definite can be said about each single event taken alone, the likelihood of a succession of recurrent misses as described in G-2 reports becomes smaller and smaller as their number becomes larger.

Before August 1945
1862 Farmers in Jinju, Gyeongsang, province rose up against their oppressive provincial officials and the wealthy landowners. This uprising was the result of the exploitation of destitute farmers by the local ruler. The rebels killed local government officials and set fire to government buildings. The revolt in Jinju triggered peasant uprisings elsewhere all over Korea. Groups of farmers rose up with arms and attacked government offices in principal towns. Many government officials were executed. Eventually, such uprisings were crushed by government troops. The same year the peasants of San-nam and surrounding villages took up arms against the elite, but were brutally butchered by troops. (Wikipedia, article entitled “Donghak Peasant Revolution”)

Sep 1866 An American schooner (i.e. a fast sailing ship with two masts) called “General Sherman” with only two guns approached Pyongyang through the Taedong River. In a battle with Korean soldiers, the entire crew were killed and the ship was burned. According to one testimony, the people loaded a lot of small boats with firewood, bound them together, set them on fire and floated them down to the American ship. (Song 1989 p. 76; Deane 1999 p. 12)

Jun 1, 1871 An expedition with 5 gunboats carrying 85 guns and 1,230 men arrived to Korea in order to discover more about the fate of the “General Sherman”. A battle broke out in Inchon which lasted 11 days. Although the American expeditionary force was able to destroy 5 Korean forts, it withdrew without achieving its political objective which was to open the country to western trade. (Song 1989, p. 77)

1876 Korea was opened to foreign trade by the Japanese as a result of the Treaty of Ganghwa. (Wikipedia, article entitled “Donghak Peasant Revolution”)

May 22, 1882: A “Treaty of Peace, Amenity, Commerce and Navigation” was signed between the United States and the Kingdom of Chosun (i.e. North and South Korea). The Treaty was ratified by both countries and went into force one year later, on 19 May 1883. It was to last almost 30 years and was terminated on 29 August 1910. (Internet: Text of the 1882 US and Korea Treaty) [It is often said (e.g. in Song 1989, p. 78) that it was an unequal treaty, but this is by no means obvious on account of its 14 articles. On the contrary, it emphasizes same rights for each side. For instance, while Americans were authorized to establish themselves in Korea, Koreans were also authorized to establish themselves in the United States and were even permitted to purchase land (article 6). Article 12 says that “further commercial provisions” will be discussed subsequently. The instructions given to the American consul by the Secretary of the Navy said: “If conditions are favorable, pursue extra-territoriality and trading rights”. In other words, the fact that it was an unequal treaty resulted more from the differ-
ence in size and power of the two countries than from the rules set by the treaty. For instance, the schools established by US missionaries in Korea could easily develop in their pupils (among them Rhee Syngman) a fervent admiration for the United States whereas the opposite was almost impossible.]

**Dec 1892:** Groups of the Donghak movement armed themselves and formed a “Donghak Peasant Army”. They raided government offices and killed rich landlords, traders and foreigners, particularly in Cholla province. After confiscating their victims’ properties they distributed them to the poor. (Wikipedia, article entitled “Donghak Peasant Revolution”)

**Mar 13, 1894:** The Donghak army was defeated by Japanese troops which ended the rebellion. After having been an autonomous tributary state of China’s Qing dynasty, Korea *de facto* became a Japanese protectorate. (Wikipedia, article entitled “Donghak Peasant Revolution”)

**Nov 1895:** Horace Allen had become the King’s doctor and US advisers were influential in the post office department and in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It seems that in November 1895 they tried to organize a pro-American government which would have led the king to abdicate. However, the attempt was unsuccessful. (Song 1989 p. 80)

**Jul 27, 1905:** The US Secretary of War, William Taft, met the Japanese Prime Minister Katsura in Tokyo and they signed a secret treaty which simultaneously gave a free hand to the United States in the Philippines and to Japan in Korea. (Song 1989, p. 81)

**Dec 1908:** From July 1907 to the end of 1908 some 14,500 Korean rebels of the “Righteous Army” were killed by the Japanese army. This protest had started in Tsuntsong province in May 1906. (Sunoo 1979 p. 25)

**Jan 22, 1919:** King Kwang-mu of Korea was murdered by the Japanese. The news of the king’s death shocked the Korean people. (Sunoo 1979 p. 27)

**Mar 17, 1919:** Samil uprising. Korean riots spread. The demonstrations which have been going on in Korea have been more general than has been reported by the Japanese. It is said that all classes of the population are taking part to gain independence. Clergy and elders were jailed. The Japanese killed 20 rioters at Yangdok and 30 persons were killed at Sungchun on March 4 (Washington Post 17 March 1919, p. 1)

[This was the first article in the Washington Post which mentioned an uprising in Korea. It came 17 days after the start of the movement which later became known as the March 1st Independence uprising also called Samil Movement which refers to

April, 1919: An American, Professor Nathaniel Pfeiffer of Columbia University described the demonstrations as follows.

The first line was cut down and ridden down by mounted men, the second came on shouting “Mansei” [Long live Korea]. When one procession was broken up, another formed and marched straight at the waiting troops, only cheering and waving their flags.

(Sunoo 1979 p. 30)

[On account of such a fierce and determined will to preserve national independence it is difficult to imagine that in 1945 the People’s Republic Committees accepted to disband without offering any resistance. It can be noted that these peaceful protests followed the same method as the anti-British protests in India. One may recall that the Amritsar massacre took place on 13 April 1919.]

Mar 31, 1919: Serious disorders have occurred at Samaga, a village in southeastern Korea, according to dispatches received here. It is said that Koreans numbering 100,000 gathered at Sumga, cut telegraph wires, attacked the police with scythes and set fire to the town hall. (Washington Post 31 March 1919, p. 1)

Apr 11, 1919: The action of the Japanese foreign office in calling attention to the activities of American missionaries in Korea has brought out a statement from officials in Washington that the United States government will do everything possible to discourage efforts on the part of its misguided nationals in Japanese territory. (Washington Post 11 April 1919, p. 2)

[This statement shows that, at least officially, the United States did no wish to encourage the uprising.]

Apr 16, 1919: Japanese gendarmes took from the Severance Hospital at Seoul, an institution maintained by Americans, 3 Korean patients suffering from gunshot wounds inflicted by the police. (Washington Post 16 April 1919, p. 8)

May 8, 1919: 38 Korean agitators at Pyengyang have been sentenced to prison for periods ranging from 6 months to two years. Similar sentences were imposed upon Koreans by the court at Taiku. (Washington Post 8 May 1919, p. 5)

[Terms of 6 months to two years appear as fairly light sentences. Apparently, there are no mentions in the Washington Post of Koreans being sentenced to death in the wake of the uprising.]
May 25, 1919: The Reverend Edward W. Thwing who was in Korea in March and personally witnessed some of the disturbances resulting from the Korean independence movement, declared that “the lower Japanese officials and soldiers have acted like lawless savages in dealing with this peculiar situation”. (Washington Post 25 May 1919, p. S16)

Jul 16, 1919: 361 natives were killed by Japanese in 41 Days. Defenseless demonstrators were fired on by troops. This statement was made by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ. (Washington Post 16 July 1919, p. 1)

How many Koreans were killed during the Samil uprising of 1919?
- Death tolls reported by the Washington Post in individual incidents were low of the order of 20 or 40.
- The summary of the uprising given by the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ mentioned 361 killed.
- From March 1 to April 11 [42 days] Japanese officials reported that 553 people were killed, including 8 policemen.
- In his book “The Bloody History of the Korean Independence Movement” (1920), historian Park Eunsik (1859-1925) claims that 7,509 people were killed. However, Park was not only a historian but also the second President of the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai. Curiously, it seems that his book which was published in Korean in 1920 was never translated into English. The figure of 7,000 people killed is repeated in many publications, e.g. the Encyclopaedia Britannica, therefore it would be of great interest to be able to see more closely how Park came to this estimate.
- On 2 May 1919, in a declaration reported by the Washington Post, Dr. Syngman Rhee, secretary of state of the provisional government of Korea, said that 10,000 Koreans were killed.

In short, the true figure seems to be somewhere between 553 and 10,000; that is a huge uncertainty. It will be seen later on that there is also a great uncertainty about the death tolls of the incidents and uprisings which occurred during 1945-1948.

Aug 16, 1919: Admiral Saito was made Governor General of Korea. (Washington Post 16 August 1919, p. 6)
[In a letter to the State Department, US Consul-General Ranford Miller described him as follows. “Since his arrival Viscount Saito has shown himself so approachable, straightforward, broad-minded, kindly, patient, conscientious and fair that he

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138In a book entitled “East Asia 1800-1949” which is available on the Internet Mr. Sanderson Beck writes that “in more than a hundred incidents the Japanese police and military fired into unarmed crowds. According to their records 7,645 people were killed, and 45,562 were wounded”. However, according to the Wikipedia article entitled “March 1st Movement” these data do not come from the Japanese side but from the book by Park Eunsik mentioned above. Beck’s book also (briefly) describes the uprising of October-November 1946 but without giving any casualty figure.
has won the confidence and respect of all classes, whether Japanese, Koreans, or foreigners. There doubtless are individual exceptions to this general statement but they are comparatively few and I personally know of none”.

Admiral Saito was Governor General of Korea during 10 years. At that time, State Department officials seemed to be satisfied by the way Japan was ruling Korea.]

**Jun 27, 1921:** Free city incident. It was an incident between two factions of Koreans fighting the Japanese in Manchuria and Siberia. Accounts are rare and fairly unclear. Here is a summary given by Prof. Kim Young Sik.

First it must be remembered that around 1921 Japanese troops that came to Siberia to fight the Communist regime were still there. It seems that in 1921 the Soviet government was in discussion with the Japanese government about their withdrawal.

In October 1920, a Korean partisan unit had taken Nikolayevsk after a bloody battle, and had murdered several hundred Japanese prisoners and civilians. Quite understandably, Japan wanted to retaliate. After being defeated in a series of battles with the Japanese, many Korean fighters fled to Siberia.

In early 1921, the Soviets declared Alekseyevsk (a small military town near Irkutsk, Siberia) an open city for all Korean fighters and announced that they would receive arms and training in this “Free City”. Some 7,000 Koreans showed up. Fights broke out between pro-Soviet and independent Korean fighters. As always in such cases, the death toll is not known. Kim writes that “hundreds died”. This seems a fairly inflated estimate for such fightings which involved only small arms and no artillery.

It seems that this incident created a rift among anti-Japanese Koreans which persisted for decades.

(www.asianresearch.org/articles/1635.html)

[At least two points appear unclear. (i) How can one explain that Korean partisans were able to win over a city and take several hundred Japanese prisoners but were repeatedly defeated in subsequent battles? (ii) Why should the Soviet government promise to arm Korean fighters while at the same time trying to negotiate the withdrawal of Japanese forces?]

**Nov 3, 1929:** Kwanju Student Independence Movement. On 30 October 1929 Japanese students in the train station in Naju harassed a few Korean females. This was the starting point of a student protest. On 10 November in many schools instead of singing the Kimigayo, the national anthem of Japan, students remained silent. Subsequently there were many street demonstrations. (Wikipedia, article entitled “Gwanju student independence movement”)

**Jul 2-6, 1931:** Anti-Chinese riots in North and South Korea. As often in such cases
the immediate cause of these riots was a fairly minor incident which actually occurred at a place called Wanpaoshan in Manchuria nor far from the border with Korea. The incident opposed Chinese and Korean farmers. It seems that it was amplified by the Japanese because it gave them an occasion to do an arbitrage. In Pyongyang, Incheon and several other Korean cities Chinese stores were plundered and their owners were killed or injured. According to Chinese sources, 146 Chinese people were killed. The public backlash from the riots led to a Chinese boycott of Japanese-made products from May 1931, one of the numerous Chinese boycotts of Japanese products. (Wikipedia, article entitled “Wanpaoshan Incident”; there is also a book written by Whitewall Wang in 1931 and entitled: “Wanpaoshan incident and the anti-Chinese riots in Korea”.)

**Apr 29, 1932:** At the celebration for the birthday of Emperor Hirohito at Lu Xun Park in Shanghai, a Korean independence activist, Yoon Bong-Gil threw a bomb at a reviewing stand killing General Yoshinori Shirakawa, commander in chief of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, and wounding several others, including Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China. Shigemitsu lost his right leg in the attack, and walked with an artificial leg and cane for the rest of his life. (Wikipedia, articles entitled “Yoshinori Shirakawa” and “Mamoru Shigemitsu”)

**Dec 1, 1943:** At the Tehran conference, President Roosevelt is reported to have told Chairman Stalin that “the Koreans are not yet capable of exercising and maintaining independent government and should be placed under a 40-year tutelage”. (Song 1989 p. 84)

[The trusteeship idea was not new, it had already been used after the First World War in the mandate system. Roosevelt’s estimate was probably based on the case of the Philippines which was kept under direct US tutelage for some 40 years. Later on, at the Yalta conference in February 1945, he scaled down his estimate to 20-30 years.]

1945

**US troops which occupied South Korea in September 1945.**
They consisted of the XXIV Corps which comprised the following units.

- The 6th Infantry Division stationed at Taegu in the center of South Korea\(^{139}\).
- The 7th Infantry Division (about 18,000 men) was headquartered at Seoul\(^{140}\).


• The 40th Infantry Division (14,000 men). Its commander was Gen. Donald J. Myers from July 1945 to its inactivation on 7 April 1946.

• The ASCOM 24 composed of specialized logistics and engineering units (27,000 men).

 Altogether, at the beginning of the occupation (which was named operation “Baker-Forty”) the strength was around 75,000 men.

Sources: RG 554 Box 91 (CKCLH); website of the 31st Infantry Regiment which was part of the 7th Division.

Aug 15, 1945: According to the thesis of Mr. Kwang Sung Song, the social situation was the following.

• Landlords accounting for 3.5% of the total peasant households owned some 55% of the total farmland.

• About one half of the wealthiest landlords (i.e. those owning more than 100 hectares) were Japanese.

• Altogether the group of pro-Japanese landlords and industrialists represented some 5% of the population.

• The number of Korean workers engaged in non-farm activities (mining, transportation, manufacturing) was about 2 millions in 1944. Almost all of them were laborers (less than 2% were white collar workers).

• The Japanese owned 90% of the mining industries and 94% of the manufacturing industries.

Aug 15-20, 1945: After 15 August many Japanese in Korea tried to sell their properties before returning to Japan. Koreans who wanted to buy these properties were told not to do so as the said properties might be confiscated in the future as enemy’s possessions (NARA 4a, p.10)

[Apparently, this advice was issued by a Japanese officer, Major General Toshima Ro Sugai. It was a good advice because that is indeed what happened. It should be noted that anyway it was useless for Japanese to sell their property because the amount of money they would be allowed to bring back to Japan would soon be severely restricted by SCAP regulation.]

Aug 15-20, 1945: North Korea. About 500,000 Koreans fled from Japanese rule and settled in the USSR in the area around Vladivostock. Large numbers of those Koreans were trained in the Red Army. Thus, when the Russian Army moved into North Korea in early August 1945 it had large numbers of Korean officers and men in its ranks. This facilitated the relations between the People’s Committees and the Red Army. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 5)

141 ASCOM means “Army Support Command”.
Aug 16, 1945: Some 10,000 prisoners of the Japanese were released from jail. This was a condition set by Lyuh Woon Hyung\textsuperscript{142} for taking over power from the Japanese. (Henderson, 1968 p. 116)

[In the last days of the war the Japanese managed to convince a prominent moderate Korean, Lyuh Woon Hyung, to maintain law and order. From 15 August to 6 September Yo and his left-leaning organization, the “Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence”, governed Korea. The declaration of the birth of the “Korea People’s Republic” on 6 September (see below) was the logical outcome of this process. However, in contrast to what happened in France in 1944, this declaration was dismissed by the United States.]

Aug 20, 1945: Dr Rhee wrote letters to all major American political and military leaders: Truman, Marshal, Byrnes (Secretary of State), MacArthur, Nimitz. Copies of the letters can be found in (RECORDS, reel no 4).

At a meeting held at the Department of State on 28 August 1945, Colonel Goodfellow (Deputy Director of the OSS) declared “It might be very desirable to have Dr. Rhee undertake the trip to Chungking [and then to Korea] because he has more of the American point of view than any other Korean leader. (RECORDS, reel no 4)

Aug 29, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 1 (1). A barrel of food dropped from an American aircraft fell on a house, killing a woman and wounding another. (Catalog of the “James H. Hausman” archive at Harvard-Yenching, Box 24)

Sep 2, 1945: General Order No 4

A Military Commission is appointed to meet at such time and places as may be hereafter designated in Korea for the trial of such persons as may be brought before it. [Signed] By Command of Lieutenant General Hodge.

(NARA 10)

[The Military Commission comprised 5 members: 2 colonels, 2 majors and one captain. This order was one of the first issued after the arrival of US troops in Korea. Subsequent general orders, particularly No 14 (4 November 1945) and 18 (15 December 1945) were concerned with the same topic.]

Sep 5, 1945: Distrustful of the local police, many People’s Republic committees established their own “Peace Preservation Corps” of white-shirted young men. These committees selected representatives for provincial assemblies, a first step in the establishment of a national government. (Henderson 1968 p. 118)

Sep 6, 1945: Some 1,000 delegates from throughout Korea gathered in Seoul and created the Korean People’s Republic. A Government Organization law was passed;

\textsuperscript{142}His name is also written: Yo Unhyong. He was one of the most important Korean leaders in 1945-1947. Born on 25 May 1886, he was assassinated on 19 July 1947.
Lyuh was made chairman and Ho Hon vice-chairman. Syngman Rhee was appointed President of a Korean Provisional Government. (Henderson 1968 p. 119, KPR, Gibby (2003, p. 23)).

**Sep 7, 1945:** Proclamation No 2 to the people of Korea.
GHQ US Army Forces Pacific, Office of the Commanding General, Yokohama, Japan (excerpts).
In order to make provision for the security of the armed forces under my command and for the maintenance of public peace and safety in the occupied area I do hereby proclaim as follows:

**ANY PERSON WHO**

violate any proclamation, order or directive given under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief or does any act to prejudice the life, safety or security of persons or property of the United States shall upon conviction by a Military Court suffer death or such other punishment as the court may determine.

Given under my hand at Yokohama, Douglas MacArthur, General of the Army.
(KI 30 April 1947)

[A more complete version of this proclamation was given in the chapter about military tribunals.]

**Sep 8, 1945:** General Hodge and 72,000 personnel of the XXIX Corps arrived at Inchon.
Representatives of the People’s Republic boarded Hodge’s ship and transmitted a letter in which the Americans were informed of the formation of local People’s Committees which would become the administrative agencies of the new government.
Ignoring this appeal, General Hodge praised the Japanese for maintaining order when they fired on the Korean crowd which appeared along the landing wharfs to welcome the American troops. (Kim 1993)

**Sep 8, 1945:** The landing of the 7th Division and the occupation of the Inchon-Seoul area were accomplished without opposition or incident. (NARA 1, Summary No 1)

[Was the writer not aware of the fact (see below) that two Koreans were killed by Japanese guards? More probably he may have thought that this incident did not concern the US troops.]

**Sep 8, 1945:** Representatives of the “Korea People’s Republic” tried to meet General Hodge who refused to see them. Composed of 3 English-speaking persons, this delegation included Lyuh’s younger brother who was a graduate of Wooster College and a wealthy landlord who was a graduate of Brown University. They told the Americans whom they were able to meet that 135 local People’s Republic commit-
tees had already been established. (Henderson 1968 p. 118)

**Sep 8, 1945:** The “Korea People’s Republic” headed by Mr. Woon Hyung Lyuh, controls three youth organizations:
- The “Korean National Military Association” which comprises many young Koreans who were drafted into the Japanese army during the war.
- The “Student Corps”
- The “Inspectors”
(SNU 1, p. 8)
[The members of these groups were supplied with arms and ammunitions by the Japanese. In many areas the police had relinquished control to them which means that they often acted as a special police force.]

**Sep 10, 1945:** American troops have landed at the port of Seoul Jinsen. The troops were enthusiastically welcomed by the Koreans but their spirits were dampened by an announcement by the Chief of Staff of the 24th Corps that the Japanese Government-General Noboyuki Abe and the other Japanese civil authorities would be kept in office “may be a day, may be a year” to carry out the American occupation orders. He announced also that the Japanese constabulary would be permitted to keep their arms.

While the occupation of Jinsen was going on, a crowd of about 500 Koreans marching with tiny American flags in their hands were fired on by Japanese police who killed two of them and wounded 10 others. (Times p. 4)

**Sep 10, 1945** A message from Washington to General Hodge listed with great detail all the actions he was asked to take (“You will . . . You will . . .”). This message parallels a similar message sent to General MacArthur at about the same time (see “Relations between Allied Forces and the population of Japan”).

**Sep 10, 1945:** CIC report about an incident involving an American officer, excerpt. Kongju (also spelled Gongju, 20 km northwest of Daejeon). Statement made by 1st Lt. Wilmot J. Kinns about a brawl that occurred in a crowded street. I called “Halt” in Korean and fired one shot in the air to enforce my command. When I fired the round from my caliber 45 pistol I was holding it at arms length at an angle of about 60 degree above the ground.

At about the same time, CHUNG, Ki Yung saw a man run past him before being struck by a bullet and becoming unconscious. The man received the bullet in its stomach. However, the hole near the navel looked a little too small to have been made by a 45 caliber bullet. A military doctor reached the same conclusion. (NARA 4a, p. 151)

[In other circumstances the near coincidence of the two events would have left little
doubt about how the injury occurred. Here, however, the word of an American officer seems to prevail over the evidence.]

**Sep 11, 1945: Civil censorship**  
About 100,000 outgoing letters are handled daily by the Seoul Post Office. Some 13,000 of them are destined to foreign countries. Examination of a small sample of them has begun. By 14 September 466 letters had been examined as well as 967 telegrams. (SNU 1, No 3, 6)

[As can be seen, the civil censorship division began its work very shortly after the arrival of US forces.]

**Sep 15, 1945: Destruction of industrial and scientific equipment.**  
General Hodge had orders to destroy all industry capable of turning out munitions and war material. The same policy was followed in Japan but it was less understandable in the case of Korea.  
This resulted in wanton destruction of machine tools in the first weeks of the occupation. Much of this machinery could have been converted easily to peace-time production.  
An area located in a radius of about 8 kilometers around the port of Inchon was particularly affected by these destructions. Subsequently, under the name of Ascom City, this area became the site of the Army Service Command in Korea.  
Moreover, Korea’s largest scientific laboratory was selected by Army medical authorities as a suitable building for the 29th Army General Hospital. As a result tons of fine scientific apparatus were loaded onto trucks to be dumped into sheds.  
(Robinson 1947 p. 289)

**Sep 15, 1945: Message from Washington (Joint Chiefs of Staff) to CHQ AFPAC (Armed Forces Pacific, MacArthur).**  
Unfavorable publicity has resulted from recent report that the US Commander in Korea has decided to retain in his office the Japanese Governor General and other Japanese officials. State, War, Navy do not believe that their services are essential by reason of technical qualification. You should proceed as rapidly as possible with the removal of Japanese and collaborationist Korean administration.  
(NDL, microfiche TS-21)

[This message is interesting for two opposite reasons.  
- It shows that these decisions were made neither by General Hodge nor by General MacArthur but by the State and War Department in Washington.  
- Although the message says very clearly that the “collaborationists” should be removed, this was not done. Many Koreans who served in the Japanese police were able to keep their positions. This was a major source of protests but at the same it guaranteed that the police would have little sympathy for protesters.]
Chapter 6

Sep 16-23, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 3 (4). An incident was reported involving the death of 3 Korean civilians. (NARA 1, Summary No 2, see below for more details)

Sep 17-18, 1945: Sudeang-Ni. A disturbance occurred near a warehouse because the rice which had been promised was not distributed. In the ensuing disorder the warehouse was set on fire. The fire was put out and order was restored by US troops during the night. On 18 September a large crowd assembled again in the afternoon. American reinforcements were brought in. Only after rifle fire was placed above the heads of the crowd was order restored. 3 Koreans were killed who failed to heed warning shots by US troops. No other details are available. (SNU 1, No 9)

[Because of the disorders that occurred already on 17 September there can be little doubt that these people were considered as forming a mob (instead of a crowd). Under such circumstances the Field Manual advises to avoid firing over the heads and instead to fire in the legs of the crowd (see the excerpts given in the chapter about incidents).]

Sep 18, 1945: Provost courts were established for South Korea by SCAP directive. (NDL, Foreign Occupied Areas reports (FOA), microfiche no 4919)

Sep 21, 1945: A sentry in the west end of the 79th Infantry barracks picked up from the ground an object resembling to a pencil. The object blew up mangling the soldier’s hand. (SNU 1, No 12)

Sep 22, 1945: General Nobuyuki Abe, former Japanese Governor General of Korea was removed from office on General Hodge’s order. (NYT p. 2)

Sep 23, 1945: Hongsong (80 km east of Seoul). A Communist-inspired disturbance was reported. No details are available. (SNU 1, No 15)


Generally speaking, all, even the educated Koreans, are dreamers and visionaries with few practical ideas about how to do things. [signed] John R, Hodge. (NDL, microfiche TS-20)

[Nowadays, few people would probably agree with such a statement.]

Sep 24, 1945: Censorship

Message from HQ, USAFIK to Commander in Chief, US Army Forces in the Pacific (CINCAFPAC).

USAFPAC [US Army Forces in the Pacific] censors should be warned by your HQ to suppress all such stories as are considered dangerous. US citizens should be informed, I agree in principle, but believe critical stories are dangerous now. [signed]
John R. Hodge.
Inclosure: Statement to news correspondents.
(NDL, microfiche TS-20)
[This directive may explain why the news about the occupation of Korea given by US newspapers were rare and sketchy. Unfortunately, the inclosure was not included in the microfiche.]

**Sep 25, 1945:** Seoul. A parade of Korean students in front of the Washin Building was dispersed by the Military Police. (Seoul Times 25 September 1945)
[This was one the first confrontations in Seoul between demonstrators and US forces.]

**Sep 27, 1945:** Excerpt of the “Operation report” of the 32nd Infantry Regiment (7th Infantry Division).
A killing occurred in Hongchon (Seoul area). (NARA 17)
[This information clearly shows the limits of these “Operation reports”. We are neither told who was killed nor who was the killer. Then in a subsequent report of 1 October 1945 we read that Lieutenant Ruffner of the provost court will come to “your CP [Command Post] by first available transportation”, but we ignore if this move is related to the murder.]

**Sep 28, 1945:** Seoul. The Department of Science and Technology of Seoul University has turned over its building to the Military Government as an Army hospital. Colonel J.M. Foster, Commanding Officer of the 29th General Hospital expects that the hospital will have about 800 beds. (Seoul Times 26 September 1945)

**Sep 28, 1945:** When the People’s Republic’s branch in Pusan was forcibly disbanded weapons were found which included 257 rifles and 14 pistols. (Robinson 1947, p. 52)
[It would be useful to know more about this operation. How was the People’s committee “forcibly disbanded”? It can be noted that 257 rifles represents an amount that is probably much smaller than what was in the possession of the police in an important city like Pusan.]

**Sep 30, 1945:** The 6th Infantry Division will soon be shipped to Korea. (NYT 30 September 1945)
[This announcement shows that other landings took place following the arrival of the first troops in Incheon on 9 September.]

**Oct 1945:** The USAMGIK gave priority to establishing the Korean National Police, using former Japanese police and recruiting Korean “collaborators” many of whom had held lower ranks in the Japanese police. To hasten the transition the Military Government opened a one-month basic training course held at the old Japanese
Fig. 6.1 Headquarters of the US Military Government in Seoul. The building at the top which used to be the Capital building became the headquarters of the MG. The building at the bottom was the City Hall and it became the headquarters of the Provost Marshall. **Source: Chapter 22 of the history of the 475th Fighter Group (US Air Force archive, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama).**

Police Academy in Seoul. (Na, p. 6)

**Oct 1945:** In early October in an effort to undermine the Korean People’s Republic while at the same time consulting Koreans, the US military governor, Major General Archibald Arnold appointed an Advisory Council of 11 Korean elders, 9 of whom were conservatives. (Robinson 1947 p. 57, cited in Stuek (W.), Yi (B.) *An alliance forged in blood: the American occupation of Korea, Journal of Strategic Studies, April 2010*)

**Oct 2, 1945:** Seoul. Approximately 500 Koreans gathered at the Sung Dong District office and caused considerable damage to the building and furniture before order was restored by the MG and police. (SNU 1, No 23)

**Oct 3, 1945:** Korean laborers returning from Japan rioted in the Sung Dong district because of the suspension of payment to them from the 5 million yen fund set aside by the Japanese for that purpose. Military police was posted at 8 offices in the district. (C.E. Skoglund Papers, reel 2)

[This was certainly the same riot as the one mentioned in the previous item.]

**Oct 4, 1945:** Excerpt of the “Operation report” of the 32nd Infantry Regiment (7th Infantry Division).
A reconnaissance was sent to a tungsten mine near Yongwa. It appears that miners have quit because they were no longer paid. (NARA 17)
Oct 5, 1945:  Manifesto issued by the Government of the People’s Republic of Korea.  [excerpts]

The government of the People’s Republic of Korea has nothing to do with communist’s dictatorship or capitalists’ hegemony. It represents the will of the Korean people and is supported by them. American authority should let it take over all the administrative organs as well as economic establishments.

A few days ago the Military Government of the US Army in Korea issued a decree that says “No gatherings, no procession or parade should be held without permission of the US authority”. Is it possible to build a new nation in a democratic way without freedom of speech, without mass meetings, without freedom of political activities?

The US Army is too generous to the Japanese and seems to sympathize with only a few Korean capitalists. The majority of the population lives below the starvation level. Koreans have less than 20% of the wealth of Korea.

(Robinson 1947, p. 51-52)

[Together with the entry of 28 September 1945, this manifesto suggests that in early October 1945, that is to say one month after the arrival of the US expeditionary force, the People’s Republic was still trying to get US recognition, if not politically then at least at administrative and economic levels.

Incidentally, it can be observed that by controlling the authorizations for political meetings, the Military Government was able to influence the political competition. This was true not only for Korea but also in other liberated countries.]

Oct 10, 1945:  Major General Archibald Arnold, Military Governor of Korea, issued a scathing statement ridiculing the leaders of the Korean People’s Republic movement and ordered Korean newspapers to publish it. Excerpts.

TO THE PRESS OF KOREA.

What I say must be given a prominent place in the front page of every newspaper. This is a request with the force of an order.

There is only one government in Korea south of 38 degrees. It is the government created in accordance with the General Orders of Lieutenant General Hodge.

If there are venal men who are so foolish as to think that they can exercise any of the legitimate functions of the Government of Korea let them pinch themselves and awaken to the realities of the situation. Let us have no more of this.

(Robinson 1947, p. 56, the whole statement is reproduced.)

[Some of the words that used by General Arnold (e.g. “venal”, “boyishness”, “puppet”) were found insulting and raised resentment among many Koreans.]

Oct 12, 1945:  Susaeng-Ni. Koreans attempted to rob a warehouse. Guards fired on the robbers which resulted in the wounding of several. (SNU No 37)
[The report does not say if the guards were American, but it can hardly be otherwise for in the same volume (p. 1) one learns that at this time the Korean police were armed only with sabers.

**Oct 13, 1945:** Basic Initial Directive to the Commander in Chief of US Army Forces, issued by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). Excerpts. [What makes these directives particularly interesting is the fact that many of them are very similar to what can be read in the “Details of Civil Affairs directives for Denmark” of 9 April 1945 (available on the Internet). The two documents were prepared by the SWNCC roughly in the same time span.]

- (5c) You will establish such military courts as may be necessary with jurisdiction over offenses against the forces under your command and over such other acts as you may declare to be offenses against your military occupation [for instance the distribution of leaflets asking for withdrawal of occupation forces will be considered as one of those “other acts”].

- (5f) Koreans who manifest hostility to the objectives of the military occupation will not permitted to hold any office.

- (6c) You will seize or destroy all arms, naval vessels, military aircraft or aircraft designed for civil use and stop the production thereof.

- (8k) All expenses incurred by the United States in connection with displaced persons operations shall be considered a part of occupation costs which may be included in US claims against Japan.

- (9b) You will establish such minimum censorship of civilian communications including the mails, wireless, radio, telephone, telegraph and cables as may be necessary.

- (9c) You will immediately place under control all political parties. Those whose activities are consistent with the objectives of the military occupation should be encouraged. Those whose activities are inconsistent with such objectives should be abolished. [This means that from the very beginning all parties who objected to the occupation were outlawed.]

- (10a) In educational institutions those who actively oppose the purposes of the military occupation will be removed and replaced by acceptable Korean successors. [In substance, if not in form, this was similar to the educational purge in Japan. It can be observed that there was a similar instruction in the case of Denmark.]

- (21a) You will insure that all laboratories and research institutes are closed immediately except those you deem necessary for the purposes of the occupation. You will detain such personnel as are of interest to your technological investigations. In such closed institutions you will require free disclosure of the results of the research. [The laboratories which did not submit to this directive were closed permanently.
The same appropriation of research results took place on a larger scale in Germany and Japan.

- (25c) You will be responsible for providing imported supplies only to supplement local resources and only to the extent needed to prevent serious disease and widespread unrest as would endanger the occupying forces. [Such “widespread unrest” took place in October 1946 partly because of a famine.]
  - (32a) You will use in Korea supplemental military yen currency (type A) issued pursuant to military proclamation.
  - (35a) The Bank of Chosen will perform central banking functions under your direction.
  - (36,37b) You will close the Bank of Taiwan, Bank of Mongolia, Federal Bank of China, Southern Development Bank. You are authorized to close other banks for the purpose of removing objectionable personnel. [The closing of all these banks may have adversely affected the economy of South Korea. There is a similar directive in Denmark.]
  - (38b) You will prohibit the payments of public and private pensions to any person arrested during the term of his arrest or permanently in the case of his subsequent conviction. [The directive does not explain how the families of these persons will be able to survive.]
  - You will impound all gold, silver and other valuables of any person subject to arrest and any person specified by the Military Government. [In other words, any person can be dispossessed if so decided by US authorities.]

(FRUS: Diplomatic papers, 1945, British Commonwealth and Far East)

**Oct 13, 1945:** A fight at a Communist meeting in Masan resulted in the death of one Korean policeman. Police were forced to call for help before order was restored. (SNU No 35)

[This account is typical of the kind of understatement and opacity that one sees all along in these reports. It does not say why and how the policeman was killed, it does not say who was called for help and finally it does not say how “order was restored” by US troops.]

**Oct 14–21, 1945:** Hamyang. A Youth organization took over the town, cut communication lines and put the police in jail. US troops restored order. (NARA 1 Summary No 6)

**Oct 15, 1945:** Namwon incident (1). Namwon is located in the south center of South Korea in the province of South Cholla. Elements of the Namwon Peoples Committee and of the National Preparatory Army attacked the US occupation force and the Korean police units. (Nap. 6)
Another serious incident is mentioned in the same city on 15 November 1945. At this point it is not clear whether or not these incidents are actually different.]

**Oct 15, 1945:** Yong-Dong. US troops evicted members of the People’s Republic Committee who had taken over the city hall and established themselves as the local government. (SNU 1, No 37)

![Fig. 6.2 Syngman Rhee with General MacArthur.](Internet, Wikimedia Commons)

**Oct 16, 1945:** Dr. Syngman Rhee landed in Korea on General MacArthur’s plane. He came to Seoul as guest of Lieut. Gen. John R. Hodge who reserved a suite for him at the army-occupied Choson Hotel. The next morning Hodge and General Arnold, the military governor, both accompanied Rhee to a press conference. Thereafter an American guard was provided for Rhee. He also received American gas coupons. Rhee was to head the conservative Korean Democratic Party (KDP) which was formed in mid-September with US approval and support. (NYT 18 October 1945 p. 4, Henderson 1968 p. 128)

[So, from the very beginning, Rhee was be the protégé of the Military Government. To keep this position, he had to accept the suppression of the People’s Republic committees by the MG in the following weeks. After such a start, all his statements about Korean independence would be nothing but pure rhetoric and demagoguery.]

**Oct 16, 1945:** A call was received at 9:20 from Lt. Col. Karp, Military Governor of South Choon Chung giving the following information. In Toshin (also spelled Dangjin) a committee of the “People’s Republic” disarmed the police. They took 56 rifles, 12 pistols, 5,700 rounds of ammunition. They have defied the Military
Government in public statements. A platoon was sent to Toshin. (NARA 4a, p.23) [The report does not say how the control of the committee was broken.]

**Oct 16, 1945:** Pusan. The “Public Peace Party” voluntarily disbanded following the arrest of 13 of its members on the night of 13 October. (SNU 1, No 38)

**Oct 17, 1945:** Tongyong (60 km south-west of Pusan). On arrival of American forces a city mayor and a chief-of-police was appointed on 11 October. However, the home of the newly appointed police was destroyed on the very same day. The fact that the officials appointed by US authorities did not include anyone from the People’s Committee explains the protest of the population. (SNU 1, No 39)

**Oct 18, 1945:** Since the arrival of the American Army, the various functions of the Government have been taken over by the Military Government under the direction of Major General A.V. Arnold, Military Governor of Korea. (Korea Times 18 October 1945)

[This third issue of the “Korea Times” also gave the list of the names and positions of the top members of the Military Government. For instance, the Justice Bureau was headed by Major Emery J. Woodall while the director of the Police Bureau was Colonel Argo.

The article says that these American Army officers will offer their skilled *advice* to Koreans which is of course an understatement. This journal was created in late August 1945 but was published at irregular time intervals about every two weeks. Number 5, the last issue, was published on 25 November 1945.]

**Oct 18, 1945:** An organization known as the “Independent Party” ordered the mayor of Changnyong (small island in the south of Korea not far from the coast) to dismiss the police. After the “Independent Party” took control of the place the police refused to obey a US order to return to duty. (SUM, vol 1)

[The report does not say how the occupation authorities solved the problem; probably by sending a military unit as was done in other places where the same problem arose.]

**Oct 19, 1945:** The Bank of Chosen [that is to say the Bank of North and South Korea] and the Industrial Bank will be headed by two US Naval officers.

- Lt Roland T. Smith has been appointed governor of the Bank of Chosen.
- Lt Harry J. Robinson has been appointed President of the Industrial Bank.

(Seoul Times 19 October 1945)

**Oct 20, 1945:** A welcoming rally was organized for Rhee with support of the MG. The New York times reported it with the following title. “Patriot, introduced at fete by General Hodge, stressed demand for unity”. (Henderson 1968 p. 129, New York Times 21 October 1945 p. 30)
Oct 20, 1945: Members of the “Korean Preparatory Army” attempted to murder a MG interpreter. 15 of them were interrogated. (Papers of C.E. Skoglund, reel 2)

Oct 21–28, 1945: Hadong. The “Korean People’s Republic took over control of the municipal government and refused to recognize the US Military Government. US troops were used to retake control and to replace party members with appointed personnel. (NARA 1, Summary No 7)

[In this and in many similar episodes in which the Military Government was installed against the will of the local population, one wonders to what extent the groups which were removed resisted.]

Oct 21–28, 1945: Kwangju. A group lead by a leader called “Captain Kim”[his name was Kim Sok] gained control of the city with the backing of 6,000 followers. US troops ousted the group and installed Military Government. Kim Sok was arrested on 28 October and convicted on charges of an alleged assassination plot. (NARA 1, Summary No 7, Cumings 1981 p. 300)

[What is meant by “ousted”? Where all leaders arrested or did they relinquish their power without any objection?]

Oct 22, 1945 Region of Pusan in Kyongsang-Nambo province. G-3 operations report of the 40th Infantry Division.

A company moved from Ulsan to Pango-ri in order to quell local disturbances. Moreover a patrol left Andong to investigate local governments at Kohyon-Ni, Chindo and Kochon-Dong. (NARA 15)

[As can be seen from this sketchy report, the “G-3 Operations Reports” provide very little information about actual interactions between US troops and the Korean population. For instance, one would like to know how these disturbances were “quelled” and what the “investigations of local governments” really implied.]

Oct 23, 1945 Region of Pusan. G-3 operations report of the 40th Infantry Division. A reconnaissance party returned from Sanchong to Chinae [which is an important naval base] and found roads in excellent condition. Moreover a patrol that returned from Kunwi found that the local government was well accepted by the people. (NARA 15)

Oct 23, 1945 Seoul. A poster put on a building one block from the USAFIK headquarters contained the following statement: “MPs are using night sticks on the streets and in private houses, This is not American liberalism”. (SNU 1, No 45)

Oct 23, 1945 Hadong. People’s Republic members have taken over the town government and refused to recognize the MG. They stated that force will have to be used to remove them. US troops have been dispatched to arrest the leaders and replace
them with personnel approved by the MG. (SNU 1, No 45)

**Oct 24, 1945** Region of Pusan. G-3 operations report of the 40th Infantry Division. A platoon went to Chowchon to investigate reported local disturbances. (NARA 15)

**Oct 24, 1945** Region of Pusan. G-3 operations report of the 40th Infantry Division. Disturbances were reported at Chowchon. A platoon went there to investigate. (NARA 15)

**Oct 25, 1945** G-3 operations report of the 7th Infantry Division. An inclosure of this daily report gives locations of the different units composing this division. It appears that they were dispersed in some 40 different cities and towns. (NARA 16)

**Oct 25, 1945** Pusan. During a strike at the Pusan Sake factory a picket line was established. The workers who tried to enter were badly beaten. The picket line was broken by US troops and the leaders were arrested. (SNU 1, No 47)

**Oct 25, 1945:** Military occupation courts As of 25 October 1945 a total of 110 cases have been tried in provost courts. (SUM, vol 1, p. 175)

[This statistic is consistent with the estimate of 100–200 provost court trials per month that was found in an earlier chapter. It should be noted that early in the occupation not all provost courts were operating.]

**Oct 25, 1945:** It was reported that a political party called the “People’s Republic of Korea” had taken over the town government of Hadong (100km west of Pusan) and refused to recognize the Military Government. They said it would require force to remove them. US troops were sent to arrest the officials and replace them by approved personnel. (SUM, Vol 1, No 1)

**Oct 25, 1945:** The conversion rate of the yen used in Korea was set at 15 yen to one dollar. (SUM, Vol 1, No 1)

**Oct 27, 1945:** Pusan. An investigation has been initiated for possible arson at the ASCOM 24 dump. The fire started around 16:00 next to warehouse 14 and quickly resulted in the explosion of a Japanese munition barge. Three buildings were destroyed. 7 US soldiers were injured. (NARA 1, Summary No 7; SNU 1, No 48)

[The summary of the subsequent week says that the investigation indicates probable arson because the straw which was used to wrap the ammunition did not burn slowly but burst into flame as though it were saturated with an inflammable agent.]

**Oct 27, 1945:** Kumje (on the west coast of Korea, 20 kilometers south-east of Kunsan). Some 75 members of the “Young Men’s Association” held a meeting which was dispersed by armed US guards. (NDL, FOA microfiche no 5046)
**Oct 27, 1945:** Two US soldiers are seriously ill as a result of drinking methyl alcohol from a bottle marked with a cognac label. (SNU 1, No 49)

**Oct 31, 1945:** There were 9 disturbances requiring the intervention of American troops; they occurred in the following cities and towns: Seoul, Chouju, Tanyang, Yougun, I-ri, Chyngun, Benju, Kempo-Ri, Hyopchou, Cheju island. (SUM, Vol 1, No 2)

**Oct 31, 1945:** In 1939 Japan had absorbed 97% of Korea’s exports and 99% in 1944. After 1945, by order of SCAP and MG it took almost none. As a result there was a sharp contraction of industrial production. By September 1947, industrial employment had fallen 60% with respect to 1944. (Henderson 1968 p. 138)

**Nov 1945:** In November 1945 Choi Wan Tak, the president of the Seoul Citizens’ Committee was sentenced to 9 month hard labor (or a 12,000 yen fine) by a Military government court [certainly a provost court] for printing that Lee Bum Seung, MG’s appointee as mayor of Seoul, had collaborated with the Japanese. As a matter of fact, Lee served the Japanese for 9 years as the governor of a province. (Korean Independence 12 June 1946)

**Nov 1, 1945: Summary of recent disturbances.**

- 16 Oct, Yong-Dong (between Taegu and Kwanju). People’s Republic Committee took over city government and had to be ousted by US troops.
- 16 Oct, Tangjin (also spelled Toshin or Dangshin, northwest of Daejeon). A Communist organization ousted local police, took their arms and defied US Military Government.
- 21 Oct, Yangsan (north of Pusan). 30 members of the People’s Republic Committee took over the town government by force. US troops were used to reinstate original government.
- [no date], Kwangju. A “Captain Kim” was found to be running the city with the backing of an army of 6,000. US troops ousted him and established US Military Government in the city.
- [no date], Yonggnang (west of Kwangju). US forces have intervened and reinstated former ousted Korean officials.
- [no date], Kriye-Ri (same area as Yonggnang). Korean officials restored to office by US troops after having been removed by members of the “Young Men’s Association”.
- [no date], Namwan (probably Namwon, between Kwangju and Taegu). 5 leaders of the “Young Men’s Association” were arrested for failure to comply with MG
orders. The party continued to hold daily military drill in spite of orders to cease this activity.
(NARA 4a, p. 30-33)

Two simple questions come to mind. (i) Did the People’s Republic Committees not offer any resistance? (ii) Why did they not remove again the officials once the US troops had departed? One way to solve the second question is to suppose that their leaders were arrested.

Nov 1, 1945: Chusan. US troops confiscated 9 rifles and 1 machine gun at the “Young Men’s Association”. (SNU 1, No 53)

This information is interesting because it shows that the Korean groups had not only rifles but even machine guns.

Nov 1, 1945: Chongup. A group of the “Farmer’s Association” [left wing] gathered to march on town to free leaders of their party. US troops dispersed the crowd outside the town. (SNU 1, No 53)

Nov 1, 1945: Hyopchon. 7 members of the People’s Committee were arrested for setting fire to the court house. (SNU 1, No 53)

Nov 1, 1945: Seoul. Although the MG has notified the Korea People’s Republic to disband, the Central Committee of the party stated that the organization will not disband. (SNU 1, No 54)

Nov 3, 1945: Mangun (at the south west end). Disturbances between the Peace Society and civilians were quelled by US troops. (SNU 1, No 55)

It is not clear who were the two parties and why US troops had to intervene.

Nov 4, 1945: General Orders No 14. A Military Commission is appointed to meet on 5 November 1945. It comprised 4 Colonels. (NDL, microfilm WOR 14275)

It would be very interesting to find the accounts of the trials by Military Commissions held in 1945.

Nov 5, 1945: An armed clash occurred between two groups on Cheju Island. 154 rioters were arrested by US troops and a curfew was imposed. (SUM, Vol 1, No 2; SNU 1 No 59))

It would be interesting to learn more about the groups who clashed because this incident was followed by many others until the rebellion on Cheju island was eventually crushed in mid-1949.

Nov 5, 1945: General Arnold’s request to publish his explosive message of 10 October 1945 was not complied with in our last issue [of 18 October]. We were forcibly reminded of it by numerous readers. The message is as follows.
To the press of Korea. What I say and hand you today must be given a prominent place in the front page of every newspaper. This is a request with the force of an order.

There is only one government in Korea. It is the one working under the Military governor and his officers . . . (Korea Times No 4, 5 November 1945)

[So, it took almost one month for this message to be published in the Korea Times.]

**Nov 7, 1945:** A P-38 of the 475th Fighter Group crashed shortly after take off from Kimpo airport near Seoul. The pilot, Lieutenant Donald W. Gipe, was killed. (Chapter 23 of the history of the 475th Fighter Group.)

**Nov 7, 1945:** Namwon. Five leaders of the “Young Men’s Association” were arrested because the party continued to hold daily military drills in spite of US MG order to cease this activity. (SNU, No 59)

[What happened to these persons after their arrest? Were they tried and sentenced? If they had been released it is to be expected that they would have resumed the same activity.]

**Nov 7, 1945:** Kumje (25 km south-east of Kunsan). On 27 October 1945 about 75 members of the “Young Men’s Association for the Building of a Nation” paraded through the streets of Kumje carrying training rifles and rice sickles. The local police made no attempt to control the demonstration. CHO Je Chun, the leader of the Association defied the rules set by the MG and stated that they would continue the demonstrations. At a subsequent meeting armed US guards were employed to keep order. Arms and sickles have now been collected and no further trouble is anticipated. US troops are patrolling the streets of the city. (NDL 1, FOA 5046, No 58)

[The source gives no details about how the determination of this organization was broken. How many casualties had the restoration of order claimed? Were the members of the organization arrested?]

**Nov 9, 1945:** Polgyo-Ri. There was a disturbance between the Democratic party and the People’s Committee. When US troops arrived the members of the People’s Committee fled to the hills. Rifle fire was exchanged between pursuing US troops and escaping party members. Later on, 10 members of the Committee surrendered. As the police force had refused to take action during the disturbance, the police chief was apprehended and police duties were taken over by US troops. (SNU, No 72)

[From this account it is difficult to understand what really happened. Why did the members of the People’s Committee flee to the hills and why were they pursued by US troops? Had they committed any crime? How many people fled? Why did 10 of them surrender?]

**Nov 11, 1945:** Excerpt of the “Operation report” of the 32nd Infantry Regiment (7th
Fig. 6.3 Page excerpted from the “Satan’s Angels Courier”, the weekly newsletter published by the 475th Fighter Group based in Seoul. Publication of this newsletter started on 10 November 1945. The paper featured 6 pages altogether. It is an interesting micro-historical source of information. The present issue carried an article about Keesang girls, (“Keesang” is the Korean term for “Geisha”. Source: Chapter 23 of the history of the 475th Fighter Group, US Air Force archive, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama.

Infantry Division).

Raymond K. Burke was charged for rape under the 93th Article of War. (NARA 17)

**Nov 11, 1945:** Kunsan (on the south west coast). A Korean interpreter for MG was beaten by a group of men. He stated that he had previously been warned to leave the employ of MG. (SNU 1, No 64)

**Nov 12, 1945:** Lyuh Woon Hyung, the leader of the “Korean People’s Republic”, quite unexpectedly, resigned from the direction and left the party. (Robinson 1947, p. 59)

[This resignation is also reported in the New York Times of 13 November 1945 (p. 4): Woon Heung Lyuh, who was Vice President of the “Korean Peoples Republic” which had difficulties with the occupying force . . . .

This was the first time that the “Korean People’s Republic” was mentioned in the New York Times.

Incidentally, there is not a single article in the New York Times, Washington Post or Chicago Tribune about the suppression by US forces of the local committees of the “People’s Republic”.]

**Nov 14, 1945:** Kochang (south east). The chief of police and his assistant, both members of the Korea People’s Republic were taken into custody. (SNU 1, No 67)

**Nov 14, 1945:** • **US fatalities: 2 (2).** Ammunition dump blast in Korea killed 2 Americans. (NYT 14 November 1945)
Nov 14, 1945: Excerpt of the “Official Gazette”.

1 Brigadier General Lawrence E. Schick is hereby appointed Director of National Defense of the Military Government of Korea.

2 Colonel Arthur S. Champeny is hereby appointed Director of the Police Bureau.

(Official Gazette, Vol. 2)

Nov 15, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 2 (6). Namwon incident (2). The Japanese had turned over considerable property to the local People’s Committee just prior to the arrival of the Americans. Military Government demanded the property, but the People’s Committee refused to renounce title. Whereupon, 5 leaders of the Committee were arrested by the Korean police. A mob formed outside a police post to protest the arrest. The police and protesters clashed and a policeman died. Several police companies rushed to the scene but they, too, faced a rout until an American infantry battalion came in support. This included shooting and bayoneting. Two protesters were killed and 60 others were wounded. There was a public outcry in Korea about American military brutality. (Robinson 1947, p. 53; NARA 2, No 52; Millett (A.R.): The forgotten army in the misunderstood war. The Hanguk Gun in the Korean War 1946-53. Available on the Internet.)

[Another incident is mentioned on 15 October 1945. As the descriptions are fairly different it is not clear whether or not these incidents were in fact identical. In fact, according to US Army historian Mark Reardon (2008, p. 215) the attempt made by the MG to recover Japanese property who had been confiscated by Koreans followed an order issued by General MacArthur. This means that similar clashes under similar circumstances may have occurred in many other places.]

Nov 15, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 1 (7). Chonju. As US MPs were quelling a disturbance a Korean who resisted arrest was shot and killed. (SNU 1, No 68)

Nov 16, 1945: Miryang (50 kilometer north of Pusan). The headquarters of the “Korean People’s Republic” movement were raided by US troops. A Communist flag and propaganda was confiscated and 20 Koreans were arrested. (NARA 1, Summary No 10)

Nov 16, 1945: Mokpo. The headquarters of the People’s Republic Committee was raided by US troops. 20 Korean were taken into custody for questioning. (SNU 1, No 69)

Nov 16, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 1 (8). Kunsan. There was a disturbance in a tunnel. US troops opened fire on 20 Koreans. One Korean was killed and another wounded. (SNU 1, No 72)

[It is really surprising that under such circumstances there were only two casualties.]
**Nov 18, 1945**: Seoul. A special US Board was set up to investigate the loyalty of Koreans serving in the Military Government. The Board is composed of 7 American members: 3 officers and 4 civilians. The 4 civilians are (i) the representative in Korea of the State Department (ii) the head of Christian college in Seoul (iii) an American business representative (iv) an agricultural expert and for many years a resident in Korea. (NYT p. 6)

**Nov 18–25, 1945**: Seoul. The Military Government suspended the Mai Il Shin Bo, a Seoul newspaper. This provoked a vigorous protestation of the Seoul press. Subsequently, the newspaper reopened under a new name. (NARA 1, Summary No 11)

**Nov 18–25, 1945**: ● Korean civilians killed: 1 (9). Kunsan (west coast). One Korean was killed when US troops’ order to halt was ignored. (NARA 1, Summary No 11)

**Nov 18–25, 1945**: ● Korean civilians killed: 1 (10). Mangun (west coast). A Korean woman was shot and killed by US troops when caught stealing equipment. (NARA, Summary No 11)

**Nov 21, 1945**: Seoul. 200 Koreans armed with clubs attempted to break up the Korean People’s convention on its second day. MPs broke up the disorder. (NARA 1, Summary 11, SNU No 73)

[A comparison with other cases along with the instructions contained in the Field Manual 31-15 (see the reference section) would suggest that the tugs were acting in accordance with MG authorities and that the MPs in fact took advantage of the disturbance to side with them in order to beat or arrest members of the Korean People’s Party. Of course, this is merely a working assumption which needs to be confirmed by accounts from other sources.]

**Nov 22, 1945**: Seoul. 42 Japanese were arraigned before a provost court on charges of belonging to a terrorist organization headed by Major Kawai. (SNU, No 75)

**Nov 23, 1945**: The barracks occupied by two companies of the US 7th Division was destroyed by fire at 3:30 am. No one was injured but almost all the men lost their clothing. A preliminary investigation disclosed that the fire was caused by defective wiring. (SNU, No 76)

[“Defective wiring” is a standard explanation in such cases but here it is difficult to accept for two reasons (i) The fire occurred at a moment when all lights were turned off (ii) Fires due to faulty wirings start slowly. The sentry on guard should have seen the smoke and given alert soon enough to put the fire under control.]

**Nov 23, 1945**: Mokpo. The headquarters of the “Korean People’s Republic” movement were raided by US troops and the leaders were arrested. (NARA 1, Summary
Nov 23, 1945: US fatalities: 14 (16). Small pox hit GIs in Korea. Five American soldiers have contracted a virulent oriental type of smallpox in Seoul. There is no danger of an epidemic disease because of the vaccination program. (NYT p. 2) [This short article gives no further details about possible spread of the disease in the population. However, one can find more information in Potter (1958). It turns out that 2 of the 5 soldiers died in November. In December 9 died, in January 2 and in February 1. Altogether, from November 1945 to February 1946, 14 members of the occupation force died from smallpox despite of the fact that all soldiers had had vaccination (yet did not necessarily react “positively” to the vaccination) None of these deaths was reported in the New York Times.]

Nov 23, 1945: The Central Korea People’s Committee wrote a long letter to General Hodge. It says: “The statement of General Arnold on 10 October, the arrests and imprisonment of members of the People’s Committee in Seoul, the request to change the name of the “People’s Republic Party” show that MG’s misunderstanding of us has been getting deeper and deeper. The requests to change the name of the party have increased in intensity since Dr. Rhee’s return. (NDL 1, FOA 5046, No 81) [The letter was published in the Korean newspaper “Chosun In Min Po”. The translation from Korean to English was made by the MG and included into the translations of Korean newspapers which are appended to the G-2 reports.]

Nov 23, 1945: Arrest of a group of 44 youthful Japanese who had pledged themselves “to risk death” to sabotage the United States occupation of Korea and do everything possible to bring about an American-Korean rift. They will be tried. (NYT p. 3)

Nov 25, 1945: On 23 October 23 representatives of some 50 political groups gathered at the Chosun Hotel and resolved on forming a central committee of all the groups with the view of presenting a common front. They met again on 2 November under the chairmanship of Dr. Syngman Rhee. The following resolution was adopted.

    We speak to you with the common voice of the 30 million Koreans. To be sure, different parties have sprung up. But we are all one in our common aim:
    WE WANT OUR INDEPENDENCE

(Korea Times No 5, 25 November 1945) [The common aim was also written in capital letters in the article. Clearly, Syngman Rhee paid only lip service to this resolution for he knew very well that his position
entirely relied on American support. This was the 5th and last issue of the “Korea Times”. In its first issue it had expressed its immense gratitude to and admiration for the Allies and especially the Americans. Then, in the course of the following 3 months it had become more critical (remember that it did not print in due time the message delivered by General Arnold on 10 October) and eventually its publication was stopped.]

Nov 25, 1945: Onyong (center). Two Koreans attempted to assault a US soldier who was searching a house for hidden weapons. The soldier fired and wounded both men. No weapons were located. (NARA 1, Summary 12)

Nov 25, 1945: Onyong (near Pusan). The former police chief of a town near Onyang is now in jail awaiting trial on charges by the MG. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 90)

Nov 26, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 1 (11). Seoul. 4 Koreans were found stealing gasoline from a US dump. Three of them were arrested and one was killed as he attempted to flee. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 79)

Nov 26, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 1 (12). Miryang (45 kilometers northwest of Pusan). A Korean was killed while attempting to steal oil from an oil supply. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 79)

Nov 26, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 1 (13). Kiho station (10 kilometers north of Pusan). A Korean was killed while stealing from a supply dump. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 79)

Nov 26, 1945: Seoul. A Korean tried to stab a MP who was investigating a disturbance. He was arrested. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 79) [He was certainly tried by a provost court; it would be interesting to know the sentence.]

Nov 27, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 2 (15). Chinhai Naval Base. Two Koreans who were looting a warehouse were shot and killed. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 80)

Nov 27, 1945: Namwoon (not far from Taegu). There were several clashes between the US Military Government and the People’s Committee. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 79) [The report does not give any information about possible casualties.]

Nov 28, 1945: Kwanju. 10 Koreans were jailed by MPs when one of them struck a US soldier. (NARA 1, Summary 12)
Nov 28, 1945: Kwanju. 10 Koreans who were on a tour with the aim of forming a Korean army were arrested. One of them assaulted a US soldier. They were placed in jail. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 79)
[This is the same incident as the previous one, but the (daily) periodic report gives more detail than the weekly summary.]

Nov 29, 1945: ● Korean civilians killed: 1 (16). An American soldier shot and killed a worker at Asan. (“Chosun Inmon Po” [The Korean People’s Times], reproduced as translation No 245 in the daily G-2 reports.)

Nov 30, 1945: An estimated 432,000 Koreans arrived in South Korea from north of the 38th parallel. (NARA 1, Volume 2 p. 217)

Nov 30, 1945: ● US fatalities: 9 (25). ● Korean civilians killed: 12 (28). Kunsan (now Gunsan, on the west coast of Korea in the province of South Cholla). 2 American officers and 3 enlisted men were killed (another officer and 3 other enlisted men who are still missing were certainly also killed) after an explosion resulting from the destruction of Japanese ammunition. 12 Korean civilians were also killed and 300 were injured. Further details are not available. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 81 and 82)

Nov 30, 1945: Blast in Korea killed 2 and injured 325. (NYT 1 December 1945 p. 3)
[Whereas the figure for the people injured agrees with the previous one, the death toll is largely under-reported.]

Nov 30, 1945: A third account of the same incident is given in the Korean newspaper “Choson Ilbo”: “On November 30, at Kun-San, there was an explosion of Japanese military ammunition which resulted in 325 casualties. Among them were 26 American soldiers including one captain. It was the biggest explosion since the end of the Pacific War, an American military official said.
(Choson Ilbo 2 December p. 2, many thanks to Beom Jun Kim for the translation)
[This account is of interest because it gives detailed casualty numbers (i.e. persons injured or killed). By bringing all information together one gets the following figures:
● Americans: 9 killed on the spot, 17 injured
● Koreans: 12 killed on the spot, 287 injured.
It may be expected that among the 304 persons who were injured some will not survive.]

Nov 30, 1945: Political condition in Yechon. The People’s Committee in Yechon is extremely well organized but it is prepared to use violence to achieve its ends. It may
even include actions against the occupation forces. (NDL, microfiche FOA 5047)


The material in this report has been assembled from information obtained from postal and electrical communications censored by CCIG-K during the period of December 1946. Excerpts.

Complaints were frequent that inspectors at ports of embarkation took things from Japanese repatriates. American soldiers confiscated watches and all money over 1,000 yen. At Pusan Japanese women were stripped naked for inspection.

Numerous writers reported that American soldiers were involved in attacks and thefts. One writer wrote that whereas Koreans in Changju had welcomed the US Army they are now afraid of them because the American soldiers commit burglary and take women. Another wrote that Americans intrude in homes at night and “sometimes prize one’s daughter’s chastity”.

Dec 1, 1945: Ordinance No 33 vested title to all property owned by Japanese on 8 August 1945 in US Military Government. The Office of the Property Custodian was entrusted with the administration of this property. (McCune 1950 p. 97).

[In other words, the Military Government became the largest land owner and also the largest owner of industrial facilities.]

Dec 1, 1945: Price of rice. After the start of the occupation the controls over rice distribution were lifted and a free market was instituted. The initial price of rice was 32 won per bag. However once price began to rise, speculators, seizing upon opportunities for quick profits, bought up stocks and farmers were also prone to hoard. Thus prices rose still higher. By early November the price of rice in Seoul was 70 won a bag (of 5 bushels), on November 23 it was 100 won per bag, and in early December it reached 160 won per bag. (McCune 1950, p. 104-105)

Dec 1, 1945: Korean civilians killed: 3 (31). Namwon (south center) incident. The translation of a report of the “Seoul Lawyers Association” is given but is fairly unclear. The people were told “to disperse within 2 minutes or be prepared to accept the unpleasant consequences”. It is said that they did not move away. Then the troops opened fire. 3 Koreans were killed, 7 or 8 were injured. (NDL, microfiche FOA 5047, G-2 report No 87 and 88)

Dec 2, 1945: 23 members of Kim Koo’s Provisional Government arrived in Korea. The two US Army transports that carried them were forced to land at an airfield 160 km south of Seoul, because a snowstorm prevented their landing at the Kimpo Airfield. (NYT p. 39)
[It is often emphasized that Syngman Rhee arrived in Korea in the personal plane of General MacArthur. The previous excerpt shows that Kim Koo and his followers came from China also on American planes. In other words, the only politicians who were not from the very start depending upon the good will of the MG were those who had remained in Korea during the Japanese occupation. Not surprisingly, in subsequent months most of those more independent leaders were pushed aside by the MG.]

**Dec 2, 1945:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (32). Pusan. A Korean was surprised while stealing from a freight car by a US guard, He was fired upon and killed while attempting to escape (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 88)

**Dec 2, 1945:** Declaration of the “Korean People’s Republic”. The “Korean People’s Republic” is an organization which covers both the North and the South. For this reason the problem of disbanding it must be solved by the United States and Russia. (NDL, microfiche FOA 5047, No 85)
[This means that when the MG ordered the dissolution of “Korean People’s Republic” in its zone of occupation, it was already preparing the division of the country.]

**Dec 3, 1945:** A fire destroyed the barracks occupied by 3 quartermaster companies. There were no casualties. The cause of the fire has not been reported. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 86)

**Dec 4, 1945:** Seoul. A Japanese was sentenced to 2 years at hard labor and an additional year if the fine of 20,000 yen was not paid. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 84)
[This sentence confirms the fact that there was an equivalence between 1 month confinement and an amount of unpaid fine comprised between 1,000 and 2,000 yens (depending upon the court).]

**Dec 4, 1945:** Seoul. At 06:30 a fire completely destroyed the barracks occupied by two companies of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, One soldier suffered a broken leg when he was forced to jump from the second story window, (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 86)
[Fires were fairly common in this time. However, they should be less frequent in military than in civilian buildings because the former are supposed to be under the watch of sentries.]

**Dec 4, 1945:** Mokpo. The People’s Committee of Muan gun has an estimated membership of 230,000 persons with headquarters in Mokpo. It is led by BAK Seom Kyu. (NDL, microfiche FOA 5047, G-2 report No 87)

**Dec 5, 1945:** **Building the South Korean Army.** General Hodge created the “Ko-
The Korean Military English School” to train officers for a South Korean army to be created. The first class consisted of 60 students: 20 former Japanese servicemen, 20 from the Kwantung (Manchuokuo) Army, and 20 from the KPG (Korean Provisional Government) Army (Kwan Bok Gun). In other words, persons who were formed by the Japanese formed 66% of the first promotion.

Some 50,000 Koreans served in the Japanese Army during World War II, mostly as privates who were forced into the Army. However, several hundred Koreans did volunteer and achieved officer ranks. The nationalists and Communists refused to enroll in the School with the Japanese collaborators. Furthermore, Hodge stipulated that “no Korean with a Japanese prison record” would be accepted.

The individuals who were to become the founding members of the South Korean Army (ROKA). included the following; their ranks in the Japanese Army are indicated within brackets.

1 Yi Ung Jun (Col.) 1st ROKA chief-of-staff
2 Won Yong Duk (Lt. Col.) 1st commander of ROKA
3 Yu Chae Hung (Major)
4 Chae Pyon Duk (Major)
5 Chang Do Yong (Captain),
6 The following lieutenants and captains: Choe Chang Un, Choe Kyong Nok, Chong Il Gwon, Kang Mun Bong, Kim Chae Gyu, Kim Hong Jun, Kim Paik Il, Kim Suk Pom, Kim Tong Ha, Park Sung Yup, Park Jung HeePark Im Hang, Park Ki Yong, Yang Kuk Chin, Yi Chong Chan, Yi Chu Il, Yi Han Nim, and Yun Tae Il

(Source: US Military Government in Korea, 1945, see reference section)

Dec 6, 1945: USAMGIK Ordinance 33: Transfer to the MG of all assets owned by Japanese individuals, excerpt

Section II. All gold, silver, platinum, currency, securities, valuable papers, and any other property owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Government of Japan on 9 August 1945 is hereby vested in the Military Government of Korea.

Section IV. Any person violating the provisions of this ordinance shall, upon conviction by a Military Occupation Court, suffer such punishment as the court shall determine. [Signed]  A. V. ARNOLD

Major General, United States Army, Military Governor of Korea.

(http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/USAMGIK_Ordinance_33)

[Through this Ordinance the Military Government took possession of all property owned by the Japanese that is to say almost all the industrial and commercial facilities and a large part of the land. Two months later this ownership was organized in the form of a business company under the control of the MG.]
**Dec 8, 1945:** Funding of Rhee’s party. Dr. Rhee, through the MG, was able to borrow 200 million yen from the Bank of Korea. In addition, key financial figures visited Dr. Rhee on 3 November and agreed to give a total of 900,000 yen. (NDL, microfiche FOA 5048, G-2 report No 90)

**Dec 10, 1945:** Mosong-Ni. Heavy wire was found stretched across the highway in the route leading to one of the Infantry Regiments. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 93)

[Although similar actions are mentioned repeatedly, there is no report whatsoever that any damage has ever been suffered by US troops as a result.]

**Dec 10, 1945:** The “Korean Democratic Party” [Rhee’s party] requested [from the MG] the disbanding of the People’s Committee. (NDL, microfiche FOA 5048, G-2 report No 92)

[As we have already seen, the disbanding had been asked earlier by the MG itself; as the People’s Committees were the only bridge between the north and the south this dissolution sealed the fate of the country.]

**Dec 12, 1945:** General Hodge issued a harsh statement specifically denouncing the “Korean People’s Republic”. Excerpt. Regardless of what it calls itself, the “Korean People’s Republic” is not in any sense a government and is not authorized to act in any capacity as such. I have today directed my occupation forces to insure that no political organization operates in any portion of the American occupied area without specific authority of the Allied Powers. (Robinson 1947 p. 61)

[The suppression of the People’s Republic committees had begun one or two months before this declaration was made. However, it seems that in some places the People’s committees were still operating. Robinson mentions the case of several counties in the north-eastern province of Kangwon (now Gangwon). See below.]

**Dec 12, 1945:** When Military Government authority was first extended over the province of Kangwon in October 1945 it was found that the People’s Republic controlled the three counties along the coast. When county chiefs appointed by the Military Governor of the province arrived in these counties they were promptly jailed. Surprisingly, however, this did not lead to open confrontation as in so many other places. It seems that the People’s Republic leaders were recognized officially as government officials and that they agreed to take their orders from the provincial governor.

This situation lasted until the declaration of 12 December mentioned above. The provincial governor was forced to fire the People’s Republic officials. From that time on there was nothing but trouble in the area.
Dec 16, 1945: Richard Robinson, a member of the Military Government, attended an interesting political meeting in Seoul which he describes in the following terms. My interpreter whispered to me in awed tones “These are the millionaires of Korea”. The group was in the throes of organizing itself as the “Economic Contributors Association” for the benefit of the Provisional Government. Their aim was to raise 200 million yens (about two million dollars as measured by comparative purchasing powers). Promissory notes for large sums were made out on the spot by a number of those present.

When I reported the matter to American authorities, I was told to forget about it. Somehow, however, news of the deal leaked out to the press and Dr. Rhee was charged with having accepted a large sum of money from the wealthy of Korea, most of whom had amassed their fortunes under the Japanese by exploiting their fellow countrymen.

(Dec 17, 1945: A provost court sentenced Kim, Je Hi (aged 20) to one year imprisonment for participating in a riot. He was paroled on 25 July 1946. (NARA 8, folder 1)

Dec 17, 1945: The Korean newspaper “Chosun (also spelled Choson) Ilbo” reported the previous trial in an article entitled “Offenders referred to a military trial cluster” (Google translation). (Chosun Ilbo, 17 December p. 2. The archives of this newspaper are available online at the following address: http://srchdb1.chosun.com/pdf/i_archive)

Dec 20, 1945 G-3 operations report of the 7th Infantry Division.

An inclosure of this daily report gives a list of guard posts. Apart from warehouses, barracks and other military installations there were also guard posts for the British Consulate, the Chinese Consulate, the opium factory, the Law College, the “Rika Women’s College”, the “Chosen Christian College”. (NARA 16)

Dec 23, 1945: Seoul. The office of the Central People’s Committee of the Korean People’s Republic was raided by the Counter Intelligence Corps and Military Police. Members of the committee were searched, forced to strip, slapped. Papers were confiscated and further use of the building was denied. (Korean Independence 16 January 1946)

[This was one instance in a long series of raids by American forces against the headquarters of leftist organizations.]
Dec 25, 1945: Nine newspapers agreed to form a Korean news agency. It was called Hapdong-KP with the last two letters meaning “Korea Pacific” press. (NYT 25 December 1945)

[In December 1980, “Hapdong-KP” became “Yonhap” which is still in existence at the time of writing (July 2011).]

Dec 29, 1945 Seoul. In objection to the Big Three’s 5-year trusteeship program, Koreans stoned American soldiers and by noon hundreds of them who were employed by the American Military Government quit work and left the government palace. (Korean Independence of 9 January 1946)

Dec 31, 1945 Seoul. In a protest organized mainly by right-wing parties, 30,000 paraded ice-covered streets shouting outbursts against anything resembling a trusteeship. (Korean Independence 9 January 1946)

Dec 31, 1945 Kim Ku attempted a coup that failed. Kim was hauled into Hodge’s office and told that he would be killed if he tried again to “double cross” the Military Government. The failed coup put Kim Ku and the KPG out of action.

(Source: US Military Government in Korea, 1945, see reference section)

1946

Jan 1946: 80% of all the real property in Korea was owned by Japanese and subsequently taken over by the Military Government. (Korean Independence 9 January 1946)

Jan 1946: During the fall and winter of 1945 the Provisional government of Koo and Rhee was given 4.5 hours of radio time per month over station JODK which was operated by the Military Government. The Korean People’s Republic received only 30 minutes.

In January 1946 the Provisional Government established its headquarters in the spacious Dawk Soo Palace in Seoul whereas the People’s Republic was unable to find adequate quarters.

(Robinson 1947 p. 67)

[It can be observed that both radio times seem fairly insignificant: about 10 and 1 minute a day respectively.]

Jan 1, 1946: Kim Koo (also spelled Kim Gu or Kim Ku), the leader of the provisional government, attempted to seize control of the police force and establish his own Provisional Government in Korea.

Specifically Kim Koo’s headquarters served notice that henceforth all members of
the Korean police would take orders from the Korean Provisional Government rather than from the Americans. Announcements of the coup were intercepted by American officers before they reached the general public. (NARA 1, No 52, Robinson 1947 p. 71)

[As the police was under American control this attempt was in fact directed against the Military Government. Were there some Americans who supported Kim’s attempt? Probably, otherwise it would have been silly to try, but we do not really know.]

**Jan 1, 1946:** After meeting for two and a half hours with Lieutenant-General Hodge, Kim Koo, leader of the provisional government called off all demonstrations as well as a projected general strike. The American Military Government has banned the publication and distribution of all handbills and pamphlets in Korea. (Korean Independence 9 January 1946)

**Jan 2, 1946:** Tried by a provost court, prisoner Kim Yeon jin was sentenced to a term of 5 years at hard labor in Masan prison. After a petition for clemency presented on 16 July 1946 had been approved by the Board of Review No 908, the prisoner was released on 22 September 1946. (NARA 8, folder 1)

[The source does not say why the prisoner was sentenced nor does it explain why he was released. It is very uncommon that prisoners sentenced to 5 years (the longest term a provost court can inflict) are released after only 9 months.]

**Jan 3, 1946:** US fatalities: 6 (31). Chong Dan (near the 38th parallel). Six Americans were killed in a blast in Korea. (NYT 3 January 1946, WP 3 January 1946, p. 1)

**Jan 4, 1946:** General Orders No 1: Establishment of the US Army Military Government in Korea. The MG will be the legal government of Korea and will assume all its functions. It comprises 663 US officers: 24 Colonels, 85 Lieutenant Colonels, 124 Majors, 211 Captains, 156 First Lieutenants, 63 Second Lieutenants. In the same order it is announced that Major General Archibald Arnold is relieved of his duties as Military Governor. (NDL, microfilm WOR 14275, reproduction of NARA Record Group 407, Box 1703, Folder 3)

[“No 1” refers to 1946; there have already been “General Orders” in 1945, see above.

Here is a chronological list of successive Military Governors of Korea:

1. 12 Sep 1945–3 Jan 1946: Archibald Vincent Arnold
2. 3 Jan 1946–11 Sep 1947 (death): Archer Lynn Lerch
3. 11 Sep 1947–16 Sep 1947: Charles Gardiner Helmick (Acting Governor)
Jan 5, 1946: Kwangju. US military police and members of the Korean police arrested and imprisoned 11 members of the Korean Student Scouts for posting large hand-painted notices in the center of the city of Kwangju. The posters incited to oppose trusteeship. Here is the translation of some of them.

- “We will punish all civilians who do not fight against trusteeship.”
- “To US Military Government, 30 million Koreans will fight against trusteeship.”
- “As a demonstration against trusteeship all places of amusement and recreation should close.”
- “All interpreters and employees of the Military Government must resign their jobs.”

(NARA 4a, p.44)

Jan 6, 1946: Uchon. A crowd of 125 Koreans released 7 Koreans who had been arrested by police. US troops arrived and dispersed the crowd. (NARA 1, Summary No 18)

Jan 7, 1946: Seoul. There was a pro-American demonstration estimated by American Military Police at 100,000. (Korean Independence 9 January 1946)

Jan 8, 1946: Cho Byong Ok, the police chief of the AMG, is a PhD from Columbia University. (Korean Independence 8 January 1946)

Jan 10, 1946: Seoul. Koreans threw rocks at a US sentry in what is believed to be an attempt to steal nearby lumber. (NARA 1, Summary No 23)

[For people planning to steal lumber what can be the purpose of raising the attention of the sentry by throwing rocks at him? This is puzzling. It can also be noted that this incident was reported only in early February. So, it is either a delayed report (which sometimes happens) or it occurred in fact on 10 February.]

Jan 13, 1946: US soldiers in Korea raised a protest while Secretary of War Patterson was visiting Korea. (NYT 13 Jan 1946)

Jan 13, 1946 Major General Archibald Arnold was relieved of his duties as Acting Military Governor of Korea. He returned to his command of the 7th Infantry Division. He was also named head of the US delegation to the joint American-Soviet Military Commission for Korea (NYT 13 January 1946)

[The order relieving General Arnold was already contained in “General Orders No 1” of 4 January 1946 (see above). General Arnold was replaced by General Archer Lerch.]
Jan 14, 1946: General Orders No 5. Provost courts established in the 6th Infantry Division (southern part of South Korea), 7th Infantry Division, 400th Infantry Division, Army Service Command 24, will continue to function until replaced by MG provost courts. (NDL, microfiche WOR 14275)

[It would be of interest to find records of the trials held in such courts in late 1945 and early 1946.]

Jan 14, 1946: Chieyong-Ni. The headquarters of the Korean National Preparatory Army was raided by American authorities. Communistic pamphlets were found. (NARA 1, Summary No 19)

Jan 14, 1946: Mokpo. Military Government troops raided the headquarters of the following political groups and unions:
(i) People’s Republic Committee,
(ii) Comrades Young Men Associations,
(iii) Young Men’s Alliance,
(iv) Cottonseed Oil Factory Union.
33 persons were jailed including the Mokpo chief of police and several other government officials, After the raid, 20 policemen from Kwanju were ordered to assist the police in Mokpo. Around 19:00 a mob entered a police station and attacked a Kwanju policeman on duty there. (NARA 1, Summary No 19)

Jan 14, 1946: Seoul. American authorities raided the headquarters of the “National Protecting Army” and of the “Kwang Buk Army” and arrested 8 persons. (NARA 1, Summary No 19)

Jan 15, 1946: Seoul. American authorities raided the headquarters of the “Young Men’s Association for Establishing the Nation”. Two arrests were made. (NARA 1, Summary No 19)

[The “Young Men’s Association” was an important leftist group.]

Jan 15, 1946: Mokpo (south coast of Korea). Chung In Han, an interpreter of the MG declared to his American supervisors namely Lt. E.B. Hanson and Captain G. A. Holmstrom, that it was common talk in Mokpo that US troops and especially Military Police were arresting people on the streets and that rarely could anyone be shown guilty of any charge. Chung stated that he was spending most of his evenings at the Police station to interpret for MPs who bring in prisoners against which there is seldom a specific charge.
Agents’ note: This allegation is largely true.
(NARA 4a, p.42)

[The most interesting part in this report is of course the agents’ note. This story may explain why, after clashing with a group of insurgents, US troops or police are able
to arrest a large number of people. Perhaps these people in fact did not belong to the

group of insurgents but were just picked up in the streets after the clash.

A handwritten note which was added at the end of the report says: “Chung resigned in January 1946” that is to say shortly after this incident.]

**Jan 17, 1946:** Seoul. American authorities raided the headquarters of the “National

Army” and arrested 7 persons. (NARA 1, Summary No 19)

**Jan 17, 1946:** The Korean Boy Scout movement is currently being reorganized

along American lines. Some 15 leaders of the movement will go to a national training school in the USA. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 7)

**Jan 18, 1946:** Korean students anti-trusteeship demonstration in Seoul. A peaceful demonstration of about 1,000 students that took place in Seoul was attacked around 19:30. One student was shot and 6 were seriously wounded by club blows. None of the attackers was arrested by police. Only one was interrogated (and released). (NARA 4a, p.57)

**Jan 18, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 2 (34). Seoul. Civil police attempted to raid the “Returned Students Alliance” building but were fired upon. A siege resulted with some 200 police taking part. Two men were killed during the disturbance and 119 persons were arrested (NARA 1, Summary No 19)

[This was a large-scale operation. Surprisingly, there is no mention of an intervention of US troops.]

**Jan 18, 1946:** Pop Song Po. A group of young men attacked the police station and severely beat the policemen on duty. On the next morning at 7:00 US troops arrived from Kwanju and restored order. 12 men were arrested (NARA 1, Summary No 19)

**Jan 19, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 3 (37). Seoul. At 3am, Military Government forces raided the “Student Soldiers’ League”, an organization of progressive students formerly conscripted in the Japanese Army. The attack commenced with machine gun fire into the rooms were members of the League were asleep. Three of them were killed. (Korean Independence 15 May 1946)

[One wonders what motivated such a brutal action.]

**Jan 19, 1946:** Andong (east). A rock-throwing incident by railroad workers necessitated the intervention of US troops. 30 rioters were arrested. (NARA 1, Summary No 21)

[The report does not say who was targeted by the rock-throwing workers. It seems that they stopped throwing rocks as soon as the US troops appeared.]

After a night and a day of disorder and rioting in Seoul in which 2 Koreans died and 120 were arrested. Major General Lerch, the newly appointed Military Governor of Korea, warned the Koreans. (NYT p. 19; WP p. M4; Harford Courant p. C8)

**Jan 21, 1946**: Kim, Il Pak was murdered around 21:00. Some 17 persons were arrested in connection with the murder. (NARA 1, Summary No 21)

**Jan 25, 27, 28, 1946**: Missed Yongdung. US guards were fired upon. (NARA 1, Summary No 22)

**Jan 27, 1946**: The representatives of South Korean newspapers issued a joint statement declaring the New York Times correspondent, Mr. Richard J. H. Johnston “persona non grata” in Korea because of his journalistic dishonesty. In particular he attributed to Mr. Pak Heun Young [Secretary General of the Korean Communist Party] a declaration saying that he accepted the trusteeship. (Korean Independence 20 February 1946)

**Jan 30, 1946**: USAMGIK assumed control of provost courts which were previously a responsibility of tactical commanders. (SUM, Vol 1, No 5)

[The report does not say what were the practical consequences? In the section about provost courts we have seen that local courts had to send trial reports to USAMGIK headquarters in Seoul. So, it can be guessed that this was one major implication.]

**Feb 1, 1946**: Missed Two US guards riding in a railroad mail car were fired upon by unknown persons. (NARA 1, Summary 21)

**Feb 3, 1946**: US fatalities: 1 (32). Inchon Bay. At 05:30 am the body of an American soldier who had been on a jeep patrol of the area was found in Inchon Bay. Investigation continues. (NARA 1, Summary No 25)

[It is fairly unusual for a soldier to patrol alone. May be on the night of his death this soldier was rather on some personal “business”?]

**Feb 7, 1946**: Seoul. Fire swept and destroyed a US warehouse. (NYT p. 17)

**Feb 7, 1946**: Seoul. Missed A US sentry was fired upon around 20:00. (NARA 1, Summary No 22)

[Over the past two weeks 5 incidents are reported in which US soldiers were fired upon. Yet, there was not a single injury. Why after missing their target did the attackers not fire more shots? Did they only want to scare the sentries? Later on, in May, hand grenades and stones were thrown at US soldiers. But they all missed their targets and there was not a single casualty.]

**Feb 9, 1946**: An Interim People's Committee was set up in North Korea as a provisional central government. (Robinson 1947 p. 266)
[This Interim People’s Committee enacted a Land Reformation Act on 5 March 1946 and a Labor Law on 24 June 1946. Both are reproduced in extenso in Robinson's book.]

**Feb 10, 1946:** Lead by US Lieutenant Colonel W.T. Stone, Korean detectives raided the headquarters of the Korean Central Labor Committee where they arrested 12 persons and confiscated a large cache of arms and ammunition. The Military Government said that one prisoner confessed that the group had planned to kill Wun Sei Hun, the leader of the Democrat Party. Wun Sei Hun succeeded to the leadership of the party in December 1945 following the assassination of Song Chin Woo whose murder remains unsolved. (NYT p. 34)

**Feb 13, 1946:** No civilian mail service with Japan and Germany has yet been restored. (Korean Independence 13 February 1946, p. 2)

**Feb 13, 1946:** Crash of a P-38 aircraft into the sea 50 kilometers west of Kimpo airfield. The pilot, First Lieutenant Donald B. Slinger, was killed. (Ch 26 of the history of the 475th Fighter Group, US Air Force Archive BO 633)

**Feb 14, 1946:** The American Military Government has announced the formation of a “Representative and Democratic Advisory Council for South Korea” of which Dr. Syngman Rhee is the chairman and Kim Koo the vice-chairman. Most of the other political leaders have refused to take part in this council. (Korean Independence 20 February 1946)

**Feb 14, 1946:** In mid-February a public opinion poll organized by the Military Government indicated that a bare 52% of the Koreans considered the American administration better than that of the Japanese. (Robinson 1947 p. 82)

**Feb 21, 1946:** **USAMGIK Ordinance 52: Creation of the “New Korea Company”**, excerpt

SECTION I. The New Korea company, Limited is hereby created as an independent agency of the Government of Korea. The corporation will be directed by ten directors. The United States Army Officer acting as President of the corporation will have full power to decide questions of policy affecting United states interests, subject to the approval of the Military Governor.

SECTION II. The directors will appoint an Advisory Board consisting of the Chairman of the Board of Directors and members from each province nominated by the Military Governor.

SECTION IV. All property owned on 9 August 1945 by the “Oriental Development Company” and all Japanese property in which the “Oriental Development Company” had a financial interest is hereby vested in the New Korea Company.
SECTION V. The capital stock may be reduced or increased by the Board of Directors by the issuance of a public notice signed by the Military Governor. Under the directives of the Military Governor the Company will have the power to own property and dispose of the same.

SECTION VII. Any person who makes any statement which directly or by inference is derogatory to the standing of the corporation shall upon conviction by a Military Occupation Court suffer such punishment as the Court shall determine.

[Signed] Archer L. Lerch  Major General, Military Governor of Korea.

(Through ordinance 33 of 6 December 1945 the MG had taken into its hands all the property previously owned by Japan that is to say almost all industrial facilities and a large part of the land. By the present ordinance it gave to this ownership a business-like appearance without giving up its control.)

Feb 22, 1946: Kaesung (near the 38th parallel). The seizure of hoarded rice stocks has not yet begun but will start shortly. (NARA 4b, p.397)

Feb 23, 1946: Subject: Relations between US Army officers and Koreans. Effective at once, no officer of the US Army will accept any gift or favor from any Korean or permit himself to be entertained by Koreans. (NARA, RG 554, Box 50) This rigid policy certainly contributed to a lack of understanding between the two groups. On 4 May 1946 the gap was made even wider by an interdiction to eat anything prepared by Koreans either in restaurants or purchased in stores. The interdiction also extended to beverages. The reason given in the directive was that sanitary conditions in Korea were not good enough.

Feb 25, 1946: A fire destroyed the barracks of Red Cross aides. (NYT p. 7)

Mar 2, 1946: Hamnyol (west). A riot between local police and 180 railroad workers necessitated the intervention of US troops. 74 men were arrested. (NARA 1, Summary No 26)

Mar 5, 1946: American soldiers upbraided [i.e. reprimanded] for crimes in Korea. Responding to growing complaints of the Korean press against the conduct of many GI’s, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commanding United States forces in Korea, today called on his troops to improve their conduct and rebuild Korean opinion. He declared that in just a few days in the Seoul area there have been one murder in armed robbery, several unwarranted physical assaults against Koreans committed by men in the uniform of the US Army. (NYT p. 15)

Mar 8, 1946: Chinju (east, near the 38th parallel). A mob composed of members of the “Young Men’s Association” gathered at the police station to avenge the death
of a party member. US troops dispersed the crowd. (NARA 1, Summary No 27)

**Mar 15, 1946:** Uisong (50km north of Taegu). Military Government trucks attempted to transport rice from a local warehouse. The removal of the rice was resisted by a crowd of about 1,000. Loading was completed upon the arrival of US troops. Nevertheless, the departing trucks were stoned. (NARA 10, Summary No 30)

[This is a typical grain riot. In times of scarcity or famine the countryside people try to prevent the grains from being transported to the cities.]

**Mar 18, 1946:** Excerpt of a report of the Department of Public Information of the MG. A vast majority of people definitely desire an economy closely controlled by the government. A heavy majority favor government ownership of large industry. About 50% of the people favor outright government ownership of all [emphasis in document] farm lands. (NARA 4b, p.407)

**Mar 18, 1946:** The Joint Soviet-American Commission (also called US-USSR Joint Commission) came into being. (Robinson 1947 p. 81)

[The reports of its sessions are a possible source of information about some of the events that occurred in Korea because the Soviet delegation had its own specific sources. This Commission had been preceded by the Joint Soviet-American Conference which took place from 16 January 1946 to the end of February.]

**Mar 20, 1946:** Four US transport aircraft (two C-46 and two C-47) were destroyed while being parked on Kimpo Air Base. On the same day a B-17 piloted by Luther B. Rice had a take off accident. (Appendix A)

[Although of some importance, these events were not reported in the New York Times. Nor were they reported in the weekly G-2 report No 28 which covers the week from Sunday 17 March to Sunday 24 March.]

**Mar 23, 1946:** Millions face starvation. (Seoul Times p. 1)

[At first, one might think that this title in the “Seoul Times” referred to Korea. Actually, it referred to the situation worldwide. The information given in the article is completely based on American sources. As a matter of fact, the argument that the situation in the rest of the world was worse than in South Korea was repeatedly used by the MG to convince Koreans that the way it ruled the country was not so bad after all. In many other countries (e.g. Germany or Japan) the situation was indeed serious but these countries had suffered many destructions during the war which was not the case of Korea.]

**Mar 23, 1946:** 100,000 cans of American food supplies will be sold to the general
public in 500 retail stores. (Seoul Times 23 March 1946)

**Mar 23, 1946:** *Traffic will be changed to the right side on 1 April 1946.* (Seoul Times 23 March 1946)

[As one knows, in Japan traffic was and still is on the left side.]

**Mar 31, 1946:** More cases of a virulent form of smallpox brought by service men returning from the Orient. Several hundred thousand residents of the West Coast had been vaccinated by today against smallpox. (NYT p. 38)

**Mar 31, 1946:** Excerpt of a report of the Department of Public Information of the MG.

Subject: Statistical analysis of political trends in Seoul.

- Question: Do you believe that if the Soviet and American forces withdraw, civil war would follow?
  
  Yes: 41%  No: 34%  Do not know: 24%

- Question asked to those answering “Yes”: Do you, nevertheless, favor such a withdrawal?
  
  Yes: 74%  No: 18%  Do not know: 8%

**Apr 1946:** By April 1946, 5,000 constabulary soldiers in eight companies finished the first stage of training. The recruitment was based on Japanese Korean officers rather than on fighters of the Liberation Army. The first 110 officers who graduated would dominate the South Korean military for the next three decades. At the core was the teaching of military English for the obvious reason that American officers taught the higher classes. (Na p. 10, 14)

[This marked the beginning of the Korean constabulary. The author emphasizes that this force was particularly needed because the Korean police was hated and unable to control the Koreans without US support as was indeed shown by the uprisings of October 1946.]

**Apr 2, 1946:** Excerpt of a report of the Department of Public Information of the MG. Subject: Starvation in Seoul.

Based on a survey conducted on a sample of some 500 persons, the report gives the names and addresses of 6 persons who starved to death. It adds the following observation: “An employee of the Opinion Sampling Section who receives a monthly salary of 1,250 yen has two children who are so weak from the lack of food that they are in bed unable to attend school.” (NARA 4b. p.416)

[How many persons starved to death altogether? So far, we do not know. It can be observed that famines are usually more severe in the countryside than in cities.]

**Apr 4, 1946:**  • US fatalities: 1 (33). The pilot of a P-38 aircraft, Flying Officer
Robert E. Bartlett of the 432nd Fighter Squadron, failed to pull out of his dive on a practice dive bombing mission. The plane exploded immediately after crashing. (AirForce 2 p. 524)

Apr 6, 1946: Several hundred persons gathered at the city Hall and requested rice. (NARA 1, Summary No 30)

April 8, 1946: Chinhae. A US sentry on duty at a warehouse was knocked unconscious by a blow on the head from behind. (NARA 1, Summary No 31)

April 10, 1946: In Pusan (the second largest city in the American occupation zone) all leaders of the “Democratic National Front” were arrested. Similar arrests were reported from all other provinces. (Korean Independence 12 June 1946)

April 11, 1946: US fatalities: 1 (34). A P-38 aircraft crashed on landing at Kimpo Air Base. The pilot, second Lieutenant Rodrick H. Averill, was killed. (AirForce 2, p. 524) [It can be noted that the name “Averill” is not included in the burial plot list of the US Central cemetery given in a previous chapter. One may wonder why. In contrast, Bartlett who died just one week earlier, is included.]

Apr 24, 1946: Ordinance 55 of the Military Government put political parties under its control. (Korean Independence 24 April 1946)

Apr 24, 1946: Yonsan. A group of Koreans stoned 6 US soldiers guarding a train who had allegedly robbed passengers enroute from Taejon. Upon investigation a MG officer found that the soldiers had indeed robbed a number of Koreans on the train. They were placed under arrest. The crowd then dispersed peacefully (NARA 1, Summary No 35; NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 221) [Were the Koreans able to recover what has been robbed? The report does not answer this important point.]

Apr 25, 1946: Dr. Underwood The “Foreign Mission Conference of North America” has appointed H.H. Underwood as their agent to survey the future prospect of missionary work in Korea. However, during his pre-war stay in Korea Dr. Underwood had openly favored compliance with the [Japanese] government order to bow at Shinto shrines. Recently, he went back to Korea as a councilor to the American occupation authorities. (The Presbyterian Guardian, 25 April 1946, p. 116) [In contrast to foreign missionaries most of whom accepted the compromise, many Korean Christians rejected it. As a result, many of them were imprisoned. The article mentions some 300 martyrs.]

Apr 27, 1946: Seoul. On 23, 24 and 27 April fuse board plugs were removed from
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3 power line poles, resulting in the cutting off of electricity to 3 US Army installations. A signal corpsman who investigated stated that only experienced men could have performed the removal without being electrocuted. (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 217)

[Quite surprisingly, the sabotage section of the same issue has the mention: “Sabotage: none reported”.

Apr 30, 1946: To date,
- 2,531 Koreans have arrived from Hawaii
- 10,764 Koreans have arrived from Pacific Ocean areas.
- 866,000 Koreans have arrived from Japan.

(NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 217)

Apr 30, 1946: US fatalities: 65 (99). By the end of April 1946 there were 110 graves of American military in the US Central Cemetery in Seoul (see Chapter 2). Thirteen of them died before the beginning of the occupation (aircraft crew, prisoners of war) which leaves a total of 97. Up to April 1946 some 32 have been counted in the present chronology. This leaves some 65 who are so far unaccounted for and should be added to the cumulative total.

Apr 30, 1946: Deaths due to smallpox. Between 1 November 1945 and 30 April 1946 there were 44 cases of smallpox which resulted in 17 deaths among Army personnel. (NARA 26)

May 1946: Pusan. 26 persons were tried in provost courts for styling themselves the “Self Government Civilian Guards” (SUM, No 8)

May 1946: Population in a state close to starvation. Here is a description given by the official historian of the 475th Fighter Group based in Seoul.

Along the streets of Seoul, the relatively thriving metropolis of Korea, could be seen the bloated bellies of children, innumerable ribs sharply outlined against their chests, men and women gaunt faced despairing, hopelessly drifting through Seoul.

(Chapter 29 of the history of the 475th Fighter Group, USAAF archives microfilm B0633)

May 1946: Hollywood monopole. Ordinances No 68 and No 115 permitted the confiscation of unauthorized films. In May 1946 at least 12 films from Korea, Germany, France, Italy were confiscated. Thus, Hollywood distributors enjoyed again the same kind of market dominance that they had enjoyed in Korea under Japanese rule between 1926 and 1936. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949 reel 9)

May 1946: In the Seoul-Inchon area a flood created a serious shortage of drinking
water. As a result, water had to be heavily chlorinated. (NARA 26)

**May 1, 1946:** Missed Chinhae (port near Pusan). Two hand grenades were thrown at 2 US sentries. Only one of them exploded. The sentries took cover and were not injured. (NARA 1, Summary No 34; (NDL, FOA no 5046, G-2 Periodic Report No 218)

**May 1, 1946:** The civilian prison population totals 12,150. (SUM, No 8, p. 29)

**May 1, 1946:** Mokpo. Military police restored order after a disturbance at the meeting of 1,500 members of the “Labor Association”.

**May 4, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (40). Killing of a Korean. Corporal Elmer J. Cardinal unlawfully killed Shim Bun Shen by shooting him with a US Army carbine. Sentence of the General Court Martial of 1 June 1946: to be reduced to the grade of private and to forfeit $40 of his pay per month for 6 months (i.e. $240 altogether) (NARA 10)

**May 4, 1946:** Gen. Hodge issued Ordinance No 72 which defines the following punishable offenses [excerpts].

- Acts in support of any organization declared illegal by, or contrary to the interests of, the occupying forces.
- Publishing, importing or circulating printed or written matter that is detrimental to the occupying forces.
- Organizing or attending any public gathering or demonstration for which no permit has been granted.
- Refusing to give information required by the Military Government.

(US Military Government in Korea, 1946. See reference section)

[It must be recognized that such rulings which suppress all forms of protest categorize the MG as a dictatorship.]

**May 6, 1946:** Excerpt of a report of the Department of Public Information of the MG. Some Weeks ago an order was apparently issued down through the Korean police channels to arrest all leftist leaders. Scores of leftists were placed in confinement either on the charge of seizing governmental authority illegally last fall, for failure to register the name of their political organization, for interfering with MG administration, or on no charge whatsoever. (NARA 4b, p.427)

[The graph given in the chapter about quantitative analysis shows indeed a sharp rise in the number of prisoners in early 1946.]

**May 6, 1946:** Sudden indefinite adjournment of the American-Soviet Joint Commission. As its purpose was to bring about a reunified Korea it was a matter of deep
regret for the Korean people. (Seoul Times 19 October 1948 p. 1)

**May 6, 1946:** Seoul. American investigators entered the Chickazawa Building wherein was housed the presses for one of the newspapers of the Communist Party as well as the offices of the Communist Party. The paraphernalia [i.e. a set of devices] of a full-blown counterfeiting operation was found including paper, ink, plates and bogus money. The books and other documents of the party were also seized. (Robinson 1947, p. 113,115)

[It may be that these findings were really genuine. However one must keep in mind that it is one of the oldest tricks used by secret services to take advantage of a raid on an embassy (as for the Soviet embassy in Beijing in 1927) or the offices of a party to include into the findings a number of forged documents.]

Regarding the counterfeiting operation, one wonders why it should have been carried out in Seoul when it could be done without any risk in North Korea. The border was not tightly closed to the point of prohibiting the introduction of bags filled with banknotes.]

**May 6, 1946:** Excerpt of a report of the Department of Public Information of the MG. The rice program is in an impasse. MG has apparently made it legal for a person to buy rice from a farmer above the ceiling price but at the same time it has made it illegal for a farmer to sell rice by insisting that all surplus rice must be turned in to the government. (NARA 4b, p.429)

**May 12, 1946:** Seoul. The offices of several popular newspapers (Choson Inminbo, Chungan Sinmun, and Chayu Sinmun) were destroyed. (US Military Government in Korea, 1946. See reference section)

[Who made these attacks? The next report provides a possible answer.]

**May 12, 1946:** Early in the evening of 12 May attacks were made upon the buildings of the 3 newspapers mentioned in the previous report. These attacks were made by groups that had participated in a mass meeting held by the right at Seoul Stadium in the afternoon. (NARA 4a, p.67)

[History shows that violence against the left is often carried out by right wing groups with the tacit approval of the police. The attack against the student demonstration of 18 January 1946 was another example.]

**May 12, 1946:** Gen. Hodge announced a “counterfeit” ring within the Korean Communist Party and issued arrest warrants. Using the counterfeit charges as a pretext, the US military mounted a major raid across South Korea and arrested key Communist leaders. (US Military Government in Korea, 1946. See reference section)

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143 Other spellings: Chosen In Min Bo (Korean People’s Times), Choog Ang Shin Moon (Central Times), Cha Yoo Shin Moon (Free Press).
May 15, 1946: The Military Government is using hunger as a weapon to subdue Koreans. People complain that the rice collected by the MG is being distributed in areas where groups in its favor are in strength but that areas where progressive forces are strong receive no rice. (Korean Independence 15 May 1946)

[The same kind of pressure was also used in China. As the aid provided by the United Nations Relief organizations was distributed by the Nationalist government, it was given to areas under its control while areas under Communist control were excluded.]

May 15, 1946: Shortly after the American occupation, a university of law and politics was established in Seoul. It had to apply to the Military Government for a permit and was given oral permission. But last week it was shut because a Communist had delivered a series of lectures. The students pointed out that practically all professors were members of the Democratic Party. In protest, they paraded in front of the Capital Building which houses the MG. The mounted police charged the demonstrators. When the students of three other universities, including the Christian University, learned of the brutal attack they started a sympathy strike. (Korean Independence 15 May 1946)

May 18, 1946: At 4pm American soldiers and Military Police raided the office of the “Hailbang Ilbo” newspaper, the official organ of the Korean Communist Party and closed it without giving any reason. (Korean Independence 5 June 1946)

May 26, 1946: A cholera epidemic hit Pusan. (NARA 1, No 52)

[Between May and July the epidemic spread to other provinces; see the date of 10 July and 28 August 1946. It can be remembered that in November 1945 there was a smallpox epidemic.]

Jun 1, 1946: Taejon. Major Harry W. Pardee (age 47), town Mayor and Officer for Transportation and Petroleum Control, sold to a Korean civilian two captured Chevrolet trucks, property of the United States, for the sum of 150,000 yen. On 20 May 1946 he had unlawfully sold 10 drums (each of 230 liters) of gasoline for the sum of 10,104 yen.

He was tried by court martial on 6 September 1946 and sentenced to 3 years at hard labor.

(War Department, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Washington. Opinion of the Board of Review (29 November 1946). Hottenstein, Solf and Flanagan as Judge Advocate.)

Jun 1, 1946: The American-appointed Chief Justice of the Korean Supreme Court announced in a public speech made in the city of Kwanju that (i) those who supported trusteeship should either die or be sent to Russia. (ii) it was not right to release those
arrested on suspicion of hampering national reconstruction just because there was no clear evidence against them. (Robinson 1947, p. 154) [His statements prove at least that he was a fervent anti-Communist for they were both aimed at the Korean Communists. This is probably why he was chosen in the first place.]

Jun 1, 1946: Labor unions and students rioted in Seoul. (G-2 Civil Intelligence section. Occupation trends. Japan and Korea. Report No 25. Consulted at NDL, microfiche WOR 6997.) [The source gives no further information about number of demonstrators and whether the demonstration was suppressed or not.]

Jun 10, 1946: Seoul. A US guard was attacked from behind and shot himself in the feet. (NARA 1, p. 12) [The report says in the feet, not in the foot.]

Jun 12, 1946: American GIs leaving Korea for discharge from the Army are subject to hours-long grilling by Counter Intelligence Corps agents. Their belongings are searched. The purpose is to prevent bad publicity of the MG in America. (Korean Independence 12 June 1946) [This is what happened to Richard Robinson when he left Korea in mid-1947.]

Jun 12, 1946: At present at least 1,000 Koreans are in Military Government prisons. Almost all of them are members of the Communist Party who were arrested on trumped-up charges like “disturbing the peace”. (Korean Independence 12 June 1946)

Jun 12, 1946: Lee Seoung Back, chairman of the Korean Railroad Trade Union, is now serving a prison term of 8.5 years for making an unauthorized speech in the Seoul Railroad shop in January 1946. (Korean Independence 12 June 1946) [A sentence of 8.5 years suggests that Lee was tried by a Military Commission.]

Jun 12, 1946: Black market activities of US personnel. Investigators from the 308th Bomb Wing Provost Marshal’s Office searched the houses near the living quarters of the 475th Fighter Group and uncovered quantities of GI food stuffs, clothing and cigarettes. The same kind of things were discovered in the laundry. As a result the Fighter Group personnel got a warning in the bulletin board. (Ch 30 of the official history of the 475th Fighter Group, USAAF archive microfilm B0633, p. 635)

Jul 1, 1946: • US fatalities: 1 (100). Inchon Harbor. Private First Class James E. Jenkins died. The cause of death given in the Report of Internment was drowning. He was buried at the USAFIK Cemetery in Seoul in grave 26 of Plot 2. Jenkins was an African-American working for the 114 Port Company. (NARA 21)
**Jul 4, 1946:** Declaration made by Richard Robinson to the Korean-American Cultural Society. Excerpt.

“I am rather afraid that we Americans are too prone to preach to others. Actually, we need less preaching to others and more effort at home to fight against those who would use American democracy to further their own selfish interest. Without constant vigilance by educated and enlightened citizens, independence from a foreign master can all too easily merely mean the substitution of a domestic master”.

Robinson’s remarks recognizing that all was not perfect in the United States were reported by American counter-intelligence officers as subversive.

In this book he observes that his description indeed contrasted markedly with the picture of the United States given by the Department of Public Information of the Military Government (in which Robinson had been working for some time). According to the messages delivered by this department, the United States was completely devoid of strikes, racketeers, corruption, political dishonesty and profiteers and had a purely laissez-faire economy.

(Robinson 1947, p. 295)

**Jul 10, 1946:** The cholera epidemic reached 4,081 cases and 2,259 deaths. All provinces were affected but there was not a single case among US personnel. (NARA 1, No 52)

[This epidemic had a very high mortality rate: \( \frac{2259}{4081} = 55\% \). It is quite remarkable that US troops had not a single death.]

**Jul 10, 1946:** On 1 July 1946 General MacArthur issued Proclamation No 4 which nullified Supplemental Military yen currency marked “A” as legal tender in Korea. The proclamation became effective on 10 July 1946. (NARA 1, No 52)

[The “Supplemental Military yen” were banknotes printed in the United States which provided an artificial purchasing power to the occupation force but at the cost of provoking an inflation wave which resulted in a serious devaluation of the yen.]

**Jul 16, 1946:** Seoul. A US Army guard was stabbed and critically wounded by an armed robber at the 3040th Quartermaster. (NARA 1, p. 87)

[“Critically wounded” means that it was a life-threatening wound but the report does not say whether the guard died or not.]

**Jul 23, 1946:** US fatalities: 1 (101). Taegu. At 02:10 an American sentry was killed by an unknown person. He was shot three times through the right side by a rifle. (NARA 1, p. 99)

**Jul 23, 1946:** Policy of Rhee’s party regarding labor unions.

Richard Robinson’s book contains the following account. On 24 July 1946 I interviewed the man responsible for organizing labor in the Samchok area (one of the
most important industrial center in South Korea) for Rhee’s National Society for the Rapid Realization of Korean Independence. He had been a large factory owner under the Japanese. According to his own statements made to me, he did not believe in collective bargaining and thought that labor unions should not be encouraged. When I inquired about what had happened to the left wing unions which had been very strong only a few months ago he replied that the left-wing labor leaders had been imprisoned for dabbling in politics and operating a school for the workers. Later that same day I went on a tour through the chemical works. The workers gave our group unfriendly glances. No one would say anything about their political sentiments. They were obviously frightened.

Such was the labor organization to which the American Command gave its full stamp of approval. It is little wonder that the workers turned more and more toward Communism.

(Robinson 1947, p. 126-127)

**Jul 29, 1946:** ● Korean civilians killed: 1 (41). Seoul. During the trial of Communist leaders charged with counterfeiting, a mob tried to free the defendants. In the melee which followed one Korean was killed and 50 were arrested. (Robinson 1947 p. 113)

[This trial ended on 28 November 1946. Four of the defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment and the remaining 6 to 10-15 year terms. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 4)]

**Jul 30, 1946:** Kwangju. A raid on local Communist homes was made by the CIC. The search revealed no arms but many pamphlets and other political documents were confiscated. (NARA 4a, p.135)

[This episode shows that the MG was trying to suppress Communists in the province of Cholla Namdo even before the riots of the fall.]

**Aug 1, 1946:** Seoul. Three US soldiers were attacked on a dark street by a large group of Koreans. One soldier was hit over the head. (NARA 1, p. 120)

**Aug 2, 1946:** Haui Do uprising. Haui Island (also spelled Hai Do) is a small island some 30 kilometers south west of the port of Mokpo. It has currently 1,900 inhabitants and is the birth place of former president Kim Dae Jung (known as “DJ” in South Korea). Like Cheju Island, Haui Do was also a place where opponents and agitators from the mainland were exiled during Japanese rule. In the summer of 1946 it was the theater of a peasant uprising. There are two conflicting accounts of this episode. The first which is fairly short is given by the Korean Central News Agency (North Korea); it says: “700 farmers on Haui Island were massacred attending a pro-
democracy demonstration”.
The second one which is much longer can be found in a book written by Edward Grant Meade (1951) who was a member of the MG in the province of South Cholla where Haui-Do is located. It goes as follows.
When the “New Korean Company” wanted to increase grain collection quotas there was a revolt which the local police repressed by inflicting many beatings. Then, on August 2 the people burned down the police box and the office of the “New Korean Company”. One man was shot. Reinforcements were dispatched from Mokpo (two hours away by ship) and 16 persons were arrested. After that, a mob of 600 persons attacked the police and the company employees. Four police and two employees were badly beaten. On August 4, 70 additional police were sent to the island. They were roughly treated. A few of them escaped to the mainland with a lurid story of violence and revolt.
On 8 August 1946 a team of 16 US soldiers of the 33rd Company landed on the island with fixed bayonets and in full combat regalia. The work of the officer who headed this team was a model of intelligent government and constitutes a high point in civil affairs.
Before the team started out on its mission it had been briefed that Hai Do was a pro-Communist hotbed of anti-American radicals. The officer was not inclined to accept this report at face value. He organized meetings with the farmers and three weeks later 90% of grain quota were filed. (Meade 1951 p. 230-231).
[The account by Meade is a nice story. The question is whether it is true. One aspect seems surprising. This revolt followed a pattern that what subsequently repeated in several other places. Beatings by police led to attacks on police boxes and eventually to intervention of US troops. However, in the other cases the repression involved arrest, indictment and sentencing of several hundred people. Here, on the contrary, in spite of the fact that police and employees of the “New Korean Company” (founded by the MG) had been beaten, the account does not mention any arrests or trials. In this happy end story all the crimes that were committed were seemingly forgiven. The second surprising point is the fact that 90% of the grain collection quotas were delivered. It is commonly admitted that in the summer and fall of 1946 there was a severe shortage of grains and food (which was recognized as one major cause of the uprisings). So, one wonders how, after having first opposed such quotas, the farmers eventually came to accept them. Persuasion cannot fill stomachs. The story would become more plausible if the discussions with the farmers had led to a reduction of the quotas but this is not mentioned in the account.]

Aug 2, 1946: Taejon. A serious disorder involving 3,000 Koreans and 30 colored
soldiers of the 1321st Engineer Regiment developed at the railroad station. After these soldiers had been attacked by the crowd, reinforcements from the same regiment arrived in a truck. Some 8 Koreans were injured by blows on the head. Earlier in the afternoon, 4 men from the same regiment had been caught by Korean police in the act of selling gasoline. The report complains that “there was no officer in charge. A lack of control seems to prevail in this unit”. (NARA 4a, p. 95)

Aug 7, 1946: CIC [Counter Intelligence Corps] personnel raided the home of the chief of political affairs of the South Korean Communist Party. (Reardon 2008, p. 217)

Aug 7, 1946: The chairman of the “Democratic National Front” (left wing), Lyuh Woon Heung, was kidnapped but was able to escape. (Korean Independence 7 August 1946)

[He will be assassinated less than one year later, on 23 July 1947 (see below).]

Aug 10, 1946: Pusan. Around 21:00 two US sailors were attacked by a Korean who slashed one sailor on the wrist with a knife. He was taken to hospital where he received a blood transfusion. (NARA 1, p. 131)

Aug 10, 1946: Seoul area. Several soldiers were injured in a traffic accident which occurred on an unknown date previous to 9 August. This was reported in a letter written by one of them to his family back in Ohio. However, the letter gives very little information about the circumstances of the accident (BGSU 1, letter of 10 August by Jim Leiser.)

Aug 11, 1946: Seoul. Three jeeps of the 7th Army en route to Uijongbu were stoned by a group of 350 Koreans as they were leaving the eastern edge of Seoul. One windshield was broken but no injury was reported. One jeep continued on while the other two returned to Seoul. (NARA 1, p. 131, NARA 4a, p. 521)

Aug 15, 1946: Pusan. At 02:45 am a US guard stationed in a tower on the perimeter of the Pungsong stockade was fired on twice from outside the stockade. No injury was reported although the first shot pierced his helmet liner and the second grazed his shirt at the shoulder. (NARA 1, p. 145)

[Why did the assailant not fire again? Did he have only two cartridges?]

Aug 15, 1946: Kwangju: Suppression of the miner demonstration. A detailed account was given in Chapter 2, Section: case-study of the reliability of US military sources.

Aug 16, 1946: Radiogram from XXIV Corps Headquarters to the 475th Fighter Group.
Fig. 6.4 M7 tank. Several versions of the M7 tank were used by the US Army in World War II. For the kind of operation performed in South Korea before the outbreak of the Korean War it was the machine gun at the top (rather than the howitzer) which was the most useful. *Source: Wikipedia article entitled “M7 priest”*

“The successful employment of fighter aircraft in prevention of civilian riots and disturbances on 15 August 1946 indicated the value of continuing such demonstrations. It is recommended that frequent flights be made over the following towns: Yosu, Mokpo, Kwangju, Cheju, Iri, Kunsan, Chipsong-Ni, Taegu, Taejon, Inchon, Pusan, Samchok, Suwon, Sunchon, Rosong. A minimum altitude of 330 m will be adhered to unless specific requests for low level flights over troubled areas have been made”. (AirForce 2, p. 708)

**Aug 21, 1946:** ● Korean civilians killed: 3 (44). Yongdungpo. US troops were called in to quell the disorder when Korean police could not stop it. (SUM, No 8, p. 670)

**Aug 21, 1946:** Enumeration of offenses against the Military Government. Without limiting the provisions of proclamation No 2, GHQ, USAFAC [United States Army Forces in the Pacific], 7 September 1945, the following are declared to be offenses against the Military Government.

[A list of 82 articles follows which begins by “Killing, assaulting, or wounding any member of the occupying forces”. Punishment will be as the court shall determine. Offenders on these counts would only be tried by Military Government courts (provost courts or military commissions).] (Korean Independence 21 August 1946)

**Aug 21, 1946:** Chunchon. Two US soldiers PFC William L. Engle and PFC Jonathan Robinson were set upon and beaten by 40 Koreans. Robinson had to be sent to the 29th General Hospital for treatment of his injuries. (NARA 4a, p. 123)

**Aug 21, 1946:** Chonju (also spelled Jeonju, south of Daejeon). Kuwa-ri food riot.
“The CIC agent went out and met the Communists. He succeeded in rounding up approximately 100 of them and ordered them to lay down their hand-made weapons. After that the police arrived and arrested the leaders.” (NARA 4b, p.129) [A single CIC agent disarmed and rounded up 100 Communists. Does this seem plausible?]

**Aug 24, 1946:** Gen. Hodge issued Ordinance No 118 that authorized elections for a South Korean “interim legislative assembly.” (SKILA). Half of the SKILA members will be appointed by the Military Government which will also have absolute veto power. Not all Koreans will be able to vote, only tax payers and landlords.

William Langdon (US State Dept.) wrote:
“As the State Department may be aware, the administrative officials of military government, because of the antagonism and virtual boycott of military government by the Left from the very beginning, are predominantly rightist. Thus the administrative preparations for the elections have been largely in their hands; and because of their tendency toward partisanship on the one hand and the lack of interest in the elections by most local leftists on the other hand, it is a foregone conclusion that an overwhelming majority of rightist members will be elected.” (US Military Government in Korea, 1946. See reference section)

**Aug 26, 1946:** • **US fatalities: 1 (102).** Private First Class John A. Roum (serial number 36997575) died from acute encephalitis at 22:23 at the 1st Station Hospital in Seoul. He belonged to the “184 Malaria Survey Detachment”, a branch of the US Army.

He was given a temporary grave at the USAFIK Central Cemetery in Seoul. His grave was in plot 2, row No 4, grave No 40. The remains were disinterred on 22 May 1947 and the casket was shipped to San Francisco. (NARA 14)

[At the USAFIK Central Cemetery in Seoul each plot had 100 graves which means that by the end of August 1946 some 140 US personnel had died in the Seoul area. At this point we still do not know if, apart from the one in Seoul, there were other USAFIK temporary cemeteries in South Korea.

The annual report of medical activities in XXIV Corps mentions that during the week from 24 August 1946 to 30 August 1946 there were 4 cases of Japanese B encephalitis among Army personnel of the Seoul area which resulted in one death.]

**Aug 26, 1946:** Seoul. A provost court of the 97th Military Government Group sentenced a Korean to 2 months CHL (Confinement at hard labor) and to pay a fine of 5,000 yen or serve an additional 3 months. (NARA 8, folder 1)

[The interest of this sentence lies in the fact that it specifies the equivalence between non-payment of the fine and prison time; basically:
Non-payment of a fine of 1,600 yen = 1 month in prison.
The “Manual for Provost Courts” (paragraph 23) says that the defendant who cannot or will not pay the fine may be required to serve an additional time at a rate of 1 month for each 1,250 yen remaining unpaid (NARA 8).

Sometimes, especially for big fines, the rate was very different. For instance, a person tried in Seoul on 24 September 1946 must pay a fine of 300,000 yen or remain in prison for an additional 12 month. The standard rate would have resulted in a prison term of 20 years!

**Aug 28, 1946:** In the cholera epidemic there have been 10,955 cases of which 7,193 died. No American was affected. (NARA 1, No 52)

[This represents a fatality/case ratio of 66%. A subsequent report written in March 1947 (NARA 28, p. 22) gave the following figures: 16,000 cases and about 10,000 deaths which corresponds to a ratio of 63%. The fact that no American was affected can be explained by the existence of a vaccin. The same report says that 40 million cubic-cm of cholera vaccine, most of it Korean made, were distributed and administered. The report does not say how many Koreans were vaccinated. The epidemic was finally brought under control in November 1946.]

**Aug 29, 1946:** Through Ordinance No 102 the Military Government established Seoul National University. (NARA 1, No 52)

[The same policy was followed in other occupied countries, e.g. creation of the International Christian University in Tokyo or the Free Berlin University.]

**Aug 29, 1946:** Seoul. The American police opened fire upon a demonstration of unarmed people who marched to the building of the American military administration with the demand to transfer the power to the Korean people. (NDL, John Melby papers, MELBY 3943)

**Sep 6, 1946:** Four left-wing newspapers were suspended, namely the Chosun Inmin Po (Korean People’s Press), Hyern (or Huyun) Dai Ilbo (Modern Daily News), Choon (or Chung) Ang (Central Times of Korea) and Si Moon. They will be prosecuted for violation of SCAP Proclamation No 2.

At the same time General Hodge ordered the arrest of Pak Heun Yung, the leader of the Korean Communist Party and of Lee Chu Wha, secretary of the Communist Party and Lee Kang Kook, a leader of the Democratic People’s Front. However, none of these men could be arrested. (NARA 1, No 52, Robinson 1947 p. 118)

**Sep 11, 1946:** Gen. Hodge announced that all USAMGIK departments will be turned over to Korean directors with American “advisers”. (US Military Government in Korea, 1946)
**Sep 12, 1946:** Assassination attempt against Dr. Rhee when 4 small caliber rounds were fired into his car. (NARA 2, No 83)

**Sep 14, 1946:** Cooperation between American missionaries and the Military Government.

Subject: Policy for admission of missionaries to Korea.


Excerpt

The assistance given to Military Government by missionaries who have previously served in Korea, who know the Koreans, their traits and habits have been found in many cases to be invaluable. In consideration of the service which they are rendering, it is believed to be fully justified to offer in return such assistance as purchasing privileges for food, clothing and assistance in billeting.

(NARA, RG 554, Box 15)

[US missionaries played an important role in recommending Koreans for positions in the Military Government. As a result many conservative Korean Christians were selected. This point was emphasized by Roger Baldwin in his memorandum on Korea.]

**Sep 14, 1946:** Missed Kunsan (Gunsan) on the west cost of central Korea. A US MP guarding PX supplies (i.e. supplies that can be bought by the GIs) was fired upon by an unknown person. The bullet missed. (NARA 1, p. 230)

**Sep 18, 1946:** 11 persons were arrested on a 300,000 yen counterfeit charge. (Seoul Times 18 September 1946)

[Incidentally, it can be noted that in this issue of the “Seoul Times” the Kojubu cartoon (see chapter 1) had been replaced by two US cartoons, namely “Henry” by Carl Anderson and “Blondie” by Chic Young.]

**Sep 20, 1946:** During the week ending on 20 September 6 cases were tried by the Chongno [central Seoul] provost court. Among them were the following.

- Hostile writing against the US Military Government: 1 year at hard labor.
- Attempt to damage US Army installations: 6 months at hard labor.
- Illegal possession of explosives: one year confinement at hard labor and a fine of 15,000 yen.

(Seoul Times 4 October 1946 p. 1)

[15,000 yen was a big amount of money. In case the person was not able to pay it, this would add $15000/1250 = 12$ months to the prison sentence.]

**Sep 23, 1946:** Some 8,000 railway workers went on strike in Pusan. The strike quickly spread to most major cities. The strikers demanded more rice, more pay, housing and food for unemployed and refugees from North, release of all political
prisoners and the restoration of the People’s committees. Gen. Hodge ordered mass arrests of the strikers.

(US Military Government in Korea, 1946)

**Sep 23, 1946:** In a special radio broadcast, General Lerch, American Military Governor, declared the strike of railway workers illegal and all strikers liable to arrest. On the following day in Pusan armed police and US Military Police attacked the strikers in an attempt to arrest the leaders. Once in police hands, non rightist labor leaders are often tortured.

(STATE DEPT 1945-1949 reel 10. The account is excerpted from a letter sent to President Truman by an American union leader, Harvey Park, who was able to meet Korean workers. The last sentence is from a report made by Arthur C. Bunce, US Economic Adviser.)

[The legal argument for declaring the strike illegal was that the MG was the legal owner of the railway, all workers were therefore government employees and thus their strike was illegal. This was of course a purely US argument because in many countries government employees have the right to strike.]

**Sep 23, 1946:** Seoul. Korean people who had received an evacuation order from the Property Custodian’s Office demonstrated at the residence of General Hodge. They wanted to attract Gen. Hodge’s attention on the fact that they had no place to live. (NARA 4a, p. 165)

**Sep 24, 1946:** The entire membership of 18 locals of the Railway Workers’ Union, 40,000 strong, joined the strike of railway workers, stopping the operation of all railway transportation. (Song 1989 p. 251)

**Sep 24, 1946:** Oh Byung No, the representative of the “South Korean Railroad Workers Association to Improve Labor Conditions” made the following announcement to the press. “We presented the following demands on 14 September to the officials of the Transportation Department. We have not yet received any official reply and we started to walk out because we do not expect to receive any official reply under normal working conditions”.

The demands.

- We demand four hops of rice per laborer per day and three hops for our families.
- We oppose the daily payment system\(^\text{144}\).
- We oppose the planned cut in the number of employees.

[As the strikers’ employer was the Department of Transportation, itself part of the Military Government these demands were in fact addressed to the Military Gov-

\(^{144}\text{Previously a monthly salary system had been used.}\)
ernment. By the way, the reduction in the number of employees was an economy measure proposed by the Military Government. A similar policy was introduced 2 years later in Japan.

This trend toward precarious, insecure and poorly paid jobs was a harbinger of what would happen on a broader scale in industrial countries once the control power of unions would be eliminated that is to say from 1980s on in the United States and one or two decades later in Europe.

At first both left-wing and right-wing unions were participating in the strike. However, a few days later after General Hodge had called the strike a Communist machination, the right-wing unions resumed work.]

**Sep 25, 1946:** Seoul. Ko Hyung Un was sentenced to 6 months at hard labor by the Changno Provost Court [Changno is an area of central Seoul] on 25 September. He was found guilty of representing himself as a personal secretary of Dr. Rhee Syngman. (Seoul Times 2 October 1946 p. 1)

[During those days there were certainly many other provost court trials of strikers and protesters. So, this information of the Seoul Times provides a very restrictive view. Moreover, the article does not mention that Provost Courts were US military courts.]

**Sep 25, 1946:** Kaesong. About 25 Koreans attacked two American soldiers. One soldier sustained head and eye injuries. The second received only minor bruises on the arm. (NARA 1, No 56)

**Sep 26, 1946:** The Seoul police launched systematic attacks on all local strike headquarters and arrested union leaders. (Song 1989 p. 253)

**Sep 28 – Oct 2, 1946:** *Alternative account of the events in Taegu* In a book published in 1979, Harold H. Sunoo gives the following account of the events in Taegu which is fairly different from the official US-Korean account.

On 28 September armed police attacked the workers’ dormitories slaying several workers.

On 2 October the students of the Taigu Medical School, the Teacher’s College, the Agricultural College as well as high school students were having an orderly demonstration through the city, carrying the bodies of several slain workers. The procession was halted in front of the police station where two machine guns were installed and more than one hundred policemen waited. The chief of police ordered the demonstrators to disperse. The students maintained their ranks solidly and demanded the police force to withdraw. The police disre-

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145 Located in the north of South Korea until the Korean War, the city is now in North Korea, not far from the 38th parallel.
garded the appeal whereupon the students rushed into the police station. They were successful because the police were reluctant to shoot and in fact many of the policemen joined the students. The students then forced the police to concede three points (i) Release of all democrats from jail (ii) No retaliatory action by the police (iii) Police duties should be performed without arms. However, American tanks and motorized units were mobilized in the city and attacked demonstrators in the afternoon leaving a wake of murdered youth. (Sunoo 1979 p. 55-56 and 198)

This account is mainly based on an interview of a former medical student in Taigu conducted by the author during his visit to Korea in the summer of 1961. The repression by US troops that he describes is similar to the one in Masan as told by Harry Savage in his letter to President Truman. It can also be noted that the reluctance of the policemen to go out against the demonstrators is confirmed by a US account.

Sep 30, 1946: Lee Sang Ho and Kwang Tai Byuk, respectively chief editor and administrative chief of the “Korean Central Times” (Choong Ang Sin Moon). were tried by a US provost court for violation of proclamation No 2 and sentenced to 18 months of hard labor. However the sentences were suspended by order of General Hodge. (NARA 5, No 343)

Sep 30, 1946: The Chonpyong’s [which was the main Korean Union] Committee for the general strike in South Korea was established at the Kyongsong factory at Yongsan. Under the leadership of Chang Taek-sang, the Seoul police chief, some 2,000 policemen and 2,000 strikebreakers attacked the 2,000 railway workers. 3 workers were reported killed, 40 injured and a total of 1,700 strikers were arrested. (Song 1989 p. 254)

[For a clash which involved a total of 6,000 people the casualty toll seems fairly low: less than 1% injured or killed.]

Sep 30, 1946: The director of the MG Department of Transportation explained the American methods used in suppressing the strikes in the following terms:

We went into that situation just like we go into battle. We were out to break that thing up and didn’t have time to worry if a few innocent people got hurt. We set up concentration camps outside of town and held strikers there when the jails got too full. It was war. And that is the way we fought it.

About 150 strike leaders were tried in the military courts. By 3 October about 45% of South Korean trains were back in operation. (Song 1989, p. 255)

[Song cites this excerpt of Meacham (1947). In spite of this statement, he provides
almost no evidence of US involvement in the suppression of the strike. Only the Korean police is mentioned which in fact was poorly armed. That concentration camps were required is explained by the fact that over 10,000 workers were arrested.

**Sep 30, 1946:** Electric repairmen, telegraph office workers strike. Slow progress in rail negotiations due to the fact that many union agents hide. (Seoul Times 30 September 1946 p. 1)

[These titles on the first page of the Seoul Times show some concern for social unrest but hardly at the level that one would expect at this critical moment.]

**Oct 1946:** Ordinances promulgated by the American Military Government curtailed the basic freedoms of speech, assembly. For instance ordinance 72 which defines the crimes against the Military Government lists 82 items including:

- Attendance to gatherings or demonstrations for which no permit has been granted by the Military Government.
- Publishing and circulating printed or written matter which is detrimental or disrespectful to the occupying forces.
- Ordinance 55 requires that any group of more than 3 persons engaged in political activity furnish to the Military Government a complete list of its members, and the address of its meeting place.

(Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10, No 5, p. 145)

[The same article which is entitled “Our record in Korea” notes that news from Korea are limited by the fact that American journalists must operate under army control.]

**Oct 1946:** Missed Two home-made incendiary bombs were planted in the MG Provincial Headquarters in Pusan. (NARA 4b, p.316)

[The exact date is not specified and there are no details about damage or casualties.]

**Oct 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (45). At the border between North and South Korea US medical teams were in charge of inoculating all Koreans entering the American zone. To insert the needle required that only a sleeve be raised. Notwithstanding every Korean woman of desirable age was completely stripped, handled and not infrequently raped. Many incidents occurred including one murder. (Korean Independence 2 October 1946)

**Oct 1, 1946:** Taegu. Police shot into a crowd of student demonstrators killing one student. The enraged citizens stormed the police station and killed 38 police officers (mostly former Japanese police). American tanks moved in to restore order. (US Military Government in Korea, 1946)

**Oct 2, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 5 (50). *Summary account of the uprising in Taegu.* When a large mob stormed the main police station the police ran for their
lives rather than mounting an effective defense. When American civil affairs personnel requested assistance from Colonel Russel J. Potts from the 1st Infantry Regiment they were dismayed to learn that he refused to send any US troops in Taegu unless he received full authority to declare martial law.\footnote{What was at issue was probably not so much the point of declaring martial law than the kind of methods that would be used to restore order. As always in such situations there were basically two options: the police option or the full warfare option. The two options differed by the caliber of the weapons that would be used and, consequently, by the number of civilians that would be killed.}

American MG personnel received a second surprise when Korean Constabulary units remained in their barracks rather than halt the rioting. The Constabulary officers were worried that their enlisted ranks, which contained many leftists sympathizers, would refuse to obey if told to fire on the rioters.

Before the belated arrival of US troops and armored vehicles, the rioters had relocated to the outskirts of the city. When the rioters refused to disperse the Americans opened fire killing several Koreans.

(Reardon 2008, p. 218)

[This short account written by a US Army historian gives several precisions which are not clearly stated in the G-2 reports. (i) the fact that Korean troops could not be used (ii) the fact that Colonel Potts put conditions before engaging US troops (iii) the fact that armored vehicles were used and an undetermined number of Koreans were killed, most of them in the outskirts of the city.]

\textbf{Oct 2, 1946:} Taegu. An agreement has been reached between demonstrators and the chief of police but by 3:30pm US troops began to mobilize tanks and then exerted themselves to break up the gathering of the crowd. So the police ignored the agreement and began to arrest the leaders. At 6pm martial law was proclaimed. (Korean Independence 25 December 1946)

[The publication does not give any indication about casualties and in a general way it gives very little facts about the role of American troops in the suppression of the fall uprisings. Did this journal not get any testimonies of Koreans who took part in these events?]

\textbf{Oct 2, 1946:} At this time Taegu had a population of 50,000. In the afternoon, American troops equipped with tanks and machine guns patrolled the streets. At 7pm the MG declared martial law. \textit{The sound of shooting did not stop throughout the night.} An International News Service reported that the city looked like a battlefield. (Song 1989 p. 263)

[The picture suggested by this source differs from the account given in G-2 reports in 3 aspects: (i) Number of troops (ii) Frequency of shootings (iii) Aspect of the city after the repression. This description rather resembles the Masan episode (see below}
at the date of 7 October) as described in Harry Savage’s letter.]

**Oct 2, 1946:** Taegu.
- 09:15: A mob began to form in front of the Taegu police station. It consisted mainly of school children of all ages. The demonstrators were bearing the body of a civilian killed during last night. They demanded that police be disarmed and that people be given more food.
- 11:00: Four police in front of the railroad station started shooting at civilians.
- 11:30: The mob over-ran the police station driving police into the barracks compound of the 99th Military Government for protection.
- 12:15: After demonstrators had attacked police boxes there was an intervention of US tactical troops. With four M-7 tanks they broke up mobs and cleared the streets.\(^{147}\)
- At 15:00 the city was placed under martial law. The crowd was disbanded and in three hours the US troops had recovered the police boxes.
- 15:30: Colonel Heron met two labor leaders who demanded that people be given three hop of rice per day (that is to say 0.54 liter), that police be disarmed and that mass funeral be held for dead. Colonel Heron refused.
(NARA 1, No. 56, NARA 4a, p. 361-366, 460)
[The last demand suggests that as early as 2 October a great number of people (apart from police) had already been killed.]

**Oct 2-3, 1946:** Sabotage. Two bridges were blown up on the main highway north of Waegan. American troops are guarding all railroad bridges in the vicinity. (NARA 5, No 346)

**Oct 3, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 2 (52). Tongyong (near Taegu). At 11:00 the leftists attacked the police force and took control of the town. Police reinforcement coming from Masan were turned back.
At that point the Military Government requested aid of tactical troops. Two batteries of field artillery were dispatched at 19:00. In attempting to restore order American troops have of necessity been involved in the shooting of a number of Koreans They released a number of policemen and made 15 arrests. (NARA 1, No 56-57; G-2 periodic report No 347)
[How were such results achieved so quickly? Why was field artillery an adequate means for controlling an urban riot? As always the G-2 report does not give any details.]

**Oct 3, 1946:** Office workers of the Chosun Industrial Bank tried to strike but 40

\(^{147}\)A M-7 mount allows the gun to cover a 360 degree range. The gun can be a machine gun or a heavier gun. M-7 mounts with 105mm howitzer were common in the US army during World War II.
of them suspected of agitating were discharged by bank officials. (Seoul Times 3 October 1946)
[Since 19 October 1945 the president of the Chosun Industrial Bank was a US Naval officer (see at this date).]

**Oct 3, 1946:** Inchon. 1,000 out of 1,300 workers in Korea’s largest rolling stock factory walked out after making the same demands as the railway workers. Members of a (rightist) labor union attempting to prevent the strike came to blows with the strikers. Police were immediately called and put a stop to the rioting in a short time. (Seoul Times 3 October 1946)
[The article does not say whether or not the strike continued.]

**Oct 3, 1946:** Seoul. More than 100 workers of the Tram Car Service of the Seoul Electric Company and several agitators were arrested by police and charged with disturbing other workers. Full details were not learned because police refused to give out any information. One of the police officials said that they were ordered to keep their mouth closed to the press by MG. (Seoul Times 3 October 1946)
[This issue of the Seoul Times gives a fairly restrictive account of the strikes, protests and disturbances which were under way in Korea at that time. The second sentence makes clear that the newspaper relied solely on official information and did not try to send reporters to investigate and interview the strikers.]

**Oct 3, 1946:** The “North Korean Democratic Joint Front” drew up a long list of “crimes against the people committed by the American forces” which it addressed to General Hodge.
Included in the North Korean document is also a listing of the number of people by province who participated in the mass meetings. The total number was about 2.5 million. (NARA 1, No 56-57; G-2 periodic report No 347)
[Because of the National Security Law such a document cannot be found in South Korean university libraries.]

**Oct 3, 1946:** Yongchon. A mob of 10,000 attacked the police station and killed the county chief (kunsu) and some 40 police officers. The mob killed some 20 landlords and pro-Japanese officials. Mob actions spread to many counties and villages throughout South Korea.
(US Military Government in Korea, 1946.)

**Oct 3, 1946:** • **Missed** Waegwan (50 km north west of Taegu). A patrol of US troops was fired upon by a group of 18 Koreans (not all were armed). The patrol returned fire and the Koreans fled. No casualties were suffered by the patrol. Korean casualties, if any, are unknown. (NARA 1, No 57)
[This is one of the numerous accounts of events involving US troops that sound fairly
unrealistic. One would expect that the group of Koreans began to fire from a well chosen, protected position. Let us assume that one half of them had rifles. The first surprise is that all the 9 Koreans who fired missed their targets. This could be the case if they fired from far away (say from over 50m) but only very inexperienced fighters would start an ambush in such conditions. The second surprise is that after an exchange of shots, the party who was in a protected position fled, thereby leaving cover at the risk of being targeted by the US patrol. We do not necessarily imply that the account is wrong but in the sketchy form in which it is presented it does not sound plausible.

Oct 3, 1946: Taegu. Proclamations 1, 2 and 3 were posted in different parts of the city. (NARA 4a, p. 369)
[It would be interesting to know what they said.]

Oct 3-4, 1946: Kyongju (near Taegu). Yesterday morning Communists of Kyongju presented the following demands to the mayor. (i) Barley returned to farmers at once (ii) No rice collections (iii) All officials should resign. Later a mob of 300 students attacked the police station killing a number of Korean Constabulary. US troops (one officer and 20 men with full field equipment) were dispatched to occupy the town and maintain order. (NARA 4a, p.372-373)

Oct 4, 1946: A train with 11 cars of wheat left Pusan for Seoul. (NARA 4a, p.372)
[Given the scarcity of food in the south the transportation of wheat to Seoul could certainly anger starving people.]

Oct 4, 1946: Seoul. 38 Korean police were slain in riots at Taikyu connected with a railroad strike. Martial law was declared. (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10, No 5, p. 172)

Oct 4, 1946: More than 20 police were slain as rioting erupted in Red Center of Taegu. US Army authorities said that US troops did not fire a shot so far. (Seoul Times 4 October 1946)
[In spite of the fact that this account came 3 days after the events, the newspaper did not in any way try to interview people in order to learn what really happened.]

Oct 5, 1946: Korean civilians killed: 2 (54). Sonsan. An officer and 16 enlisted men guarding a grain convoy were stoned by a mob which opposed the removal of food. When the crowd refused to disperse the troops were ordered to fire in the crowd. Two or three Koreans fell. The convoy then drove on. (NARA 1, p. 260)

The only military casualty reported during these events occurred when a soldier accidentally discharged his weapon at the command “Inspection arms” and wounded a soldier standing next to him in ranks. (NARA 4a, p.200)

Action recommended:
(1) That Colonel Herron, Provincial Military Governor, and Major Plezia, Security Officer be relieved at once and that their replacements be sent as soon as possible.
(2) That military commissions be appointed in Taegu and elsewhere and that those perpetrating disorders be brought to trial at as early a date as practicable. (NARA 4a, p.200)

Oct 5, 1946: Five bridges were blown up between Kumchon and Waegwan near the 38th parallel. Further south, near Andong (about 100 km north of Taegu) the insurgents went into the telephone exchange and disconnected all connections including US Army circuit from Andong to Taegu. (NARA 4a, p.377)

Oct 5, 1946: Many demonstrators were slain in protest against US. (WP p. 4)

Oct 5, 1946: General Hodge issued the martial law order after police had precipitated widespread violence by opening fire on pickets who had tried to stop a train. (Daily Worker 7 October 1946 p. 2)

Oct 6, 1946: Elements of the US Sixth Division were called on to rescue several policemen from a mob at Tongyong-gun. It was also announced that US military police had raided a warehouse, a few miles from Seoul and discovered arms that included one machine gun and 50 rifles. They were believed to have been stored there by striking railroad workers.
Moreover, the US Military Government in Korea announced that the entire province of Kyongsong Pukto, where 59 policemen were killed during the past week, has been placed under martial law. (NYT p. 43)

Oct 6, 1946: Kimpo Air Base. Between 3 am and 7 am two 110 volt transformers were stolen in the grounds of the Senior Officers’ Hotel. They were recovered after being found hidden about 400 m from the hotel. (AirForce 1, p. 4)

(US Military Government in Korea, 1946)

M. Armendarez died, apparently as a result of methylism incurred after the deceased drank Korean alcohol. (NARA 19)

**Oct 7, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 8 (66). Masan. 500 persons attacked and destroyed the police station. The disturbance was broken up by 40 US troops who fired into the crowd. The gunfire inflicted heavy casualties which disintegrated the mob. 8 rioters were killed and about 150 were arrested. It was one of the bloodiest repulses of rioters. (NARA 1, No 56, 57, NARA 4b p. 350)

[One would like to know what kind of weapons were used, rifles or heavy machine guns? It can be observed that the report gives no information about the wounded. According to the testimony of Sergeant Harry Savage given in chapter 1, the previous account is fairly misleading. Savage wrote: “Our entire battalion (about 500 to 1,000 soldiers) patrolled the town all day with dead bodies lying all over the streets and we kept our machine guns blazing. About two weeks later the *Stars and Stripes* [an US Army newspaper] had an article about it. They said that there had been a riot in Masan but American troops restored law and order without firing a shot”.

So, we have seen three different versions involving increasing numbers of people killed:

- The *Stars and Stripes*: 0 killed
- The G-2 report: 8 killed
- The Harry Savage document: indeterminate number of civilians killed, but certainly much more than 8.]

**Oct 7, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 16 (82). Chinju (south east coast of Korea). While attempting to disperse a large crowd which had armed itself with spears and clubs, the police were forced to fire into the crowd killing two. The mob later reassembled for an attack on the city hall. Tactical troops were used and they also were forced to fire into the crowd killing 4 and wounding many more. The mob dispersed around 13:00. About 100 rioters were arrested. The peasant demonstrators wanted the MG to stop rice collections for the benefit of “profiteers”.

One week later there was another confrontation in which 10 persons were killed (NARA 1, No 57; NARA 5, No 348; Song 1989 p. 267)

[It can be observed that the report gives no information about the wounded. After firing into a crowd the number of wounded should be some 3 times the number of the dead (see the data about Koje Island in Chapter 2) NARA 1 refers to the weekly summary whereas NARA 5 refers to the daily report. It can be noted that the daily report does not give more details (rather less in fact) than the weekly summary.]
**Oct 7, 1946:** The US MG set up the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly: 50% elected and 50% appointed by the MG. Only two leftists were elected (from Cheju Island) but they were assassinated upon their arrival in Seoul. To his credit, Gen. Hodge recognized a rigged election and appointed 31 leftists to the Assembly. (US Military Government in Korea, 1946)

**Oct 7, 1946:** All of North Kyongsang province is under US martial law. Hodge’s Headquarters said American troops had not fired a shot and had not suffered casualties; it was said that the crowd fled after the appearance of US troops. (North China Daily News p. 4)

[The fact that this newspaper published in Shanghai only reports the statement issued by the US Headquarters shows that it had no independent source of information about the events in South Korea.]

**Oct 7, 1946:** American newspapermen are reporting the situation from US headquarters because they have been given no facilities to reach the trouble spots. (Daily Worker 7 October 1946 p. 2)

**Oct 8, 1946:** Pusan. A student riot resulted in 24 deaths. (US Military Government in Korea, 1946)

**Oct 8, 1946** Revision of custom laws. Custom duties shall not exceed 10% ad valorem. Articles imported by US armed forces in Korea shall be exempt from import duties. (NDL, microfiche FOA-4962)

[The price differential between the products imported regularly and those available in Army exchanges (the so-called PX exchange stations) was a clear incentive for black market operations by US servicemen.]

**Oct 8, 1946:** All officers on Kimpo Air Base were issued 0.45 caliber pistols and were instructed to wear them off the base. Vehicles dispatched to other places carried armed guards. (AirForce 1, p. 3)


The place of death is not given; the only indication is that the death occurred in the unit to which Jensen belonged, not in a hospital. As the body was received (and stored) at the mortuary of the 107th Quarter Master Platoon in Seoul it is likely that the death occurred not far from Seoul. As the body was unrecognizable, it was identified through the watch found on the body.

The body was shipped to Kelso in Washington State on 6 November 1946. (NARA 21)
[Normally, the certificate of death indicates the kind of accident that lead to the death, but in this case the only indication is that the death was caused by 3rd degree burns of entire body. It can be recalled that on 4 December 1945 a fire completely destroyed the barracks occupied by two companies of the 32nd Infantry Regiment in Seoul. Was there another fire on 9 October 1946? At this point we do not know what caused this death.]

**Oct 10, 1946:**  ● Missed  Camp Skipworth (east of Taegu). At 01:20 while making a change of guard a MP patrol was fired upon. (NARA 1, No 58)
[The report does not say if somebody was injured.]

**Oct 10, 1946:**  In the provinces of North and South Kwangsang which belong to the area of the 6th Infantry Division, there have been disturbances in 37 cities and towns between 1-10 of October.
The following weapons have been reported taken by the rioters: 288 rifles, 5 pistols, 200 sticks of dynamite and 1,600 rounds of ammunition.
At Waegman 18 Koreans fired on a US patrol.
● Missed  At Masan a mob stoned the quarters occupied by American Red Cross women.
(NARA 4a, p. 232-233)
[This report to the US-Soviet Commission does not say if there were any casualties in the last two cases. Statistically, the likelihood for all the 18 Koreans to miss would be low unless they were particularly inept, or unless only a few of them had firearms.]

**Oct 11, 1946:**  ● Korean civilians killed: 5 (87).  Ungchon (also spelled Ochchong, near Yosu on the south coast). A patrol of 3 US soldiers and 7 Korean police was threatened by 400 rioters. When firing over the heads of the mob failed to disperse them, the soldiers fired into the crowd killing 5. Some 24 of the rioters were arrested.
(NDL, microfiche FOA-5120, G-2 daily report no 354)
[Once again the report gives no information about the wounded.]

**Oct 12, 1946:**  US pursued 600 Koreans in disorder. (WP p. 2)
[This was one of the last mentions made in the Washington Post of US troops intervention in Korean disorders.]

**Oct 12, 1946:**  Major Paul N. Thakara reported that the windshield of his jeep was struck by a rock at 7:30 am while leaving the Senior Officer’s hotel. The rock struck the windshield at a point directly in front of the driver and would have caused considerable injury had the windshield been broken.
In addition several reports have been received of cases were rocks have been hung at windshield level from under-passes and stones have been piled and ditches dug in sections of the roads frequently used by US military personnel. To this date no
accident has occurred.
(AirForce 1, p. 4-5)
[This was the analog of the so-called improvised explosive devices used by insurgents in Iraq. If one can believe this report, it seems that such means were completely ineffective.]

Oct 12, 1946: At the 15th exchange of mail [between North and South Korea] at Kaesong some 54,000 letters were sent to the Russian zone. South Korea received 37,000 letters. The next exchange of mail is scheduled for 26 October. (Seoul Times 17 October 1946 p. 2)
[This news shows that exchanges of mail occurred every 2 weeks approximately since the beginning of 1946.]

Oct 12, 1946: Organization of the Interim Assembly
Although the printed ordinance bore the date of 14 August the ordinance was released to the press on 12 October.

- The Assembly would consist of 90 members, 45 of whom were to be elected and 45 appointed by the American Command.
- The ordinances enacted by the Assembly had to be approved by the American Command. In case of disagreement the ordinance would be returned to the Assembly with a written statement explaining the reasons for non-concurrence.
- Persons who had held senior positions under the Japanese administration were specifically declared ineligible.
- The election would not be held by universal suffrage but by a multi-level system. The village elders would select a representative for a gathering at the district level which would itself select the representatives for a county meeting. For instance in Seoul, a city of about 1.5 million people, the final electorate which actually chose the three Assemblymen for the city consisted of 564 persons.

Of the 45 representatives selected, only 2 were leftists and those were from the leftist island of Cheju.
(Robinson 1947 p. 175-176)

Oct 13, 1946: Uprisings in the countryside. The uprisings did not occur at the same time in all provinces.
1 Oct 3: From Taegu the uprising spread into the North Kyongsang province.
2 Oct 7: From North Kyongsang it spread into South Kyongsang,
3 Oct 13: Incidents occurred in South Chungchong.,
4 Oct 20: There were incidents in the central part of South Korea, namely in the provinces of Kyonggi, Kangwon and Hwanghae.
5 Oct 30: The South Cholla entered into a situation of uprising.
In many places the peasants refused to surrender their rice to the police, burned the records of rice collection, killed landlords, attacked the police stations and released jailed peasants.

(Song 1989 p. 263)

**Oct 14, 1946:** Seoul. US troops under Major-General Alfred E. Brown have been deployed in battle order to enforce martial law against labor throughout the South Korean province of Kyongsang-Pukto where 36,000 railway men have been striking since late September. (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10, No 5, p. 173)

**Oct 14, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (88). Sosaeng Ni (north of Pusan). At 3:00 a mob of 500 destroyed the town hall and besieged the police in the police station. A 4-man US patrol and a detachment of police arrived from Ulsan, dispersed the crowd and rescued the police. One rioter was killed.

**Oct 15, 1946:** The telephone wire from the 6th Division to the Pusan CIC detachment was deliberately cut. (NARA 1, Summary No 59)

**Oct 15, 1946:** Security patrol number 289-C flown by the 475th Fighter Group. A large crowd was seen at Pyongyong (Pyongyong, now Byeongyeong, is on the east coast of Korea north of Pusan, should not be confused with Pyongyang, the capital of North Korea). Buzzing had little or no effect upon the people. (AirForce 1, Annex)

**Oct 15, 1946:** General Orders No 29 Major John T. Parker is appointed Historian of USAFIK. (NDL, microfiche WOR 14275)

[It is perhaps more than a coincidence that a USAFIK historian was appointed in the middle of the incidents that started in mid-September.]

**Oct 16, 1946:** Maj. Gen. Archer L. Lerch, United States Military Governor approved an ordinance creating an interim legislative Assembly. This assembly will have 90 members. Of these 45 will be appointed by the American Military Government and the rest will be elected by an unspecified method. Moreover the Military Government will retain the power to veto the assembly’s actions and to dissolve it and organize new elections. (NYT p. 8; Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10, No 5, p. 144)

**Oct 16, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 6 (94). Simbang (northeastern coast of Korea). An artillery patrol of the 6th Division was sent to Simbang after a mob made up of 300 members of the “Farmers Association” gathered and attacked the police box. Its leader, Kang Tal Koo was killed by the police. After the troops arrived at the scene 6 other persons were shot and killed. 48 prisoners were taken.

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148 The name of this town is spelled in three different ways in the source: Sinban, Sinbam, Simbam. We suppose that it refers to Simbang.
[As always the report contains no information about the wounded. The “Farmers Association” was a leftist organization that the occupation forces were willing to destroy. So, it is quite possible that its leader was killed by the police in cold blood and that the attack on the police box followed in reprisal.]

**Oct 17, 1946:** Myonchon (near the 38th parallel, now in North Korea). At 22:00 a mob of 200 captured 5 policemen who were jailed. A US patrol dispersed the mob and freed the police. (NARA 1, No 58)

**Oct 17, 1946: Statistics about riots in the Pusan area.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Police: 7, MG officials: 0, rioters: 29</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>Police: 34, MG officials: 10, rioters: 84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons seized by rioters</td>
<td>rifles: 1,352, revolvers: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weapons recovered by the police</td>
<td>rifles: 93, revolver: 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(NARA 4a, p.401)

[This is one of a few cases in which casualties are mentioned among MG personnel. Of course, the 10 persons who were injured were not necessarily American. Some 60,000 Koreans were employed by MG. The injured persons may have been interpreters or other employees. Over 1,000 rifles remained in the possession of the insurgents. One may wonder how these rifles were used. The sources contain few mentions of insurgents using their rifles to avoid being arrested.]

**Oct 18, 1946:** If the American authorities show not the slightest inclination to carry out the Moscow agreement of late December 1945, is this not in the direction of permanent partition, with the objective of turning South Korea into a virtual colony of the United States? (Daily Worker 18 October 1946 p. 6)

[The Communist newspaper “Daily Worker” observes that the Moscow agreement was a great advance over the Cairo Agreement because it promised independence (for a united Korea) within 5 years whereas the Cairo conference promised independence “in due course”. It is known that President Roosevelt’s interpretation of this expression was a length of time similar to the one for the Philippines after their “liberation” from Spanish colonization, that is to say about 40 years.]

**Oct 19, 1946:** Licenses issued for foreign trade but not with Japan. Almost 300 licenses to engage in foreign trade have been issued. However, these trade authorizations exclude Japan. (Seoul Times 19 October 1946 p. 2)

[Prohibiting trade between South Korea and Japan was certainly harmful for both countries. One wonders why this interdiction was maintained for so long.]

**Oct 19, 1946:** Movie films put under censorship through Ordinance No 115. Clarence
Ryee, Director of the Department of Public Information, announced the conditions and controls detailed in Ordinance No 115 before movies can be shown to the public. (Seoul Times 19 October 1946 p. 2)

Although the title of the article is fairly clear, its content is rather opaque.

**Oct 20, 1946:** There has been an insurrection in Kaesong (north of Seoul and near the 38th parallel). The jails in Kaesong are packed and 300 of the more important leftits have been shipped to Seoul. (Gayn 1948, p. 377)

[The following entries clearly show that there were some serious incidents in this area around 20 October, but a comprehensive account is still lacking.]

**Oct 20, 1946:** Paekchon (near the 38th parallel, now in North Korea). At 7:45 Communists took over the police headquarters and disarmed the police. 7th Division troops restored order. (NARA 1, No 58, Gayn (1948))

[The journalist Mark Gayn stayed in Paekchon on the nights of 23-24 October that is to say immediately after the town was retaken by US troops. However, in his book he gives no details about how the US Army was able to occupy the place: were there exchanges of rifle fire, how long did it last, was the town shelled before US troops entered?]

**Oct 20, 1946:** Missed Paekchon (near the 38th parallel in the west). A US patrol was fired upon by a truckload of 25 Koreans. They fired 5 or 6 rounds high above the patrol. When the troops returned the fire, the Koreans immediately threw down their arms and surrendered. (NARA 1, No 58)

[A fairly astounding account. Why did the Koreans open fire if they just wanted to fire above the heads of their opponents. Why did they surrender so quickly? Why did they not attempt to drive away?]

**Oct 20, 1946:** Missed Yonan (near the 38th parallel, not far from Paekchon). A US patrol leaving Paekchon for Yonan was fired on by two Koreans who expended 4 rounds. The patrol returned fire with 5 rounds. No one was injured and the Koreans were not apprehended. (NARA 4a, p. 337)

[This episode occurred not far from the previous one but its outcome was fairly different (and more plausible). It is surprising that only 9 shots were fired.]

**Oct 20, 1946:** Chongdan roadblock (on the 38th parallel). At 8:30 approximately 800 villagers from north of the 38th parallel crossed the border and began carrying off rice. A “Banzai charge” was made on American troops and one soldier was slightly wounded. Approximately 90 of the villagers were apprehended. (NARA 4a, p. 337)

[This is one of the few cases in which a US casualty is mentioned in a military operation. However, it should be noted that the villagers came from North Korea.]
In other words, this account is consistent with the US policy of mentioning only casualties in operations involving North Koreans.]

**Around Oct 20, 1946:** Yesan (about 100km south of Seoul). 400 Koreans moving toward the police station were dispersed by the police assisted by 4 American soldiers. Later the police arrested 275 of them. (NARA 1, No 58)
[It seems a fairly improbable account. In all other places the insurgents were able to disarm the police. Here, on the contrary, the police was able to arrest 257 of them. Only 4 American soldiers provided help. The story becomes more plausible if one assumes that the 4 Americans were manning a tank. But even so, one fails to understand how they managed to arrest 257 people.]

**Oct 20, 1946:** Kaesong (near the 38th parallel, now in North Korea, the area around Kaesong is an industrial area). On 20 October at 5:30 the MG was notified that attacks on police stations in outlying areas around Kaesong were in progress. The 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment under the command of Lt. Col. Masson was alerted. Tactical troops and CIC agents were used to apprehend the rioters. The prisoners were being transported by truck to Kaesong. Order was restored in all places of disturbances by 15:00 on 21 October 1946. As the uprising could be considered as broken the alert of tactical units was lifted. (NARA 4a, p. 335)
[Although less well known than the uprising in Taegu, the one in the Kaesong area was a major disturbance. The previous report said that the uprising could be considered broken on 21 October but in fact there were other disturbances and acts of sabotage subsequently.]

**Oct 21, 1946:** Account of the Taegu uprising broadcast by “Radio Moscow” and published in the “Middlesboro Daily News” newspaper (21 Oct p. 1)
London Oct 21. Radio Moscow today reported that workers in the American zone of Korea had staged an armed [uprising] against American troops and that a great number were killed and wounded on both sides. The broadcast quoted radio reports from Seoul as saying that violent battles occurred when police and troops used force in attempting to arrest strikers.
The Moscow radio said Lt Gen John R. Hodge American commander in Korea had openly urged the people to exterminate elements who organize strikes and provoke discontent.
The report said strikers were arrested in the town of [name of town missing] and that local officials had sacked the post office and burned wealthy country homes.
Radio Moscow said the strike turned into an armed insurrection in Kensi Province with more than [number missing] persons taking part. The broadcast said that the
area looked like a veritable battlefield.

[Because this is a scanned (and interpreted) version of the article some words are not reproduced correctly. It was downloaded on 16 May 2012 from the following address:


This description differs from the official US-South Korean version in that it emphasizes the extent of the fighting and large number of victims. In this respect it is similar to the accounts given in the Savage letter or in Sunoo (1979, p. 56). Unfortunately, it gives no data about casualties.

In the following days there were no other article including the key-word “Korea”.]

**Oct 21, 1946:** 200 recruits wanted by National Police. The article gives a number of conditions that should be met by the recruits. At the end it says: “Former policemen are especially urged to enlist” Dr. Chough [Chough Byong Ok, Director of the Department of Police] said. (Seoul Times 21 October 1946, p. 1)

[“Former policemen” can only refer to people who served in the Japanese police.]

**Oct 22, 1946:** Koreans fight Yanks, Reds say. (WP p. 6)

**Oct 22, 1946:** Provost Marshal Report for period 20 October – 20 November. 5 investigations were opened for murder. 229 Koreans were arrested for military offenses. (RG 554 Box 71 (CKCLH))

**Oct 22, 1946:** Sabotage. The engine of a freight train exploded near Pugang-Ni. It resulted in injury to 4 men, derailment of 8 cars and 70 meters of track torn up. It is believed that the detonation was caused by explosive hidden in the coal. (NARA 1, Summary No 59)

**Oct 22, 1946:** Seoul. US Army tanks and heavy trucks manned by machine-gunners patrolled Seoul. (NYT 22 October 1946)

**Oct 23, 1946:** The 475th Fighter Group was instructed to stand by for shows-of-force over troubled areas. It flew 6 such missions (5 by the 431st Fighter Squadron and 1 by the 432nd Fighter Squadron) making low passes over 42 towns frequently hitting such hot beds as Taegu, Pusan, Waegman and Pohangdong. Similar missions in September had been effective. Pilots said, however, that the immediate effect on assembled crowds buzzed on these missions seemed to be less noticeable.

In addition, there were 4 security missions: 1 by squadron 431 and 3 by squadron 432.

(AirForce 1, p. 4,8)

[The summary of the number of missions flown does not seem to be consistent with the individual mission reports given at the end of the source. These reports describe
6 security missions of squadron 431 and 2 security missions of squadron 432, all of them after 17 October. As a result, one would expect a larger number of missions for the whole month even though there has been a gas shortage between 1 and 11 October 1946.]

**Oct 24, 1946:** Kimpo Air Base. In a special meeting called by Colonel Ashley B. Packard, plans were laid to better prepare the 475th Fighter Group for situations which might demand support for the ground forces. (AirForce 1, p. 7)

**Oct 24, 1946:** Seoul. A show of strength by US forces was followed by two uprisings in which one Korean was wounded and 18 arrested. American tanks were rushed in but did not fire. (North China Daily News p. 6)

**Oct 24, 1946:** Taegu. **Number of provost court trials.** As many as 5 provost courts are operating at the same time. We are disposing of confined (untried) persons at an average rate of 341 per week. Thus, it appears that it will take 8 weeks to complete the situation here in Taegu. (NARA 4a, p. 357)

[These data from the “Office of the Provost Marshal” have two interesting implications:

- Each one of 5 provost courts could handle about $\frac{341}{5} = 70$ cases per week.
- A total of some $341 \times 9 \sim 3,000$ cases will be tried in Taegu between mid-October and mid-December.]

**Oct 25, 1946:** Ground support mission (number 298-C) of squadron 431 at Chun-chon (located east of Seoul). Numerous American troops and equipment were present on air strip northeast of the town. (AirForce 1, Annex)

**Oct 25, 1946:** Fresh riots have broken out in Seoul and American soldiers are confined to barracks. A number of deaths have been reported. The rioting began when Korean workers and students demonstrated against the setting up of a new legislative assembly, the formation of which was announced on October 14. (Times p. 4)

**Oct 25, 1946:** The P-51 Mustang aircraft of the 475th Fighter Group practiced support to ground force units in the form of bombing and strafing passes. Moreover show of force missions were flown at the special request of the XXIV Corps and covered towns in which rioting had occurred or rioting was expected. (AirForce 2 p. 823-824)

[The source does not say what kind of bombs were used but it is likely that it was napalm bombing because on the previous page the report mentions that a napalm tank was set up somewhat earlier in the same month.]

**Oct 25, 1946:** Report (excerpt) of a mission of the 475th Fighter Group. Large crowd at Pyongyang (in South Korea). Buzzing had little or no effect upon
people. (AirForce 2 p. 837)

[Needless to say “buzzing” implies flying at low altitude. This shows that the mini-

mum altitude rule of 330 m (1,000 feet) set in a previous order was relaxed fairly

broadly. It can be noted that there is in fact no date for this report, so we gave it the
date of the subsequent mission which was on 25 October; it was a mission in support
of ground troops at Chunchon.

It can also be noted that the mission reports are not written by the pilots but by an
intelligence officer, Robert D. Ramsay.]

**Oct 25, 1946:** Regulations of SCAP prohibits all trade between Japan and Korea.
(NARA 8 folder 5)

[According to Richard Robinson trade was forbidden not only with Japan but also
with other countries such as North Korea or Manchuria. As in previous years trade
between Korea and Japan was very important this suspension had a detrimental effect
on the Korean economy.]

**Oct 26, 1946:** The US Army, plagued by a month of agitator-led uprisings that
have cost 100 Korean lives, today opened its file of secret, confiscated documents
to support its statements that the riots were Communist inspired. (NYT 26 October
1946)

[The figure of 100 Korean lives lost grossly underestimates the actual death toll.
In only two of the provinces (namely North and South Kyongsang) there were 356
Koreans killed according to US Army G-2 reports. Note that according to chapter 2
the G-2 reports may themselves under-estimate real death tolls. (NARA 4b, p. 319).]

**Oct 26, 1946:** General John R. Hodge commanding the US Army forces in Korea
denounced “the agitators whose activities have resulted in the recent wave of mur-
der, pillage and arson”. Meanwhile the campaign of calumny against the US forces
remained unabated. The Military Government is experiencing great difficulties over
the collection of rice since the agitators have issued orders that this should be im-
peded in every way possible. (Times p. 3)

**Oct 26, 1946:** In relation with a petition for clemency, a document dated 26 October
1946 makes reference to the record of trial of Kim Jung Myung by provost court No
5 of North Kyonsang.

The clemency petition implies that a high ranking Army officer sold identification
passes149 and tried to exonerate the defendant by using a judicial technicality. The
document ends with the following statements:

149It says: “I admit that I typed passes which were illegal. However, I did not know that they were illegal. I feel that I
am not more guilty than had the passes been typed by me for a high ranking Army officer, not my superior, who later sold
them illegally. I am anxious to study in America and to take a place in the leadership of Korea.

[Signed] Your humble servant, Kim Jong Myung
In the event any officers concerned with this case have acted to the prejudice of the service, disciplinary action will be taken.

In the future, US Army officers will not appear in Provost Courts as defense counsels for the accused but they can appear as witnesses.

(NARA 8 folder 1)

[A subsequent investigation showed (perhaps not surprisingly) that no Army officer was involved; see below at the date of 1 November 1946. The record of trial was a fairly comprehensive document about the trial. Another record dated October 29, 1946 (see below) gives more details about the information that it included.]

**Oct 29, 1946:** Provost court case of Kong Kin Sik tried (case number 4852) at Sun-chon, province of Cholla NamDo. Excerpt.

An examination of the record of trial of the above named accused discloses the following deficiencies. The report is herewith returned for completion.

a. Factual information on the charge sheet is missing.

b. A resume of evidence considered by the court on which the findings of the court is based is lacking.

c. The record does not say whether or not the fine has been paid.

d. The place of confinement is not specified.

e. The chronology sheet is not included.

It is directed that the completed record be returned to this headquarters immediately.

[Signed] By order of Lieutenant General Hodge

**Oct 31, 1946:** At a conference held between miners from the Kwangju area and American officers (Colonel Stanton and Colonel Peet) the miners stated that they were not receiving sufficient food rations, (NARA 4a, p.440)

**Oct 31, 1946:** By the end of October some 30,000 Koreans were in jail. (US Military Government in Korea, 1946)

**Oct 31, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 10 (104). Naju (in the south west of Korea). At 14:30 a mob of 5,000 converged on Naju but were headed off and dispersed by police and US troops. At about 15:30 a mob surged toward a group of police who fired into the crowd. 10 rioters were reported killed and 50 were arrested. (NARA 1, No 60)

[This report does not say that US troops had fired but according to another US military source cited below this was indeed the case. Moreover, the large number of fatalities suggests that heavy firepower was used. Once again the number of the wounded are not given. The account given in Cumings (1981, p. 365) says that “two C-47s buzzed the crowds, which led angry peasants to climb a hill to throw rocks at them”. The C-47 was a two-engine transport aircraft which was the military version}
of the DC-3. It was an aircraft without guns.]

**Oct 31, 1946:** Elements of the 20th US Infantry Regiment fired on a 5,000-strong mob converging on Nanju killing 10 protesters. (Reardon 2008, chapter entitled “Chasing a chameleon.”).

**Oct 31, 1946:** Mokpo (south coast of Korea). Five police boxes were attacked by rioters. [US] troops restored order. Police casualties were 2 dead. Civilian casualties are unknown. (NARA 1, No 60)

**Oct 31, 1946:** During and after the insurrection Communist leaders were thrown in jail in great numbers. The arrests of Pak Heun Yong (secretary general of the Communist party of South Korea), Lee Kang Kook and Lee Chuhu were ordered. Pak Heun Yong went into hiding. Altogether some 1,500 persons were prosecuted of whom 500 had been convicted by the end of 1946. The case of 16 of them who were sentenced to death by a US military commission became a critical issue (see below at the date of 30 April 1947) (McCune 1950, p. 85).

**Oct 31, 1946:** General Orders No 31. Lieutenant Colonel Charles S. Fitzgerald is appointed “Chief of Claims”. (NDL, microfiche WOR 14275)

[What was the function of this “Chief of Claims”?]

**Nov 1946:** Elections of local members of provincial, municipal and district committees were held in North Korea. About 50% of the population took part in the vote. The method of voting was the following. In each district one either voted for or against a single candidate. In the event that the candidate did not receive a majority vote, another candidate was selected. (Robinson p. 280)

**Nov 1, 1946:** Subject: Trial of Kim Jong Myung by Provost Court No 5 (see above 26 October 1946).

The necessary investigation has been made. It appeared that no Army officers of this command has sold identification passes; no officer concerned with this case has acted to the prejudice of the service.

[Signed] For the Provincial Military Governor. (NARA 8)

**Nov 1, 1946:** List of agitators. This CIC file is a list of 34 Koreans considered as “agitators” in the province of Chung Chong Namdo. The list gives the name, age, occupation and address.

There are 3 doctors, 4 businessmen, the rest are farmers or laborers. One of them is already in Seoul prison. (NARA 4a, p.482)

**Nov 4, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 4 (108). Hwason, South Cholla, account No 1. Two casualties among US soldiers are reported. Rioters erected hasty
road-blocks and ambushed a US patrol, overturning a jeep and injuring the driver. The patrol was reinforced by another patrol and after a fire-fight in which 4 rioters were killed and 25 wounded, the two patrols succeeded in getting out of the ambush. (NARA 4b, p.367)
[For this episode there are three accounts all from US military sources. One could expect them to be fairly consistent but they are not. In account No 1 and 3 the rioters are killed in a firefight, in account No 2, three of the dead are over-run by the US vehicles. There are many other differences.]

**Nov 4, 1946: Hwason, South Cholla, account No 2.** A convoy of 26 Americans including 4 CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) agents who had apprehended 6 leaders of the Hwason riots were attacked by a crowd of 1,500 miners. A log was thrown through the window of one of the jeeps. It left the road and overturned. The second jeep also overturned. Both vehicles were abandoned and the occupants transferred to the remaining vehicles. At one point the convoy was stoned and fired upon. At another point the convoy was forced to run through a crowd which suffered 3 killed. Two American soldiers were injured. (NARA 1, Summary No 61)

[Apart from this, it can be mentioned that in the following weekly summary (No 62) there are many accounts of attacks on police boxes in the province of Cholla Namdo. Surprisingly however, even in situations in which the police had lost control of the situation there is no mention of any intervention of US troops.]

**Nov 4, 1946:** Subversive elements among Koreans have been apprehended distributing inflammatory handbills written in English addressed to “American soldiers and officers in Korea”. All military personnel will be on the alert and will report to the nearest intelligence agency any information coming to their attention. Authorized agencies will make arrests of all such violators. (NARA, RG 554, Box 15)

**Nov 4, 1946: Hwason, South Cholla, account No 3.** At 03:45 two officers, 6 CIC, 17 enlisted men and some Kwanju policemen (about 30 persons altogether if one supposes that there were 5 policemen) formed 5 raiding parties which arrested 5 Communist agitators. The moment the raid was noticed the town siren was sounded and people began constructing hasty roadblocks. Three of the 5 raiding parties got out of town but the other two were halted by the road blocks. The driver of the leading vehicle was hit on the head by a club which had been thrown against the windshield. His vehicle turned over in a ditch. A second vehicle following closely ran into the road-block and was damaged.

- **Missed** Firing then was directed at the raiding party by riflemen concealed about 100 meters from the road-block. After the second raiding party arrived to re-enforce the first the riflemen were silenced by the returned fire of the two parties but casu-
Fig. 6.5 Withdrawal notice from the US national archives. This withdrawal notice does not just concern one record as is usually the case, but an entire file. It occurred on 8 February 1982 in NARA, RG 554, Box 15 in a section about the disturbances in the area of Taegu in 1946 and those in the area of Yosu in 1948. The number 000.5 is the decimal classification number for “Crimes and offenses”. Source: NARA, RG 554, Box 15

Alties among the attackers could not be determined due to the concealment of the ambushing party and the darkness. Next day, it was discovered that 4 had been killed and 25 wounded.

The raiding parties then returned to Kwangju.

At 6:00, some 20 men of the Korean Constabulary took custody of the two vehicles and took possession of the mines by placing guards over them. They were later reinforced by 10 Kwanju policemen.

(NARA 4b, p.373-374)

[How can one believe such a story?

- The two parties fired at concealed people 100 meters away and in the middle of the night (around 4am in November). Yet, they managed to kill 4 and wound 25 without suffering any casualty themselves!
- After the US parties barely escaped, we are told that a small group of Constabulary was able to occupy the mines apparently without meeting any resistance. It is well reported by US reports that during these uprisings the Constabulary was completely unreliable to the point of not being used.]
Nov 4, 1946: Political Advisor (Langdon) to Secretary of State. Mob attacks on November 4 involved first instance of organized attack on US troops, mostly in South Cholla province. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 4)
[Does this refer to the Hawson incident? Probably not because it refers to several attacks. What is meant here by “organized attack”? In a previous dispatch it was already mentioned that US troops were fired upon. Whether or not it was already an organized attack is probably difficult to determine.]

Nov 5, 1946: Lt Brown, in charge of the Constabulary in Kangwon-Do took a party of Constabulary and went into search of the Koreans who cut the lines and attacked the repairmen. They arrested 15 Koreans and found 30 homemade explosive charges. (NARA 4a, p. 549)

Nov 5, 1946: Kim Kyu Sik, a moderate rightist and co-chairman of the Committee charged by General Hodge to nominate the 45 members of the Interim Assembly to be appointed by the American Command, sent an open letter to General Hodge condemning the elections and asking him to invalidate the results. Excerpt of the letter.

“Because of police investigations there was no chance for the leftist members in the elections. The results have produced impressions of an undemocratic nature and have caused disappointment to the people. I hope that your pre-eminent judgment will find a suitable way to either partly or entirely invalidate the results of the elections.” (Robinson 1947, p. 177)
[General Hodge invalidated the elections in Seoul and the province of Kangwon. However, the same men were reelected with only two exceptions. In 2010 there was an election in Afghanistan which was clearly denounced as a fraud even by some lucid American commentators. Yet, it was not invalidated, not even partially as in Korea.]

- Americans make fun of the Koreans calling them “Gooks”.
- Americans make passes at and yell and whistle at Korean women.
- Americans play kiddish pranks on Koreans who do not receive this idea of humor with anything but animosity.
- Americans literally push Koreans out of their way. They yell insulting remarks at Koreans who are slow to get out of their way.
- Americans drive too fast especially in villages where there is no Military Police. They take joy in making Koreans dive for safety.
- Americans sell many items to Koreans then arrest them for possession of illegal
Americans openly ridicule the idea that there can be any good in anything Korean.

h Americans act as though Koreans were a conquered nation rather than a liberated people.

(NARA: USAFIK Press Release, Record Group 554, Box 24, 11 November 1946; also cited on p. 48 of a thesis written by Ms. Bo Ram Yi, 2006, see the reference section)

[In an attempt to improve the situation the statement listed 10 specific reckless behaviors of GIs that Koreans most complained about. Among these ways, the one which had the most tragic consequences is certainly (e) for it resulted in Koreans, including women and children, being overthrown by cars.]

**Nov 6, 1946:** Hwasun raid. 50 to 75 leaders were arrested among the miners. (NDL, microfiche FOA 5126, G-2 report No 375) [The source gives no information about a possible resistance of the miners.]

**Nov 6, 1946:** Riots in Kwangwun province extending. (NDL, microfiche FOA 5126, G-2 report No 375) [This is the translation of the title of an article in the Duk Lib Sinbo (Independence News) newspaper.]

**Nov 8, 1946:** According to a message of the General Headquarters in Seoul, low passes by US aircraft have been discontinued following an order issued by the Commanding General of the forces in the Pacific to stop strafing against rioters. (NDL, microfiche TS-00029) [The order is reproduced in the gallery of documents given in the preface.]

**Nov 12, 1946:** 417 prisoners escaped from Chonju prison. On 16 November the head of the prison was sentenced to life imprisonment. (NARA 1, No 74) [The report does not say if he was sentenced by a military commission or by a Korean court.]

**Nov 13, 1946:** Two grenades were thrown at the car of the Korean Chief of the Seoul Metropolitan police. Although a policeman riding with him was seriously injured he escaped with minor bruises. (AirForce 2 p. 873)

**Nov 13, 1946:** During the night a railroad bridge near Seoul was consumed by fire. (AirForce 2 p. 874)

**Nov 14, 1946:** All officers and enlisted men of the 475th Fighter Group were instructed to apprehend and hold by force any person distributing printed material to
the effect that American forces should leave Korea. (AirForce 2 p. 875)

[The same order was probably given to all other units stationed in Seoul. As the Americans could not read the leaflets this means that they would apprehend all persons distributing leaflets.]

**Nov 14, 1946:** A late and distorted account given by the “Times” of London. The strikes have led to disturbances so violent that they have come to be referred to locally as the October Revolution. So far, riots have been quelled by American-trained Korean police and constabulary while American troops are confined to barracks. (Times 14 November 1946 p. 5, Col F)

[“American troops confined to barracks” is at variance with US Army G-2 reports which themselves are likely a lenient presentation.]

**Nov 15, 1946:** Railroad collision kills 21 in Korea. (Washington Post p. 1)

**Nov 15, 1946:** According to MG reports, during the first two weeks of November there were at least 50 separate attacks on police stations by mobs of peasants armed with clubs, spears, rocks, scythes and rice-cutting hooks. A total of 47 places (villages, towns or cities) were touched by the uprisings. About 70% of the incidents involved less than 500 people and only one of them involved more than 5,000. (Song 1989 p. 268)

[According to a document presented in the prologue chapter, strafing by fighter aircraft was freely used against insurgents until 6 November 1946. After that date, specific authorizations had to be granted by Pacific Air Force Headquarters. The previous data help us to understand for what purpose fighter aircraft were used instead of ground forces. It would have been fairly ineffective (and in fact almost impossible due to limited troop numbers) to send troops into all towns or villages where some disturbances occurred. On the contrary, pilots could easily spot mobs. If they were bearing weapons one can suppose that the pilots were authorized to use their guns. After all, it could be said that by attacking the insurgents they rescued landlords or Korean police.

In other words, one should not imagine that strafing was conducted against large and peaceful crowds of demonstrators. That sounds unlikely. Most likely it was used against small groups of armed (even though poorly armed) insurgents. This is the idea expressed by the term *marauding* fighter aircraft. The notion is not too different from the use of remotely guided predator aircraft against alleged Taliban fighters in Pakistan or elsewhere.]

**Nov 16, 1946:** Missed Pusan. A Korean attacked two Military Policemen with a scythe. The Korean was jailed. It was not reported whether the MPs were injured. (NARA 1, No 63)
Nov 16, 1946: Repeated cutting of telephone wires. Pohang. On 16 November at approximately 06:00 the telephone connection in Camp Wiggins was found to be inoperative and the Wire Section was dispatched to locate and correct the fault. It was found that approximately 100 meters of wire had been removed at a point one kilometer from the Command Post. The lines were repaired immediately. On the same day at 18:15 the telephone lines were cut again this time at a point 150 meters from the Command Post; 175 meters of wire had been removed. At that point there were 5 lines (all used by the US Army) approximately 10 meter in height. The lines were repaired and two police were dispatched from the Pohang Police station to stand guard. The nearest house, some 10 meters away, was owned by a person named CHUNG, Duk Pyo who was interviewed by a CIC agent on 7 December. He stated that although he was at home on the day when the wires were cut he did not see anybody near the telephone line. [Signed] Special Agent 5146 (NARA 4b, p.2-3) [There have been hundreds of incidents similar to this one but only a small fraction of them were investigated by CIC agents. In this case the Special Agent concluded that “sabotage was responsible and that it was an attempt to disrupt the Armed Forces Communication”. It can be noted that the second sabotage was done at 18:15 that is to say at the beginning of the night. Needless to say, it was impossible for the two police who were dispatched to guard the whole line especially after sunset. This seems to suggest that the saboteurs lacked determination. Otherwise they would have been able to cut the line every night.]

Nov 20, 1946: An electric generator was sabotaged in the Inchon Basin. The report says that the oil line was cut and that the voltage regulator was taken off. The Special Agent (No 4683) who conducted the investigation questioned some of the Korean laborers who were in the area at the time of the incident but none of them could give any information of value. (NARA 4a p. 633)

Nov 21, 1946: Taegu rioters sentenced. The Provost Marshal reported that two leaders of the October riots were sentenced to death by a Military Commission. Three additional leaders are expected to be given the death penalty. In Taegu the provost court tried 113 persons. There are still 780 imprisoned persons in Taegu who are awaiting trial. (NARA 1, No 62) [The report gives the precision that 59 of the 113 persons tried by provost court were acquitted. Such a proportion of acquittals is quite exceptional in provost courts; usually it is rather below 5%. Moreover the numbers given in this report are in contradiction with those given in the report of 24 October 1946,]
Nov 21, 1946: Taegu rioters sentenced. Five more Taegu rioters are to be hanged. (NARA 1, No 74)
[With respect to the term “more”, it can be noted that so far we were not able to find reports of death sentences prior to 21 November.]

Nov 22, 1946: • US fatalities: 1 (105). One American soldier was killed in a train wreck near Kon-Dong. Two others were injured. (NARA 1, No 74)

Dec 1,5, 1946: Two boilers exploded at the Beisenia hotel which was housing US personnel, the first one on 1 December, the second on 5 December. According to the billet officer, James P. Downey, the only thing that would cause the boiler to crack would be to have a low head of water with a hot fire and adding cold water while the boiler was overheated. (NARA 4b, p.20)

Dec 4, 1946: General MacArthur banned US pressmen’s trip to South Korea. (Korean Independence 4 December 1946)

Dec 4, 1946: Misconduct of the Korean Constabulary.
Incheon. Many reports have been received by the CIC office of offenses committed by members of the constabulary. These offenses rank from unprovoked beating of Korean civilians to destruction of private property. Constabulary members think they are to be given special privileges for instance in theaters or restaurants. If these privileges are not given, the persons are beaten in public or taken to Constabulary Headquarters and beaten. Here is an example of one of these episodes.
On 4 December 1946 at about 20:00 constabulary members tried to make KIM, Yun Moon (a member of the National Police, Division M) move from his seat in a theater. Kim refused because no other seat was available. Then Kim was taken to their headquarters and beaten unmercifully. Captain Gervas and Captain Moore, advisers to the Division A National Police in Incheon went to the constabulary headquarters [who informed them about the incident?] on the night of 4 December and made the Incheon chief of the constabulary, SAW Jong Chol, apologize to the beaten men.
Agent’s Notes: Police and Constabulary cooperation does not exist in Incheon. It is the opinion of the Commanding Officer of the CIC Incheon district that an American military adviser should be appointed for the Incheon constabulary unit.

Dec 5, 1946: General Hodge announced a series of measures to raise the standards of the Korean Police.
• Salaries and training standards would be raised
• Practical measures would be taken to eliminate those policemen whose actions were incompatible with the principles of democracy.
• Special measures [never revealed] had been taken to prevent utilization of the police for political purposes.
After reporting these statements, Richard Robinson (1947, p. 168) comments that almost nothing of what was announced was actually done. Salaries remained at a miserably low level thereby requiring that policemen indulge in graft to stay alive. No undesirable policemen were dismissed.

(Robinson (1947 p. 168)

**Dec 13, 1946:** The Korean interim legislative assembly opened but 20 rightist members (out of a total of 90 members) boycotted the opening session. (NYT 13 December 1946)

**Dec 15, 1946:** Kwangju (south west of Korea) A Military Commission sentenced 7 Koreans to 20 years each for participating in the murder of policemen in Posong (40 km south of Kwangju). (NARA 1, No 74)

**Dec 15, 1946:** A CIC agent questioned 6 school girls who, when interrogated by police, had admitted being responsible of a fire which destroyed the Chong No Primary School on 27 November 1946. When assured that the investigation was on behalf of the US Army and had no connection with the Korean police, they stated that they had only admitted starting the fire because the police treated them roughly. (NARA 4b, p.12)

[In this case the only purpose of the police was to close their investigation successfully. If rough treatment was used in such a situation, one can imagine that third degree methods would also be used to get sensitive information.]

**Dec 17, 1946:** Incheon. A CIC employee was beaten by 6 Korean members of the Coast Guard. They will be tried in provost court on December 17 with the permission of Lt Chesler, Korean Guard adviser. (NARA 4b, p.31)

**Dec 19, 1946:** Korean civilians killed: 6 (114). Chonju (also spelled Jeonju in North Cholla) shooting. The leftist “Democratic Young Men Association” sponsored a meeting in the Primary School. About 5,000 people attended including 1,200 students. After the meeting the students wished to parade through the streets. They started off with the students first with locked arms singing and chanting. There were three bands in the parade.

At an intersection the police warned them to disperse. When the students refused the police fired over their heads with a machine gun. The crowd began to scatter, so the police moved in with bayonets, clubs and rifle butts. They fired up and down the streets as well as in the air. The final score was 6 civilians dead and many injured. When a student was knocked down or cornered the police would gather and kick him (or her). Small boys and girls were beaten just as merciless as were the older. A CIC agent saw a young student girl with the whole side of her face carved in from a rifle butt. By 19:00 the streets were cleared and a curfew imposed.
The action took place just a few meters away from the MG building. The Provincial Chief of Police [certainly an American] was present on the street and a number of Military Government troops were on the street during the whole incident. (NARA 4b, p.38,63)

[We counted the 6 people as victims of the occupation on account of the fact that it was an unprovoked attack on a peaceful demonstration and because the police was legally and practically under US command. One of the wounded, Miss PAK Sun Kap who was shot through the lung and arm was not expected to live. This would bring the death toll to 7.

This incident has many similarities with the incident of 15 August 1946 in Kwangju. Like the Kwangju incident it triggered protests in the Korean press. Then, toward the end of December, posters appeared in Chonju through which a self-proclaimed “North West Iron Blood” threatened pressmen who would “enlarge the accident affair” (more details are given below).]

**Dec 19, 1946:** About 50,000 Koreans are employed by the Military Government at national and provincial level (NARA 1, No 74)

[In other words, there is almost one Korean employed for each GI.]

**Dec 22-29, 1946:** Sabotage. Counter intelligence information from the 6th Division disclosed that Communists sabotaged the electric power station of the 6th Division in Chirye. (NARA 1, Summary No 68)

**Dec 25, 1946:** ●Missed Seoul. One round was fired at an American officer. It went through the windshield of the vehicle but missed him. This is the third attempt on the officer’s life. The previous attempts (also by firearms) occurred on 13 and 14 December. (NARA 1, No 67,69)

**Dec 26, 1946:** The Lawyers Union requested reconsideration of the death sentences imposed by a Military Commission upon 18 persons involved in the Taegu uprising. (NARA 4b, p.55)

[This association had already opposed the Counterfeit trial (directed against Communists). Ten death sentences were later commuted to life imprisonment but we do not know what happened for the 8 others.]

**Dec 27, 1946:** Economic Adviser (Bunce) to the Secretary of State. The MG has largely financed its operations through the printing of money. The currency in circulation is increasing at a rate approaching 1 billion yen per month. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 4)

**Dec 29, 1946:** Four Koreans were arrested by Div. M police. They had in their possession 822 sticks of American made dynamite and 57 rolls of primer cord. (NARA
Dec 30, 1946: Assassination threats by rightist group. After the bloody repression of the Chonju demonstration, journalists who wrote about it were threatened by a terrorist group which called itself the “Northern Iron Blood Group”. Here is an extract of a translation of one of the posters that this group posted in the town.

“Our independence is our ultimate goal. Do you know what you dogs are doing? We will solve this crisis through assassinating the evil doers who are trying to hinder our independence by enlarging the accident affair under the camouflage that you are sympathizing with your dead comrades.”

The group in a broader way stated that it will kill any person opposing the Americans or the MG (NARA 4b, p.80-81)

[It is somewhat difficult to understand how a group can favor independence and at the same time support the MG.]

Dec 30, 1946: Five students of Seoul University were arrested by Military Police and CIC. They confessed discontent with Military Administration. (NARA 4b, p.78)

Dec 31, 1946: Korean civilians killed: 200 (314). According to two G-2 Summaries published on 1 and 31 December 1946 respectively, the suppression of the uprisings of October-November 1946 resulted in 240 fatalities among the insurgents. Korean forces played only a little role in this suppression because the police was overwhelmed by the insurgents from the very beginning and the Constabulary was not employed by the MG. (NARA 4b, p.319,369)

[In the total of Korean civilians killed we only added the dead in excess of those we already mentioned in the incidents since 1 October 1946.

Dec 31, 1946: In the autumn of 1946 a series of unorchestrated leftist-led labor strikes and peasant rebellions were suppressed after some 1,000 deaths and 30,000 arrests. (Savada 1990, p. 305)

[The death toll estimate provided by this source is 4 times larger than the previous one. Although the book does not say on which source the figure of 1,000 deaths is based it is nevertheless of interest because it is a semi-official US publication whose authors had access to US archives and had no special reason to inflate the death toll.]

Dec 31, 1946: By the end of 1946 it was unwise for unattended Americans to walk alone in the country at night. (Robinson 1947 p. 149)

Dec 31, 1946: Province of Cholla Nam Do. From 1 March 1946 to 31 December 1946 some 7,000 persons were arrested of whom 4,824 were tried and convicted and 388 were acquitted. (Publication of the Public Safety Office of Chola Nam Do, available on the website http://www.history.go.kr)
Jan 1, 1947: An American soldier was attacked and severely beaten by a Korean. Two members of the Constabulary seized the Korean and carried the soldier back to his unit. (NARA 1, No 69)

Jan 1, 1947: • US fatalities: 1 (106). Corporal John P. McCoy of the 1534th Engineering Department Truck Company (42 Engineer Construction Battalion) died of head injury and internal injuries at the 34th General Hospital. His body was shipped to San Francisco on 1 March 1947. McCoy was an African American. According to the certificate of death established on 22 April 1947, McCoy was involved in a vehicle accident that occurred on 1 January 1947 at 01:00. (NARA 22)

Jan 2, 1947: • US fatalities: 1 (107). Private First Class John McGrosky died from a skull fracture at the 1st Station Hospital in Kwanju. According to the certificate of death established at the 1st Station hospital on 2 January 1947 the soldier was involved in a jeep accident that occurred on 1 January at 16:30 some 20 kilometers from Sunchon. He died 24 hours later. (NARA 22)

Jan 3, 1947: Thirteen Koreans were arrested for theft and illegal possession of explosives. 24 cases each containing 100 sticks of dynamite were stolen. Some cases were recovered during the investigation. (NARA 4b, p.49,51,159-161)

Jan 4, 1947: Pusan. As the train was leaving the station a rock was thrown through the window of the military car. One officer and two enlisted men were injured. (NARA 1, No 70)

[This is a very common form of protest. It occurred repeatedly not only in Korea but also in Japan.]

Jan 7, 1947: Two leftists were tried by the 38th Military Government provost court in Kangnung district for possession of firearms. They were sentenced to two years imprisonment. (Nara 4b, p.87)

Jan 7, 1947: It has been recommended [by whom?] that LEE, Chong Wha (17 year old and a member of the Chemical Laborer’s Union) be tried by provost court for sabotage of transformers and that he be given the maximum sentence. It has been further recommended that upon his apprehension KANG Joo Young be tried before a Military Commission in connection with the October Taegu riots. (NARA 4b, p.98)

[Lee poured salt water into three transformers which burned out all the coils. Such a sabotage required good technical knowledge of the working of a transformer.]
**Jan 7, 1947:** Three women were raped in a train. One of them was raped in the toilets after being undressed against her will. The two others who carried their sons on their backs were raped about 20 minutes in the eyes of 20 American soldiers. (NARA 4b, p.105)

[The rape of a Peiping student by a US Marine which occurred on 17 January 1947 occasioned considerable protests in China; this event certainly contributed to amplify public emotion about the train rape in Korea. It is also possible that the harassment incident of Korean women by Japanese students on 30 October 1929 which started the Kwanju Student protest came back to the memory of the people.]

**Jan 7, 1947:** Four GIs raped three Korean women on a train in a special coach for the exclusive use of American troops. During the incident which lasted over one hour Korean transportation police and passengers tried to rush to the rescue of the victims but were threatened at gun point by over 20 American soldiers. The four GIs were arrested at the Taichan railway depot. (KI 12 February 1947)

[This is the incident already mentioned. In a general way during periods of military occupation rapes are grossly under-reported. This one got reported because it occurred in a train and because the local American commander ordered the GIs to be arrested. It can be noted that this incident was not mentioned in the New York Times. Because, especially in Asiatic countries, rapes are grossly under-reported for various reasons, we made the methodological choice of discarding rapes from our incident reports. An exception was made in this specific case because of the country-wide attention that it received.]

**Jan 8, 1947:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (315). Seoul. American soldiers on guard at the Central Market of Chong Rim Dang shot into the crowd. There was no obvious reason for the shooting. LEE Young Sei was hit in the stomach and died the next day. (NARA 4b, p.155-156)

**Jan 13, 1947:** A hand grenade which failed to detonate was thrown in the middle of a performance at the Choo Han Theater. Police guarding the place allowed the culprits to escape. On the following day another grenade was thrown which did detonate and caused much damage. The police took no action and seemed to give silent approbation.

This theatrical group has had its script censored and although in some places it is mildly and farcically anti-MG it has been allowed to show. (NARA 4b, p.141)

[The report does not say if there were casualties. This episode raises the question of who were the people who threw the grenades: Koreans who were more pro-MG than the MG itself or tugs in the employment of the MG (or of the police which is basically the same thing).]
**Jan 13, 1947:** Seoul. Severing of a power cable leading from the generator to a printing press used by the US Army. This act was probably done by a Korean but there were no witnesses. (NARA 4b, p.144)

**Jan 15, 1947:** Incheon. The “South Korea Labor Union” held a public meeting. At 12:00 an individual rushed out of the meeting and shouted to some men standing outside that he had been attacked in the meeting. The men took police whistles from their pockets and used them to give a signal to a group of 300 young men who were concealed a short distance from the meeting. This group then attempted to rush the meeting hall.

As they came out of concealment they tied white strips of cloth on their upper left arm. At the main entrance of the hall were some police and one CIC agent. The police refused to disperse the mob and were ineffective in every way. The CIC agent prevented the mob from entering and called out a platoon of MPs and one armored car. The mob was dispersed by the MPs without incident.

(NARA 4b, p.152-153)

[This episode is interesting because it involves 4 different kinds of actors (i) The leftists who held the meeting. (ii) A group of rightists belonging to the Korean Labor Alliance. (iii) The police (iv) A CIC agent. In chapter 2 we have shown that it was the policy of the MG (if not officially at least in practice) to suppress leftist organizations. As police forces were under US command one cannot be surprised that they were reluctant to disperse the attackers. What is more surprising is that the CIC agent does not seem to follow the same policy. He even called out tactical troops to disperse the mob of rightists. In this sense it is an unusual episode.

There are similar examples during the occupation of Japan. For instance, Alfred Rodman Hussey, one of the American drafters of the Japanese constitution, was a liberal who frequently tried to restrict the actions of rightists. Yet, in what was a fairly unexpected move, after his time in Japan he joined the newly created Central Intelligence Agency.]

**Jan 19, 1947:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (316). Pusan. Seven US sailors went to a store. As the owner did not understand what they wanted one of them struck him with a wooden chair. He died the next morning at the hospital. (NARA 4b, p. 131-132)

**Jan 17, 1947:** In a stern message to US troops general Hodge described 5 types of soldier who created a negative image of the United States among Koreans, from ones who walk 5 or 6 abreast down the street shouldering aside the citizens, to rapists, murderers, hold-up men and thieves. He admonished his troops to keep their hands off Korean women and stop calling them by derogatory names. (RG 554, Entry

[On 16 January 1947, because of numerous incidents, a special order was issued regarding discipline on railroad trains.]

**Jan 17, 1947:** LIM, Han Pong, owner of a Chinese restaurant, reported that at 21:30 three American soldiers armed with a pistol entered his restaurant and stole 8,000 yen and a wristwatch. (NARA 4b, p.109)

**Jan 17, 1947:** Seoul. Fire at one of the buildings of the Seoul Electric street car system. The fire was due to sabotage. (NARA 4b, p.139)

[In this connection see also 23 January below]

**Jan 20, 1947:** Kwangju. SHIN Ki Woo was sentenced by a provost court to 6 months hard labor for the theft of a drug from a medical supply room. (NARA 4b, p.243)

**Jan 20, 1947:** In one province alone over 1,000 farmers were arrested for alleged failure to fulfill their 1946 rice quotas. (Robinson 1947, p. 284)

**Jan 21, 1947:** Missed Inchon. 10 rounds of fire were directed at an American officer in his car. None took effect. However, one round pierced the windshield of the officer’s vehicle. (NARA 1, No 72)

**Jan 21, 1947:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (317). Changdong-Ni. Two platoons of the 63th Infantry Regiment waited for police to join them on a rice collection raid. After waiting for 45 minutes the MG officer told them to go alone. The first platoon arrested 37 Koreans, the second arrested 3.

One farmer, HO Jung Kil, fled when he saw troops approaching. One of the officers borrowed a rifle [why did he not shoot with his pistol?] and fired after calling him to halt. The Korean was killed.

At noon, when the Company Commander heard of the employment of two of his platoons in the rice collection, he ordered them to stop. The MG Provincial Governor had no knowledge of the order issued in the morning to tactical troops to assist in the rice collection. (NARA 4b, p.108)

[Rice collecting operations often led to similar incidents. In the present case the order was probably given by a MG officer but is is surprising that he did not inform the unit commander.

A hand-written annotation says: “Bad. This is a 6th Division report. Pass to General Lerch for comment”.]
Jan 23, 1947: MG is attempting to cut down the overstaffed street car system. (NARA 4b, p.138) [Similar policy of personnel reduction was implemented in Japan especially in the railways.]

Jan 24, 1947: • Korean civilians killed: 1 (318). At about 15:40 a rice collection team entered the village of Pong San Ri (Kwangju district). It was composed of two enlisted men and two Korean policemen under the command of Lt. Stevens. When Lt. Stevens entered the yard of a house he was confronted with 3 Koreans armed with clubs. He shot a warning shot over the heads of the Koreans and accidentally killed KIM, Sam Peak, one of the men who was about to attack him. The two other men fled. There were no other witnesses. (NARA 4b, p.233) [It is really surprising that the commanding officer did not remain with his team during the investigation.]

Jan 27, 1947: Korean shot and killed by US enlisted man Apparently a Korean policeman on guard at a gasoline dump was engaged in black market. An enlisted man knowing of it took action. The policeman raised bystanders to resist action. The US soldier fired into the crowd hitting one in the stomach. He died the next day. (NARA 4b p. 155)

Jan 29, 1947: Houseboys of American personnel have resigned after they were threatened of bodily harm if they did not cease working for the Americans. (NARA 4b, p.163-164)

Jan 30, 1947: 16 Koreans were sentenced to death for their participation in the Taegu uprising of 2,3 October 1946. They were charged not with any political offenses but with the basest crimes such as murder or robbery. (Korean Independence 30 January 1947) [In late April 1946, 9 of these sentences were commuted to life imprisonment and one was thrown out. The other 6 condemned persons can only be saved by presidential clemency.]

Jan 31, 1947: Taegu. The police wanted to arrest three constabulary men who were found drinking at a restaurant at 23:40 that is to say after curfew. The men resisted and called the Taegu Battalion for help. 80 constabulary soldiers were sent to the place to prevent the arrests. One of the policemen was roughed and wounded. Agents’ note: The ill feeling between the Police and the Constabulary has been evident and will be a menace to the people as well as to the Police unless measures are taken. (NARA 4b, p.165-169) [The paradox is that both the Police and Constabulary were under US command. In another report (NARA 4b, p.238) Lt. Col. Russel D. Barrows the Director of the
Dept. of Internal Security stated that trouble between the Constabulary and Police occurred about once a week. It would be interesting to know if there was already the same rift between them during the Japanese occupation.]


Feb 8, 1947: Korea swept by sabotage; 27 were killed. (WP p. M4)

Feb 8, 1947: Chonju. Attack on the Chonbuk newspaper (left) by a gang of rightists. A gang of 10 men of the “Northwest Youth Alliance” came to the office of the newspaper and asked the editor why an article entitled “True conditions in North Korea” that they had sent had not been published. The editor replied that it could not be published because it had already been published by another newspaper. Thereupon the editor was struck, the office was wrecked and three employees were injured. (NARA 4b, p.218)

[Of course, the local leader of this organization denied that this group had received permission to take action in this way. The printing office of the same newspaper was wrecked again on 21 February 1947. This time the vandals left a message threatening the personnel and their family with death if the journal continued to be printed (NARA 4b, p.258).]

Feb 8, 1947: Yong Chon, North Kyong Sang. On 28 September 1946 a prominent left wing leader, Pak Hae Kun, was arrested and charged with illegal assembly. On 3 October 1946 he was released by a mob who attacked the Yong Chon jail. In late October he was rearrested and kept in jail without trial. On 27 January 1947 he was tried by Provost Court No 18. The trial lasted until 1 February and resulted in the acquittal of the defendant. (NARA 4b, p.231)

[This was a very unusual provost court trial for two reasons. (i) It lasted 5 days instead of one hour (or less) (ii) It resulted in an acquittal. This is at odds with standard judiciary practice because usually when a judge wants to release a defendant the sentence at least covers the period of detention until the trial (here it was 3 months). The acquittal made the previous detention baseless.]

Feb 9, 1947: Army keeps US troops out of rioting. (WP p. 2)

[This will be the main message released by Headquarters in all subsequent incidents. Whereas 3 months earlier, Korean police and constabulary were unable to curb the insurgents it seems that in this short time span considerable progress was made.]

Feb 10, 1947: Cheju. Students held demonstrations against the Military Govern-
ment. A MG company broke up the demonstration and drove the students out of town. (NARA 1, No 75; NARA 2, No 88)
[The report does not say if the students were arrested, if they were not, they could have returned and resume their demonstration.]

Feb 13, 1947: Excerpts of a secret report about how tactical troops should deal with domestic violence.
The following measures will be taken.
(1) During the period 17-28 February 1947 training will be intensified with particular emphasis on quelling domestic disturbances. Attention is invited to the following quotation from the “War Department Basic Field Manuel”:

“In domestic disturbances, firing over the heads of rioters will be regarded as an admission of weakness or as an attempt to bluff and may do more harm than good”.

(2) The primary mission of tactical troops is to assist Military Government.
[Signed:] By command of Lt General Hodge, Charles Ennis, Colonel AGD
(NARA 4b, p. 221)
[The advice given to tactical troops to fire into the crowd rather than over the heads stands at odds with current (i.e. 2011) rules of engagement which say the following. “Graduated response to unarmed hostile elements may be used. Such a response can include:
(a) Verbal warnings to demonstrators in their native language.
(b) Warning shots fired over the heads of the hostile elements.
(c) Other reasonable uses of force, to include deadly force when the element demonstrates a hostile intent.”

As a last observation, it can be noted that although most reports in the volume under consideration are marked “Confidential”, this report is classified as “Secret”?]

Feb 14, 1947: Korean police [under order of MG] raided the headquarters of the South Korean Labor party. (Boston Globe p. 2)

Feb 14, 1947: It was reported in the New York Herald Tribune of 14 February that a Russian letter was found during the raid on the headquarters of the Labor Party which tells Reds to stir up discontent among students.
However, in a message of 22 February the US Political Advisor in Seoul (Langdon) told the Secretary of State that the letter is probably a forgery: “Reported letter from Major Nicolai Gusomov to Hu Hun has appeared only in mimeographed [that is to say duplicated form] form. Reports saying that witnesses could be produced who had seen the original were not substantiated so far”.
(STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 1)
[It is a common trick to take advantage of such a raid for planting forged documents destined to show that a party is controlled by a foreign country. Similar episodes occurred after raids on Soviet offices in China in the 1920s (see “Relations between US troops and the population of China”).]

**Feb 15, 1947:** Seoul. A banquet was offered to American newspaper men at the Chang Duk Palace. At approximately 17:00 there were some 1,000 individuals gathered in the street leading to the entrance of the Palace. Most of them seemed to be students but there were also many women and children. Posters in English had been fastened to the walls. They read as follow.

- Welcome American pressmen but do away with trusteeship
- Withdrawal of the Soviet and American armies.
- Removal of the 38th parallel border.
- Give us perfect independence or death

The guests began to arrive at 18:30. As the cars approached the individuals raised placards and shouted “Man Sei!” (“Long Live Korea!”). At 19:00 the crowd sang the national anthem and then dispersed without incident.

During the whole time some individuals were observed standing in the alleyways. They were mostly young men possibly from right-wing organizations acting as self-appointed guards. No identification of them was made.

(NARA 4b, p. 191-192)

[It is surprising that after the dispersion none of the demonstrators were attacked and molested by the “self-appointed guards”]

**Feb 15, 1947:** CIC memorandum addressed to Col. Robinson (G-2), excerpts.

- A big riot is being planned in Taegu for 1 March 1947.
- Major Kang from the North Korean Army will move to South Korea with 5,000 men to sabotage US Army forces. Major Kang will act simultaneously with other movements on or about 1 March 1947.
- LEE, Tai sang will lead 200 men to carry out mass murder beginning with Kim Koo [president of the provisional Korean government in exile in China during the war] and other personnel in South Korea. Action will start about 1 March 1947.
- KIM Koo stated current demonstrations were a warm up for those to be held on Sam-Ill Day (1 March 1947, see explanations below).
- KIM Koo will try to seize the government on 1 March 1947.
- Chun Pyung will make a bid for power in Incheon on 1 March 1947.
- PAK, Heun Young is trying to recoup his forces after the failure of the last uprising.

(NARA 4b, p.272-274)

[Sam-Ill (or Samil) Day means 3-1 Day (Sam means 3, Il means 1, these words are
almost the same as in Chinese namely san and yr). It refers to the uprising of March 1, 1919 against Japanese rule.

This memorandum provides a summary of various CIC reports. Altogether there are 20 warnings. Very few of these predictions materialized. A similar inflation of warnings occurred in the years after the 9/11 attack against the World Trade Center. To be sure not to miss anything, intelligence departments are tempted to lend credence to all rumors reported by informants.

As an example of an event that was highly unlikely to succeed one can mention the seizure of power by KIM Koo. In 1947 nothing could happen in Korea without the green light of the MG. In other words, seizure of power by Kim meant that the MG wanted to get rid of Rhee. It would have been just a replacement, not a seizure of power.]

Feb 16, 1947: Koreans hear Reds propose US withdrawal. (Chicago Tribune p. 10)

Feb 19, 1947: US fatalities: 1 (108). A handwritten message dated 2/19/47 is included in the files of (NARA 4b, p.151); it says the following.

“Col Robinson
The officer who slipped on this has since died. ”
[Signed by three initials which are hard to read, may be GCC?]
[“To slip” means to fill in a “Memo routing slip” by which information was transmitted between different departments. From another file in the same source (p. 251) it can be learned that Col. Robinson was at the G-2 department of USAFIK that is to say at the headquarters of the occupation force.

The clear implication of this message is that an officer has died shortly before 19 February 1947. However it is not clear whether this officer was Col. Robinson or whether this note was addressed to him. As Robinson is a fairly common name it would be useful to know his first names. According to two other files in the same source (p.272,275) the initials of Col. Robinson’s first names may have been J. M.

On 15 February 1947 a Memorandum was addressed to Col Robinson by CIC Headquarters which means that he was still alive.]

Feb 19, 1947: Tte police produced a letter, allegedly signed by a Soviet Army major, to the leader of the South Korean Labor Party ordering agitation against the American Command, including school strikes. One week later the letter was exposed as a fraud cooked up for the occasion by the South Korean police. (Robinson 1947, p. 293)

[It can be remembered that on 14 February 1947 the police raided the headquarters of the South Korean Labor Party (see above) Such raids are usually used to plant “discovered letters”, this is a common trick. The fact that subsequently the letter was exposed as being a fraud hardly matters because most newspapers had reported the
first statement while very few reported the fraud.]

**Feb 20, 1947:** Interim constitution of South Korea.
A bill for an interim constitution limited to South Korea was introduced in the interim assembly on “20th day of February in the 4280th year of the Dankoon era (alias 1947)”.
Its first section clearly states that it will only apply to South Korea. It says: “Section 1. Korea south of 38 degrees north latitude shall be governed by the people on the principle of democracy and the legislation, executive and judicial power shall be exercised according to this law.”
(NARA, RG 554(332) Box 37)
[This means that as early as February 1947 the persons who controlled the Interim Assembly (and particularly Rhee and the MG) had decided the creation of a separate South Korea.]

**Feb 21, 1947:** US control of alien property and businesses. Memorandum for Commanding General USAFIK. Excerpt.
The issuance of MG Custody order No 8 of 31 December 1946 transferring control of alien property to American advisers has touched off considerable opposition in the Korean Press.
Korean directors of MG recommended repeal of order No 8 on the ground that it meant control by Americans of 90% of the Korean economy, thus invalidating “Koreanization”. It means the public to believe that America means to come into the shoes of Japan as economic grasp is concerned. More specifically, the Korean directors observed that there are two separate functions: conservation and utilization. They asked for utilization to be “Koreanized” immediately and conservation to be “Koreanized” progressively.
(NARA, RG 554, Box 310)

**Feb 28, 1947:** General Weckerling welcomed rightist youth group leaders. (Excerpts)
The following gentlemen called on General Weckerling at the Duk Soo Palace. [6 persons are listed who belong to the following organizations: Young Men’s General League, Dai-Han Labor General League, Dai-Han Youth Party, National Party, Korean Youth Party]
**SIN, Ill Yong:** We have come to report to you the incident that occurred on February 16. Members of the “Korean Independence Youth Organization” [not represented at this meeting] were trying to organize a youth organization in a certain town when they were attacked by a Communist youth group. One man was killed and six seriously injured.
Gen. Weckerling: I will be very glad to hear all details of this matter.
SIN, Il Yong: Communist groups want to stir up the country until the Foreign Min-
isters Conference. What specific measures do you recommend that we take to nip it in the bud? We have certain plans but first we all wish to consult with General Brown.
SON, Kee Yeub: All Communists have methods such as setting fires to buildings, assassinations and outright murders.
YOO, Il Yong: Punishing all these outlaws is the only decent thing to do in any society either by death or long prison sentences.
Gen. Weckerling: I will be very glad to put your views forward to the proper au-
thorities concerned. In the meantime you may want to consider talking to some of the MG people including Dr. Chough, the Director of the National Police.
PACK, Kyung Hoo: We have a force of 8 million young people ready to start out at the command of the General Headquarters. We can clean them [i.e. Communists] out with this 8 million man force, but we are waiting to hear something definite from MG.
Gen. Weckerling: I am certain that General Lerch as Military Governor would be very pleased to hear any suggestions that you gentlemen might make concerning the specific action that MG should take.
(NARA 4b, p.270)
[That account makes it very clear that anti-Communist groups expected instructions from the MG. It also shows that “setting fire to military buildings” was an insurgency method used by the Communists; thus, it reveals that systematically calling all fires accidental was not correct.]

**Feb 26, 1947: Military Commission Orders No 2.**
Before a Military Commission which convened at Chinju on 30 January 1947 were tried Kang Dea Chang, Ku yong Sik, Kang In Jung, Ku Sun tae, Whang Koon Bong, Hurh Jung Sik, Sohn Duk Cho, Am Chon Jai.
**Charge:** Violation of Proclamation No 2 of 7 September 1945.
On 6-9 October 1946 the defendants committed acts of sedition by causing residents to defy lawful authority. In conjunction with numerous other persons the names of whom are unknown they killed willfully, feloniously and with premeditation Kim Ul Do by beating him with fists, clubs, stones.
All accused pleaded “not guilty” on all charges.
**Sentence:** All 8 accused, except Am Chong Jai and Sohn Duk Cho, to be hanged by the neck until dead. Sohn Duk Cho: 5 years confinement at hard labor, Am Chong Jai: acquitted.
(NARA 11)
[There are many similar Military Commission records in NARA 11; the phrasing is basically the same for all of them: “violation of Proclamation No 2”; “beating with fists, clubs and stones”; “to be hanged by the neck until dead”.

As such statements give little information about the exact circumstances, we will refrain from reproducing such Military Commission records.]

**Feb 27, 1947:** Statement made by Representative Walter Riehlman in the US House of Representatives. Excerpt.

Eighteen months have passed since the defeat of Japan. However, South Korea, occupied by the American Forces is not yet allowed to trade with the outside world. Why is Korean trade still prohibited? (NARA, RG 554, Box 310)

[This is indeed a puzzling question. The same policy was used in Japan, but in this case it was seen as a kind of punishment for a defeated country. What was the rationale for following the same policy in Korea?]

**Feb 28, 1947:** Missed Provost Marshal investigators were shot at while investigating a robbery at Kimpo (north-west of Seoul). (NARA 2, No 88)

**Mar 1, 1947:** Between 1 October 1945 and 1 March 1947 approximately 300,000 Japanese and 700,000 Koreans were allowed to pass the border between the northern and southern parts of Korea. The source does not say how many of the Koreans came from Manchuria where a fierce civil war between Communist and KMT troops was under way. (NARA 28, p. 30)

**Mar 1, 1947:** Summary of the report of the “National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident” (excerpt).

Shooting on 1 March 1947 by the National Police was followed by tortures resulting in deaths, terror and mass arrests.

(http://www.jeju43.go.kr/english)

[The island of Jeju is located about 60 kilometer at the south of the Korean peninsula. In Korea the whole episode is called the 4.3 incident because the police opened fire on protesters on April 3, 1948. This marked the beginning of a series of massacres which continued until the end of 1949. See below at the date of April 3, 1948.]

**Mar 1, 1947:** Korean civilians killed: 5 (323). Cheju island. A mob assumed to be leftists attacked the police building and were met with rifle fire which resulted in the death of 5 rioters. US troops are reported as having assisted in the dispersal of the mob but there is no indication that they resorted to the use of weapons. (NARA 1, No 77)

**Mar 1, 1947:** Seoul. KIM, Chun Ho, a member of the leftist Chosun Democratic Young Men’s Alliance, was killed while taking part in a demonstration at the South
Gate. A funeral parade was given in his remembrance on 8 March 1947. The funeral ceremony also remembered HAN, Sang Muun, member of the Printers Union who was killed by Rightists who broke into the Printers Union building. (NARA 4b, p. 285)

**Mar 2, 1947:** The British government’s distress call about Greece got a favorable reply in Washington in the sense that the United States will finance the Greek regime and its war against the leftist guerrilla. (Boston Globe p. C1)

The situation in Greece paralleled fairly closely the one in South Korea. After the withdrawal of the German Army counter insurgency warfare was first conducted by the British. The present statement made by President Truman indicated supporting the Greek government will be taken over by the United States.

**Mar 4, 1947:** Taejon. Two Koreans were trapped while stealing gasoline at the 1321st Engineers supply dump. Both were shot in the legs when they attempted to escape and are confined in the provincial hospital. (NARA, RG 554, Box 16)

**Mar 5, 1947:** Taejon. An explosion caused a fire in the MG dry cleaning and laundry building. One enlisted man was burned around the face and head.

In the province of Chung Chong Nam Do American troops have had 6 fires since the beginning of the year. (NARA, RG 554, Box 16)

**Mar 6, 1947:** Songdo district (near Incheon and Kaesong). On 28 February at 8:00 a police telephone line was cut and about 120 meters of wire were removed. At that place there were 3 sets of wire, one of the police and two for civilian private companies. The fact that the police line was installed above the two others rendering it most inaccessible precludes the possibility of pure theft.

A domiciliary search was conducted in the neighboring villages and 3 suspects were arrested. Pieces of wire of same quality as the police wire were found in their homes. The suspects are 37, 40 and 53 year old respectively. (NARA 4b, p.313)

**Mar 6, 1947:** Yongdong (not far from Taejeon). 60 rightists from Yongdong Po raided 5 homes of leftists at Youngchun village in the Kimpo district. The attackers were armed with clubs and half of them were wearing dark glasses, fur lined caps and partial disguise. (NARA 4b, p.312)

[The fact that foreign intervention and occupation often brought about civil strife was verified in numerous cases: China, the occupation of European countries by Germany in World War II, Korea, Greece, Vietnam, Iraq. The countries such as Germany or Japan where this did not happen had previously experienced severe military defeat.]

**Mar 6, 1947:** Recommendation addressed by Lt. Leonard Bertsch (of the Legisla-
The rightist members of the ILA [Interim Legislative Assembly] claim that there are no political prisoners in Korea, but there are political prisoners in every country in the world. In the United States and in most European countries the death penalty is not given to political prisoners. A good example is the case of Herschel Grinszpan, the Jewish refugee who murdered a Nazi spy. The French government gave him a prison sentence rather than the death penalty. It is proper for ILA to pass a bill which will provide for light sentences for political prisoners. (NARA, RG 554, Box 310)

[Not surprisingly, this recommendation produced a stir in the Assembly and in the MG. Bertsch was replaced by somebody else but no other disciplinary measure was taken against him because General John Weckerling exonerated him.

**Mar 8, 1947:** In the past week there have been two fires at ASCOM city, a US Army camp near Incheon.
On 6 March there was a fire at G Company, 2nd Battalion, 32 Infantry Regiment in Kaesong. (NARA, RG 554, Box 16)

**Mar 10, 1947:** It was announced that of the 16 men sentenced to death by Military Commission in the wake of the Taegu uprising, 9 had seen their sentence commuted to life imprisonment and one was released by order of the Supreme Reviewing Authority of the United States Army Forces in the Far East. (McCune 1950, p. 86) [The source does not say whether or not the 6 others were executed.]

**Mar 10, 1947:** Wolmi Do. An American guard was slugged on (that is to say struck heavily) while investigating. (NARA 2, No 88)

**Mar 10, 1947:** President Truman held secret discussions with his military chiefs about rushing guns and money to the Greeks and to the Turks. The United States may also ask for the removal of the Greek king. (Boston Globe p. 1) [The king was not removed, at least not until several years later.]

**Mar 12, 1947:** Island of Cheju. Six people were killed by the police. In protest, transportation employees and employees of the Military Government on the island started a strike. (NARA 2, No 88) [According to a report one week later 50% of the transportation employees were still on strike but 90% of the employees of MG had returned to work.]

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150 This case was not really a good illustration. In November 1938 Herschel Grynszpan killed Ernst von Rath, a minor official at the German embassy in Paris. Rath was in fact an anti-Nazi and was under investigation by the Gestapo. As a result of the assassination the Nazis organized the Crystal Night in Germany. Grynszpan was indicted but was not tried before France was invaded by Germany. Then, on 18 July 1940 Grynszpan was taken into custody by the German Government.
Mar 13, 1947: It is believed that during 1946 at least 6 Seoul university professors have moved to Kim Il Sung University in Pyongyang. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 1)


- Appointments of administrative officials of the rank of Civil Administrator and above shall be made by the Military Governor subject on approval by the Interim National Assembly as provided in Ordinance No 118 of 21 August 1946.
- All appointments within the several Provinces shall be made by the respective Provincial Governors subject to the approval of the Korea Civil Service in those cases in which existing law require such approval.

(NARA, RG 544, Box 310)

[Given that anyway one half of the members of the Interim Assembly had been selected by the MG, this ordinance gave the MG practically a free hand in appointing Korean officials.]

Mar 17, 1947: As in Japan all imports and exports were subject to authorization delivered by the Department of Commerce of the Military Government. In early 1947 an investigation was started for alleged large-scale embezzlement and graft by American military officials. The offending officers were later removed quietly and sent home. A convenient fire on 17 March 1947 destroyed many of the records involved in the allegedly-illegal transactions. (Robinson 1947 p. 291)

Mar 17, 1947: According to a report of medical activities in Korea, swimming was prohibited in any pool, stream or beach until the place had been investigated for sanitary conditions. As a result of these inspections, the only satisfactory places were found on the east and southern coast well away from populated areas and polluted streams. Severe tide differentials and mud flats eliminated the west coast for use by US personnel. (NARA 26)

[The report also says that critical shortage of water limited the use of swimming pools. Despite such restrictions there were several deaths by drowning (as mentioned in separate entries)]

Mar 18, 1947: Two Russian soldiers were killed by the South Korean police near the 38th parallel. (NARA 2, No 88)

Mar 19, 1947: Island of Cheju Do. Some 1,000 people attempted to rush the jail; 4 of them were wounded by the police. (NARA 2, No 88)

[This disturbance is mentioned in a retrospective chronology which covers 3 February 1947 – 30 April 1947. Unfortunately, it gives little detail.]

Mar 22, 1947: After an abortive strike 1,831 persons were arrested. In a number of
convictions by provost courts the charge was not implication in the strike but rather anti-Military Government speeches made in the weeks before the strike. (This comment was made on 26 June 1947 in a memorandum by Roger N. Baldwin, director of the “American Civil Liberties Union” who visited Korea from 12 to 23 May 1947. (RG 554, Box 16)
[On the same trip Roger Baldwin also visited Japan. His memoranda provide a lucid view about civil liberties in these two countries; see below at the date of 28 May 1947.]

**Mar 22, 1947:** After a 24-hour strike which affected mainly industry, communications and railroads, some 2,718 persons were arrested many being left-wing leaders. The sentences meted out to the labor leaders ranged as high as 5 years at hard labor. (Robinson 1947, p. 218)

[Robinson observes: “Just why there should have been any arrest for a 24-hour strike in which the only violence was started by the police defies explanation”. Coming from him, it is a curious observation for in his book he shows repeatedly that the constant policy of the Military Government had been to quell leftist influence in South Korea and to put in place a strong anti-Communist bulwark.]

**Mar 22, 1947:** How can members of the Legislative Assembly find a house in Seoul?
This question was raised by a Korean member of the Liaison Committee of the Interim Assembly. Mr. Kim Boong Joon explained his own experience in the following terms.
There are two methods for obtaining houses: one is through the Army personnel, the other is through the property Custodian. The second method does not work. I tried it over the past two years. Whenever I asked for a house, they would say “We don’t have one. Go ahead, find one and report to me”. When I would find one they would say “This one is taken by someone else, you can’t have it”.
There are about 500 former government houses in Seoul to be used as official residences. About one half are occupied by officers in MG, the other half are occupied by members of the government.
Col. Lincoln replied that for the moment the MG had no policy in this respect (a convenient way to elude the question).
Mr. Kim Boong Joon expressed the wish that a policy will be defined soon so that members of the Interim Assembly may find places in which to live.
(NARA, RG 554, Box 310)

**Mar 23, 1947:** Beginning of a strike of railroad workers in Korea. They demand the release of 3 union officials. American intelligence called the strike a show of
strength. (NYT 23 March 1947)

**Mar 24, 1947:** A general strike was broken. 90% of the workers are back on their jobs. (NARA 2, No 82)
[The source does not say when the general strike started or how it was “broken”.

**Mar 29, 1947:** Memorandum of Minister Arthur C. Bunce to General Weckerling. Excerpt.
“The basic objective of the American policy on Korea is to follow a middle-of-the-road policy which will prevent either the extreme left or the extreme right to seizing power.” (NARA, RG 554, Box 310)
[This is how the objective of American policy is usually presented, whether in Korea or elsewhere. If this was really the objective of the State Department one must recognize that it was a complete failure for instead of that, middle-of-the road forces were pushed aside and an extreme right-wing government was brought to power under President Rhee. Rhee had the great advantage of delivering a fierce anti-Communist policy. At the same time as the Communist threat in China was becoming more serious, the necessity of a strong anti-Communist bulwark in Korea became more compelling. In this sense what happened in Korea was just a corollary of what happened in China.]

**Mar 31, 1947:** 75% of the Korean employees at the 34th General Hospital [an hospital for US troops] went on strike. (NARA 2, No 82)

**Apr 1947:** In the Spring of 1947 the situation at Seoul National University was investigated by an American officer delegated by the G-2 section of the XXIV Corps. He returned a report citing real grievances such as the lack of books, poorly-trained teachers, inadequate heating and so on as the main cause of the agitation, with Communist subversion being only a minor factor. The report was ordered rewritten. The new version described the basic grievances as merely propaganda raised by the Communists.

Soon after that, the US supervisor of the Seoul City Department of Education issued a vigorous plea for a constructive approach to the problem of education by the American Command. General Lerch, the Military Governor, acted by asking him for his resignation. (Robinson 1947 p. 150)

**Apr 1, 1947:** There was a disturbance at Mitsubishi, a GI’s billet. (NARA 4b, p. 276)
[This event appears in a chronology of civil disturbances but no more details are given.]

**Apr 1, 1947:** Chigyong-Ni (about 10km south-east of Kunsan not far from Taejon
on the west coast). A train was wrecked by sabotage. A stone was laid across the track, the engine struck the stone, jumped the track and is now lying on its side in a rice paddy. The tender overturned too but the other cars are still on rails. Possible injuries are unknown. The CIC and the Military Police of the 63d Infantry [Regiment] are investigating. (NARA 4b, p.293)

**Apr 1, 1947**:  ● Missed  At 1:30 in Seoul a shot was fired at a US sentry by an unknown person. It pierced the sentry’s sleeve without injuring the man. (NARA 2, No 82)

[This is one of the numerous miracles through which many US soldiers escaped injury.]

**Apr 2, 1947**: The State Department today assisted Dr. Syngman Rhee, leader of the South Korean Democratic League, to obtain passage to return to Korea after his visit to the United States after the War Department had told him there was no space for him on Air Transport Command planes. (NYT p. 2)

[A curious lack of coordination between the War Department and the State Department.]

**Apr 3-12, 1947**: There were 3 sabotage actions against telephone lines of the US Army. On 3 April in Ongjin, 1,500 meter of wire were removed. On 7 April the 6th Division reported that 30 meter of wire were removed. On 12 April 1947, the 7th Division reported that 100 meter of wire had been removed. (NARA 2)

**Apr 3, 1947**: According to a statement made by General Lerch, after a 24 hour strike 2,700 persons were arrested throughout South Korea. According to a statement made on 23 March 1947 by the Chief of the Metropolitan (i.e. Seoul) Police, Chang Taik Sang the arrests involved all leaders of the following organizations: (i) South Korean Labor Party (ii) Democratic Youth Alliance (iii) People’s Front (iv) Council of All Korean Farmers (v) Council of the Korean Labor Union. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 10)

**Apr 5, 1947**: Abortive leftist inspired mutiny in the South Korean Constabulary at Kangnung in the north east of Korea near the 38th parallel. (NARA 2, No 88)

**Apr 10, 1947**: The US military crushed the last People’s Committees in Chejudo and Keojedo (also spelled Jooje or Koje Island, located off the eastern Korean cost near Pusan) Many Korean nationalists died in the fighting. (US Military Government in Korea, 1947)

**Apr 12, 1947**: Information received from an informant led to a CIC raid on the home of LEE Pyung Chung in Seoul and the recovery of 80 fragmentation grenades which were hidden in a coal shed. (NARA 2, No 85)
[One would expect this person to receive a fairly severe sentence in a trial before a military tribunal.]

**Apr 17, 1947:** The CIC raided Chu An, a small village 6km north east of Inchon and found that a Korean [name not given] had 17 artillery fuses in his possession. They were hidden in a deep, water-filed, hole. (NARA 2, No 85)

**Apr 17, 1947:** Why did the letter written by Sergeant Savage get a broad diffusion? In the first chapter we reproduced a letter written to President Truman by a former Sergeant in Korea. In documents of the State Department of April 1947 one learns more about the reactions brought about by this letter.

- First, one learns that Mr. Savage addressed the same letter to General Marshall. Although the letters did not reach either President Truman nor General Marshall they raised some interest among persons of the State Department who read it. Why?
- It seems that the State Department did not like the way the War Department managed the occupation and that it wanted to use the letter for the purpose of “civilianizing” the occupation. This is said very clearly in a message from Mr. Rudin to Mr. Gross. “This is an impressive letter. I would recommend that it be used as ammunition if and when snarks develop with the War Department in the plan to civilianize our administration of the occupation of Korea.”
- Copies of the letter were circulated. As a result the letter was read by General Hilldring (Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas from 1946 to 1947) and Howard G. Peterson (Assistant Secretary of War). This is why it can be found in their personal paper archives.

(STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 5)

**Apr 17, 1947:** American personnel was withdrawn from the Liaison Committee between the Legislative Assembly and the Military Government. (NARA 2, No 88)

**Apr 23, 1947:** A telephone pole was deliberately felled across the Chinhae-Pusan road. (NARA 2, No 86)

**Apr 28, 1947:** Record withdrawn on 10 March 1978. It was entitled “From Hoover to Lyon” and was withdrawn through the authority of the FBI. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 6)

[This is just one exemple. In fact, there are numerous items (records, files or folders) which were withdrawn from the US archives.]

**Apr 30, 1947:** Excerpt of “Korean Independence”. Eighteen ringleaders of the uprising were tried by a US Army Military Commission. They were found guilty of violating Proclamation No 2 to the People of Korea; 16 of them were sentenced to death. (KI 30 April 1947)
[The charge of violating Proclamation No 2 (see above at the date of 7 September 1945) does not tell us much about the actual crimes with which the defendants were charged. 16 of them were sentenced to death but the sentences of 10 of them were commuted into life imprisonment or voided.]

**Apr 30, 1947: Visit to Korea of a delegation of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).** The delegation canceled its tour of South Korea the second day. “We have seen Korean unionists beaten under our eyes and our delegation itself was insulted and threatened” declared a member of the delegation.

- “Driving from the airport the delegation met a throng of welcoming workers. Louis Saillant, the WFTU General Secretary, asked that the car stop so delegates could shake hands with the people. US officials refused.
- During the delegation’s first day in Seoul police carried out a mass arrest of leaders and workers belonging to the All-Korea Federation of Trade Unions.
- Unionists who managed to reach the WFTU delegation said they were doing so at the risk of their lives.
- On the second day the delegation went to inspect the Kyung Bang textile factory. In the court yard two unionists bearing welcome leaflets ran toward them. Guards beat them up and kicked them in the face before the very eyes of the dumb-founded delegates. It was later learned that the attackers were members of the Great Korea Labor Federation, a labor front organization created by Syngman Rhee.
- When the delegation visited Major General Archer L. Lerch who was kind enough to give them one and a half minute of his time he astonished the delegates by saying that Americans were no longer responsible having turned over the government to Koreans.

(Korean Independence 30 April 1947)

**May 1947:** In a sharply worded warning, General Lerch told the Interim Assembly that if it did not pass a law calling for a new assembly elected on the basis of universal suffrage before 31 July 1947, the Military Government would do so in the form of an ordinance. Rhee concurred with this demand. (Robinson 1947, p. 232)

**May 1, 1947:** On 1 May, telephone lines of the 7th Division were interrupted by pulling them from switch boxes.
On 3 May and again on 8 May and 12 May US Army telephone lines were cut in the Ongjin peninsula (north of Inchon that is to say not far from the 38th parallel). In one case, 900 meters of wire were removed. in another case the cut ends were re-taped to conceal the break. (NARA 2, No 87 and 88)

[Comments made in the reports about such incidents often tend to suggest that no sabotage was intended, that it was to sell the wire that it was removed. If this were
the case it would be less risky to remove the wire of civilian telephone lines than to take it from military lines.]

May 1, 1947: A number of students from Seoul National University participated in the May Day celebration staged by the Communists and leftists. In the following days some 800 students were arrested by the Korean police. In addition to the arrests, a large number of students were expelled from the university by the Department of Education.
The American supervisor to the Department of Education could keep quiet no longer. In defiance of Military Government, he issued a public denunciation of the unjustified arrests and expulsions. A few days later he was dismissed from his job by General Lerch.
(Robinson 1947, p. 293)

[At about the same time, Chinese universities were staging massive movements directed against the presence of American troops in China. Little wonder therefore that the Military Government in Korea tried to suppress any move in the same direction.]

May 4, 1947:
- A telephone line connecting two army units on Ongjin peninsula was cut. No wire was taken.
- The Ongjin Military Governor reported that the bolts on the rear wheel of his jeep had been purposely loosened.
(NDL, microfiche FOA 5167-5169, G2 periodic Report No 526)
[If it was really a sabotage, one may wonder why it was done on the rear wheel.]

May 9, 1947: Pusan. Stones were thrown by Koreans at a US Army officer who was investigating the stoning of a quonset barrack (a semi-cylindrical shelter). None of the Koreans were apprehended. (NARA 2, No 88)

May 14, 1947: A fire believed to be due to sabotage wiped out the Kwanju railhead. The fire destroyed 9 carloads of oil, 14 refrigerators, 5 railroad cars, 2 trucks and a warehouse building. (NARA 2, No 88)
[The report does not explicitly say if these were installations of the US Army but the presence of sophisticated equipment like refrigerators makes it likely.]

May 15, 1947: Taejon (Daejeon). Saboteurs damaged the refrigeration mechanism of a 30 cubic meter reefer (that is to say a railroad car that carries cargo under refrigeration). (NARA 2, No 89)

May 15, 1947: CIC reported that 1,036 sticks of dynamite, 2,200 caps and 1,000 meters of fuse were stolen from the Mu Kuk gold mine located at Umsong-Gun. (NARA 2, No 90)
[This episode as well as others suggest that the leftist groups held large quantities of explosives. Quite surprisingly however there are few accounts telling us something about how they were used. One exception was the explosion at the Pusan customs warehouse on 8 July 1947. There are also some accounts of bridges which were blown up.]

**May 19, 1947:** Pupyong (not far from Incheon). 1,000 pieces of Dupont explosives and two boxes of blasting caps which had been stolen from an US Army engineering unit 5 months ago were discovered at the home of LEE Tok In, a member of the outlawed leftist “Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance”. (NARA 2, No 89)

**May 20, 1947:** Kunsan (Gunsan) located on the west coast of Korea. Three known Koreans beat an American officer who attempted to confiscate rice. They took his pistol and beat him with a flexible pipe (a rubber hose) and a stick until he was unconscious. Once he recovered he was able to drive his jeep to his unit. (NARA 2, No 89)

[The report says “known Koreans” which suggests that they have been arrested. One would expect them to be severely sentenced by a military tribunal.]

**May 21, 1947:** The Joint Soviet-American Commission resumed its activities after an interruption of several months. (Robinson 1947 p. 226)

**May 23, 1947:** Seoul–Chunkchon road (“Chunkchon” probably refers to Chuncheon, east of Seoul). A wire was found stretched across the road. It was firmly attached to a tree on each side. (NARA 2, No 89)

[The report does not say if any plane was damaged. There were certainly many Korean employees on this airport who could have read the inscription. It is likely that nobody wanted to read the inscription to avoid the implication that the sabotage was politically motivated.]

**May 24, 1947:** Kangnung airport. A landing airplane struck one of several piles of rock which had been placed at the end of the runway. An inscription in Korean which could not be read had been placed on top of the rock piles. (NARA 2, No 89)

[The report does not say if any plane was damaged. There were certainly many Korean employees on this airport who could have read the inscription. It is likely that nobody wanted to read the inscription to avoid the implication that the sabotage was politically motivated.]

**May 28, 1947:** Memorandum on Korea by Roger N. Baldwin, director of the “American Civil Liberties Union”. The selection of Koreans by the Military Government both in the legislature and in the administration has tended to favor Koreans who speak English or who are Christians and have been recommended by missionaries. Moreover, the present system of appointments by the Military Government with approval by the legislature should rather be reversed with the legislature making the appointments with possible veto by the Military Government. (RG 544 Box 16 (CK-CLH))
May 28, 1947: Pusan harbor. Some 500 stevedores [i.e. docker] began a strike after two US Army enlisted men threw a Korean that they caught stealing into the water. (NARA 2, No 90)

Jun 3, 1947: There was a deliberate sabotage of a big [telephone] cable that connects two US Army units in Imjin-Ni (in the suburb of Seoul) and Kaesong (north of Seoul). (NARA 2, No 91)

Jun 8, 1947: Chonpyong, the main labor union, was outlawed by the MG. (Song 1989 p. 257)

Jun 13, 1947: Seoul. Two soldiers of the Special troops of the XXIV Corps drowned after their boat overturned. (NDL microfiche MISC-00929)

Jun 14, 1947: Captain KWAWN Ui Sang, chief of the Pusan central police was killed by an unknown person. Kwawn had fired the first shot into the Communist inspired demonstration of 1 March 1947. (NARA 2, No 92)

Jun 14, 1947: So far some 3,000 Koreans were sentenced to prison terms by US provost courts.
Mr. Kim Byong No, director of the Department of Justice of the South Interim Government announced that 669 prisoners sentenced by Provost Courts to confinement ranging from 3 months to 5 years will be released from jail next week. Their release will bring the total number of released persons to 1,056, about one third of the total number of prisoners sentenced by provost courts in Korea. (Korean Independence 25 June 1947)

Jun 18, 1947: Instead of being en route to the Conference of the WFTU in Prague, the 3 union leaders named as delegates by workers of South Korea were jailed. Roger Baldwin, head of the American Civil Liberties Union obtained their liberation. They were able to arrive at Prague on the last day of the conference. (Korean Independence 18 June 1947)


- The Radio Bureau of the Dept of Public Information now operates a 50kW station at Seoul and 9 substations ranging from 30W to 300W in other cities. Moreover, 5,000 alternative current receivers secured from Japan will be distributed especially in provinces where Communist activity is great. There is a great need for battery operated receivers for villages without electric power. 20,000 such sets have been ordered from Japan.
• The Motion Picture Section has produced 28 good quality films illustrating American aid to Korea. The films were distributed in 96 commercial outlets of which 17 are in Seoul and 23 in Pusan.

• The Korean Mobile Education Train consists of 6 cars, distinctly painted with a recording studio, portable stage equipment, motion picture projectors, a power generator, radio receivers.

(STATE DEPT 1945-1949 reel 7)

**Jun 23, 1947:** Subject: Performance of military police duty.
To: Each soldier and officer assigned to military police.
You are always fully justified in using firearms in self-defense. Never shoot unless you shoot to hit. Shooting to scare only breeds contempt. But you don’t have to kill to stop somebody.
[Signed] John R. Hodge
(NARA 9)

**Jun 24, 1947:** Seoul. The welcome ceremony organized for the return of the Korean marathon runner, Sur Yon Bok, after his victory in Boston was turned into an anti-trusteeship demonstration by the followers of Rhee and Koo. In what seemed to be a well planned action, several thousand people gathered in front of the gates to the Duk Soo Palace where the US-USSR Joint Commission was in session. Stones were hurled at the Soviet Delegation as it drove through the gates of the Palace. American tanks and armored cars had to be called out to patrol the streets. (Robinson 1947 p. 252)

[How can one explain this resurgence of anti-trusteeship demonstrations? The US-USSR Joint Commission had resumed its meeting in late May. It was not so much to trusteeship that Rhee was opposed than to the idea of a US-Soviet agreement because this would open the way to Communist influence in South Korea. Therefore Rhee made all he could to sabotage any possible agreement.]

**Jun 25, 1947:** Gathering of Korean delegates in Seoul and Pyongyang.
After the Joint Soviet-American Commission reconvened on 22 May 1947 it was agreed that gatherings of delegates of political parties, labor unions and cultural associations would take place in Seoul and Pyongyang to allow the commission to listen to their pleas. There were some 420 delegates at the gathering that took place in Seoul on 25 June. A few days later a similar gathering took place in Pyongyang to which an American delegation headed by Geneal Brown attended. (Robinson 1947 p. 262)

[This was one the few occasions where American officials went to Pyongyang and

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151 After August 1948 he agreed to leave the control of all Korean security forces to the American occupation authorities and there was a similar agreement after the end of the Korean War.
were able to talk with North Korean political leaders.]

**Jun 25, 1947:** Between September 1945 and June 1947 some 3,000 persons were sentenced in provost courts to prison terms comprised between 3 months and 5 years. (Korea Independence 25 June 1947)

**Jun 30, 1947:** Training of the Korean National Youth Movement.
Some 50 kilometers south of Seoul, in the ancient walled town of Suwon, was established the training center of the National Youth Association. In late May 1947 it was visited by a group pf American journalists which included Carl Mydans from “Time Magazine”. By June 1947 some 70,000 men (aged 18 to 35) had already received training.

“But where are your funds coming from?” asked Mydans. “You Americans are paying for it” answered the director of the center. “The American Military Government in Korea has just given us 5 million yen ($333,000) and equipment and supplies worth much more (automobiles, gasoline, shoes). We also have an American colonel as adviser. We think if we behave ourselves somebody will give us more”.

The American officer was Lieutenant Colonel Ernest E. Voss who had been appointed to direct the movement. The Korean head was General Lee Bum Suk (also spelled Yi Pom Sok) formerly second-in-command of the Kwangbok army set up in China during the war on the advice of Chiang Kai-shek. In that capacity he had been working actively with American Intelligence. By July 1947, some 70,000 had received training.


[Richard Robinson writes that it was a “rightist army, well trained and armed”. The article in “Time Magazine” mentions troops “marching in military cadence to a martial song” but it does not say if they were armed. However, it is known that members of this Youth Movement were employed in several places (and in particular in Cheju Do) against Communists and leftists. This suggests that they had indeed received some military training.]

**Jun 30, 1947:** Proliferation of youth movements. By this date 34 organizations of young men had registered. For instance, Rhee had his “Korean Independence Youth Association”, General Yi Chong Chon, a leader of the “Provisional Government”, had his “Taedong Youth Corps”. (Henderson 1968 p. 141)

**Jul 1947:** About 55% of the South Korean workers are unemployed. (Korean Independence 2 July 1947)

**Jul 8, 1947:** Pusan. Explosion in the customs warehouse. CIC believes that it had
been set off by a time mechanism. (NARA 2, No 96)

**Jul 15, 1947:** Some 95% of the prominent Korean officials in the US MG are graduates from American universities. The list includes a dozen persons who studied at the University of Michigan, Columbia University, UCLA, University of Chicago, Boston University. The only official, namely Mr. Yu Tongyol, who studied in Japan rather than in America, nevertheless spent two years in the United States. (NDL, microfiche FOA-4960)

**Jul 16, 1947:** Approximately 400 Koreans demonstrated against American personnel sent to Shin Dang Chung to evict Korean squatters in order to prepare the houses for American dependents. One enlisted man was beaten by the Koreans. Several arrests were made. Of noteworthy interest is the total lack of cooperation of the National police in aiding the Americans with the eviction. (NARA 2, No 97)

**Jul 19, 1947:** Assassination of Lyuh Woon-Hyung, the founding father of The Korean People’s Republic, by a 19-year-old man named Han Chigeun, a recent refugee from North Korea and an active member of a nationalist right-wing group. It was the 10th assassination attempt directed against him. (Robinson 1947 p. 45)

[With Kim Koo (who would be assassinated in June 1949) Lyuh was the only hope for a moderate leadership of national union. He is revered in both South and North Korea.

Why was this great leader assassinated at that very moment? Meacham (1947, p. 35) explains that an attempt was under way to organize a center-left force which may become an alternative to the Rhee-Kim Koo tandem. In the evening of the day of his assassination he was expected to have a dinner at the American Consulate in Seoul along with his friends Ahn Chai Hang and Kim Kiu Sic.]

**Jul 19, 1947:** Lyuh Woon Heung, former chairman of the leftist People’s Front, was assassinated. An unidentified person fired three 45-caliber bullets into the rear of Lyuh’s moving automobile. He died in hospital two hours later. (Korean Independence 23 July 1947)

[Shortly before his assassination the MG wanted him to play a greater political role in order to attract liberal and left-of-center support.

**Jul 27, 1947:** Inchon. A rail switch which was tampered with caused a railroad accident. (NARA 2, No 99)

**Jul 27, 1947:** Police killed 4 members of the outlawed “Chosun Democratic Youth Alliance” in Hadong (south of Korea not far from Yosu). (NARA 2, No 99)

**Jul 31, 1947:** In July 1948 the Korean Constabulary had a strength of 15,000 men. By December 1948 it had expanded to 50,000. (Gibby 2004, p. 54,58)
Aug 3, 1947: Missed Seoul. A US sentry guarding an ammunition dump was shot at. The round passed through the man’s leg without touching the bone. (NARA 2, No 100)

[Another miracle...]

Aug 6, 1947: The weekly newspaper “Korean Independence” was charged with un-American activities by Mr. Walter S. Steele in the statement that he made before the House Committee on Un-American activities. (Korean Independence 6 August 1947)

[The publication of the “Korean Independence” stopped from 27 August to 15 October 1947. When it resumed publication it was no longer the same left-wing oriented newspaper.]

Aug 11, 1947: Seoul. A group of 30 refugees armed with clubs and knives attempted to attack a MP station because they thought the MPs had no ammunition for their weapons. (NARA 2, No 101)

[This short report raises many questions: why did these refugees attack the MPs, what made them think that they had no ammunition. How many were injured or killed?]

Aug 12, 1947: Korean National Youth Movement

Letter from the “US Office of the Political Adviser” in Seoul to the Secretary of State. Excerpts.

A member of the staff of my office with a pressman and an interpreter went to the National Training Center of the “Korean National Youth Movement” located at Suwon (south of Seoul). This center organizes 30-day training courses for adults between the age of 18 to 35. It has already trained 120,000 persons. Its director is Mr. SONG Myung Soo, a long time assistant of General LEE Bum Suk in China.

Mr. Song at first wished the visitors to leave. Then, he made the following statement. The principles of the movement are much akin to those of the Boy Scouts in the United States. Training consists in group singing, group manual labor, drill, lecture attendance on Korean history or world affairs. Once trained the persons are destined to become the leaders of their communities.

Despite repeated further questioning Mr Song would not speak further. Therefore he left unanswered a number of questions such as for instance:

- Why are men of the age of 18 to 35 allegedly playing Boy Scouts when there is already a Boy Scout movement in Korea?
- The establishment in Suwon alone cannot be financed on the 5 million yen allotted by the MG. Who are the other sponsors? Probably wealthy rightists but per-
haps also the Chinese Kuomintang. In particular, this movement closely resembles the “San Min Youth Corps” established in China.
(NDL 1, FOA 5042)

[Apart from funding by wealthy rightists it is quite possible that the Suwon center was also funded by another US organization than the MG. In this respect one should recall that the development of paramilitary groups is a strategy explicitly mentioned in Field Manual 31-15 about “Operations against irregular forces”.]

**Aug 15, 1947:** Twelve prominent leftists were arrested by the CIC. (NARA 2, No 104)

[On 11 June 1947, 16 (alleged) Communists were apprehended in Constabulary ranks.]

**Aug 29, 1947:** Pusan. A patrol of MP was stoned by a crowd of Koreans. After the patrol fired a shot in the air, the crowd dispersed. (NARA 2, No 103)

[Why did the crowd stone this patrol?]

**Aug 31, 1947:** 172 prisoners escaped from Kongju prison (NARA 2, No 120)

**Sep 6, 1947:** A leftist newspaper published in Seoul, Hyun Dai Ilbo (i.e. Modern Daily News), was suspended by USAFIK for violation of SCAP proclamation No 2. When it resumed publication again it had become an extreme right-wing newspaper. (NARA 2, No 82)

[The source provides information (e.g. a short biography of the director) about the 19 daily newspaper published in Seoul and the 25 dailies published in the rest of South Korea. The only English newspaper published in Seoul was the “Seoul Times”. It had a distribution of only 3,000 as compared to 65,000 (20 times more) for the “Seoul Shinmun”, the most important Korean newspaper.]

**Sep 11, 1947:** A mill which held 690 bags of American wheat was destroyed by a fire. Sabotage is suspected. (NARA 2, No 104)

**Sep 11, 1947:** Major General Archer L. Lerch, Military Governor of South Korea, died at the age of 53. He succumbed to a heart attack at the Thirty-Fourth General Army Hospital. (NYT 11 September 1947 p. 15)

**Sep 13, 1947:** In a railway center in North Cholla a group of enlisted men stationed there asked a Korean-speaking member of the “Office of Civil Information” to ask the Korean children standing nearby what they thought of them. The children merely responded that they did not like the enlisted men because the soldiers sometimes threw rocks at them. The men admitted the truth of the statement, saying that the children were too curious and bothersome. (NARA 4b, p.521)
**Sep 16, 1947:** 175 teachers in Seoul schools were arrested for Communist (or leftist) activities

**Sep 20, 1947:** Pusan. A Korean will be tried by a provost court for throwing stones at US personnel outside the stateside theater. (NARA 2, No 107)

**Sep 25, 1947:** A fire started in a warehouse for automobile parts. A guard who wanted to investigate was fired upon and clubbed. Little damage was done by the fire. (NARA 2, No 106)

[The report does not say if the guard was severely injured or not.]

**Oct 1947:** Province of South Cholla. 22 school teachers have been dismissed and arrested because of their activity in the “Salaried Worker’s Association” which is considered as a leftist organization. They are awaiting trial. Numerous bank clerks were also arrested. (NARA 2, No 108)

[Over one hundred teachers were arrested in Seoul (see above 16 September 1947). This purge paralleled the one under way in Japan.]

**Oct 2, 1947:** Taejon. A military telephone line was cut between every other telephone pole for approximately 10 poles. No wire was stolen. However, 500 meter away from this sabotage, wire was stolen from Korean lines. (NARA 2, No 107)

**Oct 4, 1947:** 5 US soldiers patrolling the dividing line exchanged shots with North Korean police. (NYT 4 October 1947)

[The fact that that this news was published in the New York Times is in accordance with acknowledged US aims in Korea, namely to protect South Korea against a Communist take over.]

**Oct 9, 1947:** **US fatalities: 1 (109).** Taejon. An American soldier was killed with a 45 caliber pistol by an unknown prowler while he was asleep in a railroad boxcar (i.e. an enclosed railroad car for the transport of freight). Two other soldiers were reportedly sleeping in the same boxcar when the soldier was killed. (NARA 2, No 109)

[It is not clear why a prowler should be armed with a 45 caliber pistol and why he should want to kill an American soldier. A more plausible explanation would be that he was killed by another soldier.]

**Oct 12, 1947:** Translation of a poster found on the trees in the Masan area by the “Office of Civil Information”. “In the general franchise law, we see nothing but an intention aiming at exclusion of young men and laborers from voting.” (NARA 4b, p. 575)

[The “Office of Public Information” was a kind of public relation bureau. It showed American films, distributed a magazine, the “Farmers’ Weekly” and organized opin-
ion surveys. Because it included many Korean-speaking personnel it had a better contact with the population than either the MG or the troops.]

**Oct 31, 1947:** Letter about the reorganization of the Korean Court System. Excerpt. “It seems plain that no more work will be done on the Court Reorganization Law unless we push it vigorously”. [Signed:] Richard D. Gilliam, Assistant Adviser. (NARA, RG 554, Box 307)

[Richard Gilliam played a key role in the writing of the “Court Reorganization Law”. More details can be found below at the date of 1 June 1948.]

**Nov 3, 1947:** US fatalities: 1 (110). A Korean, Cho Sung Ho, killed Private First Class Charles H. Pierce by shooting him with a shotgun. (NARA: RG 554 Box 170, CKCLH)

**Nov 12, 1947:** South Korea has 18 national prisons and 5 prisoner camps. Together they hold some 20,000 inmates. In July 1945 under Japanese rule there were about 8,000-10,000 prisoners in South Korea. On 16 August 1945, at the request of Kim Chun Yon, some 10,000 prisoners were released by the Japanese. (KI 12 November 1947, Henderson 1968 p. 116)

**Nov 12, 1947:** American Military Government ordinances number 52, 55, 72 and 88 repressed freedom of speech, press and assembly. (Korean Independence of 19 November 1947)

[Ordinance 55 required opposition parties to make reports to the government. Ordinance 88 made possible the closing of newspapers. It would be useful to read these ordinances. They remained in force after 15 August 1948 and were used by the Korean government against the opposition (MacDonald 1992 p. 174, 180).]

**Nov 22, 1947:** US Army communication lines on Nam San mountain were sabotaged 5 times in the last two weeks. (NARA 2, No 120)

**Nov 23, 1947:** Chonju (southwest of Korea, not far from Kwangju). A locomotive was overturned and all its attached cars derailed when the train ran into an open switch. A switch is an installation enabling trains to be guided from one track to another. The wreck is believed to be the result of sabotage as the switch was deliberately left open. (NARA 2, No 116)

**Nov 26, 1947:** Title of an article about Korea in the New York Times: “Political jailing in Korea is denied by authorities. They say that the 17,867 who are held are accused of theft, riot, murder and other crimes.” (NYT 26 November 1947 p. 8)

[It is a common rule that governments do not wish to recognize that they hold political prisoners. Clearly, the citizens who took part in the Boston Tea party (which took place in the early days of the American War of independence) and dumped
cases of tea in the sea could have been charged with theft and destruction of property. In Korea each major uprising brought about a surge in the number of prisoners. For instance by the end of October 1946 their number had swelled to 30,000 (see above).]

**Dec 2, 1947:** Seoul. Dr. Chang Duk Soo, a right-wing political leader close to Rhee Syngman was shot to death at his home by a former Korean police sergeant. Holding a PhD from Columbia University, he was the behind the scene leader of the powerful Democratic Party. (NYT 4 December 1947)

[A trial of 10 defendants took place 4 months later before a US Military Commission with 8 of them being sentenced to death, see below at the date of 2 April 1948.]

**Dec 9, 1947:** The US Treasury ordered Korean bank notes to be printed in case the London Conference is unable to reach an agreement. (Le Monde 9 December p. 4 and 10 December p. 4)

**Dec 10, 1947:** Seoul. An American sergeant was assaulted and badly beaten by 4 Koreans. (NARA 2, No 118)

**Dec 14, 1947:** The Korean Legislative Assembly was created last year by the United States occupation authorities to give the Koreans experience in self-government, but this Legislature has been threatening for the last several weeks to dissolve itself because of the “excessive exercise of the veto” on its acts by the American Military Governor. (NYT p. 27)

**Dec 31, 1947:** At the end of 1947 the strength of Korean police and constabulary were as follows.

- Police: 30,000, approximately 3,000 in each of the 10 provinces.
- Constabulary: 15,000.

**Dec 31, 1947:** Grain collection for 1947. Despite the fact that the summer grain collection quota in 1947 was only one-third of the 1946 quota, the collection program was far from being a complete success. The crop was poor, afflicted by an early spring drought and damaged by prolonged rains at harvest time. (McCune 1950, p. 106)

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**1948**

**Jan 6, 1948:** Camp Pusan. A fire which started around 23:00 partially destroyed the Agasaki warehouse. (NARA 13)

**Jan 13, 1948:** Cheju Do. The house of a dependent of a MG officer was destroyed
Feb 8, 1948: Korea Reds start sabotage and strikes. Rail lines were cut and a train was wrecked. They demand the withdrawal of US troops. 27 people were reported dead. An organization calling itself the “General Strike Committee of South Korea” addressed a letter to General Hodge which included a demand for the release of political prisoners and a purge of pro-Japanese collaborators. These actions were motivated by the decision to place the Korean question before the Little Assembly [also called Interim Committee whose role was to prepare the work of the General Assembly] of the United Nations.

While the military authorities were inclined to minimize the effects of the strike, reports came in during the day indicating simultaneous destruction of power and communication lines.

There were some 50,000 strikers both in Seoul and South Korea. This strike was characterized by the destruction of communication and transportation facilities and by the fact that it led to the creation of mountain guerrilla units called yasandae. (NYT p. 1, Song 1989 p. 259)

[This article does not give a comprehensive description. It neither says who were the dead people nor by whom they were killed.]

Feb 9, 1948: Communist inspired sabotage and riots in protest against the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea have now continued for a second day throughout South Korea. (NYT p. 1)

Feb 10, 1948: The strike in protest against the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea went into its third day, with a death toll estimated at 47 in South Korea. (NYT p. 18)

Feb 10, 1948: Monthly offenses against US property and personnel. At this date there were 21,458 prisoners in the prisons of the Department of Justice. Among them 17,867 were convicted and 3,591 were awaiting trial. For those awaiting trial 785 were indicted for offenses against US property and personnel, 176 for murder and 64 for rioting. (RECORDS, reel no 6)

[Those indicted for offenses against US property and personnel represented a proportion of $\frac{785}{3591} = 22\%$ of those awaiting trial. If one applies the same proportion to those already convicted, one gets 3,930 such offenses. Adding the 785 awaiting trial gives a total of 4,715. This is of course an underestimate because it does not include the prisoners who have been liberated before this date. For the 29 months from September 1945 to January 1948 this gives an average monthly rate of $\frac{4715}{29} = 162$ offenses against US property and personnel.]

Feb 11, 1948: Appealing to Koreans not to be misled “by the latest Communist
effort at sabotage and destruction in South Korea” Lieut. Gen. John R. Hodge, United States commander in Korea issued a 1,500-word statement to the Korean press and radio. (NYT p. 10)

**Feb 12, 1948:** Publication of a regulation for “Legal apprenticeship requirements”. At the top of the documents one reads: “South Korean Interim Government, Department of Justice”. At its bottom one reads: “By direction of the Military Governor”. (NARA, RG 544, Box 307)

[Although Korean judges were consulted on this reform the initiative and final draft came from the Military Government.

A memorandum of Major John W. Connelly, Judge Advocate General, dated 12 February 1948 says: “It would be proper for the Military Government to sign and promulgate this ordinance without prior referral to KILA [Korean Interim Legislative Assembly] because lawyers are urgently needed in South Korea and it is believed emergency legislation in this matter is proper.

Work on this question was started by assistant adviser Richard D. Gilliam in December 1947. He concluded his draft by the following words. “The Korean Director of the Department of Justice is satisfied with the proposed Regulations and appear to feel that a Department Order is all right. Whether issued as an order or as an ordinance in name of MG, it would certainly be valid as he is the supreme legislative authority.

I recommend issuance as an Order (which is more consistent with the precedent established by us) after Drafting [i.e. the Drafting Department of MG] has done a little polishing”.

The archive documents contain several drafts in English (including handwritten drafts), some of which with numerous corrections which show that the matter was actively discussed among the group of advisers. At the end of the archive documents comes the Korean translation which is a final text without any corrections.]

**Feb 21, 1948:** US advisers at the Korean Department of Justice.

The document does not say how many advisers there were but it lists some 34 who are considered either as non essential (e.g. Adviser on Juvenile affairs, Acting adviser at the claims bureau, Prison industries adviser, and so on) or are not currently filled. (NARA, RG 554, Box 35)

[An inevitable consequence of the presence of such a large number of advisers who were not able to speak Korean is that necessarily a preference was given to Korean employees who could speak English. Otherwise the work of the advisers would have been almost impossible.]

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152 Namely Kim Byong No
153 A key-person in the Legal Drafting Bureau of the Department of Justice was Sydney S. Rubin.
Feb 27, 1948: South Korean Communists launched another wave of sabotage and civil disturbances last night. 15 people were killed. (NYT p. 10)

Feb 28, 1948: The toll of Korea’s disturbances rises to 37 dead. 25 Police stations were stormed simultaneously. (NYT p. 6)

Mar 10, 1948: Five people have been killed so far in rioting in Southern Korea as the result of numerous strikes called by unions in the hope of disrupting the coming elections. Moreover 21 Communists have been arrested for distributing leaflets. (Times p. 3)

Mar 10, 1948: The Korean Constitution
Far East Command. Outgoing message.
From: CINCFE [Commander-in-Chief, Far East]
To: Department of Army.

- Draft of national constitution essentially acceptable to Gen. Hodge is ready for consideration and could be adopted at an early date.
- Will RCA [Radio Corporation of America] and Northwest Airlines rights be protected pending a treaty of commerce with the new Korean Government? (NDL, microfiche TS0045)

[It is hardly surprising to see that the new constitution of Korea was submitted to General Hodge for approval for the Military Government was still the only legal government of South Korea. It would be interesting to know more about how this constitution was drafted. The second item in this message shows that the interests of US companies were never forgotten by the military. What special rights did RCA and Northwest Airlines hold in Korea?]

Mar 11, 1948: Roving bands, described by the police as Communist agitators, have attacked 7 villages in southern Korea. In one coastal town they set fire to the city hall. (NYT p. 8)

Mar 17, 1948: Publication of the “Law for the election of representatives of the Korean people” in the “Official Gazette” of the USAMGIK. Although it was called a “law”, it was in fact an ordinance (No 175) signed by Major General Dean. (NARA, RG544, Box 309)

[Five days later this ordinance was supplemented by the “Regulation for implementing the law for the election of the representatives of the Korean people”. Together these two texts have 133 articles and their English version covers 28 pages. An unfair election was concealed behind an intricate organization. As an illustration of this]
intricacy one can recall\textsuperscript{154} that the appointment of the chairmen of the electoral and voting districts depended on no less than three different bodies.\]

**Mar 28, 1948:** North Korean armed forces ambushed a party of American civilians near the border between the United States and Soviet zones on the Ongjin Peninsula, wounding one with light machine gun fire. (NYT p. 3)

**Mar 28, 1948:** Rhee offered the US Navy a base on Cheju Island. In a declaration to Under Secretary Draper Rhee proclaimed that there would be a large turnout at polls and that police, youth and labor groups will be able to keep the situation under control.
He suggested that the United States might desire a naval base on Cheju Island and felt certain that the future Korean government would permit establishment of such a base. (US State Department, Internal Affairs of Korea, reel 2)
[The project of a joined US-Korean naval base on Cheju did not materialize until 2010 when construction of the Gangjeong port started. Although the construction was opposed by some Korean people it is scheduled to be completed by 2015. As one knows (see below the entries for 2013), according to the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Status of Forces Agreement between South Korea and the United States, the American military retains wartime command over South Korea’s military. In this way, it could use the Gangjeong facility in any regional conflict with China.]

**Apr 1948:** Major General William Dean ordered the formation of “Hyangbo-dan” or community security corps which were to function as auxiliary agencies to the local police during the election period.
In the weeks before the election Korean right wing groups called on every house to see to it that the people were registered. Carrying clubs and baseball bats, they threatened and beat people. (Sunoo 1979 p. 63)

**Apr 2, 1948:** Following the murder of Dr. Chang Duk Soo on 2 December 1947, 10 persons were charged with conspiracy. They were all found guilty by a US Military Commission. 8 were sentenced to death and the two other to 10 years at hard labor. (NYT p. 14)
[Were these 8 persons executed or reprieved? So far, we do not know?]

**Apr 2, 1948:** • US fatalities: 4 (114). A soldier of the Sixth Infantry Division was arrested on suspicion of willful homicide in connection with a fire that took the lives of 4 soldiers and destroyed the barracks of the Sixth Signal Company, 16 kilometer south of Pusan. The soldier is suspected of having tossed a can of gasoline into a coal burning heater shortly after midnight following an argument with a sergeant. (NYT

\textsuperscript{154}As already mentioned in the section entitled “Techniques in election manipulation” (chapter 1).
Apr 3, 1948: Summary of the report of the “National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident” (excerpt).
In response to the massacre of March 1947 and to protest the general election that was only held in the southern half of the peninsula, members of the Jeju branch of the South Korean Labor Party attacked several police stations which started the uprising. (http://www.jeju43.go.kr/english)
[By October 1948 the rebels had approximately 4,000 combatants. By spring of 1949 four Korean battalions (i.e. about 10,000 soldiers) arrived which finished off most of the remaining rebel forces. The Truth Committee found that 86% of the killings were done by security forces and 14% by the armed rebels. 14,373 victims have been identified by the end of 2006; the Committee estimates the total number at 30,000.]

Apr 3, 1948: On Jeju island, in response to a series of outrages and following the announcement of separate elections, police stations at 13 points were attacked by the people. (Sunoo 1979 p. 64)

Apr 3, 1948: Early in the morning of April 3, 1948, several hundred armed leftist militias attacked 11 of the 24 police stations of the island. Key leaders of the North-west Youth Corps, the Greater East (Dae-dong) Youth Corps and other rightists were attacked at the same time. 15 people were killed on this day. Thus began the April 3rd Mass Uprising. (Jung Hae Gu 1998)

Apr 3, 1948: Seoul. An American soldier was stabbed in the arm by two Koreans. (NDL, microfiche FOA-5258)

Apr 7, 1948: US fatalities: 1 (115). Pusan-Tong Highway. A Korean policeman, Zai In, killed Private First Class Joseph W. Comeau by shooting him with his carbine in a brawl outside of a prostitution house that Comeau had just visited with another soldier. (NARA: RG 554 Box 16)

Apr 8, 1948: Resolution of the US National Security Council (no 8, approved by the President on 8 April 1948).

There should be a military advisory group of appropriate size which should use its influence to persuade the new government in South Korea to follow policies which would contribute to the advancement of US interests in that area. (Documents of the National Security Council, Vol 1: Korea I (1948-1950))

[The interesting point in this statement is that it makes clear that the role of the advisory group is much broader than just providing military advice. Its role is really to shape Korean policy in a way which is advantageous to the United States including most certainly in economic affairs.]
Apr 12, 1948: A survey of 1,262 people was conducted by the Korean Public Opinion Association which asked how they came to register. 9% stated that they registered voluntarily while the vast majority (91%) responded that they were forced to do so because they were threatened with revocation of their food rationing credentials. (Seo 1996, p.82,91, primary source is the newspaper “Chosun Ilbo”) [It can be noted that this factor is not mentioned in the report about the activity of the “Office of Civil Information” regarding the elections. The report says that the high registration rate of 92% of eligible voters was achieved thanks to an “educational program” (see below).]

Apr 12, 1948: Educational program concerning registration for May elections. Excerpt.
To: Commanding General, USAFIK
Conversations with regional officials and residents in remote areas showed that the educational program set up by the OCI (Office of Public Information) was the primary cause of a registration estimated at 92% of all eligible voters. This educational program was somewhat expensive both in GARIAO [Government and Relief in Areas under Occupation] Funds and in equipment and gasoline. However, the operation proved that we now have the means to reach virtually all Koreans in South Korea. An air-drop of 800,000 small-sized leaflets urging all patriotic Koreans to register was made; other airdrops are planned for the 5th, 6th and 7th of May. CCI Branch Centers and 16 mm motion picture projectors were mobilized to publicize the registration.
We believe it was the basic interest in the election that the OCI was able to arouse that brought about the heavy registration without resort to coercive methods. Had not the idea of an election become exceedingly attractive to the bulk of the Korean people there could have been no mass registration without the use of force.
[Signed] James L. Stewart, Director of the Office of Civil Information. [These statements are in such sharp contrast with the one made by the “Chosun Ilbo” that one wonders what is the explanation.
  ● Clearly Mr. Steward wants to put the work of his department as well as the US policy in a favorable light.
  ● Did he really ignore the threat about food rationing or does he wish to ignore it? At this point it is impossible to know.
  ● However, he goes too far. Even General Hodge was probably aware that it was an exaggeration to say that the election had become exceedingly attractive to the bulk of the Korean people.
This is an interesting case of an organization which succeeds in making its belief become the accepted truth.]
**Apr 13, 1948:** 18 cases of dynamite were stolen from the 42nd Engineer Construction group. (NDL, microfiche FOA 6709, G2 Periodic Report No 823)

**Apr 20, 1948:** Cheju Do. At 01:30 snipers opened fire on the dock area where Coast Guard ships were being unloaded. (NDL, microform FOA-5264)

[This action is connected with the ongoing uprising in Cheju Island.]

**Apr 23, 1948:** Ordinance No 190. Entitled: “Radio licensing and fees amended” it was one of several ordinances issued by the MG which organized radio broadcasting in Korea. (NARA, RG 544, Box 309)

**Apr 23, 1948:** North-South Korean leaders unity conference at Pyongyang. Several important non-Communist South Korean political leaders took part in this conference. Among them were Kim Koo and Kimm Kyu-Sik (also written Kim Kyu-Sik). The Conference sent an open letter to the governments of USSR and USA which was signed by many organizations. The main request made in the open letter was the withdrawal of the two occupation armies. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 2)

[Kim Koo went to Pyongyang to protest against the organization of the May election in South Korea. With left-wing leaders in jail or in hiding and right-wing leaders such as Kim Koo opposing the election, one realizes that the election will be restricted to supporters of Rhee and to so-called independent candidates. In short, it was a farce and it required a very effective public relations campaign to make it appear as “the first democratic election in Korea”.

**Apr 24, 1948:** Cheju-Do A C-47 plane taking off from the Cheju airstrip in the afternoon was fired on by two snipers.

On the same date the PX building (PX means Post Exchange which is an Army Exchange Service where soldiers can buy American products) in the MG was broken into during the night. (NDL, microfiche FOA-5265, report No 818)

[The existence of a PX building on Cheju Island attests the presence there of American troops.]

**Apr 25, 1948:** Port of Pusan: investigation by a MG team led by Colonel Clyburn and Captain Pearson.

It was found that there were too many stevedoring companies employing too many stevedores for the work available. There were about 20 companies employing some 15,000 stevedores. As a result the stevedores remain unemployed most of the time and their monthly earnings are very limited.

It was also found that the president of the stevedore union was unable to obtain a permanent pass allowing him to enter the pier. To get a daily pass he encountered a great deal of red tape, expense and loss of time.

Moreover some company employees refused to meet the team by fear of reprisals.
Apr 25, 1948: Korean constabulary troops armed with American Garand rifles surrounded the city of Cheju on Cheju Island early today while Korean police raided the homes of suspected agitators and arrested 60. (NYT 25 April 1948)

Apr 27, 1948: Cheju Island. Snipers fired at a US plane at the airport. (NYT p. 13)

May 11, 1948: Role of the US Navy and US Air Force. In a radiogram to Seoul headquarters the Military Governor of Jeju reported that a state of guerrilla warfare existed on the island and requested the immediate dispatch of two destroyers and fly-overs by fighter aircraft to intimidate the guerrillas. A US destroyer, the USS John R. Craig, took up station off the northern coast of Cheju Island to prevent infiltration of arms to the insurgents. (Merrill 1980, p. 172; the source given in Merrill’s paper is: “FEC, Intelligence Summary, 13 May 1948”)
[“Fly-overs” certainly means “low passes” for it is difficult to imagine that the guerrillas would have been much “intimidated” otherwise.]
Other accounts say that together with other US Navy warships, the USS Craig shelled the villages on Jeju Island:

Some 18 warships provided by the United States to blockade the island bombarded defenseless villages with 39 mm caliber cannons (Katsiafikas 2012, p. 97).

The source of this statement as given in Katsiafikas’ book is Kwon (2001), an article in a collective publication about the Jeju massacre. Needless to say, one would like to find primary sources giving more details about this episode. Incidentally, it can be observed that for naval guns the caliber refers to the ratio (length of the gun)/(diameter of the shells). The biggest guns of USS Craig were indeed of caliber 38 but this means that they were $5 \times 38$ inches (4.8 m) long which is indeed compatible with the size suggested by the photograph. The deck logs of another destroyer, USS Orleck, have been transcribed and made available on the Internet. One learns that on 1 February 1948 the USS Craig was in San Diego and that on 1 May 1948 it was moored alongside the USS Orleck in the Japanese port of Sasebo on the western coast of Kyushu Island in the south of Japan. The distance between Sasebo and Jeju island is around 300 km.]

Fig. 6.7 105-mm howitzer. A howitzer is a gun which fires shells at fairly steep angles. It is intermediate between a gun which has high velocity and relatively flat trajectories and a mortar which fires at very steep angles. In almost horizontal position the 105-mm can be used for direct hits with a range of about 1 km. In a steep position, i.e. when really used as a howitzer, the range is about 3 km. Between July and October 1948 a few battalions of the Korean Constabulary received training in the use of machine guns, 57-mm anti-tank guns and 105-mm howitzers. Source: http://www.asphm.com

**May 1948:** In late May strategic hamlets were established on the coast of Cheju Island by fortifying villages with high stone walls. Mountain villages were burned
Fig. 6.8 Destroyer USS Craig (DD-885) in 1948. According to John Merrill (1980), this destroyer took station off the northern coast of Cheju Island in mid-May 1948. The ship was a Gearing class destroyer: length=119 meter; guns: 6 guns of 128 mm (5 inches), 12 guns of 40 mm and 16 cannons of 20 mm. Source: http://ussjohnrcraig.com/Photo%27s%2045-49%20page/craig1948.jpg

by police and right wing groups and their residents were forcibly relocated to these refugee villages. In addition some 600 alleged members of the South Korean Labor Party were imprisoned during the summer. (Merrill 1980, p. 173)

May 1, 1948: The MG issued Order 21 totally prohibiting any assemblage and demonstrations until after the election. (Sunoo 1979 p. 63)

[How can there be a valid election without the right of holding meetings and listening to the speeches of candidates?]

May 3, 1948: A small-scale war is reported to be raging on the Island of Cheju. Korean police, supported by Korean constabulary, are battling swift-moving bands of Communists who are terrorizing the island’s 276,000 inhabitants. (NYT p.9)

[The claim that the Communists are terrorizing the people is made in a recurrent way by official authorities. This is of course an easy justification of the repression. In the early 1930s the Chinese Nationalists made the same claim. Of course, it became less credible in 1948-1949 when the Chinese people completely rejected the Kuomintang.]

May 3, 1948: Letter to Syngman Rhee from an opponent in the election. This letter was intercepted and translated by the Civil Communication Intelligence Group (i.e. censorship section of the MG). Excerpt.

I regret having to run as a candidate as your opponent in the same electoral district. You have said that the general election should be free. However,

- the election committee insisted on vetoing my candidacy regardless of electoral rules;
• they made assaults on the people who recommended me as a candidate;
• they coerced people in supporting you by means of outrageous kidnapping, violence and threats;
• ever since 12 April 1948 they have sought to force me to give up my candidacy; they even claimed that I am working with the Communists.

(NARA, RG 554(332), Box 37)

May 6, 1948: Issue of the payment of electricity imports from North Korea.
Excerpt of a broadcast of Radio Pyongyang (in Korean). “Ever since 15 August 1945, North Korea has been supplying South Korea with electricity without a break. However, the American command is only paying the smallest amount possible with the result that the South Korean debt is increasing month by month, now totaling a stupendous amount.

On 17 June 1947 representatives of the American Command signed in Pyongyang an agreement which provided that for the power supplied from 15 August 1945 to 31 May 1947 the American Command would pay in full by 12 July 1947. Today, 11 months after July 1947, the American Command has paid no more than 20% of the agreed amount. The American Command never responded to the letters sent by the North Korean authorities”.

(NDL 1, FOA 5040)

May 6, 1948: The Coast Guard cutter “Kowon” deserted and landed in the North Korean port of Soho. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 2)

May 10, 1948: General elections. American fighter planes roared endlessly overhead. American troops carried people in their trucks to the election booths. (Sunoo 1979 p. 64)

May 10, 1948: General elections. During the weeks preceding the election
• Some 325 persons were killed (15 election officials, 49 police and 261 rioters)
• There were some 32 arsons of election offices
• Some 500 telephone lines were cut
• Some 540 telegraph poles were destroyed.

(RECORDS, reel no 3)

May 11, 1948: Ignoring Communist threats of violence and reprisal, more than 85% of South Korea’s 8,000,000 eligible voters went to the polls to cast their ballots in the United Nations-sponsored election. (NYT p. 1)

[The article does not mention the pressure (in terms of food delivery) which was applied on Korean people to force them to register and vote.]
May 25, 1948: USAMGIG Order No 18. Through this order 24 American lawyers were admitted to the Bar of Korea. Effective on 30 April 1948.
[signed] By direction of the Military Government, Kim Byung Ro, Director of the Department of Justice.
(STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 6)

May 26, 1948: Methodists plan to hit Communism. In a 4-year program trained corps will go to areas menaced by its ideology. (NYT p. 28)

May 27, 1948: Questionable discrimination.
To: Major General William F. Dean, Military Governor.
Excerpt.
It has just come to my attention that on 27 May at 16:00 when the bus carrying the passengers from the Kwanju plane passed through the gates of Kimpo Air Base [near Seoul] en route to Seoul, Military Police got on the bus and forced 3 Korean officials to go to the rear of the bus and sit there and ordered two American passengers to go forward and sit in the front of the bus. One of the Koreans was the former Mayor of Kwanju.
We are sure that you feel as we do that Korean officials should not be humiliated by Military Police in the National capital of Korea. It is our hope that you can cause this most objectionable practice to be corrected.
[Signed] Colonel Timothy H. Murphy, Chief Civil Affairs Officer. (NARA, RG 554, Box 16)

May 27, 1948: Seoul. 2 empty US Army barracks were destroyed. Arson is suspected. (NYT 27 May 1948)

May 28, 1948: North Korean armed forces ambushed a party of American civilians yesterday near the border between the United States and Soviet zones on the Ongjin Peninsula, wounding one with light machine-gun fire. (NYT p. 3)

Jun 1, 1948: Money exchange “We are not allowed to exchange Korean money into American money” said a priest at a meeting of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. For that reason Korean missions could not buy theological books in the US, except if they received gifts in dollars. (Presbyterian Guardian, June 1948, p. 152)

Jun 1, 1948: At the present time there are some 35,000 lepers in South Korea. The US missionaries who visit their colonies distribute Bibles but they have almost no supply of the drugs (e.g. “Promin” or “Diason”) that would provide an effective treatment. (The Presbyterian Guardian, July 1948, p. 174)

Jun 1, 1948: Court Organization Law.
This extensive law which has over one hundred articles defined the organization of
the Korean judicial system. The first draft was transmitted to the MG by Richard Gilliam, an adviser at the Ministry of Justice, on 3 April 1948. It was approved and signed by Major General Dean (with the seal of the USAMGIK) on 4 May 1948 as Ordinance No 193 of the MG and became effective on 1 June 1948.

Its introduction was saluted by a statement released by the Information Department of the Interim Government. As the handwritten draft of this statement is contained in the archive papers of the MG one is inclined to think that the statement was in fact transmitted to the Interim Government by the MG.

(NARA, RG 554, Box 307)

[Work on this vast reform was started by a directive of General Lerch (who had studied law himself) dated 11 February 1947: “Have ordinance prepared restoring the Third Instance system. Discuss with the Koreans”. The “Third Instance” system is in reference to the role that the Supreme Court should play in the judicial system. The law begins with the following words: “Pending legislative action on the subject, the following law shall govern”. It is clear that the Korean National Assembly had the power to change the law if it wished to do so. However, one may wonder why this law which was drafted by American advisers of the Ministry of Justice (see the caption of the handwritten draft) was introduced two months and a half before a Korean government was put in power. According to the archive documents it does not seem that this law was discussed or approved by the Interim National Assembly. Even the discussion which took place between the Korean members of the Committee and the US advisers was somewhat flawed for three simple reasons.

- The Committee members were selected by the MG among those judges who wanted to cooperate with the MG and in addition knew English. That was a very narrow selection.
- The fact that, according to archive documents, the whole discussion was mainly conducted in English was a great obstacle even for the committee members who knew English. There is of course a sharp difference between having a smattering of English and being able to follow discussions among experts.155
- During the summer of 1947 the committee of 5 Korean jurists in charge of this reform went to the United States to study the American system.]

Jun 6, 1948: Election toll put at 323 dead. (NYT 6 June 1948)

Jun 8, 1948: Korean civilians killed: 5 (328). Cheju Island. Two policemen

155 Even very official letters contain fairly bizarre English sentences. As an illustration one can cite the following one which is contained in a letter sent by the Chief of “Judicature News” to Major General Archer Lerch (25 February 1947): “All judges and prosecutors will be protected in the view of personal and economy”. Here is an other example also from a letter to General Lerch from 4 Korean Judges (January 1947): “We can gradually fill up the staffs and let the appeal affairs smaller amount than ever by receiving [sic] only legal problem”. Incidentally, it can be noted that all Korean texts in this set of archives are written with Chinese characters. (NARA, RG 554, Box 307)
A “Court Organization Law” was published in the “Official Gazette” of Japan on 16 April 1947, that is to say about one year before a similar law was introduced in Korea. The Japanese law has 83 articles (plus 7 supplementary articles) while the Korean law has over one hundred articles. Source: NARA, RG 554, Box 307.

killed 5 civilians (2 men and 3 females). (NARA, available on www.koreanhistory)

[See also below at the date of 12 July 1948.]

**Jun 10, 1948:** Excerpt of a report about Korea issued by the “Office of Intelligence Research” of the “Department of State”.

Working closely with the police and governmental officials, the extreme-rightist groups particularly the “National Society for Acceleration of Korean Independence” and the local youth groups maintain a dominant leadership over most of the local
Fig. 6.9b  Court Organization Law in South Korea, handwritten draft (1947-1948). Handwritten version of the Court Organization Law which defined the judicial system of South Korea. The archive also contains two typewritten versions: one with addition of handwritten corrections and the final corrected version. The law had been under discussion for over a year by a committee including Korean judges. In the meanwhile 5 of these judges visited the United States. At the end, however, because, according to the US adviser, the Korean judges “could not agree on all points” the draft was written in English by “the lawyers of this office who have had experience in drafting laws” that is to say by the American advisers of the Ministry of Justice. They carefully took into account the suggestions made by several members of the committee.

Source: NARA, RG 554, Box 307.

communities throughout South Korea.
(NARA 4b, p.632-653. The report is entitled: “Social and political forces in small communities in South Korea.”)

Jun 16, 1948: Memorandum on Jeju operations for State Department. Colonel Rothwell Brown is conducting operations as follows.
Fig. 6.9c  Court Organization Law. Typewritten draft with corrections and comments. The comments show that all these questions raised vivid discussions among the members of the MG who were in charge of this question along with Koreans with whom they were in contact. There can be no question that they took it at heart and tried to do the best possible job.

Here are some relevant sentences in more readable form than in the picture (the last sentence suggests that in this organization there would be no juvenile courts in the main cities of Korea).

Note. At a meeting of the lawyers of this office at Mr. Scott’s house several weeks ago it was the consensus that the juvenile courts should be separated from the Department of Justice (…) All our difficulties with juvenile courts have arisen from our policy of pushing new ideas that are not fully understood by the Koreans. (…) Articles 35 to 39 were drawn entirely by me without consultation with anyone. I propose in a supplemental memorandum to provide for the merger of the juvenile courts of Seoul, Taegu, Pusan and Kwanju with the appropriate district court. The above sections give the supreme court the power to establish additional juvenile courts as they may be needed.

Chapter IV. Summary Court

Art. 45. The decision of the juvenile court shall be made by a single judge.

Art. 46. There shall be probation officers in each juvenile court. The probation officers shall meet the judge by investigations and gathering of evidence. He shall also perform all the duties imposed by law on probation officers.

Chapter V. Summary Court

Art. 47. The chief judge of the district court shall appoint the probation officers from among those who have had experience in protection and education of juveniles and other proper persons.

Chapter VI. Summary Court

Art. 48. The summary court shall be a lower court of the first instance.

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a 4 constabulary battalions have been stationed on the island.

b About 3,000 persons have been apprehended and screened. At present there are 575 persons in the stockade at Jeju now being screened again by 4 interrogation teams.
Fig. 6.9d  **Court Organization Law, comments on first draft.** The first draft of the “Court Organization Ordinance” (as it is called here) was transmitted to the MG by adviser Richard Gilliam on 3 April 1948. Albert Lyman (who was probably a senior adviser at the Department of Justice of the MG) replied on 10 April 1948. His letter gives one explanation of why such an important reform was introduced before the establishment of a Korean government. It was considered as a “fine, enduring legacy left to Korea by the American Military Government”.

Here are some relevant sentences in more readable form than in the picture (excerpts). The attached Draft on Court Reorganization is a very comprehensive and learned document. You, as the creator and compiler thereof deserves the highest praise from all quarters for the preparation of this farseeing and important piece of work. The Draft as drawn can very well be embodied in an Ordinance without any changes whatsoever. If that is not done now, the implementation of this Ordinance may never be accomplished because the new National Assembly may desire to have it await the establishment of a new national government, and nobody knows what its course shall be. However, if the present Military Government can “take the bull by the horns” and push it through now, then a fine enduring monument can be left as a legacy to Korea by the American Military Government.

*Source: NARA, RG 554, Box 307.*

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c  The police brutality has contributed immeasurably to the work of the Communists. The police activities are well known in this headquarters.
Ordinance 192 has 120 articles (called “sections”). which fill 22 pages in the “Official Gazette”. The present copy is the proof copy as can be seen from the fact that 2 corrections were introduced. *Source: NARA, RG 554, Box 308.*

(State Dept 1945-1949, reel 2)

**Jun 17, 1948:** The North Korean radio reported that the crews of two South Korean coast guard cutters had deserted with their vessels to North Korea. (NYT p. 50)

**Jun 19, 1948:** Colonel Bak Jin Jung, Constabulary Chief on Cheju was shot and killed. (NYT p.6)

**Jun 25, 1948:** The United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea adopted a
resolution stating that the election held in the southern zone was a “valid expression of the free will of the electorate in those parts of Korea which were accessible to the Commission and in which the inhabitants constituted approximately two-thirds of the people of all Korea”.

[The circumstances under which the election was organized and in particular the fact that most left-wing leaders were in hiding rather suggests that the election was neither free nor fair but was cleverly advertised as being such. See in this respect the discussions about the election in previous chapters, in particular the statement made by Chief of Police Chang.]

**Jul 6, 1948:** American forces discovered a Communist insurrection plot. (Le Monde p. 2)

**Jul 12, 1948:** Subject: Request for a Military Commission trial. A trial by Military Commission was demanded for two Korean policemen who had confessed to having killed 5 Koreans on 8 June 1948 on Cheju (see above). (NARA: available on www.koreanhistory) [In fact the execution of rebels who had been taken prisoner was common practice in the Korean police or Constabulary (see in the respect the aftermath of the Yosu rebellion). Therefore this request appears surprising. As a matter of fact, the Headquarters replied that this is a purely Korean matter which should be tried by Korean tribunals. This decision virtually guaranteed impunity to the murderers.]

**Jul 17, 1948:** The Constitution of the Republic of South Korea was promulgated. Drafted by Yu Jin-oh and Kwon Seung-yeol, the 1948 Constitution was first amended in 1952 ahead of President Syngman Rhee’s re-election. In subsequent years it was amended several times. (Wikipedia article entitled “Constitution of the Republic of Korea”.)

**Jul 20, 1948:** Dr. Rhee is chosen as Korean president. This veteran independence leader has overwhelming backing in nation. (NYT p. 12) [As always, this New York Times headline is in line with the wishes of the State Department. However, the statement that Rhee has “overwhelming backing” can be doubted. Less than two years later Rhee experienced a crushing electoral defeat.]

**Jul 20, 1948:** ● **US fatalities:** 1 (116). A US soldier, Private Charles Labita, was killed near the 38th parallel at 1 am and a second was slightly wounded. The ambush engaged an American 5-men patrol with rifles and hand grenades. The patrol returned fire but the assailants fled. (NYT 20 July p. 12, 24 July p. 4) [If this description of the incident is correct it is really a miracle that only one soldier was killed. A more plausible account was given on July 24. See below.]
It should be noted that there have been other clashes on the dividing line in previous months. See above.

**Jul 24, 1948:** It was disclosed that in the attack which cost the life of one GI, the attackers confiscated the five soldiers’ rifles as well as an Army jeep. The attack occurred 70 kilometers north of Seoul. (NYT p. 4)
[The G-2 Weekly summary says that the attack was carried out by 8 Koreans in civilian clothes. (NARA 2, Vol. 5 p. 391)

“Rhee sent his wife and wanted her to discuss several matters with me without arousing unnecessary rumors. One. Rhee will nominate Lee Bum Suk as Prime Minister and wished to know what I thought of that nomination.” (RECORDS, reel no 3)
[Apparently, the State Department had no objection to this nomination because Lee Bum Suk (Lee Beom-seok) remained prime minister from August 1948 to 21 April 1950.
It can be seen that even after Independence the opinion of the State Department mattered.]

Military property of the Government of the United States furnished to the Korean Constabulary, Police and Coast Guards will be transferred to the Korean government from time to time as authority for such transfer is given by the US government.
The Korean government agrees that all Korean property under the control of US-AFIK during the period of withdrawal shall be made available and maintained without charge.
The Korean government relieves the US government of all liability and other obligations incurred by the USAMGIK including present and future claims.
Proceeds in Korean currency derived from sales of supplies furnished by the United States will be deposited in a special account. Disbursement from this account will be made only for such purposes as agreed between the Korean and US governments.
The USAMGIK has reimbursed Korea at fair dollar value for all goods and services provided for the USAFIK from the Korean economy for the period of 9 September 1945 to 30 June 1948. The Korean Government agrees that these payments constitute full, final and complete settlement.
The Korean government relieves the US government of all liability for funds used from the overdraft account of the Bank of Chosun entitled “USAMGIK Funding Account”. [This suggests that the MG used the same procedure as in Japan to get a free
supply of local currency.]

The Korean government agrees that the Commanding General of the USAFIK shall continue to draw Won from the overdraft account of the Bank of Chosun presently entitled “USAMGIK Funding Account No 2” and the US government agrees to pay to the Korean government in dollars or other US assets the fair dollar value of all goods procured in the Korean economy with Won drawn from such account. [Although it is not said explicitly, one understands that the repayment by the US government concerns only the funds drawn from the “Account No 2” that is to say the account used after 15 August 1948. Incidentally, one may wonder what was the utility of such a mechanism. If the MG wanted to pay its purchases it could have done so in dollars without having to draw on this overdraft account. In order to get a better understanding one would need to know what exchange rates were used in these operations.]

In consideration of certain property heretofore [until now] furnished to the Korean economy by the US government, the Korean government agrees to pay to the US government the fair value of said property. Interest shall accrue at the rate of 2.4% per annum from 1 July 1948 on the unpaid balance.

The rate of exchange in any transaction shall be the rate most advantageous to the United States provided such rate is not unlawful.

(NARA, RG 554, Box 310)

[All these explanations are fairly cryptic. In order to get a better understanding one would need information about some actual transactions.]

**Aug 8, 1948:** Plans for transmitting nominal power to the Korean government

What in the Document of 8 August 1948 is the meaning of the expression “token date of transfer”? When followed by “of” as in “as a token of gratitude” token means “proof of”, but when used in conjunction with a noun it means something which is minimal, superficial, perfunctory, formal. As examples of this meaning one can mention the following expressions: “a token gesture of reconciliation”, “a token resistance”.

The main message of Major General Dean’s letter is that there will be almost no changes after 15 August 1948 because of two circumstances:

i. The new government has promised that at government and provincial level the former officials who had been chosen by the MG will remain in their former positions.

ii. The Military Government officers will continue to advise the Korean officials. Only the vocabulary will be changed.

**Aug 14, 1948:** The first 6 select Korean officers left Korea to attend the Advanced Infantry Course at Fort Bening, Georgia. (Gibby 2004, p. 111)
HEADQUARTERS
United States Army Military Government in Korea
8 August 1948

Lt Colonel Winston R Hayward
Commanding Officer, 101st Military Government Group

Dear Colonel Hayward,

The 15th of August marks a *token date* of transfer of governmental functions and responsibilities. On that date USAMGIK becomes in the eyes of the Korean people the Civil Affairs Group of USAFK. However, this change only applies to the visible designation on buildings, vehicles, etc. All military correspondence will carry the appropriate Military Government designation.

On 15 August the newly appointed officials of the new Korean Government will move into their respective departments and will there be oriented and assisted by the incumbent Korean SKIG [South Korean Interim Government] officials. The *American advisers* will lend every assistance in the orientation of the newly appointed Korean Departmental Heads.

At the provincial level the Chief Civil Affairs Officers will encourage Korean officials now in the employ of SKIG to remain on the job. The President and Prime Minister of the new government have assured me that there will be no sweeping personnel changes. They see clearly that the maximum use must be made of SKIG officials who have acquired “know-how” in the service of the Military Government.

So after 15 August 1948 your duties are to advise as before and to assist the incumbent Korean officials.

[signed]  Sincerely, W.F. Dean, Major General, United States Army

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**Document 1: Letter about the transfer of government functions.** Letter sent by US Headquarters to all the chiefs of Military Government at provincial level. Basically, nothing will change and South Korea will continued to be piloted by US advisers. *Source: RG 554, Box 16 (CKCLH)*

[Shepherded by Colonel Hausman, this program continued until the summer of 1953]

**Aug 14, 1948:** ● **US fatalities: 1 (117).** Private Legault (age 18) had been drinking beer with Private Francis Meister during the course of the evening. They left the club around 23:00 and went to the Medical Supply Office where Legault wanted to visit a friend. Legault was noisy and belligerent and was asked to leave which he refused to do. Private Meister tried to lead him out. In the ensuing scuffle, Legault fell to the floor. The fall resulted in a dislocation of the 4th and 5th vertebrae. He died shortly later. Captain Ford investigated the line of duty of Legault. His findings were “No A.W. 107” [A.W. 107 means Article of War 107 which seems to refer to some form of misbehavior related to a psychiatric condition] (NARA 12)

**Aug 15, 1948:** **USAMGIK Ordinances issued in the months preceding 15 Au-**
Chronology

August 1948.
Several laws were introduced which were to rule many important facets of the Korean polity. Most of them were established through the work of small committees which brought together US advisers and selected Koreans who were fluent in English. Most of these laws were not discussed in the Interim Assembly.

1. Ordinance No 176, 20 March 1948, “Changes in criminal procedures”
2. Ordinance No 173, 22 March 1948, “Creation of the National Land Administration”
3. Ordinance No 185, 24 April 1948, “Corporations procedures simplified for vested judicial persons”
4. Ordinance No 193, 1 June 1948, “Court Organization Law” (more details are given above at the date of 1 June.
5. Ordinance No 209, 3 July
6-9. Ordinance No 216 217 218 219, all on 12 August, “Establishing Boards of Educations and organizing the financing of elementary education” (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 6 and 7)

[Not surprisingly, many of these laws were modeled on organization ideas prevailing in the United States. As an example, one can mention the Boards of Education which were pillars of the US education systems in the sense that they were elected and had the power to levy school taxes and to employ (or discharge) teachers. In June 1947 in a Report of the Educational and Informational Mission to Korea, American advisers had already suggested that Boards of Education be established but the proposal had not been acted upon.

Incidentally, it can be mentioned that Boards of Education were also established in Japan.

An article published in the New York Times on 22 August 1943 (p. 7) was entitled:

“In Sicily the judicial system is reorganized in lines approaching Anglo-American law”. In its conclusion it stated: “Thus far the indications point to our contribution as being along the line of Anglo-Saxon democracy and liberalism”.

Such candid assessments were not repeated in subsequent invasions and occupations. Even the word “AMGOT” (Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories) which was used after 1 November 1942 was completely omitted after 16 August 1943. It was replaced by “Civil Affairs” which had the same meaning but sounded much more neutral.]

Aug 15, 1948: Seoul. The Republic of Korea (ROK) was formally established in South Korea. However, President Rhee accepted to keep his army under US control. US advisers would be attached to every Korean army division headquarters and US
generals would have the command control of Rhee’s army. US ambassador Muccio agreed to keep the latter provision secret. (US Military Government in Korea, 1948)

**Aug 15, 1948:** In the new government the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Home Affairs, Finance, Education, Transportation were graduates of US or British universities. (Korea Graphic 15 August 1948)

[The journal “Korea Graphic” was published by the XXIV Corps. It includes pictures of the president and prime minister together with the list of the Cabinet members. Incidentally, it seems that even after the end of the MG the fact of being fluent in English was still a big asset.]

**Aug 19, 1948:** On 14 August the US government recognized the government of South Korea. In contrast, on 19 August the British government announced that it will *not* recognize it. (Le Monde 14 August 1948 p. 8 and 19 August 1948 p. 2)

**Aug 24, 1948:** US-Korean agreement extending the control of Korean forces by US Commanders. (article 2, excerpt).

The Commanding General, USAFIK, agrees to transfer to the Government of the Republic of Korea progressively, and as rapidly as he deems compatible with common security, responsibility for the direction of the Security Forces of the Republic of Korea, consisting of all Police, Coast Guard and Constabulary units.

It is further agreed that until completion of withdrawal of United States Army Forces he shall retain the authority to exercise such over-all operational control of Security Forces of the Republic of Korea as he deems necessary.

[Signed]
Syngman Rhee, President of the Republic of Korea
John R. Hodge, Lt. Gen., Commanding General USAFIK.

(NARA, RG 544, Box 310; Website (read on 24 January 2011) of the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://mofaweb.mofat.go.kr/inter_treaty_real.nsf)

[This agreement makes clear that Korean forces remained under US authority even after the establishment of a Korean government. What is not clear is for how long this agreement remained in force. In principle, it should have been terminated with the departure of the last US troops. Their withdrawal was suspended during the Yosu rebellion.]

**Aug 25, 1948:** Elections were held in North Korea. Of the 570 seats of the National Assembly 360 were reserved for the South. Underground elections were organized in the South by the South Korea Labor Party. According to US intelligence at least 25% of the rural population of South Korea was able to vote. The fact that many persons signed with fingerprints or seals (instead of using their names) is not surprising when
one realizes that some 100,000 ballots were seized by South Korean authorities while being transported to Haeju, the North Korean town just across the 38th parallel where the SKLP headquarters was located. (Merrill 1980, p. 177)

**Aug 25, 1948:** Elections called by the People’s Council in Pyongyang were held in both zones of Korea. In the North, according to Pyongyang, 99% of eligible voters cast their ballots, while in the South, 77% of the people defied violent opposition to vote through underground election committees. (Sunoo 1979 p. 67)

**Aug 25, 1948:** According to the Tass agency, 78 South Korean delegate to the “Supreme People’s Assembly” which is to meet in North Korea could not attend and 42 of them were imprisoned by American occupation forces. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 3)

**Sep 1948:** In September 1948 the National Assembly passed the “National Traitors Act”. Its main purpose was to remove from their positions Koreans who had collaborated with the Japanese but it seems that it was also used to outlaw the “Workers Party of Korea”, the party which dominated the government in North Korea. (http://twincities.indymedia.org)

**Sep 1, 1948:** Letter of President Rhee about the transfer of responsibility of the National Police. Excerpt.

“I have the honor to acknowledge reception of your letter announcing your preparedness to transfer to the Korean government the responsibility for the direction of the National Police of the Republic of Korea, effective as of 12:01 on September 3, 1948.”

[Signed:] Syngman Rhee, President

(NARA, RG 544, Box 310)

[At first sight this letter may seem in contradiction with the agreement of 24 August. However, as is made clear by other letters in the same folder, this transfer is from the Interim Government to the Department of Home Affairs of the new government. MG will continue to retain final authority in the same way as during the period of the Interim Government. This is confirmed by General Coulter’s letter of 13 September (below).

There were similar transfers for all departments of the Interim Government. All the Korean directors of the different departments of the Interim Government resigned.]

**Sep 13, 1948:** Letter of General Coulter to President Rhee regarding US control of Korean security forces. Excerpt.

“I agree to retain until completion of the withdrawal of US Army Forces the authority to exercise such overall operational control of Security Forces of the Republic of Korea (including the Constabulary and Coast Guard) as I deem necessary in the
interest of common security”.
(NARA, RG 554, Box 310)

[In his reply of 14 September to General Coulter President Rhee made a fairly veiled and cryptic reference to the fact that final authority remains on the American side. He writes: “All you suggested in your letter is in accordance with the executive agreement between the President of the Republic of Korea and the Commanding General, USAFIK.”

Sep 14, 1948: The UN Commission in Korea had finally elected to recognize the Rhee regime. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 3)

Sep 14, 1948: • US fatalities: 36 (153). Some 40 Americans were killed in a train collision which occurred at 19:40. The train wreck occurred between Seoul and Taejon, at about 25 kilometer north of Taejon and some 200 kilometer south of Seoul. At least 60 were injured. The accident occurred when a local train crashed into two rear cars of the “Korea Liberator” train. It was the most serious train accident involving Americans since the occupation began. The “Liberator” was stalled due to a brake failure about 1,200 after a tunnel. A flagman had been posted near the mouth of the tunnel but it seems that the driver of the second train did not see him because he actioned the brakes only shortly before the crash. Only the last three cars which contained the US troops were damaged. Railroad regulations were violated by the stationmaster at Pukong (the previous station) in allowing the second train to enter the Pukong-Naipan block (i.e. railroad segment) without making sure that the first train had left it. Railroad regulations were also violated by the crew of the first train in not setting flares and other warnings. (Times 15 September p. 4, NYT 15 September p. 1, NARA 12)
US troops who contracted venereal diseases were sent to a special treatment center. According to the website of the 31st Infantry Regiment (which was stationed in Seoul) this train was bringing troops back from the treatment center. Seven soldiers of this regiment were among the victims who were killed. (31stinfantry.org/Documents/Chapter%208.pdf)

[Subsequently (NYT of 18 September and 13 October 1948) the death toll of US soldiers was reduced to 36. The articles do not say if the driver of the second train was killed nor do they say if some railroad personnel were tried for being partially responsible.]

Sep 14, 1948: Names of some of the 40 US servicemen who died in the train accident. Acosta (John E.), Rct, RA 19311999, Hq.Co, 7th Inf Div, age not given
Adams (Joseph C. or Jimmie R.), Pfc, RA 38632212, 1st Inf. Regt, 19
Bartlett (Clifford W.), Rct, RA 14271357, 1st Inf Regt, 18
Bass (Thomas L. R.), Cpl, 18286896, 371st Ord Ammo Supply Det, 21
Bowers (Raymond T.), Cpl, RA 14240428, 517th Eng Utilities Det, not given
Brown (Ira V.), 44108823, Pfc, Co C 12th Engr C Bn, 21
Delarosa (Raul M.), Pvt, RA 19403151, Co B, 76th Sig Service Bn, age unknown
Frink (Gene A.), Caporal, 500 Trans. Rwy. Grand Division, 18
Goff (Osvil H.), Pfc, RA 382330569, 7th MP Pl, 7th Inf Div, age unknown
Janeluinas (Stephen), Rct, RA 11176950, 76th Sig Service Bn, age unknown
Perham (Robert E.), Rct, RA 16275612, Co L, 32d Inf., 18
Robison (Belle S.), Pfc, RA 19263271, 742nd Engr Base Eq Co
Sells (Paul R.), Pfc, RA 36928279, Co A, 76th Sig Service Bn, age unknown
Smith (Robert G.), RA 33997448, 7th MP Platoon, 7th Inf Div, age unknown
Tennison (Howard E.), Rct (civilian), Co B, 32d Inf, 20

The following abbreviations were used: Bn=Battalion, Co=Company, Cpl=Corporal,
Det=Detachment Div=Division, Engr=Engineer, Eq=Equiment, Inf=Infantry, Pvt=Private,
Pfc=Private First Class, Pl=Platoon, Rct=Recruit, Regt=Regiment, Sig=Signal, Sv=-Service.
(NARA 12)

[One surprise from this list is the young age of some of the soldiers, especially the so-called recruits. “Recruit” was the lowest rank just under private. Sometimes it was also given after a disciplinary action until the soldier could be dishonorably discharged.]

Sep 17, 1948: ● Korean civilians killed: 1 (329). Ongjin. An elderly Korean pedestrian (aged 63) was over-run and fatally injured by a jeep driven by Private James Nichols. The accident occurred on a road leading to the Ongjin ferry point at 13:10. It seems that the man ran into the way of the jeep. (NARA 12)

Sep 17, 1948: ● Korean civilians killed: 1 (330). Seoul, 7th Mechanized Cavalry Reconnaissance troop. At 11:40 an M-8 armored car driven by Corporal Erwin Brown collided with a Korean man riding a bicycle. The man was pronounced dead when arriving at the Kaesong Provincial Hospital. (NARA 12)

Sep 17, 1948: ● US fatalities: 1 (154). Taegu, Camp Skipworth. Two recruits attempted to sell US Army property to Koreans but the Koreans were warned not to purchase it by a Korean policeman. Later the policeman was recognized by the two soldiers which lead to a fight in which the policeman was injured. Later a second policeman who had been told about the incident opened fire on one of recruits named Dominic Coladonato (aged 23) from a distance of 40 meter and killed him. (NARA 12)
**Sep 22, 1948:** Financial agreement. Excerpt. The government of the Republic of Korea has undertaken to provide repair and maintenance for US Forces in Korea until their withdrawal. For convenience in effecting payments it is required that the Korean government designate disbursing officers in Seoul and Pusan to whom vouchers for repairs, payrolls of maintenance personnel and other expenses can be submitted. [Signed] John E. Muncio, Special Representative.

[This demand was made in accordance with the provisions of the “Initial Financial and Property Settlement” between the US and Korean governments. This arrangement is similar to the one which exists between the Japanese and US governments for the payment of the salaries of Japanese employees who work on US bases.]

**Sep 23, 1948:** Letter of President Rhee to Ambassador John J. Muccio. Excerpt. “It was unanimously decided at the Cabinet meeting of September 5 that the Banto Hotel be offered as a gift to the US Government for the purpose of using it as the US embassy”.

(NARA, RG 554, Box 310)

**Sep 28, 1948:** US fatalities: 1 (155). Pusan. Private First Class George W. Brink died when the tractor that he was driving to tow a railroad car overturned. (NARA 12)

**Sep 30, 1948:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (331). 599th Engineer Base Depot. A Korean child (aged 3) was fatally stricken by a 3/4 weapon carrier driven Sergeant John Ross. (NARA 12)

**Sep 30, 1948:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (332). Excerpt of a report of accident. Seoul. At approximately 11:00 a Korean man riding a bicycle struck a truck of the US Army Post Engineer Motor Pool driven by a Korean, Ahn Moon Yong, with private Charles E. Hinderliter siting beside him. He was knocked into the ditch and died at the hospital several hours later. No regulation were violated as the vehicle was well within the speed limit. Witnesses state that the Korean was under the influence of alcohol. Investigation indicates that the Korean was entirely at fault and that the driver of the US Army truck was not responsible.

[signed] 4 October 1948 James C. Hogle, Major (NARA 7)

[This accident occurred after the establishment of the Korean government in August 1948. Yet, the accident report was made by an US Army officer not by the Korean police. It was obviously biased against the Korean man because it says “Witnesses state the Korean was under the influence of alcohol”, yet the same report lists only one
witness namely Private Hinderliter who was sitting next to the driver and can hardly be considered an impartial witness in this matter. Moreover, the report does not say whether or not the driver had a driver’s license. As a matter of fact, the report form contains many specific questions (e.g. weather conditions) but does not require any information about the ability and qualification of the driver.]

**Oct 1, 1948:** Between 1 October 1945 and 1 October 1948 the won-dollar exchange rate was divided by 30. (Korea Herald 15 August 1965, p. 7)

**Oct 3, 1948:** British forces in Malaya are devastating villages on the mere suspicion that they are in areas which support the guerrillas. A government communique stated that together with the police they burned 80 houses in a raid on a mining area in Selenger State although no contact was made with guerrillas. (The Worker 3 October 1948 p. 2)

**Oct 5, 1948:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (333). Uijeongbu (just north of Seoul). A small Korean boy (aged 5) was killed by a US Army vehicle when he run from the left to the right side of the road. (NARA 12)

**Oct 5, 1948:** US fatalities: 1 (156). On the night of 5 October a serviceman on patrol duty found the dead body of Archie W. Madison, 1st Lieutenant (Service number O-1119763) in a ditch beside a truck on the Ascom cutoff road. A detailed examination of the body at the hospital disclosed no marks of injury of any nature. Official cause of death is awaiting the result of autopsy. The position of the jeep when found was upright and facing opposite direction to that which it was traveling. (NARA 7)

**Oct 5, 1948:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (334). Ding San Dong. A small Korean child (aged 4) was hit and killed when running into the path of a vehicle driven by Private First Class Everett Chess. (NARA 12)

**Oct 8, 1948:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (335). Song Jong Ni. A Korean pedestrian (aged 36) was killed by an ambulance of the 20th Infantry Regiment. A mechanical check indicated that the ambulance had practically no braking power. (NARA 12)

**Oct 10, 1948:** The “South Korea anti-Communist National Youth Corps” is reportedly 1,250,000 strong. (NYT p. 19)

**Oct 12, 1948:** Transfer of the Office of Property Custody held by USAMGIK to a Custodian of the Korean Government. After this transfer the US custodians will be relieved of responsibilities but will continue to assume the role of Consultants and advisers.
[This was an important step. A more detailed study would be required to understand how this transfer was effected in practice.]

**Fig. 6.10 Map of the Sunchon-Yosu area.** Other spellings are as follows: Kwangju=Gwangu, Kurye=Kure=Gurye, Jinju=Chinju, Kwangyang=Gwangyang, Chinhae=Jinhae. As to the scale of the map it can be observed that from Yosu to Kwanju there are about 100km.

**Oct 13, 1948:** An inquiry report layed the train crash of 14 September to violation of railroad operations rules. However, the report was not made public. (NYT p. 7)

**Oct 15, 1948:** US fatalities: 1 (157). Pusan. Two recruits were on post as sentinels on a railroad box-car. The weapon of one of them fired by accident killing the other, James C. Worley (aged 18) of the 1st Infantry Regiment. (NARA 12)

**Oct 15, 1948:** Expansion of South Korean industries. Letter addressed to President Rhee. Excerpt.
I am in receipt of your letter of 11 October 1948 requesting that steps be taken to have the US Economic Recovery Administration recruit on the behalf of the Korean Government a group of thoroughly competent industrial engineers to come to Korea and conduct surveys for the orderly development of a program of rehabilitation, expansion and reconversion of South Korean industries.
Mr. Muccio is taking appropriate steps to carry out your wishes.
[Signed:] John B. Coulter, Major General, US Army

[A similar letter (given below) was written by General Coulter on 16 October. Why was there suddenly a rush to involve US companies in the development of Korean? The reason is simple. Since August 1945 the Korean economy had been so to say]
frozen because trade with the outside world was prohibited and because the Korean industries were owned by the MG Custodian. Now, with the establishment of a Korean government, trade opened and industry was re-appropriated by the Korean State. In short, this was the right time for US companies to offer their services.

**Oct 16, 1948:** Rehabilitation of the electric power system in Korea. Letter addressed to President Rhee. Excerpt.

“In accordance with your letter of 14 September 1948 the first contingent of the personnel that Mr. Draper has recruited to rehabilitate the electrical system of Korea is scheduled to arrive in Seoul about 18 October.

Members of this group are [follows a list of about 10 engineers at various American utility companies: Alabama Power, California Electric Power Company, Illinois Light Company, Utah Power and so on.]

The Consultant to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, Mr. Rupert Anderson, has been instructed to assist in planning the activities of this group of experts. I am sure the Minister of Commerce and Industry realizes that this group is to work solely for the benefit of Korea.


[There was a similar rehabilitation program planned for and by US companies after the invasion of Iraq. Clearly, financial and economic advantages is the ultimate goal of political influence. With a pro-American president, with US advisers and consultants working inside the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and with the support of US Command, these experts were certainly in a good position to win profitable contracts for US companies.]

**Oct 19, 1948:** Yosu. The South Korean Army 14th and 6th Regiments, some 2,000 strong, mutinied. The rebel soldiers took over Yosu and Sunchon. Many Japanese police and Rhee’s henchmen were killed. The People’s Committees were restored. (US Military Government in Korea, 1948)

[It may be useful to see this uprising in international context. As a matter of fact, social conflicts were underway in many countries:

- On 5 October 1948, sailors and armed civilians revolted in the seaport of Callao in Peru. However, the Army forces in Lima and Callao remained loyal and were able to crush the revolt. The government blamed the uprising on the People’s Party (APRA).

On 27 October 1948 government tanks smashed the gates of San Marcos University in Lima and routed students barricaded there. (Daily Worker 4 October 1948 p.2 and 27 October 1948)

- On 26 October 1948, in the north of France 30,000 troops attack miners who
had been on strike for some time and occupy the mining area. On 27 October near Saint Etienne in the center of France, government troops with tanks attack striking miners. One miner was killed. (Daily Worker 26-27 October 1948)

- In many countries armed conflicts were under way between leftist guerrilla movements and government troops. One can mention the cases of Greece, China, Indochina, Indonesia, Malaya and the Philippines. In all those cases it is through their resistance against German or Japanese invaders that these leftist groups and parties had won a prominent position in their respective countries. Rightist governments supported by American, British or French troops and advisers set up to crush them; the repression was indeed successful everywhere except in China and Indochina.

Oct 19, 1948: Yosu. The rebellion started around 19:00. At about 22:30 some 30 prisoners were released from the guard house and were armed by the rebels. (NARA 18 Flash report No 119)
[This source confirms that the mutiny started in Yosu on 19 October.]

Oct 20-26, 1948: The following account of the Yosu uprising differs in several important respects from the official US-Korean account.
On 20 October 1948 members of the 14th Regiment of the National Army of South Korea stationed in Yosu mutinied. The soldiers and officers captured all strategic points and rallied together the people of Yosu. The entire population of more than 40,000 people responded enthusiastically. From 20 to 26 October an elected People’s Committee administered and defended the city against the troops. The strategy of the mutiny was not to hold Yosu but to go to the nearby Chiri mountains and establish bases for extended guerrilla warfare. The insurgents left the city as quickly as possible and joined forces with others who had gone ahead and captured Sunchon where more volunteers enlisted. Numbering more than 4,000 they succeeded in arriving safely at their destinations. The people of Sunchon and Yosu, for the most part youths armed with old Japanese rifles, were told to hold the towns as long as possible to cover the retreat of the partisans. Government troops, equipped with modern American weapons, tanks and armored cars attacked Yosu on 24 October. They were supported by shell fire from American warships lying off shore. Despite this military superiority, it took the 3rd, 5th, 12th and reformed 14th regiments two days of fierce fighting to overcome the Yosu insurgents. The retaliation that followed was an orgy of cruel massacre. The Noryukja [Toiler], an underground newspaper in Seoul wrote: “Many tens of thousands of innocent people were arrested and stripped naked on the playgrounds of the schools, and then, the enemy took out before the firing squad any person he pleased. Thus, many thou-
Fig. 6.11: Two sorts of weapons used against the Yosu uprising. The two pictures were taken in Yosu by Carl Mydans, a well-known photographer for Time Magazine. On the left-hand side is a makeshift system for firing a machine gun from a truck. On the right-hand side is a M3 half-track. To which unit of the Korean Constabulary did it belong? Source: Website of Time Magazine

sands of people were executed”.
(Sunoo 1979 p. 67)

[According to the book’s endnotes, this account is based on Korean newspapers and on news from the Tass agency of 6 November 1948.
As at that time the Korean army did not have any tanks and since it would have been impossible to man them with Korean personnel in such a short time, one must assume that these tanks were manned by Americans.
Because of their proximity it would be difficult to understand that no American warships took part in the Yosu battle. Yet, this book provides the first mention of the role of the US Navy that we were able to read so far. Needless to say, it would be important to find a source which would possibly confirm this contention and provide more details. What ships were involved and what were their targets?]

Oct 20, 1948: Yosu. A statement by the “Soldiers’ Committee”, published in the “Yosu People’s Daily” while the city was under rebel control, explained the reasons of the mutiny. An American intelligence report translated the declaration as follows. “The Committee’s aim is to protect the country against foreign imperialism and accuses President Rhee and Prime Minister Lee of selling their country by forming a separate government. The people of Cheju Island began a fight against imperialist policy in April 1948. The soldiers in Yosu refuse to murder the people of Cheju and do not want to be sent to the island. The objective of the uprising is to obtain the real independence of Korea”.

Regarding the short-term factors which lead to the mutiny one should keep in mind that a purge of security forces was started in the wake of the unsuccessful attempt to assassinate President Rhee on 18 October 1948. This screening raised widespread dissatisfaction in the Constabulary among both leftist and rightist opponents of Rhee.
Chapter 6


**Oct 20, 1948:** Two companies deserted from Kwangju. (NARA 18)

**Oct 20, 1948: Planes** What follows is excerpted from Clark (2003) which is a book about the experience of Presbyterian missionaries in Korea. There were 6 missionaries living at the Presbyterian Mission station in Sucheon. On 20 October 1948 a train full of rebels from Yosu pulled into the Sucheon station. Over the next several days mortar shells fell on the mission compound and bullets scarred the houses but none of the Americans was hurt. To make low-flying spotter planes aware of the fact that the mission compound was friendly territory and inhabited by American citizens, the women fashioned a Stars and Stripes flag from red cloth and some blue-and-white feed sacks and put it on the roof of their house. When the ROK soldiers came into Suncheon the missionaries opened their homes to the American advisers of the ROK. They cooked for them and sheltered them. At one point there were as many as 14 advisers.

(Clark 2003, p. 336)

[This account is of interest for 3 reasons. Firstly it shows that the missionaries were not harmed by the rebel soldiers. Secondly, it shows that, not surprisingly, there was a close connection between the American military personnel and the Presbyterian missionaries. Finally, it mentions low-flying spotter planes. First, it should be observed that the expression spotter plane was certainly not appropriate because, obviously, the purpose of the American flag on the roof of the house was to prevent bombing or strafing. Otherwise it would make little sense.

Were these Korean or American planes? The text says “government spotter planes”, thereby suggesting that the planes were Korean.

However, at the outset of the Korean War the Korean Air Force had only a few Piper L-4 and L-5 liaison aircraft (“L” means Liaison) plus 2 or 3 C-47s which were transport aircraft. None of these planes could carry guns or bombs. In other words, if

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156The source is: http://www.korean-war.com/sokorea.html
the mission had to seek protection from aircraft attacks, the planes must have been American.]

Fig. 6.13  Piper L-4 Grasshopper. The Piper L-1 to L-5 were military versions of the Piper Cub. The designation “L” means Liaison aircraft.
Source: http://www.korean-war.com/KWAircraft/SouthKorea/ROKAF/piper_l4.html

Oct 21, 1948:  Captain Reensternjd of G-2, 6th Division has been flying in an L-5 over the towns of Yosu and Sunchon. In Yosu several burned buildings were seen and one was still burning around 12:00. In Sunchon several burned buildings were observed. One two-story building in Sunchon was flying a large North Korean flag. Captain Harisman flying in a L-5 over Kyoryong-Ni saw a truck flying the North Korean flag. with 25 to 30 soldiers on it. (NARA 18, Flash report No 122, 123) [In the last report Kwangju was replaced in handwriting by Kyoryong-Ni.]

Oct 21, 1948:  According to a report received by US Army headquarters, fighting has extended as far as Namwon, 80 kilometers north of Yosu. (NYT 21 October 1948)

Oct 21, 1948:  Four Korean Army units have pressed insurgents into the south peninsula mountains. Quick moving loyal troops sealed the Communist-led rebels off from all directions. (Christian Science Monitor p. 14)

Oct 21, 1948:  Five destroyers and one submarine of unknown nationality were seen by the Korean police near the island of Nam Hai (also written Namhae, east of Yosu). (Hausman 1)
[It seems fairly clear that these ships were from the US Navy for it is difficult to imagine that Soviet ships would come so close to the American naval base of Jinhae which is located some 20 km to the east of Namhae.]

Oct 21, 1948:  Uprising in South Cholla province (in the south west of South Korea). The port of Yosu (now Yeosu) and the railway center of Sunchun (now Sungjin) were in the hands of the rebels. Government troops have halted the northward drive of the insurgents after a battle at Kurye, 80 kilometer north of Yosu. Another rebel column has moved north east from Yosu toward the port of Fusan (now Pusan). The revolt started among troops who were awaiting transportation to Cheju Island to put down
the uprising. (Times p. 3)

This part of Korea again became the center of an uprising in mid-May 1980 (more details can be found in Scott-Stokes et al. 2000)

**Oct 21, 1948:** In a letter to Captain Hausman, adviser to the Korean Army, General W. L. Roberts scolds him and orders him to take Yosu fast. (Catalog of Box 10 of the Hausman Archives at Harvard-Yenchin Library.)

[The rebellion of the 14th Regiment was a setback for Hausman who took a leading role in shaping the Korean Army. In spite of this order, the capture of Yosu will take several days.]

**Oct 21, 1948:** PMAG [Provisional Military Advisory Group] reported that the ship “Kong-Ju” and the ship “Dai-Dong-Kang” of the Korean Coast Guard have joined the rebels of the 14th Regiment. (NARA 18, Flash 134)

**Oct 21, 1948:** Two American lieutenants (Greenbaum and Mohre) accompanied one company of the 4th Regiment (Korean Constabulary) into Sunchon on 20 October. (NARA 18)

**Oct 21, 1948:** At that date the locations of the government units involved were as follows.

- The 1st Battalion of 3rd Regiment moved to Chonju. The 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 3rd Regiment were committed at Namwon forcing back and containing enemy forces at Sunchon. Elements of two Battalions of the 4th Regiment have also been committed to Sunchon.
- The 1st and 3rd Battalions of 12th Regiment moved by rail from Kunsan to Kwanju and are continuing to Suchon.
- One Battalion of 6th Regiment at Taegu moved toward Sunchon.

[From these indications it appears that at least 6 Battalions (representing about $6 \times 700 = 4,200$ soldiers were about to attack the rebels at Sunchon.]

**Oct 21, 1948:** The Hadong Police Department called for assistance from American troops in Chineae. About 2,000 rioters are attacking Kurye police station. Kwangyang is already occupied and the rioters are taking the arms of the police as they overpower them. (NARA 18, Flash report No 124)

[These uprisings seem to be distinct from those of rebel troops and have a strong resemblance with the events of October 1946.]

**Oct 21, 1948:** *Aircraft* The American Command transferred to the Korean Government 9 aircraft which are already being used. (HOOVER, Radio Intercepts)

[Clearly, the pilots were transferred along with the aircraft. Of course one would wish to know the type of the aircraft.]
Oct 22, 1948: Korean uprising under control, 1,300 Rebels were trapped, Seoul says. Government troops appeared to have the Communist-led rebellion under control tonight. (NYT p. 1)
[This was a premature announcement as shown by the news over the following days.]

Oct 22, 1948: At 15:00 an observation plane of the XXIV Corps reported elements of the First Battalion of the 15th Regiment half a mile West of Hadong. He also observed friendly troops moving 5 miles north of Sunchon. (Hausman 1)
[The participation of US observation planes is the only way recognized in USFIK documents in which US forces came to the aid of loyal Korean troops.]

Capt Burgess responded on the same day: “Have anticipated possible rebels from mainland. Have had patrols and air reconnaissance during the past 36 hours.”
On the same day Capt Burgess sent the following message: “I am sending 5 Constabulary prisoners who were arrested as rebels to Kimpo [Kimpo Air Force base north west of the city of Seoul] today. Have transportation and guards at Kimpo to meet the plane on its arrival. Reply requested. (Hausman 1)

Oct 22, 1948: Message by Captain of vessel No 5716 lying off Yosu harbor.
“We tried three times to land but we could not land because of concentration of fire by rebels. Our present location is outside of Yosu harbor. We patrol there. (Hausman 1)

Oct 22, 1948: Sunchon. According to air survey People’s Republic flags were hoisted on the mast of large buildings. Citizens in Sunchon are putting up People’s Republic signs all over the city. (Hausman 1)
[The People’s Republic of Korea is the movement who took over the government of the country after 15 August 1945 and was forcibly dissolved by the Military Government in January 1946. At this point we do not know this flag.]
Oct 22, 1948: General Roberts ordered the landing of a battalion of the 5th Regiment.
Message to Captain Hausman: “One battalion of 5th Regt will land at Yosu, at 03:00 on 23 October 1948 by LST.
Signed: Yates for General Roberts (Hausman 1)
[Did the American forces provide artillery cover so that this order can be executed?]

Oct 22, 1948: Somehow in contradiction with other messages there is a message from the police division which says: “07: 45. In Yosu, the remnants of Police, Coast Guard and Constabulary officers formed a troop, re-attacked the rebels and seized the entire city of Yosu.” (Hausman 1)

Oct 22, 1948: A train with 19 flat cars and motor equipment is to move from Yong Dung to Chonju. (NARA 18, Flash report No 128)
[Flat cars are intended for transporting vehicles. The message does not say what kind of vehicles were transported on this train.]

Oct 23, 1948: According to a Coast Guard captain, ship 516 was attacked by the enemy and 2 or 3 sailors were killed. (Hausman 1)

Oct 23, 1948: With the Communist-led insurgents surrounded in three small areas of Cholla Namdo Province, the Government announced tonight that final mopping up operations were under way. (NYT p. 5)

Oct 23, 1948: Government troops have recaptured the port of Yosu in an amphibious operation. (Times p. 4)
[Actually the battle did not went as smoothly as suggested by this article. According to the website of the US Marines, http://www.leatherneck.com (remember that US Marines call themselves “leather-necks”).
“Four Navy cutters157 attempted to land, only to be pushed back by the mutineers. The rebels fought for several more days before abandoning the city”. The account on this website begins with the following sentence: “On 19 April 1948, communists within the ROK Army’s 14th Regiment mutinied, sparking an uprising in the cities of Yosu and Sunchon. President Syngman Rhee ordered a joint Army-Navy task force to put down the rebellion”.
Two observations are in order. (i) Unless there has been a similar uprising on 19 April (which is highly doubtful) the date must be wrong. We have watched this webpage for several months without any correction being made. (ii) The second sentence is typical of US (as well as Korean) accounts. Yet, according to the agreement

157A cutter is a small, lightly armed boat used for transporting stores and passengers.
of 24 August 1948, the US Army retained over-all operational control over all Korean Forces. In other words, the orders came from General Roberts (as indeed shown by several messages from “Hausman 1”), not from President Rhee.

This page tells us the story of the creation of the Korean Marines. One learns that on 1 February 1949 the Republic of Korea Marine Corps (ROKMC) was “established without American advisers or equipment”. It was founded as the Navy’s landing force with only 380 Marines initially. In other words in October 1948 the Korean Constabulary did not have any amphibious landing force. Was the landing in Yosu assigned to ground forces untrained for such an operation?

**Oct 22-23, 1948: US gags newsmen in Korea.** This was the title of an article published by Mr. Keyes Beech in the “Chicago Daily News”. On 25 October 1948, Mr. Basil L. Walters, chairman of the “American Society of Newspaper Editors’ Committee of Freedom of Information” wrote to Secretary of State Marshall: “I know of no law which gives ambassadors [i.e. US ambassador Mucio] the right to decide which news is good or bad for the American public”.

An article of 23 October in the “New York Herald Tribune” echoed the same protest. Under the title “US officials hamper newsmen”. it says: “No Korean newspaper has been permitted for the last two days to publish anything except the government’s version. American correspondents might go to the front but only with American advisers to the Korean Army”.

(STATE DEPT 1945-1949, roll 12)

**Oct 23, 1948:** After being defeated in the three previous days’ battles, on October 23, the government forces under the leadership of American military advisers made concentrated attacks on Sunchon and Yosu with the help of a tank unit, mortars on a warship, and L-4 light planes. As a result Sunchon was recaptured by the government forces.

By 25 October all the rebellious areas except Yosu had been retaken by government forces. The rebels in Yosu resisted longer even though three-fourths of the city was burnt. On 27 October Yosu finally fell but the main forces of the rebellion retreated to the neighboring Chiri and Paekun mountains.

On 1 November the Rhee government extended the area under martial law to the whole North and South Cholla provinces. It remained in effect until 5 February 1949.

(Song 1989 p. 296)

[The source on which Song relies for this section is a book published in Korean by Hwang, Nam-jun (1987). It has two interesting points.

- The first one is his mention of a tank unit. At this time the ROK did not have
any tanks. This point is made very clearly in the following excerpt\textsuperscript{158}.

“When US Armed Forces in Korea withdrew from South Korea in 1949, it transferred equipment to the ROK Army sufficient for 50,000 men. The weapons of the ROK divisions stationed along the 38th Parallel included 81-mm. mortars, 2.36-inch rocket launchers, and the M3 105-mm. howitzer. The South Korean armed forces had no tanks, no medium artillery, and no fighter aircraft or bombers. In October 1949 the ROK minister of defense had requested M26 Pershing tanks from the United States, but the KMAG staff concluded that the rough Korean terrain and inadequate roads would not allow efficient tank operations”.

In June 1950, the ROK had 27 armored cars, certainly handed over by US forces in 1949 when they left Korea. In short, if there was indeed a tank unit involved, it must have been an American unit. Of course, this point needs further confirmation.

- The second point concerns the mention of “mortars on a warship”. There is something weird about that. In June 1950 the Korean Navy had only small craft as shown by the following excerpt\textsuperscript{159}.

  On 25 June the South Korean Navy consisted of:
  * a patrol craft recently purchased in the United States from surplus vessels
  * 3 other similar patrol craft at Hawaii en route to Korea
  * 1 LST
  * 15 former US mine sweepers
  * 10 former Japanese mine layers
  * various other small craft.

Would such small craft be stable enough to allow a mortar to be used with acceptable accuracy? It should be recalled that the parabolic trajectories of mortar shells are much dependent upon the angular direction of the weapon.

The US Navy had many ships in ports near Yosu. Rather than to put mortars on small craft, it would have been more effective to send one (or several) of them to Yosu. In this respect, it would be useful to know whether or not Yosu consisted of wooden buildings. In the first case three-quarters of the city can indeed be burned by one fire. On the contrary, if there were mostly stone or brick buildings it would require many large caliber shells to destroy three-quarters of the city. More details on this point can be found in the Prologue.]

\textbf{Oct 23, 1948:} Government troops retook Sunchon (60,000 inhabitants). In an arti-


article published in Life Magazine reporter Carl Mydans described the repression that followed in the following terms: “Now the national army aided by a few police who had fled to the hills and come back, repaid brutality with brutality. We watched from the sidelines of a huge playground with the women and children of Sunchon while all of their men and boys were screened for loyalty. Four young men stripped to their shorts were on their knees begging. Behind them stood two men with clubs. They beat the kneeling group over heads and backs until the beaters, grinning, had to pause for breath”. The caption of a full-page photograph (p. 58) says: “A civilian rebel holds his bloody head after questioning by loyal soldiers. He may get death sentence.” (Mydans 1948)

[The Korean troops who retook Sunchon were accompanied by American advisers. One of Mydans’ pictures shows a young US Lieutenant named Ralph Bliss.]

Fig. 6.15  Command center during the Yosu uprising. The picture was taken by Carl Mydans in November 1948 not far from Yosu but we ignore the exact date, the precise location and the names of the persons who are around the table. Source: Website of Life Magazine.

Oct 23-27, 1948: Immediately after they recaptured the city, the police confined the entire male population of Sunchon to the school yard to identify those who joined the rebellion. While waiting for being interrogated, the detainees were beaten with bars, iron chains and the butts of rifles. In Yosu, after the recapture of the city, about 40,000 members of the male population experienced the same kind of screening as in Sunchon and an unknown number of them were shot to death at the hill behind the railway tunnel.

An American army communique at the end of November 1948 reported that about 17,000 persons had been tried for participation in the rebellion in the Korean military courts of whom 866 were sentenced to death.

It is impossible to know how many persons were killed by the police in summary executions.

(Song 1989 p. 296-297, Merrill 1982 p. 238)

Oct 24, 1948: One detachment of the revolting South Korea constabulary has escaped from the encirclement of the Yosu peninsula and captured the town of Posong, 40 km west of the rail junction of Sunchon. Planes dropped leaflets to those elusive
foes. (Chicago Tribune 24 October 1948 p. 38)

**Oct 25, 1948:** Instructions for “Task Force Roger”.

1. The units are to attack Yosu at 06:00. Their approximate strength is 600 reinforced by 4 sections of reconnaissance.
2. The enemy is now positively identified as being organized in two groups of approximate strength 300 and 250. They have not been aggressive since the fall of Suncheon. An estimated 20 trucks are still in their possession.

[Signed] Hausman

(Hausman 1)

**Oct 25, 1948:** Message sent by Captain Kim on an LST off Yosu.

“Rebels are gathering at Yosu. Friendly land troops are unable to land without artillery. Request artillery troops.” (Hausman 1)

[The request for artillery is understandable, but why artillery troops? Destroyers or other naval ships with heavy guns would seem more appropriate. In any case, Korean ground forces or Coast Guard vessels had almost no heavy artillery.]

**Oct 25, 1948:** US fatalities: 1 (158). Captain Harry C. Symmonds, adviser and commanding officer (C.O.) of the 3rd Korean Brigade and two Korean officers were killed when their 1/4 ton jeep overturned West of Masan. Captain Symmonds was not killed on the spot but was taken to the Masan hospital where he died at 15:50. (Hausman 1, p. 9,117)

[A 1/4 ton jeep is a light open vehicle with two front seats and one back seat. In case it overturns one would expect that at least the passengers would be ejected. In other words one would not expect all three persons to be killed.]

Alan Millett (in “Understanding is better than remembering: the Korean War, 1945-1954”, Dwight Eisenhower Lecture of 1995) observes that the list of the names of Korea’s honored war dead begins not on 25 June 1950 but on 15 August 1945 which suggests that for the Korean people the civil war started in 1945. He then remarks that the first American serviceman to die in this civil war was Captain Symmonds. This is of course not true. As we have seen, many American servicemen died in South Korea before the death of Captain Symmonds. For instance, Private Charles Labita was killed on 20 July 1948, just 3 months earlier.]

**Oct 25, 1948:** US Army headquarters announced that American observers had counted 86 police and civilians dead in Sunchon after it was re-captured by Korean forces. (NYT 25 October p. 12)

[This announcement contradicts the statement made in the G-2 Report No 972 according to which the rebels had executed an estimated 500 police and civilians in Sunchon.]
Oct 26, 1948: To Commanding Officer of the amphibious task force in Yosu harbor.

“Lack of communication makes coordination impossible. Amphibious task force will not, REPEAT NOT, attempt a landing until a landing is ordered by land forces. Amphibious forces not needed for attack. Too dangerous because of possibility that enemy may capture automatic weapons and use them against our land forces. Request acknowledgment.”
Signed: General Roberts
(Hausman 1)

Oct 26, 1948: Yosu. A US infantry officer serving as a regiment adviser, First Lieutenant Minor L. Kelso, serviced himself a 81mm mortar in the fight against the rebels. (Gibby 2004, p. 72)
[This is one of the few cases in which American sources recognize a direct involvement of US personnel in the fighting. After the suppression of the mutiny Kelso wrote an after-action report for General Roberts. This report is mentioned in Gibby (2004) but we were not able to read it yet.]

Oct 26, 1948: The insurgents\(^{160}\) are equipped with some 60 American trucks and with heavy machine guns. Posung has now been retaken by government troops but the rebels have captured Chonghung, 70 kilometer west of Yosu. It is not confirmed that Yosu has been recaptured from the rebels though government forces have staged an amphibious assault [this confirms that the rebels resisted sturdily]. Sunchun is now finally cleared and American observers who visited the areas counted 86 dead. Some of them appeared to have been executed. (Times p. 3)

Oct 26, 1948: Flash Report from Major Greenwood, 6th Division. Today’s attack on Yosu was partly successful. The town was entered at two points. Kurye was reported quiet with friendly troops seen there at 16:38 by US Air reconnaissance. (Hausman 1)

Oct 26, 1948: Order given by General Roberts. It is essential that all vessels in Yosu harbor be searched for rebels. It is also necessary that harbor guards prevent the escape of rebels before and after the capture of the town.
[Signed] General Roberts
(Hausman 1)
[The order was sent to Lt. Charles S. Pemberton, assistant adviser to the G-3 Korean Constabulary who would then transmit it to the Korean commanders.]

Oct 26, 1948: Summary account A small group of mutineers killed 30 officers and

\(^{160}\)Their number is given as 1,500.
persuaded 800 of their comrades to switch sides. A Korean mechanized squadron lead by American Lieutenants Robert Shackleton and Ralph Bliss eventually defeated the main group of mutineers after prolonged fighting. (Reardon 2008, the original source is Gibby (2004, p. 60)

[Curiously, this is the only source which mentions this mechanized unit. At first sight it seems surprising that the Constabulary had a “mechanized” unit. In fact, the unit trained by Shackleton and Bliss was a reconnaissance unit which, according to Gibby (2008), had only poorly reconditionned surplus items consisting of half-tracks and jeeps. The unit’s motley collection of weapons consisted of carbines, pistols and some 0.50 caliber machine guns. In short this unit which had no armored vehicles nor tanks can hardly be called a mechanized unit.]

**Oct 27, 1948:** Mass murder in wake of Korean revolt. (Boston Globe 27 October 1948 p. 2)

**Oct 27, 1948:** Loyalist army battles 12,000 rebels in bid to recapture the original seat of the revolt. The battle for control of the South Korean port city of Yosu continued through its second day, according to reports reaching headquarters of the Korean Army here today. (NYT p. 9)

[What part did the US Navy and US Air Force take in this battle?]

**Oct 27, 1948:** The Korean constabulary recaptured Yosu in the afternoon of 27 October and used about 400 mortar shells in the operation which burned part of the town. (NARA, RG 554, Box 15, Inspection trip to Yosu rebellion area.)

**Oct 27, 1948:** Headquarters of the XXIV in Seoul agreed shortly after the outbreak of fighting to brief the foreign press with the proviso that the information be attributed to the Korean Army. (NYT 27 Oct p. 9)

[It is of course understandable that US Forces wanted to belittle their role.]

**Oct 27, 1948:** Yosu recaptured by government troops was achieved on 27 October 1948. (Mydans 1948 p. 57)

[According to US testimonies some 1,500 buildings were destroyed and some 1,200 people were killed. According to these sources, the destruction was accomplished through mortar fire. In episodes such as this one where a rebellion occurs in a port city the standard tactic is to use naval guns. This tactic was used repeatedly by western ships during the civil war in China. It was also used by French naval forces during the uprising in Haiphong (near Hanoi) on 23 November 1946 causing some 6,000 fatalities. It is really surprising that no similar action by US destroyers is mentioned in the present case.]

**Oct 27, 1948:** Appointment of an American education adviser to President
Rhee. President Rhee was literally surrounded by American advisers. His main adviser was Robert T. Oliver.

The appointment of an education adviser gave rise to an interesting discussion between the State Dept and the US ambassador in Seoul (Muccio) because Rhee did not want any of the six persons that the State Dept suggested. He wanted a person named Paul Douglas. However the State Dept objected that “Douglas’ appointment would work adversely toward private American support of Korean educational programs” (it is not clear what this sentence means). Muccio argued that if the State Dept did not accept Douglas, then Rhee may not follow the suggestions of the State Dept for the appointment of his other advisers.

(State Dept 1945-1949, reel 7)

Oct 28, 1948: The “Kook Min Shin Mun” (center) was one the few Korean newspapers that sent journalists to the area of the uprising. However, on 26 October its journalists were arrested and on 28 October the newspaper was banned by the government. (Great Eastern News 31 Oct. and Seoul Daily 31 Oct. The articles of these Korean papers were translated in the G-2 Report No 979)

Oct 28, 1948: The southern port city of Yosu which was the original seat of the revolt fell on the 3rd day of attack. It was the last stronghold of the rebels. (NYT p. 15)


[Dolsan-do is the 7th largest island in South Korea. About 10 km south-north and 8 km east-west. It has many hills.]

Oct 30, 1948: According to a dispatch of the “Associated Press” some of the insurgents who abandoned the defense of Yosu are now on the offensive on the island, south of Yosu. Government forces landed on the island and fierce fighting is going
on. (Hoover, transcript of Radio-Pyongyang)
[Usually, it is said that the insurgents took refuge in the Kiri mountains. To take refuge in a island is a surprising action unless boats are available which will allow them to go elsewhere if needed.]

**Oct 31, 1948: Chronology of the uprising in Yosu**
Here is a summary chronology of the uprising in Yosu based on the G-2 Periodic Daily Reports.

- **20 Oct**  Beginning of the uprising.
- **23 Oct**  Failed landing attempt. A battalion of the 5th Regiment landed at Yosu at 9:40. After meeting machine gun fire from the mutineers located on commanding ground [i.e. up in the hills which surround the port] the invading force withdrew to its LST. (Report No 971)
- **25 Oct**  Attackers at the outskirts of the city. Loyal constabulary elements have occupied the high ground north of the city. By 6:00 on 25 October they were at the outskirts of Yosu. (Report No 972)
- **26 Oct**  Attackers in a stalemate. Loyal forces trying to enter the city at two points were met by well organized resistance. The attack was still in progress at 8:00 on 26 October. (Report No 973)
- **27 Oct**  At 13:00 Yosu was retaken by constabulary units attacking from the north and elements of the 5th Battalion who landed from a Coast Guard ship. (Report No 974)

This chronology raises the following question. Landing from the sea and attacking from the north proved unsuccessful on 23 and 25 October. Why is the very same tactic suddenly successful in the morning of 27 October? The G-2 Report No 978 provides one half of the answer. “The loyalist forces broke through the defensive position of the rebels under the protection of artillery”. The other part of the question is: which artillery? There are two possibilities: tanks coming from the north and/or shelling from naval guns. This is indeed what is said by a number of reports which unfortunately, as already mentioned, do not give their sources.

**Nov 1, 1948:** A report by the Health and Welfare Department of Chonman province stated that in Yosu about 1,300 persons lost their lives and that in Sunchon 1,135 persons lost their lives. (Song 1989 p. 301)
[These figures do not included the persons which were executed during the subsequent repression. In other words, these losses mainly resulted from shelling and warfare.]

**Nov 2, 1948:** *Short account of the mutiny of the 6th Regiment at Taegu.* A senior noncommissioned officer of the 6th regiment charged with inciting mutiny killed the
Korean Military Police Lieutenant sent to arrest him. The murderer gathered about 100 enlisted men who proceeded to kill 7 more officers. South Korean Military Police rushed to the scene, only to encounter a deadly ambush. The survivors sought assistance from a nearby American unit which confronted and disarmed the mutineers. About 20 rebel soldiers escaped including the ringleader.

Two more incidents involving the 6th regiment occurred on 6 December 1948 and 30 January 1949. Both involved the death of several loyal officers and the escape of many mutineers. (Reardon 2008, the original source is: Military History of Korea, translated into English by Headquarters, US Army Forces, Far East Military Intelligence Service Group, 5 September 1952, p. 55-56, Historical Research Collection, CMH (Chief Military History))

[This account sounds fairly plausible with the exception of the assertion that the Korean soldiers surrendered to US troops. After killing several officers they knew very well that they would be executed. Why then should they have surrendered so easily? It can be noted that the source does not mention the location of the incident. Below is the more detailed story given in the original source.]

Nov 2, 1948: Taegu rebellion incident Second Lieutenant Cho Chang Pil of the military police was secretly informed that Sergeant Kwak Chong Chin belonged to the Korean Labor Party. He tried to arrest him but was killed during the arrest. This started the rebellion at around 1pm. Seven or eight officers were killed. in the regimental compound. Major Choe Kyomg Man and Captain Kim Chin Sun rushed 40 military police to the scene. When they arrived they were ambushed by a rebel force approximately 100 meter in front of the regimental headquarters and many casualties resulted. Without any means of aid available they asked for help from the nearby American forces. The 150 rebellion force were disarmed. However, approximately 20 of the rebel force fled toward the Kimchon area in the hope of joining forces with part of the 6th Regiment stationed there. Instead they were surrounded by the company dispatched to Kimchon and captured. Only 5 were able to flee. (MHK1 p. 55)

[On 6 December 1948 there was a second mutiny in Taegu; on 30 January there was another mutiny (see below)]

Nov 2, 1948: In connection with the riots in the province of South Cholla in which many students and teachers had participated, the Minister of Education stated that they will be punished and that henceforth there will be some thought control among the students and teachers. (HOOVER, translation of the South Korean newspaper “Min Ju Ilbo”.)

Nov 2, 1948: In the afternoon the Korean Military Police tried to apprehend a
sergeant because of his Communist activities. But their officer, Lieutenant Cho Sung Pil, was killed. The sergeant then summoned his fellow soldiers. There was fighting with government forces. One group escaped on trucks and on their way they exchanged firing with American soldiers. One American GI is reported to have been killed\(^{161}\). Eventually, 70 of the rebels were arrested.

By 9 pm on 2 November the following fatalities were reported:
- Lt Chung [not the same name as above] and 3 other officers of the Constabulary were killed,
- 4 police were killed.

In addition about 10 students, boys and girls, were wounded.

(HOOVER, Public Information Office of XXIV Corps)

[This account is almost as puzzling as the others. Why after exchanging fire with US soldiers did the rebels suddenly surrender? What was the part played by the students? They are not mentioned in the story but appear in the casualty list.]

**Nov 2, 1948:** The newspaper “Cho Sun Tong Shin” was closed by government authorities. Moreover, the vice-president (Kim Chai Hyawng) and Chief editor (Awm Hong Sawp) of the newspaper “Che Il Shin Mun” were indicted on the charges of having inserted an article applauding the “People’s Republic of North Korea”. They were arrested on 1 November 1948.

(HOOVER, translation of an article of the South Korean newspaper “Kook Chei Shin Mun” (International Times).)

**Nov 3, 1948:** *US troops curbed rebels in Taegu.* South Korea’s second Army-bred uprising in 13 days was put down yesterday after it had resulted in death to 14 persons. The Taegu garrison reduced to 200 men by the previous revolt had apparently been controlled by Communists according to Korean officials.

An American source said that US troops stopped trucks carrying revolting Korean soldiers toward Taegu. The rebels surrendered to American troops without any shooting being reported. (NYT p. 32)

[This is one of the few mentions of a direct military confrontation between US troops and rebel troops that can be found in the New York Times.

An anomaly in this account is the fact that the insurgents surrendered to American troops without any resistance. We are in 1948 and at that time they probably knew well enough what would be their fate, namely execution or imprisonment without trial for an indefinite time.]

**Nov 4, 1948:** A United States Army unit broke up a minor clash yesterday between South Korean constabulary and police forces at Taegu, 250 km southeast of Seoul, it

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\(^{161}\) A footnote says: Editor’s Note: False report.
was announced officially today. (Washington Post 4 November 1948 p. 18)
[One wonders what lead US troops to intervene in this “minor clash”. In contrast,
during the much more serious Sunchon-Yosu rebellion all US Army press releases
insisted on the fact that the rebellion was put down solely by Korean forces as indeed
appropriate for a country that has now its own government (even though its troops
are in fact still under US operational control).]

**Nov 4, 1948:** 14 are killed in the second army-bred uprising in Southern Korea. 14
killed in second army-bred uprising in Southern Korea. (Chicago Tribune 4 November
1948 part 3, p. B8)

**Nov 4, 1948:** In the Taegu area the First Regiment of the Constabulary rose in arms.
Its soldiers were reported to fight policemen in the streets. It is reported that US
troops participated in the fight.
In Naju, South Cholla Province, the Third Regiment of the Constabulary also rose in
revolt. (HOOVER, Radio Pyongyong intercept)

**Nov 5, 1948:** RCA communications facilities sold to Korea. (press release)
All transmitting and receiving radio communications facilities operated by the MG
and owned by RCA were sold to Korea. These radio and telegraph facilities were
ordered from RCA by the Military Government after the beginning of the occupation
in 1945. (NARA, RG 554, Box 306-4)
[The article does not give the price at which the equipment was sold to the Korean
government.]

**Nov 6, 1948:** Summary list of mutinies
Here is a recapitulation list of the 4 mutinies.
- 1 20 Oct. Mutiny in Yosu
- 2 29 Oct. Mutiny in Posong (west of Sunchon)
- 3 2 Nov. Mutiny in Naju (between Gwanju and Mokpo in the province of Cholla-
  Namdo in the South-west of Korea). The Commanding officer of the 4th Regiment
  shot the Battalion commander and then fled with his men to the mountains north
  west of Naju (Report No 979)
- 4 3 Nov. Mutiny in Taegu

**Nov 9, 1948:** Uprisings reported in Northern Korea (Boston Globe 9 November
1948 p. 10)

**Nov 9, 1948:** *Excerpt of an article about the destructions in Yosu.*
Title: Summary of damages of the Yo-sun Incident. 2,000 buildings and houses were
lost. Major buildings were as follows.
Police Station, Post office, Land administration office, two banks, Finance associa-
tion, You-su daily newspaper, Gungang-Hotel, Yo-su Hotel, You-su Theater, Fishing association, Ice manufacturing company, Suncheon-Hospital, Hospital, Iron works, Stores. (Seoul Shinmun 9 November 1948)

[The “Seoul Shinmun” was at that time the most important Korean newspaper in terms of distribution. It can be noted that the list does not include the railroad station. However, from pictures that can be found on the Internet we know that it was also destroyed. In this case the destruction was not by fire but by explosion (collapsed wall and roofs). It would be of interest to see photographs of other destroyed buildings in order to determine whether they were destroyed by fire or by explosions. In the second case the razing of so many important buildings required a firepower that the Korean Constabulary did not have at the time of the uprising.

On the website of “Time magazine” there a lot of photographs of Yosu after the uprising but none of major destroyed buildings. In spite of the fact that Yeosu is surrounded by hills which would have made it easy to take overall pictures of the city there are no pictures of that kind. In fact, according to the pictures one would think that Yosu was a village of small wooden houses and not a city of 40,000 people with banks, theaters and other important buildings.]

Nov 11, 1948: After the mutiny was quelled, a broad leftist-hunt started in the Korean Army. Park Chung-hee who was to become president after 1961 and was at that time a company commander was arrested on 11 November. After his arrest, according to his biographer, he was tortured with electrical shocks to force him to give up names of leftists in the Army which he did. Thanks to his cooperation his death sentence was reduced to 10 years in prison. In fact, he was released when the Korean War started that is to say less than two years later.

Park had been a member of the South Korean Workers’ Party but he declared that he joined the Party only because he was angered by the killing of his brother Park Sang-hee in October 1946 in the wake of an insurrection in the town of Kumi (Sonsan county in the province of North Kyongsang). Park Sang-hee was the Secretary-General of the Sonsan County People’s Front. He had organized anti-trusteeship demonstrations against the Americans and in October 1946 he led an attack on the police station. When US Army units arrived along with police reinforcements he was killed while trying to escape. (Clark 2003 p. 338-339)


At the Yosu hospital, it was indicated [by the doctors] that the rebellion had received considerable support from the population in Yosu similar to that at Sunchon. Father Boyer (a Presbyterian missionary) said that there was some rejoicing in Sunchon when the town was recaptured but not nearly as much as when it had been originally
captured by the rebels. (NARA, RG 554, Box 15)

**Nov 12, 1948:** Executions  The fact that the bodies were left on the execution grounds for three days suggests that the executioners did not fear any investigation. These executions were documented in Life Magazine of 25 October 1948 by photographer Carl Mydans. The caption of a picture showing a row of about 15 corpses in a field reads as follows: “Dead rebels, their bodies dotted with bullet holes lie beside a school ground at Sunchon. Other rebels are hauled away in army trucks for trial by a Korean military tribunal.”

**Nov 12, 1948:** According to a thesis by K.S. Song (1989) 1,300 people were killed in Yosu and 1,100 in Sunchon. In addition, some 20,000 people were made homeless in Yosu. (Song 1989, cited in MacDonald 1991 p. 4)  
[How and by whom was the city destroyed? The collective memory of the inhabitants of Yosu has certainly kept remembrance of such events.]

**Nov 18, 1948:**  ● Korean civilians killed: 1 (336).  Seoul. A Korean was killed when a jeep on duty of fire call hit a street car. (NARA 12)  
[The report does not say clearly whether or not the Korean was a passenger of the jeep driven by Sergeant Cassimer Slavinski.]

**Nov 18, 1948:**  ● US fatalities: 1 (159).  Town of Uchi-dong. During a patrol made by 5 men of the 32d Infantry Regiment the weapon of Private Demarest discharged killing Private Francis Villi and injuring the Korean interpreter. (NARA 12)  
[According to the report only one shot was fired accidentally. Villi was hit in the stomach and although no sign of the exit of the bullet from Villi’s body was evident, the interpreter was hit in the chest.]

**Nov 18, 1948:**  ● US fatalities: 1 (160).  Private Rex Stockton of ASCOM died after consuming a large amount of high proof alcohol. (NARA 12)

**Nov 20, 1948:**  The Ninth Constabulary Regiment based in Cheju-do claimed to have killed 1,625 guerrillas during the period from 6 October to 20 November 1948. Anyone unfortunate enough to be found in the interior of the island was considered a rebel and dealt with summarily. The slaughter reached its peak in mid-December when some 600 persons were killed in a single week. (Merrill 1980 p. 83-84)

**Nov 22, 1948:**  Government troops reportedly killed 230 rebels in a clash in the Kurye area (a small island on the west coast near the 38th parallel) (NYT p. 10)

**Nov 29, 1948:**  The Army announced today that it was pulling the Seventh Infantry Division out of South Korea in accord with the agreement by the United States and the Soviet Union. (NYT p. 1)
Inspection trip to the Sunchon-Yosu rebellion area
12 November 1948

While in Sunchon the adviser stayed at the home of the Southern Presbyterian missionary. It was at his home that all American Military personnel had been cared for when visiting in that area recently.

From a discussion on the evening of 1 November it developed that the Korean Constabulary re-captured Yosu in the afternoon of 27 October 1948 and used about 400 mortar shells in the operation which burned some 1,500 buildings. Lieutenant Kelso who was there during the entire period estimated that he had seen approximately 325 bodies during and after the fighting. Town officials estimated that there were 1,200 dead. Five CIC agents were in Yosu and these agents undoubtedly have made complete reports to military authorities.

The military men said that they did not know of any houses that had been burned by the rebels.

On 2 November 1948 the adviser interviewed Father Brandon, an Irish Catholic of the St Columbus order who was present in Sunchon during the rebellion. He said that no catholic had been killed by the rebels. He said that he has heard that 66 rebels had been executed after the battle.

On the afternoon of 2 November the Committee toured Sunchon and went to the execution grounds where 60 to 70 bodies were still piled. None of the bodies had been removed. The executions had been carried out on Sunday 31 October 1948 that is to say 4 days after the city was re-captured. At first it was said that the Korean Army carried out the executions but later American officers were told it was the police.

Another execution of 30 persons occurred on the day when the city was recaptured. As a result it is difficult to say if it was carried out by the Communists or by the Korean Army.

On 3 November 1948 our group visited Yosu. The group visited the execution ground where 24 persons had been executed. The bodies were being burned in a pyre [that is to say a structure used for the cremation of dead people]. The execution ground was outside of the town about 800 meters from the road.

On 5 November 1948 the myun chief of Pohlhyo was interviewed. He said that 40 executions had been carried out by the Army.

At the hospital it was indicated that the rebellion had received considerable support from the population in Yosu as in Sunchon. Some of the rebels who managed to escape took with them 110 sacks of rice.


Doc. 2: Suppression of the Yosu-Sunchon rebellion. On 12 July 1948 a request was made for a trial by Military Commission of two policemen who had confessed in killing 5 civilians on Cheju Island. Not surprisingly the request was not granted. From the present excerpt it is clear that if American authorities had really been willing to prosecute Koreans who carried out mass executions they had ample evidence in their hands. Most likely the same tactic of mass executions was followed in the suppression of other uprisings that took place in Korea. Source: RG 554, Box 15 (CKCLH), Cumings (1998).

Nov 30, 1948: South Korean troops clashed with a rebel band in Kwangwan province;
20 rebels were killed. (NYT p. 16)

**Nov 30, 1948:** Korean soldiers killed 20 guerrillas in their rugged mountain hideout. (NYT p. 16)

**Nov 30, 1948:** 55 more officers and men of the Korean army have been shot to death for participating in the Oct. 20 mutiny against the young republic. (Associated Press report)

**Nov 30, 1948:** According to an American missionary who arrived in Pusan in September 1948 “water runs only every other day from 11pm to 5am. So they have to stay up in those nights when the water runs and fill up their water vessels to have a supply when needed.” (Presbyterian Guardian November 1948 p. 253)

**Dec 1, 1948:** The “National Security Law” was enacted. Article 3: Those who organize or join an anti-state group shall be punished as follows.

- Death or life imprisonment for the chief instigators or organizers.
- Minimum 2 years in prison for lesser members or for those who encourage others to join an anti-state group.

[One may think that the law at least defines what is meant by an anti-state group but the text of the law does not contain any definition whatsoever. It is often said that the law was directed against North Korea, but this is only one of its purposes. It was also used to suppress leftist activities or even to arrest people for chanting anti-American slogans at student rallies (Savada 1990 p. 245).]

The “National Security Law” criminalized all contacts between the North and the South, e.g. listening to North Korean radio programs, distributing or holding books or documents printed in the North, or even praising North Korea. Those who “create or spread false information which may disturb national order” will be imprisoned for a minimum of two years.

Under Article 10, anyone who fails to inform on those who have committed anti-state acts can receive up to 5 years in prison. In other words, this article made informing compulsory. It specifies that sentences may be “reduced in cases involving family members”.

By 1949, 80% of all court cases involved charges against suspected Communists. (Cumings 1997, Kraft 2005)

[Excerpt of Article 7 of the Law: “Those who praise or encourage an anti-state group will be imprisoned up to 7 years. Those who spread false information which may disturb national order will be imprisoned for a minimum of two years.”]

Within the first year of enactment of the National Security Law 118,000 people were arrested and 132 political parties and civil organizations (including media organizations such as newspapers etc) were dispersed utilizing the law. (Interview with Kwon
Oh-Hun, a reunification activist since 1964.)

As examples of the law’s enforcement, one can mention the following cases.

- **On August 14, 1965** the Korea Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) claimed that Do Ye-jong and 12 other individuals organized the People’s Revolutionary Party. According to the NIS (National Intelligence Service) this was “an organization attempting to overthrow the Republic of Korea according to North Korean programs” that “tried to recruit more people from various backgrounds to expand the party structure.” Do and other 8 were sentenced to 6 years imprisonment, while the others were sentenced to one year imprisonment and 3 years probation. (Wikipedia article entitled “People’s Revolutionary Party incident”)

- **On 8 April 1974**, as demonstrations were building up against the dictatorship of Park Chung-hee, the KCIA arrested 23 individuals including Do Ye-jong under the National Security Law, based on accusations that they had formed a “Committee for Re-establishment of the People’s Revolutionary Party. Eight of them including Do Ye-jong were sentenced to death the following day and executed on 10 April 1974. (Wikipedia article entitled “People’s Revolutionary Party incident”)

- **In 1987**, the president of a publishing company was arrested for publishing “travel essays written by Koreans living in the United States who were reportedly sympathetic to North Korea”.

- **In 1989**, President Roh arrested 1,200 persons under the National Security Law.

- **During the first half of 1998**, the National Security Law was used against students and workers who demonstrated against unemployment, resulting in more than 400 arrests.

- **In 2001**, an American citizen, Song Hak Sam, was arrested in Seoul and imprisoned for two months after he supported the publisher of a best-selling book, Kim Jong Ils Unification Strategy.

- **In 2001**, Kang Jeong Koo, a sociology professor at Dongguk University in Seoul, was arrested for violating the National Security Law after he visited the birth place of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang.

- **In 2002**, Mr. Lee, a new recruit in the South Korean army, was sentenced to 2 years in prison for having said “I think Korean separation is not North Korean but American fault” to fellow soldiers. The Military Prosecutor’s Office could not charge him for what he had said, but it searched Mr. Lee’s civilian house and found various books, and charged him in violation of the NSA Article 7.

- **In May 2006**, the Seoul district court convicted Professor Kang Jeong-Koo of Dong-Guk University of making pro-North Korean statements. Kang posted an article on the internet which said that the North’s invasion of the South in 1950 was an attempt to reunify the Koreas and that US intervention hampered reunification.
He also said US General Douglas MacArthur was a war criminal because his actions made Korea’s civil war last for three years. He was given a one-year suspended sentence. The conviction will result in the stripping of Prof. Kang’s title and likely dismissal from his university post. From protest letters posted on the Internet it can be seen that in February 2006 Prof. Kang had already been suspended from his academic position by the Department of Human Resources of his university. So it seems the suspension preceded the conviction.

- In November 2010 an upper South Korean court upheld a jail sentence for a woman convicted of possessing instrumental music with composition titles that praised North Korea (Atlantic Magazine Monthly April 2011)
- Between 2005-2009, there were annually some 58 investigations under the National Security Law. Investigations have surged to 91 in 2010 and by August 2011 there were already 150 cases [which would correspond to an annual number of 225]. In 2010 some 80,000 web pages related to North Korea were deleted by South Korean authorities. In February 2012 Park Jung-geun was indicted over a Twitter Post (Kraft 2005, p. 632; http://www.asck.org/letter.htm; The Korea Herald Monday, October 17, 2005, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2012/02/03/south-korea-national-security-law-muted-north-korea-related-discussions-online/)

**Dec 2, 1948:** US fatalities: 1 (161). Camp Pochon of the 32nd Infantry Regiment. Private First Class David Jones missed a step while walking into his quarters, he fell, his head hit a concrete wall which injured him fatally. (NARA 12) [Many of the reports of fatal accidents do not sound very plausible. This is such an example. Unless the man was completely drunk an injury of this kind should not have been fatal.]

**Dec 6, 1948:** There was a rebellion of the 6th Korean Regiment which involved the death of government officers. (Military History of Korea, p. 55-56, cited in Reardon 2008 p. 222, a more detailed description is given below.)

**Dec 6, 1948:** *Mutiny in Taegu* While a purge of leftist elements was under way in the constabulary there was another mutiny. Curiously, it took place in a convoy of 380 troops of the Sixth Regiment when it reached the outskirts of Taegu. Seven officers were killed. The regimental headquarters dispatched the military police and one hundred special police members. However, the could not prevent a large number of insurgents to flee toward Palkong-san. (MHK1 p. 56)
[Another uprising occurred on 30 January 1949, see below.]

**Dec 8, 1948:** Korean civilians killed: 1 (337). Incheon. At 00:50 three enlisted men (one corporal and two Private First Class went to a Korean house to get
some liquor. As they were leaving the gun of one of them exploded killing the Korean store keeper. The weapon which was used was not a US Army carbine but a semi-automatic shotgun that had been issued to one of the men for recreational purposes. The man who carried the gun claimed that he stumbled while leaving the store. (NARA 12)

[The report says that a CID investigation is under way.]

**Dec 10, 1948:** Signature of a US-Korean “Economic Cooperation” agreement. The agreement stated that the United States would appoint “Aid Representatives” in order to assist the ROK in making the “most effective use of Korea’s own resources and aid furnished” by the US. These “Aid Representatives” were given diplomatic privileges and immunities and they could request the ROK to maintain accounts and records pertaining to the Aid Program. (Song 1989, p. 185)

[US aid to Korea was indeed substantial. In 1948 and 1949, South Korea paid 86% of its imports with the US aid. As for the Marshall plan in Europe, this aid favored imports from the US and was therefore a way of indirectly subsidizing American companies. It was stipulated in the agreement that the aid could be terminated if the president “determines that it is no longer consistent with the national interests of the United States”. This agreement reveals once again that the best way for a country to become subordinate to another is to accept financial aid.]

**1949**

**1949:** Throughout 1949 and until June 1950, special service squads trained by the Americans were sent to North Korea to carry out specific assignments of assassination of leading figures, to destroy railways and factories, to poison drinking water (Sunoo 1979 p. 71)

[In the notes at the end of the book, the author writes that this account is based on “interviews by the author of several army officers who had participated in such activities. These officers are still holding important positions in the ROK army”.

**1949:** A letter written to his family by Patrick Byrne, the Vatican’s ambassador in Seoul, mentions that in these times thievery was endemic in South Korea. Burglars and pickpockets were everywhere. Byrne’s house was visited by burglars several times. One morning as he went to his garage he found that during the night the four wheels of his Pontiac car had been stolen. He could recover them on the black market.

Not even the US ambassador was safe. One night, his shoes were taken from the threshold of a restaurant and he had to walk to his car in stocking feet. (Clark 2003 p. 352-353)
[This outbreak shows that social and economic conditions have a strong impact on crime. This account is made with some humor, but it is likely that some thieves also resorted to assault and aggression.]

**Jan 1949:** • **US fatalities: 1 (162).** Incheon. Death by drowning of Private Ernest Salazar aged 19. He belonged to the 90th Trans Harbor Craft and was on duty aboard a US Army tug (ST 46 meaning Small Tug No 46) which operated in the port of Incheon. He was seen alive for the last time on 11 January 1949 and his body was found in the water on 3 April 1949. His body was not interred in Korea but sent directly to the United States. On the same ship were also the caskets of Newell C. Lusk (Sergeant) and Ray A. Nix (Recruit). (NARA 14)

**Jan 1, 1949:** By 1 January 1949 the Korean Constabulary became the Korean Army. It had a strength of 2,730 officers and 61,858 enlisted men. (Gibby 2004, p. 132)

**Jan 4, 1949:** Cheju-do. The Second South Korean Regiment (which had replaced the Ninth Regiment on 29 December 1948) started its campaign assisted by air and naval fire support. Some 15,000 persons fled inland to escape the shelling on the coastline. (Merrill 1980, p. 185)

[Merrill does not say if the warships which provided fire support were American or South Korean. Did the Korean Navy already have the firepower to conduct such widespread shelling. In this respect one should remember that General MacArthur decided against equipping the Korean Army with tanks. Was the Korean Navy better equipped than the Army?]

**Jan 7, 1949:** Cheju-do. Dispatch of the 971st Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment (enclosure). To date, 700 persons have been tried by a special Korean court and 96 have been sentenced to death. Of these 23 were constabulary men convicted for aiding the enemy. Martial law was declared on Cheju Island on 5 December 1948. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 3)

**Jan 14, 1949:** Recruit (Rct) John T. Jannetta (RA 14249175) died following a truck accident. (NARA 27)

[Three other soldiers died following a truck accident in mid-February (see below). Was it the accident or another one?]

**Jan 15, 1949:** The XXIV Corps of the United States Army, which for three years has constituted the American occupation force in Korea, will be inactivated tomorrow. (NYT p. 5)

[However this does not mean that no US military will remain in South Korea. By the end of May 1949 there were still 7,500 American troops in South Korea.]

**Jan 20, 1949:** All (right wing) national youth groups merged to form a single “Ko-
Chapter 6

The “Korean Youth Corps” which claimed a nationwide membership of 8 million young people and over one thousand staff members. (Seo 1996 p.94)

[This merger occurred about two years after the leaders of rightist youth groups visited General Weckerling and pledged to join the fight against the Communists. Two of the 7 members of the executive committee of the new “Korean Youth Corps” took part in the meeting with General Weckerling. The 8 million membership claim was already made during this meeting.]

**Jan 25, 1949:** Cheju-do. American advisers discovered the bodies of 97 men, women and children at Ora-ri just outside Cheju city. The victims had been shot 4 to 5 times with M-1 carbines. Although both the Constabulary and police denied involvement they were the only forces armed with this weapon. (Merrill 1980. p. 186)

**Jan 28, 1949:** General Roberts received copy of an order to the Korean Army and Navy to “clean up” Communist activity on Cheju-do. Another battalion (some 600 men) will be dispatched to the island. (Catalog of the “James H. Hausman” archive at Harvard-Yenching, Box 24)

[The terms of this order and the dispatch of an additional battalion suggests that at this date the uprising was not completely suppressed. On the contrary, on 16 April 1949 a regiment will be returned from Cheju-Do to the mainland which seems to indicate that at this date the operation was completed.]

**Jan 30, 1949:** There was a rebellion of the 6th Korean Regiment which involved the death of government officers. (Military History of Korea, p. 55-56, cited in Reardon 2008 p. 222; a more detailed description is given below)

**Jan 30, 1949:** Pohang. There was a mutiny of the finance section of the Fourth Company [the source does not explain what is meant by the expression “finance section”]. They killed second Lieutenant Paek Tal Hyon and a non-commissioned officer. They took over the weapon storehouse and fled to the hills west of Pohang. (MHK1 p. 56)

[The account given by the source is much longer but so unclear and desultory that it is difficult to make any sense out of it. There was another uprising in an army unit on 5 May 1949. See below.]

**Feb 1, 1949:** Cheju-do. Excerpt of a broadcast of Radio Pyongyong.

“The people’s armed guerrillas are launching activities more vigorously than ever before on Cheju Island. On January 16 armed guerrillas liquidated a number of vicious government officials. On January 21 they liquidated 4 vicious landlords. On January 24 armed guerrillas destroyed the guard post at Pyonsan-ni and burned to the ground the police substation at Samyong.” (Merrill 1980, p. 186-187)
[It is not impossible that this excerpt which certainly comes from a G-2 report is in fact a fabrication. Indeed, these actions provide a convenient justification for the campaign which was under way. If it is not a fabrication, it reveals a very poor assessment of the real situation by North Korean authorities for at this time the guerrillas were already reduced to a force of less than 300 and their final extermination was under way.]

**Feb 2, 1949:** Chong Dan. Fighting is going on between several hundred North Korean Army troops and the South Korean Army and police forces near the 38th parallel. The North Koreans reached the outskirts of Chong Dan, a city 5 kilometers south of the parallel. Officials in Chong Dan asked that reinforcements be sent to the area immediately. (NYT 2 Feb 1949)

**Feb 15-19, 1949:** Private First Class Al J. Lambert (RA 14357845), Private First Class Arthur L. Holloway (RA 13152921) and Private Thomas E. Frazer (RA 16263002) died as the result of a truck accident. (NARA 27)

[Although Lambert died on 15 February whereas Frazer and Holloway died on 19 February it is likely that it was the same accident.]

**Feb 20, 1949:** Cheju-do. American advisers stumbled across a mass execution of 76 villagers by right-wing youth group members with bamboo spears which was supervised by Korean police. Five women and numerous middle-school age children were among the victims. The advisers reported that they were unable to halt the massacre. There is no indication that any subsequent action was ever undertaken to investigate the massacre and punish those responsible. (Merrill 1980, p. 186)

[At this time Korean security forces were still under US command. In other words, if the advisers were unable to halt the massacre it was most certainly because their attempt was over-ridden by a higher-ranking US officer.]

**Feb 20, 1949:** A US Air Force pilot was shot down 3 kilometers east of Kaesong by North Koreans. (NYT p. 25)

**Mar 1, 1949:** Tokyo. Gen. MacArthur publicly stated that the United States has no strategic interest in Korea. It has equipped 100,000 ROK army troops divided into 8 divisions. MacArthur feels that the ROKA can beat the North Korean People’s Army. He says that Korea is not a tank country and so the ROKA has no need for tanks. (US Military Government in Korea, 1949)

**Mar 5, 1949:** • US fatalities: 1 (163). Inchon. Private Floyd Raymond Cook (21 year old, RA 16281769) died at 2:35 am by accidental drowning. (NARA 20, NARA 27)

[Another serviceman died by accidental drowning on 3 April 1949 (see below). It
should be noted that in early March in Inchon the temperature of the water was probably below 15 degree. Moreover, the Annual Report of Medical Activities for Jan-Jun 1949 (NARA 27) indicates that “swimming at beaches and pools was not authorized due to disease hazards”. The certificate of death does not indicate the circumstances which lead to the drowning. In the source NARA 27 the initial of the second given name is given as C. instead of R for Raymond.]

**Mar 15, 1949:** The Korean Army is ordered to wipe out Communist-led groups that cause starvation and are terrorizing South Korea. [NYT p. 24]
[It should be noted that at this time the South Korean Army was still under American command. The same language was used with respect to Chinese Communists in the 1930s.]

**Mar 17, 1949:** • US fatalities: 1 (164). Mrs. Horace H. Underwood, wife of a prominent American missionary, was shot to death in Seoul by a pair of hooded Korean assassins, who entered her home during a tea party and plunged the gathering into panic. (NYT 18 March p. 1)
[NYT 2 April 1949, p. 5: Four Korean Reds said they killed Ms. Underwood by mistake.
NYT: 21 October 1949, p. 4: Four Koreans were sentenced to death for this murder. A plausible explanation of this murder will be found in the next entry.]

**Mar 17, 1949:** The featured speaker at the tea party given by Ms. Underwood was Ms. Mo Yunsuk, a poet but also an anticommunist and a charter member of Rhee’s regime. Her husband was An Hosang, the head of Rhee’s anticommunist youth network. Earlier in March he had outlawed all student groups that were not under his control, that is to say all leftist groups.
As Ms. Mo was speaking in the library, 4 young men from the left-wing “Democratic Patriotic Students League” entered the house intending to kill her. The barking of a dog brought Ms. Underwood into the hallway where she confronted the intruders. Two shots were fired and she fell mortally wounded.
It should be noted that the Underwoods had been closely connected with the American occupation force due to the fact that Dr. Underwood was an adviser to General Arnold. But this would not explain a murder in May 1949 that is to say almost one year after the end of the occupation.
(Clark 2003, p. 354-355)
[Clark says that the investigation by the Korean police and by American MPs turned out to be inconclusive. He does not seem to be be aware of the arrest and trial mentioned in the previous entry.
After the murder Dr. Underwood wrote to his family and friends in the United
States that it was “entirely possible” that someone in Pyongyang or perhaps even in Moscow had ordered Ms. Underwood’s murder in order to frighten other Americans into leaving Korea. On account of what is said above this is unlikely.]

**Apr 1, 1949:** • US fatalities: 1 (165). Recruit (Rct) Ray A. Nix (19 year old, RA 19314552) died of gunshot wounds. (NARA 27)

[The fact that there were several wounds (not just one) seems to exclude an accident. The source does not say when he was injured. He is buried at Kingsburg cemetery, Fresno County, California.]

**Apr 2, 1949:** Sergeant Newell C. Lusk (RA 37373949) died of heart failure. (NARA 27)

**Apr 2, 1949:** Rice rations end for 4.3 million Koreans. (WP p. 3)

[The fact that there had been a rice ration system previously suggests that it was easy to put pressure on voters in the election of Spring 1948.]

**Apr 3, 1949:** The body of Private Ernest Salazar [RA 18310857] was found in Inchon Harbor. The date of his death is not known because he had been AWOL (i.e. he had left his unit) since 11 January 1949. His unit was the 90th Trans Harbor Craft Company. (NARA 14, NARA 27)

**Apr 10, 1949:** President Syngman Rhee left Seoul by air where he will conduct a personal inspection of the mopping-up operations against Communist-led guerrillas. (NYT p.30)

[It is probably during these critical months of January-April 1949 that most of the repression and devastation occurred. Apart from the New York Times articles cited here there are also two articles which accuse the Soviets to help the guerrillas. However, there are no articles describing actual military operations.]

**Apr 11, 1949:** • US fatalities: 5 (170). A summary of preparation room reports (Form 10-15) prior to the transportation of the deceased to the United States was addressed to the “Memorial Division” of the “Quartermaster General” in Washington. The list contained 8 names of Americans who had died in Korea approximately between 5 and 17 March 1949. It comprised 8 soldiers and 3 civilians. Among the later there were Ethel Underwood who was murdered on 17 March 1949 and Troy W. Crawford, son of Colonel T.W. Crawford. The file was also supposed to contain 8 inclosures which had been removed. (NARA 20)

**Apr 12, 1949:** Jejo Do. According to figures supplied by the United Nations Commission there were some 4,000 fatalities between the start of the task force oper-

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162 The Commission makes a distinction between rebels (58%) and civilians (42%) which is probably not appropriate because at this time the number of guerrillas was already reduced to a few hundreds.
ation in early March 1949 and its conclusion on 12 April 1949. (Merrill 1980, p. 189)

**Apr 12, 1949:** President Syngman Rhee told 2,500 captured anti-Government guerrillas on Cheju Island to “forget the past and become loyal citizens of the Republic”. (NYT p.12)

**Apr 16, 1949:** At one of its meetings, the Korean Military Advisory Group planned to return a regiment (some 3,000 men) from Cheju-Do to the mainland. (Catalog of the “James H. Hausman” archive at Harvard-Yenching, Box 24)
[The plan to reduce the strength of the force on Cheju-Do suggests that at this date the suppression of the uprising was completed.]

**Apr 17, 1949:** The Ministry of Information declared that 1,193 Korean civilians were slain on Cheju island and 79,000 rendered homeless in the fighting between rebel and government forces. (NYT p. 9)
[79,000 persons represent 79,000/276,000 = 29% of the total population of the island. In other words, most of the village burning occurred before 17 April 1949 and not during the Korean War as is sometimes suggested.]

**Apr 19, 1949:** Major Arno Mowitz, the senior adviser to the 2nd Brigade of the Korean Constabulary wrote General Roberts to recommend the dismissal of the Brigade commander, Colonel Chae Wan Gai. Mowitz reported that Chae’s lack of interest in his responsibilities as a commander manifested itself in absenteeism and a preoccupation with social gatherings. Roberts forwarded Mowitz’s recommendation with his concurrence to the ROK Defense Minister the same day. As a result Colonel Chae was replaced. (Gibby 2004, p. 107-108)
[When an adviser can obtain (so quickly) the dismissal of a Korean colonel unit commander one must draw the conclusion that it is in fact the adviser who is in command (at least de facto).]

**Apr 20, 1949:** Kim, Yong Kwan the leader of the People’s Committee on Cheju Island was killed. At about the same time, the leader of the Yosu Rebellion, former Lieutenant Kim, Chi-hoe, was killed in a skirmish with government troops. (Reardon 2008, p. 223)

**Apr 20, 1949:** The Bodo League (also called National Guidance Alliance) was established in order to convert South Korean leftists including former members of South Korean Workers Party. In the course of recruiting members many innocent civilians were coerced to join the League by regional branches trying to reach their allocated numbers. It is estimated that the number of Bodo League members reached 300,000 nationwide before the Korean War.
President Syngman Rhee ordered the execution of Bodo League and South Korean Workers Party people on 27 June 1950. The first massacre was started in Hoengseong, Gangwon-do on 28 June. Retreating South Korean forces and anti-Communist groups executed the (alleged) Communist prisoners along with many of the Bodo League members.

South Korea’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established on December 1, 2005. With a staff of 240 people and an annual budget of $19 million, the Commission was planning to release its final report in 2010. For decades the massacres had been blamed on the Communists.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission shut down its inquiry before being able to explore all suspected mass graves.

**Apr 21, 1949:** Major General O. Ward is named chief of the US Army Historical Division. (NYT p. 4)

**Apr 22, 1949:** There was a formal ceremony at Seoul Stadium to establish the “Student Defense Forces”. Soon after its creation this right-wing group began a campaign to ferret out leftist teachers from their posts nationwide. (Seo 1996, p.95) [These are common steps in the establishment of totalitarian states. One may also remember that campaigns to weed out leftist teachers were going on at the same time in the United States. On 27 September 1949 all other student organizations were made illegal.]

**Apr 30, 1949:** Between 1 January and 30 April 1949, the rate of new neuropsychiatric cases averaged 79 cases per 1,000 men per annum. There was also a serious problem of drug addiction and of excessive alcohol consumption. (NARA 27)

**May 4, 1949:** Kaeson. South Korean units under Col. Kaneyama attacked North Korean Border Guard units in force. The battle lasted four days. 400 North Koreans and 22 South Koreans were killed. Over 100 civilians died. During the battle, two South Korean companies (i.e. some 300 soldiers) defected to the North. (US Military Government in Korea, 1949)

**May 6, 1949:** Two battalions (i.e. some 1,200 soldiers) of South Korean troops have deserted and gone over to the side of the North Korean Army during the border fighting north of Seoul. (Straits Times 7 May 1949 p. 1) [Were the units which defected battalions as stated in this source or rather companies as stated in the previous one? According to the following entry it appears that the units were two companies.]

**May 5-6, 1949:** Kang-Pyo desertion. Kang-Pyo refers to the names of the leaders of the rebellion, Major Kang Rae Mu and Major Pyo Mu Won both of the Eighth
Regiment of the Sixth Division. They took advantage of a night exercise near the border with North Korea to cross the 38th parallel into North Korea. Altogether 365 soldiers deserted taking with them their weapons (including 60mm and 81mm mortars). (MHK1 p. 56-57)

May 27, 1949: Currently, there are about 7,500 American troops in South Korea. (Straits Times p. 1)

Jun 5, 1949: Creation of the Bodo League. The Bodo League is also called “League for Protection and Guidance” or “National League for Guidance” or “Podo Yon-maeng”. Its task was to round up, interrogate and reeducate members of leftist organizations. After being arrested a new “member” had to write a complete confession. One of the main elements in this confession was the listing of all other people who worked in the same cell. As the interrogations were accompanied by torture this led to false confessions and to the arrest of many people who have never been Communists. This system continued after the Korean War, after the departure of President Rhee and well into the 1970s and 1980s. (Seo 1996, p.104, Sung 2001) [It seems that there are no mentions of this League (either of its creation or its activity) in the New York Times. Was the Bodo League created on 5 June as stated in this source or on 20 April as stated in a previous one?]

Jun 6, 1949: The Special Police Force of the “Treason Investigation Committee” was disarmed and 35 Committee workers were disbanded. (Seo 1996, p. 91) [The “Treason Investigation Committee” had been created on 26 August 1948; its role was to prosecute Koreans who collaborated with the Japanese. For that purpose it had a Special Police Force because it was rightly believed that the police would be reluctant to cooperate with the committee. Needless to say, rightist groups were opposed to such investigations from the very beginning. The episode of 6 June 1949 marked so to say the disbanding of the Committee.]

Jun 10, 1949: Fighting took place between Communists and government troops on the island of Ongjin. (Le Monde p. 2)

Jun 11, 1949: A letter written on 13 June 1949 by the Reverend Bruce Hunt from the Presbyterian Church gives a view of some of the problems of daily life. On Saturday, June 11, Mr. Hunt went from Pusan to a town about 3 hours away by train. On Monday when he went to the station to get back to Pusan, he discovered that the Communists had removed some rails and wrecked a train in a tunnel below the station, with the result that no train could run. He rode in a truck with some other people to a place down the line where he managed to take a boat which left him 15 km from Pusan. He finally reached Pusan around 9pm. (The Presbyterian Guardian, July 1949 p. 137)
Jun 26, 1949: Kim Koo, prominent Rightist politician was shot dead in his bedroom today by one of his followers. (NYT 27 June 1949 p. 1)
[More detailed accounts are given below.]

Jun 26, 1949: Mr Kim Koo who was President of the Korean Government in exile during the war was shot at his home in Seoul by a man said to be a army lieutenant. A political opponent of President Syngman Rhee, Kim Koo was opposed to American and Russian interference in Korea. (Times 27 June 1949 p. 3)

Jun 26, 1949: Kim Koo’s assassin stated that he met with American intelligence officials for over a year. Before the assassination he met a lieutenant colonel and then a lieutenant of the American intelligence community. (Seo 1996, p.102)
[As the assassin had been a member of the “Korean Independence Party” (Kim Koo’s party) the official thesis of the government was that the shooting followed a heated argument over party policy.]

Jun 29, 1949: An unprecedented 400,000 people attended the funeral of Kim Koo. (Seo 1996, p.103; NYT 29 June 1949 p.11)
[The NYT devoted to this funeral only a short article on p.11; it was laconically entitled “Crowds honor Kim Koo”.

Jun 30, 1949: The total admission rate to US hospitals and quarters in Korea during June 1949 was 583 per 1,000 troops and per year. On 31 May 1949, 125 US medical personnel remained in Korea, down from 431 on 1 January 1949. (NARA 29, table 4)
[The US Korean Command was officially inactivated at the end of June 1949. On 15 April 1949 the evacuation policy was changed. Prior to this date, patients requiring over 45 days of hospital care were transferred to Japan, but after 15 April the evacuation rule was set to 15 days. This led to a drastic reduction in the numbers of hospital beds that were occupied. On 17 June 1949 only 6 beds were occupied at the 382nd Medical Station Hospital, the only fixed hospital remaining in operation. Not suprisingly, however, this policy change had only little influence on the admission rate because the later was determined by the health condition of the troops (at least if one assumes that all those seeking admission were indeed admitted): thus, from January to 15 April the average admission rate was 780 per 1,000 and per year whereas it was 688 from 15 April to the end of June.
Needless to say, the rate cannot tell us how many troops remained in Korea in June 1949; for that purpose one would also need to know the number of admissions. In the case of veneral diseases, both the numbers of cases and the rates are given in the “Annual Report of Medical Department Activities, USAFIK” of 1948 and 1949. This allowed us to draw the following graph giving the monthly strength of US troops in
Korea. In 1948 the average strength was 28,000, whereas in 1949 it was 7,500.]

![Graph showing number of troops remaining in Korea from 1946 to 1950.](image)

Fig. 6.15b Number of troops remaining in Korea. The graph is based on monthly numbers of cases and corresponding rates of veneral diseases. Although the Korean command was inactivated at the end of June 1949 (with the consequence that no subsequent statistics are available) this does not mean that no US troops remained. One can be fairly sure of a remaining US presence at Kimpo airport, in Navy harbors and in the ministries of the Korean government. Later on, this presence became official in the form of the KMAG (Korean Military Advisory Group). Incidentally, it is not clear why the strength data fluctuate so much. Clearly, the real number of troops could not change so fast from month to month. A possible explanation is that the rate calculations done at the Headquarters were somewhat defective. Source: NARA 28 and NARA 29.

**Jul 1949**: Trials of “unrepentant Communists” involved in uprisings (including the Cheju-do uprising) were held in early July. 350 persons were sentenced to death and 250 were executed in October 1949 after a review of their sentence by President Rhee. Some 1,650 received sentences ranging from 7 years to life. Many of these people would be executed by the authorities in the first weeks of the Korean War when it appeared that they might be freed by advancing North Korean forces. (Merrill 1980 p. 193)

**Jul 3, 1949**: Signs of a steady drift to military control over civil affairs in South Korea under the expanding national army are viewed with mounting alarm by the top-ranking United States military advisers. (NYT p. 13)

**Jul 9, 1949**: US warships on a good-will visit to Korea. A cruiser and 2 destroyers arrived at Inchon for a 3-day visit. (NYT p. 5)

**Jul 13, 1949**: The following countries have recognized the Republic of Korea (in chronological order): USA (1 Jan 1949), China (4 Jan), UK (18 Jan), France (5 Feb), Philippines (3 Mar), Brazil (27 May), New Zealand (21 Jun), Cuba (17 Jul), Canada (19 Jul), Bolivia (29 Jul), Salvador (9 Sep), Turkey (13 Sep). (STATE DEPT 1945-
1949, reel 5) [All these countries were close allies of the United States. As always, the countries which are not in the list are as (or even more) important than those which are. Among those missing are Australia and Norway.]

**Jul 19, 1949:** South Korea jailed 6 reporters accused of being Communists. (NYT p. 8)

**Jul 28, 1949:** North Korean shelling killed 7 in the battle for the control of a hill near Kaesung. (NYT p. 4)

**Aug 3, 1949:** President Syngman Rhee left Kimpo airfield aboard a US Navy plane for Chinhae Bay, on the southern tip of Korea, where he will confer within a few days with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China on a Pacific defense pact. (NYT p. 11)

[This excerpt suggests that in August 1949 the US Navy was still maintaining a presence in its base of Chinhae. It turns out that General Chiang arrived only on 6 August. Why then did President Rhee fly to Chinhae so early?]

**Aug 4, 1949:** 29 newsmen were arrested and accused of gathering information for the Reds (NYT p.11)

**Aug 4, 1949:** General Chiang Kai-shek left Formosa for Korea in order to discuss an anti-Red pact with President Rhee. (NYT 4 August 1949)

[In a sense this is a repetition of the anti-Komintern pact between Germany, Italy and Japan before World War II. As the later it is also concluded between dictatorial regimes.]

**Aug 5, 1949:** North Koreans invaded the south. The border was crossed at three points. The South Korean Army today reported that 4,000 North Korean troops had crossed the border at three widely separated points on the Ongjin peninsula killing about 250 South Koreans. In the six weeks since the American forces evacuated there have been many incidents. (Times p. 4)

[This “invasion” was a forerunner of the invasion of July 1950.]

**Aug 7, 1949:** The assassin of Kim Koo, An Tu-hui was sentenced to life imprisonment by a Korean military tribunal. (NYT p.11)

[Yet, on 28 June 1950 a member of the CIC appeared at the Taejon Penitentiary to release An on grounds of political parole. Afterward he was promoted to army major.]

**Aug 8, 1949:** Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek of China and President Syngman Rhee of Korea called today on President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines to summon a conference for formation of an Asian union to combat communism. (NYT p.
1) [At the very same time President Quirino was in the United States where he would meet President Truman. Thus, one year before the beginning of the Korean War, the containment policy to prevent the spread of Communism had already taken shape under US leadership.]

Aug 13, 1949: Korea put 64 to death. All were convicted of revolting against the South Korean regime. South Korean police intercepted a ship trying to flee to North Korea. Crew of US Brigadier General Roberts’ boat reportedly turned Communist. (NYT p. 2)

Aug 19, 1949: Increasing Communist-directed sabotage of public utilities in preparation for a coup to overthrow the Korean Republic was reported here today by the Government. (NYT p. 3)

Aug 19, 1949: In a letter to General Bolté, General Roberts reported that it took 14,600 rounds of ammunition to produce one casualty. (Gibby 2004, p. 135)

Sep 3, 1949: Three Korean newsmen covering the United Nation Commission who were convicted as Reds and sentenced as violators of the “National Security Law” were paroled by a judge. (NYT p. 3)

Sep 6, 1949: The Seoul Government came to the help of police in their action against Communist guerrilla attacks by establishing supervisory teams. This resulted in an increase in the number of arrests. (NYT p. 15)

Sep 6, 1949: Report by vice-consul Gregory Henderson to the US ambassador in Seoul entitled “Conditions at Odaesan”. [Odaesan (1,563 m) is a mountain in Gangwon province in the north east corner of South Korea, about 40 kilometer away from the coast, not far from Hajinburi City.] Excerpt.

Some weeks ago, around July 20th, some 40 Communists had been captured by the Army as a result of a joint operation of several units. A local “people’s court” had been allowed to try most of them. The inhabitants had shown their anti-Communism by condemning all of them to death. “They were used,” the Lieutenant reported zealously, “as targets to increase the courage of our soldiers.” Apparently bayonet practice is taken up rather seriously by this unit. The lieutenant was proud of his work and of his unit. This company was part of the 10th Regiment of the 8th Division.

[In response to an US inquiry, the lieutenant, the unit commander and the chief of police responded that they did not remember such an execution. The record of the 10th Regiment revealed nothing of this incident.]

Sep 14, 1949: Some 400 prisoners escaped from the prison of Mokpo. 53 were
killed in the prison before being able to escape. 237 were killed in the hills surrounding Mokpo, 85 were captured alive. (RECORDS, reel no 6)

**Sep 16, 1949:** At least 95 prisoners were killed and 60 recaptured in a mass jailbreak of 430 convicts near Mokpo prison, 320 kilometers south of Seoul. Most of those who broke out had been seized in a round up of Communist guerrillas on Cheju island. The army sent two companies to take part in the pursuit of the 275 still at large. At least 5 guards were also killed. (NYT p. 9)

**Sep 26, 1949:** Mr. Yon, Chief of the Penal Bureau explained that he was holding no less than 6,000 soldiers suspected of subversion. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 6)

**Sep 30, 1949:** Letter of President Rhee to his US adviser Robert T. Oliver. Excerpt. “Now is the most psychological moment to take an aggressive measure. Our loyal allies in the North are waiting. The ROKA together with friendly Communist forces in North Korea could easily topple Kim Il Sung from power, and then his men would be driven to the mountains where they could be starved out.” (Liem 1993) [Liem says that the United States later tried to deny the authenticity of the letter.]

**Oct 18, 1949:** The authorities shut down 133 political parties and social organizations including the “South Korean Worker’s Party” (SKWP) and the “Laboring People’s Party”. (Seo 1996, p.105) [Through this step the transformation of the Rhee regime into a dictatorship was fully completed.]

**Oct 18, 1949:** Reorganization of Korean Youth Groups. In July 1949 Mr. John H. Lasher was sent to Seoul on a 90-day mission to assist in the reorganization of the Korean Youth Groups. In his recommendations sent to the State Department the first one reads as follows: “It is essential that some “Economic Cooperation Administration” (ECA) funds be used for the Youth Program. This would yield better control”. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 7) [In other words, as always, funding is seen also as a means of control.]

**Oct 21, 1949:** Korean army sources said today that North Korean Communist forces had succeeded in wresting from their control a strategic hilltop on Ongjin Peninsula after five days of bitter fighting. (NYT p. 6)

**Oct 21, 1949:** Four Korean youths were sentenced to death in Seoul District Court for the murder last March 17 of Mrs. Horace H. Underwood, wife of a prominent American missionary. (NYT p. 4)

**Oct 30, 1949:** The naval base of Tchin-Lu was attacked by 3,000 insurgents. (Le Monde p. 2)
Nov 15, 1949: Publication of American periodicals and books in South Korea

1 In 1947 “Farmer’s Weekly” (published by the MG) had a distribution of 350,000.

2 “Wolgan Amerika” (American Monthly) is a 84-page illustrated magazine with a circulation of 30,000 and sold at a price of (only) 100 Won. It is published by the US Information Service.

3 Sin Chun Ji (New World) has a circulation of 15,000. It is a reprint from American periodicals published by the Korean government.

4 The American Mission in Seoul published a list of American books for which the publication rights were secured by the Department of the Army for the purpose of being translated and published in Korea and Japan (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 4)

Nov 21, 1949: Trial of members of the National Assembly including its vice chairman Kim Yak Soo. These representatives were leftists of the South Korean Labor Party who demanded the withdrawal of the American forces from Korea. At their trial the 13 assembly members said that they wrote confessions because they were tortured by the military police.

A further dispatch of the US embassy in Seoul (28 November 1949) says that the hearing of vice-chairman Kim Yak Soo revealed an “even more astonishing lack of evidence than the hearing of Lee Moon Wu”. (RECORDS, reel no 4, STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 4)

Nov 21, 1949: Dispatch No 740 from the American Embassy in Seoul about torture in Korea

At the trial of the members of the National Assembly the Vice Minister of Home Affairs stated that strict orders had been issued not to torture the Assembly men. In view of the information submitted in airgrams A-322 (17 Oct 1949) and A-370 (15 Nov 1949) of this embassy regarding the deaths by torture of Ko Hi Too and professor Chang Hyung Too, the carrying out of the order of the Home Ministry is subject to some doubt. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 4)

[163 This could seem a paradox because at this date a large part of the troops had been withdrawn. However, there was still an advisory structure which kept a strong control over the South Korean army and police.

164 Airgram A-438 mentions that the same Vice-Minister of Home Affairs has said privately to an officer of the embassy: “We must torture sometimes because the Communists will not always confess unless we torture them.”]
Law to combat communism which replaced the law of 1948. It imposes more severe penalties than the previous one. Appeal procedure was eliminated. (STATE DEPT 1945-1949, reel 4)

**Dec 24, 1949:** Mungyeong, Province of North Gyeongsang. 80km north-east of Daejon). A unit of the South Korean Army massacred some 85 unarmed citizens a majority of whom were children and elderly people. They were massacred because they had provided help to the Communists. For decades, the massacre was attributed to Communist marauding bands by the South Korean government. On 26 June 2006, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Korea concluded that the massacre was committed by the South Korean Army. (Wikipedia entitled “Mungyeong massacre”)

[The article does not say how the Truth Commission was able to solve the mystery.]

**Dec 31, 1949:** The first Korean anti-Communist movie was produced in 1949. Entitled “Breaking the wall”, it is based on the events of the Yosu uprising. The two main characters are two brothers-in-law; one is a Communist and the other a Second Lieutenant in the Korean Army.


**1950**

**Jan 16, 1950:** The Soktal massacre of civilians by Korean troops led to a command shake-up. (Merrill 1980, p. 195)

[So far, we were not able to get more specific information about this event. On the Internet there are many websites containing the expression “Soktal massacre” but all of them are in Korean.]

**Feb 2, 1950:** Leaders of the US economic and diplomatic missions in Korea are concerned over the trend toward centralized authority in the Korean Government. (NYT p. 3)

[This is an understatement. In fact, at this time, the Rhee regime was already a full fledged dictatorship as revealed by the measures taken in the summer and fall of 1949.]

**Mar 15, 1950:** Families of guerrillas were taken from their villages and interned by the governments while the men formed guerrillas groups in the mountains. South Korean troops failed in their drive against guerrilla troops despite optimistic official

165 See the following New York Times article (20 January 1950): “Seoul confirms killings. Massacre of villagers on Eve of Christmas was laid to guerrillas. The police is not involved.”

166 There is Soktal-san and Soktal-li but both places are currently in North Korea not far from the 38th parallel. Probably they were in South Korea before the Korean war.
reports on the winter campaign. (NYT p. 18)

[This article, one of the few that tried to describe the situation of the rural population, also emphasized that in addition to high taxes, farmers had to pay rents of up to one third of the harvest to their landlords. In short, their situation was fairly similar to the situation of Chinese farmers.

Yet, whereas the Kuomintang was defeated in China despite American logistic support, it seems that the Korean Communists were not really able to create “free zones” in which their own administration could prevail.

How can this difference be explained? According to some sources, it is because the Korean government could rely on army and police forces that had been trained by the Japanese. It is true that even in Korea, some units mutinied and sided with the insurgents, but such defections seem to have been less frequent than in China.]

Mar 27, 1950: The United Nation Commission in South Korea does not know what attitude to adopt concerning the arrest of National Assembly members on charges of violating the National Security Act. (NYT p. 7)

Mar 27, 1950: Kim Sam Yong and Yi Chu Ha, the key guerrilla commanders in South Korea, were captured. The main body of the guerrillas including more than 600 cadres trained at the Kangdong Political Institute (North Korea) has been eliminated. This disaster effectively put an end to Kim Il Sung’s dream of uniting the country through insurrections in South Korea.

Mar 31, 1950: Fatalities in the civil war Between 1948 and March 1950 a low-intensity civil war was continuing in Korea which mirrored the one in China (although the conditions were very different). The following table gives monthly fatality statistics:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>Aug</td>
<td>Sep</td>
<td>Oct</td>
<td>Nov</td>
<td>Dec</td>
<td>Jan</td>
<td>Feb</td>
<td>Mar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla/civilian</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>880</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>6,091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government/civilian</td>
<td>266</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Civilians are included in both line-headings for two different reasons. For “Guerrilla/civilian” it is due to the fact that in such wars it is very difficult to separate guerrillas from civilians. When a village is bombed or strafed who can say how many guerrillas and how many civilians were killed? Yet, in the original source this heading only referred to guerrillas. Among the people killed by the guerrillas it should be fairly easy to distinguish between government forces and civilians; yet, for some reason in the original source the two items were bulked together.

Source: FEC (Far East Command) Intelligence Summary, cited in Merrill (1989, p. 215)
Apr 5, 1950: 50 planes from a US carrier flew over Korean cities. (NYT 5 April 1950)

Apr 13, 1950: Communist bandits in South Korea. 600 freshly enrolled Communist guerrilla bandits broke from North Korea into South Korea. (Times p. 3) [The expression “Communist bandits” was commonly used by the regime of Chiang Kai shek and by western newspapers during the Nationalist suppression campaigns between 1927 and 1936. It is surprising to see this expression re-activated 6 months after the Chinese Communists came to power in Beijing.]

May 6, 1950: A document written by the Soviet embassy in North Korea describes the partisan warfare which took place in South Korea in the Spring of 1950. Mostly descriptive, it does not give a real insight into the key factors of the struggle that was going on in South Korea at that time. (Soviet Embassy in North Korea 1950)

May 10, 1950: Defense Minister Sihn Sung Mo warned South Korea that invasion by Communist North Korea is imminent. He said intelligence reports indicated the North Koreans were moving in force toward the border. Moreover he asserted that the North Korean Army totals 183,000 trained men, has 173 planes, 173 tanks and 32 naval vessels. (This dispatch of the Associated Press was published in the Evening Star on 10 May 1950 and in the New York Times on 11 May 1950 (p. 14, 42 words); cited in Collier’s 2 September 1950 p. 24). [At first sight such a warning might seem quite prophetic. But, as we have seen, it was not the first time that such announcements were made. Moreover, the fact that the dispatch was published in the form of a tiny 42-word article on page 14 of the New York Times shows that it was not taken very seriously by Western media. As a parallel one may think of the numerous “red alert” announcements made in the United States in the wake of 11 September 2001. The main purpose of the warning by the South Korean Defense minister may have been to influence public opinion in the perspective of the elections of 30 May.]

May 20, 1950: South Koreans are set to repel invasion. (NYT p. 7)

May 26, 1950: Korean officials announced the arrest of more than 200 Communist sympathizers and said they had smashed attempts of Communist North Korea to influence the election of May 30. (NYT p. 9) [Other details about these arrests are given in the following article.]

May 30, 1950: South Korean police arrested 112 persons including 30 candidates in the election of May 30 after the discovery of a Communist spy ring. It was stated that the 30 arrested candidates were financed by the Communist Party which is banned.
Chapter 6

Fig. 6.16 April 1950, 15 km north-east of Seoul. Execution of 39 civilians. They were suspected of being Communists but the exact charges brought against them are not known. The fact that it was a mass execution carried out by firing squads of the Korean Army suggests that they were tried by a military tribunal. This execution took place two months before the Korean War started. Source: http://www.cpcml.ca/Tmld2008/D38103.htm

There are 2,170 candidates for 210 seats; some 1,200 are standing as Independents. (Times p. 4)
[A common characteristic of bogus elections organized under US supervision is the large number of candidates. Here, there are 10 candidates for each seat. This was meant to suggest a very open election which, of course, was not the case. In fact, no opposition candidates were allowed; the candidates who did not belong to Rhee’s party were all independents.]

Jun 1, 1950: Independents won the Korean elections. The vote is regarded as a defeat for the current administration and a rebuke to the regime’s police methods. (NYT p. 10)
[The fact that the elections was won by “independents” (rather than by opposition members) reflected the fact that leftist candidates had not been allowed to run. The difference in the results between 1948 and 1950 is perhaps attributable to the suppression of the food cards (see 2 April 1949)

Jun 9, 1950: North Koreans propose nation-wide elections. (NYT p. 15)

Jun 11, 1950: The United Nations Board Secretary made his first crossing of the 38th parallel for an informal conference with the Communists. (NYT p. 26)

Jun 20, 1950: A conference between United States defense chiefs was held in secrecy in Tokyo. Taking part in this meeting were:
- Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense
- Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- General Douglas MacArthur
- John F. Dulles, consultant to the State Department. (NYT p. 1)

Jun 25, 1950: The North Korean invasion started on the Ongjin Peninsula through a
Fig. 6.17 Mass execution of Bodo League members (July 1950). These photographs were taken in July 1950 by Major Abbott of the US Army and for a long time were classified as “top secret”. Prisoners lie on the ground before their execution by South Korean troops in Taejon (now known as Daejeon in the center of South Korea). They were shot in the head by the soldiers (right-hand side) and then pushed into the trench.

It seems that the pictures (these two plus several others) were transmitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by Lt. Col. Bob E. Edwards, military attaché to the US Embassy in South Korea.

President Syngman Rhee ordered the execution of Bodo League and South Korean Workers Party people on 27 June 1950. The first massacres occurred in Hoengseong, Gangwon-do on 28 June.

A British journalist, Alan Winnington, working for the US newspaper “Daily Worker”, reported such executions but his reportage was dismissed as propaganda.

The existence of a secret burial ground was discovered in 2002 after a typhoon partially uncovered one of the mass graves. The Associated Press reported in the third week of May that more and more mass graves were being discovered near Daejeon. Then, one by one, witnesses who had been too scared to talk because of the authoritarian regimes that ruled South Korea until the late 1990s came forward to relate their experiences.

The Truth Commission, also investigated the large-scale killings of Korean War refugees carried out by the US military. Source: Wikipedia article entitled “Bodo League massacre”. In spite of its importance, this article was available (at the date of 7 January 2011) in only 4 languages: Chinese, English, Japanese and Korean.

shelling of Kaesong at 5:00 hours. The ROK 12th Regiment retreated. By 9:30 a.m., Kaesung was in North Korean hands. Several US military advisers (KMAC) were taken captive. The ROK 7th Division collapsed at Cholwon and the North Korean tanks raced toward Seoul. (Korean War Starts)

Jun 28, 1950: Hoengsong, Gangwon Province, north-east of South Korea. A ROK military police sergeant, Kim Man Sik, received an urgent radio message from the South Korean Army’s Counterintelligence Corps telling him to go to local police stations, take custody of scores of Communist suspects held there and execute them. The victims were trucked to the execution ground, tied together with military communications wire, shot in the head, and then pushed into a trench that had been opened behind them. (NYT 3 December 2007)

[This is one of the few direct testimonies by a participant in the massacres that the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” was able to collect. Created in 2005, the Commission located 160 sites believed to have been used for mass burials but so far only 4 of them have been explored which lead to discovering the remains of 400 people. The skeletons were found stacked on one another with bullet holes in the
skulls and hands still tied by rusting wire. If the other 156 mass graves are of the same size that would mean a total of 16,000 persons killed.

At the burial site of Cheongwon (50 kilometer north of Daejeon in central South Korea) 110 bodies have been found so far but one of the witnesses said he saw everyday for about one week 7 trucks loaded with people going to this place (usually 4 trucks in the morning and 3 in the afternoon). On the basis of 50 people per truck this would represent $7 \times 7 \times 50 = 2,450$ people.

The powers of the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” are limited. It can neither force people to testify nor offer immunity for testimony, so few former soldiers have been willing to tell what they knew. Unwilling to open old wounds and perhaps unsure about the future after so many decades of right-wing governments, many victims have stayed away as well.

In July 2007, in one of its strongest rulings so far, the commission said that the killings that took place in December 1950 in the village of Hampyong (south-west of South Korea) were a crime against humanity. Soldiers of the South Korean 11th Division stormed the village to hunt Communist guerrillas but instead killed most of the villagers.

**Jul 1950:** In the early days of the Korean War, Seoul placed its armed forces under the command of General Douglas MacArthur as United Nations Commander. After the armistice this arrangement continued for 25 years. (Savada 1990)

[In fact it continues up to the present time (2014) in the sense that the chief of the Combined Command is always a US general.]

**Aug 1950:** During a flight over the region of Masan in the south of Korea at the beginning of August, Hugh Baillie makes the following description. “I counted 17 burning villages. The towns looked like honey-combs, thoroughly blasted out [by US aircraft]. The city of Pohang was all unroofed. (Baillie 1959)

**Aug 1950:** Testimony given by an American soldier about North Korean prisoners. “A lot of times when we captured the enemy we didn’t take them back to no [sic] concentration camps. Took them to the side over there”. King [Samuel King] insisted he never directly participated in the killings. (Green 2010, p. 133)

**Aug 15, 1950:** In an interview given to Hugh Baillie, the president of United Press, president Syngman Rhee declared: “I can handle the Communists. The Reds can bury their guns and burn their uniforms, but we know how to find them. With bulldozers we will dig huge excavations and trenches and fill them with Communists, then cover them over. Then they will really be underground. (Baillie 1959, p. 267)

**Aug 30, 1950:** According to a written order obtained by “Newsweek”, a senior intelligence officer in the South Korean Navy instructed Cheju’s police to “execute
all those in groups C and D \(^{167}\) by firing squad no later than September 6, 1950”. In subsequent weeks 2,500 islanders were executed. (Newsweek, 19 June 2000, p. 51)

**Dec 12, 1950:** A letter to the Far East Command by Adjutant General C.W. Rogers reported that the Legion of Merit was awarded to Captain James Hausman for his role during the Yosu rebellion.

The first recommendation letter for such an attribution was written by Brigadier General W.L. Roberts on 20 December 1948. Other recommendation letters were written by several officers (e.g. 10 January 1949, 7 March 1949).

(Catalog of Box 10, Folder SA1 and Box 24 of the Hausman Archives at Harvard-Yenching Library.)

[The “Legion of Merit” is a military decoration of the US Armed Forces. It should not be confused with the “Medal for Merit” which is a civilian decoration.]

**Dec 20, 1950:** On 28 June 1950 Seoul was taken by the North Korean Army. The city was retaken by US and South Korean forces at the end of September 1950. Then it was taken by Chinese and North Korean troops at the beginning of January 1951. It was retaken by American troops at the beginning of April 1951. The following article falls shortly before the Chinese counter-offensive.

Most of the military police were taken out of Seoul for the mission of keeping traffic rolling during the withdrawal. As a result Seoul’s seven dance halls became arenas for nightly brawls, much gun brandishing and some shooting. Korean women were molested in the streets and several shootings of Koreans were reported to the authorities.

The Army acknowledged 3 homicides by US soldiers in the last 10 days but it has not made global crime figures public. The Korean police decided on the advice of the American Liaison group that local crime statistics should be kept confidential.

Merchants complained that the GIs took the wares they wanted and then walked off without paying. Not all the culprits were enlisted men. Following a collision between two cars a US captain in a jeep shot the Korean driver and escaped.

(NYT p. 4)

**1951**

**1951:** The fact that third-degree interrogation methods (i.e. what is commonly called torture) were used during the war by both American and South Korean army interrogators is reported by Minoru Kiyota, a Japanese American who served in US intelligence in South Korea. He mentions two episodes (Kiyota 1997, chapter 9).

- One day [near Inchon] I encountered a man called Choi. He was in his late 20s

\(^{167}\)This group classification was based on the security risks posed by the prisoners.
and had been arrested by American military police who accused him of heading a smuggling operation. He refused to confess even though they inflicted a good deal of pain on him. I identified myself to the military police as an American intelligence agent and asked them to turn the man over to me.

- I was sent to Seoul with a group of nisei colleagues to interrogate Chinese prisoners of war. Among them was a platoon leader about 18-year old. When the Korean soldiers interrogated him he kept his silence. Even when they struck him and knocked him down he would not break.

1952

**Jan 16, 1952:** *Bombing of prisoners of war?* The headquarters of General Ridgway acknowledged that US aircraft were in the general vicinity of Kangdong, North Korea, Monday night when, the Communists asserted, US warplanes bombed a prisoner-of-war camp, killing 10 United Nations prisoners and injuring at least 60 others. (NYT p. 1)

[Of course, the fact that the planes were in the vicinity of the camp does not imply that the camp itself was bombed. One would need photographs made in the camp as further evidence. However, just because bombing was so widespread occasional bombing of prisoner camps would be a likely occurrences. In order to make a clearer assessment one would need more information about the number and location of the camps. It is clear that if all prisoners had been in just one camp it would have been fairly easy for US bombers to spare this area. On the contrary, if the prisoners were housed in a large number of small camps it would have been difficult to avoid hitting any of them.]

**Feb 18, 1952:** Some 77 North Korean prisoners of war were killed at the Koje Island prisoner camp when US troops intervened to “restore order”. (NYT 22 February p. 1)

[A detailed account can be found in chapter 2.]

**Jun 10, 1952:** Some 41 North Korean prisoners of war were killed (or died from their wounds) at the Koje Island prisoner camp when US troops intervened to move the prisoners to another compound. (NYT p. 1)

[The New York Times calls this intervention a “battle”. To the extent that it opposed tanks to basically unarmed prisoners was it really a battle? In an testimony by a US soldier who took part in the action one can read the comment that “the smell of burned flesh hung in the air after the riot.”]

**Summer, 1952:** Hugh Baillie, chairman of United Press, sent the following dispatch
to the agency’s Far Eastern correspondents.

“Let’s revive Korean War. Now it’s merely another bore war. American troops who are out there and their people here deserve better treatment than this. Let’s have first person stories from troops under fire. I would suggest military funerals, evacuation of wounded by helicopter, bringing up supplies, just as if it were all brand new. All this battlefield stuff should be vivid and raw because otherwise it won’t get printed.” (Baillie 1959)

[This excerpt shows through a specific illustration that a news agency like “United Press” does not only reflect and describe world events, but to some extent also shapes them. An operation like this one would make the war more gripping, hence more acceptable to public opinion and indirectly would contribute to prolong it.]

Sep 24, 1952: Some 50 prisoners of war were injured on Cheju Island during the breakup of a demonstration. (NYT 24 September 1952)

Oct 2, 1952: ● Korean civilians killed: 52 (389). 52 Chinese prisoners of war were killed yesterday morning and 113 others were wounded by two platoons of United States soldiers sent into a prison compound on Cheju Island to quell one of the most serious prisoner of war uprisings of the Korean war. (NYT p.1)

[The recurrent demonstrations and uprisings of POWs probably had their source in deplorable living conditions. It would be interesting to know the mortality rate in the prisoners camps on Cheju Island. According to an article of 3 October there were 6,000 Chinese POWs on the island and an unspecified number of North Korean POWs.]
Oct 7, 1952: Guerrillas killed 5 South Korean police near Cheju City on Cheju Island. (NYT 7 October 1952)

Mar 7, 1953: Some 24 North Korean prisoners of war were killed at the Yongcho camp when United Nations troops suppressed a riot. (NYT 9 March 1953 p. 2)

Jun 19, 1953: At least 33 non-Communist Korean war prisoners were killed and 93 wounded when captives in a prison enclosure made a mass break for freedom last night. About 400 escaped into the nearby countryside. (New York Times 19 June 1953)

[The term “non-Communist” means that they were South Koreans who enrolled in the North Korean Army during the first phase of the war when North Korean forces occupied the south. Most US accounts say that they were forced to enroll but given the feelings which prevailed in South Korea at that time many may have enrolled voluntarily.]


[This accident was not reported in the New York Times.]

Jul 28, 1954: Syngman Rhee, President of South Korea, had the unusual honor of being invited to address a joint session of Congress in the House Chamber. He had a prepared speech but departed from it occasionally. Once was when he said in an emotional way that while he is a Korean by law and by birth, by sentiment he is an American. Rhee’s English is a little difficult and the members of Congress had some trouble catching all of what he said.

He called a counter-attack on Communist China and said it would be successful if carried out by an Asian army of more than two million men, backed up and supported by US planes, guns and ships. In short, he called on this country to join in a full-scale war on China. When he finished Rhee was loudly applauded but the applause was for him personally and not for his call to World War III. (NBC Camel News Caravan as aired on July 28, 1954)

Mar 9, 1955: • Korean civilians killed: 5 (394). Three US guards of the 24th Infantry Division shot and killed 5 Koreans, all siblings, when they did not stop upon being challenged. (Korea Times, cited in Yi 2006 p. 79)

[On 12 October 1957 he Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported that in the 8 months between March and October 1957, 13 Koreans were killed by guards in and around US military bases. This represents a monthly average of 1.6. (Yi 2006)]
May 15, 1956: Presidential election. A short time before the election, Democratic candidate Shin Ikhi died in a train, allegedly from a cerebral hemorrhage. After charging that national police were intimidating people into voting for Rhee, he had boarded a train in Seoul to begin a stumping tour of southwestern Korea. After his death his body was put aboard a special train for return to the capital. As the train pulled into Seoul, it was met by a crowd of 20,000, many of them students from Korea University and the National University of Seoul, both anti-Rhee strongholds. In order to break the biggest riot against Rhee since the end of the Korean war the police had to shoot into the crowd.

The government announced that it was too late for Shin Icky’s Democratic Party to enter another candidate but his running mate Dr. John M. Chang was elected as vice-president. He was wounded slightly in an attempted assassination in September. According to a United Press report, another candidate, Cho Bong-am was in hiding, fearful of his life. He charged that his supporters were subject to terrorism, their houses destroyed and property robbed. (Time Magazine May 14, 1956, Sinoo 1979 p. 108).

[The fact that these stories were published in American newspapers suggests that the State Department was becoming somewhat tired of President Rhee. Indeed, four years later he was dropped by the American administration.]

May 31, 1957: In April and May 1957 there were 6 serious incidents between GIs and Koreans. All of them occurred in the Paju area (see above). On April 16 a Korean woman was raped and killed. On April 26 two GIs destroyed a Korean store.
Jan 13, 1958: Memorandum From the State Department Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Jones), Washington, February 3, 1958. Excerpt.
Subject: Arrest of Cho Bong-am
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 795B.00/2358. Confidential. Drafted by Gregory Henderson.
Cho Bong-am, Chairman of the Progressive Party and recipient of 2,164,000 votes in the 1956 Presidential elections, was arrested by the ROK police on charges of violation of the National Security Act. On immediately preceding days, 4 other top officials of the Progressive Party and Progressive Party Assemblyman, Kim Tal-ho, were arrested on similar charges. There have since been reports that some 4 other members of the party have been detained. Confidential information indicates that the Government may be seeking to outlaw the Progressive Party.

Charges against the suspects have included the familiar paraphernalia of suspected contacts with spies, advocacy of “peaceful unification” and Marxism. The Embassy “believes the purported evidence is, at best, flimsy”. Release was denied by the Seoul court on January 30, on the basis of evidence of Communist contacts.

The Government is evidently seeking to thwart the Progressive Party before the April elections and, by inference, to issue warning to all members of the opposition. The ROK press has thus far discreetly questioned the arrests but has raised no outcry. Government action will probably tend to drive underground sentiment favorable to peaceful unification

May, 1959: Retired Admiral Felix Stump, former commander of the US forces in the Pacific, on behalf of the “Freedoms Foundation”, presented President Rhee with the Freedoms Leadership Award. (MacDonald 1992, p. 199)
[The ““Freedoms Foundation” was (and still is at time of writing) an influential conservative and neoliberal association. Its stated mission is to “advance individual liberty, free enterprise, and limited, accountable government”.
It is somewhat ironical that this award was given a few month before Rhee organized an additional highly rigged election. Although the Freedom award was conferred by a private institution, it can be recalled that during his visit to the United States in July 1954, Rhee had the honor to address a joint session of Congress; he took advantage of this opportunity to urge the United States to wage a full-scale war on Communist China.]
Jul 30, 1959: Cho Bong-Am, chairperson of the Progressive Party, which called for peaceful reunification with the North, was arrested and executed on July 30, 1959. (Interview of Kwon Oh-Hun, chairperson of the Supporting Committee for Prisoners of Conscience)

[The excerpt of 13 January 1958 shows that the US Department of State was well aware of the fact that the charges brought against Cho Bong-am were largely untrue. Yet, it did not try (or tried but did not put enough pressure to get satisfaction) to prevent this (legal) assassination.]

Mar 1960: Instead of organizing a fair and just election, the Minister of the Interior, Choi In-ku, actively campaigned in favor of Dr. Rhee. Bureaucrats and police were instructed to ignore violations of election laws. (Sunoo 1979 p. 113)

Mar 15, 1960: The election delivered an unbelievable majority (over 90%) for Rhee. In the southeast city of Masan where the authorities refused to register large numbers of voters, demonstrations escalated into hostilities against the police.

After a number of students had been killed, the Korean military authorities asked (and were granted) permission from the US Commander, General Carter B. Magruder, to use Korean troops to restore order. Eventually, only 50 Korean Marines were used but a whole reserve division was standing by. The decision of the US commander was not publicized. (MacDonald 1992, p. 203)

[The Wikipedia article entitled “Masan” says (retrieved on 29 March 2012) that General Magruder dispatched US Marines to quell the unrest. As its source the article cites Cumings (1997, p. 344) who gives MacDonald (1992) as his source. It seems that in this process the Korean Marines had become US Marines.]

April 1960: Uprising of April 1960. Our main interest concerns the role played by the US State Department. During the student uprising of April 1960 the declarations of US officials revealed an attitude which was closely paralleled during similar episodes of February 1986 in the Philippine or February 2011 in Egypt.

The following chronology of the events which lead to the resignation of President Rhee on 27 April 1960 is based on titles of New York Times articles.

- As in the Philippines and Egypt, there had been an election shortly before the uprising (on 15 March 1960) in which Rhee (85-year old and in power since 1948) received 89% of the votes.
- 11 April 1960. The revolution started on 11 April when the bloated body of a young student victim of police torture was discovered in the port of the city of Masan.

What was new in this event was not of course that a student had been tortured and killed by the police (that happened all the time under Rhee’s government), what was
new is that this incident was reported with big titles in American newspapers. In so far that it made a connection with the rigged elections, the title that the New York Times devoted to this event, namely “Body of boy found in sea, enshrined as evidence of election-day brutality” already showed that Rhee’s regime no longer had the support of the State Department. Similarly, whereas in former years there had been many demonstrations which were brutally suppressed by police (including during the time of the MG) but were not reported in the NYT, this time such episodes received great attention. In the days following 11 April there were many titles of this kind.

- 12 April 1960. The following account is excerpted from MacDonald (1992) which is a compilation of State Department files. The body of a student was recovered from Masan harbor with “four wooden pegs driven through the right eye” (subsequently explained as grenade fragments). The police had denied any knowledge of the student’s whereabouts since his disappearance on March 15. Students, then growing numbers of townspeople (to an eventual total of 40,000) went on a general offensive against the police. The police fired on the crowd, then fell back in confusion. Again the US Commander was asked and granted permission to use Korean troops.

[One may wonder how the 4 wooden pegs have been transformed into fragments of a grenade.]
- 19 April 1960. “Seoul police fire on anti-Rhee mob, 30 rioters were killed and wounded”.
- 21 April 1960. “President Syngman Rhee’s Cabinet resigned today as an aftermath of the bloody uprisings in which at east 115 persons were killed in several cities”.
- 22 April 1960. “US envoy holds long talk with Rhee. US call on Rhee to enact reform”. [To enact democratic reforms was just another way to ask President Rhee to leave because it was obvious for everybody that his repressive regime could not survive in a democratic framework.]
- 23 April 1960. “President Syngman Rhee agreed to the establishment of a new system of Cabinet responsibility in which the President’s office would become a more or less ceremonial position”. Yet, President Rhee emphasized the importance of a strong executive.
- 26 April 1960. “Police open fire. Some students were hurt.”
- 27 April 1960. “The resignation of President Rhee was regarded by officials in Washington as a necessary step in ending the political crisis. Korean leader’s decision followed new US warning”.
• 27 April 1960. The US Embassy made the following report. At the height of the demonstration yesterday a large floral wreath with a message of tribute was placed on the statue of General MacArthur in Seoul [Jayu (Freedom) Park]. This spontaneous unadvertised action by Seoul citizens symbolizes the attitude of Korea toward Americans.

• 28 April 1960. Huh Chung, in whose previous appointment as senior cabinet minister the US had heartily concurred, became Acting President and named mostly nonpolitical figures to his interim cabinet. Lee Ki-Poong, head of the Liberal Party, committed suicide together with his family. (MacDonald 1992, p. 207)

Comparison with the case of Turkey in May 1960. The State Department withdrew its support to Prime Minister Adnam Menderes in the same way and almost at the same time as it had done with respect to President Rhee in South Korea. In both cases despite Rhee’s and Menderes’ pro-US policies. However, Menderes differed from Rhee in several ways. For one thing he was much younger than Rhee. Moreover, the elections in Turkey were certainly less rigged than those in Korea. So, it can be said that Premier Adnam Menderes was the leader of a democratically elected government. The last election had taken place in October 1957, and new ones were scheduled soon after May 1960.

The following chronology lists some of the events which lead to the overthrow of the Menderes government by a military coup, the first of a long series. The excerpts below are from titles of New York Times articles. It is revealing that the expression “military coup” is not used.

• 8 March 1960. An eminent Turkish editor is sentenced to 15 months in jail on charges of having violated national press laws. He is the fifth to be imprisoned for reprinting American’s criticism of Premier Menderes.

• 29 April 1960. The student demonstrations in Istanbul are only the outward manifestation of widespread discontent with the government. [This title sets the tone. For some reason, the State Department was not happy with Premier Menderes. This appears even more clearly in subsequent titles.]

• 29 April 1960. Students were fired on by police. Five were reported slain. Officials deny the deaths.

• 30 April 1960. Police fired on crowd and troops quell new riots.

• 30 April 1960. The State Department expressed displeasure over the uncompromising position taken by Premier Menderes toward the student demonstrations.

• 5 May 1960. US denies taking a role in protest and rejects rumours that its envoy talked with Menderes.

• 16 May 1960. Menderes vows he won’t resign and says that Turkey will vote
soon.

- 22 May 1960. Tough young cadets from the Turkish Army War College march in protest.
- 24 May 1960. The United States-operated Robert College was closed today by Istanbul’s military commander after about 150 Turkish students had demonstrated against Premier Adnan Menderes.
- 29 May 1960. General Gursel heads the new Turkish Cabinet. People hail the new regime with joy.
- 30 May 1960. Turkey imprisons 100 ousted chiefs on an island base.

The last title is characteristic of the US attitude in this crisis. It says “Turkey”, not the “the Turkish Army”; it says “ousted chiefs” without reminding readers that among them were several members of a democratically elected government.

When he was removed by the military, Menderes was only 61-year old and had been in power for only 10 years. He had sent troops to fight in the Korean war. His country had joined NATO in 1952, was a key-member of the Baghdad Pact and welcomed the deployment of US nuclear strategic missiles. Moreover, in 1959 Turkey granted a specially favorable status to US investments in Turkey.

So, why did the State Department wish to replace him? Why did the United States not use its influence in Turkey to prevent him from being tried and eventually hanged on 17 September 1961 along with two of his former ministers (foreign affairs and defense)?

The students’ protests targeted the fact that Menderes’s rule was too authoritarian. This, however, can hardly be the key-reason for the position of the State Department because there were at that time many dictatorial regimes with which the United States had friendly relations. In the case of Korea, the State Department expressed very little objections when the military seized power in 1961 or when the student revolt of April-May 1987 was crushed with great violence.

**Parallel with the Philippines in February 1986.** This is a third case where the State Department withdrew its support to a President who was a close US ally. There had been an election prior to the uprising of which Marcos (69-year old and in power for 21 years) was declared a victor on 16 February 1986. The following chronology lists some of the events which lead to his departure on 25 February 1986. The excerpts are from titles of New York Times articles.

- 10 November 1985. Disengaging from Marcos.

168 Directed against the Soviet Union, these missiles were removed (along with those deployed in Italy) in the wake of the Cuba missile crisis.
• 23 January 1986. Marcos’s wartime role discredited in US file. [Marcos was considered a hero by many Filipinos for his role during the war.]
• 9 February 1986. US aides alarmed at fraud in vote.
• 15 February 1986. 10 were killed in the Philippines.
• 16 February 1986. Marcos declared victor.
• 18 February 1986. US envoy meets Philippine rivals.
• 23 February 1986. Two key military leaders urge Marcos to resign.
• 24 February 1986. Rebels seize key radio station.
• 26 February 1986. Police chief allied to Marcos is killed by Filipino gunmen
• 26 February 1986. Marcos flies and is taken to Guam. US recognizes Aquino as president.

Parallel with Egypt in February 2011. This is a fourth case where the State Department and White House withdrew their support to a President who was a close US ally. The following chronology lists some of the events which lead to the resignation of President Mubarak on 11 February 2011. There had been an election prior to the uprising (on 29 November 2010) in which Mubarak (82-year old and in power for 29 years) and his party received 90% of the votes.
• 29 January 2011. With revolt sweeping Egypt, Mubarak ordered a crackdown. State television said 13 were killed.169
• 29 January 2011. Mr. Mubarak ordered all his ministers to resign.
• 1 February 2011. Mubarak’s grip is shaken as millions are called to protest.
• 1 and 3 February 2011. President Obama’s special envoy, Frank G. Wisner, is to meet with Mubarak. The veteran diplomat was sent to prod Mubarak.
• 2 February 2011. Mubarak won’t run again [in the next election].
• 4 February 2011. White House is said to press for his [Mubarak’s] rapid exit.
• 11 February 2011. Mubarak won’t quit stocking revolt’s fury and resolve.
• 12 February 2011. Mubarak out.
• 4 March 2011. Obama says Qaddafi (69-year old and in power for 42 years) must leave Libya now.

Apart from the similarities between the lists of events, one should also observe that the role of the army received very little attention in spite of the fact that it certainly played a crucial role in these crises. It must be recognized that we know very little about this aspect.

As a rough rule of thumb, it can be hypothesized that when a leader is over 80 or has been in power for more than 25 years, he may fall out of favor with the State Department even though he is a trusted ally of the United States (as were indeed

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169The words which were used in this title are of importance. It is called a “sweeping revolt”, not a riot. This can be contrasted with the following title that was used to describe a protest in Algeria on 13 February 2011: “Algerian riot police break up protest”.
Chapter 6

Rhee, Menderes, Marcos and Mubarak). However, this rule does not apply to Prime Minister Menderes whose eviction remains a mystery.

**Jun 10, 1960:** The new Turkish military Government has decided to withdraw most of the Turkish brigade maintained in Korea since the outbreak of hostilities there in 1950. (NYT p. 3)

[Turkey had sent to Korea a combat force of 5,400 (the fourth largest after the US, UK and Canada.]

**Aug 7, 1960:** The US Army is quietly beefing up its two divisions in South Korea. Approximately 8,000 troops are being shipped from the US to bring them almost to full strength of 13,000 men each. American Army brass insisted on the build up after student rioting overthrew the Rhee government. (The Student Times 7 August 1960)

**May 16, 1961:** At 3:32 am (Korean time) American intelligence reported that a coup d’état attempt had commenced at about 1 am. During the early morning hours the ROK Army Chief of Staff, General Chang Do Young asked General Magruder for commitment of US forces to help put the coup down. General Magruder refused. (MacDonald 1992, p. 208)

[The previous account was given by the US State Department. It is very unlikely that General Chang asked for the help of US forces. Indeed, the coup was carried out by a small group. Cumings (1997) writes that the insurgent military were a dozen colonels with a strength of about 3,500 troops while at that time the ROKA had a strength of 600,000. In other words, the Korean Army could easily crush the rebels with its own forces. Therefore, it is likely that General Chang has been asking General Magruder permission for moving Korean forces against the rebels. One should keep in mind that Korean forces were under US operational command.]

**May 17, 1961:** General Lee Han Lim who commanded the First Rock Army issued a statement (apparently under duress) throwing his support behind the coup. (MacDonald 1992, p. 213)

(Subsequently General Lee Han Lim was arrested and tried which shows that he did not submit willingly.)

**May 17, 1961:** General Magruder telegraphed the following judgment to the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. “All the powerful men in and around the Seoul government appear to have had knowledge of the plan for the coup and at least have not opposed it”. He observed that the uprising was not Communist inspired and he noted that although the ROK First Army under his operational control might suppress the uprising such an action would restore a leaderless government. He concluded by saying: “Accordingly, I do not propose to direct the First ROK Army to suppress the uprising on my own authority only.
[This telegram confirms the interpretation that the ROK First Army was not allowed to crush the uprising. Relying on the same account given in MacDonald (1992), Prof. Cumings writes that “Americans did not okay to put down the coup”. Of course, no document will ever be released which shows explicitly that the policy was initiated by the White House and the State Department, so it is always possible to claim that this decision came about almost randomly (which is what is suggested by Prof. Cumings).]

**Jun 1961:** After the military coup an “Anti-Communism Law” was passed which complemented the “National Security Law”. All socialist states were defined as enemy states. The Anti-Communism Law was incorporated into the National Security Law on 31 December 1980.

Another security law which was passed in the early 1960s was the “Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration”.

(Translated text of the National Security Law: http://www.bommin.net; Cumings 1997)

**Nov 15, 1961:** General Park Chung Hee was invited to come to Washington for a working visit during which he met President Kennedy. The president offered Korea all possible economic and military help. (NYT 15 November 1961)

(This was less than 6 months after General Park’s coup and this visit did not prevent him from continuing the arrests and political trials.)

**Dec 22, 1961:** After the military coup some 200 persons were tried and convicted under the “National Security Law” and 5 were executed. One of the executed was Joo Yong-Soo, chairperson of the Korean Social Party Organizing Committee and publisher of the “Peoples Daily Newspaper.” It has recently come to light that the outcome of his trial was actually a “not-guilty” verdict but he was executed regardless. (Interview of Kwon Oh-Hun, chairperson of the Supporting Committee for Prisoners of Conscience; NYT 22 December 1961)

**Dec 22, 1961:** The South Korean military junta hanged five more supporters of former President Syngman Rhee. (NYT 22 December 1961)

[Joo Yong-Soo is mentioned in the article of the New York Times but he was certainly not a supporter of President Rhee. To the extent that the military coup re-installed the anti-Communist policy that had prevailed under Rhee it is surprising that there were supporters of Rhee among the persons who were executed.]

**Nov 4, 1962:** New constitution. A draft constitution was introduced which would be submitted to voters. Professors Rupert Emerson of Harvard University and Gilbert Flanz of New York University spent several weeks in Korea as private consultants to
the Korean government to advise on constitutional reform. The drafting of the constitution was undertaken under the auspices of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. The US embassy was kept informed about the progress of constitutional revision. (MacDonald 1992, p. 220)

**Dec 11, 1963:** A retired South Korean Army officer burned himself to death today near the official residence of President-elect Chung Hee Park. (NYT 11 December 1963)

**Dec 13, 1963:** A new civilian government was appointed by President Park. The State Department had suggested certain guidelines for Park in choosing his Prime Minister and the US Embassy was confidentially informed of the nomination before public announcement. (MacDonald 1992, p. 227)

**Jun 4, 1964:** The police force in Seoul was overpowered by a mob of 10,000 students. President Chung Hee Park proclaimed martial law in the Seoul area and consulted the US ambassador. The US military commander accepted to release two combat divisions from his operational control while cautioning the president about their use. (NYT 4 June 1964 p. 1, MacDonald 1992, p. 227)

[The crisis led to the removal of the removal of the Chief of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency.]

**Aug 19, 1965:** The Korean National Assembly passed a bill authorizing the dispatch of one Korean Division to Vietnam. The division was to deploy in three increments: 29 September 1965, 14 October 1965, 29 October 1965. (Larsen and Collins 1984)

**Aug 19, 1965:** US raps De Gaulle [sic\(^{170}\)] over N-monopoly (i.e. nuclear monopoly). Strong criticisms of De Gaulle’s national independence policy were voiced to 800 newsmen at a State Department briefing in foreign policy. The newsmen were told that France will probably move to dismantle much of the NATO organization and will seek to weed out supernatural aspects of the European Common Market. (Korea Times 31 October 1965)

[Why did we include this excerpt? Apart from the fact that the article was published in the “Korea Times”, it has little to do with Korea. However it explains an interesting aspect of US foreign policy against “trouble makers” which also applies to US policy toward some Korean political leaders.

Around 1965 the State Department was clearly upset by de Gaulle’s policy. Yet, it did not wish to acknowledge that it started a public relations campaign against him. This is documented first by the fact that the news conference described above is

\(^{170}\text{The correct spelling is de Gaulle. This mistake is a common characteristic of many US documents.}
hardly ever mentioned in US newspapers (e.g. in the New York Times) and secondly by the two following excerpts:

- Several French newspapers have accused the United States of conducting a “violent” anti-French campaign to embarrass President de Gaulle in the election campaign [President de Gaulle will announce his candidacy for a second term on 4 November 1965]. (NYT 2 November 1965 p. 10)
- A State Department spokesman described as “patent nonsense” a French charge that the United States Government had undertaken a campaign against President de Gaulle. (NYT 2 November 1965 p. 10)

So, in spite of the fact that seen from South Korea or France there was a clear awareness of the State Department’s campaign, nevertheless it was denied by its spokesman in the strongest possible terms.]

**Dec 1965: Participation of South Korea in the Vietnam War.** In the last months of 1965, South Korea sent 45,000 troops to South Vietnam. These forces included the Tiger and White Horse divisions and the Blue Dragon brigade. In 1972 there were still 33,000 ROKA troops in South Vietnam. During the whole period the number killed in action reached 5,000.


[In terms of percentage the number killed in action was almost the same as for US troops, i.e. 10% of annual forces.

There has been a discussion about the funding these troops got from the United States. The troops were armed and trained by the United States but it seems that the total funding amount is not known. It is better known in two related cases, namely the sending to Vietnam of

- 2,200 men of a Filipino construction battalion, for which the United States paid $39 million (NYT 19 November 1969 p. 1), that is to say about $18,000 per man.
- a Thai division for which the United States paid $1 billion (NYT 1 December 1969 p. 1), that is to say some $60,000 per soldier.

**Aug 29, 1966: More than a hundred thousand people gave an enthusiastic send-off in Seoul to the South Korean Army’s White Horse (ninth) Division due to leave for South Vietnam next week.** (NYT 29 October 1966)

**Dec 31, 1967: US economic aid to South Korea.** Between 1955 and 1967 US aid to South Korea (both economic and military) amounted on average to 447 million dollars per year. (Yi (2006, p. 66)

[In order to put this figure in perspective, one should recall that in 1955 Korean exports of goods and services were around 20 million dollars, in 1960 they stood at 122 million dollars. In 1967 they had grown to 518 million dollars. In other words,
during the period 1955-1965 US aid exceeded Korean exports. It is only toward 1967 that exports tended to surpass US aid.]

**Dec 31, 1967:** Population growth in the Paju area. The Paju area northwest of Seoul is close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Nicknamed the “GIs Kingdom” the area was home to the 1st Marine Division, and the 2nd, 7th, 24th Infantry Divisions. Between 1953 and 1967 Paju’s Korean population soared from 5,000 to 60,000. It was transformed from a farming village into a business area for sex, drugs and black-market activities. The main town in the Paju area, Tongduchon, became known as “Little Chicago”. In 1967 the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs recorded 1,750 registered prostitutes in Tongduchon alone. During the Korean War registered prostitutes were required to have a venereal disease (VD) examination every week. The townspeople estimated that there were an additional 500 unregistered prostitutes. (Yi 2006 p. 73-74)

**Sep 1968:** Professor Kwon Jae-hyeok was sentenced to death by the Supreme Court for allegedly being in the service of North Korea. He was executed two months later. Kwon was a prominent scholar who studied economics in the United States at the University of Oregon and had returned to Korea to teach at the Korea Military Academy. On July 30, 1968, the “Korean Central Intelligence Agency” (KCIA), the predecessor of the “National Intelligence Service”, arrested 13 people, including Kwon, on charges that they organized an underground organization in support of North Korea. Three of them received long prison sentences. Lee Il-jae was sentenced to serve a lifetime in prison. Lee Hyeong-rak was sentenced to 10 years and Kim Bong-gyu. to 7 years.

In April 2009 the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” after investigating the case announced that the KCIA had fabricated the charges. The committee said that the KCIA had detained the suspects illegally for up to 53 days. During interrogation, they were tortured and beaten to obtain false testimonies. The four men were posthumously acquitted in a Supreme Court ruling in May 2015. (Korea Joogang Daily, article of 5 January 2016 entitled “Compensation ordered for victims in fabricated spy case”).

[What is exceptional in this case is of course not that the persons were sentenced under fabricated charges (there may have been hundreds of similar cases) but the fact that they were subsequently acquitted.]

**Oct, 1971:** The regime passed the “Law Concerning Special Measures for Safeguarding National Security”. (Cumings 1997)

**Dec 6, 1971:** After the admission of the People’s Republic of China into the United Nations, a proclamation by President Park declared a “State of National Emergency”
and stated that “every citizen must be prepared to concede some freedoms he enjoys for the sake of national security”. (Sunoo 1979 p. 3-4)

External threats are often invoked to limit the rights and freedom of citizens. History has many examples of that kind. For instance, one may think of France during the Algerian conflict or the United States in the wake of the attacks of 9/11. The author mentions a report of “Amnesty International” according to which there were 1,100 political prisoners in Korea and that some of them have been tortured. Unfortunately, he does not give the date of this report.

**Feb 13, 1972:** The issue of the United States’ moral responsibility for war crimes committed by its allies in Vietnam has been raised in letters published in the February issue of the Foreign Service Journal. (NYT p. 4)

The article refers in particular to actions of the Korean Tiger division. In an early article the New York Times had already expressed some concern. For instance, an article published on 13 February 1967 was entitled: “South Korean units use big-stick in Vietnam pacification drive. The South Korean fierce Tiger Division is convinced it has found a lasting formula for pacification”.

A similar concern can be found in an article published in Time Magazine on 18 September 1972 which was entitled: “South Vietnam: Another My Lai?”. It begins with the following sentence: “Since they arrived in South Vietnam seven years ago, South Korean troops have gained a reputation as the toughest and meanest of the allied forces”.]

**Nov 13, 1973:** A textile worker, Chon Tae il, immolated himself by fire at Seoul’s Peace Market. He was shouting “Obey the labor standard act” as the flames were consuming him. (Cumings 1997, p. 371)

**Apr 10, 1974:** The South Korean Government said that a total of 261 people had surrendered to investigating authorities for having been involved in an outlawed student organization. (NYT p. 4)

**Apr 10, 1974:** Eight students were executed by the Korean Government for violation of the “National Security Law”. They were charged with belonging to an underground student organization. (Wikipedia entitled “People’s Revolutionary Party incident”)

[It can be noted that the New York Times did not report these executions in spite of the fact that events related to this investigation were mentioned both before and after the date of 10 April.]

**Apr 18, 1974:** A Seoul criminal court began the trial of 32 South Koreans on charges of having spied for North Korea using Ullung Island off South Korea’s east coast as their base. (NYT p. 11)
**Apr 26, 1974:** The South Korean Central Intelligence Agency announced today that about 240 people were under investigation in connection with an underground student organization that allegedly attempted to overthrow the Government. (NYT p. 8)

**Nov 9, 1976:** Federal investigators have been told that President Park Chung Hee and other senior South Korean officials conceived, organized and directed an illegal effort to influence Congressional policy. (NYT p. 1)

**Nov 14, 1976:** President Park Chung Hee has secretly ousted the third-ranking official of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. The official was reportedly responsible for coordinating the activities of a network of operatives in Washington, including Park Tong Sun, a businessman known in the United States as Tongsun Park, and Pak Bo Hi, a key official in the Reverend Sun Myung Moon’s Unification Church. (NYT p. 25)

**Dec 5, 1976:** President Park Chung Hee today dismissed the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, apparently in connection with the defection of a top Korean agent in Washington. (NYT 4 December 1976)

**Jun 5, 1977:** A former Director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim Hyung Wook, has broken a long silence to identify Park Tong Sun as a KCIA agent who spent millions of dollars on an allegedly illegal scheme to influence American policy on Korea. (NYT p. 1)

**1978:** In 1978 a bi-national headquarters, the South Korea - United States Combined Forces Command (CFC) was created. As Commander-in-chief the CFC has a US General who is at the same time the Commander-in-chief of the US Forces in South Korea.

**Oct 28, 1979:** A growing number of analysts both Western and Korean, are finding it increasingly difficult to accept the South Korean Government’s assertion that the death yesterday of President Park Chung Hee was an accident. (NYT p. 1)

[It was indeed an assassination.]

**Dec 12, 1979:** General Roh Tae Woo and General Chun Doo Hwan mobilized armored units in front of the ROK Army headquarters. Chong Sung Hwa, the ROK Army chief of staff and 40 officers were arrested. Other officers fled through tunnels to the US Army command across the street. (Cumings 1997 p. 375)
suburb of Tokyo) next to the headquarters of all US military forces in Japan. As in Seoul the Japanese command center is linked to the US command center by an underpass (Japan Times 27 March 2012).

**Apr 30, 1980:** The newly named acting director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency said today that his organization would no longer be allowed to interfere with government. (NYT p. A18)

**Gwangju uprising**

**May 1980:** Troops were withdrawn from the Combined Forces Command and dispatched to Kwangju to quell the student uprising. This led many South Koreans to believe that the United States supported the violent suppression of the uprising. A statement published 10 years later (on 19 June 1989) by the US Department of State emphasized that the South Korean troops deployed at Kwangju were not under the operational control of the CFC. However the order to detach them from the CFC had to get US approval. More specifically the US Commander accepted the dispatch of the Twentieth Division to Kwangju. (Savada 1990, p. 298)

[It is unclear why this clarification came more than 10 years after the Kwangju events.]

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*[Fig. 6.20]* A South Korean soldier clubs a man arrested during anti-government protests in Gwangju on May 20, 1980. This picture looks weird for one would expect the victim to protect himself with his arms. *Source: Japan Times, 17 May 2014. Article by Jeff Kingston*

**May 20, 1980:** The uprising had started on 18 May, mostly in the universities. By 20 May there were 3,000 paratroopers in the city. At approximately 2:30 pm, paratroopers began firing flamethrowers at the Seobang intersection. Several citizens were burned to death on the spot. (http://populargusts.blogspot.kr/2008/05)

[This account was found on the post of a full-time blogger living in Seoul. As no sources are given, it is difficult to assess its reliability.]

**May 21, 1980:** The issue of firing from helicopters. “The Army was confirmed to have used 500MD attack helicopters and UH-1H [military] utility helicopters to fire

[This is the official statement made on 7 February 2018 by attorney Lee Geon-ri who was the head of the Special Committee of the South Korean “Ministry of National Defense” investigating the uprising. Firing from helicopters had already been reported by witnesses in particular by Methodist Reverend Arnold Peterson who also stated that right after the helicopter raid, a group of dead and injured was rushed to Kwangju Christian Hospital. Another testimony was made by “Peace Corps” volunteer David Dolinger which is cited below). The previous statement was the first official recognition.

Lee also confirmed that Navy vessels sealed off the waters at Mokpo to prevent demonstrators from escaping via water. This action shows a will to, not only suppress the uprising, but also crush all people who had taken part.

Established in Sept. 2017, 37 years after the event of May 1980, on orders from President Moon Jae-in, the special committee had been tasked to find out whether helicopters opened fire on demonstrators.

In 1995 a prosecution office had concluded that “the helicopter shooting incident was a false claim and had never existed.” (http://english.donga.com/home/3/all/26/825734/1).

In 1980 was the airspace around Gwangju under US control? Gwangju was an active-duty US Air Force base until it was turned over to the Republic of Korea in 1991. The helicopters were certainly coming from the Gwangju Air Force base and could hardly take off without US knowledge. Clearly attack helicopters were not just for the purpose of observation.

Gwangju is also about 50km south of the US Air Base of Kunsan, the second largest in South Korea. The “621st Air Control Squadron” was responsible for air control of the Korean peninsula and surrounding waters. There were 12,000 US Air Force personnel in South Korea in 1990. It is highly likely that, given the disproportion of air forces and missions, the US side had a predominant role in airspace control.

The Seventh Air Force, headquartered at Osan Air Base, was the command element for all US Air Force organizations in South Korea. US Lockheed U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft patrolled the North Korean border and monitored the Soviet Union’s air and naval activities in the Sea of Japan area.]

**May 21, 1980:** Peace Corps Volunteer David Dolinger described the scene in Kwangju after returning to the city on the afternoon of the 21st.

> As we neared downtown I heard a helicopter approaching and I saw the people in the streets running for cover. I was told that the troops had been flying over since the morning and shooting into any crowds that they spotted. I then saw it for myself. As the helicopter flew over downtown I saw a soldier lean out of the
Fig. 6.20b  Acknowledgement of firing from helicopters on demonstrators. **Left:** Attorney Lee Geun-ri, head of a special Ministry of National Defense committee investigating the military's response to the May 1980 Democratic Movement, presents the findings during a press conference at the Ministry of Defence on Feb. 7, 2018. (Yonhap News).  **Right:** Former employees who worked at the Jeonil building in downtown Gwangju inspect bullet holes left by helicopter fire on the buildings 10th floor on Feb. 23, 2017. The “National Institute of Forensic Scientists” determined that the marks were left by helicopter fire that struck the inside of the broadcasting building. (Yonhap News). The red dots are on the left of the bullet holes (that are hardly visible. There are 31 marked holes (plus perhaps some on the right which are not visible). This is more than the 30 rounds contained in the magazine of a M16 automatic rifle. This shows that it is a machine gun (not a rifle) which fired these shots. *Source:* http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/831456.html

Fig. 6.20c  Pictures of the MD 500 (left) and UH-1H (right) helicopters used in May 1980.  *Source: Internet*

side door and fire his gun. On Thursday [May 22] I visited the major hospitals where I saw those wounded by the fire from the helicopters. All had wounds of the upper torso with the projectile’s trajectory going downwards.

(http://populargusts.blogspot.kr/2008/05)

[In order for the volunteer to be able to see a soldier leaning out of the helicopter it must have been very close. This account was found on the post of a full-time blogger living in Seoul. As no sources are given, it is difficult to assess its reliability. However, the story of soldiers firing on crowds from helicopters seemed to have become an accepted fact as can be seen from the following statement made in 2014 in the “Japan Times” by Alexis Dudden, a professor of history at the University of Connecticut: “How is it possible that the United States’ first so-called human rights
president (Jimmy Carter) was commander in chief of the chain of command that OK’d helicopter gunship attacks on civilians?”

May 21, 1980: The mystery of the retreat of the troops. On May 21, there were 3,000 troops in the city with tanks and helicopters and yet, in the evening of that day they retreated to the outskirts of the city. We are told that they were waiting for reinforcements. The city center and the Provincial Hall were retaken only 6 days later in the early hours of 27 May. What was the purpose of this strategy? During these 6 days several rallies for the defense of democracy were held in front of the Provincial Hall. However, one wonders how the city could receive supplies of food, medical supplies or other needed items. Incidentally, there were some parallels between the uprising in Gwangju and the upheaval of May-June 1989 in Beijing. In both cases, the movement was started by students. In both cases, buses were used to block the streets, were driven into troops and eventually set on fire.

Jun 1980: Overlooking the fresh bloodstains, Washington approved $600 million in loans from the US Export-Import Bank for purchasing US nuclear technology, a vote of confidence aimed at reassuring international financial markets and thereby propping up the regime of General Chun Doo-hwan. In early 1981, less than one year after the massacre, General Chun was President Ronald Reagan’s guest of honor at the White House. (Japan Times 17 May 2014)

Dec 9, 1980: There was an arson attack on the US Information Service Office in the southwest city of Kwangju. (Lee 1999, p. 60; Cumings 1997 p. 385) [Bruce Cumings says that “this was the first of many anti-American acts” but provides no further details. It can be noted that this attack was not reported in the New York Times. During their trial the defendants said that they attacked the cultural center because of US support in the suppression of the Kwangju uprising.]

Feb 3, 1981: During his visit in Washington, President Chun Doo Hwan met with President Reagan. Congressional aides said the Administration had asked Congress to delay publication of a report on human rights violations in nations around the world to avoid embarrassing President Chun. (NYT 3 February 1981) [This was less than 9 months after the suppression of the Kwangju uprising by Major General Chun Doo Hwan. Back in 1961, General Park Chung Hee had been invited to Washington some 6 months after his coup against the civilian Korean government. Another parallel is that President Chun continued the repression throughout 1981 just as General Park had done after his visit to Washington (see above). According to Cumings (1997, p. 379), some 37,000 civil servants, journalists, teachers, unionists
and students were sent into purification camps. It can be observed that this method of repression was similar to the “Bodo League” policy set up under President Rhee in 1948-1950.]

**Mar 21, 1981:** The United States will sell 36 F-16 jetfighters to South Korea. The sale will also include training and technical aid. (NYT 27 March 1981)

**Mar 18, 1982:** The burning of the American Cultural Center in Pusan by unknown arsonists on 18 March was seen by many Koreans as the most serious anti-American incident in South Korea in decades. Youthful attackers spread gasoline in the hall of the Cultural Center, causing a fire that destroyed the first floor of the three-story building, killing a student visitor. Leaflets distributed at the mission in Pusan just before the fire on Thursday warned of more anti-American attacks. The police questioned some 16,000 people nationwide, especially in Seoul, and carried out house-to-house searches in Pusan but the culprits have not been caught yet. (NYT 20 March 1982, 28 March 1982 p. 3)

**Mar 20, 1982:** Dissidents demanding that Washington withdraw its 40,000 troops from South Korea set fire to an American Government office in the first attack on an American mission in South Korean history. (NYT 20 March 1982)

[Contrary to what is stated in the article, this was by no means the first attack on an “American mission”. During the period 1945-1948 there were numerous attacks on buildings and personnel of the occupation forces and in December 1980 there was an attack against the US Information Service in Kwangju (see above).

It can also be noted that on 19 March 1982 there was a bomb attack on the US cultural center in West Berlin. On the same day, two cars belonging to American military personnel were destroyed by bombs in Salonika (Greece) and an American school in Athens was damaged by arson.]

**Mar 21, 1982:** The police detained more than 5,700 people in Seoul in an overnight search for arsonists who set fire to a United States International Communications Agency office in Pusan (that is to say an American Cultural Center). Most of those held in the sweep were reprimanded or sent to summary courts but 200 were held for further questioning [probably many of them were tortured as revealed in the subsequent trial]. The Government offered a reward of $30,000 for any information. The police said they were looking for about six suspects, including a man already wanted in connection with a fire at a United States Information Service Office in the southwest city of Kwangju in December 1980. (NYT 21 March 1982)

**Jun 1982:** 16 people went on trial on charges of burning down a United States cultural center in Pusan on 18 March 1982. One student was killed in the fire. As
the building was burning leaflets demanding the withdrawal of American troops from Korea were thrown from nearby buildings. A defense lawyer said 9 defendants could receive the death penalty under the nation’s tough National Security Law. (NYT 15 June 1982, 9 March 1983 p. 8)

[Eventually two of the defendants were sentenced to death. Both are Catholics, one is a theology student, the other is employed in a Catholic education center. This episode shows that the “National Security Law” can also be used for actions directed against the United States even though they are not done by Communists or in relation with North Korea.]

**Jul 15, 1982:** According to the “Japan Emergency Christian Conference on Korean Problems” which has a staff of Japanese and Americans: “The use of torture today is more systematic than at any previous time in modern Korean history”. (NYT 15 July p. 4)

**Feb 8, 1985:** Kim Dae Jung, South Korea’s leading dissident politician, was confined to his house in Seoul. A dispute swelled over a roughing-up that he and supporters suffered at the hands of the police when he returned home from exile in the United States. Two United States Representatives and two other Americans [one of whom was Prof. Bruce Cumings] who accompanied Mr. Kim said officers beat them as they left the airplane that brought them to Seoul from Narita, Japan. They walked off the plane arm in arm, they said, but a squad of policemen rushed in to separate them. Several of them said later that they and Mr. Kim had been punched and kicked and that one of them, possibly two, had been hurled to the ground. (NYT 9 February 1985 p. 1)

[In his book “Korea’s place in the Sun”, Prof. Cumings gives the following narrative.
I was fortunate to be part of an American delegation that accompanied Kim Dae Jung back to Seoul after his exile in the United States. A phalanx of KCIA thugs pummeled and threw to the floor prominent Americans (two congressmen were on the delegation) while roughly snatching Kim and his wife into a waiting car and subsequent months of house arrest.
Needless to say, this action at the airport was ill advised and useless for the police or KCIA could have put Kim under house arrest at any moment after the departure of the Americans.]

**Feb 11, 1985:** The controversy over the violence that broke out last Friday [8 February] when the exiled opposition leader Kim Dae Jung returned home took a new turn today. The United States Ambassador to South Korea charged that some members of a group of prominent Americans had deliberately provoked the violence. The
accusation was rejected as “absolutely false” by the Americans. (NYT p. 1)

**Feb 12, 1985:** President Reagan said today that “bad judgment on both sides” had led to the melee at the Seoul airport between South Korean security agents and an American delegation accompanying the opposition leader Kim Dae Jung on his return from two years’ exile in the United States. The President added that South Korea has made “great strides in democracy”. (NYT p. 3)

[This is a standard statement for semi-dictatorships which are friendly to the United States: the situation is not yet completely satisfactory but much progress has been achieved.]

**May 27, 1985:** A group of students occupied the US Information Service in Seoul for 4 days. The end of the occupation came at 12:04 pm when the students emerged with arms linked, carrying a handmade South Korean flag and chanting, “Down with the military dictatorship of Chun Doo Hwan”, the South Korean President. (NYT p. 4)

[The students belonged to the so-called Sammint’u group. This group was suppressed in 1986 under the National Security Law. (Savada 1990, p. 242)]

**Oct 21, 1986:** Wall posters placed around the Konkuk University campus called for the withdrawal of United States military forces from South Korea. The police stormed five buildings held by protesting university students arresting more than 1,000 students after a 2-hour battle in which the protesters hurled gasoline bombs and set the buildings ablaze. The police said 50 students had been injured in the assault, 3 of them seriously. Three of the buildings were destroyed by fire (NYT p. 9)

**Jan 14, 1987:** Many students were arrested in the 1980s. Park Jong-chul, the president of the student council in the linguistics department of Seoul National University, was one of them. Park refused to confess the whereabouts of one of his fellow activists. During the interrogation, authorities used waterboarding techniques to torture him eventually leading to his death on 14 January. (New York Times 31 January 1987)

**Jun 9, 1987:** During a protest demonstration a Yonsei student, Lee Han-yeol, was fatally injured when a tear gas grenade hit him in his head. (Washington Post 9 July 1987)

**Dec 31, 1987:** In 1987 over 260,000 tear gas shells were used to quell demonstrations. According to government statistics in 1988 there were 6,500 demonstrations involving 1.7 million people; in 1989 there were 6,800 demonstrations involving a total of 2.2 million people. (Savada 1990 p. 311)
**1988:** Even at present time, 40 years after the establishment of the Republic of Korea and 35 years after the end of the Korean war, the Korean military forces are still under the control of an American general. (Song 1989 p. 401)

**1988:** Small groups of students staged more than 25 raids on US diplomatic and military facilities in Korea, (Savada 1990, p. 242)

**Jun 7, 1988:** A student who set himself on fire Saturday (i.e. June 3) to protest the American and Government roles in the Kwangju killings died. It was the third student political suicide in a month. (NYT 7 June 1988)

**Feb 1989:** Seizure of the US Information Center Library in Seoul. (Savada 1990 p. 242)

**Apr 1989:** Dong Eui University in Pusan. Six riot police officers trying to storm a library building were killed in a fire set by students occupying the building. (NYT 24 May 1989)

**Oct 14, 1989:** Before departing for a visit to Washington where he will address the US Congress, President Roh Tae Woo defended his record on human rights, saying the arrests of several hundred dissidents in recent months, as well as the indictment of Kim Dae Jung, the country’s most prominent opposition leader, were prompted by specific violations of the law and not carried out to suppress dissent. President Roh Tae Woo also said that South Korea will increase its share of the cost of stationing American military forces. (NYT 14 October 1989)

**Dec 1989:** Occupation of the US ambassador’s residence by 6 students. (Savada 1990, p. 242)

**Aug 1996:** Former presidents Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo were convicted in August 1996 of treason, mutiny and corruption. Chun was sentenced to death, later commuted to life imprisonment, while Roh’s 22-year jail sentence was reduced to 17 years on appeal. Both were released from prison in December 1997, pardoned by President Kim Young-sam. (Wikipedia article entitled “Roh Tae-woo”)
[In this (fairly rare) instance two former presidents were tried and sentenced.]

**Feb 25, 1998** Former civil right advocate Kim Dae Jung won the presidential election.
Surprisingly, in spite of the fact that he was himself kidnapped in Tokyo by the KCIA in 1973 and sentenced under the “National Security Law” in the wake of the Kwangju uprising in 1980, his action as president fell short of the expectation of many Koreans. The “National Security Law” was neither abolished nor substantially amended. According to Amnesty International, 302 political prisoners were imprisoned during
President’s Kim first year in office.
It is true that there was an amnesty in the spring of 1999, but 83% of the 8,812 persons who were claimed to be released had in fact already been released previously. (Suh 2001, p. xv)

**Mar 24, 2011:** The number of US soldiers found guilty in Korean courts of committing crimes has jumped more than 2.5 times over the past five years, according to an analysis of court results posted on the website of the United States Forces Korea. The analysis shows that 48 US servicemen were convicted in Korean courts in 2007, 66 in 2008, 87 in 2009 and 128 in 2010 (the total for these 4 years is 329)
Of the 128 US servicemen found guilty in Korean courts in 2010, 28 were charged for driving under the influence of alcohol, 24 for assault, 14 for theft, 9 for burglary and one for rape. (Korea Times 24 March 2011)
[The fact that there were 128 trials in Korean courts does probably not provide a good estimate of the annual number of incidents because according to the “Status of Forces Agreement” only the most serious offenses can be tried in Korean courts and even in such cases Korean authorities can renounce to that right.]

**Jun 16, 2012:** The Korean National Police Agency in South Korea has released statistics showing a rising number of rapes, robberies, thefts, and other acts of violence committed by the troops and other personnel working for the US military, in the past few years. In the past decade, the total number of such incidents in South Korea has been about 225. (Website of the Korean newspaper Choson Ilbo, english.chosun.com)
[How does this statistic compare with the figure (given above) of 329 Americans sentenced in Korean courts over 2007-2010? Probably many of these sentences were for driving offenses or disorderly behavior without violence against persons.]

**Jun 16, 2012:** US Forces Korea (USFK) Commander Gen. James Thurman, has proposed that Seoul and Washington keep the Combined Forces Command even after the handover of full operational control of Korean troops in December 2015. Thurman proposed that it should be headed by a Korean officer instead of the USFK chief, as at present. (Website of the Korean newspaper Choson Ilbo, english.chosun.com)

**Jul 27, 2012:** Ansan, Gyeonggi Province. Some 150 workers of the car part producer SJM were attacked by about 200 people from a security firm hired by the company. Wearing helmets and protective gear, they wielded clubs and shields, sprayed fire extinguishers, and threw pieces of metal to force the unionists out of the plant. Some 34 workers suffered injuries, including 10 who were inside a building and jumped out of windows to escape the attackers.
Although the police was called at 4:30 am when the security firm people intruded,
they did not arrive until 5:30 am. Once there, they did not take any action when the security firm people left the plant at 6:30 am.

(Korea Times 1 August 2012)

One day later a second article in the Korea Times gave the following precisions.

- The name of the security firm was “Contact us”; it was headed by Moon Sung-ho who was a member of the ruling government party, the Saenuri Party.
- Moon was a campaign team member for candidate Lee Myung-bak (the current president in 2012) during the 2007 presidential election. He also ran as a Saenuri Party candidate in the local elections in 2010.
- I seems that Contactus has provided security services for the Saenuri Party on many occasions; as a result the party recommended Moon as head of the firm.
- The main opposition party, the “Democratic United Party” (DUP) called for a thorough investigation of the incident and pointed out that the security service industry has shown rapid growth under the Lee Myung-bak administration.

[This is of course a kind of story that is very common not only in South Korea but in other countries as well. However, it takes a special significance in Korea because of the collusion between the ruling party and right-wing groups acting under the umbrella of the police which was an important feature of the post-war years when there was a raging confrontation between leftists and rightists. Although in 2012 the social situation is much less tense, this story shows a permanence in the attitudes of both police and ruling party. It can be added that, as in former times, President Lee is a staunch pro-US ally.]

**Jul 18, 2013**  Seoul and Washington agreed in February 2007 to hand back full troop control to Seoul by April 17, 2012, but former president Lee Myung-bak and Obama agreed in 2010 to postpone the handover to Dec. 1, 2015. This handover would mean the end for Combined Forces Command under US leadership. However, on 18 July 2013 it was learned that Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin has asked his US counterpart Chuck Hagel to postpone [to after 2015] the transfer of full operational control of Korean troops to Seoul. Kim made the request when he met Hagel in Singapore last month. After the transfer the decades-old ROK-US Combined Forces Command is supposed to separate US and Korean command structures, alongside a new alternative body that will be headed by a Korean general. (Chosun Ilbo 18 July 2013, Korea Times 18 July 2013)

[The last sentence is not very clear.]

**Jul 22, 2013**  Korean contribution to the cost of maintaining US forces in South Korea. In 2012 the fee for the 28,500 American soldiers composing the US Forces in Korea (USFK) was $745 millions. The amount is set every year by a so-called “Special Measures Agreement” (SMA) whose broad lines are discussed every 5 years.
The SMA supplements the “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA). In addition, Korea covers the “Korean Augmentation to the United States Army” (KATUSA) and indirect costs such as providing land for bases and firing ranges for free along with exemption from taxation and special rates for electricity and telephone. Korea also pays a part of the salaries of the Korean civilians hired by the USFK and of the construction cost of military facilities. (Korea Times 22 July 2013)

[Because of the many facets for which no precise figures are given it is difficult to estimate the total cost for Korea. One can also add that due to compatibility requirements South Korea is bound to buy US military equipment. Clearly, such a monopoly market will not provide competitive prices.]

**Aug 8, 2013** South Korean Navy officials were seeking an injunction against the release of a film questioning Seoul’s claim that North Korea was behind the 2010 sinking of the Cheonan warship. The naval corvette sank with the loss of 46 lives on the night of March 26, 2010, near the South’s disputed Yellow Sea border with the North. An investigation by a South Korean-led international commission (and including experts from the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Sweden) concluded it had been sunk by a torpedo from a North Korean submarine. The documentary film “Project Cheonan” was produced by prominent left-wing filmmaker Chung Ji-young and highlights various theories that cast doubt on the commission’s findings. It cites several experts who question the result of the probe, including one who suggests the vessel had probably sunk after colliding with a submarine of unknown origin. The documentary premiered at the Jeonju International Film Festival, with the Defense Ministry criticizing the film and asking it not to be shown in theaters. The documentary’s nationwide screening is scheduled for early September 2013. (Japan Times (AFP-Jiji) 8 August 2013; Korea Times 7 August 2013)

[It is probable that the legal basis for this “injunction” will be the National Security Law on the motive that this film might be inspired by pro-North Korea nationals. Needless to say, the end result of such a move is to block any discussion of the official thesis.]

**Aug 2, 2014** Harassment in the South Korean Army. In South Korea, all able-bodied male youth are required to serve approximately two years in the military or police.

- In 2005 a conscript who was bullied at a frontline base went on a shooting rampage killing 8 soldiers.
- Ganghwa Island. On 4 July 2011 four Marines lost their lives in a shooting spree by a 19-year-old corporal, Kim Min-chan, who claims to have been a victim of bullying in his military barracks.
- 28th Division in Yeoncheon, south of the border with North Korea. In April
2014, a 23-year-old Army private first class surnamed Yoon died after being beaten by 6 of his colleagues at their barracks. The investigation revealed that he was also sexually molested and had suffered frequent assaults and abusive treatment by his fellow soldiers.

- In June 2014 an Army sergeant who had been bullied by his colleagues went on a shooting rampage, killing 5 and wounding 7 others.

According to the Defense Ministry, sex crimes in the barracks have been on a steady rise in recent years: 327 in 2009, 338 in 2010, 426 in 2011, 453 in 2012.

According to a military document, a total of 82 soldiers committed suicide in 2010, up from 65 in 2005.

According to Representative Shin Hak-yong, only 14% of 57 harassment perpetrators against female soldiers since 2003 faced tough punishment such as dismissal [can dismissal be called a tough punishment?].

(Korea Times: 25 October 2010, 17 July 2011, 27 October 2013, 1 August 2014)

[Are such treatments a legacy of the Japanese occupation or US occupation\textsuperscript{171} or are they rooted in Korean culture?]

It seems that this kind of behavior is not limited to the army. According to the testimony of a journalist of the Korea Times: “When I transferred to a high school as a sophomore, my new classmates humiliated me whenever possible”.

With respect to a total number of 690,000 military personnel the 82 suicides in 2010 correspond to a rate of 11.9 per 100,000.

\textsuperscript{171}There have been news about harassment in Japanese sport teams and about sexual assaults in US military units. Moreover abusing conscripts is a well established tradition at US Marines boot camps that is to say at training camps for military recruits.
Global quantitative data

Number of deaths in South Korean security forces before the Korean War

How many Koreans died during the incidents and uprisings that occurred between 1945 and August 1948?

This is a very difficult question. However, one knows how many were killed in the police and constabulary because these numbers are given (along with the names of the deceased) at the War Memorial in Seoul. The figures are as follows.

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<th></th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
<th>Police</th>
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</tbody>
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Notes: Unfortunately the source does not give any information about the dates and places where the deaths occurred. Source: Tables of the War Memorial, Seoul

Number of prisoners

The number of Koreans in prison provides an indirect measure of the level of disturbances. The graph shows that there was a sharp increase immediately after the occupation.

Then, from mid-1946 to mid 1949 there was an exponential increase which an acceleration in 1949. As a matter of fact, after the creation of the Bodo League on 20 April 1949 the number of prisoners no longer reflects the actual number of the people who were in custody or semi-custody. The Bodo League organized camps for the “re-education” of leftists. In June 1950 there were about 300,000 inmates in these camps, 10 times more than in regular prisons.
Fig. 7.1 Number of prisoners in national prisons. After the defeat of Japan as anti-Japanese fighters were liberated there was a short-lived fall in the number of prisoners. In the aftermath of the uprising of the fall of 1946 some 30,000 persons were arrested which lead to a surge in the number of prisoners which lasted for several months. It is likely that temporary facilities had to be created to house this huge inflow of prisoners. The creation of the Bodo League in early 1949 League permitted an arbitrary and broad extension of quasi-imprisonment in re-education camps. These quasi-prisoners were not included in the graph. Source: Ch.3, Section “Number of prisoners”; Chronology: 1 May 1946, 12 and 26 November 1947; Savada (1990).
Chapter 8
Enduring US influence

Armed forces

The Korean armed forces are dependent on the United States in several ways.

- As already mentioned, the Combined US-Korean Command is headed by a US general. There are some discussions which may eventually (in 20015 or later) result in the appointment of a Korean general as the Chief of the Combined Command. However, this would not fundamentally modify the situation. There are several reasons to that.

- The United States maintains a nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Needless to say, this has become of particular importance after North Korea tested nuclear weapons.

- Any modern army is dependent upon its supply of weapons. If the weapons to be used by a country $A$ are produced in a country $B$, the way in which they are used by $A$ will to some extent be under the control of $B$. A clear illustration was provided during the Second World War. Both British and French troops were equipped with US material; as a result, the undisputed leader was the United States. In Korea, the United States has dissuaded$^{172}$ the Korean industry to develop several kinds of advanced weapons particularly rockets, missiles, fighter aircraft.

Next, one should address the question of the influence of the Korean Army on other government sectors: intelligence agencies, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and particularly relations with North Korea, Ministry of Justice particularly regarding the role of the National Security Act.

In our opinion, it would be fruitless to conduct such an analysis at an institutional level. A more effective method is to study the response of these institutions to specific events. The next sections provide some preliminary observations in a few cases.

The Vietnam War

$^{172}$A milder statement would be to say that it had not encouraged the development of some kinds of weapons; the end result is the same, however.
South Korea sent a force of some 45,000 to Vietnam. In exchange Korea was granted additional financial and economic aid from the United States.

In this section we want to focus on two specific questions:

1. Korean headquarters claimed that in Vietnam, the Korean forces were under Korean command. Is that true?

2. President Park repeatedly stated that only volunteers were sent to Vietnam. Is that true?

To answer these questions we will mainly rely on the official history written by the US Army (Larsen and Collins 1985).

**Were the Korean forces under Korean command?**

Larsen and Collins observe that the Koreans did not wish to come under de jure US operational control because they thought that the Vietnam War was an opportunity to show that they could operate on their own without American forces or advisers looking over their shoulders. For political reasons the State Department wanted to sell the same message. However, it is quite understandable that the US Army headquarters had another opinion. An obvious solution to this dilemma was to have a non-written understanding. That is precisely what was done. Larsen and Collins give the following account.

- First it should be observed that before the Korean forces could be sent to Vietnam they had to be released by the US Commander of the United Nations Command.
- General Westmoreland, the US commander in Vietnam in 1965, would exercise operational control over all Korean forces in Vietnam. In 1965 after additional discussion with General Chae, General Westmoreland realized that a formal signed arrangement could be politically embarrassing to the Koreans because it might conote that they acting as mercenaries for the United States. General Westmoreland felt that a formal arrangement was not necessary since General Chae had agreed to de facto operational control by US commanders. It was understood that although directives to Korean units would be in the form of requests they would be honored as orders.
- One should realize that whether or not there was a de jure or a de facto agreement in fact made little difference because the Korean forces were equipped and supplied by the United States. This was an effective means of control which had already been used in similar situations: in China with respect to Nationalist forces (1942-1949), in Turkey (see the book by Richard Robinson), during the first Vietnam war with respect to French forces (1950-1954). The only argument that Korean forces could have been tempted to use in bargaining with US headquarters would have been to put their very participation in the balance but this was of course impossible for political reasons. However, it should be observed that a US request made in
1968 for additional Korean troops was turned down by the Park government (see in this respect the thesis of Jiyul Kim (1991).

- Korean officers were assigned to the US headquarters to assist in matters relating to Korean units. However, this did not constitute a combined staff. The Korean officers would rather serve as liaison officers which means that they would transmit US “requests” to the Korean forces.
- During one of his visits to Vietnam President Park told General Westmoreland that he was proud to have Koreans fight under Westmoreland’s command.
- We do not really know how “deep” US operational control extended. Were there US advisers at the battalion or regiment levels? The answer may have been different depending on circumstances. For instance, the official history does not tell us anything about the role of Korean troops during the Tet offensive.

**The perks of volunteering to go to Vietnam**

President Park insisted that only volunteers be sent to Vietnam. In fact, the question of whether the Koreans who went to Vietnam were volunteers is almost meaningless for the rewards for doing so were so substantial that probably all Korean servicemen wanted to go to Vietnam. Here is a short list of the main advantages.

- The tour of duty was only one year. The fatality rate was low because in their operations the Korean forces always insisted on a huge tactical superiority. Thus, the ratio of enemy to friendly casualties was 10 to 1 or even higher. For the whole war the fatality rate of Korean troops was about the same as for US troops.
- Initially, the Koreans asked for the same duty pay as received by US personnel. Although not quite as high as requested, the final compromise included “a very substantial increase in pay for the troops deployed”. In addition, the United States accepted to pay death and disability payments.

Annual US costs for the operation of one Korean division in Vietnam were estimated at $40 million.

- The Korean side provided additional privileges. The soldiers would receive credit for 3 years of military duty for each year served in Vietnam. Furthermore, combat duty would enhance their future Army careers.

**Military cooperation**

“Cooperation” is not really the right word for in fact the United States has had operational command over Korean forces ever since South Korea got its own government on 15 August 1948. According to current plans, Seoul’s retaking of wartime operational command over its troops from the United States will take place in December 2015 (Korea Times 26 March 2012).
Coups d’état

At the time of writing (April 2012) one has still a vivid recollection of the coup d’état that occurred in Egypt in February 2011. At the time, all western media wrote that president Mubarak resigned. This was not true however as became clear subsequently. In fact, he was put under house arrest by the military. Why do we mention this episode? Because this was one of the few cases where US influence would appear in broad daylight.173

First, on 31 January, the State Department sent former ambassador Frank G. Wisner to meet President Mubarak. The New York Times suggested that “the administration was using him as an emissary to gently prod Mr. Mubarak to resign” (NYT 31 Jan). Then on 1 February President Obama declared that an “orderly transition must begin now”. According to the NYT in a 30-minute phone call to Mr. Mubarak Mr. Obama was even more forceful. Alas, Mr. Mubarak declared that he would leave in September 2011. That was not quick enough. When Mr. Mubarak nevertheless refused to yield the Egyptian army (which has a close connection with the US) stepped in and on February 10, Mr. Mubarak was arrested and the media reported that he “resigned”.

In this case, the Obama administration was seen as the force which pushed out a dictator for so he was suddenly called in US media who had found him an acceptable strongman for some 20 years.

In the case of Korea, there was one example where US influence was applied to obtain the resignation of a real dictator, namely President Rhee, but there were also several cases where US influence served to usher in generals who turned out to be quite as authoritarian as President Mubarak had been.

Two examples are detailed in the chronology chapter. One occurred in May 1961 with the coming to power of General Park, the other, in December 1979, brought to power General Chun Doo Hwan. In both cases, the US command ensured the success of one faction over the rest of the army by refusing to move loyal units against the insurgents. In both cases also, the successful generals were invited to the White House within 6 to 9 months after coming to power and despite their brutal crackdowns on opponents.

173It shows in particular that such decisions are made at the highest level, that is to say by the president and his advisers and not (as sometimes suggested) by unknown officials of the State Department. This was seen quite clearly in the Mubarak case because Ms. Clinton and the State Department wanted President Mubarak to remain in power until September 2011 but their opinion did not prevail.
Quick outline

In the previous chapters we tried to give a fairly detailed account. However, if one just wishes a broad outline of the occupation, then the occupation of Japan may provide a useful blue-print. This is a paradox because formally the two occupations were very different.

- In South Korea, there was a Military Government which means that the government of the country was assumed by the occupying power. On the contrary, in Japan there was no Military Government; a Japanese Government remained in power at least formally. In reality, however, the Japanese government had no autonomy whatsoever. All its decisions had to be approved by SCAP; moreover, many of its decrees simply implemented directives issued by SCAP either in the form of SCAPINs (SCAP Instructions) or transmitted through the Central Liaison Committee which served as the bridge between SCAP and the Japanese government.

- There was of course another major difference in the sense that whereas Japan was a defeated country, Korea was a liberated country whose guerrilla fighters had to some extent contributed to the defeat of Japan.

What nevertheless made the two occupations fairly similar is a basic principle of planning according to which it is easier to repeat standard procedures than to design new ones. Any military occupation has a great number of facets and for many of them the solutions already used in Japan (and for that matter also in Italy or Germany) were transposed to Korea. Let us give a few examples.

1. The control of foreign trade was taken over by the occupation authorities. In both cases, this resulted in a drastic reduction. In 1946 Japanese exports were 1.3% of their value in 1949; similarly, in 1946 South Korean exports were 5.0% of their level in 1949 (Mitchell 1982, p. 395). Not surprisingly, this led to extensive black market operations.

2. In Japan SCAP required from the Central Bank that it put to its disposal the

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174 In physics this may be called a “first-order approximation”. 
amount that it required. Similarly, in Korea the MG was able to draw on an overdraft account at the Bank of Choson. Whereas on 6 August 1945 there were 4 billion yen in circulation in all Korea, by the end of 1948 the overdraft of the Bank of Choson stood at 38 billion yen (Nenderson 1968). Not surprisingly, this led to high inflation. Between 1945 and 1947 consumer prices were multiplied by 13 in Japan and by 10 in South Korea (Mitchell 1982 p. 683 and Henderson 1968).

3 In both countries, industrial facilities that could be used for the production of weapons were destroyed. This resulted in a considerable reduction in industrial production. Thus, in Japan the production of pig iron was reduced from 3.6 million tons in 1940 to 0.21 million ton in 1946 (Mitchell 1982 p. 334).

4 Military courts (i.e. military commissions and provost courts) were introduced in both countries to try offenses against occupation forces. In Japan there were some 140 trials per million population during their first year of operation. In the case of South Korea, the figure is not yet known but one would expect a somewhat higher figure because there were more disturbances than in Japan.

5 In both countries a strict censorship of mail and telephone calls was introduced for security reasons. Military archives show that even letters addressed to political leaders (e.g. Syngman Rhee) were intercepted, read and translated in English.

6 In both countries, personnel review boards were introduced to investigate the “loyalty” of people. In Japan these boards focused on militaristic activity before the war whereas in Korea they investigated collaboration with the Japanese. Precise criterions were defined to give these investigation an appearance of objectivity. However, it is well known that many former militarist and many former collaborators kept their positions which suggests that the real criterions were somewhat different from what was claimed. As a matter of fact the screening was rather about political attitude: whether or not the persons opposed the American occupation or whether they were leftist or anti-Communist. The focus on anti-Communism became stronger in parallel with the worsening of the military situation of Chiang Kai shek in China.

7 In both countries, elections were organized during the first year of the occupation. In Japan candidates who opposed the occupation were not allowed to run or were discarded even after having been elected\footnote{The most spectacular case was the dismissal of Mr. Hatoyama who had won the elections and had already be called to be Prime Minister by the Emperor.}. In Korea the candidates were either allies of Rhee or independents.

**Lucid Americans**

The fact that Syngman Rhee’s leadership would lead to a totalitarian dictatorship was recognized fairly early (that is to say by the end of 1946) by several lucid Americans.
who were working for the Military Government. Unfortunately, they did not prevail.

- The name of Richard Robinson comes immediately to mind. He saw fairly clearly that a policy solely based on anti-Communism would certainly not lead to a democratic government.

- This opinion is shared by another MG officer whose notes can be found in the archives of the MG (NARA, RG 554, Box 16). He makes the following observations. “Since his return to Korea his [Syngman Rhee’s] insatiable greed has disheartened those who wanted originally to work with him. His well-stuffed bank accounts offer striking contrast to the poverty of the people”. “In the lexicon of Dr. Rhee anyone who does not submit to his personal authority is a Communist, though many of the individuals thus libeled have records vastly more free of totalitarian thought patterns than his own”. “It would not be possible to have Syngman Rhee as leader of a democratic Korea. It would be possible to make him the Fuehrer of a totalitarian state. To do so would be easy but it would invite inevitable future disaster.”

Unfortunately the 3-page text from which the previous excerpts are extracted is neither dated nor signed. From the content one can assume that it was written toward the end of 1946 (it mentions Marshall’s policy in China) by somebody who was a close adviser of General Hodge.

Most of the observations are far-sighted except perhaps the last one. If the objective of the State Department was to build a bulwark against Communist influence, Rhee was indeed the right man. From that perspective, it was a success not a disaster.

Impact of the occupation on the future of Korea

To what extent did the occupation shape the future of South Korea? There are in fact two different issues in this question: the legacy of the occupation and the legacy of the Korean War. We begin by analyzing the second of these two components

The legacy of the Korean War

“The KATUSA Program is symbolic of ROK/US friendship and mutual support.” says one of the Wikipedia articles devoted to the American military bases in Korea. What is the KATUSA program?

KATUSA means “Korean Augmentation To the United States Army”. KATUSA soldiers are Korean draftees who serve in the US Army in Korea for the duration of their military service. In 2005 roughly 4,800 KATUSA soldiers served with 25,000 USFK, versus 11,000 in 1968. As the number of US Soldiers in South Korea decreases, the number of KATUSA soldiers is decreasing as well. The ratio of US soldiers to KATUSA soldiers is roughly 5:1. One of the important functions of KATUSA soldiers is to serve as translators between the local populace and the US Army.
The KATUSA program began in July of 1950, during the Korean War by informal agreement between President Syngman Rhee and Douglas MacArthur. In other words, it is a clear legacy of the Korean War, not of the occupation itself.

Can one say that US bases are a legacy of the Korean War as well? At first sight it may seem so. As one knows, by the end of 1949 the US Army had basically left Korea except for a group of US advisers, but what about the US Navy and the US Air Force? It seems that most Navy or Air Force bases of the United States in Korea were deactivated in 1949. So, it can indeed be said that, in contrast with Japan, US bases in Korea are a legacy of the Korean War and not of the occupation.

Needless to say, US military presence in Korea has become even more essential to South Korea after North Korea tested two atomic bombs in October 2006 and May 2009. It can be argued that these tests complicated reunification prospects and by making South Korea more dependent on and closer to the United States shifted the strategic balance at the expense of North Korea. In a sense, they had the same effect as a second Korean War. Ever since 1946 North Korea was presented as a threat by right-wing South Korean leaders. By making this threat more credible and conspicuous the North Korean nuclear capacity played right into their hands.

The legacy of the occupation

In the Preface it was mentioned that during the occupation of Japan the issuance of decrees by the government and the legislative activity of the Diet were largely controlled by the political department of SCAP\textsuperscript{176}. As a result, many (if not all) of the reforms introduced in Japan between 1945 and 1952 were shaped by American advisers. Not only had the drafts to be approved by SCAP before being introduced for discussion in the Diet, but a substantial number of the most important bills were in fact drafted by American advisers. Was there a similar process in South Korea?

It is true that in the first half of 1947 a flurry of ordinances were issued by the MG which defined several important aspects of the Korean polity. In the chronology we gave a close look at the case of the organization of the judicial system (see at the date of 1 June 1947). There were several similar cases. Most of these reforms were not (or only shortly) discussed in the Interim Assembly. They were drafted by committees in which American advisers had a prevailing influence; all the more so because the Korean members had been selected by the MG and therefore were unlikely to disagree on crucial points. All these ordinances began with the following sentence:

“Pending enactment of the Korean National Assembly, the following instructions shall govern.”

\textsuperscript{176}This point is explained in more detail in “Relations between Allied Forces and the population of Japan” by the same author.
After 15 August 1948, US advisers remained in activity in the various departments of the Korean government. What was the extent of their influence? At this point we do not know.
Appendix A
Aircraft accidents in South Korea (1945-1947)

Source: http://www.aviationarchaeology.com/src/db.asp

This database is only for US Air Force aircraft. US Navy aircraft and Marine Corps aircraft are not included.

DATABASE FIELDS (USAAF)
1) Date  Date is in YYMMDD (year-month-day) format. 441021 is 1944 October 21st.
2) Aircraft Type
3) Serial Number  Aircraft Serial Number
4) Sqdn  Squadron to which the aircraft was assigned
5) Group  Group to which the aircraft was assigned
6) Home Base  Air Base to which the aircraft was assigned
7) AF  Army Air Force to which the aircraft was assigned
8) Action  Type of accident. See our Action Codes List for what each of these abbreviations mean.
9) D  Damage to aircraft. 1 is minor damage and 4 or 5 means completely destroyed. Initially, the Air Force used a scale of 1 to 5 for damage, but toward the end of 1944 the scale was changed to 1 to 4; however a 5 was still occasionally used. Also, 0 is sometimes used to indicate no damage. In addition to using the number ratings ”minor Reports” also use: M- major damage (upper case M), m- minor damage (lower case m), O- major overhaul, BL- Blank (or column is left blank) exact amount of damage not given in report.

The US Navy uses letters: A means completely destroyed, D or E means almost no damage.
10) Pilot  Name of the pilot charged with the accident. This field does not list the entire crew. If you are looking for a crew member other than the pilot, try our Names Database.
11) Country  The Country the accident occurred in. See our Country Code List (abbreviations) and use the code to search for all crashes in that country.
12) US State  The US state in which the accident occurred.
13) Location  Be careful using this field, this is the least reliable way to search. If you find the accident, great, but if not, do not give up! Try searching other ways (date, pilot name, home base, etc). If the crash occurred in between two towns, which one would be listed? It might be neither; the report may list a town farther away, or it may list a different or incorrect place name altogether.

DATABASE FIELDS (US NAVY) (these events are within brackets [ ])
1) Date  Date is in YYMMDD (year-month-day) format. 441021 is 1944 October 21st.
2) Aircraft Type
3) BuNo  Number Bureau of Aeronautics Number
4) Sqdn  Squadron to which the aircraft was assigned
5) Wing  Wing to which the aircraft was assigned
6) Home Base  Air Base to which the aircraft was assigned
7) Action  Type of accident. See our Action Codes List for what each of these abbreviations mean.
8) D  Damage to aircraft. E or D is none or minor damage and A means completely destroyed.
9) Pilot  Name of the pilot charged with the accident. If you are looking for a crewmember, also try our Names Database.
10) Country  The country in which the accident occurred. See our Country Code List (abbreviations) and use the code to search for all crashes in that country.
11) US State - The US state in which the accident occurred (no applicable to overseas countries)
12) Approximate location of crash
13-) Remarks, name of crew members or passengers

MILITARY ACRONYMS
68 FS: 68th Fighter Squadron
ACG: Air commando group
AVG: American volunteer group (organized and led by Claire L. Chenault during 1938-1945; it was incorporated into the 14th Air Force after 1941)
AB: Air base
AAB: Army air base
BG (L,M,H): Bomber group (light, medium, heavy)
CATF: China air task force
CCG: Combat cargo group
GP bomb: General purpose bomb (a bomb that has both blast and fragmentation effects)
MACR: Mission air crew report
MAW: Marine air wing
NAS: Naval air station
NFS: Night fighter squadron
TAC: Chinese air transport (organized by Claire L. Chenault after 1945)
TCG: Troop carrier group
TCS: Troop carrier squadron
V: Heavier than air (Navy)
VB: Bombing squadron (Navy)
VC: Cargo transport squadron (Navy)
VF: Fighter squadron (Navy)
VMF: Marine Fighter squadrons (Navy)

COUNTRY ABBERIATIONS KOR=Korea CHI=China [anywhere within continental borders-except Formosa/Taiwan]

ABBREVIATIONS OF CAUSES
BB=Bomb blast
BO=Bail out (to escape by parachute)
BOEF=Bailed out, engine failure
BOW=Bailed out due to weather
CBL=Crashed, belly landing
C=Crash
CR=Crash [of unknown type]
CRL=Crash landing
CRW=Crash due to weather
FLEF=Forced landing due to engine failure
FLW=Forced landing due to weather
GAC=Ground accident
GL=Ground looped (failed looping)
KCR=Killed in a crash
KCRDF=Killed in a crash, destroyed by fire
LAC=Landing accident
LACF=Landing accident due to fire
MACB=Mid-air collision with bird
MIS=Missing In Service
TAC=Taxiing accident
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Aircraft accidents

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461116 P-51D-25NA 44-73884 68FS 8FG 5AF CBL 3 Higgins, William F KOR, Kimpo City/ 8mi S
461101 C-47B 43-49899 46TCS 317TCG 5AF KCR 4 Killian, Melvin J KOR, Taiden AS
461112 C-45F 44-87293 46TCS 317TCG 5AF LAC 3 Binns, Charles C KOR, Kimpo AAB
461115 P-51D-30NA 44-74288 431FS 475FG 5AF MACB 3 Ross, S L KOR, Kimpo AAB
461116 P-51D-25NA 44-73884 68FS 8FG 5AF CBL 3 Higgins, William F KOR, Kimpo City/ 8mi S

* 1946 DECEMBER
461203 F-6K-5NT 44-11942 82TRS 35FG 5AF BOEF 4 Bachle, Wilfred H KOR, Chinchon/ 6mi N
461213 C-45F 44-87290 46TCS 317TCG 5AF BO 4 Shearer, Dale H KOR, Koesan/ 14mi SE

* 1947 JANUARY
470114 P-51D-20NA 44-72110 432FS 475FG 5AF LAC 3 Ramsey, Robert A KOR, Kimpo AAB
470116 P-51D-30NA 44-74295 431FS 475FG 5AF LAC 3 Helms, Earl E KOR, Kimpo AAB

* 1947 FEBRUARY: nothing

* 1947 MARCH
470301 L-5B 44-16737 158LS 5AF MIS 4 Strong, Robert R KOR, Ongjin/ 14mi from
470316 F-9 44-83522 3BG 5AF TAC 3 Deutschendorf, Henry J KOR, Kimpo AB
470321 P-51D-30NA 44-74286 433FS 475FG 5AF MACB 3 Manning, Clark P KOR, Kimpo AB

* 1947 APRIL
470403 L-5B 44-16754 3ERS 5AF GAC 3 Simpson, Robert A KOR, Kimpo AAB

* 1947 MAY
C-45F 44-87146 46TCS 317TCG 5AF CBL 3 Pappas, Christ (NMI) KOR, Kimpo AB

* 1947 JUNE: nothing

* 1947 JULY
470715 C-47B 43-16298 46TCS 317TCG Kimpo AAB, KOR 5AF LAC 3 Paschall, Edward D KOR, Ongjin

* 1947 AUGUST: nothing
* 1947 SEPTEMBER: nothing
* 1947 OCTOBER: nothing
* 1947 NOVEMBER: nothing
* 1947 DECEMBER
471208 P-51D 44-73894 432FS 475FG Kimpo AAB, JPN 5 CRL 4 Palmer, Duncan JPN Kimpo AAB, KOR [?]

END OF LISTING
Acknowledgments

Started by 2009, this study has covered several years, basically until the end of 2015. During my two visits to Seoul, I have had contacts with several Korean scholars. While working at the Library of the National Assembly, at the National Library and at the Library of Seoul University I benefited from the kind support of staff and librarians. Moreover, one should not forget that the National Diet Library in Tokyo holds a large collection of microfiches which are copies of NARA records pertaining to the US occupation of Japan and South Korea. That brought me to visit the NDL several times.

Completing this research project would have been impossible without the help that I received from many persons who provided contacts, documents, advice and encouragements. In particular, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the following persons.

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177 “Chung” may also be spelled “Jeong”
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Acronyms, abbreviations and lexicon

Phonetic alphabet for radiograms

For reading radiograms or teletypes, it is useful to know the phonetic alphabet (as well as the abbreviations that are commonly in use). For instance, the words “William Charlie Love” do not refer to a person called “William C. Love” but represent the acronym WCL (e.g. WCL 35831 refers to a previous radiogram)


CMA=Comma, PD=Period, REOURAD=Reference our radiogram, YOURAD=Your radiogram

In the Navy, some of the letters A, I, N, O, P are pronounced as follows:
A:AFIRM, I:INTERROGATORY, N:NEGAT, O:OPTION, P:PREP

Acronyms and abbreviations

AIT: American Institute in Taiwan (de facto US embassy in Taiwan)
AMG: American Military Government
AMGOT: Allied Military Government for Occupied Territories (this expression was used in the early part of the occupation of Italy).
AMIK: American Mission in Korea. After mid-1949, AMIK comprised KMAG (Korea Military Advisory Group), the US embassy in Seoul, ECA (Economic Cooperation Administration) and JAS (Joint Administrative Services)
ANSP: Agency for National Security Planning (new name of the KCIA after 1981)
ARC: Archival Research Catalog: the search engine of the electronic catalog of NARA.
ASCOM: Army Support Command (logistics unit in US Army)
ASN: Army Serial Number (also called US Army Service Number).
For instance, 35425274 is the serial number of a serviceman who was enlisted in West Virginia (indicated by the number 35 which includes Indiana, Kentucky, Ohio, West Virginia) in March 1942.

AWOL: Absent without leave (means that a soldier has left its unit but is not yet considered a deserter)

Bn: Battalion (about 700 men)

BomMinRyon: Pan-Korean Alliance for Reunification (founded in 1990 in North Korea)

CCIGK: Civil Communications Intelligence Group in Korea (censorship section of the Military Government)

CDTRHV: Commission for Discovering Truth and Recovering Honor of Victims.
[This Commission was created by the Korean government in 2000 for the investigation of the Cheju rebellion and its suppression. This commission is distinct from the “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” (TRC) which was created in December 2005 and has a much broader objective.]

CG: Commanding General

CHL: Confinement at Hard Labor (sentence inflicted by US provost courts)

CHONNONG: National League of Peasant Unions (Chonguk Nongmin Chohap Chong Yonmaeng)

CHONPYONG: National Council of Korean Labor Unions (Choson Nodong Chohap Chonguk Pyonguihoe)

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency.

CIC: Counter Intelligence Corps (a kind of US Army FBI).

CIC: Civil Information Center (Public Relations department of the MG)

CID: Criminal Investigation Division. It is a service of the US Army which investigates law violations within the US Army. Nowadays it is called “US Army Criminal Investigation Command” but the former CID acronym has been kept.

CINCAFPAC: Commander in Chief, American Forces in the Pacific

CKCLH: Center for Korean Constitutional Law History (at Seoul National University).

CMA: Comma (used in military teletypes and radiograms)

Co: Company (about one hundred men)

CP: Command Post (US Army)

CPL: Corporal (US Army)

DIS: Department of Internal Security (a department of MG)
DPRK: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)
ECB: Engineer Construction Battalion
FOA: Foreign Occupied Areas (a subset of the collection of microfiches available at the National Diet Library)
FRUS: Foreign Relations of the United States (a collection of volumes)
G-2: Army intelligence. Each corps or division had its G-2 unit. Note that the US Navy had its own intelligence services which were part of the “Office of Naval Intelligence” (ONI).
G-3: US Army branch. Operations, including planning, training, combat development.
HAFMIDPA: Headquarters Army Forces Middle Pacific.
ILA: Interim Legislative Assembly
KATUSA: Korean Augmentation to the US Army (Koreans serving in the US Army in Korea)
KCIA: Korea Central Intelligence Agency (created in 1961 under the dictatorship of President Park Chung-hee’s, it was renamed “National Intelligence Service” in 1999.)
KCNA: Korean Central News Agency (News agency of North Korea)
[Instead of sticking to facts, this agency uses a rhetoric which spoils readability. Here is one example (13 October 2005): “This clearly proves once again that the US imperialists are the arch criminals of genocide and the sworn enemy of the Korean people”. Although this appaling style does not imply that all news given by this agency are necessarily wrong, their reliability is often hampered by lack of detail and no indication about sources.]
KDP: Korean Democratic Party (Syngman Rhee’s party)
KFLU: Korean Federation of Labor Unions (controlled by the KDP)
KI: Korean Independence (a newspaper published in Los Angeles, see reference chapter)
KILA: Korean Interim Legislative Assembly
KMAG: Korean Military Advisory Group (American advisers for the Korean Army)
KNP: Korean National Police
KPA: Korean People’s Army (army of North Korea)
KPG: Korean Provisional Government (the Korean government in exile in Chungking)

KPR: Korean People’s Republic (the short-lived republic formed by Koreans before the arrival of American troops)

LST: Landing Ship Tank. Naval vessels created during World War II to support amphibious operations

Lt: Lieutenant

Lt-Col: Lieutenant-Colonel

M Division: Seoul Metropolitan Police

MAGIC: Military Advisory Group in China (American advisers to Chiang Kai shek)

MG: Military Government (the government which officially ruled South Korea from September 1945 to 15 August 1948)

NAN: means “N” in a radiogram. Thus the three words ABLE SUGAR NAN mean

ASN=Army Service Number (i.e. the identification number of a serviceman)

NARA: National Archives and Records Administration.

It is the national archive of the United States. It comprises several centers the largest being the one located at College Park near Washington DC.

NDL: National Diet Library (Japan’s National Library in Tokyo, similar to the Library of Congress in the United States)

NIS: National Intelligence Service (created on 1961, it comprised the KCIA. In 1981 it became the Agency for National Security Planning)


Located at St Louis, Missouri, it is the repository of millions of military personnel records of discharged and deceased veterans of all services during the 20th century. In particular such records would give the date and cause of death of military personnel who died abroad.

NSA: National Security Act (passed in December 1948 by the Korean National Assembly; it is still enforced)

NYT: New York Times. For some of the articles the page number is no longer indicated in the online index. In such cases we only give the date. As the newspaper has over 40 pages it can be a demanding task to find a small article.

OCI: Office of Civil Information (the propaganda department of MG)

OCMH: Office of the Chief of Military History. It holds a collection of historical manuscripts called “OCMH files” on which many of the official historical accounts are based.

OMG: Office of the Military Government
ONI: Office of Naval Intelligence (the intelligence unit of the US Navy).

OSS: Office of Strategic Services (American inter-army intelligence gathering organization during World War II. In addition each military branch had its own intelligence units)

PACUSA: Pacific Air Command United States Army.

PD: Period (unsed instead of the punctuation in military radiograms and teletypes)

PFC: Private First Class (soldier in the US Army, rank just above “Recruit” and “Private”)

PCKI: Preparatory Committee for Korean Independence. Was set up on 15 August 1945 by members of the League for Korean Independence, an underground resistance organization formed in August 1944.

PMAG: Provisional Military Advisory Group (created in August 1948 to train the South Korean Army)

PMG: Provost Marshall General (US Army)

POW: Prisoner of War

PVT: Private (lowest rank in the US Army, if one excludes “Recruits”)

RCT: Recruit (the lowest rank in the US Army just under private)

REOURAD: Reference our radio [message]. Used in radiograms and military teletype transmission.

RDC: Representative Democratic Council (Korean council set up by the MG in the early phase of the occupation)

RG: Record group. This is the first-level classification at NARA. Lower classification levels are “Box” “folder” and “record”.

Rgt: Regiment (about 3,000 men)

ROK: Republic of Korea

ROKA: Republic of Korea Army.

S-2: Intelligence officer (US Army)

SCAP: Supreme Commander Allied Powers. It was the official title of General Douglas MacArthur after the capitulation of Japan. However, this expression is also commonly used to refer to the whole organization in charge of setting up the political, economic and cultural policies in Japan and South Korea. It should be noted that the Military Government in South Korea was ultimately responsible to General MacArthur.

S. Sgt: Staff Sergeant
SKIG: South Korea Interim Government (it was set up on 17 May 1947 and lasted until 15 August 1948.)

SKILA: South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (its creation was decided on 12 October 1946)

SKLP: South Korean Labor Party.

SKWP: South Korean Worker’s Party (a left wing organization)

SNU: Seoul National University.

SUGAR: means “S” in a radiogram

SWPA: South West Pacific and Australia theater of operations.

TASC: Taiwan America Student Conference (a student exchange program between Taiwan and the United States that was set up in the 2010s on the model of the Japan America Student Conference (JASC) established in 1934. There are many other Taiwan-USA student exchange programs that are co-sponsored by the American Institute in Taiwan and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

TRC: Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

[It was created by the Korean government in December 2005 with the broad objective of investigating incidents and mass killings that occurred since the beginning of the Japanese occupation. It is supposed to be terminated in 2010. It is distinct from the “Commission for Discovering the Truth and Recovering Honor of Victims” (CDTRHV) that was created in 2000.]

USAFIK: US Army Forces in Korea

USAMGIK: US Army Military Government in Korea (the political arm of the occupation force)

USAT: US Army Transport (usually designates a ship; for instance: “USAT Wall & Crow” where “Wall & Crow” is the name of the vessel)

USMAGIK: US Military Advisory Group in Korea (succeeded to USAMGIK after August 1948)

WD AGO: War Department Adjutant General’s Office

WFTU: World Federation of Trade Unions.

WP: Washington Post (US newspaper published in Washington DC)

ZI: Zone of the Interior (military parlance for the continental United States)

Korean-English lexicon

Numbers:

1 = il, 2 = ee, 3 = sam, 4 = sa, 5 = oh, 6 = yuk, 7 = chil, 8 = pal, 9 = goo, 10 =
ship, 10,000 = man
Chinese numbers for dates, money, minutes.

Bom Min Ryon: Pan-Korean Alliance for Reunification

buk (or puk): north

Chosun: Korean (name comes from Joseon-Dynasty; for instance: Chosun Minchok Dang = Korean People’s Party)

chong: a unit for measuring area (about one hectare = 10,000 square meters)

dang: party (for instance: Chosun Kongsan Dang = Korean Communist Party)

do: island or province (e.g. Cheju Do = Cheju Island, Keoje Do = Koje Island)

gun: county

gu: district

Hankook: an old name for Korea.

hop: unit of volume: 1 hop = 0.18 liter

Inmin-gun: People’s army

konsang: communist

kook: republic or government. (e.g.: Chosen Inmin Kong Wha Kook = Korean People’s Republic)

kookmin: nationalist

Man Sei! Literally means: 10,000 days; also “Long live Korea!”

nam: south

ri: village

Sam-Il Day: Literally means: 3-1 Day; refers to the uprising of March 1, 1919 against the Japanese occupation.

suk: volume unit equivalent to 216 liters.
References

Archives

All the documents used in the “Occupation project” including those listed below (plus a number of others which have not been used yet) are available in the so-called “Fonds Roehner 434 W” belonging to the archive bureau of “University Pierre and Marie Curie” (UPMC), Central Tower, office 810, 4 place Jussieu, 75005 Paris. In addition to archive records there are also several books, for instance a book with many pictures of the 1941-1946 period in Iceland and two big volumes about the occupation of South Korea published by Hallym University. Altogether there are 8 boxes numbered: 434 W 1-8.

- 434 W1-4: Japan
- 434 W5: Hawaii
- 434 W6: South Korea
- 434 W7: South Korea, China, Iceland.
- 434 W8: Germany

NARA (CKCLH): Photocopies of NARA documents collected by the “Center for Korean Constitutional Law History at Seoul National University.

NARA 1 and NARA 2: G-2 Weekly Summary.
United States Armed Forces in Korea (USAFIK) Headquarters.
Published in 1990 by Hallym University. 5 volumes.
The 5 volumes cover: 9 September 1945 – 26 November 1948.
The reference NARA 1 concerns the first two volumes.
The reference NARA 2 concerns the volumes 3-5.
Vol. 1: 6 September 1945 – 9 June 1946
Vol. 2: 10 June 1946 – 30 March 1947
Vol. 4: 11 August 1947 – 30 January 1948
[A substantial number of attacks on American troops are mentioned in Volumes
1-3. In contrast volumes 4 and 5 contain almost no incidents of that kind. Volume 5 gives recapitulating tables summarizing the number of police killed, rioters killed, sabotages. Yet, these tables have no entry for attacks on US troops. The apparent disappearance of such attacks is surprising because in 1947-1949 the overall tension and frequency of incidents increased.

Moreover, in the account of the Yosu mutinies and uprisings the summary executions carried out by the police and constabulary (and described in the report of RG 554, see above) are not mentioned in the Weekly Summary.

In short, after August 1947 the “G-2 Weekly Summary” becomes almost useless.

NARA 3: Burial plots of the US Central Cemetery in Seoul, Korea, April 1946.
National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 312.
ARC Identifier 596290. Records of the Far East Command.
[The reference to this document in the electronic catalog (ARC) is not very transparent. It is entitled: “Subject Files, compiled 08/28/1945 - 06/1949” because, apart from burial plots this files covers a wide range of subjects. Through ARC it can be located by using the key-word expression “burial plots” which appears in the “Scope and Content” description of the file. This is the only file retrieved through this keyword search.

According to this document in April 1946 there were 110 graves in plot 1 of this cemetery. We do not know if there were other plots comprising American graves in this cemetery or if there were US cemeteries in other Korean cities. The last assumption seems plausible if only for the practical reason of avoiding moving to Seoul coffins of personnel who died elsewhere in Korea.

In this respect it can be noted that there are some 20 graves of US servicemen in the “Seoul Missionary Cemetery”. This shows that, for reasons that are now forgotten US servicemen have been interred in various places.]

NARA 4a: This source is Volume 1 of the publication number 6 (677 p.) (entitled “Citizen demonstrations and riots”) in the list of the Hallym University publications of US archive documents about Korea. The whole series of the Hallym publications is listed in the next section.

[This volume contains mainly reports of interviews performed by agents of the “Counter Intelligence Corps” (CIC). These interviews are not of great interest because it can hardly be expected that the persons express their real opinions; moreover, their description of facts is fairly narrow since it corresponds to what was seen by just one individual.

Some major events such as the incident of 15 August 1946 in Kwanju are described by several sources (CIC, G-2, report of the commander) which leads to interesting comparisons. It turns out that the CIC reports are the least reliable.]
An element of inconvenience in this volume is the fact that the documents are not sorted in chronological order; some documents are even reproduced twice (e.g. compare p. 232-250 and p. 290-308).

It can be noted that there is very little information about the first phase of the occupation from September to November 1945.

NARA 4b: This source is Volume 2 of the publication number 6 (681 p.) (entitled “Citizen demonstrations and riots”) in the list of the Hallym University publications of US archive documents about Korea. The whole series of those Hallym publications is listed in the next section.

[This publication comprises several volumes. It is available for instance at the Central Library of Waseda University in Tokyo. The first few volumes contain some information about the relations between the Korean population and the occupation force, for instance there are statistics about the activity of provost courts and about the number of violation of MG ordinances. After volume 4 this kind of information is no longer given. That is all the more surprising because the organization of trials by military tribunals was an essential activity of the MG which should therefore be documented in this publication.

Just as an illustration of the poor quality of the information about specific events one can mention that the shooting of an American soldier on 9 October 1947 is described in the following terms: “An American soldier on guard was shot by an unknown person”. This account is incomplete and misleading. It says that the soldier was shot but not whether he was killed. Moreover, from another source it is known that the soldier was not “on guard” but sleeping (see the chronology).

RECORDS: Records of the US Department of State relating to the internal affairs of Korea 1945-1949.
12 microfilm reels.
[The collection is available (for instance) at the Central Library of Waseda University in Tokyo.
It is organized following the decimal file system.
For instance: 8 95.24/11-2044 has the following meaning:
Class 8 is “internal affairs”; all files in this series start with 8.
95 is the code number for Korea.
24 is the code number of the subject in the decimal classification.
11-2044 is the date of the document, namely 20 November 1944.]

NARA 5: This source is item number 2 in the list (given below) of the Hallym
University publications of US archive documents about Korea.
[These are daily reports but they do not give much more details than the weekly summaries. Each issue contained an inclosure giving English translations of articles published in Korean newspapers. Unfortunately, these inclosures are not included in the documents edited by Hallym university. We do not know why. These inclosures are available in the copy of this file (on microfiches) held at the National Diet Library in Tokyo.]

NARA 6: General correspondence files. Awards and decorations. April 1944–June 1949 National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 37. ARC Identifier 595596.
[When decorations are awarded a General Orders issued by the HAFMIDPAC (Headquarters Army Forces Middle Pacific) describes the circumstances of the gallant action. In this way one can get some information about military activity performed in a given theater. I have seen only the 10 first pages of this file. For instance, through General Orders No 91 of HAFMIDPAC dated 17 December 1945 the following distinctions were awarded: Legion of Merit (1), Bronze Star Medals (9), Meritious Service Unit Plaque (1). However, all these acts occurred during the war not after the war.]

NARA 7: General correspondence files. Letter report of fatal injuries 1948. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 144. ARC Identifier 595596.
[The ARC Identifier leads to a broad series entitled “General correspondence files”; in order to find the “Letter report of fatal injuries” one must first click on “Archived copies”, then on “View container list”. This list comprises 148 boxes of which the present file is Box 144. NARA 7 refers to the 10 first pages of this file which has about 1,500 pages altogether.]

HAUSMAN 1: October 1948. Bundle of documents labeled “Yosu documents G-3 USAFIK RG 332”.
Mostly handwritten notes, some by Hausman and Col. Wright. 159 pages. Box 26 of Hausman Archives held at Harvard-Yenching Library (see below). [The description given in the catalog is not very accurate. In fact, about 40% of the documents are typed. Often, the handwritten documents are just first drafts of typed documents which are also included. Altogether there are less than 20 notes written by Hausman or Wright. The majority of the notes were written by Korean police chiefs. These messages are exchanged within the sphere of Korean forces (Constabulary and police) and
their US advisers. They do not include any exchanges between commanders of US army units, ships or aviation squadrons. Whether or not some of these units took part in the events, one would suppose that they were put in a state of high alert if only for security purposes. It is in this respect that this bundle of documents presents a fairly narrow view of the situation. One should recall that by this time the US forces still represented the most important fighting force in Korea.

HAUSMAN 2: Military rosters for USAMGIK for January and July 1947. (126 p.). Box 25 of Hausman Archives held at Harvard-Yenching Library (see below).

NARA 8: General correspondence files. Provost courts 1946. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 51. ARC Identifier 595596. [The ARC Identifier leads to a broad series entitled “General correspondence files”; in order to find the content of Box 51 one must first click on “Archived copies”, then on “View container list”. This list comprises 148 boxes of which the present file is Box 51. The online catalog gives the following description of the content of Box 51: “Box 51: 250.411 General courts martial 1946 to 253 Withdrawal notices” (the numbers refer to the decimal classification). In other words the “provost courts 1946” topic does not appear. However it appears in the “Revised box list for RG 554” (paper document). These documents were photocopied at NARA by Prof. Ki-Choon Song. Many thanks to him for sending me a copy.

This file contains records of clemency decisions for Koreans who have been sentenced by provost courts. It does not contain trial records. Moreover, it is unfortunate that (as happens pretty often) many of the inclosures which should be attached to the letters are no longer included.

NARA 9: General correspondence files. Operations and movement of troops. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 91. ARC Identifier 595596. [The ARC Identifier leads to a broad series entitled “General correspondence files”; in order to find the content of Box 91 one must first click on “Archived copies”, then on “View container list”. This list comprises 148 boxes of which the present file is Box 91. These documents were photocopied at NARA by Prof. Ki-Choon Song. Many thanks to him for sending me a copy.]

NARA 10: National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 153. [These documents were photocopied at NARA by Prof. Ki-Choon Song. Many thanks to him for sending me a copy.]
NARA 11: National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 170.
[These documents were photocopied at NARA by Prof. Ki-Choon Song. Many thanks to him for sending me a copy.]

NARA 12: General correspondence files. Letter report of fatal injuries 1948. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 144. ARC Identifier 595596.
Stack area: 290, row: 51, compartment 25, shelf: 5, Box 144
[The ARC Identifier leads to a broad series entitled “General correspondence files”; in order to find the “Letter report of fatal injuries” one must first click on “Archived copies”, then on “View container list”. This list comprises 148 boxes of which the present file is Box 144.
NARA 12 refers to the 200 first pages of this file which has about **1,500 pages** altogether. Many of these 200 pages are reports of death for servicemen who died in the railroad accident of 14 September 1948. The report for each of the dead has some 7 pages: a letter report of fatal injury (4p), a supervisor’s report of accident (2p), a diagram of accident scene.]

RG 554: References in this RG where only the Box number is indicated refer to the list entitled “Revised Box List for RG 554, United States Forces in Korea”. Altogether it has 312 entries (corresponding to 312 boxes); all these boxes are located in stack area 290, row 51.

NARA 13: General correspondence files. Record and reports of fires and other accidents. National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 123,129. ARC Identifier 595596.
Stack area: 290, row: 51, compartment 25, shelf: 2, Box 123,129
[The ARC Identifier leads to a broad series entitled “General correspondence files”; in order to find the present files one must first click on “Archived copies”, then on “View container list”. This list comprises 148 boxes of which the present files are Boxes 123,129.
The whole collection of the “Record and Reports of Fires and other accidents” comprises 7 boxes; with about 1,500 pages per box, that represents over 10,000 pages. We have seen only the first 20 pages of Box 123 (July-August 1946) and Box 129 (January 1948).
The reports that we have seen give an assessment of the losses, explain the circumstances of the fire but do not give the conclusions of the investigations into the causes of the fire.]

National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, ARC Iden-
Death records for military personnel produced by the Quartermaster Section of the USAFIK.

The death records comprise the following information. (i) Time, location and circumstances of death (ii) Autopsy reports and dental records (for identification) (iii) Grave registration work sheet and internment report (temporary and/or permanent grave). For each death there are about 15 pages (including some duplicate pages).

Altogether for this series there are 10 boxes (No 251-260). The content of the boxes follows alphabetical order of family names but for each separate letter entry the records are arranged in chronological order of dates of death. It can be noted that the deaths were recorded until June 1949 at which time there were still some 7,000 American troops in Korea.

NARA 14 comprises only the first and last 20 pages of Box 259 which corresponds to 2 deaths, one on 26 August 1946 and the other in January 1949 (more details are given in the chronology at these dates).

It can be noted that these death records became available to researchers only in August-September 2004 after being declassified (see “Accessionings and openings for August-September FY 2004” on the NARA website).

NARA 15: US National Archives at College Park, G-3 operations reports, 40th Infantry Division, Oct-Dec 1945.

Record Group 554, Box 57, 290/51/22/6.

[I have seen only the first 10 pages out of a total of 120. These daily reports give mostly routine information: weather, movement of troops from one place to another, reconnaissance patrols sent to nearby places, buildings and installations for which a guard is provided, screening of Japanese civilian repatriates. No information is given about possible interactions with the population. There may have been nothing to report, however, the style of the document (i.e. the fact that it is administrative rather than factual) suggests that it would not report any possible incidents that may have taken place.]

NARA 16: US National Archives at College Park, G-3 operations reports, 7th Infantry Division, Oct-Dec 1945 and Nov-Dec 1945.

Record Group 554, Box 58, 290/51/22/6.

[I have seen only 20 pages out of a total of 218. The observations made for the previous item also hold for this one. A typical example of the sentences found in these reports is the following: “17th Inf: This regiment continued assigned missions in its zone of responsibility with no changes in troop dispositions reported.”]
Records of the Adjutant’s General Office, World War II operation reports, 7th Infantry Division, 32nd Infantry Regiment, Korea 8 Sep–Dec 1945.
Record Group 407, Box 7138, Folder 2.
[In contrast to the two previous reports, these operation reports are written at regiment level. Therefore one expects more “real-life” information and this is indeed the case. Unfortunately, the accounts are too fragmented and this makes the stories difficult to follow. For instance, one may read that a “killer” was put in jail, but none of the previous reports says anything about who was murdered and under what circumstances this has occurred.]

AirForce 1: This is chapter 34 of the “History of the 475th Fighter Group covering 1-31 October 1946. Call number GP-475-HI. Available from the Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama. 54 pages.
[This document has several parts. First there is a summary of the month activity. Secondly, there are data about strength, number of planes and flying time. Thirdly, there are individual mission reports. Then there are a few photographs. Finally there are so-called special orders about personnel transfers. This account turns out to be incomplete in several respects.

- The individual mission reports start on 17 October. There is nothing for the earlier part of the month. We are told that the P-38 and P-51 could not fly because of a shortage of gas in Kimpo. But squadron 433 based on Itami Air Base (near Osaka) did not have that problem. Yet, no mission is recorded for this squadron. Moreover, we are told that even in Kimpo the four AT-6 planes (which is a light attack aircraft) were able to fly between 1 and 11 October. However, there are no reports of missions flown by these planes.
- Only one of the mission reports mention low passes, namely over the town of Pyongyang (north of Pusan). Yet, the summary of the first part mentions similar show-of-force missions over 42 other towns; they are not mentioned in any of the mission reports.]

NARA 18: US National Archives at College Park.
Title: Operations Journals, Record Group 554, Box 9: XXIV Corps G-3 Journals 23 October 1948 to XXIV Corps G-3 Journals November 1948
[This file is about operations during the Yosu rebellion. It contains messages from G-3, G-2 Flash reports, messages to or from Captain James Hausman (often spelled “Hauseman”). I have seen only 40 pages of this file, all of which were about 21 October 1948. Apart from the role of US advisors and some US observation planes there is no mention of the role of other US troops, planes or ships.]
National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, ARC Identifier 595893.
Stack area: 290, row: 51, compartment 27, shelf: 7, Box 251
[I have seen the first 19 pages only]

National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, ARC Identifier 595893.
Stack area: 290, row: 51, compartment 27, shelf: 7, Box 252
[I have seen the last 15 pages only. The file also contains a summary of 8 deaths that occurred among Americans in Korea around March 1949: this list comprises 5 soldiers and 3 civilians including Ms. Ethel Underwood who was murdered on 17 March 1949.]

[This is one of the volumes published by Hallym University. It was consulted at Seoul National University. The call number is: 355.03251 H159h (stack 5). These daily reports are numbered. However, some of them have been removed. The standard statement is as follows: “The item identified below has been withdrawn. Date [for instance] 10/7/77”. Sometimes it is only a page in a report that has been removed, sometimes it is the whole report, e.g. No 27 of 4 Oct 1945 was removed altogether.
It should be noted that the Hallym volumes do not include the inclosures consisting in translations of daily Korean newspapers that are appended at the end of each report, These translations start after No 61 of 8 November 1945.]

NDL 1: Tokyo National Diet Library’s microfiche copies of NARA documents relating to foreign occupied areas. The call numbers of these microfiches begins with FOA. It is an extensive collection of several thousand microfiches. In particular, it comprises the G-2 daily and weekly reports for South Korea (approximately from FOA 5046 to FOA 6855).
After November 1945 the daily reports included enclosures consisting of translations of South Korean (and even sometimes North Korean) newspapers. For some reason these enclosures are not included in the edition of the G-2 reports made by Hallym university.

HOOVER: Title: Radio Pyongyang radio broadcast transcripts
Dates: 1948
Collection Number: YY417
Creator: Radio Pyongyang and Headquarters XXIV Corps
References

Repository: Hoover Institution Archives
[I have seen the documents pertaining to the period 20 October 1948-10 November 1948. Also included in this folder are translations of South Korean newspaper articles [such translations are included (inclosure 1) in the G-2 periodic reports] These documents are disappointing for two reasons.

- The transcripts suggest that, apart from US news agencies (such as Associated Press or United Press) Radio Pyongyang had in fact few (and fairly poor) sources of information about the events in South Korea. Moreover, a considerable amount of the transcripts consists in hollow phraseology (e.g. “vicious attacks of the puppet government” or “imperialists and their hirelings and traitors”)

- When the news is about to become interesting it is the translation which interrupted by . . . or by notes from the translator or editor saying “False report” or “no source given”.

It must also be observed that for a period of almost 3 weeks there are only about 20 pages of transcripts which means that these transcripts are select news. How was this selection done?

[This is the same reference as the AirForce 1 source mentioned previously but it is much broader. Whereas AirForce 1 was only for October 1946, AirForce 2 covers all months from August 1945 to June 1948.
It is an official history in the sense that it was established at the request of the War Department History section in accordance with AR 345-105 and was checked by an officer after being written.
For each month the report starts with a narrative of about 20 pages after which it provides some archive material such as statistical data about flying time, special orders, accounts of missions and, at the end, a few photographs most of which unfortunately are much too dark. The special orders section which contains usually some 20 pages; it gives the official orders regarding transfers of military personnel.
The mission accounts would be the most interesting part but, unfortunately, the accounts cover less than 5% of all the missions flown in a given month. Because this is an official history one can hardly expect that such accounts will give information about episodes (such as strafing of civilians) which would not be in accordance with the wishes of the State Department.
Starting in November 1945 the Fighter Group published a weekly internal newsletter entitled “Satan’s Angels Courier”. For two months (November and December 1945) some of these 6-page newsletters were appended at the end of the
monthly report. In many respects they were more interesting than the official 
report. It is a pity that in later months no other issues were attached. 
As one knows, when the official history is faulty it is almost never because 
the accounts are wrong (except perhaps for casualty figures) but rather because 
some important things are omitted. The fact that this is the case for the present 
account can be seen by three examples.

• On 20 March 1946 four parked transport aircraft (C-46 and C-47) were de-
stroyed on Kimpo Air Base (see Aircraft accidents) Y et, the narrative for this month 
does not mention anything of this kind. It is true that the planes did not belong to 
the 475th Fighter Group (which had no transport aircraft) but the narrative at the 
beginning of each month’s report gives fairly broad news extending even to events 
occurring elsewhere in Korea.

• As mentioned in the Prologue, a directive was issued on 7 November 1946 by 
the Pacific Air Force Command which ordered discontinuation of low level strafing 
against civil disturbances. Yet, nothing of this kind in mentioned in the report of 
November 1946 in spite of the fact that many orders much less important (e.g. special 
orders) are reproduced at great length.

• In May 1946 the pilots had been told that they should not, under any circum-
stances, cross the 38th parallel. In the report for January 1947 one reads that a P-51 
pilot, Walter B. Dillard III, became lost and flew north of the 38th parallel. Quite 
surprisingly, the account stops at this point. It does not say how the pilot realized 
that he was over North Korea nor does it explain how he managed to return back to 
Kimpo. Such omissions are all the more surprising because otherwise the reports 
indulge in giving many details of trifling importance.

Aircraft accidents (appendix A): This is a computerized database available on the 
following website:
http://www.aviationarchaeology.com/src/db.asp
It reproduces USAAF and US Navy accident records. Cross-checking with 
the accidents mentioned in the history of the 475th Fighter Group shows its 
reliability. Although the 475th Fighter Group was the only one based in Korea, 
aircraft from other units also made flights to and over Korea. In this sense, this 
database provides a useful complement. The data for Korea are reproduced in 
Appendix A. This database gives fairly detailed information about the damages 
suffered by the aircraft but none about the injuries (or death) suffered by the 
pilots.

National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, ARC Iden-
tifier 595893.
Stack area: 290, row: 51, compartment 28, shelf: 1, Box 256
REFERENCES

[Death records for American personnel produced by the Quartermaster Section of the USAFIK. NARA 21 corresponds to the first 30 pages of this file which has about 1,500 pages altogether. The death records comprise the following information. (i) Time, location and cause of death (sometimes but not always the circumstances of death (ii) Autopsy reports and dental records (for identification) (iii) Grave registration work sheet and internment report (temporary and/or permanent grave). For each death there are about 15 pages (including some duplicate pages). Altogether for this series there are 10 boxes (No 251-260).]

National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, ARC Identifier 595893.
Stack area: 290, row: 51, compartment 28, shelf: 1, Box 257
[Death records for American personnel produced by the Quartermaster Section of the USAFIK. NARA 22 corresponds to the first 30 pages of this file which has about 1,500 pages altogether. The death records comprise the following information. (i) Time, location and circumstances of death (ii) Autopsy reports and dental records (for identification) (iii) Grave registration work sheet and internment report (temporary and/or permanent grave). For each death there are about 15 pages (including some duplicate pages). Altogether for this series there are 10 boxes (No 251-260).]

National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, ARC Identifier 595893.
Stack area: 290, row: 51, compartment 28, shelf: 1, Box 258
[Death records for military personnel produced by the Quartermaster Section of the USAFIK. NARA 23 corresponds to the first 30 pages of this file which has about 1,500 pages altogether. The death records comprise the following information. (i) Time, location and circumstances of death (ii) Autopsy reports and dental records (for identification) (iii) Grave registration work sheet and internment report (temporary and/or permanent grave). For each death there are about 15 pages (including some duplicate pages). Altogether for this series there are 10 boxes (No 251-260).]

BGSU 1: Correspondence of Vernell R. Miller [who was a serviceman in Korea in 1946].
MS 736 of the “Rare books and special collections” of the “Center of Archival
Collections” of the “Bowling Green State University” (Bowling Green, Ohio). [This file contains 11 letters written between 9 July 1946 and 23 October 1946 by two US servicemen who served in Korea; 9 were written by Vernell R. Miller and 2 by Jim Leiser who was a long-time friend of Miller. As the letters were written in Seoul they were certainly submitted to some form of military censorship. However, on account of the fact that there were dramatic events in South Korea during September-October one would expect news about some of the implications of this situation for the servicemen (e.g. restrictions on leaving barracks). Yet, nothing of the sort can be found. Most of the information concerns military life on base or family affairs in Ohio.

The only mention of something which occurred outside of the military camp concerns an accident suffered by Jim Leiser (probably) in early August 1946. “I got out of the hospital yesterday. I can consider myself pretty lucky at that, cause I sure did see some awful cases come in the hospital riding the same thing.” (letter of 10 August 1946) Was this “thing” a car, a truck, a military vehicle or an ambulance? The letter does not tell us. It is amusing to observe that all the letters written by Miller begin and end with the same sentences: “Dear Folks, Well, I will try and write you a few lines again today” and at the end: “Well, I can’t think of much more to write so I will close for now. Your son, Vernell”.

Miller was driving a fire truck. He writes: “The only thing I do is wait for a fire then I take off and I mean take off. The fellows sure do drive fast in here but I manage to keep up with them”.

Miller left Korea for the United States on the day after writing his last letter (23 October 1946).]

NARA 24: Death records, H,1946-Ind,1947
National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 255, ARC Identifier 595893.
[Death records for military personnel produced by the Quartermaster Section of the USAFIK. NARA 24 corresponds to the first 100 pages (received in November 2012) of this file which has about 1,500 pages altogether.]

NARA 25: Death records, T,1946-W,1948
National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 554, Box 255, ARC Identifier 595893.
[Death records for military personnel produced by the Quartermaster Section of the USAFIK. NARA 25 corresponds to the first 150 pages (received in November 2012) of this file which has about 1,500 pages altogether. It can be noted

178 At the end of the letter Leiser writes that he is a truck driver and is hauling rations for the mess. What is surprising however is the fact that the letter seems to mention several injured persons. One would expect only two persons in a truck.
that in spite of the end-year indicated in the title, this file includes deaths which occurred in 1949.]


Document available at the US Army Center of Military History, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington DC.

This official history of the Korean Army was published during the Korean War. It is written from a Korean perspective in the sense that it gives little attention to the role of US forces. For that reason it is not of great interest for the present study. Unsurprisingly, it attributes all the rebellion and mutiny incidents (such as the Yosu mutiny) to direct North Korean intervention.


NARA 26: Office of the Surgeon. Headquarters XXIV Corps

Record Group 112, Box 567, Entry 54A (46 pages)

No known ARC identifier at this point (27 November 2014)

Subject: Annual Report of the medical department activities.
Date: 11 March 1947

[This file gives a chronological account of the activities of the medical department of the XXIV Corps in Korea. It emphasizes the problems caused by the scarcity of personnel. The Seoul area had about 1,500 hospital beds in a total of 2,000 which explains that patients from the rest of Korea were routinely evacuated to Seoul and from there to Japan or to the United States. The evacuation to Seoul was done by rail in three special hospital cars.]

NARA 27: Office of the Surgeon. Headquarters USAFIK

Record Group 112, Box 567, Entry 54A (29 pages)

No known ARC identifier at this point (27 November 2014)

Subject: Final annual report of Medical Department activities, Jan-Jun 1949
Date: 30 June 1949

[The report says that the mean strength of troops during these 6 months numbered 7,530. After 15 April 1949 the evacuation policy was set at 15 days against 45 days previously. This means that after this date, all patients whose stay at hospital was estimated to exceed 15 days were evacuated by air, mostly
to Japan.]

NARA 28: Office of the Surgeon. Headquarters XXIV Corps
National Archives and Records Administration,
Record Group 112, Box 567, Entry 54A (29 pages)
No known ARC identifier at this point (27 November 2014)
Subject: Annual report of Medical Department activities.
Date: 11 March 1947
[The report documents the widespread use of DDT. Individuals were dusted, houses, section of cities and even broad areas were sprayed with DDT. For instance, in March-April 1946 after two suspected cases of bubonic plague, the entire Chunchon area (Chuncheon is the capital of the province of Gangwon, east of Seoul) was sprayed with 10% or 5% DDT. Approximately, 2,270 cubic meter of 5% DDT were utilized.
The report says that “all foods utilized for feeding US Army personnel in Korea were shipped in from the Zone of the Interior (i.e. the Continental United States) or from other areas of the Pacific Theatre”. Probably a part of it came from Australia. In addition, in May 1946, all native restaurants were placed “off limits” for off-duty food consumption.]

NARA 29: Office of the Surgeon. Headquarters XXIV Corps
National Archives and Records Administration,
Record Group 112.
Annual Report of Medical Department Activity, USAFIK, 1948.
Annual Report of Medical Department Activity, USAFIK, January-June 1949.
[Copies of these reports were sent to the “Surgeon General, Department of the Army, Washington 25, DC. In these annual reports there is a section (1948: section 21, p.29-30, 1949: section 20, p.18) entitled “Vital Statistics” which gives birth and death data for the American occupation force. In 1948 the average strength was 28,000; (derived from Table 2 of the report for 1948), there were 121 deaths (100 from injuries and 21 from disease), among the injuries 29 were from gunshot wounds. In 1949, the average strength was 7,500; there were only 9 deaths, among which one was by gunshot.]

Health of the Army.
This monthly periodical gives data about hospital admissions, bed occupation, evacuations, death from illness or injury, and so on. However, about 80% of each volume is about US Army hospitals in the United States itself. That is why it was difficult to use these data for our study of Korea.
The periodical is available in only a few libraries. Among them is the library of Columbia University. Many thanks to librarian Ramon Acosta who has for-
warded electronic copies of the post-war issues of this periodical to Ms. Agnes Kermin of the Inter-library loan Department of University Pierre and Marie Curie in Paris.

The Hausman archive at Harvard Yenching Library

Captain James H. Hausman (1918-Oct 1996) landed in Korea in July 1946. He stayed there for 5 years. As an US adviser he is considered as the father of the Korean Army. He played an important role during the Yosu rebellion for which he was awarded the Legion of Merit (see the chronology at the date of 12 December 1950). After retiring from the US Army in 1960 as a Lieutenant-Colonel, Mr. Hausman remained in South Korea until 1981 as an adviser to the Korean Army.

A catalog of the Hausman archives is available on the website of the Harvard-Yenching Library. Broadly, the archives consists of 3 parts:

- Box 1 - Box 10: Hausman papers (letters, promotion, Legion of Merit papers, etc.)
- Box 11 - Box 23: Mostly North Korean documents seized by US troops during their invasion of North Korea in 1950.
- Box 24 - 26: Papers donated by Allan Millet. Almost all these papers are from NARA. Most of them, however, are not yet catalogued in the electronic catalog of Nara.

Publication in Korea of documents held at US Archives

By Ilwol Sogak Publishers

The two following publications started a long-term program for making NARA documents available in Korea.


By Hallym University, Institute of Asian Culture Studies

Over two decades the “Institute of Asian Culture Studies” has compiled and published many volumes of documents produced by the USAFIK (US Army Forces in Korea) and the USAMGIK (US Army Military Government in Korea) which was the political arm of the USAFIK. We list most of these publications below179.

179 More information can be obtained on the following website: http://web.hallym.ac.kr/~asia/sub02_5.html


5 *G-2 Weekly Summary* United States Armed Forces in Korea (USAFIK) Headquarters. 5 volumes. 9 Sep 1945 - 26 Nov 1948. Series: Source material no 5. (1990)

[In “WorldCat” (the worldwide catalog of university libraries) this work bears the title “Civil commotion”.

7 Documents on North Korean guerrillas Vol. 6. (1996)

8 The leaflets during the Korean War. (2000)

**By the Center for Korean Constitutional Law History (CKCLH) at SNU**

This collection is partly in paper form, partly in electronic form. It has not yet been made available online but researchers can get a copy by writing to the author of the present study.

**G-2 Periodic Reports**

The daily G-2 Periodic Reports (along with the weekly summaries) are one of the main sources used by historians of the occupation. We have seen in Chapter 2 that their reliability is open to question particularly because of its tendency to underestimate the role of US Forces and corresponding casualty tolls. Nevertheless, this source provides an easy starting point for a closer investigation.

Despite its importance this source is not easy to find. We have already mentioned that the compilation volumes issued by Hallym University are available only in a few
libraries.

In early 2011 I wrote to NARA to order photocopies of the “G-2 Periodic Report” No 343-369 (September–November 1946). In a reply dated 24 February 2011, Mr. Eric Van Slander, the archivist with whom I was in contact, told me that in spite of having carefully searched their holdings they were not able to locate this file. The letter does not say if this observation applies only to this specific volume or to the whole collection. Of course, a few years ago this volume was available, otherwise these issues would also be missing in the NDL or Hallym collections.

Newspapers and magazines

The question of censorship

It seems that the censorship of Korean newspapers by the Military Government was somewhat less strict than in Japan. Nevertheless, one can hardly expect them to give detailed accounts of incidents between US Army forces and Korean people; except perhaps in the first few months of the occupation (September-December 1945) for the obvious reason that it took some time to set up the censorship section; recruiting and instructing translators took some time.

In the chronology it was mentioned that on 6 September 1946, four left-wing newspapers were suspended. As a matter of fact, by this time most newspapers were giving a sanitized and censured version of what happened in Korea.

As an illustration, we have performed two tests for the Chosun Ilbo, a major conservative newspaper. In 1946 the newspaper comprised two pages and each page had between 15 and 20 (fairly short) articles.

- On 20 Jan. 1946 there were massive anti-trusteeship demonstrations in Seoul which resulted (according to MG sources cited in the New York Times) in 2 persons killed and 120 arrested. Yet, the index of the articles of the Choson Ilbo does not mention these demonstrations and related casualties. To be on the safe side we have had a look at all issues between 14 and 23 January. As these events took place in Seoul one cannot pretend that the journalists were not aware of them.

- 1 October 1946 marked the beginning of a great uprising in the area of Taegu. The issue of 2 October of the Choson Ilbo has articles about international relations, political meetings, activities of Korean political leaders, sport events, but as far as we can see none of them mentioned the Taegu uprising.

In short, Korean newspapers may possibly be of usefulness for exploring the suppression of the Korean People’s Republic committees in September-December 1945, but after January 1946 they are hardly a useful source of information for the kind of events in which we are interested.
Korean daily newspapers

- The “Seoul Times” was an English language newspaper which started in early September 1945. Unfortunately, as already mentioned, no archives of this newspaper seem to be available whether in Korean libraries or in the rest of the world\textsuperscript{180}.
- The Chosun Ilbo resumed publication on 24 November 1945. According to the Wikipedia article about it, it is a conservative paper. Its archives are available online at the following address (as of 26 July 2011):
  
  http://srchdb1.chosun.com/pdf/i_archive

Newspapers, reviews and magazines

[This leftist review was published from 1937 to 1947. As indicated by the subtitle, it was first published every fortnight but after 1945 the periodicity became monthly. Its first part consists of political articles about the foreign relations of the United states with Asian countries. The second part gives a chronology of the main facts that occurred during the period covered by the issue in question. Although much shorter than the first part, this 2-or 3-page chronology is of interest. In early 1945 the editor Philip Jaffe was arrested by the FBI and charged with divulging secret military information. Although the matter was eventually settled by the payment of a fine, the exact terms of the agreement that was struck are not known.]

[Until 20 August 1947, this publication was fairly critical of the American policy in Korea and even expressed some sympathy for Pak Heun Yung, the secretary general of the South Korean Communist Party. Then, from 27 August 1947 to 15 October 1947, there was a break in the publication. When publication was resumed the page setting had changed and, more importantly, the tone of the articles was much less critical. In addition, whereas previously 90% of the space was devoted to news from Korea, after October 1947 there were many other news about other Asian countries and even news about the United States. For instance in late 1947 there were many articles which emphasized alleged victories of Nationalist armies in China, e.g. “Chiang’s army launches new all-out drive. American trained troops in action”, “Chiang’s staff ready for quick}

\textsuperscript{180}The “Korean National Assembly Library” has only a few issues; for Sep-Dec 1945 it has the following issues: Sep 1945: 12, 14, 21, 23-25, 28; Oct 1945: 6, 19, 21, 28. I’m grateful to Prof. Hawoong Jeong for giving me this information.
victory” (10 Dec 1947). In a general way, after October this publication looks fairly similar to a journal like “Stars and Stripes”, the newspaper destined to US troops. In short, after October 1947 this publication can no longer be considered by historians as an independent and reliable source of information.

Unfortunately even before before August 1947, “Korean Independence” reports few facts. It is more concerned with diplomacy and broad statements than with actual description of the clashes which occurred in Korean towns and cities. This is probably due to the fact, that it has no real way to know what was going on in Korea. Its only source of information seems to consist in accounts given by GIs who came back to the US after serving in Korea. Naturally, such testimonies provide only piece wise information; in addition, before leaving Korea, servicemen were briefed by CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) agents.

Seoul Times.
Daily newspaper published in Seoul from September 1945 to 1948.
At the end of the introduction to his (unpublished) book “Betrayal of a Nation”, Richard Robinson writes that on leaving South Korea in August 1947, “fortunately, I was able to take with me a file of the Seoul Times, an outspoken daily news sheet published in English in the Korean capital”.

Was it really an outspoken newspaper?
It is not easy to find out because, according to the WorldCat catalogue of libraries, there are only 3 places in the world where some issues of this newspaper are available (i) The National Assembly Library in Seoul. Unfortunately, only 20 issues are available altogether: 10 in 1945 and 10 in 1946. (ii) Cornell University (Kroch Library of Rare Documents): about 50 issues are available most of them for 1946. (iii) The Library of Congress has the most complete collection. However, in recent times it has become almost impossible to get photocopies of documents held there.

We were able to see the Seoul archives and also (through the Inter-Library Loan service) some of the issues from the Cornell archive.

Examination of these issues is rather disappointing. The “Seoul Times” is hardly an outspoken paper. Instead of its subtitle which is “The Voice of Korea” a more appropriate one would be “The Voice of America” for it is truly a mouthpiece of the Military Government. Let us take for instance the issue of 15 October 1946. It has only 2 pages. One half of the first page is occupied by a declaration made by General Hodge about the uprising which he attributes to “anarchists, criminals, dangerous agitators many of whom are foreigners”. About one third of the second page is occupied by an American cartoon (by Carl Anderson and Chic Young) and by a picture showing a tractor in action in a field in Alabama. The rest of the issue is devoted to some international news.
There is nothing about the critical situation in the Southern part of the country. The issues of the following days are very similar. They emphasize the ties of friendship between North America and South Korea. For instance, the issue of 16 October reports that “people of the US and Canada gave their own wardrobe to Korean relief”. The picture on page 2 invariably shows some nice aspect of the United States e.g. regarding a scientific breakthrough.

We gave a fairly detailed account so that future historians do not spend and waste as much time as we did to get issues of this newspaper until realizing that it will not give them any interesting facts.

Books and articles

Baik (Tae-Ung) 2007: Justice incomplete. The remedies for the victims of the Jeju April Third incidents.

[At the beginning of the book the author writes: “All descriptions of people living or dead are real as are the quotations attributed to them.”]

Blum (W.) 2004: Killing hope: U.S. military and CIA interventions since world war II. Common Courage Press, Monroe (Maine)
[The book has 56 chapters and examines 55 different episodes. The book provides a useful array of information and data. The author uses mostly newspapers and secondary sources such as books or public reports of the US administration. Needless to say, this method has its limits. Some of the episodes are well researched and quite convincing while others would have required more research to become convincing. For instance, the chapter about the role of the CIA in the putsch by French generals in Algiers in 1961 contains very little new information. It would have been better to omit such cases for which too little information was available. Incidentally, the same observation applies to the “Gladio” networks in western European countries. With regard to France, it is likely that the so-called “Barricade week” in Algiers in January 1960 was seen by the State Department as a better opportunity to get rid of de Gaulle than the rather desperate putsch of the generals. This is clearly shown by the coverage that the “New York Times” gave to the two episodes.
One would expect that after examining so many cases the author would be able to give some indications about regularities and patterns. It is fairly clear that the policies of the State Department and the CIA’s operations (the two working in
close cooperation) were not invented anew in each case but were designed on the basis of a small number of blue-prints\textsuperscript{181}.

In this respect the book “Inside the Company, CIA Diary” (1975) by Philip Agee does a much better job because it gives clues about how the CIA recruits its agents, that is to say the foreign nationals who accept to serve US interest in return for some personal benefit usually in the form of a boost to their career. The crux of the matter is of course that these people must be able to convince themselves that by advancing US goals they also serve the interests of their own country and the privileges of the social group to which they belong.]


[The book describes the support that the United States gave to President Marcos during the 20 years during which he remained in power. Surprisingly, only a few pages are devoted to the economic side of the story that is to say the benefits that US companies were able to extract from the Philippines thanks to the favorable treatment given to them by President Marcos.]  

CDTRHV: Commission for Discovering Truth and Recovering Honor of Victims.  
4.3 Sageon Jaryojip.[Collection of materials about the 4.3 incident, i.e. the Jeju Do uprising]. 10 volumes, (in Korean).  
[This commission was funded by the Korean government. With a staff of some 200, it was able to carry out extensive investigations during a period of several years in the 2000s.]  

Chetelat (E. de) 1950: Roaming Korea South of the iron curtain. With 34 illustrations and a map. The National Geographic Magazine, June 1950, 778.  
[This article describes the election of 10 May 1948 in a way which sounds interesting and plausible when one ignores the real conditions but which appears delusive otherwise. Here are some excerpts.  

- “May 10, 1948: South Koreans flocked to the polls for their first free election in their country’s history”. On pages 780 and 783 this same sentence appears 3 times.  
- “In Pyongchang a full 99% of the registrants voted” (p. 789).  
- “The only serious incident in my gun was the shooting of a Communist by Korean police at Poll No. 42. During the previous night a band of roving troublemakers had come south from the Russian Zone and clashed with a Korean patrol.”]  

In short, according to this article the only people who were opposed to this election were Communists coming from North Korea. In fact, even moderate leaders like Kim Koo refused this election and showed it by attending a meeting in North Korea.  

Choe (Yong-Hui) 1996: Kyoktongui Haebang samnyon [The three turbulent years  

\textsuperscript{181}e.g. one for power seizure by the military as in Chile, Greece, Korea or Venezuela (which failed), another for destabilizing leftist governments that were democratically elected in countries of close allies such as Australia, Germany (Willy Brandt), Italy or Japan (Hatoyama).
Choe (Yong-Hui) 1996:Kyoktongui Haebang samnyon [The three turbulent years after the liberation] (595 pages) Hallym University’s Research Institute of Asian Culture.

In its first pages the book contains maps and photographs. Inside there are many cartoons mostly from Korean newspapers.

At least in its form the purpose of this book is very similar to ours in the sense that it is a daily chronicle of the 3 years from 15 August 1945 to 15 August 1948. For each day there is an account whose size ranges from a few lines to two pages (or even more in some cases). The coverage is as follows: 1945: 1.0 page/day; 1946: 0.46 page/day; 1947: 0.33 page/day; 1948: 0.35 page/day.

There is an index for person names and another for subjects. Thanks to the subject index (p. 551-595) it is fairly easy to determine what are the main topics of interest of the author. The expressions which have the most entries are the names of political parties or organizations, international meetings and political conferences. Here are a few examples.

Korean Workers Party (p. 558), group for the independence of Korea (p. 560), Moscow conference (p. 563), Joint USA-Russia Commission (p. 564).

In contrast, the book contains very little information about the incidents, uprisings and rebellions. For the crucial month of October 1946 the accounts are rather short: 0.36 page/day that is to say about the same length as for the other months of 1946. The role of US troops is completely left out of the picture.

I am most grateful to Mr. Alejandro Hope of the INALCO (Institut National des Langues et Civilisations Orientales = National Institute for Eastern Civilisations and Languages) for his help in analyzing the content of this book which was given to me when I visited the Institute of Asian Culture at Hallym University in October 2011.


[This book has 3 chapters about the occupation period. Chapter 14: Liberation and reoccupation, Chapter 15: Making Korea safe for democracy. Chapter 16:
Soldiers of freedom. In chapter 15, there are substantial excerpts of the Harry Savage document.


[A large part of the book is devoted to the emergence of the civil affairs division and to the organization, and training of civil affairs officers. The two historical occupation cases that are discussed in some detail are those of Italy and France. There are two important facets of civil affair duties about which the book gives very little information, namely the organization of censorship and the working of military tribunals which tried offenses against the occupation troops.]


[After observing that in 1996 nearly all funding for studies of Korea in the United States comes from South Korean sources, the author notes that this money remains tainted by its provenance since most Korean sources have yet to show their respect for academic freedom. He concludes by deploring the “intellectual blight” resulting from the fact that South Korean funding blankets the field of Korean studies.]

[In addition to the historical narrative, Prof. Cumings also provides many personal testimonies.]

[Excerpts of this paper are available on line on the following website: http://www1.korea-np.co.jp]


[In this refreshing and authoritative study Professor Carter Eckert provides a view of economic development in Korea under Japanese colonial rule which is more balanced than that usually found in South Korean monographs.]


[This manual requires weekly reports to be filled in. Personally, I have never been able to find such reports for any of the occupation episodes that I have studied so far.]


[Excerpt of p. 62: “In occupied territory, military authority is supreme. Military police have authority to quell all disorders, disturbances, and uprisings of any nature. Assistance of troops is requested when necessary. The amount of force to be applied and the tactics to be employed are determined by the military commander. The tactical principles outlined in FM 27-15 are generally applicable” (see below).]


[Excerpt of p. 24: “Charges of crimes against persons such as murder should be made, if possible, rather than charges of crimes directly affiliated with the resistance movement that may result in martyrdom and serve as a rallying point for increased irregular activity”.

That is exactly what was done in Korea in the trials by US Military Commissions in the wake of the fall 1946 uprising.

Excerpt of p. 34: “To minimize the requirement of military units maximum assistance is sought from civil police, paramilitary units and local individuals who are sympathetic to the friendly cause. When friendly guerrilla units are employed they should be subordinate to the military force commander who furnishes a liaison party to remain with the friendly guerrilla force. Dossiers on leaders of the irregular force should be maintained. The names and locations of
families, relatives and friends are desired”.
That is exactly what was done in South Korea, and in particular in JeJu Do.

[The book covers the Military Government experiences in Austria, France, Germany, Guam, Italy, Japan, Korea. Such a comparative study could be of great interest. However this study focuses mainly on purely formal questions of organization, directives and so on. Very little attention is given to how the directives were actually implemented and how people reacted.]


[Mark Gayn was an American journalist who, apart from Japan, also visited Korea in October 1946. In this book 80 pages are devoted to Korea.]

[The author got his Bachelor degree in history from the West Point Military Academy and returned to West Point as an instructor of military history in 2002. The thesis adviser was Dr. Allan R. Millet, a former US Marine officer for some thirty years.
Not surprisingly, the defeat of July 1950 put a rather negative light on the work done by the Advisory mission in Korea. One of the declared objectives of the thesis is to describe this mission in a more favorable light.
At the same time this investigation upholds the thesis of the State Department that there was little involvement of American troops in the civil war that raged in South Korea between 1945 and 1949. For instance, in spite of the fact that over 100 pages are devoted to the incidents which preceded the outbreak of the Korean War the work does not contain the names of any of the American officers (e.g. Captains Burgess, Darrow, Smith, Symmonds) who took part in the suppression of the Yosu rebellion.]

In Stocker (D.) editor: Military advising and assistance: from mercenaries to privatization (1815-2007).
[Brian R. Gibby is a serving US Army officer.]
Green (T.H.) (no date): Papers of Major-General Thomas H. Green.  
[Green was Judge-Advocate in Hawaii and after 7 December 1941 he became 
the executive officer of Hawaii’s Military Governor. His collected papers are 
available at the National Diet Library in Tokyo.]

Cambridge, Mass. [Gregory Henderson’s service with the US State Department 
includes 7 years at the US embassy in Seoul, first as vice-consul from 1948 to 
1950 and as Cultural Attaché from 1958 to 1963.  
The word “vortex” in the title refers to a kind of tornado which attracts men 
toward the power-center before crushing them or throwing them out.  
In practically all accounts written by former State Department’s employees 
there is a tendency to minimize the role that USAMGIK and USAFIK played in 
Korea. The book by Richard Robinson stands out as one noticeable exception.  
On the contrary, in Henderson’s book this bias is carried to an extreme. He 
gives almost no personal testimony from his own experience in Korea; the word 
“provost court” does not appear in the index (nor in the book); the suppression 
of the People’s Republic committees in the fall of 1945 is described in one line; 
the clashes between insurgents and US forces in the fall of 1946 are summarized 
in less than two lines: “At 4pm the local American Command declared martial 
law and restored order with American tactical troops”.  
In the introduction (p. 7) Henderson explains this bias in the following terms:  
“These pages [i.e. this book] say little about many instances of foreign influence. They do so partly to avoid that to which I was officially privy”. In other 
words, because of his position, Henderson has to refrain from giving personal 
testimonies. This strongly contrasts with Robinson’s attitude although a certain 
degree of restraint is also perceptible in “Betrayal of a nation”.  
Henderson’s theoretical approach is based on an interesting conception in which 
social events are explained in terms of the underlying network structure of so-
ciety. There is however a problem in the way this method is implemented. Can 
one model the movements of a pendulum that swings in strong wind without 
taking the wind gusts into account? It is the same here. Systematic discounting 
of exogenous forces makes the analysis of the remaining endogenous factors 
pretty unreliable.]

Hermes (W.G.) 1990: Truce tent and fighting front. The last two years. Center for  
Military History, Washington DC.  
[This is an official publication of the US Army which has several chapters. 
Chapter 11 is devoted to the Koje prisoner camp.]

Hydrick (B.) 2004: A guide to the microfilm edition of: Art looting and Nazi Ger-
[In spite of its title, this collection does not only document art looting by Nazi Germany but also art looting by US military personnel.]

[Jung Hae Gu belongs to the “Korea Policy Institute”. According to its website, the KPI is an independent research institute based in Los Angeles whose mission is to analyze US policies toward Korea.]

Kim (Dong-Choon) (Published between 2001 and 2010, exact date not given): Beneath the tip of the iceberg. Problems in historical clarification of the Korean War.
[Available on the Internet. Excerpt about the repression of the Jeju Do insurgency:
The ROK army under the direction of the US Military Advisory Group in Korea (USMAGIK) burned villages and killed those suspected of collaborating with the insurgents. The estimated number killed reached 30,000, about 10% of the island’s population. Some 70% of the island’s 230 villages were burned to the ground. Other sources (Cumings 1998) say that 57% of the 400 villages were destroyed.]


Kim (Pong-hyon), Kim (Min-ju) 1963: Cheju-do inmindul ui 4.3 mujang tujaengsa charyojip. [Chronicle of 4.3 armed struggle of Cheju islanders.], Kumjungnim, Taepan
[This book in Korean about the Cheju-Do uprising was never translated. It was cited in Merrill (1980) and in Cumings (1998).]


Korea in War.

This document was originally written in Korean by Korean officers. At the re-
quest of the Office of the Chief of Military History (OCMH), it was translated into English by the 500th Military Intelligence Group.


Kwon (Yang Han) 2001: The truth about the Jeju uprising. in: Soo (Ur Sang) editor: For the truth and reparations: Jeju April 3 of 1948 massacre not forgotten. Baek San publisher, Seoul.


[Chapter 6 (p. 120-160) is devoted to the participation of South Korea. This book is part of a broader series entitled “Vietnam Studies”.

This is in official history which means that although it is fairly detailed in some respects, some aspects are completely omitted. For instance, the atrocities committed against Vietnamese civilians, some of which came to light in the 2000s, are not even alluded to. The sentence which deals with the interrogation of Vietnamese prisoners says: “Detainees were a valuable source of information. They were retained in one central area until the Koreans were convinced they had been properly exploited, the theory being that if held long enough they would provide the desired information”. In South Korea prisoners suspected of Communist sympathies were routinely tortured. Were the same methods not used in Vietnam?]


Although such stories did not come to the knowledge of the general public until several decades after the war, they had already been known in 1972 at the State Department; for more details see the chronology at the date of 13 February 1972.
[After earning a Ph.D. in Political Science from Princeton University in 1945, the author returned to Korea in 1948 as an adviser to the American Military Government and as first secretary to So Jae-Pil who was Chief Adviser to General Hodge. Dismayed by the partitioning of Korea he returned to the United States within the year. He waged an overseas campaign against the Rhee dictatorship and following the overthrow of Rhee by the April 1960 student uprising he served as ambassador to the United Nations in the reform government of Chang Myon. He resigned in protest two years later in the aftermath of the Pak Chung military coup.]


MacDonald (D.S.) 1992: US-Korean relations from liberation to self-reliance. The twenty-year record. An interpretative summary of the archives of the US Department of State for the period 1945 to 1965. Westview Press, Boulder. [Before being published as a book this compilation was first published in 1975 as a secret internal study intended for State Department officers. In a sense, it is more remarkable for what it does not contain than for what it contains. To see this point more clearly one must keep in mind that under the general title “Foreign relations of the United States” the US Department of States publishes numerous annual books containing various documents such as messages between Washington and embassies around the world, internal communications and so on. Yet, almost all the State Department documents to which the study refers were still not in the public domain in 1992 that is to say almost 30 years after being issued.

The original endnote numbers have been kept in the text but in the endnote section at the end of the book no sources are given. For instance, there are 115 notes for chapter 5 but only one reference (number 7) is shown; for the other numbers one reads: “1-6”: Not released, “8-115”: Not released. Moreover, from the Preface one learns that apart from the endnotes, portions of the original text were also eliminated.

Needless to say, these omissions took away most of the interest that the book may have had initially.]

McCune (G.M.), Grey (A.L.) 1950: Korea today. Harvard University Press, Cambridge [This is a broad historical account which covers the whole 20th century. Regarding more specifically the occupation from 1945 to 1950 there are two useful
sections: “Suppression of Communism” (p. 84-88) and “American economic policies” (p. 93-113).

McCune had been in charge of the Korean Affairs in the “Office of Far Eastern Affairs of the Department of State. He died at the end of 1948. The book was initially published by Harvard University Press in 1950.

The book is available online (as of 25 January 2011) at the following address:
http://www.archive.org/stream/koreatoday006954mbp/koreatoday006954mbp_djvu.txt

The text was scanned and treated with a word identification software which, however, left many spelling mistakes.


[In the preface of this 700-page book the author recognizes that the book “is an official history in the sense that it was produced under the auspices of the state”. He adds: “It does not, however, represent the government’s view of the war. I was given no guidelines, nor was I subjected to any form of censorship.” Actually, no guidelines nor censorship were needed because the author was an employee of the “Ministry of Culture and Heritage”, the organisation which funded the book’s publication together with the New Zealand Defense Force.

Is it a dependable account? Well, a look at the index will tell us immediately. None of the following words appears in the index: black market, desertion, killings, prisoners, prostitution, torture. These aspects exist in any war (and especially in counter-insurgency wars) but in this account they were just omitted.

On p. 230 there is a short account of the killing of Vietcong prisoners by New Zealand troops but the few cases cited mention only wounded prisoners and their executions are presented as mercy killings.

The book contains many pictures from the army public relation office. It would have been possible to include pictures made by soldiers or reporters but there does not seem to be a single one (as suggested by the fact that there is no list of the pictures). Needless to say, there are many pictures in which the troop help smiling Vietnamese. There are several chapters about medical assistance and relief efforts.]


[Stewart Meacham was “Labor Advisor to the Commanding General USAFIK” that is to say to General Hodge. In the last pages of his 42-page report, Meacham lists a number of advices. While the report shows a high degree of lucidity, these advices show a great apparent naivety. They start with “Step number one would be to launch a thoroughgoing investigation of the activities of Rhee Syngman and Kim Koo”. Meacham had probably no illusion and knew that his advices
would not be followed but as they resulted logically from his analysis he could hardly not give them.]


[This pioneering paper about the Cheju uprising was written in 1975 as a Master thesis submitted to Harvard University. It provides an accurate picture of the suppression of the uprising at a time when this topic was still taboo in South Korea.
However, his study systematically minimizes or ignores the role of US advisers with Korean troops or the presence of US forces on the island during the repression. He does not mention the agreement made with President Rhee according to which Korean forces remained under US command after August 1948.
In 1989 Merrill became a State Department analyst in charge of North Korea at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research.]


Military History of Korea.
Written initially in Korean it was translated into English by Headquarters, US Army Forces, Far East Military Intelligence Service Group, Historical Research Collection, CMH (Center for Military History).
[This translation is a sister document of the one given above under the title “Korea in War”.]


Millett (A.R.) 2009: War behind the wire: Koje-do prison camp. Military History Quarterly (January)
[Prof. Allan Millet is a retired Colonel of the Marine Corps Reserve.]


[This book is an inquiry about prostitution around US bases in Korea in the 1970s. The same kind of study could be done in other countries where there are
foreign military bases. The fact that (to my best knowledge) it was done only for South Korea is quite to the credit of this nation. This study complements a vast range of other investigations carried out by Korean journalists, scholars and publishers to get a lucid insight into the recent history of their country.]


[The photographer Carl Mydans reported for Life and Time Magazine. He came to Sunchon (60,000 inhabitants) when loyalist troops retook the city on 23 October 1948. He was told that during the uprising a number of rightists and police (about 500 rightists and 100 police according to Korean sources) were killed. He saw the corpses but did not witness these killings himself. He saw how Korean men were executed by firing squads or beaten with rifle buts and clubs during loyalty investigations by Korean troops.

On one of the photographs there is an American adviser, Lieutenant Ralph Bliss. Apparently, he was unable (or unwilling) to stop the executions and the torture that Korean forces used in questioning the loyalty of the inhabitants.]


[Excerpt (p. 6): “To the disappointment of the Military Government the Korean National Police failed to control disturbances without assistance from US troops. Because the Korean National Police consisted of former Korean collaborators, from its very inception Koreans did not acknowledge the police’s official authority. Conflicts between Koreans and US occupation forces complicated the situation. The Nam-won Incident of October 15, 1945, was the worst of these. With the Korean National Police losing control of the situation, the MG decided to create a conventional military force to impose order.”]


[The authors of the articles were George Wehrfritz, B.J. Lee and Hideko Takayama.

This 3-page article was published in the wake of the research done by the “Cheju 4.3 Research Institute” (created in 1989) and by the “Jemin Ilbo”, a Chejudo based newspaper who in the mid-1990s published several volumes containing

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183 Members of the Namwon People’s Committee and of the “National Preparatory Army” attacked the US occupation force. Note that there was another incident in Namwon on 15 November (see the chronology). At this point it is not clear whether or not these incidents were really different.
archive documents and interviews of islanders."
Through sentences such as “Rhee sent police, soldiers and gangsters from the mainland” the present article conveys the notion that the US Army command had no responsibility in this repression. Yet, the agreement of 24 August 1948 between president Rhee and General Hodge stated that the United States will retain over-all operational control over all Korean forces (Police, Army and Navy) until the end of the withdrawal of US forces.]

Nusbacher (A.J.S.) 2000: From Koje to Kosovo. The development of the Canadian command element; in: Dennis (P.), Grey (J.) editors: The Korean War 1950-1953, a 50 year retrospective. Proceedings of the Chief of Army’s Military History Conference. Published by the Army History Unit.

Official Gazette, United States Army Military Government in Korea, 4 Volumes. Published by USAMGIK between September 1945 and August 1948. It was later recompiled and reprinted in 1991.
[It was the official journal of Korea during the time when the country was ruled by the MG. As such, it should include all proclamations, directives, ordinances, executive orders and regulations which were issued by the MG. However, it is far from containing all these items. Even for the items which are included there are gaps. For instance, in the section “Instructions to banks” of Volume 1 there is a gap between Instruction No 6 of 27 February 1946 and Instruction No 12 of 2 July 1946. In Volume 3, listed Ordinances are limited to No 119 to No 149. One would like to find a more complete version.
This publication was consulted at the Library of Seoul National University where its call number is 951.071 Y66o v1-4. For some reason it is kept in a special room which means that one must make an appointment with a librarian to get it.]

[The expressions “Military Commission” or “provost court” do not appear in the index. The concluding chapter was written by Prof. Bruce Cumings.
In a review of the book, Allan R. Millett points out the book’s deficiencies. For instance there is almost nothing about the Autumn Harvest Uprising of October-November 1946. Yet, Prof. Millett does not mention the issue of US military tribunals among the book’s omissions. He concludes his review by the following words: “Professor Oh’s volume should encourage others to return to the primary sources in our search for the real Korea after World War II”. This is a good advice. Yet, in the contributing chapter that Prof. Millett wrote two years later for Stueck (2004) he does not provide more insight; in particular not a
single line is devoted to the issue of military tribunals.]


[On p. 51 the thesis gives a short excerpt of the letter from Sergeant Harry Savage to President Roosevelt that we mentioned in the Prologue. The real point of interest is that the reference (note 27 on p. 100) describes a copy in Record Group 107, more precisely in the correspondence of Assistant Secretary of War Howard Charles Peterson (also spelled Petersen). Clearly this copy is different from the copy of RG 59 that is mentioned by Clark (2003). This gives some hope of finding letters written by other GIs who served in Korea during 1945-1949.]

Potter (L.A.) 1958: Smallpox.

in: Preventive medicine in World War II, Volume 4 (Communicable diseases), Ch. 9 (Smallpox) Office of Medical History, US Army, Washington DC.


Robinson (R.D.) 1947, 1950, 1960: Betrayal of a nation. Unpublished manuscript (329 pages). [In 1946 Richard Robinson (1921-2009) was Chief of the Public Opinion Section of the Department of Information of the USAMGIK. Later he was attached as historian to the G-2 Department at the Headquarters of the XXIV Corps. During his stay from early 1946 to mid-1947 he wrote a long account about which he makes the following statement (p.4): “The original of this book was several times the length of the present volume, nearly every statement being fully documented from indisputable sources. Unfortunately, General Hodge and his detachment of Counter Intelligence Corps agents evidenced such obvious displeasure over this proposed revelation of American mistakes and misdeeds in Korea that the volume was burned to avoid personal incarceration. This present work is a reconstruction of the more complete version. Fortunately, I was able to take with me a file of the Seoul Times, an outspoken daily news sheet published in English and a few other documents”.

He wrote the present manuscript (under the pseudonym Will Hamlin) after he left Korea in 1947. As suggested by its title the book was critical of the action of the Military Government. In this respect it is a fairly unique book for 99% of the books written by Civil Service officers follow the lines set by the official historiography of
the occupation as established by the History Section of the Military Government. It is likely that it is because of its critical tone that the book has never been published. In his preface the author explains that he made unsuccessful attempts at finding a publisher in 1948 after writing the book and then tried again 10 years later but with no more success.

Nevertheless, the book can be read in manuscript form in a few libraries. The “WorldCat” (collective catalog of world libraries) gives only two locations in the United States: Harvard-Yenching and Georgetown University. The book has not been made available online so far. Google Books mentions its title and shows its cover but does not provide any part of it, not even the table of contents.

Apart from “Betrayal of a nation” Robinson wrote several other books, e.g. “The first Turkish Republic” (1963), “International business policy” (1964). This last book caused one reviewer to condemn him as a “traitor to American capitalism”.

Robinson’s book describes the anti-leftist policy of US Headquarters, the rivalries between Korean political parties, the discussions between Russians and Americans. Unfortunately, it contains almost nothing about some important episodes. Nothing about the suppression of the Korean People’s Republic committees, nothing about the suppression of the uprisings of September-November 1946. nothing about military commissions. However, it is the only study that I have read so far which contains some limited information about trials by provost courts. Unfortunately it gives no data about the total number of trials or prison sentences. In other words, it fails to fill many important gaps in our knowledge and understanding of the occupation.

Despite these limitations the book provides a number of interesting facts and gives useful clues. It opens the way for a real understanding and it is really a pity that it has never been published and was largely ignored by subsequent historians.

The Harvard-Yenching copy (which is the one that I read) was made available to this library by John Merrill with the permission of Richard Robinson. Merrill’s letter dated 19 April and Robinson’s reply dated 25 April 1975 are inserted at the beginning of the volume. Merrill asks Robinson whether the book should be included in the general collection or in the Korean Section’s “vertical file” in which it would be possible to attach restrictions to its use. Robinson responded: “There is no reason for it not to be included in the general collection.”

Incidentally, in the copy that I read two pages were missing namely pages 124 and 211. According to the footnotes at the bottom of page 33, these pages had figures summarizing the organization of political parties in Korea.

The main shortcoming of Robinson’s book is that it does not contain any references to primary documents. However, our own investigation basically confirmed most of Robinson’s claims.]

184 The librarian of Harvard-Yenching told me in 2011 that the “vertical file” was no longer in existence.
[Sponsored by the Department of the Army and issued by the Federal Government, this study can be considered as a semi-official publication. It is a fairly lucid account of the post-1945 political history of South Korea. Available online.]
[This official history of the role of US advisers in Korea is available online.]
[The book has a foreword by then president of South Korea Kim Dae Jung who was himself arrested and sentenced to death in 1980.]
[This interesting article shows that what the author calls an “anti-Communist state structure” in fact shares many features with pre-World War II fascist states: abolition of all youth or worker organizations except those sponsored by the government (most of which were personally headed by President Rhee), elimination of political opponents by assassination, repression of all opposition by arresting dissenting members of parliament.]
[There is only one chapter which is concerned with the period after 1945, namely: Chapter 9 entitled “Historical origins of peasant radicalism in liberated Korea (p. 144-174).”]
PhD thesis, Ohio State University.
[Written 10 years after the 1998 paper by Bruce Cumings and 8 years after the article of 19 June 2000 published in Newsweek, this thesis about the Cheju Do events appears in several respects a fairly “sanitized” account.

(i) It does not mention the relocation strategy. Thus, the thesis fails to bring new light on one of the most crucial (and little studied) aspects.

(ii) Obviously, the question of the executions could not be completely omitted in this story. However, the episodes which are mentioned concern only small-scale cases (a few dozen people killed), a far cry from the mass-executions which actually took place.

According to some of the cases mentioned in the thesis, it seems that summary executions of villagers started toward the end of October 1948.

The author is a professional soldier of the South Korean Army with the rank of Major (in 2008).]

Song (K.-C.) 2006: A study on the military occupation courts under the military administration of USAMGIK. (paper in Korean in a Korean journal)


[The author relies on many Korean sources, including newspapers and he shows much sympathy for the Korean People’s Republic. Unfortunately his emphasis is more on structures and ideas than on facts and events. He describes in detail the organization of the various political groups but tells us very little about the tragic events of the fall of 1945 and 1946. He describes the Korean judicial system but tell us almost nothing about US military tribunals. Similarly to what is done in the two-volume work of Bruce Cumings, he describes the program and organizational structure of the People’s Republic Committees but tells us almost nothing about their suppression.]

Soviet Embassy in North Korea 1950: Partisan movement in the rural areas of South Korea.

[The document is dated 6 May 1950. Released in English by the US Wilson Center, it was not only translated but also edited as can be seen by the fact that it gives the date of death of Syngman Rhee (namely 1965). It can be accessed at the following address:

I’m grateful to Mr. Yoo Kwang-On for attracting my attention on this docu-

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185 As in US military reports confrontations are described just in one sentence. For instance (p. 243): “On 3 November 1945 the American forces abolished the South Cholla People’s Committee”. This suggests that the committee’s members offered no resistance whatsoever, a fairly surprising proposition when one recalls the sturdy resistance seen elsewhere, e.g. during the uprising of May 1980.
[Only the first chapter is about the pre-Korea War period. It is entitled “The Korean people: missing in action in the misunderstood war 1945-1954 and written by Prof. Allen R. Millet. It sheds little new light on the topic of the occupation. For instance, the question of US military tribunals is not mentioned.]

[The author was arrested in 1971. He was interrogated and tortured under suspicion of being a North Korean spy. For some unknown reason several Americans, including Prof. Bruce Cumings, lobbied the Korean government for years in order to obtain his liberation. Eventually, Sung was released on 28 February 1990. Later on he became professor of international studies at Ritsumeikan university in Japan.
The book is somewhat dishonest in the sense that during the first 30 pages the reader is kept in the belief that the author was arrested for no reason whatsoever. One must wait until page 34 to learn from the account of the trial that Sung had made a one-month long visit to North Korea in the full knowledge that such visits were forbidden not only by the government of South Korea but also by the Japanese government (the author was born in Japan). As a result he had to enter North Korea clandestinely. After that he entered Seoul National University (of course without revealing anything about his visit to North Korea) and studied there for 3 years before being arrested. During these three years he had some political activity but the book tells us very little about that. On pages xix-xxi there is a fairly detailed chronology which for instance even mentions the death of Sung’s mother and father. however it does not mention the stay of Sung in North Korea in 1968. Is that not a deliberate misrepresentation?
As a matter of fact, the whole book seems fairly careless about facts and truth. On page 35 the author writes that Imperial Japan and the colonial rule were responsible for the division of Korea after national liberation”, a fairly puzzling statement. On page 165 he writes: “In 1981 for the first time since the Korean War students openly engaged in anti-American action setting fire to the US Cultural Center in Pusan” (in the chronology at the beginning of the book this event is reported in 1982). As we have already observed, there had been (at least) one other similar arson attack in December 1980.
The author gives no information whatsoever about the actions undertaken by several Americans in order to obtain his liberation. There are two pictures which
portray Senator Edward Kennedy and Prof. Bruce Cumings with the author after his liberation, but their names do not appear in the book’s index.

In the course of being translated from the Japanese, the book was also heavily edited. Some sections were eliminated while at the same time some new chapters were added. Although the translator thanks Prof. Mark Selden (the series editor) for his help in the editing process and claims that all this was done for the benefit of the reader, one is not really convinced.


[The book was published shortly before the assassination of President Park. It has only two chapters about the period 1945-1949. However, it makes the interesting point that during the Yosu rebellion “government troops, equipped with tanks and armored cars attacked Yosu on 24 October. They were supported by shell fire from American warships lying off shore” (p. 67). Is this really true? Needless to say, one would wish some confirmation along with more details about the circumstances. The author visited Korea in the early 1960s and was able to interview Korean officers. That would have given him the opportunity to check this statement. Did he do that? He does not give any additional information.

The book exposes the main features of Park’s dictatorship but without much coverage of the most gruesome aspects such as torture of political opponents. On p. ix we are told that following the proclamation of martial law, according to decree number 9, Korean people were no longer allowed to speak to foreigners. On account of the fact that there were many American companies in Korea one must admit that this rule suffered some exceptions.

The author deplores the support provided by the United States to this regime but he understands this support purely in diplomatic and economic terms and fails to describe the actual collaboration between the Korean Army and the US Army or between the KCIA and the CIA.

One chapter gives ample evidence of strong economic growth during the Park era, a case which (once again) illustrates the fact that economic growth and totalitarianism can go hand in hand.]


[Available on the following website:
Young Sik Kim grew up in North Korea and came to South Korea in 1950 as a member of an anti-Communist guerrilla. He attended the Seoul National University majoring in physics from 1953 to 1955. While attending the University, he worked for various US Military Intelligence Services. After 1956 he studied
physics at Brigham Young University in Ohio. He earned a Ph.D in nuclear physics from Purdue University in 1962. and taught physics at Ohio State University from 1962 to 1980.

According to the following website
http://www.johndclare.net/cold_war10_YoungSKim.htm#Young%20Sik%20Kim

Young S. Kim’s website, “Kimsoft”, was accused of spreading pro-North Korean propaganda and banned by the South Korean government in 1997.

Regarding Kim’s book the main problem is the fact that it does not give the sources for the events that are described. It is true that at the end of the book (eyewit33.htm) there is a bibliography, but apart from a few secondary sources (mainly books) the only archive documents which are listed are CIA reports of a fairly broad type which probably do not give the detailed accounts given in the book.

So, our excerpts from this work are given as a set of statements that need confirmation. In other words, we consider them as providing what physicists would call “working assumptions”; they give directions for further research but must be comforted by further evidence. In many instances the evidence that we found in US intelligence reports confirmed the facts described by Mr. Young Kim.

[Available on the following website of the Moon religious movement:
http://www.tparents.org/Library/Religion/Cta/Korea-J/eyewit11.htm]

[Available on the following website:

[Available on the following website:
http://www.tparents.org/Library/Religion/Cta/Korea-J/eyewit15.htm]

[Available on the following website:

[Available on the following website:
http://www.tparents.org/Library/Religion/Cta/Korea-J/eyewit17.htm]


Internet sources
We list only those websites which provide documents in a fairly systematic way.

http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/USAMGIK_Ordinance_33

This webpage gives the text of Ordinance No 33 of USAMGIK. The same website gives the text of a number of other ordinances. However, the collection is far from complete. Less than one half of the ordinances are given. In particular, none of the ordinances numbered 1-9 seems to be available and it does not contain ordinance 88 about the press (this observation was made on 15 January 2011).
Occupation episodes and analytical history

By education the present author is a physicist, so it may not be surprising that he tried to transform history into a testable science. How to do that was explained in a book he co-authored with Pr. Tony Syme and which was published by Harvard University Press in 2002.

The main step in transforming history into a testable science is to study not just one case but several similar cases. Indeed, a physicist does not just study the fall of one kind of bodies (e.g. apples), he wants to describe and understand the fall of all kinds of falling objects (e.g. iron balls, drops of water, hailstones, and so on).

Actually this requirement is not specific to physics, it is common to all testable sciences. Thus, in medicine one does not wish to describe solely the influenza of Mr. Martin; one wants to understand all cases of influenza whether they occur in China, Europe or the United States.

That is why the present study is part of a series of several books devoted to various occupation episodes.

Studies of “occupation” episodes by the same author

1. Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan
2 Relations between Allied forces and the populations of Germany and Austria.
3 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Iceland
4 Relations between US forces and the population of Hawaii
5 Relations between American forces and the population of China
6 Relations between American forces and the population of South Korea
7 Relations between American forces and the population of Australia

All these studies are available on the author’s website at:
http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/roehner/occupation.html

Modules and submodules

What we call modules of a major historical episode are simpler elements. Occupation episodes are modules of the Second World War, but these modules have themselves several aspects that can be called submodules. It turns out that many of these submodules are common to several occupation episodes.

As examples of such submodules one can mention:
- Military tribunals
- Clashes between soldiers and the population
- Looting of art items
- Purge of undesirable elements in education and the medias
- Control of political activity
- Introduction of a special currency
- Creation of new universities
- Establishment of exchange programs for teachers or officers in the police and armed forces

For each submodule the various occupation episodes will provide several realizations. These realizations parallel the repeated experiments conducted by a physicist who wants to study a specific phenomenon.

Of course, defining the submodules and collecting all information about them is only the first step. Once this has been done, the historian is in the same situation as a physicist who has finished a first round of experiments.

The next challenge is to make sense of the data. This means asking the right ques-
tions in order to find some hidden order behind them. Once a regularity has emerged, a new set of observations can be planned which will permit to improve its accuracy.