

**RELATIONS BETWEEN  
ALLIED FORCES  
AND THE  
POPULATION OF JAPAN**

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Alle Menschen werden Brüder wo dein sanfter Flügel weilt.  
[All people become brothers under your tender wing.]

—Friedrich Schiller, *Lied an die Freude* [Ode to Joy] (1785)

“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”

“Yes, to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”

“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”

“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *Silver Blaze* (1892)

There is a strong family resemblance about the misdeeds, and if you have all the details of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can't unravel the thousand and first.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Valley of Fear* (1915)



# **RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED FORCES AND THE POPULATION OF JAPAN**

15 August 1945–31 December 1960 (Okinawa: 1945–1972)

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Version of 26 December 2015. Comments are welcome.

We hope that these notes will enable us to get in touch with Japanese scholars; needless to say, this is an essential condition for the success of this project. Please, if you happen to know people who have a working interest in this kind of historiography do not hesitate to send them a copy of the present draft.

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(\*) Okinawa is treated in a separate chapter not only because it was not part of Japan during the period under study, but also due to several other special features, e.g. the extreme paucity of sources for the period 1945-1952 or the fact that the period of study is extended until reversion to Japan in 1972.



# Chapter 1

## Introduction

There is an abundant literature about the occupation period in Japan but three questions of key importance have been largely ignored.

- How were the occupation troops accepted and what was the frequency of the incidents between the Japanese population and the troops?
- What degree of autonomy did the Japanese government have with respect to General MacArthur's General Headquarters (GHQ)?
- What was for Japan the cost of the occupation and of the reparations.

On these points the reading which still prevails nowadays is not much different from the picture that GHQ tried to impose and which can be summarized by saying that:

- the troops were welcomed and there were few if any incidents.
- GHQ had only an advisory role and there was a friendly cooperation between the Military Government and the Japanese administration.
- Japan paid only minimal reparations.

How do we know what kind of picture GHQ tried to force on the Japanese? Burton Crane, a New York Time journalist, was able to examine 60 stories which were censored by SCAP (Supreme Command of Allied Powers). He found out that the Japanese were not to know how great a hand SCAP has had in shaping their future; they were not allowed to know the cost of the occupation and they were not allowed to know the plans for reparations. He concludes by saying: "SCAP's public relations policy was to convince America [and the rest of the world] that the democratization of Japan had achieved unprecedented success and that the Japanese government had furthered this process voluntarily. The first premise is debatable and the second is contrary to fact" (Lauterbach 1947, p. 50).

This was written in 1947. In the 65 years that followed the State Department was able to sell the distorted historical account not only to the Japanese people and to the American public (including American scholars) but to the whole world. In short, the public relations operation was a tremendous success.

### No incidents?

With respect to the first point mentioned above, we will see that the archive records

which would be required in order to get a complete picture are not yet available, but that the evidence based on accessible sources does hardly support the notion of an occupation without incidents. As a matter of fact we will see that according to American military statistics there were several hundred serious incidents.

### Was it “friendly cooperation”?

One can get a glimpse of the kind of relation which existed between SCAP and the Japanese government by considering the following cases which occurred in late 1951.

- The Bureau of the Prime Minister had to get the approval of SCAP for depurging any Japanese citizen. Moreover it had to ask permission for paying their pension to such depurged persons. (Chronology chapter, date of 10 September 1951)
- The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to ask SCAP’s authorization before it could give the status of permanent resident to immigrants from Okinawa. Similarly, it had to ask permission from SCAP before authorizing some of this citizens to travel abroad. (Chronology chapter, dates of 10 September and 4 October 1951)
- The Japanese Ministry of Transportation had to get the approval of SCAP before Japanese merchant ships could be scrapped. (Chronology chapter, dates of 10 September and 4 October 1951)

In short, even for the smallest things the Japanese government could not act without the approval of SCAP.

The subservience of the Japanese government was well recognized by people which followed closely the occupation. Thus, in 1948 Lindesay Parrott, who was Tokyo bureau chief for the New York Times from 1945 to 1955<sup>1</sup>, wrote:

“As the fourth year of occupation begins, all major policy still is made by the occupation authorities and even the most minor detail is checked and counterchecked on local levels by Military Government teams in all prefectures. Parliament remains largely a rubber stamp for the Cabinet it elects which in turn is a rubber stamp for the occupation authorities”. (NYT 8 Aug. 1948, *The Week in Review*, p. E4).

In the following chapters (e.g. in chapters 3 and 6) we will see that this judgment is indeed confirmed by many documents particularly by the numerous instructions to the Japanese government, the so-called SCAPINs and SCAPIN-As. But, as in the case of the incidents, many documents which would allow us to get a more comprehensive view are not accessible currently. For instance, we would need sources documenting the way SCAP instructions were enforced at the local level of prefec-

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<sup>1</sup>During his years in Tokyo Parrott wrote over one thousand papers several of which are cited in the chronology section below.

tures, corporations, schools and so on. According to replies that we received from their archivists, Japanese prefectural archives seem to hold very few documents pertaining to the activity of Military Government teams in their respective areas.

Naturally, the aforementioned issues are related in the sense that among some disgruntled and defiant sections of the population opposition to reforms imposed from above translated into resentment, anger and various forms of resistance.

Non-compliance with GHQ instructions or overt offenses against occupation forces were disciplined through various means: dismissals from jobs especially for government personnel or trials either by Japanese courts or by military tribunals.


**Prefectures and largest cities, from north to south:**

01: Hokkaido, 02: Aomori, 03: Iwate, 04: Miyagi, 05: Akita, 06: Yamagata, 07: Fukushima, 08: Ibaraki, 09: Tochigi, 10: Gunma, 11: Saitama, 12: Chiba, 13: Tokyo, 14: Kanagawa, 15: Niigata, 16: Toyama, 17: Ishikawa, 18: Kukui, 19: Yamanashi, 20: Nagano, 21: Gifu, 22: Shizuoka, 23: Aichi, 24: Mie, 25: Shiga, 26: Kyoto, 27: Osaka, 28: Hyogo, 29: Nara, 30: Wakayama, 31: Tottori, 32: Shimane, 33: Okayama, 34: Hiroshima, 35: Yamaguchi, 36: Tokushima, 37: Kagawa, 38: Ehime, 39: Kochi, 40: Fukuoka, 41: Saga, 42: Kumamoto, 44: Oita, 45: Miyazaki, 46: Kagoshima, 50: Tokyo (city), 51: Yokohama (city), 52: Nagoya (city), 53: Kyoto (city) , 54: Osaka (city), 55: Kobe (city), 56: Kitakyusyu (city).

**Prefectures and largest cities, alphabetical ordering:**

Aichi (23) Akita (05) Aomori (02) Chiba (12) Ehime (38) Fukuoka (40) Fukushima (07) Gifu (21) Gunma (10) Hiroshima (34) Hokkaido (01) Hyogo (28) Ibaraki (08) Ishikawa (17) Iwate (03) Kagawa (37) Kagoshima (46) Kanagawa (14) Kitakyusyu, city (56) Kobe, city (55) Kochi (39) Kumamoto (42) Kyoto (26) Kyoto, city (53) Mie (24) Miyagi (04) Miyazaki (45) Nagano (20) Nagoya, city (52) Nara (29) Niigata (15) Oita (44) Okayama (33) Osaka (27) Osaka, city (54) Saga (41) Saitama (11) Shiga (25) Shimane, 32: Shizuoka (22) Tochigi (09) Tokushima (36) Tokyo (13) Tokyo (city) (50) Tottori (31) Toyama (16) Wakayama (30) Yamagata (06) Yamaguchi (35) Yamanashi (19) Yokohama, city (51)

In a sense the thesis that the occupation was well accepted may at first sight seem fairly plausible. As a matter of fact, Japan has a long tradition of friendship with America. For instance in an article of the Japan Times published on 9 May 1935 one reads that “the US sailor base-ball team of the USS Augusta, the flagship of the American Asiatic Fleet, beat the Tokyo Agriculture College”. Even as late as 29 July 1938 another article of the Japan Times was entitled “Japan still likes America”. It say: “Though many actions in the past proved unkind, this nation still considers her neighbor across the Pacific a true friend. Among the people of Japan the United



**Fig. 1.1 Map of Japan: prefectures and largest cities.** The correspondence between the numbers and the names of the prefectures is given in the text. *Source: Vital Statistics of Japan, 1964-1968.*

States is probably the most popular of all foreign powers”. Yet, this did not prevent Japan from having to face a long and harsh occupation.

### **Facts can be kept secret even in democracies**

One may think that it would be difficult to keep hidden an incident that created a crater about 4 meter deep and 8 meter in diameter which occurred near Albuquerque, some 7 km south of Kirtland Air Force Base in the US state of New Mexico. Yet this is what happened on 22 May 1957 and was revealed only 29 years later by an article in the Los Angeles Times (27 August 1986, Associated Press dispatch). A Mark 17

hydrogen bomb accidentally fell from a bomber. The non-nuclear explosive used a trigger of the bomb detonated when it hit the ground but it was stated that little radioactivity was released. Such bombs have a primary and a secondary plutonium core. One of the cores was stored separately in the plane but it seems that the other was in the part which hit the ground.

The information was provided by government documents obtained by an Albuquerque newspaper through a “Freedom of Information Act” request.

The area where the bomb fell was owned by the University of New Mexico. The B-36 bomber which transported the bomb was flying from Biggs Army Air Field in Texas to Kirtland Air Base.

According to the Wikipedia article about the Mark 17 bomb, it weighed 21 tons and had a yield of about 15 megatons. The Mark 17s were withdrawn by August 1957. The bomb was certainly destined to the Los Alamos nuclear research center to be reprocessed.

As in similar accidents (for instance those in North Carolina, Alaska or Spain), the place had to be cleaned by removing the scattered nuclear material. This task required a large display of manpower that would inevitably be noticed by people living in the neighborhood. Nevertheless the secret was well kept for 29 years. Although the place was cleaned a few fragments of the bomb, some still radioactive, are occasionally found in the area. A marker was placed on the site in 1996 but was subsequently removed.

## Economic perspective

As a general rule, military victories and occupations are intended to be profitable operations for the victorious countries.

### Restrictions on Japanese economic development

After her defeat in the war of 1870-1871, France lost Alsace and Lorraine, two prosperous provinces and had to pay Germany a war indemnity of 5 billion gold francs. Partial military occupation was to last until the huge indemnity was paid. One should therefore not be surprised to see the same spirit at work during the occupation of Japan. The means, however, were different; they included the following moves.

- Occupation costs were covered by Japan as shown by numerous directives and rules<sup>2</sup>. One of the first requirements (6 September 1945) of the Occupation

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<sup>2</sup>This is made clear in the following instruction given to General MacArthur by the Department of State (3 November 1945): “You will require the Japanese authorities to make available to you legal tender yen notes or yen credits free of cost and in amounts sufficient to meet all expenses of your forces including the cost of your military occupation.” (for



**Fig. 1.2 The two sides of a B-yen note.** Most B-yen notes were printed in the United States by the Californian lithographer Strecher-Traung. They became legal tender in Japan at the request of the occupation forces (SCAPIN 8 of 6 September 1945) and were used by the general population as well as by US Forces personnel. After 1945 some B-yen notes were also printed in Japan by the Ministry's of Finance's Printing Bureau. About 35 millions of this specific 20-yen note were issued in 1945. Added together all B-yen notes issued in 1945 represent 5,500 million yen; at the official exchange rate of 6.6 dollars to 100 yen, this amounted to about 360 million dollars. Although the official exchange rate was not changed until 12 March 1947, the actual value of the yen was quickly eroded by high inflation rates. *Source: <http://www.baxley.com>, Liesner 1989, p. 55)*

Forces was that “B-yens” (printed in the United States) become legal tender in Japan; moreover the Japanese government had to transfer regular yens to the Occupation Forces.

- **Reparation payments** were secured mainly in 5 forms.

(i) Japanese industrial equipment in China, Formosa, Korea and Manchuria, were confiscated. These assets have been valued at \$40 billion by SCAP (Reday 1949). That confiscation was in line with the traditional policy of depriving defeated countries from their colonies. It was similarly applied to Germany in 1918 and to Italy in 1945.

(ii) Plants were dismantled and shipped to countries which had been at war with Japan. An article published in the *New York Times* (31 October 1947) says that initial war reparations claims filed by 11 Pacific Allies against Japan were reported to add up to approximately \$54 billion (approximately 500 billion dollars of 2000). According to the “Far Eastern Survey”, a semi-official State Department publication,

more detail see the chronology chapter)

the sword of reparations was still hanging over the Japanese industry in June 1949 (Reday 1949, p. 149).

(iii) In this connection, one can mention that SCAPIN 1146 of 11 September 1946 (see the chronology chapter at this date) organized the removal for reparation purpose of all technical and scientific laboratory-type equipment. Moreover, SCAPIN 1925 of 6 August 1948 (see chronology chapter) organized the plundering of Japanese technical patents by allowing US investigators to get access to all Japanese technical facilities and documents. In this respect one should also mention the secret removal of 1,800 Japanese patents from the Japanese Patent Office to the Department of the Army in Washington. (see the chronology at the date of 3 August 1948).

(iv) Over several years exports of Japan to Allied countries which were termed “restitutions” meant that they were not commercial transactions but reparations. Such “restitutions” are described in a number of administrative instructions issued by SCAP (SCAPIN-As) pertaining to countries such as Britain, China, France, the Netherlands or the Philippines. For instance: SCAPIN-7237-A dated 4 August 1950 is entitled: “Restitution of tin to the government of the United Kingdom”; SCAPIN-7248-A dated 18 August 1950 is entitled “Restitution of phosphorous ore to the French government”; SCAPIN-7331-A dated 21 November 1950 is entitled “Restitution of industrial machinery to the government of the United Kingdom”; SCAPIN-7463-A dated 16 August 1951 is entitled: “Disposition of proceeds from sales of reparations equipment”. Between September 1948 and April 1952 there were 180 “restitutions” of that kind each one referenced by a SCAPIN-A: 33% were for the Republic of China (i.e. Taiwan), 27% for the United Kingdom, 18% for the Netherlands, 12% for France, 9.5% for the Philippines, and 0.6% for India. Note that there are no mentions of restitutions destined to Australia, New Zealand or the United States (NARA 8).

(iv) Gold, silver, platinum, diamonds were searched, stored under US custody in the vaults of the Bank of Japan<sup>3</sup> and handed over as compensation to countries which had suffered damages as a result of the war. For instance, on 6 October 1949 French Indochina and Thailand received gold shipments for a value of \$37 million and \$44 million respectively. It seems that some of the diamonds were fraudulently misappropriated (see the chronology at the dates of 22 May 1947, 1 March 1953). In 1953 the missing diamonds represented 98,000 carats. Part of these stock of precious metals and stones was also used as collateral for a revolving loan to finance Japanese imports (Reday 1949).

According to an article in Wikipedia, Japanese reparation payments to Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam totalled \$1 billion. The last payment was made

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<sup>3</sup>In March 1946 the value of the precious metals and jewels in the vaults of the Bank of Japan was estimated at \$250 million (NYT 17 March 1946 (p. 28)).

to the Philippines on 22 July 1976.

- Imports and exports were subject to prior authorization by the Occupation Forces. Thus, almost all the raw cotton imported by Japan came from the United States (see chronology at the dates of 3 March 1946 and 20 May 1947).

- Machine tools which could not be easily removed were destroyed. In the “History of the non-military activities of the occupation of Japan” one reads that 12,000 machine tools were destroyed. More details can be found in the chronology at the date of 5 December 1949.

- The equipment which was removed represented a value of 162 million yen of 1939 of which 52% went to China, 20% to the Philippines, 16% to the UK, 12% to the Netherlands. For instance all bearing plants were removed (see SCAPIN 1136 of 14 August 1946). The costs of removals amounted to 20 million yen of 1939 which were also covered by Japan. (History of the non-military activities of the occupation of Japan, Vol. 9, Appendix)

- The revival of Japanese manufacturing industries (e.g. for automobiles, aircraft or ships) was drastically limited by orders of the occupation authorities. In mid-1947, the Japanese government applied for permission to manufacture passenger cars (see SCAPIN 1715 of 3 June 1947 in the chronology chapter). For cars of more than 1500 cc permission was denied altogether and for cars of less than 1500 cc annual production was limited to 300 cars.

- The fact that the ban on aircraft manufacturing also included civil aircraft (see the SCAPIN of 22 September 1945) means that Japan had little opportunity to develop an industry in which it excelled before the war<sup>4</sup>. A statement made by the US State Department on 3 March 1946 (see chronology below) even suggests that in 1946 the policy of the United States was to encourage Japanese exports of raw material (silk, tea) and handicraft at the expense of industrial exports.

- During the war 80% of the Japanese merchant fleet was sunk. Naturally, the war also took the lives of a large number of seamen. All the remaining commercial

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<sup>4</sup>In the same line of thought one can mention that in 1946 German wind tunnels were removed to the United States for experiments on high speed aircraft or missiles (North China Daily News 2 April 1946 p. 3). The fact that the war gave the United States a distinct advantage in civil aviation can also be illustrated by the Anglo-American agreement of June 1942 (the so-called Arnold-Powers agreement, see Engel 2007 p. 30) which divided the load of military aircraft construction between Britain and the United States. Through this agreement Britain offered to forgo the production of transport aircraft throughout the remainder of the war. As the development of transport aircraft became part of the package assigned to America, Britain could not develop aircraft that would be needed by civil aviation. After 1945 Britain tried to recover the lost ground. But in the war’s aftermath American manufacturers had masses of redundant aircraft with a seemingly endless supply of spares. American salesmen exploited this globally to gain markets. In contrast, British-built airliners such as the Comet, Britannia or Viscount were unable to find a substantial market in the United States. The fact that American authorities excessively delayed the granting of airworthiness certificates for the most advanced British airliners was vehemently denounced on several occasions by Lord Brabazon of Tara, the chairman of the British Air Regulation Board.

(Times 25 April 1953 p.3; Times 23 February 1954 p.6; Times 5 July 1957 p.1, <http://www.aviationarchive.org.uk>

fleet was put under the control of SCAP which made it sail under the SCAPFLAG flag. Moreover, compensations for war losses that the Japanese government destined to the shipping companies were held in escrow accounts so that Japanese companies were not only deprived of vessels and employees but also of the basic funds needed for their reconstruction. It is only in December 1949 that SCAP authorized the construction of large ships (see the chronology at the date of Oct 27, 1952). Until that date Japanese companies were not allowed to built vessels of more than 5,000 tons with speed faster than 12 knots. The first ocean going vessel built in Japan after World War II was the Heian Maru which was launched in 1950; it had a capacity of 7,000 tons which corresponds to a fairly small ship by modern standards<sup>5</sup>. Until the Japanese fleet was reconstituted, all goods imported from the United States were carried in US ships<sup>6</sup>.

### **American campaigns to seize scientific, military and commercial assets of Japan**

The seizure of Japanese commercial assets took several forms.

- Several organizations were in charge of collecting scientific information. The Scientific and Economic Section of SCAP was one of them, but other specific missions were sent to Japan. One example is the US Naval Technical mission to Japan<sup>7</sup>. It comprised 430 members including 295 officers, 10 naval technicians and 125 enlisted men. Among the 295 officers there were 23 British specialists. This group had been preceded by a small group of scientists who in September and October made a quick survey which was published in the so-called “Compton-Moreland Report” on 1 November 1945. Key Japanese naval personnel and scientists were interrogated; documents and samples of equipment were sent to the United States. Approximately 3,500 documents and 15,000 pieces of equipment were shipped to the United States. The largest items were two 18.1 inch guns each 25 meters long and weighting 180 tons<sup>8</sup>.

In cases where documents had been destroyed (as for instance in the petroleum industry) Japanese scientists were asked to reconstitute what had been burned.

- All Japanese employed in technologically advanced industries had to fill in

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<sup>5</sup>The source for these facts and figures is the English version of the Visitors' Guide of the NYK (Nippon Yusen Kaisha, which means “Japan Mail Shipping Line”) Maritime Museum in Yokohama. During the war the NYK lost 185 of its 222 vessels and the lives of 5,300 employees which represented 43% of its total sea staff. Of the 37 remaining vessels only one, the Hikawa Maru, was an ocean going vessel.

<sup>6</sup>The Britannica Book of the Year 1949 says “US policy in Japan during 1948 began to lay stress on economic recovery, the lack of which has been costing the US taxpayer nearly \$400 million a year, in particular because of continuing relief shipment of food financed by the US”. The last part of this assertion is contradicted by a statement made in an article from the New York Times (February 8, 1947, see chronology chapter) according to which “Last year 687,000 tons of food had been imported in Japan, Japan being charged in full at current market prices”. Clearly, one of these statements must be wrong.

<sup>7</sup>A similar mission was sent to Europe.

<sup>8</sup>This information come from the following website: [http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary\\_documents/gvt-reports/gvt-reports.toc.htm](http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_documents/gvt-reports/gvt-reports.toc.htm) which provides a database of many primary documents.

a detailed questionnaire about the field in which they were working. This gave the Scientific Section of SCAP the information it needed to approach the most promising of these scientists and engineers in the perspective of their immigration to the United States.

Apart from the organizations that we already mentioned, several others were involved in these operations. One can mention the following: the “Field Information Agency, Technical” (FIAT), the “British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee” (BIOS), the “Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee” (CIOS).

### **Opening the road to American companies**

The occupation created favorable conditions for many American companies. For instance, the ban on a great number of Japanese films (see chronology at the date of 16 November 1945) and selective censorship on films from other countries created a vacuum which provided a good ground for Japanese people to get accustomed to those American films which were permitted.

Before the war in the Philippines, Malaysia and Burma some 90% of the films shown in movie theaters were American. In French Indochina, 60% of the pictures were French and the rest American. After these countries were conquered by Japan, the Japanese film industry cooperated with the government in order to develop its production so as to be able to take over the role of the US film industry (Japan Times 24 February 1942, p. 5). This may explain the strong development of the Japanese film industry during the war.

Back in 1942 General George C. Marshall had ordered the creation of the Army Pictorial Service (APS) to produce motion pictures for the training, indoctrination, and entertainment of the American forces and their Allies. The APS took over Kaufman Astoria Studios in 1942 and produced over 2,500 films during the war with over 1,000 redubbed in other languages (Wikipedia, article entitled “Signal Corps, United States Army”). It is likely that a number of these pictures were used in countries occupied by US troops and in particular in Japan.

Early in 1946 Hollywood’s “Motion Picture Export Association” set up offices in Tokyo and by the fall of 1948 American movies had captured 42% of the film market in Japan. The United States was supplying about 114 pictures yearly as compared with 24 for France, 14 for the Britain and 5 for the Italy (Textor 1951, p. 166). Thanks to a strong support by Occupation authorities, the Reader’s Digest magazine quickly became a popular magazine. During the War, Coca-Cola Company set up small bottling plants overseas to keep servicemen supplied with 5 cents bottles thus introducing the brand to the peoples of all countries visited by American forces. Similarly, the GIs and Occupation authorities made an excellent job in promoting

the brands of American tobacco companies (see the chronology at the date of 30 January 1948).

The fact that there was a close cooperation between US occupation forces and American corporations is attested by the creation of the “Colonial Club of Yokohama”. The charter of this club is reproduced in the papers of General Eichelberger (reel 33, unfortunately the second and third pages of the charter are dark to the point of being unreadable). It is defined as “a club for the use of civilian employees of the US government and of commercial corporations and organizations who are attached to accompanying the Allied Occupation Forces in Japan.” The charter is signed by General Eichelberger acting as its president (General Eichelberger’s Papers reel 33). The “Colonial Club of Yokohama” is mentioned in the “Japan Who’s Who and Business Directory” of 1948 (p. 251). The address of the club is in the office of the “American President Lines Ltd”, an American shipping company who is nowadays (2007) the world’s sixth largest shipping company.

The occupation forces also played an important role in the field of information. For instance, in 1947 one American newsreel was released each week and in addition 132 Allied feature motions were released during the year ending on 1 July 1947. Moreover, mobile projection units showed American educational films. The public relation action based on American movies began almost immediately after the beginning of the occupation. As soon as September 13, 1945 an agreement between the GHQ and the American motion picture companies ensured that 9 movies would be imported in September, 6 in October and 3 in November. These fairly limited numbers are due to the fact that movies with super-imposed titles and dialogues in Japanese had to be produced which naturally was a time-consuming process.


## Repatriation, expatriation of American Japanese

After the war, Japanese people living in former Japanese “colonies” (Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, Pacific islands) were repatriated to Japan. The total numbers of these repatriates exceeded two million people. However, other groups of repatriates deserve a special comment because their status was somewhat different.

- About 69,000 Japanese people were repatriated from the Ryukyus (i.e. Okinawa). The status of these people was different because before the war Okinawa was not a colony but was part of Japan<sup>9</sup>. What distinguishes the case of Okinawa from similar cases such as the repatriation of Japanese from Taiwan or the repatriation of German-speaking people from Silesia, Dantzig and other eastern provinces of Ger-

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<sup>9</sup>A somewhat similar episode occurred in Alsace-Lorraine when these French provinces became German after the war of 1870. But in this case the people were given the choice to leave or to stay. For those who left it was by their own will.



**Fig. 1.3 Repatriation of Japanese after World War II** The total number of Japanese repatriated reaches 6.6 million. The three largest numbers are China (1.5 million), Manchuria (1.1 million), Southeast Asia (0.71 million). *Source: <http://www.history.army.mil/>*

many which became part of Poland after World War II, is of course the fact that in contrast to these regions, Okinawa was returned to Japanese sovereignty in 1972.

- About 13,000 Japanese aliens were repatriated from the United States to Japan (see the table below). Because before World War II, it was legally impossible for people of Japanese ancestry to become naturalized American citizens, many of these people have probably been living in the United States for decades and many of them certainly had children who, because they had been born in the United States, were US citizens.

- Other countries followed a similar policy for example Australia, Canada and

the Philippines.

**Table 1.1 Repatriation (or expatriation) of people of Japanese ancestry living in the United States, during and after World War II**

Area	Total to be evacuated (June 1946)	Evacuated during the war	Evacuated by 4 June 1946	Evacuated by 1 May 1950	Total evacuated
United States (mainland)	18,639	1,259	9,907	$\geq 9,907$	$\geq 9,907$
United States (Hawaii)	6,289	?	23	3,592	3,592
Ryukyus (Okinawa)	61,051	~ 70,000	48,862	69,374	69,374
Australian areas	142,969	–	126,998	138,680	138,680
Philippines	133,635	–	86,671	132,917	132,917
Pacific Ocean Area	130,544	–	123,196	130,906	130,906

Notes: (i) The word “expatriation” was introduced in this context by Eric Muller (2001). It refers to American citizens of Japanese ancestry who returned to Japan after the war. Because almost all of them were born in the United States, in their case the term “repatriation” would obviously not be correct. (ii) The symbol  $\geq 9,907$  in the line for mainland United States is due to the fact that this area is omitted in the report of 1 May 1950, so we do not know whether the target of 18,639 repatriations has been reached or not. Moreover the 1,259 evacuated during the war are probably not included into the 9,907 because the figures in this column refer to post-war repatriation plans. (iii) The 70,000 people indicated in the line for Okinawa are rather evacuees who searched protection against heavy bombing before the invasion of Okinawa. They are mentioned in this table because many of them were not allowed (or not willing) to return to Okinawa after the end of the war. As we do not know how many did not return, these evacuees were not included in the total of the last column. (iv) We do not know the exact meaning of the term “Australian areas”. In addition to the Australian mainland, it may also have included some Pacific islands previously under Japanese trusteeship. Similarly, we do not know the exact meaning of the entry “Pacific Ocean Area (POA)”; which island did this area comprise?

Sources: SCAP GHQ, Annex 1-1, Subject: Status of repatriation, Date: 4 June 1946; SCAP GHQ, Annex 1-3, Subject: Status of repatriation, Date: 1 May 1950. I am most grateful to Mr. Masahiko Fujita of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) for pointing these data to my attention.

## Double language in historical episodes

At the beginning of this chapter we explained that the historical presentation of the occupation which was shaped and publicized by SCAP headquarters was largely at variance with historical evidence. Clearly, however, SCAP and Eighth Army commanders had knowledge of the true picture for instance through G-2 reports which gave a more reliable account. In other words, this was an instance in which an organization used a double language pattern: a fairly trustworthy version was reserved for internal usage whereas a sanitized version was sold to the outside world. To set up such a double language standard and to stick to it over time could seem a difficult challenge. However, this task was made easier by two circumstances.

- All parties involved had a common interest in promoting the fiction of an occupation without incidents and marked by a genuine collaboration between American and Japanese authorities. For the Allied side this version confirmed the success of the occupation; for the Japanese ruling class, it justified and vindicated its role during the occupation years.

- In the course of time the fiction story gained widespread acceptance (even among historians), so that the real story receded in the background and was progressively forgotten even in government circles. Thus, the need for a double language vanished. Incidentally, this may have led the US government to start other occupations (e.g. in Irak) on false assumptions and rosy expectations which did not materialize<sup>10</sup>. This paradox has been convincingly highlighted and explained by Cora Sol Goldstein (2005, 2008) in two lucid articles. In the second of these articles, she shows that the United States lost the information battle in Irak because it did not resort to the kind of strict censorship that had been enforced during the occupation of Germany.

How can one explain that all published biographical accounts written by veterans upheld the fiction story? Far from being special to the case of the occupation of Japan, it appears that misrepresentations by omission are a fairly frequent phenomenon. Just for the purpose of illustration, three episodes are mentioned below; they have been selected on a much longer list because of their similarity with the present case.

- The first example consists in the accounts made by French veterans and historians of the war in Indochina (1946-1954). Even in fairly detailed accounts such as the 5-volume history by Lucien Bodard (1972-1973), there is almost no mention of the role played by the United States. Yet, just by browsing through the articles published in the New York Times one quickly becomes convinced that this role was both massive and crucial. (i) Almost all the war material was provided by the United States (ii) French tactical plans had to be approved by the US Joint Chiefs of Staff (iii) American military advisers were present at French headquarters (iv) French troops were often transported in American planes piloted by US airmen (more details on all these points can be found in Roehner 2007, p. 137-143).

It is of course easy to understand the rationale of such omissions. For French military it would be fairly uncomfortable to recognize a subordination of this kind; for US advisers it would be equally embarrassing to mention their role, all the more so because the whole campaign ended in disaster at DienBienPhu. Similarly (and for the same kind of reasons) the role of US Forces in the civil war between Nationalists

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<sup>10</sup>The occupation of Germany and Japan was explicitly mentioned as a model by US officials in the weeks before the invasion of Irak.

and Chinese Communists is down played in most American accounts.

- The second example concerns the statements made by Edgar Hoover, the Chief of the FBI, about acts of sabotage during World War II in the United States. He claimed repeatedly that “there had not been one act of foreign-directed sabotage in the country. Every suspect act was the result of vandalism, pique, resentment or a desire for relief from boredom.” (NYT 31 December 1944, p. 16 and website of the FBI).

Well, just by browsing through the articles published in the New York Times one quickly realizes that soon after the war began in Europe there was a tremendous increase in the number of explosions which occurred in US defense factories. A similar wave of suspect explosions had occurred in World War I; during the war many saboteurs were arrested and in the decades that followed the end of World War I, it was recognized by both American and German authorities that most of the explosions were the result of a systematic campaign of sabotage. During World War II, negating sabotage by enemy powers was a convenient posture for all parties involved. (i) The FBI would thus be exonerated from having failed to prevent acts of sabotage. (ii) This posture was also seen with favor by the American government because it would prevent any panic or demoralization in the public (iii) the German government was pleased as well because it helped him in its efforts to prevent the United States from entering the war.

After the war, what had been a convenient (but untrustworthy) presentation of the facts became the established truth. More details on this topic can be found in “Relations between US Forces and the population of Hawaii” (Appendix A: Sabotage and espionage) by the same author and available on the same website.

- At first sight the third example could seem very different and yet we will see that it follows a similar pattern. On 15 April 1989 a football match (a Football Association Cup semi-final) opposed Liverpool and Nottingham Forest at the Hillsborough stadium in Sheffield, England. The match started at 3 pm but at that time Liverpool supporters were still entering in great number into the stadium. This led to a tragic crush which cost the lives of 98 persons. The people were compressed between the entry point and the high steel fencing between the spectators and the pitch. Such fences had been placed in many English football stadia as a response to hooliganism involving pitch invasion and throwing of missiles. As the match was broadcast by the BBC the unfolding of the tragic events was witnessed by many spectators. Following the disaster, Lord Justice Taylor was appointed to conduct an inquiry into its causes. One might think that in such a case there was little room for misrepresentation. Yet, surprisingly this is not so. In fact, this episode shares

with the previous ones two major features: (i) The documents relating to the events have not been made public. (ii) Because of this lack of evidence the official account remains the only version available in spite of the fact that many of its statements are hardly plausible. Let us examine these two points in more detail.

In 2009, twenty years after the tragedy, most official documents were still unavailable in spite of repeated demands made by the families of the victims. This included police, ambulance and hospital records (including accurate times of death), closed circuit television tapes and the minutes of the meetings between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and other government officials and Yorkshire police officers<sup>11</sup>. The official inquiry concluded that all victims were already dead at 3:15 pm (that is to say less than 30 minutes after the tragic crush began) with the result that the investigation did not consider what happened after this time.

It turns out that the conclusions reached by the Taylor inquiry were acceptable for both police officers and government officials. In spite of serious doubts about their role no police officers were prosecuted. In short, this is again a case in which the official account is shaped by the requirement that it should not raise inconvenient and embarrassing questions. It is true that for over two decades the families of the dead have been campaigning for further inquiries but to no avail so far.

In conclusion it can be said that when all parties involved (with the exception of the victims) have a common interest in presenting a biased account, it is this story which is likely to prevail and to become the accepted truth. It is only by resorting to comparative analysis that such “anomalies” can be detected. Naturally, another obvious implication is that historians should not blindly trust official statements even when they have been accepted for a long time.

### **Official history of the occupation**

In modern democracies scholars are supposed to conduct their investigations with complete freedom. The very idea of an “official” version of history seems at variance with this notion. This, however, is a fairly theoretical view. In practice the situation is fairly different in several respects.

- Historians are dependent on the availability of archive records. If some documents are kept out of their reach free investigation becomes impossible. In this book we have described several cases of this kind.

- Before the Internet era, historians were dependent upon the good will of publishers, referees and editors. It is interesting to observe that most historical accounts which are at variance with the accepted mainstream version are usually published by small publishing houses. As a result, such books have only a small readership and

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<sup>11</sup>Times 20 April 2009, p. 25, article entitled: “Hillsborough files will be opened 10 years yearly”.

are unable to change the mainstream consensus.

- The two previous reasons are fairly general. In the case of the Allied occupation of Japan there is a more compelling argument. In the reading room of the National Diet Library which is devoted to the history of the occupation there are 55 blue volumes; in the fall of 2009, they were just on the shelf facing the microform reading devices. Entitled “History of the nonmilitary activities of the occupation of Japan 1945-1951”, these volumes were written and published by the “Civil Historical Section of GHQ-SCAP in the years between 1950 and the end of the occupation. They certainly give what can be called an “official” version of the occupation. In fact, all events which do not square with the picture that SCAP and the State Department wanted to give are just omitted. For instance, volume 6 is entitled “The purge” but it does not mention the “Red Purge” which started in 1947 nor does it describe the “screening” of newspaper reporters, radio journalists and teachers (numbering 400,000)<sup>12</sup>. Volume 15 is entitled “Police and public safety” but it does not mention the Japanese people who were shot and killed by sentries in the vicinity of US military installations, nor does it mention the many incidents between Allied troops and the Japanese population.

Volume 17 is entitled “Freedom of the press”. Not surprisingly, censorship is mentioned only briefly, but this is perhaps only of marginal importance. A more serious bias is the very scope of this volume. Indeed, the most crucial (and at the same time the most innovative) characteristic of SCAP censorship was the fact that it permeated the whole society. Radio broadcasts, books, lantern pictures, movies, playwrights, exhibitions and indeed all cultural exchanges were controlled and censored; letters, telegrams and phone calls were intercepted, translated and the most useful parts were transmitted to G-2.

These are just three examples of omission and understatement but one could mention many others.

Of course, one can hardly be surprised that an account written by a section of SCAP gives the version that SCAP was trying to promote. What is more surprising is that in the following 60 years two generations of historians were unable to correct such misrepresentations<sup>13</sup>. How was this possible?

Several circumstances contributed to this result.

- Of the accounts written in Japanese, only those who were in agreement with

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<sup>12</sup>This screening differed from the purge of 1946 in two main aspects. (i) It occurred about two years later at a time when the priority was no longer to eliminate militarists but rather leftists. (ii) Whereas the purge directive of January 1946 targeted a number of well defined nationalistic organizations, the screening was a fairly arbitrary process. Anybody whose attitude was judged to be “inimical to the objectives of the occupation” could be dismissed.

<sup>13</sup>Here, we are speaking specifically of the version accepted by scholars and historians not of the “socially accepted” version that is to say the version commonly shared by the public. There are many examples of events for which a flawed version is still widely accepted by public opinion in spite of the fact that historians have been able to work out a more reliable picture.

the version of SCAP were ever translated into English. Even those translations which did appear were in fact “edited translations”. Examples of this practice are provided by the books written by S. Okamoto (“The man who saved kabuki”) or Eiji Take-mae (“Inside GHQ”). The first one was abridged, the second one was considerably expanded with the help of two American scholars (for more details see the corresponding entries in the reference section).

- Many of the American historians who have published books and papers on this topic had some links with the US Department of State. This is the case of Baerwald, Bix, Braibanti, Finn, Hussey, just to mention some of them.

- Once there is a consensus on a flawed version it becomes very difficult to change it. Why should a professor propose as a PhD topic the study of the incidents between American troops and the Japanese population when the accepted truth is that there were *none*? Why should a scholar analyze how the government section of SCAP was able to shape the laws passed in the Japanese Diet when the consensus holds that SCAP did not interfere in any way in domestic Japanese affairs?

A last question may be of interest. Will the present book be able to change the consensus that is currently (in December 2009) still prevailing? In mid-2007 it has been published on the Internet on the website of the author, in December 2007 it has been announced on the main forum for historical research about the relations between the United States and Japan (namely “H-US-Japan”). Since mid-2008 paper copies of the book have become available in several major national and university libraries, e.g.: Stanford University, UCLA, University of Hawaii, Cambridge University Library, Library of the National Foundation for Political Science (FNPS, Paris), Chuo University (Tokyo), International Christian University (Tokyo), National Diet Library (Tokyo), National Library of China (Beijing). Moreover, on 29 November 2007 I sent messages (by email or by post) to 29 leading US scholars in order to attract their attention on the fact that the mainstream account of the occupation (particularly the belief that there was not a single incident) is contradicted by many archive records.

Of course, the fact that the book is available in libraries does not guarantee that any of these copies will ever be read. In this respect, I remember having seen on a shelf of one of the major libraries of the university of Paris a book published around 1900 and whose pages were still not cut open. It was a book in English about the French religion wars of the 16th century. For over one century this book had been kept on this shelf without attracting the attention of a single reader! Will the present book have a similar fate? It is difficult to know, but one can make at least one observation in this respect.

A surprising number of challenging historical books were published, read, reviewed

and cited in the decade 1970-1979. Why?

This was after the Vietnam War, a time marked by the publication of the Pentagon papers, by investigations into the activities of the CIA conducted by journalists of the New York Times and other newspapers, by the meeting in Beijing between President Nixon and Chairman Mao. In a more general way it was a time during which many Cold War prohibitions were lifted. If sometime in the future there is another decade of this kind the present book may perhaps be read and taken into consideration.

### **Social acceptance of historical evidence**

Even once clear historical evidence is made widely available for instance by being published in newspapers with a broad circulation, this does not mean that it will gain widespread acceptance. A fairly spectacular case was provided by the discussion regarding the presence of nuclear weapons in Japan. The fact that there were nuclear weapons was recognized fairly clearly in a interview of former US ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer published in Japanese<sup>14</sup> by the “Mainichi” (18 May 1981), one of the main national Japanese newspapers. Reischauer declared:

“The government of Japan knows that US naval vessels which carry nuclear weapons on board constantly pass through its waters.”

Nonetheless, during the following 28 years successive Japanese governments of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) repeatedly denied that this was the case, even when answering questions in the Diet. The question was brought before the public only after the LDP was defeated in a general election in 2009 and replaced by a coalition led by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).

In fact, even at this time most Japanese media tried to minimize the extent of the presence of US nuclear weapons: “Yes, there are nuclear weapons aboard ships in Okinawa” (with the implication that there are none in mainland Japan), “Yes, there are nuclear weapons aboard US ships in ports of mainland Japan but these ships are only in transit”, or “Yes, there have been nuclear weapons aboard US ships in the past but this is no longer the case”.

To my best knowledge, there was not a single newspaper which stated clearly that there *are* nuclear weapons aboard ships stationed *permanently* (the technical expression is “homeporting”) in US Navy bases located in Japanese harbors such as *Yokosuka* (near Yokohama). And yet, this point was made clear in a letter written by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on 17 June 1972, a document readable on the Internet (in December 2009) at the following website:

<http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=16086>

What this example suggests is that uncomfortable truths are not readily accepted even in the face of clear evidence. What does this imply for the present book? The

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<sup>14</sup> We add this precision because the Mainichi has also an English edition, the “Mainichi Daily News”.

“truths” that it tries to convey are likely to be felt as uncomfortable truths both for the US Department of State and for Japanese politicians. Therefore, based on the previous case, one can hardly expect them to be ever *socially* acknowledged. Our more limited hope is that some day they may be *scholarly* accepted. If clear historical evidence cannot get scholarly acceptance, then it is difficult to see how sociology can ever become a real science.

## The fictitious autonomy of the Japanese government

### Facts and myth

From September 1945 to the end of the occupation the thesis of the occupation authorities was that their role was only to advise the Japanese government and that they avoided “to interfere in internal Japanese political matters”<sup>15</sup>. This picture implies that the Japanese government and the Diet had some flexibility in discussing (or even rejecting) American “suggestions”. In spite of the fact that this thesis is in contradiction with available evidence (as we will see below), it is still widely accepted nowadays by American as well as Japanese historians.

There has been much debate about the role of US “advisers” in the drafting of the Japanese constitution. Once it is realized that in fact *all* Japanese legislation had to be approved by SCAP, the debate about the constitution becomes clearer. Is it conceivable that SCAP would insist on controlling and approving fairly minor pieces of legislation while at the same time renouncing to this capacity of control in the much more important issue of the Constitution?

As a matter of fact, the report of the meeting of the Government Section of 4 February 1946 (Fig. 1.3a,b) explains fairly clearly what was the plan regarding the writing of the constitution.

We will come back to this question below when we discuss the requirement imposed to former SCAP personnel to “prevent publication of unauthorized information”.

### Was SCAP only an adviser?

In reality all decisions taken by the Japanese government had first to be submitted to and approved by the relevant sections of SCAP. The same was true for the Diet. All bills, all amendments all revisions of laws had to get prior approval (in writing) by SCAP. An illustration is provided by the document in Fig. 1.4. Other examples are

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<sup>15</sup>These are the terms used by Mr Atcheson, the acting president of the Allied Council for Japan in a letter of 20 May 1946 to the Soviet member of this Council:

My Dear General Derevyanko, General MacArthur has been pursuing a policy of avoiding interference in internal Japanese political matters, except in cases of extreme necessity. Very sincerely yours, George Atcheson, Jr.

(Source: Records of US elements of the Allied Council for Japan, microfilm NDL: YF-A9, roll No 2.)

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Summary Report on Meeting of the Government Section, 4 February 1946

## I

General Whitney opened the meeting with the statement that in the next week the Government Section will sit as a Constitutional Convention. General MacArthur has entrusted the Government Section with the historically significant task of drafting a new Constitution for the Japanese people. Three principles, outlined by General MacArthur must be basic in the Government Section's draft. They are:

## I

The Emperor is at the head of the state and his succession is dynastic. But his powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and responsive to the will of the people as provided therein.

## II

War as a sovereign right of the nation is abolished. As an instrumentality it can no longer be exercised neither for the settlement of disputes nor for the preservation of Japanese security. No armed forces will ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon any Japanese force. Japan must rely upon the higher ideals now abroad in the world for its defense.

## III

Feudalism is ended in Japan. No rights of peerage except those of the Imperial Family will extend beyond the lines of those now existent. No patent of nobility henceforth will embody within itself any National or Civic power of government.

General Whitney wishes to have the Government Section's draft of the new Constitution completed, and approved by General MacArthur, by February 12. On that day General Whitney will meet with the Foreign Minister and Japanese Government officials for an off-the-record discussion of their constitutional draft. General Whitney expects this draft to be strongly rightist in tone. He intends to convince the Foreign Minister and his group, however, that the only possibility of retaining the Emperor and the remnants of their own power is by their acceptance and approval of a Constitution that will force a decisive swing to the left. General Whitney hopes to reach this decision by persuasive argument; if this is not possible, General MacArthur has empowered him to use not merely the threat of force, but force itself.

It is intended that the Foreign Minister and his group will reorient and change their own constitutional proposals to fit our demand for a liberal Constitution. When this has been done, the finished document will be submitted by the Japanese to General MacArthur for

Fig. 1.3a Planning the drafting of the Japanese constitution, part 1. This is a well-known document as attested by the fact that it is readable on the website of the NDL. The reason why we present it here is because the drafting of other major laws by the teams of SCAP followed basically the same rules as explained at the end of this document in the "Working Arrangements" paragraph. The only difference was that the secrecy rules were less strict than for the constitution. Incidentally, the word which was crossed out at the top of the document is "TOP". Source: Website of the National Diet Library at the following address: [http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryu/03/002\\_21/002\\_21\\_0021.html](http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryu/03/002_21/002_21_0021.html)

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approval. He will accept this Constitution as the work of the Japanese Government and so promulgate it to the world.

Points in Open Discussion

In drafting the Constitution, the Government Section will follow the existing Japanese Constitution for structure, headings, etc.

The proposed Constitution should not be over-burdened by details but explicit controls should be put in, if deemed necessary to protect the fundamental rights of the people.

The powers and rights of the Emperor were precisely defined and guarded in the present Japanese Constitution; this pattern must be reversed in our draft. The new constitution probably should be less flexible than the British, for the British have no single and cardinal definition of constitutional rights, but less precisely drawn-up than the French. In drafting the new Constitution our emphasis should be upon placing sovereignty squarely in the hands of the people; the Emperor's role will be that of a social monarch, merely.

No explicit mention need be made of the United Nations Charter, but the principles of the Charter should be implicit in our thinking as we draft the Constitution.

Working Arrangements.


1. Absolute secrecy must be maintained in all aspects of this work.
2. A code name is to be used for this operation.
3. All drafts, notes, etc. used in this work are classified as "Top Secret".
4. Work is to be organized in terms of small working sub-committees; work of the sub-committees is to be integrated by an over-all or steering committee.
5. A tentative draft is to be ready by the end of the week.

Fig. 1.3b Planning the drafting of the Japanese constitution, part 2. As is explained below in this chapter, secrecy was still maintained 16 years later as experienced by Alfred Hussey when he tried to publish his memoirs as a SCAP officer. *Source: Website of the National Diet Library at the following address:*  
[http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryō/03/002\\_21/002\\_21\\_0031.html](http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryō/03/002_21/002_21_0031.html)

provided in Appendix A.

Moreover, as explained in Appendix B at the end of this chapter, the nominations of ministers and high level civil servants had to be approved by SCAP. Several examples are given in Appendix B.

In the excerpt of the article (NYT 8 August 1948) by Lindesay Parrott that we cited



**Fig. 1.4** An example of the “legislative” work done by SCAP. Many divisions contributed to the drafting or review of Japanese bills. For a good synthesis to emerge there had to be many contacts between the divisions. This short text takes into account and brings together (i) the wishes of the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS) (ii) the broader plans of General Whitney, the head of the Government Section (iii) the possible objections of the Civil Service Division (iv) the goals of Justin Williams of the Government Section. *Source: National Diet Library, microfiche call-number: GS(A)-01806.*

at the beginning, he says that in 1948 the Diet “remains largely a rubber stamp for the Cabinet which in turn is a rubber stamp for the occupation authorities.”

In this sentence it is not clear how the expression “rubber stamp” should be understood. Does it mean that the cabinet had to follow general guidelines set by occupation authorities or does it mean that really its decisions had to get written approval from SCAP. It is the second interpretation which is correct. Of course, Parrott must have been well aware of this fact because through discussions with SCAP personnel he was informed of the debates which took place between them. Some lucid Japanese law makers shared the same opinion. An illustration is provided by the

statement made by Tatsuo Tanaka which is presented in Fig. 1.5.

<b>CONFIDENTIAL</b> <b>GENERAL HEADQUARTERS</b> <del>UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES, PACIFIC</del> <b>FAR EAST COMMAND</b> <b>CHECK SHEET</b> (Do not remove from attached sheets)			
File No:		Subject: TANAKA, Tatsuo, Candidate for Governor of YAMAGUCHI Prefecture	
Note No.	From: G-2	To: Government Section	Date: 1 APR 1947 GB/CIS/OD/LBG/mh
1	<p>1. TANAKA, Tatsuo, candidate for governor of Yamaguchi Prefecture and former member of the House of Peers is reported by a reliable source to have made the following statement at a discussion meeting held on 8 March 1947:</p> <p>"The current political situation is swayed by the will and intentions of GHQ, and the important bills you referred to are all planned and drafted by GHQ. Therefore, the Central Government and the members of the Upper and Lower Houses are mere puppets of the Occupation Authorities. The deliberation of bills is being conducted just for 'form's sake' and is not based on the will of representatives of the people. This kind of deliberation has no significance. I should like to be the local administrator. The reason for that is because I wish to embark on a local administration in which comparative degree of 'self-government' is expected."</p> <p>2. Forwarded for your information, and any action deemed necessary.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>for</i> <b>PSP</b> C.A.W.</p>		

**Fig. 1.5 Statement made by Tatsuo Tanaka about the control of GHQ over the Diet.** A former member of the House of Peers, Tanaka was no ordinary Japanese citizen. There are examples of union members sentenced to several years at hard labor for making similar statements about what they called the "semi-colonisation of Japan". Such expressions were judged prejudicial to the success of the occupation. In contrast, Tanaka became governor of Yamaguchi prefecture and he remained in that position at least until 1950. The date of this report is 1 April 1947. G-2 is Army Intelligence. *Source: Hussey Papers, Roll no 9, picture 78-C-17-1.*

### The legislative work carried out by the Government section

Needless to say it was no easy task to draft bills and to review amendments on topics which were often very technical. We give below examples of laws about automobile regulation, social security or employee compensation. In a sense the small group of people of the government section and a number of other important sections functioned as a kind of virtual parliament. As in a real parliament there were often vivid discussions or even stormy debates. What occasioned these debates?

- Many decisions taken by the government (or bills discussed in the Diet) followed drafts written by SCAP personnel. Naturally, the task of drafting such laws gave rise to lively and useful discussions among SCAP officers both within each section and between different sections (or divisions). Often several successive versions were written before the draft was eventually transmitted to the Japanese government

through the Central Liaison Office.

- Once the draft had passed through the hands of the government (as well as in the cases in which the initiative was taken by the government) the resulting text had to be approved by SCAP again. What made this process fairly tricky is the fact that it had to be approved by *different sections* of SCAP. For instance a bill regarding Japanese schools would require the green light from the “Civil Information and Education Section”, the “Government Section” and perhaps also from the “Economic and Scientific Section”. The messages exchanged by different sections that can be found in the US archives reveal that this process of adjustment often brought about animated discussions. Sometimes these discussions lead to an agreement, sometimes the question was eventually settled by the chief of the Government Section.

Inevitably Lindesay Parrott and other US newsmen got wind of such discussions but they knew that they should not report about them in their articles. There was an implicit understanding that to reveal such discussions would undermine the picture that SCAP wanted to build and imperil the success of the occupation.

For the same reason the Japanese press was not supposed to reveal that before being passed in the Diet the laws had to be approved by SCAP. Naturally, many Japanese journalists were well aware of this fact. In the last months of the occupation the control exercised by SCAP was progressively lifted. In the following articles about the weakening of such controls, the “Japan Times” (at last) acknowledged their existence..

Nippon Times (14 February 1952) In a new measure to extend the scope of Japanese sovereignty, General Ridway has directed GHQ to approve all amendments to existing laws as long as they do not directly affect the budget. *Hitherto all amendments that the Diet desired were subject to approval by GHQ.*

Nippon Times (26 March 1952) The Diet henceforth will not be required *to obtain prior approval by GHQ for submission and revision of legislative measures including budget bills.*

If one recalls that the Peace Treaty of San Francisco between the Allied Powers and Japan was signed on September 8, 1951 and came into force on April 28, 1952, it can be seen that SCAP-GHQ renounced to its control of the Diet only one month before the peace treaty came into force.

### **SCAP as Supreme Commander**

The title of General MacArthur was Supreme Commander, Allied Powers. The term also came to designate the offices of the occupation, including a staff of several hundred American civil servants and military officers. Apart from the control exercised on the executive and legislative branches, the prominent role of SCAP was

also apparent in the numerous instructions that it sent to the Japanese government. A subsequent chapter is devoted to these so-called SCAPINs and SCAPIN-As.

For the Japanese government one of the most painful ordeals was probably when he was ordered to hand over to the American authorities the officers suspected of war crimes. In some cases, their names were already known to the occupation forces (see in the chronology Scapin 40 of 22 September 1945); but in other occasions (e.g. SCAPIN 158 of 19 October 1945 or SCAPIN 303 of 19 November 1945) the Japanese government was ordered to provide the names of submarine commanders or to deliver information which would be used against the defendants. In other words, it was ordered to give self-incriminating evidence against its own citizens<sup>16</sup>. Did it comply? At this point we do not really know. An element of the answer would be given by the number of submarine commanders who were tried by Allied military tribunals.

### **Restrictions on information release by former SCAP members**

The number of personnel which formed the core of the sections directly involved in the control activity was not large, probably around 50<sup>17</sup>. In the archive records of the messages exchanged between the main sections of SCAP one sees the same names mentioned again and again. Because these people who acted behind the scene nevertheless played a key-role it is understandable that they may have been tempted to describe what was their role by writing their memoirs. Naturally, this would have shaken the “adviser fiction” that SCAP and the State Department wanted to prevail. This is why a directive was issued in July 1946 which prevented former SCAP personnel from disclosing “unauthorized information”<sup>18</sup>:

“All personnel will be cautioned, prior to departure, against compromise of classified information and will be advised of **their responsibility in preventing publication of unauthorized information.**

[Signed] Richard J. Marshall, Major General, by command of Gen. MacArthur.

### **The case of Alfred R. Hussey (1902-1964)**

As a case in point one can mention the experience of Alfred R. Hussey. As chief of the “Governmental Powers Division”<sup>19</sup>, Hussey was one of the Americans who drafted the Japanese constitution and he played an important role in many other reforms. Being basically a liberal and an idealist, he was critical of the behavior

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<sup>16</sup>It can be recalled that the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution protects American citizens against self-incrimination.

<sup>17</sup>Altogether there were about 130 persons in the Government Section, but less than 10 heads of division.

<sup>18</sup>Source: Records of US elements of the Allied Council for Japan, microfilm NDL: YF-A9, roll No 2, frame 671.

<sup>19</sup>The Government Section (GS) comprised several divisions such as “Governmental Powers”, “Local Government”, “Civil Service”, “Political Affairs”, “Courts and Laws”, “Legislative”, “National Government”. There have been several modifications in the organization and names of these divisions in the course of the occupation.

of occupation forces in several circumstances, for instance he was outraged that the military took advantage of their role in controlling prostitution for organizing a sort of institutional rape of young women who were not prostitutes at all (see below for more details).

In 1962 at the age of 60 Hussey wanted to publish his memoirs. Quite understandably he thought that they would represent a major contribution to the post-war history of Japan. Probably did he assume that almost 20 years after the war the real story could be told. He was wrong. In principle, it should have been easy for him to find a publisher: not only did he have an interesting story to tell but in addition he had personal connections with the editors at three publishing houses, namely Lippincott<sup>20</sup>, Little Brown, and Simon & Schuster. On 7 May 1962 in a letter to Mr. George Stevens at Lippincott, he wrote<sup>21</sup>:

“I am grateful for your expression of interest in my project for a book on the occupation of Japan.”

Despite that expression of interest Lippincott did not publish the book.

In parallel, Hussey had proposed a research project about the occupation of Japan to the Rockefeller Foundation, but on 30 December 1963, he wrote in a letter:

“It is distressing but not fatal that Rockefeller turned me down.”

Then in July 1963 Hussey sent his manuscript project to Little Brown. He received an answer only on 2 December and it was negative:

“Please forgive me for keeping your material so long without reporting. I’m not sure it will be a book for the general public.”

Then, Hussey contacted Simon & Schuster, but on 27 May 1964 he received the following negative answer from Joseph Barnes:

“It is a book I would like to read but it is not a book I would like to have to promote.”

Quite lucidly, Hussey responded on 2 June 1964:

“Your letter while disappointing did not come as any great surprise.”

Alfred Rodman Hussey died in November 1964 after a long illness.

Hussey is not the only example of a person who tried to publish his testimony but was unable to do so because what he had to say contradicted the version spread by the State Department.

Richard D. Robinson is a similar case. After being a member of the Military Government in South Korea from 1946 to 1947, he wrote a book about his experience which is entitled “Betrayal of a nation”. He was not able to find a publisher in 1947.

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<sup>20</sup>To the editor at Lippincott, he wrote: “I’m an old friend of your sister Peggy and her husband.”

<sup>21</sup>The source for the following excerpts is Hussey Papers, reel 11.

He tried a second time in 1960 but once again to no avail. Later on, he became a professor at MIT and published several other books but “Betrayal of a nation” was never published. Nevertheless, the manuscript can be found in a few libraries, e.g. at Harvard Yenching Library.

Robinson’s case illustrates fairly well the whole pattern. Except during the Cold War when some books (as for instance the novels written by Howard Fast) were removed from the shelves, there does not seem to be an official blacklist of books in the United States. Yet, by a kind of common agreement, the books which present evidence that can be an embarrassment for the Department of State will not be published. Or if ever published, it will be by a small publisher and with a very limited distribution. The copies available in a few libraries will be ignored by scholars in the same way as Robinson’s book is discarded.

### **Hussey’s carrier as a CIA officer**

Our portrayal of Hussey’s carrier would remain incomplete if we omit the 14 years during which he worked for the CIA.

When he left SCAP in early 1948 he had good hope of finding a job at the State Department. For some reason it did not work. Then, in February 1949 he entered the CIA where he remained until his retirement in March 1963 at the age of 61 (reel 10, 92-A-1). Even after his retirement he was fairly discreet about his former career. To a professor at the University of Washington, he writes “having last spring been retired from the Government” (93A-25).

During all these years his freedom of speech was quite limited. At one point the editor of the “Journal of Asian Studies”, Roger F. Hackett, encouraged Hussey to write an article which would explain “what was exactly the degree of suasion [a fairly rare word for persuasion] that was exercised to gain Japanese acceptance”. This was indeed one of the most crucial questions. At the same time, however, it was a question that was considered “off limit” by the State Department” which means that Hussey could never write that article.

In another episode, Hussey wanted to take part in a conference organized by his friend Robert E. Ward from the Department of Political Science of the University of Michigan. On 6 May 1960 Hussey wrote to Ward: “The situation gets more and more foggy and I become madder and madder. A week and a half ago I called Dave Bane and asked him when he thought the ban would be lifted. His response was that the ban remained in effect so long as I continued to be employed by the US Government. State [i.e. the State Department] is sensitive until the Security Treaty is through the Diet”.

On 2 January 1963 (3 months before Hussey’s retirement) Ward wrote to Hussey:

“Congratulations on your impending freedom. I imagine it is a very pleasant project to look forward to”. He did not realize that it would be only a semi-freedom.

In May 1959, Hussey attended a summer seminar on *Overseasmanship* organized by the “Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs” and by the “Institute on American Overseas Operations”. The director of the “Overseas Training Program” was Gerard Mangone who wrote a book entitled “The art of overseasmanship” that was published by Syracuse University Press in 1957. Such seminars and institutions may provide a good example of how CIA and scholarly interests and activities intermingled. Hussey’s own work at the CIA could be mistaken for an academic activity. He was “Director of training”. at the “Language and Area School”.

Sometimes the borderline between the CIA and the academic world was clearly defined but this did not prevent university scholars from taking part. As an illustration one can mention a course given in January 1960 which was destined to 19 middle and senior grade Agency [i.e. CIA] employees. The list of speakers begins with Richard Helms, a high ranking CIA officer who became “Director of Central Intelligence” in 1966, and includes many scholars from various universities such as Michigan State University, University of Buffalo or Columbia University.

## Methodology of this study

This is not an isolated study. It belongs to a set of parallel investigations of various occupation episodes. In this part we wish to describe the methodological framework of this set of comparative studies.

In the first section we explain the rationale of the chronological method of exposition that we have chosen. The second section discusses the reasons for providing a comparative perspective. In the third section we emphasize that this study could not have been carried out, at least not in this form, before the advent of the Internet.

### Making historiography into a cumulative body of knowledge

The part devoted to the chronological listing of events represents some 70% of the content of this book. As this is a fairly uncommon feature for an historical account, a few words are in order to explain why, in our opinion, chronologies should be seen as a key element in historiography.

The chronology part and the chapter on quantitative evidence are the core of this report because they contain the information that comes from the sources and documents found in various archives and in primary sources such as newspapers. The other chapters contain comments on the events mentioned in the chronology. The main drawback of these comments is their subjective nature. They concern issues which at the time of writing were considered “important” but 30 years earlier or later

historians would probably focus on different points. On the contrary, the chronology part can be seen as an objective list of events in the sense that it is largely (if not completely) independent of the personal interests of the historian. It becomes even more “objective” when it is a collective production of many historians (see below).

Why is the distinction between subjective and objective historical accounts essential?

One of the most basic features of a science is the fact that it is (and must be) a process of accumulation. From Bernard de Chartres to Descartes to Newton, this has been widely recognized:

“We are like dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants” said Bernard de Chartres in 1124. “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” wrote Newton in a famous letter to Robert Hooke (1676).

In Britain the phrase “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants” was even included on the edge of a 2 pound coin issued in 1997.

For subjective comments one can hardly speak of a cumulative process. One set of comments that is found quite interesting at a given moment will be found outdated thirty years later and replaced by another set which will of course experience the same fate a few decades later<sup>22</sup>.

On the contrary, chronologies present facts (not opinions) which will have a lasting interest for historians<sup>23</sup>.

Moreover, it is easy to add complementary information to such files. Suppose, for instance, that in 2020 an historian discovers a record (not found or not accessible earlier) that describes a series of events. Thanks to the chronology structure it will be easy to check whether these events are already known or whether they are really “new”. In the later case they will be incorporated at the appropriate dates. In this way, the chronology will grow year by year, always remaining the ultimate source of reference. In the future<sup>24</sup>, it may even be possible to make the *primary documents* available to readers. This will allow them to judge the degree of reliability of the events which are mentioned, a feature of crucial importance.

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<sup>22</sup>This could appear as a fairly cavalier judgment. Unfortunately, it seems to apply even to the work of historians who adopted a comparative perspective. Consider for instance the work of the renowned British historian Arnold Toynbee. Under the title “A study of history” he published a 12-volume study of the rise and fall of civilizations. Naturally, we are not going to argue that forty years after its publication the work is no longer useful. For one thing, it shows how such a synthesis can be done and sets a model for similar attempts; in that respect it is certainly a stimulating answer to the specialising tendency of modern historical research. However, precisely because of its originality and specificity, it would be difficult to link up this work with subsequent studies. Thus, it does not seem to be a step in a cumulative process. Naturally, such monumental studies have also another potential usefulness. Once digitized and made searchable by key-words, they will become valuable pools of facts and references of primary sources.

<sup>23</sup>The same observation holds for evidence which takes the form of quantitative data.

<sup>24</sup>Thanks to the possibilities of the hypertext format and to the fact that more and more archive resources will be digitized and made available online.

The methodology of such multi-layered chronologies has been proposed in Roehner (2002, p. 370-373) where the construction of very large chronicles (VLCs) was advocated. Such VLCs should be seen as huge computerized chronologies resulting from a process of *collective production* (somehow like the Wikipedia encyclopedia).

### Why it is crucial to adopt a comparative perspective

In medical research there are basically three successive phases.

- 1 First there is the need to describe and categorize the various illnesses. Clearly this phase is of crucial importance. If one cannot make a clear distinction between an attack of bronchitis and a lung cancer, any cure will be hazardous.

- 2 Then one has to identify the mechanisms (bacteria, virus, mutation and so on) which are responsible for the disorder.

- 3 The last step is to find a cure.

One faces the same kind of challenges for social events. Suppose for instance that one has a detailed account of 10 different riots. The first question is to see if they follow a common pattern. If they do not, a closer examination may perhaps show that there are in fact two different patterns; this opens the way to a classification of riots. As in medicine the second step is to find the mechanisms which are at the root of the different types of riots. Once these mechanisms are well understood, it may become possible to assess the likelihood of riots, may be even to prevent them.

For an isolated event the only thing one can do is to describe it. In order for a phenomenon to be studied scientifically, one needs many observations. This has been well understood by many sociologists and historians. Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Marc Bloch, Ernest Labrousse, Fernand Braudel and many others developed various forms of comparative analysis. Basically, the broader the phenomenon<sup>25</sup> the more cases one needs in order to study it in a meaningful way. For instance, economic growth depends upon a staggering number of parameters which explains why it is so difficult to come up with well-defined conclusions. On the contrary, for a sharply defined phenomenon, one can expect to draw clear-cut results even from a relatively small sample of less than 10 observations.

For all these reasons, the present study is not isolated but is part of a set of studies which centers around the phenomenon of military occupation. There have been various occupation episodes during and after World War II; several of them are examined in the various studies which compose this project. All these studies follow the same format and focus on the same variables.

They turned out to be more time consuming than was realized when this project was started because we had to pierce the smoke screen of military censorship. As a mat-

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<sup>25</sup>By which we mean that one needs more parameters to define it.

ter of fact, comparative analysis was instrumental in suggesting which accounts are most affected by censorship. For instance, if one sees a substantial number of incidents in cases *A*, *B*, *C* and none in a case *D* which is similar in other respects, then it can be suspected that censorship was stricter in this last case. Naturally, the obstacle of censorship can be overcome only if access to previously restricted sources has been made possible. Many important files still remain closed<sup>26</sup>.

We concentrated on post-World War II episodes for in this case archive sources are much more numerous than for episodes that occurred in earlier times. In the United States there does not seem to be a 50-year rule for the opening of archives. For instance, most of the files of the “Military Advisory and Assistance Groups” (MAAG) which worked in many countries in the wake of World War II are still closed and it is likely that at least some parts of them will remain closed for ever. .

### **The crucial role of the Internet Revolution**

The Internet is not just one additional tool. For the social sciences it truly represents a Revolution. This word is justified by the fact that many investigations which were strictly impossible before the Internet have now become possible. The role of the Internet in the present study can be illustrated by three examples.

- All the studies in the present project are based on the analysis of *microsocial events*. Such events can only be found in databases of newspapers or news agencies. Selecting these events from a set of many thousands articles would have been a daunting and almost impossible task before these databases had been computerized and made searchable by keywords. For the present studies, the databases of the articles of the “New York Times” and of the “Times” have been searched extensively and this information has provided (at least sometimes) a first insight<sup>27</sup>.

- The advent of the Internet has completely changed the way we work in archives. Nowadays, the catalogs of many national archives have been computerized<sup>28</sup> and it has become possible to search them by key-words as well as by other characteristics such as “record group” or “file creator”. Once the item in which one is interested has been located it is possible to get photocopies (or files of scanned images) from the archives. It is in this way that we have been able to work with archives located in various countries: Australia, Britain, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, United States without leaving Paris.

- Finally, many documents once available in only a few libraries are now directly

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<sup>26</sup>Apart from keeping a file closed there are several other ways of making it inaccessible. If it is not included in the catalog (or if the title under which it is catalogued has no connection with actual content) nobody will be able to request it. Keeping apart a record and its inclosures is a way of making the inclosures inaccessible. Sometimes such problems may occur just by inadvertance but there are also cases in which one suspects that it was done by purpose.

<sup>27</sup>Of course, during wars major newspapers are also subject to censorship (pre-censorship, post-censorship or auto-censorship); in such cases one must find alternative sources of information.

<sup>28</sup>At the time of writing (2008) this process is still in progress. For the archives which are the most advanced in this respect, about 50% of the entries have been included in the electronic catalog.

accessible on the Internet. This observation also extends to personal testimonies which had never been available in libraries and can now be read on the websites set up by veterans or their descendants.

In the following pages we briefly examine some key points in order to provide a general perspective for the events mentioned in the two chronology chapters.

## Appendix A: Control over legislative work in the Diet

In this appendix we document how the sections and divisions of SCAP-GHQ cooperated to draft and review the legislative work of the Diet. Although our examples concern the Diet it should be noted that there was a similar procedure for the decisions of the executive branch. In the Government Section there was both a “Legislative Division” and a “National Government Division”. The catalog of the files of the Government Section which has been established by the NDL in the course of microfilming the paper files held at NARA contains dozens of entries about this review work. Along with censorship and the purge, this was one of the main tasks of GHQ-SCAP.

An observation is in order regarding the quality and readability of the documents shown below. Their poor resolution (which makes some of them difficult to read) is due to two factors.

- These were internal working documents not destined to be published. There are many hand-written annotations which are particularly difficult to read but at the same time of great interest because they reveal the unofficial rules in play during these procedures.

- The documents underwent a series of successive copying operations. First, the original documents held by the US National Archives were microfilmed by the NDL. Then the microfiches were printed out at the NDL at the request of the present author. Finally these printouts were digitized to be included in this book. At each of these operations there was a loss of information. We will try to give enough additional explanations to make the documents more readable.

Sometimes Japanese authorities tried to get an advice as to the acceptability of a new piece of legislation prior to proposing it. This permitted to avoid the risk of losing face in case the proposal was rejected by US authorities. An illustration is provided by the following letter.

7 April 1952: Memorandum for the Chief of the Government Section.

Mr. Koichi Nishikawa, Liaison Officer, Osaka City, requested an opinion to whether a bill making Osaka City a special city would be cleared or disapproved by the headquarters. He pointed out that a similar bill was disapproved approximately 4 years

Bills and Resolutions Received From C.L.O.						
TITLE	CLO No.	Originator	Form	Date	Remarks	
1. Special Measures Bill re Emergency Supply of Foodstuffs		HR	D	1/28	CC: GS (Moragan, Hussey) NRS/Ag (Williams on) ESS/PC&R (Smith)	
				1/30	<i>Disapproved</i> ESS/PC&R (Smith) NRS/Ag (Boulanger)	
2. National Diet Library Bill		HR	D	5 Feb	Approved: GS (Williams, Tilton & Hoover) CI&E (Burnett)	
3. Fire Service Law		HR	D	8 Mar	CC: GS/IG (Porter) <del>GS/IG (Porter)</del> G-2/CIS/PSD (Batter)	
				25 Mar	Approved above Approved GS/C&L (Oppler)	
				4/7	APPROVED	
				4/14	AMENDMENTS APP'D GS (Brown) 4/19	
				7/4	Amendment App'd G-2/PSD/Batter (with Council)	
4. Bicycle Race Bill		HR	D	25 Mar	CC: GS/GP (Hussey) - <i>Disapproved</i> GS/LG (Tilton) - <i>Disapproved</i> ESS/Fin/PP (Baron)	
				2nd D	Same Disapproved (see amendment)	
5. Temporary Measures for Food Dispensing Business		HR	D	25 Mar	CC: GS/GP (Hussey) - <i>No objection</i> GS/LG (Tilton) - <i>No objection</i> GS/Cts & Law (Oppler) ESS/Triple Con - <i>No objection</i> (Enforcement Br. ...)	
6. Dog Race Law Bill		HR	D	4/7	CC: ESS/Fi (Baron) - <i>Disapproved</i> PH&W/Wel (Neff) - <i>Disapproved</i> GS/LG (Tilton) - <i>Disapproved</i> GS/GP (Hussey) - <i>No objection</i>	
				4/12	CC sent back by H.R. that bill was introduced on March 4/12/48	
7. Livelihood Cooperative Association Bill		HR Farmers' Party	D	4/2	CC: ESS/Fi (Baron) - <i>Disapproved</i> ESS/AC (Rose) NRS/Ag (Cooper) ESS/PC&R (Alber) - <i>No objection</i> GS (Hussey) - <i>No objection</i>	
				5/11	See Memo	
				5/20	See 4/5, NRS opinion	
				6/7	See 4/5, ESS, ditto 5/11. May. Approved	

Fig. 1.A1 A list of bills and their status with respect to the review and approval by GHQ. The titles in the first column show how diverse these bills were; e.g.: (2) National Diet Library Bill (4) Bicycle Race Bill (6) Dog Race Bill, (7) Livelihood Cooperative Association Bill. "HR" in the "Originator" column means House of Representatives. All dates in the Date column refer to 1948; they range from 28 January to 1 June. The last column lists the acronyms of the sections and divisions and gives the names of their heads. For instance GS/GP (Hussey) means Government Section/Governmental Powers Division headed by Alfred Hussey; GS/C&L (Oppler) means Government Section/Court and Law Division headed by Dr. Alfred C. Oppler; GS/LG (Tilton) means Government Section/Local Government Division headed by Cecil G. Tilton. The stand taken by each division has been added in handwriting: "Disapproved", "Approved", "No objection", "No opinion". Source: National Diet Library, microfiche call-number: GS(A)-01806.

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS		
CHECK SHEET		
(Do not remove from attached sheets) <i>GH/CLK/JR/REB/mar</i>		
Subject: Draft Legislation		
Note No.:	From: GS	To: <i>CTS</i> Date: <b>23 June 1948</b>
1.	<p>1. Immediate introduction of the attached draft bill (Tab "A") in the Diet is proposed by <b>Mr. Saeki Ozawa, Member of the House of Representatives.</b></p> <p>2. Your prompt comment is requested.</p> <p>Incl: Tab "A" - <b>Private Automobiles' Surplus Transportation Capacity Utilization Bill.</b></p> <p>----- C.W. -----</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>J. W. Barker, 26-6092</i> <b>3 July 1948</b></p> <p>From: <i>CTS</i> To: <i>GS</i></p> <p>2. Reference is made to C/N, dated 30 June 1948, from GS to CTS, subject: "Draft Legislation", which transmitted proposed legislation entitled "Draft Bill for the Temporary Utilization of the Transportation Capacity of Privately Owned Trucks" for CTS comment.</p> <p>2. The subject matter of the proposed legislation transmitted for comment by C/N No. 1 above is identical to that transmitted by C/N referenced in paragraph 1 above, and therefore it is requested that the comment of CTS expressed in C/N No. 2 of referenced C/N be applied to subject proposed legislation.</p> <p>1 Incl - n/s</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>F. S. E.</i></p>	

**Fig. 1.A2 Example 1 of the review procedure of bills.** This document illustrates a standard procedure. A bill on a fairly technical issue was introduced by a member of the House of Representative. Before being discussed in the Diet the bill was sent for comment and approval to the Government Section through which it was forwarded to the Civil Transportation Section (CTS). It can be noted that the response of CTS was given in a matter of days. The CTS said that it has already commented on a similar law and that the same change should be applied here. *Source: National Diet Library, microfiche call-number: GS(A)-01806 NARA Record Group 331, Box No 2204*

PM

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

C H E C K S H E E T

(Do not remove from attached sheet)

Subject: Draft Legislation

	Nos:	Maj Norris
		26-6076
1.	From: Govt Sec	To: ESS      Date: 27 November 1951
	<p>1. Immediate introduction of the attached draft bill in the Diet is proposed by House of Councillors.</p> <p>2. Your prompt comment is requested.</p> <p>1 Incl. Bill for Partial Amend to Law concerning Compensation of Employees in Regular Government Service #2</p>	
	F. R.	
2.	OIO(27 Nov 51)ESS/FIN	A.R. DeAngelis, 26-6148 WFM/ESS/ICG/ARD/21
	From: ESS	To: Govt Sec      Date: 8 Dec 1951
	<p>1. Proposed bill has been reviewed in accordance with instructions contained in Check Note from Chief of Staff to Chief, ESS, Subject: Draft Legislation, dated 30 March 1951. Draft Bill is found to violate the SCAP's budgetary policy. The bill fails to provide funds to cover cost of proposed program.</p> <p>2. The JFY 1951-52 supplementary budget provides funds to raise the basic pay (base pay and area allowance) of government employees £1,500 per person per month. Of this amount £150 is to cover increased area allowance payments resulting from a reclassification of areas. The funds provided permit payment of the new rates effective 1 October 1951.</p> <p>3. Funds in the amount of £6,992,000,000 have been provided in the supplementary budget to cover the above pay increases for employees of the General Account and £7831,000,000 for employees of the Special Account.</p> <p>4. Proposed bill would raise base pay of government employees £2,700 per person per month, increase the area allowance payment by approximately £300 per month, establishes an incentive pay plan and provides for a special allowance of 10% and 20% of basic pay to be paid semiannually depending on length of service. Payments to temporarily retired employees would also be increased.</p>	

Fig. 1.A3 Example 2 of the review procedure of bills. There are three differences with the previous document: (i) the date of 27 November 1951 is more than 3 years later; it shows that the same kind of review was continued until the end of the occupation (ii) the bill was introduced in the House of Councillors, not in the House of Representatives (iii) the reviewing process was done by the Economic and Scientific Section (ESS), not by CTS. Apparently, the projected bill was not accepted because its cost would not have been covered by equivalent receipts. Source: National Diet Library, microfiche call-number: GS(A)-01941.

Mr. Rizzo:

21 Feb 52

Dr. Oppler concurs in the revised Pension Bill but wants both paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 8 deleted rather than just paragraph 1 as IZEKI suggested, although IZEKI will take either draft. So far DeAngelis is exhibiting a somewhat mulish attitude, but he has not given a final reply. I think I will let him talk to Dr. Oppler as these two will undoubtedly confer. Dr. Oppler wants to show the draft to Carpenter and get his approval before formally concurring.

W.E. Monagan, Jr.

**Fig. 1.A4 Internal note about the revision of the Pension Bill.** The Peace Treaty came into force on 28 April 1952; this review by GHQ of a revision of the Pension Bill was carried out on 21 February 1952 that is to say 9 weeks before the end of the occupation. The note is addressed to Frank Rizzo then head of the Government Section. Dr. Oppler has already been mentioned in the caption of the first document of this appendix; he was the head of the Court and Law Division. *Source: National Diet Library, microfiche call-number: GS(B)-02136.*

ago. Major Jay advised Mr. Nishikawa that a specific answer would depend upon a review of the bill in question. (NDL, microfiche number GS(B)-01984)

## Appendix B: Control over main nominations

Among the instructions given on 3 November 1945 by the Department of State to General MacArthur was the following. “You [i.e. the Supreme Commander] will assure that at all times the posts of Lord Privy Seal, Privy Council, Prime Minister and Cabinet members are held only by persons who may be relied upon to further the purpose of your mission.” In other words it was the duty of GHQ to select suitable persons for these positions. This is indeed what was done but it was never presented in such a way to the Japanese public. Instead, the politicians which were found unsuitable were discarded on the pretext that new information about their activity before or during the war had suddenly emerged. This is what happened for instance in the case of Ichiro Hatoyama on 5 May 1946 when a directive issued by GHQ declared him an “undesirable person” on the eve of his nomination as the next Prime Minister. A former Minister of Education, Hatoyama was at that juncture the leader of the party who had just won the elections.

The documents shown in Fig. 1.B 1 and 1.B.2 reveal that the control over nominations in fact extended to many senior positions. The fact that standardized paper forms were used for these inquiries shows that this was a standard procedure.

In addition to the previous procedure in which the selection was done for individual positions, there was also a kind of collective control which extended to the recruitment of teachers, journalists, and other persons whose activity implied an influence on public opinion. During the first years of the occupation this kind of screening was carried out within the framework of the purge. Later on, however, the same kind of procedure was used against the socialists and communists. In this case the purge of ultra-nationalists was no longer a suitable cover but this was not a major obstacle for in this instance the occupation authorities could count on the support of the Japanese government. After all, in the 1930s anti-communism had been one of the main pillars of Japanese policy both domestically and in their occupation of Mandchuria and China.

What were the criteria in use during such procedures? As just explained, they changed in the course of the occupation. Yet, according to the comments in Fig. 1.B2, one quality was considered of paramount importance, namely to be on the same wavelength as the occupation personnel. This is revealed by expressions such as “he is an obstructionist” or “we had a great deal of difficulty with him”. Pliability was at a premium.

GOVERNMENT SECTION  
National Government Division

DEC 31 1947

**SUBJECT: Proposed Appointments**

The following named Japanese Nationals have been nominated by the Japanese Government for appointment to the position indicated.

Your opinion concerning their suitability for appointment is requested. If you non-concur in any appointment, please indicate the reason.

Name	Proposed Appointment	Home Position
SHIBATA Jataro	Chief of Culture (Education) Section, Police Affairs Division; Office of Domestic Affairs	Chief of Education Section, Police and Public Order Bureau, Home Ministry

No.	Signature	Office	Date
1.	Mr. Tolson		
2.	Mr. E.A. Tamm		
3.	Mr. Clegg		
4.	Mr. Glavin		
5.	Mr. Ladd		
6.	Mr. Nichols		
7.	Mr. Rosen		
8.	Mr. Tracy		
9.	Mr. Carson		

RECOMMENDATION: SHIBATA

~~CHECKED "UNDESIRABLE" BY~~

~~PUBLIC SAFETY DIVISION~~

23 Jan 1948

Col. Pulliam G-2 Public Safety Division said that he did not object to SHIBATA - Had been checked undesirable because he was not known. Approved this date.

(P)

**Fig. 1.B1 Review process of the nomination of a Japanese public servant (1).** As the first lines are hardly readable we repeat them here. GOVERNMENT SECTION. National Government Division. Date: DEC 31 1947. Subject: Proposed Appointments. The following named Japanese Nationals have been nominated by the Japanese Government for appointment to the position indicated. Your opinion concerning their suitability for appointment is requested.

The appointment is for the position of Chief of Education at the Police Affairs Division. The interesting point is that the appointment of Mr. Shibata was first disapproved because the Public Safety Division found him "undesirable" (19 January 1948). Then, Colonel Pulliam, the chief of of this division, said that Mr. Shibata had been found "undesirable" just because he was not known. So, on 23 January, 4 days after having been disapproved, Mr. Shibata was eventually approved. Source: National Diet Library, microfiche call-number: GS(A)-01941.

GOVERNMENT SECTION  
National Government Division

SUBJECT: Proposed Appointments

The following named Japanese Nationals have been nominated by the Japanese Government for appointment to the position indicated.

Your opinion concerning their suitability for appointment is requested. If you concur in any appointment please indicate reason.

Name	Proposed Appointment	Former Position
KOBAYASHI Yosaji	Chief of Local Autonomy Section Secretariat Office of Domestic Affairs	Chief of Administrative Section Local Public Home Ministry (also Station Section)

No.	Name	No. Opinion	Comment	Object
1.	Mr. Napier		Not purgeable	
2.	Mr. Tilton			No objection CST
3.	Mr. Saigo			
4.	Mr. Runney			(S)
5.	Mr. Hays			Alt.
6.	Mr. Williams			
7.	Mr. Oppler			PIC
8.	Mr. Saigo			
9.	Mr. Marston			

REASON: O.K.

Comments:

According to information from Capt. Diamantes he is an obstructionist. per JAN 13 1948 (8)

I agree strongly - Jim

Col. Rorst had a great deal of difficulty with KOBAYASHI. Had wanted to see him removed. 2A

**Fig. 1.B2 Review process of the nomination of a Japanese public servant (2).** The first lines are the same as in the previous document. The appointment is for the position of Chief of the Local Autonomy Section at the Office of Domestic Affairs. The comment of Major Napier is "Not purgeable". This shows that the present review had nothing to do with past nationalistic activities of the person under consideration. Other, more subjective criteria were applied. The comment of Mr. Tilton (second line) is "No objection". At the bottom of the document there are three comments which explain the "Disapproved" verdict. One says: "According to information from Capt. Diamantes he is an obstructionist" [it is not clear what this means]. The second comment is: "I agree strongly". The third comment is: "Col. Rorst (or Porst) had a great deal of difficulty with Kobayashi. Had wanted to see him removed." Source: National Diet Library, microfiche call-number: GS(A)-01941.

## Organization of the purge

The purge was set in motion by SCAPIN 550 of 4 January 1946. It can be observed that a similar purge was started almost at the same time in the US occupation zone of Germany. The fact that the rules for this purge were set by the US authorities is of course clear. What is less clear is how and by whom these rules were enforced.

Under instructions of the occupation authorities, Japanese newspapers gave the impression that the purge was carried out by Japanese Review Boards. An illustration is provided by the following excerpt from the “Nippon Times” of 20 April 1952: “The purge Review Board informally decided Friday [18 April] to depurge most of the 200 appellants re-examined at the session”.

This was not completely wrong in the sense that such Review Boards were indeed in operation, but they were only able to make proposals which had to be confirmed by American authorities. It is probably this implication that the author of the previous article wanted to convey by inserting the word “informally”. The approval of the Government Section was asked for in the following letter:

26 April 1952: Letter from Mr. Shigeru Hori, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to Mr. Frank Rizzo, Chief of the Government Section, GHQ-SCAP.

“Dear Mr. Rizzo, The government has received from Mr. Iwata a report that the committee deems just to release from the purge designation 29 persons whose names are listed in the inclosure. Request is hereby made for approval by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.” (NDL microfiche number GS(B)-01984)

It can be noted that this request was made in the very last days of the occupation.

A more global view of the “depurge” operation is given by the following statistical data.

7 April 1952: Memorandum for the Chief of the Government Section.

Subject: Statistical summary of the depurge program.

- Total number under purge restrictions on 1 Jan 1952: 17,977
- Appeals filed as of 5 Apr 1952: 9,757
- Released from purge designation [after SCAP review](#): 5,675
- under review by SCAP: 1,019

[Signed] Edgar N. Jay

(NDL microfiche number GS(B)-01984)

## Chapter 2

### Incidents

### An occupation without incidents?

In an article published on May 31 1950 in the “Straits Times” (Singapore) and entitled: “Japanese attack U.S. police” one reads that “this was the first time that violence of this nature had occurred since the occupation began”. Writing five years later in the Swiss newspaper “Gazette de Lausanne” (4 Nov 1955), the renowned journalist Tibor Mende notes that there was not a “single serious incident between Japanese and Allied troops during the whole occupation period”. Similar claims were made in more recent works as well; see for instance the excerpt from Finn (1992) given in the chronology chapter (31 May 1950), Dower (2003 a, b<sup>29</sup>) or Miwa and Ramseyer (2005, p. 7). In all these cases the phrasing is very much the same as above, namely: “not a single serious incident of violence against the occupying forces”. Naturally, such assertions remain fairly vague in the sense that one does not know what precisely is meant by a “serious” incident. A more specific statement can be found in a book published in Australia in 1995 by Murray Elliott: “The casualties suffered by the Australian contingent in BCOF (British Commonwealth Occupation Force) were probably no more than it would have had in peace time”. This is an assertion which can be tested. Actual figures, in fact, show that the level of fatalities suffered by the BCOF during the occupation was three to four times higher than in peace time.

Naturally, this leave open two questions:

- What was the fatality level for US occupation forces? This is a question which we cannot yet answer for no data have been released so far on US casualties
- What caused the inflated rate observed for BCOF troops?

Answering these questions is not easy. We already mentioned the fact that many quantitative sources are not yet accessible. In addition, Japanese medias of this time were subject to strict military censorship. But by far the greatest obstacle is the fact that one of the main objectives of GHQ was to impose a view of the occupation in

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<sup>29</sup>“In the case of Japan, there was not a single incident of terrorism against US forces there after World War II” (NYT), “In the wake of defeat not a single incident of violence against the occupying forces was reported” (LAT)

conformity with the general goals set by the State Department. To this effect, the Commanders and Public Relations offices of SCAP and Eighth Army issued declarations and statements which supported this vision even though they were in contradiction with facts. An illustration is provided below (see the chronology chapter at the date of 15 January 1947) in which an article written by the Public Relation Office of Eighth Army and published in the journal "Stars and Stripes" (destined to American servicemen) is assessed as being "misleading", "inaccurate" and "definitely a misstatement of fact" by the Civil Intelligence Section of SCAP. It can be noted that "Stars and Stripes" became an obedient vehicle of the views promoted by GHQ only after disciplinary measures had been taken against its main editors (chronology chapter at the dates of 28 January, 11 February and 3 March 1946).

In short, statements made by the military cannot be considered trustworthy. This is especially the case for statements destined to be released to the medias, but to some extent it is also the case for intelligence reports. As an illustration (given in the chronology: 8 July 1946) one can mention an Eighth Army intelligence report whose account of the death of a Japanese after a shooting occurrence appears highly unlikely. Even for the incidents which are reported, it can be observed that their significance is downplayed. When a soldier is stabbed by a Japanese, it is often stated that this was the result of a provocation by the soldier or that the Japanese was mentally disturbed. When shots are fired by Japanese against Allied soldiers they miss almost always or result in slight injuries only. We did not find a single case where a soldier was shot dead; yet, as such shots (e.g. 17 August 1946, 11 October 1946, see chronology) are not infrequent one would expect a few fatalities simply as a result of normal probability rules. When telephones wires are cut, it is suggested that it is only to sell the copper or to use the wire as a fishing line (a fairly weird proposition).

In a general way, the more serious a case the less details are provided. As an illustration one can mention the case of a Japanese who threw an explosive into a jeep (see chronology: 9 August 1946); an investigation at his home lead to the discovery of 68 sticks of dynamite which strongly suggests that the attack for which he was caught was not his first; nevertheless, nothing is revealed about the findings of the investigation nor about the outcome of the trial. Another example is the incident of 15 August 1946 when an artillery battery was moved to Niigata to ward off an attack against Military Government officers: the whole affair remains mysterious (see below the chronology chapter). Similarly, when armed clandestine organizations are discovered (see instances in the chronology: 4 June 1946, 16 August 1946) no information is given on what had been their activities before the arrest of their members and nothing is said about their trials.

Broadly speaking, SCAP's policy was to present a peaceful, benign and benevolent occupation. Naturally, all occupation forces whatsoever try to "sell" such a view to the rest of the world, but in the case of the occupation of Japan that objective was pursued with an unprecedented degree of effectiveness. For all these reasons one is inclined to think that the examples of clashes between Japanese and occupation forces which are given in the chronology chapter may be only the tip of the iceberg.

This belief relies on two pieces of quantitative evidence.

- Offenses by the occupation forces against Japanese numbered about 500 by month and monthly numbers of offenses by Japanese against occupation troops and property were in the range of 1000-1500. Physical injuries represented about 10% of the total number of offenses. It can be noted that the statistics of offenses recorded by the U.S. Provost Marshal are fairly consistent with the data collected by the Japanese police. For more details see the chapter on quantitative evidence.

- A second piece of evidence about the number of incidents is the number of trials of Japanese people by military tribunals for offenses against the occupation forces. In a statement made on March 25, 1947 the Headquarters of the Eighth Army in Yokohama (see below the chronology at the date of March 25, 1947) says that during the year March 1946 - March 1947 more than 12,000 Japanese people were tried by United States Provost Courts (i.e. on average 1,000 per month) for crimes committed against Allied troops and property or for violations of censorship regulations. In a report written on 8 October 1946 the commander of the New Zealand force writes: "One of the most powerful instruments for good in running the prefecture is the Military Provost Court which tries Japanese for offenses against the Occupation Force." (NZNA, WA-J 67/13). This point is examined more closely in the next paragraph.

The evidence presented in the following chapters shows that there were hundreds of violent incidents between occupation troops and the population of Japan. Many of these incidents appear to be at individual level. Is there also evidence of an *organized* resistance to the occupation? Of course, it is not possible to provide a reliable answer to this question until one has all the information about trials of Japanese by military tribunals for offenses against the occupation. In other words, the following remarks should be considered as provisional observations.

From what has been said about censorship it is clear that military authorities took special care in suppressing any mention of incidents which may suggest an organized form of resistance for this would have been detrimental to the image of the occupation in Japan as well as in the United States. Nevertheless, due probably to negligence, one can find some cases of that kind. Here are a few examples.

- A number of *acknowledged* actions by arsonists including aircraft set afire (see the chronology). Somewhat surprisingly, almost all these incidents are reported in the BCOF area.
- Many incidents in which bullets were fired against trains, trucks or individuals belonging to the occupation forces.
- Recurrent sabotage actions aimed at disabling military facilities. Most of the reported sabotage incidents concern the BCOF area, There is no doubt that these actions reveal *intentional* resistance but can we speak of *organized* resistance? It must be observed that even actions by well-organized groups would appear fairly disconnected unless the perpetrators are caught and confess that they belong to the same organization. Such evidence may possibly be found in the records of trials by military commissions, but unfortunately these records are not yet accessible. Another signature of an organized resistance would be the use of fairly sophisticated devices which require the cooperation of several people. In the case of Japan we do not yet have evidence of such actions.

## Trials by military courts for offenses against the occupation

In Japan there were two kinds of military tribunals (see also Table 2.1)

- Military commissions which tried serious offenses and whose range of sentences included the death penalty.
- Provost courts which tried lesser offenses and whose range of sentences was limited to confinement at hard labor during 5 (or sometimes 10) years.

Military Commissions and Provost courts were reorganized through a SCAP instruction issued on 19 February 1946. It is often said that this instruction set up these tribunals but it would be more correct to say that it provided further information about which offenses should be tried by military courts and which should be tried by the Japanese courts. It should be recalled that the memorandum of November 3, 1945 addressed by the State Department to SCAP already recommended the creation of military courts “with jurisdiction against offenses against the forces of occupation”. As a matter of fact, the creation of such courts accompanied almost all military occupations carried out by American armed forces in previous decades. In Italy and Germany, military tribunals were established as soon as the Allied forces entered into these countries, that is to say August 1943 for Italy and September 1944 in the case of Germany. In the combat zone for each division there were two military government officers who were in charge of military tribunals and who worked closely with the counter intelligence corps (CIC). Both Nobleman (1950) and Hill (1982) attest that sentencing was harsh and swift. For instance, in Florence about 7 spies were sentenced to be shot every week (Hill, p. 105); 20-year imprisonment sentences were

**Table 2.1 Military and civilian tribunals in areas under US military rule**

Persons tried	Military or civil court	Type and sentences	Type and sentences	Historical cases
Military personnel	Court-martial courts	General court-martial <i>Any sentence including death</i>	Special court-martial <i>Up to 1 year</i>	(1), (2a), (2b), (3)
Local civilians	Military courts	Military commission <i>Any sentence including death</i>	Provost court <i>Up to 5 year</i>	(1), (4)
		General court <i>Any sentence including death</i>	Intermediate court <i>Up to 10 year</i>	(2a), (2b)
Local civilians (*)	Local civilian courts	<i>Overseen by</i>	<i>occupation forces</i>	(1), (2b), (3)

## Notes:

- The case numbers in the last column have the following meaning: 1: Hawaii, 1942–1944; 2a: Western Germany, 1944–1946; 2b: Western Germany, 1947–1948; 3: Japan, 1945–April 1952.
- (\*) Cases which involved offenses against occupation personnel were outside the competence of these courts. Toward the end of the occupation this rule was progressively relaxed at least for small offenses.
- Provost courts could also try civilian personnel of the occupation forces but this occurred rarely.
- The main difference between the cases of Germany and Japan is that whereas all German courts were suppressed, Japanese courts continued to function under the control of occupation authorities. This control means that any trial could be interrupted and transferred to a military tribunal; moreover, judges could be dismissed and sentences were subject to review by the occupation authorities. This was the situation in 1945–1946.
- In subsequent years the role of civilian courts was progressively extended especially when decisions and sentences were in accordance with the expectations of the occupation authorities.
- For the sake of clarity the table does not mention summary court-martial courts whose sentences were up to 2 months in confinement. There were also similar “Summary courts” in Germany for the trial of small offenses committed by German people.
- The role of military courts in Germany did not end in 1948, but in July 1948 there was a reorganization which included a change in the names of the courts. This period was omitted in the table for the sake of simplicity.

imposed for the possession of a weapon. Once the enemy had withdrawn from the area, occupation military tribunals came in operation which had more time to take sentencing decisions. After 15 August 1945 Japan was of course no longer a combat zone but military tribunals were nevertheless functioning. Thus, on 26 January a

Japanese civilian was sentenced to death by an American Military Commission for the bayoneting of an American soldier (for more detail, see the chronology below at this date).

Military tribunals had already been used during other occupation episodes: in the Civil War (occupation of the states belonging to the Confederation), in the Philippines after 1899, in Beijing during the occupation of the Boxer war, in Haiti in the 1920s, and in Hawaii after Pearl Harbor. In the last instance, about 3,750 defendants were tried (another source gives a figure of over 20,000 cases, Hall 1950) and, according to the *New York Times*, of the 819 persons who had the hardihood to plead not guilty all 819 were convicted. (*New York Times* 2 July 1944, p. 13; 3 March 1946 p. E2 (Week in Review).) Basically, military commissions and provost courts are modeled on military courts martial and follow the same rules of procedure<sup>30</sup>.

In the statement of March 25 1947 referred to above, one learns that on average 90 percent of those tried were convicted, which implies that about 10,000 Japanese were convicted by Eighth Army courts in the first year. If this figure is extrapolated to the whole occupation period, that is to say until May 1952, one arrives to a total of about 60,000 convictions. Although only approximate for it does not include trials by British, Australian or New Zealand courts, such an extrapolation gives an order of magnitude which can be useful.

Let us keep in mind the following normalized rates which can be inferred from the figures given below. In 1946-1947 there were on average: (i) 68 provost court trials per month and per 10,000 Allied troops.

(ii) 10 court martial trials per month and per 10,000 Allied troops.

The last figure is based on Broklebank's data for the New Zealand occupation force and needs to be confirmed for the American occupation force. It is natural to think that any serious historical account of this period must take into account the archives of these trials.

What was the average sentence given by provost courts? The only archive in which we were able to find a listing of individual provost court trials is the National Archive of New Zealand. Even in this case, information about the sentence is omitted in about 50% of the trials. For a set of 112 trials for which the sentence is given, the average term is 3.4 month at hard labor<sup>31</sup>. This order of magnitude is consistent with information about provost court trials in the American zone (during March 1946 to

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<sup>30</sup>Military tribunals have also been in use in the British Empire. For instance, in the two weeks June 22 to July 2, 1857 the Military Commission at Allahabad sentenced 41 people to death, in some cases for fairly slight offenses such as plundering salt. At about the same time, a "Military commission" at Rawalpendi sentenced 5 natives to be blown from guns, 7 to be shot by musketry and 4 to be hanged; in addition a "Civil Commission" sentenced 7 to be blown from guns and 8 to be hanged (Indian Mutiny 1,2). At this point it is not clear what were the different attributions of the Military versus Civil Commissions.

<sup>31</sup>There is a more complete discussion in the chronology chapter at the date of 30 April 1947.

March 1947) given by an article published in the New York Times (see the chronology chapter at the date of 24 March 1947). It indicates an average in the range 3-6 months.

**Table 2.2 Yearly numbers of trials by military tribunals for offenses against the occupation forces in Japan (Okinawa excluded)**

	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	Total	Monthly rate per 10,000 troops
<b>Military C.</b>									
US		> 2		> 1					
BCOF, UK									
BCOF, Aust.									
BCOF, NZ									
<b>Provost C.</b>									
US		> 9,000	~ 16,000	~ 6,000	> 1,300				60
BCOF, UK									
BCOF, Aust.									
BCOF, NZ	-	250	> 695	> 20				> 1029	

Notes:

- “Military C.” means Military Commission, “Provost C.” means Provost Court.

• US: The figure for 1946 (Provost C) is for the 9 months March-December; it was derived from the figure of 12,000 for the period 27 February 1946 – 26 February 1947 which gives a monthly average of 1,000. The figure for 1947 has been derived from the number for July 1947, namely 1,400 cases (Eichelberger’s papers). It should be noted that this number does not include the cases in the restricted areas under the control of General MacArthur’s air and naval commanders. The figure for 1948 (Provost C) has been derived from the data available for the month of February, namely 506 cases. For the case of the First Army, the source also provides data for Dec. 1947 and Jan. 1948 which show that Feb. 1948 was indeed a fairly normal month (the figures for these three months are 338, 348 and 307 respectively).

• The column “Average annual rate” gives values which should be considered as orders of magnitude; it will be possible to give precise values only once complete data become available.

Sources:

• US (Military Comm.): For the two cases in 1946 see the chronology chapter at the dates of 6 January 1946 and 26 January 1946. The case in 1948 occurred on 15 January 1948.

• BCOF (Military Comm): At this point it is not yet clear whether or not only the American forces had the power to hold trials by Military Commissions or whether the BCOF was allowed to hold such trials as well.

• US (Provost C.): 1946: New York Times, 25 March 1947 (p.4); 1947: General Eichelberg’s papers (reel 33, report of July 1947); 1948: IHS1; 1949: annual estimate based on the 88 trials listed in NARA 2 for 20 Nov - 13 Dec.

• NZ (Provost C.): New Zealand National Archives, WA-J 38/6, WA-J 38/7, WA-J 76/1. There are some gaps around July 1947; the data for January 1948 to June 1948 are missing. 1029 is the number of the last trial which is listed. I’m grateful to archivist Heidi Kuglin for her help.

The main problem with this table is the fact that we do not have any data for the number of Military Commission trials. Two cases are mentioned in January 1946 but after that date military commissions are hardly ever mentioned in connection with offenses against occupation forces. Is it plausible that there were indeed no trials by military commissions? In fact, available evidence suggests that this is highly unlikely. A broad argument is that offenses and crimes form a continuum which implies that if there is great number of small crimes there are also a few serious crimes. It is even possible to make an educated guess as to the number of military commission trials. As we have already said, the military tribunals were modeled on courts martials. In Italy and Germany even their names were modeled on those of courts martials. Indeed, for courts martials one distinguishes three levels: General courts martials for the most serious offenses, Special courts martial for intermediate offenses, Summary court martial for light offenses. Similarly for the trials of civilians there were general courts (empowered to impose any sentence including death), special or also called intermediary courts (sentences of up to 10 years) and summary courts for sentences of up to 6 or 12 months (Nobleman 1950, p. 43). In Japan, it was decided to come back to the terminology of Military Commission and Provost Court which had been in use in the US Army before World War II; in this terminology the military commission courts correspond to the general courts and the provost courts correspond to the intermediary plus summary courts.

Now, we know (see IHS1) that in the Eighth Army in the months prior to March 1948 there had been:

- 37 General courts martials
- 908 Special and Summary courts martials (257 and 651 respectively)

which means that the number of General courts martials was about 25 time smaller than the number of Special and Summary courts martial. Because of the similarity in the organization, it makes sense to apply the same coefficient in order to get an order of magnitude for the number of Military Commissions in Japan; thus, one would have the following relationship:

$$\text{Number of Military Commission trials} = \text{Number of Provost Court trials}/25$$

In the four years 1946-1949 there were of the order of  $10,000 \times 4 = 40,000$  provost court trials; thus, from the above relationship one would expect:

$$40,000/25 \sim 1,600 \quad \text{Military Commissions trials in 1946-1949}$$

**Remark** When one explores the catalog of the US Archives (NARA) by using the corresponding electronic search engine one finds a file entitled: “Records of trials by Military Commission, 1945-1950”. At first sight it might seem that this file is precisely what we need. However, after closer examination it appears that this file

is fairly inadequate for several reasons. (i) It contains 15 names but among these names one cannot find the names of the persons tried in the trials mentioned in the chronology at the dates of 6, 26 January 1946 and 15 January 1948. Moreover, it does not contain the names of the persons for whom we know (from the NARA catalog) that there has been an appeal review of their death sentence (ii) The description provided by the catalog tells us that the file contains “records of cases that deal with issues such as war crimes, black market activities and smuggling”. Now, according to Piccigallo (1979), the number of war crimes tried by military commissions in Yokohama is 996; thus, if the previous file were to include war crime trials in a comprehensive way it should have at least 1,000 names. In other words, this file includes just a few cases selected from a much larger body of cases.

In Okinawa (see below the chronology for Okinawa at the date of 31 December 1951) we know that there were (at least) 10 Military Commission trials between 1946 and 1951. During that period of time the population of Japan was about 300 times larger than the population of Okinawa. If, just to get an order of magnitude, we apply this scale factor to the 10 cases we get an estimated number of 3,000 Military Commission trials in Japan. Thus, on the basis of the previous two estimates one would expect between 1,500 and 4,000 trials by Military Commissions.

## How difficult is it to identify acts of sabotage?

There can be no doubt that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were hostile actions. The organization by which they were planned and carried out did not try to cover or hide its intent. This, however, stands out as an exception in the long chronology of disasters, explosions, and deadly fires which occurred over past decades. It turns out that most often it is fairly difficult to determine the cause of the disaster and to decide whether or not it should be attributed to natural causes, to negligence or to sabotage. The following two examples will serve to illustrate this assertion.

- On September 21, 2001, that is to say 10 days after September 11, a huge explosion occurred in the AZF fertilizer factory in Toulouse, France. The disaster caused 29 deaths (28 from the factory and one high school pupil) and shattered thousands of windows causing many wounds. Was the explosion due to negligence or to sabotage? On October 4, 2001, the Environment Minister, Yves Cochet, announced that the explosion “may have been a terrorist attack” and identified Hassan Jandoubi, a plant sub-contractor killed in the blast, as a possible terrorist. To this day (February 2008) the causes of the explosion still remain unclear.

- At 2 am on Sunday 30 July 1916 a huge explosion rocked Black Tom Island. Located in New York Bay 500 meters northwest of Liberty Island (where the Statue of Liberty is located), this island was at that time connected to Jersey City by a

long pier. Today it has become part of the Southern part of Liberty State Park. In 1916 this place was a munitions depot for trans-shipment to the British and French armies. It is reported that on the night of the explosion it held more than 1,000 tons of gunpowder, shells, shrapnel and dynamite. Because many persons were injured there is some uncertainty about the actual number of persons who were killed as a result of the explosion; the numbers range from 2 to about 50.

Was the explosion due to sabotage? Conflicting statements were made in subsequent years. An article published in the *New York Times* in 1917 (24 March, p. 7) reports the declaration of an army officer according to which the explosion was the “work of incendiary”. More than four years later, a suspect named Michael Felix Kristoff, was arrested (*New York Times* 6 July 1921 p. 3) but he was soon released and met a fairly mysterious death in 1928. An article published in “*Time Magazine*” in 1930 (24 November) reverts to the scenario of an accident. According to a private detective who was hired to investigate the case, the real story was that the watchmen employed to guard the site made a fire to drive off the mosquitoes that infested the swampy land about Black Tom. A spark ignited some excelsior (i.e. small pieces of wood) which had been left carelessly under a freight car loaded with small shells. Yet, on 6 January 1941, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the responsibility of the German Government.

As can be seen from these two cases, investigations dragged on for years, and once a decision was reached, there was no real assurance that it was correct. As a result grossly conflicting accounts have been given of sabotage actions during World War II. In a book published in 2005 Pierce O’Donnell claims that apart from two groups of saboteurs who were arrested soon after their arrival on the American coast there were no sabotage attempts during World War II. But this author seems to ignore that many sabotage attempts are listed in a book written in mid-1942 by M. Sayers and A.E. Kahn. In the case of the numerous fires that occurred during the occupation of Japan the conclusions of the investigation boards are almost never available; it is true that there are several cases in which arson is suspected (particularly in the Commonwealth area, see the chronology chapter) but even in these cases, little details are provided.

## Death sentences and executions

How many people were sentenced to death by Military Courts for crimes against the occupation forces?

One such case is known to have occurred on 26 January 1946. A 18 year-old Japanese civilian, Katsumo Tamura, was sentenced to death by an American Military Commission at Sapporo for the bayoneting of Private Robert Young on 19 December

1945 (see the chronology chapter). He was hanged on 18 May 1946 at the Sugamo prison. (NYT: 26 January p. 6, 18 May 1946 p. 4).

Another case of death penalty inflicted by an American Military Commission occurred in Kobe on 15 January 1948 (see the chronology chapter) but in this cases the two defendants were Chinese, not Japanese. At this point we do not know if they were executed or reprieved.

So far we did not find any source which would give data about such executions in a comprehensive way.

This is not really surprising. It is well-known that execution data are a sensitive topic. For instance, the archives relating to British soldiers who were sentenced to death and shot during World War I were still not open in 2002. Similarly, in her thorough investigation of the executions of US soldiers in Japan, Terese Svoboda run in many dead ends (Svoboda 2008, chapters 22 and 23). From the unclear presentation of court martial ledgers or Eight Army stockade listings to the low level of interest shown by archivists, she got the impression that she was after something that should better remain buried. In the course of time a researcher learns to recognize and identify such a feeling. Most often it signals an issue that, for some reason, is considered “sensitive”.

In the present case it may nevertheless be possible to gain estimates of numbers of executions of Japanese civilians by Allied authorities. We present two methods. The first one should give fairly accurate estimates at least if the data were reliable; the second one is rather aimed at obtaining an order of magnitude.

In principle the data recorded in the volumes of the “Vital Statistics of Japan” are supposed to give the deaths of all Japanese nationals that occurred in Japan proper (which at that time excluded Okinawa). This is the statement that can be read in the volume of 1947. In the international classification of causes of death there is an entry called “Legal executions”. The first line of Table 2.3 gives the corresponding data. They are supposed to include each and every execution whether carried out by Japanese or American authorities. Note however that these data would *not* include the executions of Chinese or Korean people.

On the other hand the Ministry of Justice specifically recorded the executions carried out by the *Japanese* authorities. The data given in the second line of table 2.3.

The third relevant variable is the number of Japanese executed on the charge of war crimes. According to Piccigallo (1979)) 51 Japanese were executed in Japan on the charge of war crimes (the so-called class A, B and C war crimes). In fact this number is somewhat too low according to a list of executions (with dates and names) given in

Table 2.3 Legal executions of Japanese in Japan

		1946 Q1-Q3	1946 Q4	47	48	49	50	51	52	Total (except 46,50)
(All)	<b>All executions.</b>	?	4	9	49	47		21	17	143
(J)	<b>By Japanese</b>	9	2	12	33	33	31	24	18	120
	<b>By Allies</b>									
(A <sub>1</sub> )	War crime	4	0	1	28	20	7	0	0	49
(A <sub>2</sub> )	Not war crime (actual)	1	?	?	?	?	?	?	?	≥ 1
(A <sub>2</sub> <sup>e</sup> )	Not war crime (estimate)	?	2	-4	-12	-6	?	-3	-1	-26

Notes: According to the definition given in the “Vital Statistics” volumes, the variable “All” in the first line is supposed to record all legal executions of Japanese nationals that occurred in Japan. There were three sources of death sentences (i) civilian Japanese courts for ordinary crimes (*J*) (ii) US military courts on the charge of war crime (*A*<sub>1</sub>) (iii) US military courts for crimes against the occupation forces (*A*<sub>2</sub>). Naturally, one should have: All = *J* + *A*<sub>1</sub> + *A*<sub>2</sub>. From this relation we can derive an estimate for the unknown variable *A*<sub>2</sub>, namely:  $A_2^e = \text{All} - J - A_1$ .

The fact that almost all these estimates are negative (that is to say meaningless) shows that the execution data recorded in the “Vital Statistics of Japan” simply are not trustworthy; they are way too low.

Sources: **All**: *Vital Statistics of Japan, Part 2: 1946 (this volume covers only the 4th quarter), 1947, 1948, 1949, (for some reason the volume 1950 was not available), 1951, 1952.* **J**: Schmidt (2001, p. 71, 111); the quarterly data for 1946 are derived from monthly figures given in the NDL microfiche number G2-02269. **A**<sub>1</sub>: Ginn (1992); **A**<sub>2</sub>: *New York Times 18 May 1946 (p. 4).*  $A_2^e = \text{All} - J - A_1$ .

Ginn (1992, p. 192-193) which numbers 60 executions<sup>32</sup>. Until further information becomes available we will assume that the list given in Ginn is correct. The annual numbers of executions are given in Table 2.3.

We now come to the variable in which we are really interested, namely the number of executions carried out for crimes against the occupation. In principle it should be given by the difference:  $A_2^e = \text{All} - J - A_1$ . Alas, as can be seen in table 2.3, most of these differences turn out to be negative that is to say meaningless. This indicates that the data given in the “Vital Statistics of Japan” do *not* record *all* legal executions that took place in Japan.

As a matter of fact they do not even record all the executions carried out by the Japanese authorities. This can be seen from the fact that in 1947, 1951 and 1952 the variable “All” is smaller than the variable “*J*”. It can also be seen in a more direct way, by considering the month of December 1946. The “Vital Statistics” give

<sup>32</sup>For the period until the end of 1948 this list can be checked and confirmed by another one given in an account written by Shinsho Hanayama (1955), the budhist priest who visited the prisoners. For the first six months of 1947 there remains an open question: two New York Times articles (13 February 1949 p. 29 and 12 June 1949 p. 34) mention a total of 23 executions whereas the list given in Ginn mentions only 11 executions. As the names of the persons executed are not given in the New York Times article it is difficult to make a real comparison between the two sources.

zero execution during this month; yet the data from the Ministry of Justice (NDL microfiche number G2-02269) tell us that an execution took place on 9 December 1946 at Miyagi prison. The source even gives the name and age of the person who was hanged: Kodyn Mishihara, 49 year-old.

One possible explanation of the above discrepancy would be that the people who are not recorded in the “Vital Statistics” were foreigners. Such an explanation is highly unlikely however. It would mean that about 20% of the people executed by Japanese authorities were foreigners. It can also be noted that in the case of December 1946 “Mishihara” sounds as a Japanese name.

Is there another way to get estimates for the variable  $A_2$ ? One may try the following argument.

During the occupation of Germany over a period of 16 months in 1949-1951 the death sentences inflicted by Military tribunals represented about 0.01% of all 15,618 sentences (see “Relations between Allied troops and the population of Germany and Austria” at the date of 31 May 1951). At this point we do not know how many of these death sentences were commuted and how many resulted in actual executions. On the basis of 32,000 trials in Japan (table 2.2 suggests that this is rather a lower bound) and applying the previous proportionality factor, one would get  $32000/10000 = 3.2$  death sentences. The actual number of executions would depend of the number of sentences not commuted.

Naturally, this estimate relies on a number of assumptions; e.g. the fact that the proportionality factor can be transposed from Germany to Japan, or the fact that a figure for a period after 1949 also applies to the earlier part of the occupation.

## Number of troops

An important question is to know how many troops there were. In late 1945 at the beginning of the occupation there were some 400,000 American troops. Their number decreased to 150,000 in mid-1946 but 40,000 Commonwealth troops arrived in February-March 1946. Thus, it can be assumed that on average there were at least 200,000 troops in 1946; note that this number does not include the dependents of the military and the civilians who worked for the Armed forces. The number of 200,000 can be taken as a rough order of magnitude for the whole period through 1949 for if most of the Commonwealth troops left in 1947 it is likely that this drop was compensated by an increase in the number of US dependents.

From the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1950, p. 137) we learn that in 1948 the average US rates for murder and assault were 9.3 and 110 per 100,000 male population respectively. For a group of 200,000 these rates would result in some

18 murders and 220 assaults; whereas an unknown fraction of the victims may have been US servicemen it is likely that a substantial proportion were Japanese people.

## Confrontation factors

For the comparative historian, the fact that there were indeed confrontation episodes between Japanese and occupation forces does not come as a surprise; it is rather the lack of any such episode which would be puzzling. As a matter of fact, there were numerous causes of friction and contention; one can mention the following.

- Historically, the coexistence of military occupation forces with populations of defeated countries was always a tricky and antagonistic affair. This assertion can be illustrated by many historical cases from the occupation of Palestine by the Roman army, to the occupations of European countries by the Napoleonic Armies, to the occupation of the Philippines following the Spanish-American war, and so on.
- During the first years of the occupation, Japanese people faced considerable hardships including scarcity of food, heating and housing. These living conditions were in glaring contrast with the level of comfort enjoyed by occupation forces.
- Post-war scarcity was aggravated by army requisitions. SCAP (Supreme Command of Allied Powers) directives ordered Japanese to furnish supplies, facilities and services to meet the needs of the occupation forces provided it did not result in starvation, disease or physical distress. For instance, lumber, electrical supplies, pipes, cement, steel plates were obtained in large quantities from Japanese warehouses in the I and X Corps areas (Krueger 1953, p. 365, 367).
- The dismantling (or destruction, see below 24 November 1945) of plants planned in the reparation program was a notable source of conflict.
- The trials of former political and military officials were seen as a threat and humiliation especially by right-wing followers. Let us recall that 5,700 Japanese were indicted for war crimes and at least 944 were executed (Dower 1999); more details are given below.
- The relations between Allied military personnel and Japanese girls and women arouse discontent among Japanese men. From the episode of the occupation of Germany where censorship was somewhat less strict than in Japan we know that this lead to reprisals against both Allied soldiers and German females.

As these considerations apply to occupied Germany as well as to Japan, one could expect a similar level of confrontation in both countries. Therefore, a parallel study was devoted to Germany (see on the same website “RELATIONS BETWEEN ALLIED OCCUPATION TROOPS AND THE POPULATION OF GERMANY”, forthcoming)

## Explanation of an apparent paradox

### No threat whatsoever

After a first draft of this study had been posted on the Internet I received several emails saying in substance. “Well, I was stationed in Japan during the occupation but I was able to walk around unarmed and without being ever subject to any threat. Moreover, I did not hear anything about incidents between US troops and the Japanese population<sup>33</sup>.” The authors of such messages did not call in doubt the incidents reported in the present study because they were based on official army sources, but they were puzzled by this apparent paradox. How can it be explained?

The basic answer is very simple.

One can drive a car for years without seeing a single accident or without even thinking that one may experience an accident. Of course, this does not mean that there are no traffic accidents. In fact, there are thousands every month. In other words, to know what happens in a country our personal experience is of no usefulness. One must use reliable statistical data.

This conclusion still holds if one includes accidents that happened to close friends. Indeed, during a single year most probably we will not hear about any accident which happened to friends. If one extends the period of observation to several decades then, of course, the conclusion no longer holds, but the occupation only lasted 6 years.

As another example it can be mentioned that in France during the occupation by Germany in 1940-1944, some German officers or servicemen had quite good relations with French people especially if they were able to speak French. That does not give any reliable indication about the level of resistance that may have existed at that time.

### Cost in American lives

Another point should be added. When one reads US Army reports it becomes clear that there was a will *not* to identify any adverse event as being the result of a hostile action. For instance, there were numerous fires but after a barracks had been destroyed the authorities would publish a report just a *few hours* after the disaster saying that the fire was not due to sabotage but probably to faulty wiring. Such reports were published before any serious investigation had been conducted. Usually it was added that a more thorough investigation was still under way but whether or not that investigation led to different conclusions is difficult to know because they were not published even in confidential army reports. This policy was certainly effective in accrediting the belief that no hostile action should be expected but by doing so it also contributed to lower the level of vigilance and alertness.

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<sup>33</sup> One of the most interesting of such messages was the one that I received on 24 December 2009 from Mr. Al Zelter, a Japanese-speaking intelligence officer who was in Japan from the fall of 1945 to the fall of 1946.

It would probably have been easy to prevent a number of tragic fires if the security guard had been doubled especially during the night and if the guards had been instructed to watch for possible arson and sabotage. This policy of deliberate neglect may have cost the lives of a number of officers and soldiers who perished in night fires. Although it is true that there have also been many fires of Japanese houses, fires in military installations are a completely different matter because these buildings were supposed to be under surveillance by armed sentries day and night; thus one would expect any starting fire to be quickly identified, put under control and the building evacuated.

As a matter of fact a similar attitude developed in the United States during the war as far as sabotage in industrial facilities was concerned. All fires or explosions in powder factories or chemical plants, all train derailments were declared to be due to accidental causes rather than sabotage usually in the hours after the catastrophe that is to say prior to any serious investigation. Many cases of this kind are described in a parallel study by the same author entitled "Relations between military forces and the population of Hawaii". At this point I do not see clearly what motivated such an attitude. One reason may have been to show that the preventive measures already taken (e.g. the detention of Japanese Americans or so-called enemy aliens) were indeed effective and that the protective actions offered by security services (e.g. police, FBI, army and navy intelligence) were indeed working.

### **Minimal security measures around MacArthur**

Another argument which is often brought forward, often by the same persons, concerns the level of security measures for the protection of General MacArthur. The argument goes as follows.

Every day the Supreme Commander came by car from the US Embassy (near the Akasaka subway station on the Chiyoda line) where he was living to the Dai-Ichi Mutual Life Insurance building (near the Tennozu station on the Tokyo monorail in the south of Tokyo). On this short drive of around 10 minutes his car was not escorted by any military vehicle. This is supposed to suggest that MacArthur felt perfectly secure in Japan. However plausible, this argument falls apart when considered in comparative perspective as suggested by the two following examples.

- There was an assassination attempt against President-elect Franklin Roosevelt on 15 February 1933 that is to say less than one month before his inauguration. The fact that the Mayor of Chicago Anton Cernak was fatally wounded in this attempt together with the fact that the murderer was executed on 20 March 1933 shows that this was a very serious attempt. During his three terms (he died at the beginning of his 4th term) particularly through his the New Deal policy president Roosevelt antagonized many people especially in business circles to the point of being com-

pared to Mussolini or Stalin by his opponents. Yet, there are many photographs of the president riding in an open car, a situation in which he would have been an easy target.

- A similar and even more striking example is provided by French president Charles de Gaulle. Because of his policy in favor of the independence of Algeria he became the target of several assassination attempts. Two of the most serious were first on 8 September 1961 a road-side bomb explosion at Pont-sur-Seine and secondly on 22 August 1962 in the south of Paris. In this last case he was riding in an unescorted car which although riddled with bullets did not stop and was able to reach safety.

These examples suggest that security officers know very well that an armed escort would be of little usefulness against road-side bombs or snipers. The best parade in case of an attack is rapidity and capacity to accelerate quickly. Escorting vehicles would be only a hindrance in this respect. In short, using an unescorted car is a standard procedure even in situations in which threats are known to exist.

As a last point it can be recalled that in fact there was an assassination plot against General MacArthur as attested by the following title on the first page of the New York Times of 1 May 1946: “Frustrated assassination plot against General MacArthur. The plotters are still at large.”

## Prisons

Changes in the prison population can provide estimates for the level of social unrest. However one must be able to get data not only for Japanese prisons but for *all* detention centers. Apart from Japanese prisons there were also military stockades or detention facilities especially for prisoners awaiting trial before military tribunals.

Prisoners sentenced to hard labor were confined in work camps also called “honor camps”. The chronology chapter contains information about such a camp located in Hokkaido. So far however, we were not able to find out how many honor camps were operated in the other prefectures.

## Chapter 3

### SCAP Instructions (SCAPINs)

#### Two conceptions

The two chronology chapters mainly focus on grass-root level relations between occupation troops and Japanese people. However, as the microsociological situation was conditioned by the political situation at upper levels, we must say a few words about the later.

On the first page of his book “War without Mercy” John Dower observes that  
“One of the most impressive features of the occupation was that the defeated Japanese and the victorious Allies, predominantly Americans, worked together so amicably and constructively.”

As a matter of fact, this opinion which may be referred to as the benevolence-cooperation conception, is shared by most American and Japanese scholars; this can be seen just by browsing through books’ titles: “Winners in Peace” (1992), “The Allied Occupation and Japan’s Economic Miracle” (1997), “Dear General MacArthur” (2001), “Partners for Democracy” (2002) are just a few examples among many others. Yet, a different assessment is made by some Japanese writers. For instance in a book published in 2001, Shiro Okamoto writes:

“If one could sum up MacArthur’s occupation policies with regard to Japan’s previous living standards it would be ‘denial’. The occupation tried to destroy the entire structure of Japan’s history and to create a new one in its place.”

At the end of the present chapter the shaping of a new Japan will be illustrated by some examples.

Beyond such conflicting statements, what is really the evidence<sup>34</sup>? In this chapter we consider some of the guidelines followed by occupation authorities.

#### SCAPINs

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<sup>34</sup>It can be observed that the fairly abrupt judgments made by General MacArthur on 22 September 1945 (see below in the chronology chapter) about the “punishment of Japan” are hardly consistent with the benevolence conception.

The basic rules were set in very clear terms in a directive of President Truman to General MacArthur dated September 6, 1945:

“The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state is subordinate to you as the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. Our relations with Japan do not rest on a contractual basis, but on an unconditional surrender. Since your authority is supreme, you will not entertain any question on the part of the Japanese as to its scope” (Ando 1991).

This rule was implemented as follows. SCAP issued instructions to the Japanese government which became known as SCAPINs, shorthand for SCAP Instructions. Between September 1945 and March 1952, about 2,200 SCAPINs were issued; incidentally, a complete catalog of the 2204 SCAPIN with data and subject can be found on the website of the National Diet Library at:

[http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/kensei\\_shiryō/senryō/pdf/SCA\\_1.pdf](http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/kensei_shiryō/senryō/pdf/SCA_1.pdf)

In addition to the SCAPINs there were about 7,000 administrative decrees, labeled as SCAPIN-As and numerous memoranda which do not bear a SCAPIN label and number which were addressed by GHQ to the Japanese Government through the Central Liaison Office (Takemae 2002, *Nippon Times* (Directives) 1947) Moreover, it was recognized that oral directives transmitted by SCAP officers to Japanese officials had also a binding effect (Ando 1991, p. 13). The instructions issued by SCAP concerned practically all aspects of Japanese life: political institutions (e.g. centralization versus local autonomy), organization of justice, religion, corporations, trade, education, textbooks, land holdings, private property, organization of police, creation of a national library on the model of the library of Congress, etc. Regarding textbooks it is of course well known that occupation authorities reformed the Japanese textbooks for the teaching of history, but the SCAP archives show that they devoted also much attention to the textbooks for the teaching of Japanese (more about that below).

The following excerpt provides an example of SCAPIN:

“SCAPIN 183, 24 October 1945, Civil Intelligence Section (CIS). Subject: Violation of religious freedom.

The Imperial Japanese Government is directed immediately to dismiss from their present positions the following officials of Rikkyo Gakuin [i.e. St Paul’s University, a Protestant institution of higher learning] [11 names follow; note that these persons were not accused of being ultranationalists; their offense was to have allowed the disruption of Christian services and teaching after 1943]. None of the individuals designated above shall be reemployed or placed in any position in any public or private educational or religious institution or in any government position. ” (Woodard 1972, p. 293)

SCAPIN 550, 4 January 1946 set in motion the political purge of Japanese officials.

SCAPIN 677, 29 January 1946 detached Takeshima Islands (off the western coast of Japan) from Japan; through SCAPIN 1778, 16 September 1947 it was made a bombing range for US forces.

The chronology shows that General MacArthur could take decisions in fields which are usually considered of prime importance for a government. Thus, the exchange rate of the yen was set by SCAP (see below 12 March 1947 and 23 April 1949), ministers who were not deemed acceptable by SCAP could in practice be vetoed (see 14 April 1946, 22 May 1946); moreover, Gen. MacArthur could dissolve the National Diet and call for new elections as he did in March 1946 and February 1947.

For how long was the decision-making power of the Japanese government limited by the occupation authorities? Basically, this lasted until the signature of the Peace Treaty in early 1952. It is true that in a number of fields more autonomy was progressively given to the Japanese government. Yet, the following example shows that even in matters of relatively minor importance, the Japanese government had to ask for permission from GHQ before taking an initiative. The example concerns the reintroduction of judo practice in schools and universities. The practice of judo, kendo, archery and other traditional Japanese sports had been banned by GHQ because during the war these activities had been used to support militarist objectives. Between 1946 and 1949 more than 10 petitions had been submitted to the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP in support for a reintroduction of judo. Of no avail. Eventually, on 28 April 1950 the Japanese Minister of Education, Sotaro Takase, presented a request for the reinstatement of judo directly to General MacArthur. This was indeed granted through SCAPIN-A 7265 of 15 September 1950. More details can be found in the chronology at the corresponding dates.

There were instances of SCAPINs contradicting one another. An illustration is provided by SCAPIN 313 (19 November 1945) and SCAPIN 398 (6 December 1945). In the first one the Japanese were ordered to deliver 70,000 tons of coal every month to South Korea<sup>35</sup>. Three weeks later the second instruction warned of a catastrophic coal shortage and directed the Japanese government to increase the production of coal by all means.

## How were SCAP instructions implemented?

“Acts prejudicial to the occupation objectives” were defined (by Imperial Ordinance No 274, 1946 and by Cabinet Ordinance No 325, Oct. 1950) as violations of SCAP directives and of orders issued by Occupation Force Commanders of Army, Corps or Divisions in implementation of these directives. Such acts were punished with

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<sup>35</sup>The coal was not intended for the Koreans but for the US forces in Korea.

penal servitude for a period not exceeding 10 years. As a result of these ordinances, SCAP directives were given the status of Japanese laws. Consequently, violators may have been tried by Japanese tribunals but when the later failed to act, violators were referred to American military commissions or provost courts (Woodard 1972, p. 300, Braibanti 1948).

How were SCAPINs implemented locally? Eighth Army Military Government teams (representing a total of 2,300 Americans and 3,350 Japanese which makes a total of 5,650) were established in every one of the 46 Prefectures in order to relay and implement the directives issued by SCAP sections in Tokyo. They were both enforcing and reporting agencies. Moreover, 60 Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) posts were established (representing a total of about 1,200 agents) which also covered all prefectures. For instance, in the northern island of Hokkaido (population of 3.8 million) where 5,000 American troops were stationed the MG and CIC teams comprised 78 and 93 people respectively (as of Dec 1948). In practice CIC and MG units in the field cooperated closely. In short, Allied control and monitoring extended down to local government level providing an effective and pervading coercive organization.

SCAP instructions were implemented as follows (Braibanti 1948, p. 217-218).

- Copies of the SCAPINs were sent to Eighth Army whose Military Government teams determined and defined the actions to be taken by prefectural Military Government teams. These actions were outlined in so-called Eighth Army “Operational Directives”<sup>36</sup>. As the SCAPINs do not make any reference to the role of local Military Government units the Operational Directives provided a written (and legal) basis for the actions of these units. Sometimes, an additional step consisted in writing Operational Directives at the level of the different Corps, these are the so-called “Corps Operational Memoranda”<sup>37</sup>.

- In principle the prefectural Military Government teams did not have the power to make on-the-spot corrections of non-compliant behavior. They were supposed to report infractions to SCAP. Such a procedure naturally involved long delays. As Ralph Braibanti notes, “practice soon undermined theory”. The range of penalties for infractions involved remonstrance, trial by provost court and dismissal. Generally, dismissals had to be confirmed at SCAP level, but the fact that SCAP decisions had

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<sup>36</sup>Here are three examples of how such directives are catalogued at the US National Archives (NARA): (i) Operational Directives pertaining to the manufacturing and industry branch; Headquarters Eighth Army, Civil Affairs Section, Administrative Division. September 1946-January 1948, (Record Group 331, ARC Identifier: 363427). (ii) Operational Directives, Headquarters Eighth Army, Civil Affairs Section, Hokkaido Civil Affairs Region, March 1947-December 1947 (Record Group 331, ARC Identifier: 363644). (iii) Operational Directives-Religion, SCAP, Civil Affairs Section, Kinki Civil Affairs Region, February 1946-October 1947. (Record Group 331, ARC Identifier: 372837). Whereas there are only two Operational Directives files for Hokkaido, there are about 10 for the Kinki region (also called Kansei region which includes Kyoto and Osaka) and as many as 30 for the Kanto region which includes Tokyo and Yokohama.

<sup>37</sup>Here is an example of how they are catalogued at the US National Archives (NARA): IX Corps Operational Memoranda, 1945-1951, SCAP, Civil Affairs Section, Administrative Division. (Record Group 331, ARC Identifier: 363383).

to be based on reports written by prefectural units, conferred them much authority.

- As noted by Braibanti, official reports such as the “Monthly Summations of Non-Military Activities” rarely mention the prefectural Military Government teams. Yet, the machinery of Military Government (also referred to as Civil Affairs) remained in operation until 29 July 1949. At that date, Civil Affairs personnel was greatly reduced, a move which curtailed the US role in Japan at least at prefectural level (for more detail see the chronology at the date of 29 July 1949.)

Even if after 1952 some of the reforms introduced by SCAP were deactivated by the Japanese Government (for instance those regarding the degree of autonomy devolved to local government levels, see Watari et al. p. 18-19), on the whole in terms of effectiveness the program carried out by SCAP was an astonishing achievement and success. (Braibanti 1948, MacArthur 1950 plate No 86, see also below at the date of Jan 1948).

The above-mentioned Cabinet Ordinance No 325 threatens violators of SCAP directives with trials, but in most cases no indictment was necessary. The threat of being dismissed was powerful enough to ensure compliance. That such a threat can be very effective was shown once again in a different context during the purge conducted in the United States by the House Committee for Un-American Activities in the years after World War II; certainly the threat of being discharged was taken even more seriously in devastated post-war Japan than in a prosperous country such as the United States. As noted by William Woodard (1972, p. 107),

“the teachers feared the Military Government education officers because of their power to cause the removal of any teachers on the ground of non-compliance with SCAP directives. Hence the latter did everything possible to keep away from trouble.”

This concerns compliance with directives forbidding any mention of Shinto religion or of anything having a nationalist character. How many employees were actually dismissed for non compliance with SCAP directives will probably never be known because it is almost impossible to distinguish between the removal of “ultranationalists” and of those who were simply non-compliant. The chronology (at the date of 2 May 1946) presents an episode where a mayor who became critical toward the occupation was removed and silenced by incriminating him for his nationalist attitude before the war. Another well-known example is the case of Tanzan Ishibashi. During more than a year (from 22 May 1946 to 1 June 1947) he was Minister of Finance in the first cabinet of Shigeru Yoshida. He was labelled by SCAP “an undesirable person” in May 1947 (see the chronology at the date of 7 May 1947), was dismissed on 1 June 1947 but saw his purge cancelled in 1951. The main reason invoked for purging him was the fact that he had been the editor of the journal “The Oriental Economist”

in which questions were discussed that concerned the economic expansion of Japan.” What suggests that the purge was political is the fact that those charges were already known in May 1946 when Ishibashi became Minister of Finance.

In addition to the Central Liaison Office there were similar liaison offices in Japanese ministries. For instance the so-called “Special Examining Bureau” was a liaison office at the Attorney-General’s office of the Ministry of Justice. This Bureau was in close relation with the Government Section of SCAP.

It should be observed that purges of leftists had become a fairly common occurrence in Japan even before World War II. Indeed, after the Peace Preservation Law was passed in 1925 several thousand people were arrested and/or dismissed.

## The facade of the autonomy of the Japanese government

In her book “The Atomic Bomb Suppressed” Monica Braw notes that the guidelines given to censorship sections show that SCAP wanted to be seen solely as giving advice. All decisions, including the selection of a new cabinet, were to be seen as made freely by the Japanese themselves. Any story claiming that the new cabinet must have approval of the US government was to be completely suppressed. Naturally, it was in the interest of both the occupation forces and the Japanese government to support this fiction. For the latter it permitted to save face and to maintain what remained of its prestige and authority.

From the messages exchanged between the Japanese Government and SCAP it is clear that before being presented to the Diet all bills had to get SCAP approval; this applied even to purely domestic matters such as the organization of Japanese ministries (see the chronology section at the date of June 7, 1948); naturally, this applied also to the bills which were written in response to a SCAP directive.

The means and mechanisms through which compliance with SCAP directives was secured have received little attention from American and Japanese historians. Even books which contain a detailed description of the working of the SCAP machinery (as the one by Takemae Eiji) give very little information on this point; thus, references to “provost courts” or “military commission courts” are rarely found in the index of such books in spite of the fact that ultimately these courts were important instruments of control.

The ways and means through which SCAP imposed its wishes in the drafting of bills by the Japanese government and by the Diet are documented in the chronology chapter in two instances: (i) the land reform bill (ii) the broadcasting bill (December 1948 and December 1949). In this last case it is interesting to observe that the demands made by SCAP did not take the form of official SCAPINs. In December 1948 they

were transmitted informally to the Diet during the discussion of the bill; in December 1949 they were transmitted to Prime Minister Yoshida through a private letter sent to him by General MacArthur. Yoshimi Uchikawa (1964) who reports these episodes concludes them by saying: “The Japanese government which should have retained autonomy under SCAP by the principle of indirect rule was in fact subject to the powers of SCAP and became like its executive branch”.

In a broader way during occupation episodes, there is a common tendency to overestimate the autonomy left to the administration of the occupied country. Thus, in occupied Iraq it is (at time of writing in 2007) in the interest of both the US and Iraqi governments to make the public believe that the Iraqi government is really in charge. The field reality is fairly different however. For instance, American officers are assigned to Iraqi headquarters, an American battalion (i.e. about 500 soldiers) is twined to each Iraqi brigade (i.e. 5,000 soldiers), and for each Iraqi unit down to the company level (i.e. 100 soldiers) there are American advisers (New York Times Jan 12, 2007).

## The shaping of a new Japan

Perhaps the most astonishing feature of the program developed by SCAP was the fact that it concerned almost all political and social aspects. In this sense one can say that it was a totalitarian program but one which succeeded in making itself accepted by the Japanese society.

This section gives a few illustrations.

### Political parties

In the “History of non military activities of the occupation of Japan”, there is a volume (vol 11, part F) which is devoted to the development of political parties. What is really remarkable is that despite its continuous interferences SCAP managed to give the impression to a large fraction of the Japanese that the elections and the working of political parties were more or less free. It is true that not all Japanese were ready to accept this masquerade but these people<sup>38</sup> were eliminated from the political landscape.

How was it done? The mechanism can be summarized in the following way.

In the 6 years of the occupation there were 3 general elections, that is to say one every two years on average: 10 April 1946, 25 April 1947, 23 January 1949. Each election was preceded by a pre-election purge of the candidates and followed by a

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<sup>38</sup>They certainly included the Communists and Socialists but were by no means limited to these groups. In fact, many center-left or even right-wing people would have been ready to follow a more independent path if they had been given the opportunity to do so. But that possibility was closed.

post-election purge of the elected members. In addition purge and depurge programs in between the elections. All these purges and depurges gave SCAP the opportunity to shape and influence Japan's political landscape. Here are a few examples.

- In the pre-election purge of 1946, the Progressive party was reduced from 270 to a mere 25. The Party lost every member of its executive staff save one.

- In the post-election purge of 1946 the main casualty was Ichiro Hatoyama, the leader of the Liberal Party, who should have become prime minister.

- The Cooperative Party after saving its president, Samehiko Yamamoto, from the purge in the post-purge of 1946 lost him nevertheless in a purge which occurred at the end of 1946. The fact that successive examinations of the same persons could lead to opposite results within just a few months suggests that the process was highly arbitrary.

- Shogetsu Tanaka, a candidate of the left wing of the Socialist Party was purged *on the day of balloting* in the election of Sunday 23 January 1949. Astonishing, isn't it?

- Although the depurge and revision campaigns were (at least in principle) carried out by Japanese committees, they had to be authorized by SCAP. Thus on 1 May 1951, General Ridgway (who had replaced MacArthur on 11 April 1951) made the following statement. "The Japanese government has been authorized to review existing ordinances issued in implementation of directives from the headquarters [i.e. directives concerning the removal of certain persons]".

- The biography of Morito Tatsuo who was Minister of Education in the Katayama Cabinet (24 May 1947 - 19 March 1948), illustrates the arbitrary nature of the screening process. Morito graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in 1914. From 1920 to 1923 he studied in England, France and Germany under the auspices of the "Ohara Institute of Social Research". In 1941 he published a book entitled "German Labor Movement" in which he appraised Nazi methods for utilizing labor. Yet, he was not purged nor was his book blacklisted. In 1945 he took part in the founding of the Social Democratic Party and successfully opposed any cooperation with the Communists, thus preventing the organization of a common leftist front. Nishio, Suchiro, also a founder of the Social Democratic Party, was also known as a determined anti-Communist. In 1946, together with Morito he was instrumental in preventing the formation of a united front of Social Democrats and Communists.

This containment policy was one of the main guidelines of the occupation authorities not only in Japan but also in Germany, Italy or France. (NDL, microfiche GS(A)-00526)

## Chapter 4

### Censorship

1952 marked the end of the occupation and in this year many books were published in Japan which could not be published during the occupation. One of the most well known examples was the publication of a Japanese translation of the dissenting opinion of Radhabinod Pal, one of the 11 justices who took part in the Tokyo trial of class A crimes. In this document of more than one thousand pages Justice Pal explains that in his opinion “each and every one of the accused must be found not guilty of each and every one of the charges in the indictment and should be acquitted of all those charges”. Judge Pal also described the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States as the worst atrocities of the war (New York Times 31 August 2007).

However, it would be a mistaken view to think that censorship was limited to political issues. The most innovative feature of the censorship which was enforced in Japan was its broadness. As we will see, it extended to almost all kinds of intellectual creation and cultural production.

Military censorship almost inevitably accompanies a state of war. Technically, the state of war with Japan only ended with the Peace Treaty in 1952 and it is therefore not surprising that censorship was installed by the occupation authorities. Its practical implementation required a large body of censors and it took some time until the censorship section became operational. The fact that it took only about four months to set up such a large and complex organization is a testimony of the efficiency of occupation headquarters. Thus, although the basic rules for censorship were issued as early as September 1945 the censorship machinery became fully operational only around January 1946.

A document from the American National Archives (see the entry NARA 10 in the reference section) provides a file from the Civil Censorship Detachment which consists of intercepts of exchanges between Japanese people made by phone, telegram or letter between September 1948 and September 1949. It shows that intercepts of Japanese means of communication were still conducted in a systematic way as late as fall 1949. These intercepts concern communications between police, businessmen, insurance companies, newspapermen or private citizens (a number of these intercepts

are reproduced in the chronology chapter).

Censorship was not restricted to Japanese media, it also extended to correspondents of western newspapers. Phillip Knightley's book about war correspondents focuses exclusively on wars and does not treat occupation episodes, but in the chapter on the War in Korea he notes (p. 349) that "the supreme commander [i.e. General MacArthur] had already expelled some 17 correspondents from Japan for having criticised his policies". Some of these expulsions are mentioned with more detail in the chronology chapter.

## Ubiquitous forms of censorship

It is important to realize that, as illustrated by the list given below, censorship was not confined to newspapers and radio broadcasting but concerned a broad variety of fields: movies whether existing or new; lantern slides; new theatrical scripts and performances; traditional theater such as Kabuki, Bunraku (puppet theater) or No plays; music and songs; postage stamps and currency (see below May 13, 1946); books, magazines and scholarly journals; speeches, conferences and university teaching courses; communications by mail, phone (see an example in the chronology at the date of 7 January 1947), or telegraph. In short, practically all kinds of communication, intellectual work and cultural production were monitored and censored. Quite understandably, it took some time to set up an organization, namely the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD), capable of treating such a huge mass of information. Basically, the CCD became operational in early 1946. At its height in 1948, CCD comprised 6,160 employees consisting of 354 officers, servicemen and army civilians and 5,806 non-American (mostly Japanese) personnel (Braw 1991, Cavalieri 2005, p. 47, MacArthur 1950, Mayo 1984). In the catalog of the American National Archive (NARA), there are several thousand entries regarding documents produced by the CCD in its daily working. The following list provides a few typical entries illustrating the activities of various branches of the CCD (the numbers within parentheses are the Archival Research identifiers of the online catalog of NARA):

- Censorship/Radio Broadcast, 1945-1949 (490673),
- Foreign Broadcast to Japan, 1945-1949 (488559),
- Theatrical Scripts, 1949, 1945-1949 (488062),
- Kabuki, 1945-1949 (489011),
- Daily Total of Scripts Submitted for Censors (490835),
- Motion Pictures and Lantern Slides Censored, 1946-1947 (488548),
- Suppressed Films, 1945-1949 (488005),
- Newsreels, 1949 (487991),
- Purged Publishers, 1945-1949 (488574),

- Books - Censorship 1948 (490694),
- Books Confiscated, 1947 (490390),
- Deleted and Suppressed Books, 1945-1949 (490699),
- Braille Publications, 1949, 1945-1949 (488128),
- University Publications, 1945-1949 (488173),
- Conferences and Reports on Conferences, 1945-1949 (490654),
- Religious Publications, 1945-1949 (490333),
- Music and Recording Censorship, 1945-1949 (488562),
- Communist Songs and Parodies, 1945-1949 (489928),
- Allegories Utilized as Vehicle for Leftist Propaganda, 1945-1949 (489184)
- Telephone Monitoring, 1945-1949 (487191),
- Censorship, Postal, Book No. 1, 1945-1949 (486832),
- Prosecution of Post-Censored Press Code Violators, 1945-11/1949 (487456),
- Proposed General Plan, Civil Censorship in Southern Korea (486896),
- Civil Censorship in Japan and Korea, 1 May 1947 (487113),
- Monthly Operational Report: Korea, July 1947 thru August 1948 (487060).

The last three items suggest that a similar censorship policy was introduced and implemented in South Korea in spite of the fact that Korea was a liberated nation not a defeated country. In addition, the NARA holdings comprise a long series of special files for many individual Japanese newspapers and magazines (e.g. the Sapporo Mainichi Shimbun); it shows that local publications were subject to the same level of control than major national newspapers. Two cases described in the chronology (at the dates of Dec 8, 1945 and May 2, 1946) show that speeches made in Japanese in social gatherings (e.g. of alumni associations) were monitored with criticisms against Occupation Forces being reported to military intelligence. In short, surveillance was highly effective.

Below are some quantitative estimates for the month 11 August-10 September (NDL, microfiche GII-2906).

- 5.5 million letters were examined as well as 1.5 million telegrams.
- Some 700 news items from news agencies and newspapers were suppressed.
- Deletions were made in some 200 books.
- Some 100 films were suppressed partially or totally.
- Some 400 theatrical scripts were suppressed partially or totally.
- Some 1,000 magazine articles on post censorship regime were examined; 15% of them were disapproved.

## Some specific examples of censorship

## Newspaper presentations of atomic bombings in the United States and Japan

At first sight it may seem that the story of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki has nothing to do with the occupation. They occurred on Monday 6 August and Thursday 9 August respectively whereas the first American forces arrived in Japan on 28 August only. However, the way in which these events were presented in the Japanese and American newspapers will give us useful indications about various forms of censorship including, as far as American newspapers are concerned, self-censorship.

The main issue was whether or not the long lasting effects of radioactivity and radiations should be revealed. Such effects were minimized by American officials from the very beginning. However articles reporting such effects were published in the Japanese and American press only until mid-September 1945. This date marked a turning point. After September 9 the most unrealistic (and untrustful) news were published in the American as well as in the Japanese press. In Japan this may have been an early effect of the censorship established by the occupation authorities. Henceforth only news favoring “the success of the occupation” would be published. In the United States it may have been the manifestation of the close links and connections between major newspapers such as the New York Times and the Department of State.

For the sake of clarity we present these articles in chronological form. Except when indicated otherwise the dates correspond to the publication dates of the articles.

**Aug 7, 1945 (Tuesday)** The White House and War Department announced that an atomic bomb, possessing more power than 20,000 tons of TNT, a destructive force equal to the load of 2,000 B-29s, was dropped on the city of Hiroshima. (NYT Tuesday 7 Aug 1945 p. 1)

[The bomb was dropped on Monday morning of 6 August (Japanese time). Due to the time lag (August 6, 9 am in Japan corresponds to the night from 5 to 6 August on the American East Coast) it should have been possible to publish this information (at least in short form) in the edition of August 6. In other words its publication was delayed by one day. In Japan it was delayed by 3 days. In fact, it was announced by president Truman on Monday.]

**Aug 9, 1945 (Wednesday)** New-type bombs are used in raid on Hiroshima. A communique of the Imperial Headquarters issued at 3:30 pm on Tuesday announced that the new bombs caused considerable damage to the city of Hiroshima. The new-type bombs were dropped by parachute before reaching the ground. Details are under investigation. (Nippon Times p. 1)

[The article covers less than two-third of one column (there are 8 columns alto-

gether). The declaration to the American press made by President Truman became known in Japan in the night from 6 to 7 August. Nevertheless Imperial Headquarters waited until 3 pm for issuing their communique and the "Nippon Times" waited one day more before it published the news.]

**Aug 9, 1945 (Wednesday)** Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the research project that developed the atomic bomb, said there was no reason to believe the bomb explosion over Hiroshima left any appreciable radioactivity on the ground. (NYT p. 8)

**Aug 12, 1945 (Sunday)** Nagasaki was hit by new bomb. The damages are comparatively light. (Nippon Times p. 1)

[The atomic bombing of Nagasaki was announced in a small article of 14 lines at the bottom of the 7th column.]

**Aug 25, 1945** Although Japanese broadcasts said that the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima impregnated the earth with "radioactivity" such an effect is denied by American experts. (NYT p. 3)

**Aug 26, 1945** The number of white blood corpuscles of people who were only slightly wounded dropped by 50% (from 7,500 to 3,800); the number of their red blood corpuscles fell by 10%. (Nippon Times p. 3)

**Sep 5, 1945** A visit to Hiroshima by Americans showed that the atomic bomb still is killing Japanese at a rate of 100 daily. (NYT p. 1)

**Sep 6, 1945** Even if uranium emanates into water the water becomes quite harmless after boiling. Any water obtainable from the nearby wells is suitable for drinking after it has been boiled. (Nippon Times p. 3)

[For any physicist such an information appears quite astonishing. As is well known uranium cannot be eliminated neither by boiling nor by any chemical operation. The only sound advice would have been to take the water from wells located a few kilometers away from the contaminated area. It is difficult to understand what brought about the publication of such an advice.]

**Sep 8, 1945** The NBC correspondent was one of the first Americans to see Hiroshima. He revealed a string of figures connected with the tragedy. The city had a population of 350,000. About 63,000 died either immediately or in the three weeks until September 1 This figure does not include the 30,000 who are still missing. According to the correspondent measurements performed in the area show that there is still much radium scattered through the ground. Many who were not in Hiroshima at the time of the atomic bomb attack but who entered the city for relief purposes and stayed for 10 days or more have been dying in succession after showing the same symptoms as the victims of the bomb.

Of the 104,000 who suffered only minor injuries 60,000 have died. The Takasu area which is far from the center of the explosion was affected as much as the areas near the center because the radioactive elements were carried there by the wind.

Altogether, if one also includes the deaths in Nagasaki, the number of deaths in the two cities is around 200,000. (Nippon Times: 8 Sep p. 3, 9 Sep 1945 p. 3, 11 Sep)

**Sep 11, 1945** A miraculous cure is being effected for people who have suffered burns from the atomic bomb at the Sawaya Hotsprings in Shimane Prefecture. Already several thousand patients have benefited from a 100% cure leaving not a trace of the injury. Currently, more than 10,000 people are taking the treatment. (Nippon Times p. 3)

**Sep 12, 1945** Measurement performed on the test range in New Mexico confirmed that blast and not radiation took the toll. [This title summarizes what will become the main theme in subsequent American public relation campaigns, namely that atomic bombs were not different from conventional bombs.]

**Sep 12, 1945** Uzuhiro Kurimoto, assistant professor at Tokyo Imperial University said that he studied 70 cases of persons who were within 2 kilometers of the explosion and he noted that they were not developing symptoms of the illness. (Nippon Times p. 3)

**Sep 13, 1945** Brigadier General T. F. Farrell, chief of the War Department's atomic bomb mission, reported that the explosive power of the secret weapon was greater even than envisaged but he denied categorically that it produced a dangerous, lingering radioactivity. (NYT p. 4)

**Sep 16, 1945** Tokyo reconsidered the atomic bomb effect. According to a report written by two Japanese investigators and released by the Japanese Domei news agency radioactivity produced by the atomic bomb has no effect after ten days." (NYT p. 27)

[Thus, eventually some two weeks after the beginning of the occupation, Japanese views fell in line with American wishes. The fact that the death rate by cancer of Australian BCOF soldiers who occupied the Hiroshima area was substantially higher than the national average seems in contradiction with this statement. The BCOF force arrived in Japan in the spring of 1946.]

**Sep 16, 1945** Japanese tales of hundreds who died weeks after the explosions that wrecked Hiroshima and Nagasaki and of lowered white-cpuscle blood counts were largely refuted. (NYT: Sunday, The Week in Review p. E9)

[These statements are so blatantly in contradiction with facts that one wonders what real purpose they were aimed to serve.]

**Nov 3, 1945** Major Alexander P. de Seversky declared that the fearsome atomic bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima could kill no more people than a regular 10-ton bomb if dropped on US cities of steel and concrete. (NYT p. 4)

[It should be recalled that according to the New York Times article of August 7 which announced the bombing of Hiroshima (see above) the bomb had “more power than 200,000 tons of TNT”.]

**Dec 10, 1945** Not a single employee of the thousands engaged in the production of the atomic bomb in plants throughout the country was injured by radiation or kindred phenomena. (NYT p. 2) [On account of the fact that the Manhattan project was under heavy military censorship, a more lucid statement would have been to write “According to currently available information not a single employee was injured.” As a matter of fact, several accidents became known subsequently. Following are brief accounts of some of them.

- As part of the super-secret Manhattan Project, it was the mission of the Philadelphia Navy Yard pilot plant to perfect the diffusion process for the enrichment of uranium. On Sept. 2, 1944, while working to unclog a tube in a complex array of pipes, the scientist Peter N. Bragg was killed in a horrific explosion that sent a cloud of radioactive uranium hexafluoride over much of the Navy Yard including the battleship USS Wisconsin, berthed just 70 meters away. A fellow co-worker, Douglas Meigs, was also killed.

- Another fatal accidents occurred on 21 August 1945 in Los Alamos. During the process of making critical mass studies and measurements, an employee, Harry Daghlian, received sufficient radiation to result in injuries from which he died 28 days later. ”

- A fourth fatal accidents occurred on 21 May 1946 at the Omega Site Laboratory in Los Alamos. It caused the death of Louis Slotin, a Canadian scientist but there were in fact 7 persons in the room where the accident occurred; follow-up studies suggest that three of the seven survivors of the Omega Lab accident died years later from complications that might have been caused by exposure to radiation.

The fact that most *known* injuries occurred after 15 August 1945 is probably due to the fact that military censorship was to some extent lifted after the end of the war. Roger Meade, an archivist at Los Alamos during the war declared in a 1993 interview that everything was automatically clasified and was (possibly) released after the war only under specific requests.

The sources used for these accident accounts are the “Atomic Heritage Foundation” and “Trinity Atomic” websites at the following addresses:

[http://www.atomicheritage.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=92&Itemid=83](http://www.atomicheritage.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=92&Itemid=83)

<http://www.cddc.vt.edu/host/atomic/accident/critical.html>

**Feb 1, 1946** BCOF troops began to arrive in Japan in the weeks after 1 February 1946. It was the Australian force who had the duty of occupying the Hiroshima area. Each BCOF soldier received an official guidebook entitled “Know Japan” which contained plenty of information on endemic diseases in Japan. However, there was not a single word about possible radiation danger in Hiroshima.

Up to this day (2008) Australian government authorities have refused to carry out a comprehensive health study of occupation veterans. Despite recurrent demands made veteran organizations. (Gerster 2008, p. 187).

### **The Bells of Nagasaki**

An account of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki entitled “Nagasaki no Kane” (“The Bells of Nagasaki”) was written by Takashi Nagai in 1946 but was censored until 1949. At that time publication was allowed by the Civil Information and Education Section but only on condition that it be complemented with an account (of equal length) describing “Japanese atrocities” committed during the war.

Takashi Nagai was a pacifist and rather favorable to the Americans; he did not say if his work had to be edited to suit the wishes of the CIE. This is fairly plausible because we know that the script of the movie based on Nagai’s work had to be revised twice in order to satisfy the requirements of the CIE. The author had to include a lengthy opening statement that blamed the bombing on Japanese militarism and he had to omit the scene showing the death of Nagai’s wife (Kapur p. 86).

### **Confiscation of books**

SCAPIN 824 of 17 March 1946 (for more details see this date in the chronology chapter) organized the confiscation of so-called “propaganda publications”. Step by step between March 1946 and April 1948 some 7,769 titles were blacklisted and over 200,000 books were confiscated and either “pulped” or brought to the United States. One should remember that a similar operation of book black-listing took place in the United States in the late 1940s when leftist books were removed from libraries and book stores<sup>39</sup>.

SCAPIN 824 says that the book would be “pulped”. In fact, many books were sent to US libraries and some of the books written in English were taken as personal property by US officers (see the chronology at the date of 4 April 1946).

Regarding the “pulping” operation, one should observe that this requires special pa-

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<sup>39</sup>A broader perspective about book destructions is given in a book entitled “A universal history of the destruction of books. From ancient Sumer to modern-day Iraq” by Fernando Baez (2008).

A recent episode which occurred after the publication of this book was the destruction of the library set up by the “Occupy Wall Street” movement in the fall of 2011. According to the Washington Post, books were thrown in the garbage by police after the November 15 raid in Zuccotti Park. The American Library Association published a statement which denounced this destruction.

per shredder devices which are expensive machines and were probably not common in Japan at that time. Moreover present-day shredders require electricity power of several kilowatt which may not have been easily available in post-war Japan. In other words, more information is needed about the practical conditions of book destruction.

The term “propaganda publications” included books about the expansion of Imperial Japan but it went far beyond. A sample of titles given in Nishio (2010) reveals that it included books written by non-Japanese authors or written by Japanese authors about foreign countries. In the following examples we give the English translation of the titles but one should keep in mind that all these books were published in Japanese including those written by British or German authors

- Bose (R.B.), Tetsuo (I.): The tragic history of the invasion of India.
- Eizaburo (S.): A history of Britain’s world aggression.
- Hiroshi (Kikuchi Kan): Historical extract of 2,600 years.
- Hisaji (S.): The Gobi desert expedition.
- Kiyoshi (K.): A study of the Second World War in Europe.
- Kyokai (N.T.): An overview of the history of Thailand.
- März (J.): Ocean geopolitics: the great powers and control of the seas.
- Muneki (M.): Japanese spirit and scientific spirit.
- Nobuo (M.): Industrial resources of New Zealand.
- Spengler (O.): Where is the world going?
- Tadatatsu (O.): Traditional court music.
- Tadashi (S.): A history of the growth of Islam in Greater Asia.

### **The battle of Hiro**

This battle between Australian and Indian troops (see below the section on censorship in military reports and the chronology at the date of 30 August 1947) provides an example of an episode that was censored and swept under the rug until being disclosed in 1989.

## **US medical research on A-bomb survivors**

### **Babies**

On 23 April 2012 there was an article in the “Japan Times” about the medical research conducted in the United States on survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors. It emphasized that although it has been known that samples from A-bomb victims were sent to the United States during the Allied Occupation, the scale of this operation remained unknown until recently because it was classified as military information and thus kept secret.

Hiroko Takahashi, an assistant professor at the Hiroshima Peace Institute said that internal documents from the “Armed Forces Institute of Pathology” (AFIP) show that some 77,000 newborns were studied between 1948 and 1954.

In February 1951, Elbert DeCoursey, then director of the AFIP, asked the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) which was conducting research in Japan to send fixed samples from newborns to the United States. The ABCC had been created in 1946 and in February 1947 it took over a portion of the Hiroshima Red Cross Hospital for its investigations. It operated for nearly 30 years before its dissolution in 1975.

The ABCC took advantage of the food rationing system in place in Japan at the time, which gave priority to pregnant women, to obtain information on their whereabouts in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Most of the doctors and nurses there told the ABCC when newborns died because they were asked to cooperate. As a result, 850 body organs of babies who were stillborn or died shortly after birth were sent to the United States in 1952 and 1953; several thousand tissue samples were sent in 1955. Moreover, according Ms. Takahashi’s estimates a total of 1,250 medical records of newborns were sent to the US.

## Adults

In Japan the survivors of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are known as *hibakusha*. The research on newborn babies was only one of the facets of the broad US research program regarding the *hibakusha*. Similar researches were conducted on the adult population of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Some information about the circumstances under which these researches were conducted are provided by the testimony of Shuntaro Hida now 94 year old and who was working at the Hiroshima military hospital in 1945. He survived because on the day of the explosion he was in a nearby village. In his testimony he made the following points<sup>40</sup>.

- The danger of radiation was concealed by successive American administrations. During the American occupation, the Japanese doctors were forbidden to talk about that. If they did so, they were arrested. Dr. Hida was arrested 4 times. Deeply opposed to the policy of the occupation forces, he became a member of the Communist Party.
- The United States had the first priority for monitoring the illnesses of the victims. However, the ABCC hospitals did not treat the victims, they only assessed the evolution of their illnesses by taking blood samples or pictures and making other investigations.
- When one of the survivors died the ABCC doctors asked the family to give

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<sup>40</sup>There is a 38-page typewritten memoir entitled “Under the Mushroom-Shaped Cloud in Hiroshima” and also a movie entitled “Atomic Wounds”.

them the body of the dead person. Some parts of the body were removed which would be sent to the United States. The body was then given back to the family.

- The US urged the Japanese Government to reject the assistance of the International Red Cross.

### Children of survivors

One of the main issues regarding the survivors is whether or not their children are affected. A US study (mentioned on many websites) done during the occupation concluded that no effect was detected on the children of survivors.

However, this study was made unreliable by the very way in which it was planned. Indeed, the problems affecting babies in a 2 km radius area (*A*) around the impact point were compared not to a radiation-free area but to the observations made in the area (*B*) located beyond this central zone. It is well known nowadays that apart from the distance itself the radioactive pollution depends on wind direction and on rainfall amounts. This was shown clearly after the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. In other words, it is quite possible that the difference between the results in the two areas was just too small to be statistically significant<sup>41</sup>.

According to Ms. Miho CIBOT SHIMMA, a person born in Japan and presently living in France there is an hospital in Japan which treats third generation victims of the A-bomb. The hospital to which she refers is probably the Hiroshima Red Cross Hospital & Atomic-bomb Survivors Hospital. which was created in 1988 through the merger of the Hiroshima Red Cross Hospital and of the Atomic bomb Hospital.

Leukemia incidence peaked during the 1950's and was considered a typical atomic bomb disease of the *hibakusha*. While occurrence of leukemia decreased during the 1960's<sup>42</sup>, other tumors, such as thyroid cancer, breast cancer, lung cancer and salivary gland tumors began to occur among A-bomb survivors. Gensaku Oho checked 11,400 death certificates submitted to the Hiroshima municipal government between 1951 and 1955, and discovered statistically that cancer deaths among hibakusha were much higher [it would of course be interesting to know how much higher] than the national average. He published his research in a medical journal in 1956.

## Public relations campaigns

In addition to blocking the diffusion of some news, GHQ also embarked on a vigorous campaign to convince the Japanese people of the nation's war guilt. On Septem-

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<sup>41</sup>One must also keep in mind that by choosing a very high confidence level (say a probability of 0.99 or even higher) almost any result can be made "non significant". In other words the expression "non significant" has no real meaning unless one knows to which confidence level it refers.

<sup>42</sup>However, regardless of the radiation dose, or age of the victim when exposed, through 1978 the overall rate of death among survivors from leukemia was two times as high as for those not exposed.

ber 12, 1945 Occupation authorities issued a three-page report entitled “Typical Japanese atrocities during the liberation of the Philippines”. Subsequently they prepared a series of 20 stories on the war in the Pacific which was distributed to and published by newspapers and magazines. Many of these articles appeared in special editions on Pearl Harbor Day, December 8 1945.

The stories were also adapted for radio broadcasting. A second wave of atrocity stories with supporting documents and photographs was timed to coincide with the arrest of suspected war criminals (Coughlin 1952). Another objective of the Civil Censorship Detachment was to spread the notion that the occupation was willingly accepted by the Japanese government as well as by the population. The fact that the government was working under the sway of SCAP had therefore to be kept hidden as far as possible. Several of the directives cited below explicitly contain the provision that they should not be brought to the attention of the public. With regard to the population, it was essential to give the impression that the occupation was well accepted. Mentions of clashes between occupation forces and the population were prohibited.

In an interesting and lucid article published in 1997 Catherine Luther and Douglas Boyd explain how the practice of controlling the media has to some extent been carried over to post-occupation Japan.

## Evidence of censorship in military reports

There is evidence that even Allied military reports were subject to self-censorship. Here is one example.

In the chronology chapter we mention the following episode at the date of 30 August 1947 (reproduced below for the sake of convenience):

A shootout which lasted several hours opposed Indian and Australian troops (the so-called battle of Hiro) and resulted in at least one fatality. The incident was made public in 1989 through an article in the “Sun Herald Tribune” of Melbourne after it was mentioned by a veteran in the course of a legal action about his pension (Bates 1993).

Let us see if this incident appears in the “Quarterly Report” that the Commander-in-Chief of BCOF troops addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report for the third quarter of 1947 has about 40 pages and covers all activities of the BCOF. There are two sections in which one may expect the previous episode to be mentioned: (i) The courts martial section (p. 19) (ii) the summary table of serious crimes in Appendix E. The first section mentions the court martial of a soldier who was convicted on 17 July of the murder of a Japanese civilian but there is no mention of the battle between

Indian and Australian troops. The summary table has two columns for murder and manslaughter in which the fatality of the Hiro battle should be listed. Yet, these columns do not show any case for the month of August 1947 (there are no cases for September either).

In this line of thought, it may also be observed that the same report devotes several pages to the public relation work done by BCOF headquarters. For instance, we learn that 464 photographs have been sent to Australian newspapers and 111 to Indian newspapers.

When browsing through the archives, one finds declarations made by public relation officers which are contradicted by the data from the statistical division of SCAP. For instance, the following statement can be found in General Eichelberger's papers (Eichelberger Papers) "There have been very few assaults against the occupation forces. There was none reported during the month of December [1946] and only one reported in January [1947]." In fact, SCAP statistics (see the chapter on quantitative evidence) show that there were 11 assaults during these two months.

Does this mean that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to be content with censored reports? Not necessarily because civil intelligence and counter intelligence corps published not one but two or three reports which had different distribution networks. It can be assumed that the most confidential information appeared only in the report which had a fairly restricted distribution.

## Success of the censorship policy

Was the censorship policy successful? In order to answer this question let us consider two specific issues whose mention was forbidden by censors:

- The question of occupation costs and war reparations to be payed by Japan
- he fact that Japanese exports and imports were controlled by SCAP.

Occupation costs had to be covered by Japan, see below the excerpt from the New York Times of Jan 26, 1946). In addition, as already mentioned, Japan had to provide commodities such as coal, as well as housing for the occupation troops. This was of course a heavy burden for a country which had suffered widespread destruction. The gross domestic product (at constant prices) of Japan regained its level of 1939 only in 1953 (Liesner 1989, p. 256). In contrast, France's GDP of 1949 already exceeded its pre-war level by 12% (Annuaire Statistique de la France 1966, p. 552) and Italy's GDP recovered its pre-war level in 1950; for Germany the comparison is more difficult due to the partition of the country into East and West Germany. (Liesner 1989, p. 232). The terms "occupation costs" and "war reparations" were banned almost from the beginning and were usually replaced by "cost of termination of war". In

December 1946 American censors decided to eliminate from the Japanese press all references to the fact that occupation costs would account for about 30 percent of Japan's budget for the fiscal year beginning in April 1947. As a result when the figures of the budget were published in the "Nippon Times" these costs appeared under the heading "Other items" (Coughlin 1952, p. 52).

The fact that Japanese production as well as exports and imports were controlled by SCAP is documented through numerous SCAPINs (cited in the chronology below) which give instructions and authorizations.

In these two cases, the success of the censorship policy can be assessed from the fact that such aspects of occupation policy are hardly ever mentioned even in present day studies.

Another common misconception about the post-war era in Japan concerns the war crime trials. Because, much attention was given to the Tokyo trial where only 7 defendants were condemned to death it is often believed that few Japanese were executed. In fact, most Japanese military were tried by military commissions. In the books by John Dower (1999) and Piccigallo (1979) we learn that about 5,700 Japanese were indicted and 990 executed. For Germany the respective figures are 5,000 and 496 executed (Quid 1997, p. 1088 and 1278)<sup>43</sup>.

## Inordinate praise for General MacArthur

Another proof of the success of the occupation policy is the inordinate praise lavished on General MacArthur by Japanese media or by Japanese people in their public declarations.

As an illustration, let us give an excerpt of a speech made by the President of the University of Tokyo, Shiheru Mambara, on 10 December 1949 at the "First Conference on the Occupied Areas" sponsored by the American Council on Education with the cooperation of the Department of State (NDL, microfiche CIE(A) 1044).

"These educational reforms [in Japan] bear glorious witness to the high statesmanship of General MacArthur for whom I have a hearty admiration not only as a great military leader but also as a rare personality. No one can doubt these are splendid achievements, imposing monuments of statesmanship. [...] We cannot conceal from you our unbounded admiration for the way American universities function."

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<sup>43</sup>Although generally considered as a reliable source, Quid's estimates for Germany may not be correct. If one takes into account the Germans who were tried and executed in Poland, Czechoslovakia and other countries the total is certainly higher. Thus, according to an article published in the Shanghai Herald (13 October 1945 p. 4), 400 Germans had been executed for war crimes in Poland before October 1945 and at that time 8,000 were still awaiting trial. In other words, the figures given by Quid may be correct if only western countries are taken into consideration but they markedly underestimate the *total* numbers of German who were tried and executed.

A parallel with the glorification of president Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1971) comes to mind. At least, Mao Zedong was the chairman of the Chinese people, not their victor. Can one imagine such acclaim given to Chancellor Otto Von Bismark by French officials after the defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870?

Although, generally speaking, the American universities are certainly wonderful places of higher learning, at the very moment when Mr. Mambara was giving his speech a Red Purge was under way just as in Japan.

Apart from giving praise to General MacArthur, another way to win the consideration of occupation authorities was to recognize American cultural achievements and to import them into Japan. For instance, Tositake Amano, Chief of the Department of Educational Affairs in the Kyoto Prefectural Government, organized the translation and publication of 26 American monographs on education and psychology. In a letter to Lt.Col, D.R. Nugent, chief of the Civil Information and Education section, he wrote (NDL, microfiche CIE(A) 1044).

Dear Sir. We, the people of Japan, are appreciative of the fact that through the good offices of the occupation authorities experts are sent over here to direct us.

## Chapter 5

# Economy and Black market

### Restricted concerns

The expression “list of restricted concerns” appears frequently in archive documents especially through SCAPINs such as “Addition of Hitachi Ltd to Schedule of Restricted Concerns” (21 May 1946) or (especially toward the end of the occupation) such as: “Company xxx was released from the list of restricted concerns”.

However, it is not easy to find information about this notion. Here are some explanations, as provided by an article published in a US newspaper, “The Palm Beach Post”, on Sunday 19 January 1947 (p. 7).

Japan’s zaibatsu (literally “financial clique”) organization, once the backbone of the Japanese economy, now stands as shackled and guarded as the men who sit in Sugamo prison awaiting war crime trials. The zaibatsu organization was based on interconnected holding companies, that is to say financial companies whose subsidiaries were the industrial companies where real production took place<sup>44</sup>.

SCAP established a list of so-called restricted companies. The big zaibatsu holding companies were the first to be included in this list. As a result, they have to report to SCAP every transaction. They cannot spend, borrow or give away even one yen without SCAP approval. In particular SCAP forbade any restricted concern from acquiring any interest in non-restricted firms (thus preventing any renewed concentration build up).

The restricted list grew steadily and by December 1946 it comprised 65 holding companies and 1,200 companies which were subsidiaries of the parent companies.

Moreover the “Holding Company Liquidation Commission” (HCLC) took the control of the “big four” (Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumimoto, Yasuda) holding companies by

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<sup>44</sup>This organization is not specific to Japan. There is a similar structure in other industrialized countries. Just as an illustration, in the United States about 35% of the stock of Boeing Corporation is in the hands of holding companies such as: Capital World Investors (9%), Evercore Trust Company (7%), Vanguard Group (5%), State Street Corporation (4.5%), FMR (2.5%). All these groups hold similar participations in the capital of numerous other companies. Thus, when the chief executive officer of Boeing declares that he must take into account the interests of share holders, it is primarily to such major stockholders that he makes implicitly reference.

taking custody of their securities representing an amount of two billion yen. The dissolution (a more appropriate word would be deconcentration) operation will consist in selling these securities publicly in “policed sales” in which the number of shares sold to any single purchaser will be limited.

In addition SCAP froze zaibatsu family assets. SCAP approval became necessary for any family transaction even the payment of a household debt.

Simultaneously, a purge (under way in 1947) will remove all persons who may oppose the reform.

In short, these measures gave SCAP total control of the industrial structure of the Japanese economy. They brought about a deconcentration and a reduction of the power of financial capital.

## Black market

### General factors

The mechanism which brought about black-marketing by servicemen was basically the same in all areas which were occupied by American troops during or after World War II.

- As the pay of servicemen was much higher than the salary of the working people, the presence of a substantial number of American troops in a city increased the demand to the point of locally creating a state of scarcity<sup>45</sup> which inflated non-official open-market prices (i.e. prices of goods available on the black-market) even though prices subject to official price-control may have remained unchanged. For instance, in the Chinese port of Tsingtao the arrival of about 25,000 American Marines in September 1945 provoked a huge (twenty-fold) rise in local prices.

- Once the price of black-market goods was higher than the price of canteen goods it made sense for servicemen to buy canteen goods in order to sell them with a profit to local traders.

- Naturally, such sales were even more profitable if military goods or equipment could be misappropriated by servicemen. In contrast to the sale of canteen goods for which one had to wait until local goods had become sufficiently expensive, black marketing in misappropriated goods could start almost immediately after a unit had taken up quarters in a city.

Through this process American servicemen could send home amounts of money in excess to their pay. It has been estimated that in the decade following 1940 the total

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<sup>45</sup>Needless to say, this effect was stronger in countries such as China, Germany or Japan where industrial facilities had been partially destroyed during the war.

sent home exceeded the total pay of the GIs by \$ 530 million<sup>46</sup>.

### **Factors that are specific to Japan**

Black market played a great role in post-war Japan. For the New Zealand component of BCOF which is the only force for which we have a fairly detailed view of trials by provost courts, about 80% of the sentences delivered by these courts concerned black market operations. In a sense, black market was a consequence of the great scarcity in food, clothes, coal and so on. But scarcity is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of black market. What really characterizes black market is the existence of a wide gap between official prizes and “real” prizes. The policy implemented by SCAP fostered black market in three different ways.

- US soldiers were not paid in dollars but in B-yens<sup>47</sup> (see chronology: Sep 6, 12, 21 1945). Printed in the United States, the B-yen were a form of counterfeited money. Because it was issued without any relationship to the production of goods in Japan, this money supply inflated demand at a time when all goods were in short supply. The amount of Japanese money printed in the United States before 1946 totalled some 5.5 billion yens (<http://baxleystamps.com>). In addition, the Bank of Japan had to deliver to the occupation forces amounts of “real” yens as deemed “necessary for expenditures of the occupation forces” (see chronology: 14 Sep and 5 Oct 1945). The amount required on 5 Oct 1945 was 3 billion yens. Adding the 5.5 billion of B-yen one gets a total of 8.5 billions which represents 22% of the Japanese gross domestic product in 1940.

- The previous steps created ideal conditions for price inflation. Then, on 22 September 1945 (see chronology below) SCAP required the Japanese government to implement a strict price control, thus providing the second condition for the emergence of black market: official prices were frozen while at the same time real prices were set to increase.

- A third factor explains why, in addition to the Japanese people, many American soldiers were involved in black market operations. Indeed (for reasons that are not yet completely clear to me), the exchange rate of the yen with respect to the dollar was set by SCAP at a rate that was artificially high. Incidentally, BCOF authorities often complained about this anomaly but their observations were discarded. Thus, servicemen were encouraged to sell canteen products to Japanese. By exchanging the yens earned through this trade against dollars they were able to send home more money than the total amount that they had received for their pay (see chronology: 15

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<sup>46</sup>This figure is given in Rundell (1961) but the author does not say on which primary source it is based. The article also emphasizes that even when servicemen were paid in local currency (as was for instance the case in Iceland after February 1942) they were entitled to exchange the local currency against dollars which they could send to the United States by money order at no cost.

<sup>47</sup>There were also A-yens, but unlike the B-yens which were also used by the Japanese population, the A-yens were used only by US personnel.

Apr, 25 Jun, 26 Jun 1946)

## Looting of art pieces

Looting of art works in invaded countries has been a common feature of most (if not all) military invasions and occupations. Just as two illustrations that occurred some two centuries apart one can mention the following cases.

- Around 1795 French revolutionary armies under General Bonaparte occupied Italy. It is well known that they brought back to Paris a number of Italian art pieces especially paintings.

- In March 2014 the “Taipei Times” published a short article about the looting of Iraqi museums in the wake of the US-lead invasion of 2003. Entitled: “Looted Iraqi museum hopes to reopen, minus many relics” it says that “the looting of Iraq’s National Museum under the eyes of US troops has sometimes been compared to the Mongol sack of the Grand Library of Baghdad in 1258”.

During the occupation of Japan collecting samourai swords was an activity that was accepted by US authorities. Other forms of looting occurred which were not authorized. There were a few cases (mentioned in the chronology) in which officers were convicted.

The companion study about the occupation of Germany mentions also a number of cases, e.g. the disappearance of a royal crown. It is likely that only a fraction of all cases came to light.

# Chapter 6

## Chronology, Japan, 1945-1960

The chronology in the next section focuses on the following kinds of events.

- 1 Allied fatalities (including accidents)
- 2 Clashes between Allied troops and population
- 3 Protests against occupation in the form of meetings, demonstrations, strikes.

We list protests against the Japanese government in so far as they can be seen as being indirectly aimed at Allied Headquarters decisions.

4 Occasionally, we also include observations which are not really incidents but may give the reader a better understanding of the social climate in this period of time.

The list of events that we present is by no means exhaustive. The only source which could possibly provide a fairly comprehensive coverage is the complete set of records of the trials held by:

- Allied courts martial, in relation with acts committed against Japanese
- Allied provost courts and Military Commission courts, in relation with Japanese actions against Allied military.

To our best knowledge these records are not yet available to historians which means that one has to rely on other sources such as newspapers which, naturally, were subject to censorship. The chronology below should therefore be considered as highly provisional. Additions will be made progressively as new sources become available.

It would be a misconception to think that the plans for the occupation were made only after its completion. As a matter of fact, the occupation was actively prepared at least since 1943. For instance, nisei (i.e. second generation Japanese Americans) were formed to act as interpreters during the occupation and many American experts were recruited and set to work on occupation plans and objectives. The War Department established military government schools as early as May 1942 (Cernicky 2006 p. 53). In an article published by the magazine Time in 1945 (Aug 27) one reads that the Army and Navy trained 3,100 officers for the occupation of Japan.

### Guidelines given to occupation headquarters

When General MacArthur arrived in Japan he had fairly detailed instructions about

what the Administration expected from the occupation forces. A first directive to him was issued on 29 August 1945 and a second, more detailed one, was issued on 3 November 1945; The following lines provide some excerpts from the latter which is entitled “Basic initial post-surrender directive to the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers for the occupation and control of Japan”, (cited in Ando 1991, p. 136 and in Documents 1949)

- *Nomination of the government* “You [i.e. the Supreme Commander] will assure that at all times the posts of Lord Privy Seal, Privy Council, Prime Minister and Cabinet members are held only by persons who may be relied upon to further the purpose of your mission.”

- *Military courts* You will establish such military courts as may be necessary with jurisdiction over offenses against the forces of occupation.

- *Control over Japanese courts* “Ordinary criminal and civil courts in Japan will be permitted to continue to function subject to such regulations, supervision and control as you may determine. As rapidly as possible judges who are unacceptable will be removed. Such officials will be replaced with acceptable and qualified successors. Full power of review will be retained by you over all courts which are allowed to function. You will veto all decisions which are inconsistent with the purpose of your mission.”

- *Control of political parties* You will immediately place under control all existing political parties, organizations and societies. Those whose activities are consistent with the requirement of the military occupation and its objectives should be encouraged. Those whose activities are inconsistent with such requirements should be abolished. Free elections should be held at the earliest practicable date.

- *Screening of teachers* As rapidly as possible, all teachers who have been active exponents of militant nationalism and those who continue actively to oppose the purposes of the military occupation will be replaced by acceptable and qualified personnel. [In 1947-1948, all teachers were screened and, according to SCAP, about 5,000 were dismissed.]

- *Standard of living of the Japanese people* “You will not assume any responsibility for the economic rehabilitation of Japan. You will make clear to the Japanese that you assume no obligation to maintain any particular standard of living in Japan and that the standard of living will depend upon the thoroughness with which Japan rids itself of all militaristic ambitions and cooperates with the occupying forces.”

- *Control of foreign trade* “The Japanese authorities are to enter into no economic agreement of any kind with foreign governments except after prior

consultation with you and by your express approval.”

- *Payment of occupation expenses* “You will require the Japanese authorities to make available to you legal tender yen notes or yen credits free of cost and in amounts sufficient to meet all expenses of your forces including the cost of your military occupation.”

- *Seizure of Japanese assets* You will impound or block all gold, silver, platinum, currencies, securities, accounts in financial institutions within the categories listed below: property owned by national, prefectural and local governments, the Japanese Imperial Household and all organizations dissolved by you, all public and private assets located within or outside Japan, all works of art regardless of ownership.

The previous instructions underwent a substantial revision on October 4, 1948 with the adoption by the US National Security Council of new directives to SCAP entitled “Recommendations with respect to United States policy toward Japan” (NSC 13/12). In its article no 8, this document recommends that although “SCAP should retain all its existing rights and powers, responsibility should be placed to a steadily increasing degree in the hands of the Japanese Government”.

### **Fatality numbers**

Symbols such as ● (13,3,7,23) signal the incidents marked by fatalities. The four figures total the fatalities since the beginning of the occupation for 4 different categories:

13: American troops, 3: British (and Indian) troops, 7: Australian and New Zealand troops, 23: Japanese civilians.

Whereas for Allied troops all fatalities (whether by accidents or any other cause) are taken into account, for Japanese civilians we count only the fatalities which came about as a direct consequence of the occupation, e.g. Japanese people killed in traffic accidents due to military vehicles, shot by sentries, killed in explosions brought about by Allied operations, and other similar causes. Executions of war criminals were excluded from this count.

These totals count only the incidents that are explicitly mentioned in the chronology<sup>48</sup>; two major causes of death are almost never mentioned at the level of individual cases, namely deaths due to military vehicles and deaths of prisoners sentenced by military tribunals. For more details about traffic fatalities see the chronology at the date of 1 September 1947 and the chapter on quantitative evidence; the number of Japanese fatalities turns out to be of the order of a few thousands for the whole duration of the occupation. An estimate for the deaths among prisoners sentenced

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<sup>48</sup>Basically, those which came to the attention of news agencies or newspaper correspondents and were not barred by censorship and those which are mentioned in military reports.

by military tribunals is given below at the date of 30 April 1947; for the whole occupation period it is of the order of a few hundreds.

**Table 6.1 Deaths of Commonwealth troops in Japan**

	Strength in June 1946	Buried in Yokoh. Jan 1946 to Dec 1947	Buried in Yokoh. Jan 1948 to Dec 1951	Buried in Yokoh. Jan 1952 to Dec 1960	Buried in Yokoh. Subtotal	Buried in home country	Total
Australia	11,500	47	34	24	105	~ 59	~ 164
New Zealand	4,500	11	5	4	20	?	≥ 20
Aust + NZ	16,000	58	39	28	<b>125</b>	?	≥ 184
Britain	10,000	37	16	45	<b>98</b>	?	≥ 98
India	10,000	35	1	0	36	?	≥ 36
Canada	0	0	5	18	23	?	≥ 23
Civilian	?	0	16	1	17	?	≥ 17
Total					299	?	≥ 358

Notes: BCOF troops who died in Japan are buried at the Yokohama War Cemetery (located 9 kilometer west of Yokohama city). It is thanks to this fact that we know the figures given in this table. All US troops who died in Japan have been repatriated to the United States and therefore we do not know their number. The time intervals refer to the dates of death. After occupation formally ended by April 1952 there were still Commonwealth troops in Japan because during the Korean War Japan was a resting place for the troops fighting in Korea. After 1954 there may have been only few Commonwealth troops for only a small number of deaths (less than 10) are reported.

One of the purposes of the table is to allow a comparison with the numbers of deaths reported in the chronology. Comparing the boldface numbers with the totals computed in the chronology shows that only a small proportion of about 5% of the deaths were reported in newspapers or in daily military reports.

The column “Buried in home country” requires an explanation. It is known that many injured soldiers were repatriated; a fraction of them died at home as a result of their injuries but it is only for the Australian soldiers that we have an estimate of their number.

A database to be found on the website of the Australian War Memorial gives some indications about causes of death; four general causes are distinguished which sum up to the following percentages: injuries: 25%, drowning: 13%, accident (except drowning): 47%, illness: 15% (these percentages are based on 40 deaths which occurred in 1946-1947).

*Sources: The strength data are from Bates (1993); the data for the two following columns are from the Commonwealth War Graves Commission; the data for the following column are from the BCOF Executive Council of Australia. The estimate for the number of Australian soldiers who died in Australia as a result of injuries received in Japan is from Mr. Ron Orwin, the Secretary of the Executive Council. Many thanks to Ms. Maureen Annetts and Mr. Ron Orwin for their help.*

In spite of the fact (more fully discussed in the chapter on quantitative evidence) that these data may omit a number of deaths<sup>49</sup>, they provide at least an order of

<sup>49</sup>In particular those soldiers who died shortly after repatriation. For more details see the chronology at the dates of 30 September 1946, 29 February 1948, 30 April 1948.

magnitude. It turns out that the number cases of death reported in newspapers or daily military reports is of the order of 5% of actual numbers.

## 1945

**Jul 30, 1945:** The US Navy heavy cruiser USS “Indianapolis” was torpedoed by the Japanese submarine I-58 and sank in 12 minutes. The attack occurred in the night of 29 to 30 July at 00:05am (another source says 00:14am). Although the Indianapolis sent distress calls before sinking the Navy learned of the sinking only 4 days later when survivors were spotted by an aircraft. In fact, three stations had received the distress calls but inexplicably, none of them acted. The sinking led to the greatest loss of life at sea in the history of the US Navy. Of the 1,196 crewmen on board only 317 survived.

For a long time the Navy denied that a distress call had been sent. The receipt of the call came to light only after the release of declassified records.

(Wikipedia article entitled USS Indianapolis, NYT 15 August 1945)

[The news of the sinking of the Indianapolis was published in the New York Times two weeks later: “In the midst of rejoicing it was disclosed that the heavy cruiser Indianapolis had been sunk, presumably by an enemy submarine. 1,196 casualties”. A Congressional Record of 1999 (Vol. 145, Part 8, May 24 to June 8) says that the ship had sent three distress messages before sinking but the Record does not indicate the sources on which this statement was based.

Previously, between 16 and 19 July, the Indianapolis had transported parts of the atomic bomb “Little Boy” from San Francisco to the island of Tinian. Located near Saipan, Tinian was one of the largest American airbases in the Pacific. It is from this island that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were conducted.

In summary, the key-dates of this story were as follows:

- 1 1945, 30 July: Sinking.
- 2 1945, 3 August: The survivors were located and rescued.
- 3 1945, 15 August: The sinking was disclosed by US newspapers.
- 4 1999: The truth about distress messages was disclosed.

Thus, it took 54 years for the full truth eventually to emerge. This is not uncommon however. Other cases will be mentioned subsequently.]

**Aug 9, 1945 (11:30):** Three devices attached to parachutes were dropped on Nagasaki. One of them exploded at an altitude of 1,000 meters. The other two were brass cylinders. Cylinder 1 was found in the Naval Arsenal in Sasebo (about 50 km north of Nagasaki) on 7 October 1945. Cylinder 2 was recovered in Fukuoka (about 120 km north east of Nagasaki) on 18 October 1945. (NDL:microfiche TS-00142,

Joint Chiefs of Staff to MacArthur; [http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel\\_prizes/chemistry/laureates/2008/shimomura-bio.html](http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/chemistry/laureates/2008/shimomura-bio.html)

[The two cylinders contained measurement instruments and a transmitter. They were dropped by an aircraft which preceded the one carrying the bomb by a few minutes.]

**Aug 15, 1945 (12:00):** Emperor Hiro-Hito delivered a broadcast calling for surrender.

**Aug 17, 1945:** Naruhiko Higashikuni, a prince and general of the Army, formed the first Cabinet after the surrender.

**Aug 18, 1945:** Ten Japanese fighter planes attacked 4 US B-32 Super Liberators which attempted to go over the Tokyo airports at noon on Aug. 17 to photograph them. At the same time heavy anti-aircraft fire burst around the B-32 which traveled at an altitude of 7,000 meters.

Inspection carried out after the mission revealed that one of the planes had about 50 hits in its wing, tail and cowling. The pilots claimed they sent two attacking Japanese planes down in flames. While the Japanese had not been informed in advance of the photographic mission General MacArthur had informed them that bombing missions had been terminated. The air attack upon American troop-ships off Shikoku (one of the four islands composing Japan, south west to Osaka) as well as numerous incidents not recountable now show that Japanese extremists are reluctant to accept the cease-fire orders. (NYT p. 3)

**Aug 19, 1945:** ●(1,0,0,0) An US airman was killed by Japanese fighters over Tokyo. On Aug 18, 14 Japanese fighter planes attacked two B-32 that were attempting to photograph the Tokyo area. One plane piloted by Lieutenant J.R. Anderson of Charlot, North Carolina was badly damaged and an aerial photographer was killed. On the same day, another unit of 4 Liberators taking photographs of a different area was intercepted by enemy fighters and received slight damages. Moreover, two flights of P-38s on similar missions were shot at and holed but no one was hurt. Apparently the Japanese Emperor is having difficulty in convincing his warriors that the war is over. (NYT p. 1)

**Aug 21 1945:** Beginning of show of force flights over Japan. (NDL microfiche TS91)

[For instance, the 6th and 39th Bombardment Groups as well as the 40th Bomb Squadron took part in such show-of-force flights over Japan before returning to the United States at the end of 1945 or beginning of 1946. (NDL, microfiche TS-91, Wikipedia article entitled "40th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron" and similar articles)

Such show-of-force flights were also carried out over South Korea. It seems that in

some cases they lead to strafing against protesters (see “Relations between American Forces and the Korean people”). As a matter of fact, show-of-force flights are a common US Air Force tactic as revealed by the following Internet excerpts.

- 1958. During the Lebanon crisis US Air Force warplanes coming from Incirlik in Turkey carried out show-of-force flights over Lebanon (Wikipedia article entitled “Incirlik Air Base” which is an US air base in Turkey.) Attack Squadron 83 participated in show-of-force flights over rebel-held parts of the country and up and down the Jordan River Valley in Jordan.

- 25 April 2007. GR-4 planes provided shows of force for coalition forces near a crowd of approximately 250 people near Baghdad. A JTAC confirmed it dispersed the crowd and no attacks were reported.

- 2 May 2007. Near Mosul (Iraq), F-16 planes conducted a show of force to disperse a large group of people. A JTAC (Joint Terminal Attack Controller) confirmed it was successful.

Near Gereshk (Afghanistan) A-10s provided a show of force for a coalition convoy with a disabled vehicle. A JTAC reported it was successful and there were no attacks on the convoy.


**Aug 21 1945:** Ired by the use of atomic bombs, the vicar of St Alban in London kept his church closed and refused to hold the special Thanksgiving Service that the king had ordered to be held all over England. (Nippon Times p. 1)

**Aug 21 1945:** After Japan’s surrender, many of the pilots at Atsugi airbase (16 km west of Yokohama) refused to follow Hirohito’s order to lay down their arms. They printed thousands of leaflets stating that those who had agreed to surrender were guilty of treason and urged the continuation of the war. The leaflets were dropped over Tokyo, Yokohama, Yokosuka and other locations around the Kanto Plain. They also held the base captive for seven days. Constructed in 1938, the base housed Japanese elite fighter squadrons which shot down more than 300 American bombers during the firebombings of 1945. (Wikipedia at entry “Naval Air Facility Atsugi”). On August 22, Japanese forces from Yokosuka encircled the area and restored order. On August 26 the Japanese government agreed to make Atsugi Base the site of the arrival of the first U.S. occupation troops.

(<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/atsugi.htm>)

**Aug 22, 1945:** The Tokyo radio made a special appeal to the suicide flier organization, the Kamikazes, to give in. Tokyo itself now disclosed that this organization thus far has defied the Emperor. (NYT p. 1)

**Aug 24, 1945:** In the most sweeping directive issued to date, General Douglas MacArthur ordered the Japanese Government to set aside as potential war repara-



**Fig. 6.1 Population of major Japanese cities.** The effect of the Kanto earthquake can be seen on the curves for Tokyo and Yokohama. This effect was much smaller than the consequences of the destructions caused by the bombings of 1945. The surviving population moved to other, less urbanized, prefectures. If one takes into account the population of 46 prefectures (that is to say all prefectures except Okinawa for which there are no data) one finds that the total population fell from 72.4 million to 72.0 million. *Source: Historical Statistics of Japan (available online)*

tions 505 of Japan's largest and most modern plants in eight basic industrial branches. These plants represent one third of Japanese industry. (NYT p. 1)

**Aug 27, 1945 (7:15 am):** Headed by the Missouri, the US naval forces arrived in Tokyo Bay and make contact with Japanese officials.

**Aug 27, 1945** Excerpt from an Army pamphlet destined to US occupation forces. "[Japanese women] have been taught to hate you. They do as their men tell them, and many of them have been told to kill you. Sex is one of the oldest and most effective weapons in history. The Geisha girl knows how to wield it charmingly. She may entice you only to poison you. She may slit your throat. Stay away from the women of Japan, all of them." (Time Magazine, 27 August 1945)

[This excerpt reflects the non-fraternization policy which was enforced during the first months of the occupation. The same article of "Time Magazine" also notes that "non-fraternization had broken down badly in Germany", but it is not clear in

which sense this is meant.]

**Aug 28, 1945:** The first American shipborne forces set foot in Japan to check prospective Tokyo Bay landing beaches. The same day a reconnaissance party arrived at Atsugi where it was met by Lieutenant General Seizo Arisue.

(<http://www.warbirdforum.com/navy.htm>).

This marked the beginning of the occupation of Japan which was given the code name of “Operation Blacklist”. Apart from its purely military tasks operation Blacklist also set up an organization which was to remain during the occupation years. As far as control over the Japanese population was concerned, it provided for a network of military intelligence sections which later became the Military Government and Counter Intelligence sections at the level of each prefecture. In contrast to Germany which was directly ruled by the Allied Military Government, Japan was to be ruled indirectly; to this effect, operation “Blacklist” provided for maximum but discreet use of existing Japanese organizations. General MacArthur would exercise governmental authority through instructions issued directly to the Japanese Government by the Central Liaison Committee. The Central Liaison Committee would route these instructions to the proper Japanese ministry. (MacArthur 1950, Chapter 1 and 7)

**Aug 28, 1945:** As the veteran officers and men of the United States Eighth Army commenced the occupation of Tokyo and its environs, an irritation began to crop up. This annoyance is due to the cryptic ideographic language signs to which the soldiers are confronted. (Christian Science Monitor p. 9)

**Aug 29, 1945:** The Central Liaison Office established in the Foreign Office is to maintain coordination between the government and the Allied occupation forces. The First Department of the Central Liaison Office which has already 1,000 interpreters is to undertake the translation of all documents on general affairs. The Second Department is to take care of political and military affairs including control of the press. The Third Department is to take care of economic aspects including the question of reparations. (Nippon Times)

[This article shows that as early as August 29 the main structure through which the occupation authorities would pilot the Japanese government was already organized and operational.]

**Aug 30, 1945:** In the early morning American Marines occupied the Yokosuka Naval Base and nearby positions. At 6:00 am paratroopers from the 11th Airborne Division landed at Atsugi. Later the same day, General MacArthur arrived in Atsugi.

**Sep 1, 1946:** The beginning of the occupation introduced two great changes

- All direct intercourse with the outside world ceased the day the occupation began until 1949 when travel restrictions began to be gradually lifted.

- The effective control of the Japan's economy made it necessary for SCAP to block all bank deposits. Naturally, this produced great difficulties. For instance, on December 16, 1945 Father Bitter, Rector of Sophia University, explained to SCAP officials that he found it impossible to pay members of his order. William Woodard observes that at the time nothing could be done to help him. (Woodard 1972).

**Sep 2, 1946:** Makoto Sugae, Director of the Tottori Broadcasting Corporation who was severely wounded in the atomic bomb explosion of Hiroshima on August 6 passed away on August 29 at his residence in Tottori. He was 51 years old. (Nippon Times p. 2) [Many Japanese people died in the weeks after the explosion, especially as a result of the severe burns inflicted by the bomb. Radioactivity would bring about more fatalities in the months and years following the explosion.]

**Sep 3, 1945:** Excerpt of the diary of a US sailor (battleship North Carolina at Yokosuka Naval Base in Tokyo area four days after landing):

“Earlier in the day I decided I wanted to explore some more. Another guy (name I don't remember) and I left the barracks and started to walk. We covered most of the yard and found a building that appeared undisturbed. We went in and found what was obviously an officer's office. We went through his desk and found some personal things. I found and took a small beautiful pair of binoculars and a helmet. We returned to barracks without further plunder. Many of our men were finding all kinds of things like flags, samurai swords, officers belts and pistols, medals, etc. All of this loot was being stashed in our barracks with the idea that we were going to be able to take them back to the ship and home eventually. On the 5th of September 1945, we were told to prepare to leave at 1400. During the morning we packed our gear. Mr. Modle, our commanding officer and a lieutenant, I believe, announced that he had drawn sufficient Japanese rifles for each of us to have as a souvenir. At 1300 we boarded army trucks and headed out through town to the fleet landing. We rode all over the place looking for it. Every time we passed a good looking Japanese girl we yelled and whistled, scaring them half to death.”

(Diary of Charles M. Paty, Jr, website of Battleship North Carolina, located in Wilmington:

[www.battleshipnc.com/history/bb55/wwii/battles/surrender.php](http://www.battleshipnc.com/history/bb55/wwii/battles/surrender.php))

**Sep 3, 1945:** Excerpt of **SCAPIN no 2**

- The Japanese Imperial Government will place at the disposal of the occupation forces all local resources required for their use.
- The Japanese Imperial Government will provide labor in quantities and with the training and skills and the time and place designated by the Supreme Commander

or the Commanders of the Occupation Forces within their respective areas.

- The Japanese Imperial Government will be prepared to furnish to the Occupation Forces all buildings suitable for and required by these forces. Requirements will include the following general categories: office buildings, hospitals, living quarters, warehousing and storage shops, transportation and communication installations. Buildings will, insofar as possible, be of fireproof construction and equipped with running water, sewage disposal facilities, electricity. (Ando 1991)

**Sep 3, 1945:** Office of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Subject: Buildings and facilities in Tokyo area required by Allied Occupation Forces [excerpt].

The buildings indicated below will be required initially in the Tokyo area for use of Allied occupation forces.

(1) General Officers: Suitable hotel or apartment accommodations with appropriate appointments and furnishings for not less than 150 General Officers.

(2) Officers: Hotel accommodations for not less than 5,250 officers of which 350 will be female officers.

(3) Enlisted men: Barracks or equivalent for not less than 22,000 (allowance of 21 cubic meter per man). This requirement includes 1,250 enlisted women. (4) Hospitals: Total capacity of 9,000 beds (allowance of 10 square meter floor space per bed).

(5) Covered storage: 71,000 square meter.

At the time of transfer to Allied occupation forces all buildings will be clean, staffed with operation and service personnel and equipped with furnishings.

[Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, B.M. Fitch, Brigadier General.

(SCAP-MOFA 9)

**Sep 4, 1945:** **SCAPIN 7** Subject: Funds for Occupation Forces [excerpt].

It is desired that your office [i.e. the Japanese government] place to the credit of the GHQ such sums as may be necessary for expenditures of the occupation forces. It is understood that the cost of printing, handling and distribution of these funds will be borne by the Imperial Japanese Government. [Signed] For the Supreme Commander, Harold Fair (Lt Colonel, AGD) (Scapins 1952, p. 1)

**Sep 4, 1945:** Allied authorities expressed regret for incidents in Yokohama and Yokosuka. On August 30 in Asahi-machi, Yokosuka, there were three cases of Allied soldiers attacking Japanese women. On August 31 in Yokohama there were 11 cases of robbery and a considerable number of automobile were looted. (Nippon Times p. 3)

[This was one of the last instances in which the Nippon Times (or any other Japanese newspaper) published accounts of misconducts of American troops. After 10 September censorship was implemented and prevented such statements to be published.]

**Sep 4, 1945:** The vice-chief of staff of General McArthur expressed sincere regrets about the firing by American soldiers on Japanese policemen at Hanazono bridge in the night of August 30 (Nippon Times p. 3)

[The article does not say if there have been some casualties.]

**Sep 6, 1945:** **SCAPIN 8** Subject: Legal tender [excerpt].

It is desired that the Japanese Imperial Government place in effect immediately as a decree [that] ‘Supplemental Military Yen Currency marked “B” issued by Military Occupation Forces is legal tender in Japan. Penalties for the enforcement of this decree will be prescribed by the Japanese Government and submitted to this headquarters for approval.

[Signed: For the Supreme Commander, Harold Fair (Lt Colonel, AGD) (Scapins 1952, p. 1)

**Sep 6, 1945:** The “London Daily Express” published an article entitled “30th day in Hiroshima”. It was written by an Australian journalist, Wilfred Burchett, who had been able to visit Hiroshima on 3 September. Because the article violated the censorship rules set up in the so-called “Press code” Burchett had his accreditation removed. It seems that it is his insistence on the fact that the bomb was killing people even weeks after the explosion which caused the anger of occupation authorities.

(<http://www2.binghamton.edu/history/resources/journal-of-history/stephen-buono.html>)

[In mid-September the Asahi Shimbun published an article in which Ichiro Haoyama wrote:

“The United States which claims to pursue justice cannot deny that the use of the atomic bomb and the killing of innocent people is a violation of international law and a war crime worse than an attack on a hospital ship or the use of poison gas”. As a result, the journal was slapped with a two-day suspension. Regarding Haoyama, in spite of the fact that his party won the elections in the spring of 1946, he was not allowed to become Prime Minister.]

**Sep. 6, 1945:** Message sent from Washington to General MacArthur. “You will not remove the Emperor or take any steps toward his removal without prior consultation with advice issued to you through the Joint Chiefs of Staff”. (NDL, microfiche TS 00318)

[Although the “advice” will be conveyed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff the decision itself will probably be made by the President together with the State Department.]

**Sep. 6, 1945:** MacArthur barred Allied reporters from Tokyo (NYT p. 4).

**Sep 7, 1945:** **SCAPIN 12** addressed to the Chairman of the Military Commission in Yokohama. Subject: Retention of swords by Japanese military personnel [excerpt].

With reference to the request from the Japanese Imperial GHQ concerning the retention of swords by Japanese military personnel you are advised that if these swords are the personal property of these officers they may be retained. Swords which were issued by the government are government property and will be turned in with other weapons of war. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, R.K. Sutherland, Lieutenant General, US Army Chief of Staff (SCAPINS 1-600)

**Sep. 8, 1945:** Japan's Black Dragon Society, most rabid of the super-patriotic organizations, was dissolved at the end of August (NYT p. 3).

**Sep 10, 1945:** There were 1,336 reported rapes during the first 10 days of the occupation of Kanagawa prefecture, i.e. from September 1 to September 10. (Schrijvers 2002, p.212)

[Kanagawa (that is to say the city of Yokohama) was probably not special in this respect but for other places few data seem available. The only way to get a global quantitative estimate of the extent of the rape phenomenon would be to find data documenting the births of babies of mixed Japanese-US ancestry some 9 months later, that is to say starting in May 1946.]

**Sep 10, 1945:** **SCAPIN 16** Subject: Freedom of press and speech [excerpt].

The Japanese Imperial Government will issue the necessary orders to prevent dissemination of news through newspapers, radio broadcasting and other means of publication which may disturb public tranquility. The Supreme Commander will suspend any publication or radio station which does not comply. (SCAPINS 1-600)

**Sep 11, 1945:** Press release of the Public Relation Office.

The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers has directed that the following men be at once taken into custody of American Military Forces. [The list of 39 names that follows contains political leaders, generals and also persons who have been in charge of the media, e.g. Streeter, an American employed at Wake Island who wrote scripts and took part at Radio Tokyo activities, or Major Charles H. Cousens, an Australian who engaged in propaganda activity at Radio Tokyo.] (This press release is reproduced in the September volume of a compilation of documents which have been issued by SCAP. Each volume corresponds to one month; the title is in Japanese. These volumes are available in the Modern History reading room of the National Diet Library in Tokyo)

**Sep 11, 1945:** Note addressed by the Japanese government to the Commander for the Allied Powers [excerpt].

This office has been informed by the Metropolitan Police that 5 American soldiers whose caps were identified with a parachute mark came into the Hibiya movie-theatre around half past two o'clock in the afternoon on September 10 having left one of them outside the theatre on the look-out. The other four ordered all the persons to go out, cut off the telephone wires, opened the safe with a key which they found in a drawer and took away nearly 9,000 yen in cash. We therefore request you to investigate the case and take proper and effective measures to prevent the recurrence of such cases. (MOFA 9)

**Sep 11, 1945:** At about 3 pm, while former prime minister Hideki Tojo was discussing with an American news correspondent, Frank Bartholomew of the United Press, a team of the Counter Intelligence Corps arrived at his house to arrest him. Tojo went to another room and shot himself. When Bartholomew entered the room with the CIC team, he saw Tojo unconscious in a chair with a big wound across his midriff. His shirt "was burning dully and behind him on the chair was a cushion which the pistol bullet had pierced; there were blood-stained feathers from the cushion scattered about. On the floor beside Tojo was an American Air Force Colt 0.32." (Baillie 1959, p. 203)

[There are two surprising facts about this account: (i) If Tojo really wanted to kill himself, it was probably not the most effective method to aim the pistol at his stomach rather than at his heart or head. Perhaps this was meant as a substitute for seppuku? (ii) Did Tojo really use an American Air Force Colt or is that part of the account inaccurate?]

**Sep 12, 1945:** **SCAPIN 21** Subject: Use of supplemental yen (type "B") [excerpt]. The Japanese Imperial Government has not yet complied with the memorandum of 6 Sep 1945 (SCAPIN 8) that supplemental yen (type "B") be decreed legal tender in Japan. In the event that any further delay occurs the SCAP will take such action as he deems appropriate. It is further directed that the Japanese Government prohibit the giving or taking of US currency or any other foreign currency in any transaction. [Signed: For the Supreme Commander, Harold Fair (Lt Colonel, AGD) (Scapins 1952, p. 2)

**Sep 12, 1945:** **SCAPIN 22** Subject: Japanese aircraft [excerpt].

It is desired to secure a number of Japanese aircraft for test and study by technicians of the US Armed forces. [The rest of the SCAPIN provides practical details for the organization of test flights.] (SCAPINS 1-600)

**Sep 4, 1945:** Some 300 Japanese officers committed hara-kiri at Singapore when

General Itagaki told them that he was surrendering under orders from the Emperor. They had a sake party after which they blew themselves up with hand grenades. (The Straits Time, 12 September 1945 p. 2)

[Following 15 August 1945, during a few days, General Itagaki was not willing to surrender but after attending a conference with other Japanese generals in Indochina he changed his mind. Transferred to Tokyo, he was tried, sentenced to death and executed by hanging on 23 December 1948 at Sugamo Prison (Tokyo).]

**Sep. 13, 1945:** General MacArthur ordered the dissolution of the notorious Black Dragon River society, the militarist secret organization which for 45 years, by assassination and other methods of coercion has ruled Japanese political life. He directed the counter-intelligence to arrest 7 of its leaders. This society was originally founded to encourage the extension of the Japanese frontier to the River Amur [Amur means Black Dragon] in Manchuria. It became identified with the activities of the “Young Officers” class and drew large funds from industrialists. From time to time efforts have been made by Japanese statesmen to secure its suppression. It has always succeeded in going in hiding when its existence was threatened, only to emerge with unabated influence when expansionist policies were once more in the ascendant (Times p. 4).

**Sep 13, 1945:** Through intercepts performed thanks to code breaker MAGIC, the US government learned of a message sent by the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu Mamoru, to Japan’s legations in Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland in which he wrote: “Since the Americans have recently been raising an uproar about the question of our mistreatment of prisoners, I think we should make every effort to exploit the atomic bomb question.” The official Domei news agency was the normal channel through which such a campaign could be conducted. In early September Domei also issued reports of numerous cases of rape, looting and robbery by American soldiers which were in turn picked up by Japanese newspapers. (Mayo 1984, p. 294)

**Sep 13, 1945:** **SCAPIN 26** Subject: Protection of Allied property [excerpt]. The Imperial Japanese Government will preserve in good order all property owned or controlled in whole or in part by any national of any of the United Nations on Dec 7, 1941 and make a complete report to the Supreme Commander within one week. (SCAPINS 1-600)

**Sep 15, 1945:** Order of Colonel Hoover to Togasaki (Nippon Times), [excerpt]. General MacArthur found the press did not live up to the spirit as requested and therefore strict 100 per cent censorship would be put into effect from today, Saturday September 15. He expressively stated that no Allied criticism would be permitted and that the Japanese press were responsible for leading public opinion. (MOFA 28)

**Sep 15, 1945:** Atomic bomb's purpose said to be only blast effect. (Nippon Times p. 2)

[In previous articles on the effects of the atomic bombs, the Nippon Times had emphasized the burns suffered by victims and the fact that many people died days or weeks after the explosion. After September 10 the newspaper came under the control of occupation forces and had to change its position to align with the American thesis according to which blast was the essential factor. Thereafter, thermal radiation effects which produce burns and radioactive effects which produce cancers were downplayed in spite of the fact that they represent about 50% of the energy released in an atomic explosion. Incidentally, it can be noted that the newspaper adopted a fairly ambiguous formulation: "Atomic bomb's *purpose* said to be ...".]

**Sep 16, 1945:** US occupation troops lend helping hand to Japanese boy and man in dire distress (Nippon Times p. 3).

[This article is obviously inspired by the public relation division of the occupying forces. Similar stories were published in subsequent days. The stories may have been true but they would not have received the same coverage without the action of public relation officers.]

**Sep. 16, 1945:** General MacArthur imposed a severe censorship on Japanese newspapers and on the official news agency Domai. Besides prohibiting overseas broadcasts, he also ordered full censorship of Domai's domestic distribution of news by telephone, wireless and telegraph. Summoning representatives of the Japanese Press to a conference, Colonel Donald Hoover in charge of censorship matters in the Army Counter-Intelligence Staff, told them bluntly that Japan is a defeated enemy with whom there will be no negotiations; instead, the "Supreme Commander will dictate orders to the Japanese Government" (Coughlin 1952).

Foreign correspondents were accredited directly by General MacArthur. As an illustration one can mention the fact that in June 1950 the correspondent of the Times of London was declared *persona non grata* because he had written a dispatch saying that the ban on political demonstrations by the Japanese Government was unconstitutional. Moreover, the Army had complete control over food, housing, transportation and communication. MacArthur's inner circle (in particular Brigadier-General Legrand A. Diller better known to press correspondents as "killer-Diller" and Chief Intelligence officer Charles Willoughby) considered all criticism of the Occupation a direct reflection on General MacArthur and did their best to keep unfavorable news from the press. It can be noted that this had already been their attitude during the campaign led by General MacArthur in the south Pacific: any mention of high casualties was carefully censored and in some cases victory was proclaimed days in advance.

It can be noted that no official statement to the existence of censorship was permitted. Censorship was carried out through a dual system comprising two separate organizations: the “Civil Information and Education Section” on the one hand and the “Civil Censorship Detachment” on the other hand; the latter which belonged to G-2, the intelligence section of the General Staff, was more interested in security issues while the former had the broad objective of shaping a new post-war Japan. Around 1948 precensorship was progressively replaced by postcensorship which means that non-compliant newspapers and magazines were reverted to the cumbersome procedure of precensorship. From 1949 on, during the so-called “Red Purge” (see below), journalists were dismissed as well as other categories of people such as teachers or government employees; dozens of media companies were disbanded. The threat of being fired in fact represented a more powerful deterrent than the former censorship policy; it certainly played a role in installing a form of permanent self-censorship. See below January 1946 for precisions about the implementation of censorship. (NYT Sep. 16 1945 p. 1, Times Sep. 17 1945 p. 4, NYT Jun 13 1950 p. 7, Braw 1991, Okamoto 2001, Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, Coughlin 1952))

**Sep 16, 1945:** Memorandum sent by the Japanese government to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. Subject: Handing over of the buildings of the Sendai Savings and Insurance Bureau. [excerpt].

It has to be stated that Japan is following the policy to encourage savings for operation of her national economy. In view of this circumstance, it is specially desired that consideration be given so that the building in question may not be required to be turned over. It is further requested that for similar reasons, the buildings of the Fukuoka Savings and Insurance Bureau, the Kumamoto Savings Bureau and the Kyoto Savings and Insurance Bureau be also exempted from the list of those buildings to be turned over to the occupation forces. (SCAPIN-MOFA 9).

[The fact that the English is fairly shaky is typical of messages sent by the Japanese government in the first times of the occupation. A similar request was made on 28 December 1945. At that time the English is fluent and the request is restricted to a delay of 2-3 weeks for vacating the building.]

**Sep 18, 1945:** Archbishop Francis Joseph Spellman arrived in Yokohama as the guest of honor of General Douglas MacArthur. The archbishop has been the special envoy to the Vatican on various occasions for presidents Roosevelt and Truman. (Nippon Times p. 1)

**Sep 18-19, 1945:** The newspaper Asahi Shimbun was closed down for one day for having stated that the use of the atomic bomb was a war crime violating international law (Braw 1991). The Nippon Times was also closed down for one day. The two

orders were issued as SCAPIN 34 and 37. (SCAPINS 1-600)

**Sep 19, 1945:** CLO-M No 31 [excerpt].

The Japanese government presents its compliments to the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces and transmits the following report of the Ministry of Home Affairs on an alleged case of manslaughter by three American soldiers. About 10:30 pm September 15, at Kokumin Bar in Kawasaki City, Kanagawa Prefecture, 3 intoxicated American soldiers shot to death in the kitchen the proprietor of the bar (47 years) and stabbed to death his eldest son (16 years). It is requested that the General Headquarters promptly conduct investigation into this case. (MOFA 9)

**Sep 19, 1945:** CLO-M No 32 [excerpt].

The Japanese government presents its compliments to the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces and transmits the following report of the Ministry of the Imperial Household on a case of theft of Imperial property by a group of Allied servicemen. About 2 pm September 9, about 50 Allied servicemen (presumably from the 11th Airborne Division at Atsugi) led by officers aboard three trucks and three jeeps came to the Hayama Imperial Villa. The servicemen intruded into various rooms, broke open closets and chests of drawers, ransacked and carried away a silk piano cover and several towels. It is requested that the General Headquarters take such steps as will prevent the recurrence of a similar case in the future. (MOFA 9)

[During September 1945 there are numerous CLO messages which mention thefts (e.g. cars, money, watches, sabers, fountain pens) by American servicemen. The Japanese government also lists as thefts the requisition of various items (such as lumber or chairs).]

**Sep 21, 1945:** Excerpt of a message sent by the Japanese government to the GHQ: The Japanese government was informed of the explosion of the ammunition dumps which occurred in the neighborhood of Tatayama on 20 September 1945 and wishes to express its profound sympathy to members of the American Forces who were killed or wounded. The publication of the case is being withheld. (MOFA 33)

[As a matter of fact, no account of this event is to be found in the New York Times.]

**Sep 22, 1945:** **SCAPIN 40** Subject: Apprehension of certain individuals [excerpt]. It is directed that you apprehend and deliver to the custody of the Commanding General, Eighth Army, general Nobuyuki and general Kenji Doihara. (SCAPINS 1-600) [This is the first SCAPIN to direct the arrests of Japanese officers]

**Sep 21, 1945:** CLO Message No 38, Japanese Government to SCAP. Subject: Legal tender [excerpt].

To comply with the instruction contained in the Supreme Commander's Memorandum of 6 September 1945 [SCAPIN 8] the Imperial Japanese Government proposes

that a decree be issued by the Minister of Finance as follows.

1. The Supplemental Yen Currency, marked “B” issued by the Allied Occupation Forces shall circulate as legal tender in Japan, shall have an unlimited circulation for all transactions both public and private and shall be of equal value to and interchangeable with the regular yen currency issued by the Bank of Japan.

2. Those who refuses to accept the Supplemental Yen Currency are liable to penalties of penal servitude or imprisonment, not exceeding 3 years.

This decree is in accordance with Japanese law and will have full force and effect.

Approval of the form of this decree as quoted is requested. (MOFA 9)

[To summarize, the course of events regarding the introduction of the B-yen comprised the following steps: (i) Sep 6: SCAP directs the government to make the B-yen legal tender (ii) Sep 12: SCAP makes the same demand for the second time (iii) Sep 21: The Japanese government proposes the text of the decree (its phrasing suggests that it may have been written, or at least revised, by an American adviser) (iv) Sep 21: The text is accepted by SCAP (see the memorandum below).

**Sep 21, 1945:** Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government. Subject: Supplemental yen (type “B”) legal tender. Reference is your CLO message No 38 of 21 September 1945. The wording of the decree to be issued by the Ministry of Finance is satisfactory to the Supreme Commander. (SCAPIN-MOFA 1)

**Sep 22, 1945:** **SCAPIN 47** [no subject] [excerpt].

The Japanese Imperial Government is hereby directed to comply with the requirements stated in this directive.

- You are responsible for initiating and maintaining a firm control over wages and prices of essential commodities.
- No production will be permitted of all types of aircraft including those designed for civilian use, and of all materials produced for incorporation into aircraft of any type. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, R.M. Levy, Colonel AGD (SCAPINS 1952, p. 6)

**Sep 22, 1945:** Excerpt of an interview of General MacArthur by Hugh Baillie, the president of the United Press.

Asked if he believed that Japan would ever become a world power again, General MacArthur said emphatically: “Never again, when the terms of the surrender have been accomplished”. He added: “Her punishment for her sins which is just beginning will be long and bitter. Japan can expect no relief, no food, clothing or supplies from the Allied powers this winter. It is not planned to use American troops for any construction for the Japanese and there is no plan for importing food, clothing or supplies for the use of the Japanese population this winter”.

About the behavior of the troops, when asked whether there have been some incidents since the landing, he replied: "None, whatsoever. Wherever they go, our troops are our finest diplomats." (NYT p. 1-2)

[This was one of the very few interviews given by General MacArthur and it is mainly for this reason that we mention it. Needless to say, MacArthur's rhetoric can be interpreted in different ways. One can think that he sincerely expressed his personal ideas but one can also argue that he is merely saying what American readers would like to read. The fact that he did not find himself binded by former pledges is clear from some of his other statements in the same interview. Questioned about his political aspirations, Gen. MacArthur answered: "I have never entered politics and never intend to do so", a statement which is contradicted by MacArthur's attempts to win nomination as Republican presidential candidate in Wisconsin in 1948 (NYT 8 April 1948 p. 19: "Stassen defeats MacArthur") and by the fact that he was the key note speaker at the Republican presidential nomination convention of July 1952 where he supported the Taft candidacy (NYT 11 June 1952 p. 1: "MacArthur chosen as GOP keynoter"). Regarding MacArthur's intentions in Japan, actual facts are clearly more revealing than declarations of intention. It can be said that the policy which was followed in the first two years of the occupation was more or less in line with the intentions expressed by MacArthur in this interview. Moreover, one should not forget that the most important decisions were made in Washington, not by MacArthur.]

**Sep 22, 1945:** ●(2,0,0,0) Tokyo. One American soldier was killed and 3 seriously wounded in the explosion of a Japanese ammunition dump at the edge of the Tateyama airfield in Chiba prefecture. The Army said there was no suspicion of Japanese sabotage. (NYT p. 2)

**Sep 23, 1945:** Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government. Subject: Tajima residence, Tokyo [excerpt].

The following information is based on an inspection of the subject property which is assigned for the personal use of the Commanding General, US Army Strategic Air Forces.

- (a) The water pressure is insufficient thereby making the showers and toilets on the second floor inoperative. If pressure on main cannot be raised a booster pump will be required.
- (b) The electric ice box is inoperative.
- (c) No gas is available. A field range can serve as an interim measure.
- (d) The household is completely devoid of the following: silverware, dishes, glassware, sheets and pillow cases, blankets, linen.
- (e) Servants, laundresses, gardeners and household servants will be required. (f) The

heating system burns fine coal and requires approximately 10 tons during the winter season.

Necessary action, with the least practicable delay, should be taken by your office to correct the deficiencies including the provision of an adequate coal supply.

[Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, Harold Fair, Lt Col., AGD.

(SCAPIN-MOFA 9)

[This memorandum is not listed as a SCAPIN and does therefore not appear in the catalog of SCAPINs published by the National Diet Library.]

**Sep 25, 1945: SCAPIN 60** Subject: Provision of coal at Fusan, Korea [excerpt].

It is directed that necessary action be taken to institute at once measures that will insure monthly delivery at Fusan, Korea of 70,000 tons of coal for use in Korean railways. In order to secure earliest delivery at Fusan, you will consider diversion of ships with suitable cargo. (SCAPINS 1-600)

**Sep 27, 1945: SCAPIN 67** Subject: Funds that may be brought into Japan by repatriated Japanese [excerpt].

Japanese Army and Navy personnel will be permitted to carry with them into Japan a maximum of 500 yen for commissioned officers, of 200 yen for non-commissioned officers or enlisted men and of 1,000 yen for civilians. All currency in excess of these limits will be taken up and delivered to this Headquarters. All jewelry will also be taken up. [Signed:] R.C. Kramer, Colonel, GSC, Chief Economic and Scientific Section (SCAPINS 1-600) [What happened to Japanese property left abroad? A hint is provided through a report written by the Military Government Vice Governor of the south-western province of Cholla Namdo, Korea. He tells us that when the American troops arrived Japanese property was catalogued, stored and movable items were issued to American military units. At the beginning of 1946, title to all Japanese property was vested in the U.S. government. As a result the United States had more tenants than any other landlord in Korea. This caused much clamor from the public which was hoping for land reform and the sale of large estates to their tenants (McDonald 1948)]

**Sep 28, 1945: ●(2,0,0,1)** At about 4 am a guard at the National Treasures Museum in Kamakura (overlooking Sagami Bay in central Japan) was shot and killed by a US Army guard on patrol (Woodard 1972, p. 3).

**Sep. 1-30, 1945:** After the occupation began there was a concerted resistance to American troops in the community of Yamata located between Tokyo and Yokohama. Unarmed GIs were set upon and assaulted. The climax came when two Americans returning to their barracks were seized and beaten. A show of force was made by American forces. Members of the mob were discovered, tried and sentenced to

long confinement (Eichelberger p. 273).

**Oct 1945:** The 1st Cavalry Division commenced the seizure of all stocks, precious metals, jewelry and narcotics which were in the possession of Japanese business firms and industrial plants. By the end of 1947, more than 76,000 kilograms of gold, a million kilogram of silver, 7,000 kilogram of platinum and a large quantity of diamonds had been confiscated by the Division and impounded in the vaults of the Bank of Japan. (website of the 1st Cavalry Division: <http://www.first-team.us/journals/1stndx02.html>)

**Oct 1, 1945:** The soldiers of the Eighth and Sixth Armies marched into a total of 29 head offices in 7 cities; included were the main Tokyo office of the Bank of Japan, the Hypothec Bank and the Yokohama Specie. The Japanese Finance Minister received a 10-point order demanding not only the closing of the banks but also the dismissal of their presidents, chairmen of the board, managing directors, and special advisers. At the same time the Japanese Government was ordered to turn over to GHQ all physical assets such as gold, silver and mortgages of the 21 institutions. (NYT p. 1)

**Oct 1, 1945: SCAPIN 80** Subject: Censorship of the mails [excerpt].

All postal communications are subject to censorship to the extent deemed advisable by the Supreme Allied Commander. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, Harold Fair, Lt Colonel AGD (SCAPINS 1-600)

**Oct 1, 1945: SCAPIN 79** Subject: Confiscation of the September 29 edition of Toyo Keizai Shimpo. The Japanese Imperial Government will issue the necessary orders to effect the confiscation of all distributed copies of the 29 Sep 1945 issue of Toyo Keizai Shimpo [see below Oct 3 for details]. The confiscated copies will be submitted to the Civil Censorship Detachment, 6th floor, Radio Tokyo Building, for disposition. (SCAPINS 1-600)

**Oct 2, 1945: SCAPIN 80** Subject: Supplies and services required by the Occupation Forces [excerpt].

[The instructions mentions 23 supplies and 19 services; the following list gives some examples] Construction materials, fuel (coal wood), textiles, furniture and office equipment, soap and candles, ice, special entertainment (music, dramatics, wrestling, etc.), repair of occupation installations, laundry and dry cleaning, shoe repairs, tailoring. (SCAPINS 1-600)

**Oct. 3-9, 1945:** One enlisted man died of accidental gunshot wound (GSW). He was evacuated to Yokohama. (NDL microfiche WOR 51359, G-1 Periodic Report of the 97 Infantry Division, central Japan).

[The source does not give more information about this accident.]

**Oct. 3, 1945:** Confiscation of all the issues of the September issue of the widely circulated English language magazine “Tokyo Keizai Shimpo”. The issue carried an article dealing with Japanese reactions to American occupation which General MacArthur termed inimical to the interests of the occupation forces (NYT p. 10).

**Oct 3, 1945: SCAPIN 91** Subject: Misconduct among occupation troops [excerpt]. Receipt is acknowledged of CLO no 54,55,77 dated 27 Sep. [CLO stands for Central Liaison Office] and CLO no 107 dated 29 Sep. concerning various instances of alleged misconduct of the part of American troops. In the instant cases there appears to be insufficient evidence to properly identify the alleged violators. To assist the occupation forces in controlling cases of alleged misconduct, it is desired (i) That such violations are reported immediately by the offended person or the Japanese Civil Police to the nearest Military Police. (ii) That a written report in duplicate, numbering each incident serially be furnished this Headquarters as soon as practicable after the incident giving time and date of incident, place, name and address of person allegedly offended, description of alleged misconduct, time and person to which initial report required in (i) was submitted. (SCAPINS 1-600)

[This SCAPIN was rescinded only on 23 January 1950. If this directive has been effectively implemented (which requires that Military Police did indeed register the complaints in spite of the language barriers, it means that the records with the descriptions of such incidents should be available in Japanese and American archives. See chapter 8.

**Oct 4, 1945: ●(2,0,0,3)** Three United States Army sergeants were sentenced today to ten years at hard labor and dishonorable discharge for slaying a Japanese civilian and his son after a wild sake party in the home of the Japanese (NYT p. 8).

**Oct 4, 1945:** Premier Higashikuni resigned his office and was replaced by Kijuro Shidehara. Some sources say that its resignation was due to the fact that a SCAP directive removed his Home Minister. Shidehara speaks fluent English and is well known in the United States as being pro-American. Shigeru Yoshida is minister of Foreign Affairs in the Shidehara Cabinet; at this time the Foreign Affairs ministry served mainly as a liaison office for transmitting American directives to the Cabinet. (Brines 1948)

**Oct 5, 1945: SCAPIN 95** Subject: Request for funds [excerpt].

In accordance with SCAPIN 7 dated 4 Sep. 1945, it is requested that the Bank of Japan segregate and earmark for the use of occupation forces, the sum of 3 billion yens (about 200 million dollars of 1945 or 2 billion dollars of 2000). (SCAPIN 1-600)

[This SCAPIN implemented the instruction given to General MacArthur by the De-

partment of State (see above) to the effect that the Japanese authorities should make available to occupation forces legal tender yen notes or yen credits free of cost and in amounts sufficient to meet all expenses of the occupation forces.

In fact, this instruction followed a similar one given to French authorities in the wake of the Normandy invasion. The wording was as follows.

August 15, 1944. Memorandum no 2 relating to currency. "The Trésor Central Français (French Central Treasury) will place at the disposal of the Allied Forces at the request of the Supreme Allied Commander such amounts of French franc currency as the commander declares necessary for the use of Allied forces in continental France in such denominations, such types, and such places as the commander shall request. French authorities will be kept fully informed of all expenditures in these notes." (NDL microfiche number GS(B)-01984)

With the exception of the last sentence, this instruction was very similar to the one given to Japanese authorities. We do not know how it was received by the French provisional government headed by General de Gaulle. What we do know, however, is that the introduction of occupation francs printed in the United States (the analog of the B-yen) lead to a serious conflict between French and American authorities which was settled only in the fall of 1944.]

**Oct 8, 1945:** Memo to Colonel Mumson

Subject: Intrusion by US Army into the War Ministry.

Around 15:00 a Lt. Col Gootsby of the Quarter Master Section accompanied by soldiers from the First Cavalry Division made a search for US dollars at the War Ministry. They confiscated 1,660 dollars which were in a safe. All throughout the search their attitude appeared to be highly oppressive. They carried away 4 swords belonging to Japanese officers.

[signed] Colonel Yamamoto (Arata)

(NDL, microfiche GII-1094)

[This letter is typical of the beginning of the occupation. Very soon, the Japanese officials understood that they would not be treated with magnanimity by their victors. In subsequent months many more Japanese swords were taken away by US officers. It would be interesting to know the reaction of Colonel Mumson to this letter.]

**Oct 9, 1945:** **SCAPIN 110** Subject: Import of essential commodities [excerpt].

Several requests have been received from the Central Liaison Committee for authorization to import commodities deemed to be essential for the maintenance of the civil population. Requests to import commodities will not be submitted unless credits have been established for payment by means of exports and approved by this Headquarters. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**Oct 10, 1945: SCAPIN 136** Subject: Remittance of funds [excerpt].

Reference is made to your CLO Message no 68 dated 24 September 1945 where you requested authorization for the remittance of 15,000 yens to the French Consulate-General at Seoul, Korea. Authorization for the remittance of the funds is denied. (SCAPIN 1-600)

[This instruction shows that even for matters which were not of great importance by themselves, it was not just a formality to ask and get permission from SCAP authorities.]

**Oct. 11, 1945:** A demonstration of 800 students was broken up by military and Japanese police (NYT p. 22).

**Oct 11, 1945: SCAPIN 119** Subject: Japanese government proposal to increase domestic police force [excerpt].

There shall be no increase in the strength, organization and armament of the civil police force at this time. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**Oct 13, 1945:** Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government (GA). Subject: Raising of the national flag [excerpt].

Receipt is acknowledged for your letter of the 13th instant. In the near future you will be given a directive covering every circumstance under which the Japanese national flag may be displayed. Pending issuance of this directive no action will be taken in the matter.

[Subsequently, authorization had to be obtained in each circumstance in which the Japanese government wished to display the national flag. No less than 19 SCAPINs (21 Dec 1945, 1260, 1296, 1343, 1397, 1413, 1567, 1577, 1610, 1636, 1773, 1793, 1805, 1816, 1831, 1833, 1853, 1867, 1934) were issued to grant such authorizations. The first one of these authorizations reads as follows. 21 Dec 1945 (no SCAPIN number): The Headquarters has no objection to the use of the Japanese national flag on 25 December 1945 for the anniversary of the late Emperor Taisho. Eventually, on 6 January 1949, SCAPIN 1956 granted authorization to display the national flag without restriction.] (Nippon Times 1947, Directives; SCAPcat)

**Oct 14, 1945:** Soon after the marines landed at Tsingtao (China) the big Japanese school that was to have been used as barracks was burned to the ground. Chinese authorities arrested 10 Japanese in connection with the fire because evidence pointed to Japanese responsibility (NYT p. 10).

**Oct 18, 1945: ● (3,0,0,3)** Private First Class Arthur Herskovitz died in Asa Higawa on the island of Hokkaido. He belonged to the 305th Infantry Regiment which was part of the 77th Infantry Division. The cause of his death is not known. He was interred on 23 October 1945 at the USAF Cemetery in Yokohama. His body was

disinterred on 31 August 1948 and the casket was shipped to the United States to be buried in the same cemetery as his mother and father.

(<http://69.5.24.49/forums/printthread.php?s=31f8c374ba8ab42d11837e559c9bc34c&threadid=25548>)

[After the Japanese surrender, Hokkaido was occupied by the 77th Infantry Division under Major General Andrew D. Bruce. After this division was deactivated in March 1946, it was replaced in Hokkaido by the 11th Airborne Division.]

**Oct 19, 1945: SCAPIN 158** (LS) Subject: Command exercised by general Tomoyuki Yamashita during the period from 7 December 1941 to 2 September 1945 [excerpt].

It is directed that you [i.e. the Japanese government] furnish this Headquarters within 5 days copies of duly authenticated official documents setting forth (i) the geographical extent of the command of General Tomoyuki Yamashita (ii) all orders issued to him (iii) all orders issued by him to subordinate commanders (iv) the biographical record of General Yamashita. (SCAPIN 1-600)

[General Tomoyuki Yamashita was most famous for conquering the British colonies of Malaya and Singapore. In 1944 he assumed the command of the Fourteenth Army to defend the Philippines. From October 29 to December 7, 1945, he was tried by an American military commission in Manila for war crimes relating to the war in the Philippines and sentenced to death. The legitimacy of the hasty trial has been called into question by many. He was hanged on February 23, 1946, at Los Banos Prison Camp, 30 miles south of Manila. The Wikipedia article from which the previous information is excerpted also reproduces the statement made by Yamashita through his translator before climbing the steps leading to the gallows: this translation is faulty to the point of being incomprehensible. If the translations of the statements made by Yamashita during his trial were of the same description, it raises indeed some doubts as to the legal standards accepted at this court.]

**Oct 20, 1945: SCAPIN 162** (ESS)

Subject: Dissolution of major financial or industrial enterprises. [excerpt].

No approval will be given to plans submitted to the Japanese Government [by the companies] for the dissolution of any holding company “Zaibatsu”. “Conzern” without prior submission to this Headquarters. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**Oct 20, 1945:** A photograph shows two GI with rifles guarding ingots. The caption says: “First Division Cavalry military police guarding more than \$6 million worth of Japanese silver and platinum which is part of the \$250 hoard uncovered in the capital. Seized by Allied authorities it is being held pending instructions. (NYT p. 6)

**Oct 21, 1945:** Memorandum to the Imperial Japanese Government. Subject: Destruction of Japanese prisoner of war records. The memorandum demands the list of the documents that have been destroyed and the names of the individual who directed such destruction. (Nippon Times (Directives) 1947)

**Oct 22, 1945:** SCAPIN 172 Subject: Colonel Nebuyaki Iijima. The Imperial Japanese Government will apprehend and deliver to the authorities of the Omori Prison camp colonel Iijima, former director of military training. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**Oct 22, 1945:** SCAPIN 173 (CIS)

Subject: Military government of Batangas Province, Philippines Island [excerpt].

It is directed that you furnish this headquarters with the name of the Military Governor of Batangas Province during the period of October 1944 to July 1945, the units under his command and the complete names of all subordinate officers. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**Oct 22, 1945:** SCAPIN 178 (CIE)

Subject: Administration of the educational system of Japan.

Teachers and educational officials will be examined as rapidly as possible. All persons who have been active exponents of militarism and ultra-nationalism and those *actively antagonistic to the policies of the occupation* will be removed.

(NDL, microform GII-02902)

[This SCAPIN shows that the process of remodeling the Japanese educational system started very early in the occupation, 9 weeks after the Japanese capitulation. This is certainly the first historical instance of a military victory that is followed by such a broad-scale effort.

This SCAPIN was followed by several others on the same topic. One can for instance mention the following.

- SCAPIN 212 of 30 October 1945. Subject: Memorandum concerning investigation, screening, and certification of teachers and education officials.
- SCAPIN 916 of 2 May 1946. Subject: Dismissal of Ishikawa Koji, Professor of Kyoto Imperial University.
- SCAPIN 954 of 15 May 1946. Subject: Dismissal of Shihata Kei, Professor of Kyoto Imperial University.
- SCAPIN 955 of 15 May 1946. Subject: Dismissal of Shiga Kominoski, principal of Noshiro Industrial School, Akita prefecture.
- SCAPIN 956 of 15 May 1946. Subject: Dismissal of Taniguchi Kichihiko, Professor of Kyoto Imperial University.
- SCAPIN 1106 of 6 August 1946. Subject: Suspension of Japanese educators. Apart from militaristic activities, the reasons for removal included one of a much

broader range, namely to be antagonistic to the policies and objectives of the occupation. Needless to say, this could include almost anything. Moreover the real meaning of this expression will change in the course of time along with the objectives of the occupation.

Thus, as soon as 1946, the screening was directed against Communists, union leaders and more generally all left-wing teachers.

Even regarding militarism, the line between ultra-nationalism and mere patriotism was fairly fuzzy. For instance, one CIC investigation (microfiche G2-2902) mentions a school principal in Niigata who kept previous practices such as reading of the school code, bowing in the direction of the Imperial Palace, reporting to teachers in a military manner. Was this patriotism or militarism? It was ground for dismissal anyway.

As there were some 400,000 teachers in Japan the task of screening them was huge and would go on for several years. In principle, the screening was conducted by "Investigation Committees" composed of Japanese citizens, but the activity of these committees was closely monitored by the occupation authorities. Committee members who failed to fulfill US expectations were promptly dismissed. An illustration is provided below at the date of 16 August 1946, another at the date of 30 April 1947.]

**Oct 22, 1945: SCAPIN 179 (GS)**

Subject: Proceedings of the Diet [excerpt].

In order that the Supreme Commander may be informed of the activities of the Diet, it is desired that the Japanese Government establish a procedure by which this Headquarters will be furnished copies, in English, of proposed laws and reports on the progress of proposed legislation from the time the bills come before the Bureau of Legislation throughout the entire legislative process until enacted into law. It is desired that the proposed procedure be submitted to this Headquarters not later than 10 days after receipt of this memorandum. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**Oct 24, 1945: SCAPIN 183 Civil Intelligence Section (CIS). [excerpt].**

The Imperial Japanese Government is directed immediately to dismiss from their present positions the following officials of Rikkyo Gakuin [i.e. St Paul's University, a Protestant institution of higher learning] [11 names follow. Furthermore, it is directed] that none of these individuals be reemployed or placed in any position in any public or private educational or religious institution or in any government position. (Woodard 1972, p. 293) [Note that, as explained in the New York Times article below, these persons were not accused of being ultranationalists; their offense was to have allowed the disruption of Christian services and teaching after 1943. In addition, the SCAPIN also ordered similar investigations to be conducted in some 70 (mainly Christian) learning institutions.]

**Oct 27, 1945:** The explosion of an ammunition dump caused heavy damage on the Kurishima Peninsula below Tokyo. Doors and windows over a wide area were blown in. The ammunition was being moved by the Japanese from storage caves to wharves for disposal under the supervision of an American Army ordnance ammunition company. (Shanghai News p. 4)

[The article does not give any information about possible casualties. The New York Times does not report this explosion.]

**Oct 29, 1945:** MacArthur ordered dismissal of all Japanese officials at St Paul's University in Tokyo. The directive charged that in 1942 the Japanese had violated the 1874 charter of the institution by ending Christian teachings and chapel service. All officials were dismissed but only 11 were barred from further employment in Japanese public or private educational institutions. At the same time, the directive directed the Japanese Government to conduct a survey of 81 other Christian institutions to be handed to GHQ no later than November 15. (NYT p. 1)

**Oct. 30, 1945:** A total of 957 crimes and offenses against the Japanese population were committed by GIs since the beginning of the occupation according to the SCAP (Haikyo Vol. 7, p. 145, communicated by Eddy Dufourmont, see also chapter 8).

**Oct 31, 1945: SCAPIN 215**

Subject: Sales of securities of certain firms [excerpt].

It is directed that no sale or other transfer of the stocks, bonds or other forms of securities of the firms listed below (nor of their subsidiary firms) shall be made without the prior approval of this Headquarters. Further such securities shall not be used as collateral for loans without prior approval of this Headquarters. (Scapin 1952, p. 37) [The appended list comprises 15 firms; later on (see SCAPIN 403 of 8 Dec 1945), this list became known as the "Schedule of Restricted Concerns" and was considerably expanded. Over the years 1946-1950 there were many SCAPINs listing additions to or removals from the "Schedule of Restricted Concerns".]

**Nov 1945:** In November several accidents in the VAC zone [VAC=V Amphibious Corps=2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions= Kyushu and adjacent areas of western Honshu ] occurred during the munitions disposition program. At Kanoya, a dump of parachute flares was accidentally ignited and the resulting fire touched off a major explosion.

At Soida in the 32d Infantry Division zone, [the 32d Infantry Division, was substituted on 6 September for the 3d Marine Division] a cave full of propellant charges and powder exploded in a devastating blast which spread death and destruction among nearby Japanese. No American personnel were injured in either accident. (Shaw 1969)

**Nov 1, 1945:** GHQ, SCAP, Economic and Scientific Section Memorandum for: The Imperial Japanese Government [Transmitted] through: Central Liaison Office.

Subject: Shipment of 150,000 sheets of silkworm eggs to Korea.

1. It is directed that the necessary action be taken at once to effect the shipment to Korea of 150,000 sheets of silkworm eggs.

2. The shipment will be consigned to the commanding General of US forces in Korea.

3. The assembly, crating and shipping arrangements are to be completed at the port of shipment as soon as practicable. This Headquarters is to be advised when all arrangements have been completed. For the Supreme Commander, H.W. Allen, Colonel A.G.D. [Adjutant General Division] (Nippon Times (Directives) 1947, vol 1, section: Exports)

[Why did we mention this directive? At first sight, it might appear of minor importance but precisely for this reason it raises two interesting questions. It is clear that at this time the Japanese government had more urgent tasks than to make arrangements for the exportation of silkworm eggs to Korea. Thus, the first question is whether or not the directive was executed. If it was, one must admit that the pressure GHQ was able to apply was fairly effective and one would like to understand why. In case it was not executed, one would wish to know what sanctions followed as a result. In the present case it is likely that the directive was duly executed for a very similar one was issued on 6 February 1946 which orders 150,000 sheets silkworm eggs to be sent to Shanghai. Through an article published in the North China Daily News of 3 April 1946 we know that 300,000 sheets of silkworm eggs transported from Japan indeed arrived to Shanghai. Incidentally, one may wonder why 300,000 sheets were received when only 150,000 were ordered to be transported.]

**Nov 1, 1945:** SCAPIN 223 (GB)

Subject: Saluting.

Summary: Directs that officers and men of the police force salute all officers of United States Occupation Forces and in particular all automobiles bearing the star insignia of the General Officers and Flag Officers. (SCAPcat)

**Nov 3, 1945:** The directives to SCAP issued by the Department of state (see above the section "Guidelines given to occupation headquarters" order the establishment of military tribunals. Thus, it is likely that such tribunals have operated before the publication of Scapin 756 on February 19, 1946. I can be recalled in that respect that in Italy and Germany military tribunals had been operating in close contact with the advancing troops; these tribunals were somewhat different from those who were established once the enemy had withdrawn from the area.

**Nov 4, 1945:** Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government: [excerpts].

The Imperial Japanese Government shall (a) Submit to this Headquarters within 10 days the name, rank, title and present location of the chief of the Kempei-Tai [Japanese military police] and his assistants including all headquarters officers. (b) Submit to this Headquarters by 30 November 1945 a comprehensive report in English describing the organization, structure, channels of command and methods of operations of the Kempei-Tai. This report shall include the list of all officers in each subdivision with indication of name, rank, and official position. Signed: H.W. Allen (Nippon Times, Directives 1947, vol 1, section: Exports)

**Nov 4, 1945:** General Headquarters of the US Army Forces, Pacific to: Central Liaison Office. Subject: Repair of automobile for Italian Embassy. It is requested that assistance be given the Italian Embassy in the repair of its Lancia automobile which is in need of overhaul. [Signed:] F.P. Munson, Colonel, G-2, GHQ SCAP (MOF 1)

[This message which addressed to the Central Liaison Office located in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not catalogued as a SCAPIN (nor as a SCAPIN-A). As a matter of fact, in addition to standard SCAPINs a variety of other requests were directed to the Japanese government. The previous message is one example among hundreds of other messages.]

**Nov 4, 1945:** Among the newspaper articles excised by American censors are also articles already published in the New York Times. Explaining the censorship policy Colonel Hoover said that the Japanese public was still unfit to receive the same news as Americans. (NYT p. 36)

[The obvious implication is that the New York Times was not on sale in Japan.]

**Nov 6, 1945:** **SCAPIN 243** (LS) Subject: Apprehension of suspected war criminals [excerpt].

The following named Japanese are alleged to have committed atrocities and offenses against persons of United Nations while confined in prisons, war camps, internment camps or hospitals in Japan. These persons will be delivered to the Omori prison, Yokohama at the earliest practical date.

[Appended to the text of the SCAPIN there is a list of about 400 names of military of all ranks (down to private) as well as civilians.]

**Nov 9, 1945:** **Covert organization of the elections**

Office of the US Political Adviser. Memorandum for Supreme Commander.

Subject: The present Diet and the forthcoming election.

There is ample justification under the Potsdam declaration to inform [Prime Minister] Shidehara that the present Diet members are obstacles to the strengthening of

democratic tendencies and should not therefore stand for re-election. If this suggestion is approved, Shidehara might also be informed that there should be *no publicity* in carrying out the Supreme Commander's *oral instruction* in this matter.

[Signed] Atcheson (George, Jr).

(NDL, microfiche TS 19)

[The most interesting part of this message is probably the last advice. It sets up what will be the main characteristic of the occupation, namely pulling all the strings and pretending that the decisions are taken by the Japanese. Broadly speaking, this has remained the accepted historical version of the occupation of Japan up to the present day (23 June 2013).]

**Nov 10, 1945:** A memorandum similar in form to the one cited above for Nov 1, requires 18,000 tons of coal to be delivered monthly to British troops at Kyushu ports. (Nippon Times, Directives 1947, vol 1, section: Exports)

**Nov 10, 1945:** Tokyo. A former member of the Kamikaze Corps, Matsuo SASAKI, 26 years old, tried to stab the Japanese Home Minister (also in charge of Japanese police forces) Zenjiro HORIKIRI with a pocket knife. Horikiri escaped injury. The attacker and an accomplice were arrested. (NYT 9 November p. 3, Shanghai Herald 10 November p. 4)

**Nov 12, 1945:** ●(3,0,0,148) The explosion of gun powder stored in the Futamata tunnel (Fukuoka prefecture) which occurred at 1720 hours killed 145 persons. (MOFA 33)

[No mention of this disaster is to be found in the New York Times.]

**Nov 14, 1945:** Headquarters, US Army Service Command C, Military Government Supply Section. To: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo. Subject: Hot Water Heaters. It is requested that your office release the attached list of supplies to the Leybold K.K. Company of Tokyo. These supplies are to be used in the manufacture of 1,000 hot water heating units in accordance with Procurement Demand No CE-8-PD-193-46. [Signed:] W.A. Haviland, Lieutenant Colonel, Chief of Supply and Services].

[The appended list comprised 30 items of which the following provide a few examples] 1) 1,100 steel plates of size 5 inch × 10 inch × 4.5 mm (representing a total of 180 tons)

2) 1,100 steel plates of size 4 inch × 8 inch × 6.8 mm (representing a total of 154 tons)

3) 11,000 meter of flat bar 65 mm × 9 mm

4) 1,100 float valves

5) 88,000 fire bricks and mortar (MOFA 28)

[This message to the Japanese government provides an example of the activity of the

procurement section which was in charge of getting the Japanese supplies needed by occupation forces. In the present case the request is destined to install central heating in some of the buildings occupied by occupation forces.]

**Nov 16, 1945:** ●(4,0,0,149) Death of an American soldier and his Japanese girl companion at a lonely pier near the naval warehouse of Kishiwada. Abrasions on the foreheads of the soldier and the girl first led to the belief that the couple had been murdered. Further investigation concluded that it was an accident. (NT Ja 1, 1946 p. 2)

**Nov 16, 1945:** Eki Sone, the Director of the 1st Division of the Central Liaison Office (through which transited all messages between SCAP and the Japanese government) had been robbed of his watch in a train by two American servicemen. He sent a plea to Colonel F.P. Munson, SCAP: “The watch has high sentimental value to me, and its loss is irreplaceable. I should be very grateful if you would be good enough to take measures so that it may be reclaimed.” A two-page description of the incident is appended to the letter: “Before the train stopped at Yutenji station the perpetrator began to ask the Japanese passengers what time it was. When he asked me I took out the watch which was attached to a button hole with a chain. The perpetrator suddenly grabbed the watch breaking the chain and get off the train. From these circumstances it can be presumed that the crime was premeditated.” (MOFA 33)

**Nov 16, 1945** SCAPIN 287 (CIE)

Subject: Elimination of undemocratic motion pictures [excerpt].

The Japanese government is directed to take immediate action (i) To insure against the present and future exhibition or sale of any of the motion pictures on the attached inclosure. (ii) To secure from the owners of these pictures all prints, whether positive or negative, and store them in a safe place in Tokyo subject to the disposition of this Headquarters.

[The inclosure contains a list of about 115 Japanese picture movies]. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**Nov 17, 1945:** The first major food riot was reported in northern Japan; the Japanese Government publicly admitted that its price controls over perishable foodstuffs had reached a state of complete collapse; black market dominates. Thousands of men and women stormed into the village of Toyono, Hokkaido, broke into a flour mill, attacked and looted farm carts carrying grains and made off with whatever supply they were able to find. On the following day, 1,300 rioters seized stores at three other places. In one case the rioters left behind them money equivalent to the Government’s fixed price. The government has applied for SCAP to set a price which is

higher than the one it granted previously. (NYT p. 3).

**Nov 18, 1945:** The major Tokyo dailies reported that since the end of the war on Aug 15, about 1,400 person had starved to death in the main Japanese cities (Fifty years 1975, p. 212).

**Nov 19, 1945:** The “Civil Information and Education Section” delivered a directive containing a list of forbidden themes e.g. vendettas, feudal loyalty, approval of suicide, personal devotion to a nation. According to this directive practically none of the kabuki’s mostly historical repertoire was allowed. Subsequently, an agreement was reached under which only two-third of the repertoire was banned. The ban on kabuchi plays was lifted by the end of 1947. Movies were subjected to a similar directive. On Nov 16, GHQ ordered the Japanese government to prohibit the showing of 236 movies made between 1931 and 1945. (Okamoto 2001)

**Nov 19, 1945:** **SCAPIN 303** Subject: Lists of Japan Naval Personnel [excerpt]  
The Imperial Japanese Government is directed to furnish this Headquarters, within 15 days of the receipt of this memorandum, the names and numbers of the Japanese submarines responsible for the sinking of the following ships during the years 1943 and 1944 together with the logs and rosters of crews on board such submarines at the time of the sinking.

SS Daisy Moller (British), SS Ascot (British), SS Nancy Moller (British), SS Tjissalak (Dutch), SS Jean Nicolet (French), SS Richard Harwey (USA).

[The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a protection against self-incrimination in the sense that a defendant can refuse to answer a question because the response might form self incriminating evidence. In 1966 the US Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination requires law enforcement officials to advise a suspect interrogated in custody of his rights to remain silent and to obtain an attorney.

For the Japanese government to comply with this demand would have been tantamount to making Japanese citizens liable to a death sentence for acts accomplished in the service of their country.

Was this information really delivered to SCAP? In the negative, how did SCAP react? In the affirmative, one wonders how many Japanese submarine commanders were tried by Allied military tribunals.

In this connection, it must be recalled that American submarines sank numerous Japanese civilian vessels (including some which carried the Red Cross of hospital vessels) without any of the commanders being tried for war crime.]

**Nov 19, 1945:** ● (5,0,0,150) A GI and his girlfriend were murdered in Japan. The bodies of an American soldier and a Japanese girl evidently beaten to death with

a club have been found near Osaka. A public relations officers of the Sixth Army described the deaths as a double murder. (NYT p. 3).

**Nov 19, 1945: SCAPIN 313**

Subject: Provision of coal at Fusan for use by US Forces in Korea.

You are directed to load and dispatch vessels at a rate necessary to insure the delivery of 70,000 tons of coal to the Korean port of Fusan. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**Nov. 21, 1945: ●(5,0,0,153)** Naval arsenal of Funaoka. A number of Koreans were discovered stealing alcohol. One of them was killed and several were wounded as they tried to escape. US troops were guided to their homes by the Japanese police where two wounded were found. One of these was killed as he attempted to escape. The other died in the hospital. (G-2 Periodic Report No 84, USAMGIK, NDL, microfiche Foreign Occupied Areas, FOA 5046-5048)

**Nov. 22, 1945:** Seven Japanese civilians were seized for carrying grenades and other arms (NYT p. 16).

**Nov. 23, 1945: ●(8,0,0,171)** Three Americans and 18 Japanese were killed in the explosion of a cargo ship (NYT p. 2).

**Nov. 23, 1945:** 200 Japanese broke into an American Army warehouse at Sendai and seized food and other goods before being dispersed by American Military Police (Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP, Occupational trends in Japan and Korea, 21 December 1945; found in General Eichelberger's papers, reel 18).

[This short report does not say if the MP allowed Japanese to leave with the food that they had collected; neither does it say if any of them were injured while being "dispersed".]

**Nov 24, 1945: SCAPIN 338** Subject: Pensions and benefits [excerpt].

The Imperial Japanese Government is directed to take the necessary steps as rapidly as possible and in no event later than 1 February 1946 to terminate all payments of any public or private pensions to any person:

(a) By reason of military service, except compensation for physical disability limiting the recipients ability to work.

(c) Who has been removed from any office or position as a result of any order of the Supreme Commander.

[The consequence is that persons removed from their position for non-compliance with SCAP directives will get no compensation of any kind whatever their age; as dismissed civil servants most often could not apply to other public positions they experienced (as well as their families) great hardship.]

**Nov 24, 1945:** US Marines seized and began to destroy three large cyclotrons in

Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto. Engineers and ordnance men moved into the plants armed with welding torches and explosives. Part of the machines will be loaded on barges, taken out to sea, and sunk. The Japanese government was informed of this raid just shortly before it took place which may explain why nobody was aware of what was going on when the destruction began. Major O'Hearn told correspondents that the machines might have been used to extract uranium 235, the raw material of the atomic bomb [in fact a cyclotron can produce only tiny quantities that are by far insufficient for a bomb]. Although the action is in line with Allied directives, under peaceful control the cyclotrons might have contributed to the progress of science. (NYT p. 3)

**Nov 26, 1945:** Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Governemnt. Subject: Admission of Allied personel to Diet sessions. It is desired that 25 seats be made available in each of the Houses of the Diet for use of Allied Military personnel during the current session. (General Eichelberger's papers, reel 22)

**Nov 27, 1945:** A secret directive (called SWNCC 228) was issued by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee in Washington; it gives guidelines for the reform of the Japanese constitution. After being amended on 7 January 1946, this directive provided the framework for the drafting of the new constitution. The directive begins as follows.

TOP SECRET, 27 NOVEMBER 1945, Pages 1-14, incl.

STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE

REFORM OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

The Supreme Commander should indicate to the Japanese authorities that the Japanese governmental system should be reformed to accomplish the following general objectives: [ . . . ]

Only as a last resort should the Supreme Commander order the Japanese Government to effect the above listed reforms, as the knowledge that they had been imposed by the Allies would materially reduce the possibility of their acceptance and support by the Japanese people for the future.

[The complete text of the directive can be found on the website of the National Diet Library:

<http://210.128.252.171/constitution/e/shiryu/03/059/059tx.html.>]

**Dec 1945:** Ministry of Education officials received a report from the Education Division according to which the new interim textbooks would as a requirement be printed in romanized Japanese as the first step in a change-over to romanized Japanese. The report stirred considerable emotion. In response to his inquiry the Minister

of Education was told that it was only for certain types of documents that the shift to romaji would be mandatory (Trainor 1983).

**Dec 2, 1945:** Matsutaro Shoriki, owner and director of the newspaper Yomiuri-Hochi was named as a war criminal. Under this pressure he eventually yielded to the demand of the newspaper's employees and agreed to sell 30 percent of his stock. As a result the Yomiuri-Hochi could be reorganized in line with SCAP's requirements as had been done for other newspapers. Mr Shoriki was released some months later for lack of evidence to support the charge. (Coughlin 1952).

[This episode shows how indictments threats could be used for policy goals.]

**Dec 3, 1945:** 59 high-ranking Japanese were put on the war criminal list. This list of suspects is the fourth turned over for action to the Japanese and it brings to 354 the total of those suspected. The Japanese government is ordered to arrest the suspects and to turn them over to occupation authorities. The list includes 6 members of the House of Peers, the upper chamber of the Japanese Diet, more than a dozen former cabinet ministers, three of Japan's best known journalists as well as university professors. It also includes Yoshio Kodama. (NYT p. 1,2) [The article gives a short portrait of each of the 59 persons. For Kodama it says: "Politician, writer and former publisher of the Tokyo newspaper Yamato Shimbun" thus omitting completely his role with the Japanese army in Shanghai during the war.]

**Dec 6, 1945:** **SCAPIN 398** Subject: Production of coal.

In view of the current serious coal shortage and the need to prevent an impending economic crisis you are directed to take immediate steps to increase the production of coal in Japan. (SCAPIN 1-600)

[It should be recalled that three weeks earlier SCAPIN 313 ordered the monthly delivery of 70,000 tons of coal to the US Forces in Korea.]

**Dec 8, 1945:** **SCAPIN 403** Subject: Establishment of a Schedule of Restrictive Concerns [excerpt].

The action directed in SCAPIN 215 (31 Oct 1945) will be applied to a list of companies hereafter to be referred to as the "Schedule of Restricted Concerns". [The attached list comprises about 50 companies and it will be expanded in steps over the next two or three years to the extent of containing over one thousand companies and subsidiaries.] (Scapins 1952, p. 57)

**Dec 8, 1945:** **SCAPIN 408** Subject: Regulations affecting restricted concerns. [excerpt].

All cash on hand other than required for payroll and petty expenditures will be promptly deposited in the accounts of Japanese banks. No transfer or withdrawal from any account will be made except for the normal course of business. No new

stocks or bonds will be issued. No dividends will be paid. The Imperial Japanese Government will promptly obtain and furnish to this Headquarters statements from each firm listed on the Schedule of Restricted Concerns specifying all payments made since 1 July 1945. The Imperial Japanese Government will acknowledge receipt of this memorandum and promptly report the action taken by it in compliance therewith.

[In short, the financial operations of the companies listed on the Schedule of Restricted Concerns were completely frozen and they were put under close scrutiny by SCAP. It should be noted that this line of actions was quite distinct from the planned (but hardly implemented) dissolution of small number of zaibatsus, as were called the largest Japanese corporations. The very fact that the Schedule of Restricted Concerns comprised over one thousand companies shows that most of these companies were by no means zaibatsus. At this point it is not clear to me what was the real objective of SCAP in freezing the financial transactions of these companies.]

**Dec 8, 1945:** On 1 and 8 December 1945, Tomowo Satoki, present chief editor of the Gifu Times made public speeches before the Woman's High School Alumni Association in which he stated that American was actually stifling freedom of speech and of press in Japan. Satoki urged them to beware of Americans. Gifu is located 30 km north of Nagoya. (GHQ8a, No 247)

**Dec 8, 1945:** Beginning on 8 December 1945 the first installment of "The History of the Pacific War" appeared in all Japanese newspapers. The articles were written by Bradford Smith who was working for the US Office of War Information.

Regarding the atrocities in Nanjing (December 1937 – February 1938) the history claimed that "According to witnesses, more than 20,000 men, women and children were confirmed to have been murdered." (Yoshida 2006, p. 49)

[Subsequently, a fatality figure ten times higher was accepted and officialized by the "International Military Tribunal for the Far East" (see also below at the date of 13 November 1948). On which new evidence was it based? Unfortunately, Takashi Yoshida provides no answer to this question.]

**Dec 9, 1945:** Japanese raid on a US-guarded warehouse in Sendai (NYT p. 28).

**Dec 9, 1945:** Publication of the first directive on land reform to the Japanese government. Apart from setting basic guidelines it clearly indicated the dissatisfaction of SCAP with the bill by which the Japanese government had tried to satisfy SCAP's wishes expressed by General MacArthur to Prime Minister Shidehara in October.

SCAPIN 411, Subject: Rural land reform [excerpt].

In order to destroy the economic bondage which has enslaved the Japanese farmers for centuries of feudal oppression, the Japanese Imperial Government is directed to

take measures to insure that those who till the soil of Japan shall have a more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits of their labor. More than three fourth of the farmers are tenants paying rentals amounting to half or more of their annual crops. The Japanese Imperial Government is therefore ordered to submit to this Headquarters on or before 15 March 1946 a program of rural land reform. This program shall contain plans for transfer of land ownership from absentee land owners to land operators, and provisions for reasonable protection of former tenants against reversion to tenancy status. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, H.W. Allen, Colonel AGD (Grad, 1948, Ward 1990, SCAPIN, 1-600)

**Dec 10, 1945: SCAPIN 413** Subject: Cessation of communications between Japanese Government and its former diplomatic and consular representatives. [excerpt]. The Japanese Government will from the receipt of this Memorandum discontinue all communication between itself and Japanese diplomatic and consular representatives abroad. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**Dec 11, 1945: SCAPIN 420** Subject: Utilization of the Central Aeronautical Research Institute. [excerpt].

The Central Aeronautical Research Institute is to be disbanded by 31 December 1945. The request to convert it to civilian use is not approved.

[Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, H.W. Allen, Colonel A.G.D. (Scapins 1952, p. 65)

**Dec 16, 1945:** Allies chided Japan on coal shortage. Allied headquarters demanded today an explanation from the Japanese Government of its failure to settle the strikes and produce additional labor for the coal mines in northern Japan. (NYT p. 6)

[One should remember that Japan had to deliver coal to Allied troops (see above at Sep 23 and Nov 10) as well as to Korea (see Sep 25)]

**Dec. 19, 1945: ●(9,0,0,171)** Bayoneting to death of Private Robert C. Young who caught Japanese looting a warehouse. One of the Japanese, Katsunori Tamura (16) was sentenced to death. After the sentence was approved by General Eichelberger on 7 April 1946 and by General MacArthur on 6 May 1946 (NARA 12), Tamura was hanged on 18 May 1946.

His two accomplices, Sadatsugo Saito (17) and Tatsugo Shimizu (16) were sentenced to 30-year prison terms, but were freed in December 1949 because of their young age. A previous clemency petition had been rejected on 27 July 1949. (NYT 26 Jan. 1946 p. 6, 18 May 1946 p. 4, 27 Dec. 1949 p. 12).

The summary of the case presented in the clemency petition of 14 December 1949 provides the following details.

The three 16- and 17-year old boys were inmates of a reformatory school. About

midnight they sneaked out of the reformatory to raid army supplies. Once in the supply room Tamura removed a carbine bayonet from its scabbard and used it to open canned food. After being discovered by Private Robert C. Young they fled; but Tamura fell down, was caught by Young and then stabbed Young in the stomach with the bayonet. Young died within 15 minutes. (NARA 12)

[The account does not say whether this was their first raid; nor does it say how the three boys were discovered.]

**Dec 21, 1945:** Memorandum for the Imperial Japanese Government. The Imperial Japanese Government will issue the necessary orders to suspend publication of the daily newspaper Ise Shimbun. This suspension is to be effective as of 1 hours, 27 Dec 1945 and ending 2400 hours, 28 Dec 1945 [a two-day suspension]. Signed: H.W. Allen. (Nippon Times (Directives), 1947)

**Dec. 23, 1945:** ●(9,0,0,172) A GI shot and killed a Japanese at Matsuyama (south of Hiroshima). The dead man was part of about 1,000 civilians who stormed a bivouac area which was being vacated, to pick over the left-behind trash. One guard fired into the ground several times and when that had no effect, he fired into the mob (PSS p. 4).

**Dec. 24, 1945:** ●(21,0,0,172) Sixth U.S. Army headquarters barracks were destroyed by fire; 12 American die, scores are injured as fire sweeps barracks. Furiously, spreading flames trapped and killed 12 American officers and men in a medical battalion barracks on Shikoku (island located east of Hiroshima) leveling the two-story frame building in ten minutes. Many survivors suffered broken legs or arms in 30-foot leaps from the second floor. The origin of the fire which started at 6 am was not determined but an investigation party was on the scene within a few hours (NYT p. 1; PSS: p. 1). [On the same page of the NYT, another short article mentions that fire of undetermined origin swept a barracks of the Sixth US Marine Division Headquarters in Tsingtao, China, a big city located 500 kilometers to the south-east of Beijing. None of the 1,000 billeted troops was injured.]

**Dec. 23, 1945:** Threats against the life of General Douglas MacArthur have been made by what a Japanese source called “bitter, hot-blooded Japanese”, an Allied headquarters spokesman said today (NYT p. 14).

**Dec 27, 1945:** Report of a plot against General MacArthur is called a distortion (NYT p. 3)

**Dec 27, 1945:** The newspaper Daily Ise Shimbun was suspended for twenty four hours for violating the Allied Press code (NYT p. 2)

**Dec 27, 1945:** Tokyo area. The car of the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry,

Kenzo Matsumura, was left parked when two US soldiers menaced the chauffeur with pistols, forced him to drive to the Okido police box, dropped him there and drove away. (NDL, microfiche GII-1093)

**Dec 28, 1945:** Vice Minister of Agriculture and Forestry to Central Liaison Office, [excerpt].

We have learned that the building now used as the offices of the Staple Food Administration is to be taken over by the General Headquarters within a few days. Should this be the case, it would result in great inconvenience to this Ministry's administration. In case we are compelled to vacate the place, we should need at least 2 or 3 weeks for the removal of the equipment, to say nothing of the difficulty in finding some building suitable for our use. (MOFA 11)

[This message shows that the Ministry had not be informed that it would have to move except by rumors. It would be of interest to know to what extent the request was granted. So far, we were not able to find out.]

**Dec 28, 1945:** Tokyo area, at about 03:00. A Japanese policeman was on guard duty at a police station when 3 US soldiers drove to the station on a jeep, asked for direction and while the police was trying to answer them, one struck him on the forehead with a pistol inflicting a gash which required 3 weeks to heal, while another robbed him of his sabre. (NDL, microfiche GII-1093)

**Dec 29, 1945:** A message was sent by GHQ to Washington stating that it was SCAP policy "to permit the return of missionaries to Japan to the maximum extent practicable". At this time there were already some 900 Catholic missionaries in Japan. This statement was part of a larger plan through which SCAP promoted the activities of Christian missionaries in Japan. For instance, in the fall of 1945 the Chief of Chaplains of the Armed Forces for the Pacific Area arranged to have tens of thousands of Bibles shipped to Japan for distribution by the "Japan Bible Society". In his Reminiscences General MacArthur recalls that at his request the "Pocket Testament League" distributed 10 million Bibles translated into Japanese. (Woodard 1972, MacArthur 1964)

**Dec 29, 1945:** A bill about land reform was enacted in Parliament [without the backing of SCAP, see above Dec 9]; it should have become effective in January 1946 but remained a dead letter because SCAP did not consider it as complying with his directive of December 9. (Grad 1948).

**Dec 31, 1945:** **SCAPIN 519** Subject: Suspension in courses in morals (shushin), Japanese history and geography.

It is hereby directed that all courses in morals, Japanese history and geography in all educational institutions be suspended immediately and will not be resumed until

permission has been given by this headquarters. The Ministry of Education shall collect all textbooks and teacher manuals used in every course on these subjects. For the Tokyo, Kyoto and Osaka areas the collection of the books should be completed by 1 April 1946. A detailed plan will be submitted to this headquarters on 1 April 1946 for the collection of the books in other areas. (SCAPINS 1-600 and online catalogue of SCAPINs, website of the NDL, General Eichelberger's papers, reel 22)

**Dec 31, 1945:** Immediately after the Japanese surrendered in 1945, the Japanese Ministry of the Interior made plans to protect Japanese women in its middle and upper classes from American troops. Fear of an American army out of control led them to quickly establish the first "comfort women" stations for use by US troops. By the end of 1945, the Japanese Ministry of Home Affairs had organized the Recreation Amusement Association (R.A.A.), a chain of houses of prostitution with 20,000 women who serviced occupation forces throughout Japan. (Svoboda 2009)

## 1946

**Jan 1, 1946:** In 1945 the death rate of the population of Japan was 29.2 per 1,000 population, compared to 17.4 in 1944 (Mitchell 1982, p. 76). This puts the excess number of deaths for 1945 to 857,000 (on the basis of population numbers of 74 million and 72 million respectively for 1944 and 1945).

**Jan 1, 1946:** Increase in crime terrorizes civilians (NT p. 3)

[On Jan 12 1946 SCAP made known that press reports of a crime wave in Japan were untrue and dangerous (NT Jan 12, p. 2).]

**Jan 4, 1946:** Two memoranda were published by SCAP. requiring the Japanese government to prohibit and suppress any political party or association whose purpose was a resistance or an opposition to the Occupation Forces. Subsequently, this directive lead to the Imperial Ordinance No. 311 of 1946 concerning the punishment for acts prejudicial to the Occupation objectives. (The World Federation of Trade Unions: Seventh Report (1953), Appendix V).

**Jan 4, 1946:** **SCAPIN 550** Subject: Removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from public office. Excerpts.

- The Imperial Japanese Government will instruct each of its Ministries to remove any persons known to have been within the categories listed in Appendix A (e.g. career military and naval personnel, persons influential in the Political Association of Great Japan).

- The Imperial Japanese Government will make weekly reports showing the number as well as names of persons removed during the current week. These ac-

tions will be reviewed and possibly reversed by this Headquarters.

- All officials of the Imperial Japanese Government will be held personally responsible for compliance with this directive.

- Persons removed from public office will not be entitled to any public or private pensions without the consent of this Headquarters. An official removed under this procedure will be dismissed summarily [i.e. without hearing].

- [Below is one of the questions in the questionnaire to be filed in by all employees (section C)]

Has any member of your family held office or been influential in any of the organizations listed above? If so give his name, address, his relationship to you and a description of the position which he held. (Website of the National Diet Library, Tokyo)

[Through some of its characteristics such as self-incrimination, denunciation of family members, this procedure bears a resemblance with those used in the United States by House Committees on Un-American Activities. In a letter to a teacher suspected of having been linked to Communists and which was published in the New York Times (12 June 1953), Albert Einstein suggested that accused citizens should not answer self-incriminating questions even at the cost of being imprisoned. Although the activities of these committees peaked in 1950 they began in the late 1930s, thus it is likely that it is the American episode that provided the blue print for the episode which took place in Japan and not the other way round.

**Jan 5, 1946:** The formation of any political party which fosters opposition or resistance to the occupation forces or supports any anti-foreign measures by Japan is prohibited under a recent MacArthur's order (Times p. 4).

**Jan 6, 1946:** The Eighth Army announced that a military commission had been appointed to meet at Sapporo, Hokkaido to try a Chinese named Sing for the death of three Chinese workers. The victims were Chinese laborers working at the Hokkaido coal mines where Sing cooperated with the Japanese as an overseer. He accompanied a group of laborers from China in May 1945 and his job was to see that the workers were docile while doing heavy labor for little pay. (NCDN p. 1)

**Jan 7, 1946:** Tokyo area. Two US soldiers entered the home of Shinro Shinomoto, robbed 3,940 yen in cash and 5 watches at the point of pistols. (NDL, microfiche GII-1093)

[This message was a Japanese complaint sent through the CLO to GHQ-SCAP.]

**Jan 7, 1946:** The Tokyo newspapers greeted the purge directives of 4 January enthusiastically referring to them as the "most sweeping measures ever taken for the removal of all obstacles hampering the growth of democracy in Japan". (NCDN p.

1)

**Jan 7, 1946:** A US Army court in Yokohama sentenced a former Japanese camp chief to be hanged. (NYT p. 5)

[This was one of the first instances of a war criminal being condemned to death *in Japan*. Earlier trials had been held outside Japan as for instance the trials in the Philippines of Generals Yamashita and Homma. The last war crime trial that was held in Japan occurred on 20 October 1949, but other trials continued in other countries. In other words, the period of war crime trials in Japan covered almost 4 years.]

**Jan 8, 1946:** Tokyo. Three fires razed US quarters. Last Saturday, a fire destroyed the building of the Japan Steel Pipe Company housing American occupation troops in Suzuki-cho Kamala-ku. Another occupation troop quarters in the former airplane arsenal at Showa-cho, Kitatama-gun in the suburbs of Tokyo was burnt down Sunday morning. The same morning the former navy hospital at Harajuku-cho, Totsuka-ku occupied by U.S. troops was razed (NT p. 3).

**Jan 9, 1946:** Shaken to its foundation by the purge directive, the government of Premier Baron Kijuro Shidehara is virtually on the rocks. Shidehara who is still in bed because of a cold has delegated Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida to be his go-between with SCAP. (NCDN p. 4)

[This information suggests that Yoshida was already at this time de facto prime minister.]

**Jan 10, 1946:** ● (21,0,0,174) On January 4, four Koreans attempted to raid the clothing warehouse at Okogawa near Kumagaya, one was injured. On January 5, four Japanese tried to steal clothing from the same warehouse, one was killed. Meanwhile, at the Shitumi Quartermaster Supply Dump, a guard killed a Japanese caught in the act of stealing (NT p. 2).

**Jan 10, 1946:** Some 150 Chinese and Koreans stoned the Kobe police station to effect the release of a Chinese civilian. US Military Police suppressed the disturbance. (XXIV Corps, G-3 operation report No 10, 10-11 Jan 1946. Consulted at NDL: microfiche WOR 6906.)

**Jan 12, 1946:** ● (22,0,0,176) A US officer was killed near Chofu Air Strip (4.5 km west of Tokyo) while engaged in the removal of aerial bombs, (NDL, microfiche WOR 6906)

**Jan 13, 1946:** Fire razed Hataka hotel occupied by occupation forces near Bahashin-machi. The fire started at 1:30 am and was brought under control at 5:30 am; it also destroyed 13 other inns (NT p. 3).

**Jan 14, 1946:** An American military court sentenced an American soldier, Joseph E. Hicswa, to death today for the knife slayings of two Japanese; it is the first death penalty imposed on an American for crimes against the Japanese since the occupation began (NYT p. 3). On May 8, 1946 President Truman commuted the death sentence to thirty years' confinement at hard labor (NYT May 8, 1946 p. 10).

**Jan 14, 1946:** American occupation authorities burned Japanese school books which had been asserted as anti-democratic. (Shanghai Herald p. 5)

[This news is somewhat surprising; indeed, since American authorities ordered the books to be destroyed by the Japanese one would not expect them to carry out that destruction themselves.]

**Jan 16, 1946:** A Japanese truck sideswiped an American jeep. After investigation of the truck and its 20 occupants the Provost Marshal discovered an automatic pistol caliber 0.32 fully loaded (and with a round in the chamber), 3 short swords and one samurai sword. The men were arrested. (NARA 1)

**Jan 22, 1946:** Creation of an anti-communist organization in Osaka. Named "Hankyō Remmel" (anti-communist League) the organization is backed by Jiro Asai, an influential businessman and director of the Osaka Headgear Manufacturers; it will engage in nationwide anti-communist activity by holding lecture meetings and publishing pamphlets and books (NT p. 3). It can be noted that an anti-communist League which had been in existence at the end of the war was abolished together with other organizations through SCAPIN No 548 of January 4, 1946 (Ando 1991, p. 168).

**Jan 22, 1946:** Allied troops took over 394 industrial plants as a first installment of reparations in kind. The factories have been placed under American military guard and are destined to be dismantled and sent to Allied countries (Times p. 3).

**Jan 23, 1946:** Japanese unrest simmers under US lid. (Title of an article published in the Christian Science Monitor p. 1)

**Jan 24, 1946:** The recent SCAP purge has sent into political limbo a vast number of candidates [in the planned election]. (NT p. 1).

**Jan 24, 1946:** In the past week Japanese police has confiscated 96 machine guns, 52 mortars, 639 hand grenades, 2,300 rifles and 57 pistols (NT p. 3).

**Jan 25, 1946:** So far the Japanese government has been able to pay for occupation cost simply by borrowing currency from the Bank of Japan, a policy which lead to increasing inflation rates. A directive issued by General MacArthur's Headquarters forbade further borrowing from the Bank of Japan. The government was ordered

to balance its budget by wiping out expenses such as the reconstruction of bombed areas. (NYT p. 1)

**Jan 26, 1946:** The Japanese Finance Ministry denounced that, up to the end of 1945, the Allied occupation would cost the Japanese government a total of 3000 million yen (approximately \$200 million) of which 1,100 million in currency had already been turned over to the Allied Headquarters. Occupation expenses hitherto had been paid through government borrowing from the Bank of Japan. However, in view of General MacArthur's directive ending Government deficit financing, hereafter a special reparations account will be established through which occupation costs will be met (NYT p. 6). [It would be interesting to know how this reparations account was funded]

**Jan 26, 1946:** A former Japanese POW prison commander was sentenced to death by an American Military Commission at Yokohama (NYT p. 6)

**Jan 26, 1946:** A 18 year old Japanese civilian, Katsumo Tamura, was sentenced to death by an American Military Commission at Sapporo for the bayoneting of Private Robert Young (NYT p. 6).

[He was executed at Sugamo prison (Yokohama) on 10 May 1946 (NYT 18 May 1946, p. 4.)]

**Jan 28, 1946:** GI behavior in Japan is questioned. Some Japanese men profess an increasing reluctance to go home after dark because of hold-ups of which they accuse the GIs. Letters are known to have been submitted to the Stars and Stripes, the Army newspaper, but have gone unpublished (NYT p. 5).

**Jan 28, 1946:** **SCAPIN 660** Subject: Violations of Scap Directive No 3. [excerpt]. Reference is made to SCAP Directive No 3 dated 22 September 1945 which states: "No imports to or exports from Japan of any goods, wares, or merchandises will be permitted, except with the prior approval of this Headquarters." It has come to the attention of this Headquarters that violations of this order have been and are being committed; they have constituted principally of illicit importing of rice from Korea into Japan. It is directed that the Imperial Japanese Government seize and hold all those smuggled goods. It is further directed that all instances of violations be reported to this Headquarters (including name of apprehended criminals and date of trials) [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, H.W. Allen, Colonel AGD (Scapins 1952, p. 109)

**Jan 29, 1946:** **SCAPIN 677** detached from Japan the Takeshima Islands located between the east coast of Korea and the west coast of Japan and also known as Tokdo (sometimes Dokdo) or Liancourt Rocks.

(<http://www.geocities.com/mlovmo/temp10.html>)

**Jan 30, 1946:** An intensively terrorist organization, Jinchu Gumi, Was found in Shizuoka Ken. (Civil Intelligence Section, SCAP, Occupational trends in Japan and Korea, 30 January 1946; found in General Eichelberger's papers, reel 18)

[This very short report does not give more information; the name of another organization sponsored by the Japanese Army is mentioned: Hodo Kai.]

**Jan 30, 1946:** **SCAPIN 680, CIE** Subject: Suspension of YAMAOKA Mannosuke, president of Nippon University, Tokyo.

The Imperial Japanese Governemnt will suspend YAMAOKA Mannosuke from the Presidency of Nippon University and will prohibit his employment by Japanese educational institutions, both public and private until such time as he has been screened. (General Eichelberger's papers, reel 22).

[It can be noted that the suspension occurred prior to the screening through a purely administrative decision. Such suspensions hung over all education personnel like a sword of Damocles as long as screenings were conducted that is to say at least until 1948.]

**Jan 31, 1946:** Any film or lantern slides whether for educational, cartoon or news-reel must have an Allied censorship identification number (NT p. 3).

**Feb 1946:** **CIS Blacklist files of "objectionables"** Starting in February 1946, a file containing data on all persons objectionable to SCAP was developed by CIS. Information flowed into this file from numerous sources.

By the end of 1946 there were 45,861 persons on this blacklist file, by the end of 1947 there were 103,296; as of 31 August 1948 there were 115,013. This file was not only used in relation to the purge but also for effecting loyalty checks.

(History of intelligence activities under General MacArthur 1942-1950, NDL, ISG-1, reel 12)

[Initially the purpose of the purge was to remove militarists. Quickly, however, the objective was extended; this is well expressed by the word "objectionable", a fairly broad and vague term. A similar blacklisting operation was started at about the same time in the United States by the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA) and by the FBI. More specifically, in January 1946 the FBI under Edgar Hoover adopted Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's recommendation regarding the establishment of a Security Index of all known Communists. In the summer of 1947, Hoover decided to make FBI files on Communists in Hollywood available to the HCUA. Similar leaks were organized in following years. (Ceclair 2011)]

**Feb 1946:** A "Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre" (CSDIC) was established in Kure by the intelligence service of the BCOF; in March 1946 it com-

prised 60 officers and servicemen (59 Australians and 11 British). (Davies 2001, p. 209, Wood 1998, ch. 6)

**Feb 4, 1946:** According to the testimony of Alfred Hussey the draft of the Japanese constitution was written by a group of SCAP members between 4 and 8 February 1946. "On 4th of February Government section closed its door to the outside world and went to work on preparing a draft constitution. The result was sent over to General MacArthur who approved it with practically no change whatsoever. The question then arose as to how the Japanese should be given this material". (NDL, Hussey papers, YH1, reel 10, 91A)

**Feb 6, 1946:** **SCAPIN 712** Subject: Shipment of 150,000 sheets silkworm eggs to China. It is directed that the necessary steps be taken at once to effect the shipment to China of 150,000 sheets silkworm eggs. The shipment will be assigned to the Chinese Sericulture and Silk Co, Shanghai, China. The cargo is to be assembled, crated, and prepared for shipment by air from Atsugi Airport. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, H.W. Allen, for H.W. Fitch, Brig. Gen AGD (Scapins 1952, p. 118)

**Feb 7, 1946:** By instructing the Japanese Government to hold a new general election after the end of the present Diet session, General MacArthur dissolved the Parliament which had been elected a year earlier (NYT p. 10). [It can be noted that this instruction did not take the form of a SCAPIN.]

**Feb 8, 1946:** Three armed men dressed like GIs and wearin hoods over their heads entered the Oriental Art Gallery on Ginza, Tokyo, and escaped with jewelry valued at 50,000 dollars. (NCDN p. 2)

**Feb 10, 1946:** ●(24,0,0,176) Two American soldiers were killed and three seriously injured in Kyoto when a streetcar plunged into a river. (NCDN p. 10)

**Feb 10, 1946:** In preparation of the coming elections (see below April 30), the Japanese Government in a sweeping interpretation of General Douglas MacArthur's Jan. 4 directive forbidding former imperialists to hold public office, disqualified nearly nine-tenths of the present members of the Lower House; scores of organizations were added to those barred by Allied directive (NYT p. 34).

**Feb 11, 1946:** On January 9, 1946, Tokyo staff members of the "Pacific Stars and Stripes" [a newspaper destined to American troops] signed a statement which denounced "open pressure put on us to delete, distort and play down news to preserve the interests of the Army hierarchy". Among the signatories were Sergeant K.L. Petrus, the managing editor, and Corporal B. Rubin. This open statement brought about two sanctions: firstly, Lieutenant-Colonel James Parks, the officer supervising the

paper, was removed; secondly, Pettus and Rubin were ordered to move to Okinawa. Today, eleven of the fifteen members of the editorial staff sent a protest to General MacArthur (NYT p. 8).

**Feb 11, 1946: SCAPIN 585A** (FD): It is directed that the Bank of Japan be prepared to exchange type B yen for old Bank of Japan notes for US Army disturbing officers. (Nippon Times 1947, Directives)

[The purpose of this directive is not completely clear; indeed the type B-yen which were printed in the United States were legal tender in Japan on the GHQ request. One possible reason may be that the value of B-yen had been substantially eroded while the value of “old Bank of Japan notes” had better resisted the overall inflation.]

**Feb 12, 1946:** 26,000 confiscated samourai swords were given to US troops. These swords were confiscated in the Osaka area and given to homebound soldiers by the Ordnance Section of the 98th Division. (NCDN p. 8)

**Feb. 13, 1946:** The “Daily Express” reports that the Black Dragon organization has tried to set up a plot against General Headquarters. American armored cars and troops patrol the streets of Tokyo (GL).

**Feb 14, 1946: SCAPIN 735** Subject: Publication of Reader’s Digest in Japan [excerpt].

The Reader’s Digest Association has been authorized by this Headquarters to publish a Japanese language edition in Japan, to employ Japanese technical personnel, to enter into contract with Japanese printing concerns and to borrow yen funds as required for purposes of this publication. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, H.W. Allen, for B.M. Fitch, Brig. Gen. AGD] (SCAPINS 1952, p. 126)

**Feb 14, 1946:** A spirited controversy over revising the Japanese language is now going on in Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s headquarters. It is largely the work of an ardent young language student in the Civil Information and Education Section of GHQ. Difficult ideographs foster illiteracy, it is said. Nipponese argue against change but a single phonetic alphabet [romaji] is expected to result eventually. (Christian Science Monitor p. 7)

**Feb 18, 1946: SCAPIN 745** Subject: Action regarding banned Japanese motion pictures. Summary: Directs that all banned motion pictures now stored at the Ministry of Home Affairs, be turned over to the Eighth Army with the exception of four prints and one negative. (SCAPINcat)

**Feb 19, 1946: SCAPIN 756** Subject: Exercise of criminal jurisdiction [excerpt]. The commanding General of the Eighth army and the Commander of the Fifth Fleet have been directed to appoint military occupation courts including commissions and

provost courts. Military commissions are authorized to impose sentences of death, imprisonment at hard labor, expulsion, confiscation and fine. Provost courts are authorized to impose sentences of imprisonment at hard labor not to exceed 5 years, expulsion, confiscation and fine. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, B.M. Fitch, Brigadier General, AGD (Nobleman 1950, p. 248)

**Feb. 20, 1946:** Commanders of the United States Eighth Army and Fifth Fleet have been authorized to establish military courts empowered to impose sentences including death. General MacArthur turned back the clock in Japan 47 years by decreeing that Allied nations nationals shall be outside the jurisdiction of the Japanese courts. Not since 1899 have the Japanese suffered the indignity of having resident foreigners exempted from the provisions of their national law. The Japanese concerned in cases involving Allied forces will in future be tried by military commissions and provost courts. (Times p. 3).

**Feb 21, 1946:** The students of Doshiha University, one of the leading Christian universities in Japan, has asked the school authorities to purge 6 professors because they were appointed during the war at the recommendation of the Ministry of Education. (NCDN p. 3)

**Feb 21, 1946:** US Army telephone wires were cut in the vicinity of Nagoya. The offenders were apprehended later on when they attempted to sell the wire to a dealer in Nagoya. (GHQ8a, No 249)

**Feb 22, 1946:** Yusuke Tsurumi, secretary-general of the Progressive party was notified by Chief Cabinet Secretary of the Government's decision to prohibit party leaders affected by the Allied purge from participating in any political activities (NT p. 2).

**Feb 27, 1946:** SCAPIN 550 which set the main lines of the purge was sent to the Japanese Government on 4 January 1946. It is interesting to see how quickly the Japanese government followed suit with decrees organizing the screening. Action began almost immediately. As a matter of fact, without waiting for the decrees to be written the government released the criteria to be used in the screening through cabinet announcements. Then, on 27 February, Imperial Ordinance No 109 was officially promulgated. Cabinet and Home Affairs Ministry Ordinance No 1 followed on 10 March. In the two following weeks, 5 ministers and many members of the House of Peers resigned. (Two years of occupation, General Eichelberger's papers, reel 33).

**Mar 1946:** The smallpox epidemic which had started in January reached its peak level in March with a rate of 90 cases per 100,000 (and per year). As a matter of

comparison, the average (annualized) rate for the first six months of 1946 was 47 compared to less than 3 in 1944 and 1945. The areas with the highest rates were Hokkaido, Kyoto and Osaka with rates 5, 4 and 3.7 times higher than the national average respectively. These data from the Ministry of Health and Welfare are contained in a series of graphs and maps published by GHQ-SCAP in June 1946 (number 79A), NARA, Record Group 331.

**Mar 2, 1946: SCAPIN 647-A**

It is desired that the residence and grounds of Mr Yoshida located at 43,1 Chome, Mito Machi, Shiba-ku, Tokyo be vacated and made available for an agency of GHQ, SCAP by 1200 hours, 5 March 1946. No furniture will be removed until instructions for their disposition have been furnished by a representative of GHQ. (Catalogue and text of all SCAPIN-A, available on shelf in the Modern History of Japan room at the National Diet Library, Tokyo)

[It can be noted that this directive left only 3 days to the Japanese occupant for finding a replacement home.]

**Mar 3, 1946:** The State Department announced in the following terms that Japan will not be permitted to trade with other countries except the United States and that even this trade will be closely supervised: "Tight controls are required in order to assure that the selected Japanese exports are maximized in order to provide funds for essential imports necessary to prevent disease and unrest. No financial aid will be provided by us in rebuilding Japanese facilities for producing exports. The production of silk, tea, ceramics, coarse grades of textiles and other handicraft articles are receiving encouragement from this government." (North China Daily News p. 7)

**Mar 3, 1946:** General MacArthur approved the removal of two staff members of the Tokyo edition of "Stars and Stripes" after his inspector general said that he had evidence that both had belonged to the Communist party and had "flavored" their writings with "communistic thought." However, this charge was strongly denied by Kenneth L. Pettus, the former managing editor of the magazine. Barnard Rubin, former columnist, declared that he had left the Communist Party before the war began. Their displacement to Okinawa was seen as a punishment and under the protestations of the staff of the journal they were subsequently called back to serve in Yokohama. (NYT p. 34)

**Mar 4, 1946:** The U.S. State Department announced that Japan will not be permitted to trade with any country except the United States for a long time and that even that trade will be closely supervised. During the interim period Japanese exports to the United States will be handled through the United States Commercial Company. The War Department will continue to do most of the procuring of imports. (NT p. 1)

**Mar 5, 1946:** Four American Army officers and 7 Japanese have been taken into custody during the last three days by military police who have smashed a big black market ring dealing in Japanese yen. They were playing on the differential between the official exchange rate of 15 yen for a dollar and the black market rate of 70 yen on a dollar. (NYT p. 15)

**Mar 6, 1946:** The 16-page document constituting the draft of the constitution was made public. Japanese newspapers were forbidden by SCAP to publish the fact that the draft had been first written in English and then translated into Japanese. (Lauterbach 1947: *Danger from the East*, p. 67)

**Mar 9, 1946:** Yoshihige Abe, first professional educator ever to hold the position of Japanese Education Minister, today greeted the American Education Mission with an address that was virtually a plea to America to allow Japan to retain some of her own culture and not to westernize everything (NYT p. 6).

**Mar 10, 1946:** Four American officers were arrested between March 1 and 4 in what is called the Million Yen Blackmarket case (NT p. 2).

**Mar 11, 1946:** Japan was ordered by SCAP to construct houses for 20,000 Allied families. Weekly reports of the progress of the construction program are to be made to SCAP (NT p. 2).

**Mar 12, 1946:** ●(24,0,0,177) American Military police shot and killed one Japanese civilian and wounded another. The two Japanese were found raiding U.S. Army supplies in Yokohama. (NT p. 3)

**Mar 14, 1946:** The “Bungel Shunju”, one of the most popular magazines in this country was dissolved. The reason of the discontinuation is the difficulty of maintenance [the article does not specify in which sense this is meant] (NT p. 3).

**Mar 15, 1946:** ●(32,0,0,177) 8 crewmen were killed in the crash of a Liberator near Atami about 80 miles southwest of Tokyo (NT p. 1).

**Mar 15, 1946:** Ms. Haru Matsukata (who later became the wife of US ambassador to Japan, E.O. Reischauer) was blacklisted for informing her boss, Gordon Walker of the “Christian Science Monitor” that the draft constitution that MacArthur had announced as the work of the government was in fact written by two Americans, Beate Sirota and Richard A. Poole. Not only was Matsukata labeled a communist, but Walker was denied entry into Japan. Several journalists, American and British, would meet similar fates. For instance, in June 1948 an American journalist for the “Saturday Evening Post” was expelled and in June 1950, The Times correspondent in Tokyo, Mr. Frank Hawley, was declared persona non grata by general MacArthur’s

Headquarters (Takemae, ST Jun. 15 p. 3).

**Mar 17, 1946: Confiscation of books. SCAPIN 824** Subject: Confiscation of propaganda publications.[excerpt]

The Japanese government is directed to collect from all public channels, including warehouses, book shops, book dealers, publishing companies or agencies of the Japanese government where these publications are held in bulk, the following listed propaganda publications.

[Then comes a list of 10 titles]

These publications will be collected and stored in a central warehouse. Instructions for the disposal of these publications for pulping will be issued to this headquarters at a later date.

(Kanji 2010)

[This SCAPIN was the first of a long series. It concerned only 10 titles. Ultimately, between March 1946 and April 1948, some 7,760 book titles were designated for confiscation in the conditions delineated through the present SCAPIN. As the number of books screened was about 9,280, it means that the percentage of those marked for confiscation was 83% of those which were examined.

It is difficult to know what were the criteria which were used. However, the titles of the books (see the sample given in the chapter about censorship) shows that the confiscation went well beyond the category of what can be called ultra-nationalist literature. As a matter of fact, the list also comprised books by foreigners such as Josef März or Oswald Spengler.

We are told by NISHIO Kanji that the total number of books seized in relation with the 7,760 titles was about 220,000. That would mean that on average there were 28 copies for each title, a fairly low number which suggests that it may be underestimated.

Needless to say, this screening could only be done with the active help of Japanese intellectuals. Apparently, it was not difficult for GHQ to find willing collaborators.]

**Mar 18, 1946: SCAPIN 764A** (ESS/FI) Subject: Payment of Japanese and foreign nationals employed by occupation forces [excerpt].

The Imperial Japanese Government will direct the Bank of Japan to make arrangements for payment of Japanese and foreign nationals employed by the occupation forces. The necessary yen currency will be furnished by the occupation forces. (Nippon Times 1947, Directives)

[The SCAPIN does not say if the employees will be paid with B-yens or with “regular” yens. If the second alternative is correct this may be linked to the SCAPIN issued on 11 February 1946 through which SCAP demanded “regular” yens in exchange for B-yens.]

**Mar 20, 1946:** SCAP announced Japanese export procedure. Direct negotiations between Japanese and foreign traders are not allowed at present; all exports must be approved by SCAP (NT p. 1)

**Mar 20, 1946:** SCAP published a list of forbidden books. They are to be collected in warehouses, bookshops and publishing companies and confiscated (NT p. 2).

**Mar 20-31, 1946:** ● (34,0,0,178) At Sapporo an altercation between three American soldiers and two Japanese resulted in the killing of one of the Japanese who, armed with a bottle, attempted to assault one of the enlisted men (NARA 3).

**Mar 20-31, 1946:** In Sapporo the appearance of anti-fraternization posters was reported; prepared by unknown persons, the hand-written posters warned Japanese girls against fraternizing with the troops and complained of bad behavior in the part of the US forces occupying the town (NARA 3).

**Mar 21, 1946:** [Surveillance of the election campaign in Gunma prefecture](#)

77th MG headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division.

- Every political meeting permission will be required from military authorities.
- Surveillance teams will attend the meetings in order to check whether the candidate's speeches go against the objectives of the occupation. There are 25 surveillance teams Gunma prefecture.

- A letter will be sent to the governor of Gunma prefecture which will state "certain policies and direct certain actions".

(NDL, Papers of C.E. Skoglund, reel 3)

[With candidates screened before and after the elections, with speeches closely monitored, with the governor cooperating with the military authorities (and the extent of his cooperation being closely assessed), this was a well-planned supposedly free election. It is of particular interest because it was the first "free" election organized in a foreign country by the American government. Many others would follow. For instance one can mention the election in South Korea of the interim assembly in the fall of 1946 and the election of the Korean national assembly in 1948.]

**Mar 24, 1946:** It took the Eighth Army military court only a day and a half to try, Shinichi Motoyashi, guard at prisoner of war camp. He was sentenced to 20 years in prison for beating American prisoners. He pleaded innocent. (North China Daily News p. 3)

**Mar 26, 1946:** At Sendai, two Japanese attacked an American soldier inflicting minor injuries (NARA 3).

**Mar 26, 1946:** Starvation is held certain in Japan during the coming weeks. Headquarters officials are arranging to have the scanty food stocks sent to areas where

American troops are stationed, the idea being to prevent food riots in those places and to let the Japanese authorities elsewhere handle the food riots which may arise. The Japanese have established plans for grain collection which they submitted to headquarters; they were processed at length and much time was lost as a result. (NYT p. 12)

**Mar 29, 1946:** Philippines is holding many war crime trials. Colonel Alva Carpenter Chief of the Allied Headquarters Legal Section predicted that between 1,000 and 2,000 Japanese will face charges of war crimes in the Philippines. So far there have been 20 trials involving 50 defendants of whom 25 were sentenced the death and 6 to life imprisonment; 17, including Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma are currently awaiting execution (NT p. 1).

**Mar 29, 1946:** The Fifth Air Force reported that the Tachikawa Air Base headquarters building burned on Tuesday night (March 26). The fire destroyed the two-story frame building within an hour; its cause is being investigated. (NT p. 3)

**Mar 30, 1946:** There have already been 1,000 deaths in the Tokyo area alone due to typhus and smallpox. (North China Daily News p. 1)

**Mar 30, 1946:** ● (34,0,0,179) An American soldier has seized the automobile of Prime Minister Baron Kijuro Shidehara and after piloting it for 50 meters he killed a Japanese street vendor. (North China Daily News p. 1)

**Mar 31, 1946:** The establishment of a Christian university in Japan was approved by the Foreign Missions Conference in North America (NT p. 1). General MacArthur had accepted the position of Honorary Chairman of the Fund-Raising Committee for the projected university (Woodard 1972). An article published in the Nippon Times on January 23, 1953 mentions that 60,000 American citizens each contributed one dollar for the establishment of the International Christian University, an institution which was financed jointly by the Americans and Japanese.

**Apr 1946:** The typhus epidemic which had started in January reached its peak level in April with a rate of 150 cases per 100,000 (and per year). As a matter of comparison, the average (annualized) rate for the first six months of 1946 was 80 compared to less than 5 in 1944 and 1945. The districts with the highest rates were Tokyo and Kanagawa (12 and 3 times higher than the national average respectively). These data from the Ministry of Health and Welfare are contained in a series of graphs and maps published by GHQ-SCAP in June 1946 (number 79A), NARA, Record Group 331.

**Apr 1, 1946:** Outbreak of typhus and smallpox: 32,366 cases of eruptive typhus caused 3,351 deaths; there are almost as many cases of smallpox (NT 29 March 1946). [The present figure for the number of cases is indeed consistent with the rate

given in the previous note; as the number of deaths was about 10 times smaller than the number of cases, these epidemics had little incidence on the annual death rate.]

**Apr 2, 1946:** ●(35,0,0,179) Yokohama. Eighth Army Headquarters announced that Private Robert N. Erickson, 19 years old, had been found shot at Camp Crawford, Hokkaido. An investigation is in progress (NYT p. 14).

**Apr 2, 1946:** ●(37,0,0,179) Tokyo 1 April. Two officers were burned to death and 4 others were hospitalized with injuries in a fire which destroyed a two-story building housing the headquarters of officer's billets of the First Cavalry Division at Asaka, about 30 kilometers north of Tokyo. The flames were discovered at 1:40 am and rapidly spread through the structure forcing the 35 officers billeted at the second floor to jump from the windows. The origin of the fire has not yet been determined but witnesses commented on the quick spread of the blaze. (North China Daily News p. 1)

**Apr 3, 1946:** Three enlisted men were attacked by an unidentified assailant at 2100 hours near the area of 519 Battalion at Yokohama. Two of the men were admitted to the hospital and were found to be suffering from wounds and shock. The wounds were inflicted by a cutting weapon. In a search of the area a Military Police patrol apprehended a Japanese who was circumstantially implicated as the assailant. (GHQ8a, No 223)

**Apr 6, 1946:** Acting on a geisha house tip, Lieutenant E.V. Nielsen located a large hoard of gold, silver and platinum hidden in the mud beneath Tokyo Bay (Facts on File Yearbook 1946).

**Apr 6, 1946:** Destruction of thousands of dollars worth of communication and aircraft equipment at Chofu Airfield (24 kilometers west of Tokyo) in what is believed the first organized Japanese violence against occupation forces property. Working under cover of darkness and avoiding detection by hourly military police, saboteurs cut electric and telephone wires, destroyed emergency aircraft equipment and damaged the teletype system beyond repair. Former Japanese soldiers are suspected (NYT 6 April p. 4, North China Daily News 7 April p. 1)

**Apr 7, 1946:** Roman alphabet was urged upon Japan. Education mission found use of ideographs a handicap. A drastic overhauling of the Japanese educational system from primary schools to universities was recommended to General Douglas MacArthur in a report of the United States education mission to Japan. (NYT p. 1).

**Apr 8, 1946:** 10,000 demonstrators stormed Premier Shidehara home demanding his resignation. Japanese police fired shots over the heads of the demonstrators. Order was restored by US military police. (NYT p. 1, China Daily News p. 1)

**Apr 8, 1946:** At 2200 hours, three Japanese attempted to crowd two American soldiers off the street. One Japanese pulled a gun and fired a shot in the air and two shots at one of the soldiers. The incident occurred near a cabaret in Osaka. Two of the Japanese were taken to the police station, the third escaped. (GHQ8a, No 230)

**Apr 11, 1946:** BCOF reports that during the period 16 February 1946 to 11 April 1946, the railway signal system in the Iwakuni area (southwest of Hiroshima) had been tempered with on 10 occasions. (GHQ8a, No 250)

**Apr 12, 1946:** ●(37,0,0,181) Two Japanese were killed by US troops while attempting to loot an Army warehouse in the Kumagaya area, 100 kilometers to the north of Tokyo (NYT p. 15).

**Apr 14, 1946:** At 1600 hours a fire destroyed the barracks located at Misawa Air Base, eastern Aomori prefecture. One man was slightly injured. The exact cause of the fire is being investigated. (GHQ8a, No 228, 237)

**Apr 14, 1946:** A cairn in southern Formosa marks the site of a tragic episode in which 438 American prisoners of war were killed when their Japanese ship, the Enoura Maru, was bombed by an American plane on the morning of 9 January 1945. The place has been visited by delegates from the International Red Cross in Zurich. (North China Daily News p. 1)

[Several other Japanese ships carrying American, Australian, British or Dutch prisoners of war were sunk by Allied forces, for instance on 12 September 1944 (1,144 Australian and British POWs lost their lives), 18 September 1944 (about 1,000 Dutch POWs lost their lives), in November and December US submarines sunk several Japanese ships carrying Allied POWs which cost the lives of about 4,000 of them.

<http://members.iinet.net.au/gduncan/maritime-1b.html>]

**Apr 15, 1946:** Report by BCOF commander [excerpts].

Yen funds required for proper expenditure on pay, allowances and other items for the BCOF force will be obtained from GHQ SCAP. Currency control and the subject of remittances [i.e. sending money by post] has been given special attention. In particular the present system governing the sale of Australian Postal Notes constitutes a weakness. Strong measures are necessary to prevent possible black marketing by troops. The limitation of remittances to undrawn pay should prove an effective means of ensuring that troops who indulge in illegal activities with civilians do not send the proceeds out of Japan.

[The scarcity of foodstuffs and other basic necessities coupled with the high exchange rate of the yen set by SCAP naturally lead many soldiers to sell military items to Japanese people and to exchange the yen or B-yen against Postal Notes which could be sent to their respective countries. This kind of illegal activity was

even more common in the US zone to the point that American servicemen could send home more money than they received for their pay (see in this respect Jun 26, 1946).]

(BCOF GHQ 1, p. 16, 17)

**Apr 15, 1946:** ● (37,0,0,182) A Korean assailant was shot and killed in a theater at Takasago (12 kilometers southwest of Himeji City, Hyogo prefecture). (GHQ8a, No 234)

**Apr 15, 1946:** Approximately 15,000 works held at the library of the “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere Research Institute” are in the hands of the advance team from the “Washington Document Center”. They are principally reference works in English and Japanese, and those in Japanese have already been shipped to the “Washington Document Center”. As for the western books, some have been taken as the personal property of American officials and many were lost. (Memorandum from the Civil Censorship Detachment, cited in Nishio (2010. p. 22)).

[A parallel can be made between this kind of plunder and the looting that occurred in Iraqi libraries after the invasion of 2003 as documented in Baez (2008).]

**Apr 16, 1946:** At 0045 hours a civilian guarding a warehouse containing ex-Japanese military equipment at Asahi Mashi (Hiroshima prefecture) was shot in the stomach and killed by a Japanese attempting to force his way into the building. Upon examination, the weapon used was identified as a US .45 colt. The assailant who is presently awaiting trial stated that he bought the revolver from a Korean for 1000 yen and it is believed that the weapon was originally purchased for 1,500 yen from a US soldier. (GHQ8a, No 248)

[Certainly the trial will be before a military commission; unfortunately, the archives of such trials are not accessible yet.]

**Apr 16, 1946:** Yokohama. Marine Private First Class Earl L. Brown was still at liberty after escaping on 11 April from the stockade of the Yokosuka naval base where he was held for bilking a Japanese bank of 500,000 yens by pretending to be an US Army bank examiner. He was rearrested in May and sentenced to 15 year imprisonment. (North China Daily News: 16 April p. 4 and 15 May p. 1)

**Apr 17, 1946:** In Tokyo some 200,000 people demonstrated against the Shidehara government. SCAP sent 12 armored cars and jeeps and the US soldiers dispersed the demonstrators (Fifty years 1975, p. 217).

**Apr 17, 1946:** BCOF reports that during the night 7 Japanese were observed attempting to cut signal wires. Four were arrested and three escaped. An additional 10 men were taken into custody subsequently and charged with interfering with the

signal system. Nine of these men are demobilized soldiers. Thus far, it appears to be a group whose motive was theft rather than sabotage. (GHQ8a, No 250)

**Apr 18, 1946:** ● (37,0,0,184) Tokyo. Two American soldiers, John W. Hull and Arthur L. Hymer, who shot to death two Japanese from whom they had demanded money have been sentenced to life imprisonment. The sentence is subject to revision. (North China Daily News p. 2)

**Apr 19, 1946:** At 0100 hours a fire destroyed an officers' club located at Jimmachi (45 kilometers northwest of Sendai). All equipment was destroyed and one officer received superficial burns. (GHQ8a, No 243)

**Apr 20, 1946:** At 0210 hours a fire destroyed the soldiers' mess and recreation building at Kaidachi (5 kilometers west of Hiroshima). (GHQ8a, No 234)

**Apr 21, 1946:** The Headquarters of the 25th Division Artillery caught fire at 1635 hours. All supplies and personal equipment were lost but some military records were saved. (GHQ8a, No 238)

**Apr 22, 1946:** There was a fire in the Headquarters of the 37th Military Government at Fukuoka, western Fukuoka prefecture. 70% of the building was destroyed. (GHQ8a, No 237)

**Apr 22, 1946:** BCOF reports that a locomotive was partially derailed 25 km southwest of Hiroshima. One vehicle and three soldiers were aboard the train but there were no casualties. Investigation revealed that a trolley had been placed across the track. (GHQ8a, No 253)

**Apr 23, 1946:** A hangar and 5 L-5 liaison planes were destroyed by fire at Tambaichi airstrip (8 kilometers south of Nara). One mechanic was burned and evacuated by air to the 13th General Hospital. (GHQ8a, No 237)

**Apr 23, 1946:** At 1930 hours two Japanese were fired on by a guard at camp Loper (17 kilometers east of Sendai) when they refused to halt after being challenged. One of them was shot in the leg while the other escaped. (GHQ8a, No 239)

**Apr 24, 1946:** There was a fire in an ammunition dump on Eta Jima. A shed containing 25mm ammunition was destroyed. The town of Koyo was evacuated during the fire. No casualties were reported. (GHQ8a, No 238)

**Apr 25, 1946:** The Japanese arsenal in the island of Eta Jima in Kure bay (BCOF area) blew up with some 20,000 tons of high explosive (Davies 2001, p. 157, Elliot 1995, p. 31)

[Elliot attributes the cause of the explosion to heavy rain which may have triggered

a chemical reaction, but one wonders why earlier heavy precipitations did not have the same effect; incidentally, it can be observed that neither the NYT nor the Times mention this explosion.]

**Apr 25, 1946:** In Kyoto, at about 0900 hours, about 20 Chinese attacked a Kyoto Police detective as he was investigating concealed goods in a Chinese restaurant. He was beaten about the face and body with a bicycle chain. Ten of the Chinese were apprehended and brought to the Provost Marshal for questioning. (GHQ8a, No 245)

**Apr 26, 1946:** Four fire pumps located at Hiro (5 kilometers east of Kure) were damaged during the night by unknown persons. Hoses were slashed and a nozzle was removed. On the same night military telephone wires were cut in the same vicinity. (GHQ8a, No 243)

**Apr 26, 1946:** ●(38,0,0,184) An explosion occurred at 0900 hours at Nisumo (50 kilometers west of Kobe) killing one US officer, one US enlisted man and 7 Japanese laborers. The explosion occurred while a detail was handling powder prior to disposal but the cause of the explosion is yet undetermined. (GHQ8a, No 240)

**Apr 26, 1946:** Between 18 and 26 April, 232 bars of silver (average weight approximately 36 kg each) were recovered in the Tokyo Bay area and transferred to the Bank of Japan. (GHQ8a, No 244)

**Apr 26, 1946:** Central Liaison Office, Tokyo to GHQ SCAP, CLO No 1952 (excerpt)

- The CLO inquired whether the GHQ SCAP takes the view that compensation is claimable in the above cases [i.e. injuries suffered by Japanese people by reason of the occupation] and, if so whether it will be advisable for the Japanese side to set up some kinds of commission to assist the Allied authorities in determining the extent of compensation.

- On 13 December 1945 Colonel Munson informed this office that a policy for the disposition of claims arising in Japan by reason of the occupation was under consideration by the US War Department.

- Misconducts and accidents involving Allied military personnel have reached considerable numbers, as set forth in the Enclosures 1 to 3, and not a few of the victims stand in need of speedy relief.

[Signed:] For the President: S. Iguchi, Director of General Affairs, CLO

(Documents 1949, p. 72-73) [Unfortunately the 3 tables contained in Enclosures 1 to 3 are omitted in the source. The American reply is reproduced on page 74: it is a flat refusal to pay any compensation. Consequently, the Japanese government itself paid compensations to the victims; more details can be found in the chapter on quan-

titative evidence in which a section is devoted to the question of the compensations.]

**Apr 28, 1946:** A Japanese was shot in the leg by a sentry on duty in the Kure area. He was caught pilfering and failing to halt when challenged, was fired upon. He was taken into custody and is detained at the hospital. (GHQ8a, No 247)

**Apr 28, 1946:** The investigation of the assault by Japanese people on two US soldiers on the night of 28 April in Kamata (southern part of Tokyo) disclosed the following facts:

- The two soldiers enroute to their billet were stopped and challenged by several Japanese at 21:30 hours. They were berated and then beaten by a crowd that reached an estimate of 20 at the peak of the incident. The Japanese were armed with clubs and sticks. The soldiers were released after incurring cuts and bruises; their injuries were not serious.

- The attack was premeditated and accomplished by an organized so-called “Vigilante” group. It was not the result of any immediate acts committed by the two soldiers but rather the result of a feeling of resentment toward the Occupation Forces which has been growing in this area for a considerable length of time as the result of soldier crimes, fraternization with Japanese girls and general misconduct by US personel. US soldiers are reported to participate in black market activities and some of their methods have increased Japanese resentment. One such method has been selling cigarette cartoons from which the cigarettes have been removed, a substance of similar weight substituted and the carton carefully resealed. Another has been to employ particularly desirable items as a means of attracting prospective buyers with cash which has then been taken by force.

- The group was urged to take action against US soldiers by a leader in a mass meeting held earlier in the evening on the same night as the assault. This meeting was attended by members of three chomes comprising Kamata Ku. The leader statet at this time that he would take full responsability of any acts of violence committed. He has been identified and apprehended [his name is not given].

- There are 2,000 US troops concentrated in the Kamata Ku area which is itself a densely populated urban area.  
(GHQ8a, No 247)

This incident was also shortly described in an article of the New York Times.

Two US soldiers were beaten by a Japanese mob. The two soldiers were walking down a street in Kamata between Tokyo and Yokohama. They were approached by 4 Japanese one of whom said he had been through the Okinawa campaign, then he whistled and other Japanese swarmed around and beat the Americans. (NYT 2 May p. 4)

The information was published in the North China Daily News in the following form. Two GIs were seriously beaten by four Japanese on Sunday night (28 April) in the Omori district, Tokyo. They are in serious condition in an Army hospital. Three Japanese have already been arrested and a fourth was still being hunted. (North China Daily News 1 May p. 3).

[It should be noted that in contrast to the G-2 Periodic Report, this article says that the two soldiers were in serious condition. Since they were able to walk away and to testify in court within three weeks of the incident, the extent of their injuries could not have been too serious.]

[According to information sent to me by the son of an officer who took part in the military commission, the four Japanese were tried in Yokohama on 17-18 May 1946. One of them, Eisaku Murakami, who was considered as their leader received a life sentence while the three other defendants, namely Chojiro Nijura, Tukaturo Kurasawa and Kinkoku Kanno, received sentences of 20 years imprisonment. Many thanks to Mr. William J. Bray for bringing these facts to my attention.

According to the electronic catalog of the National American Archives (NARA) the record of the trial of Eisaku Murakami can be found under the title "5. Eisaku Murakami et al." (ARC identifier 1112045); moreover according to information sent to me by Terese Svoboda, information about the trial can also be found in another NARA file, namely: Record Group 407, 270/50/24 Box 2390, File 108-25, entry 425. I am grateful to Terese Svoboda for this information.]

**Apr. 30, 1946:** An attempted plot by a group of Japanese under Hideo Tokayama to assassinate General MacArthur was discovered (NYT p. 1).

**Apr. 30, 1946:** Japan goes to polls. The ballot consisted of a blank piece of paper upon which the voter was obliged to write with absolute accuracy the characters in the name of his choice. Statements from MacArthur and the emperor had been made which almost amounted to commands to vote. A total of 26,558,611 votes was cast which represents 72% of an electorate slightly over 36 million which for the first time also included females. The average turn out at previous elections (1928, 1936, 1942) was 80.6%. (Brines 1948)

**May, 1946:** Shigeru Yoshida became prime minister. Before the war he had been ambassador of Japan in London. After the war, he was Foreign Minister in the government Shidehara. Japan, at the time was of course no longer concerned by any foreign policy and Yoshida's chief task was to take charge of the Central Liaison Office, the organization through which Allied Headquarters transmitted instructions to the Japanese government (Morris 1947).

**May, 1946:** A fire extinguisher on a truck was found to contain petrol when it was about to be used to quench a fire in another truck. No more precisions (date and location) is given about this incident which occurred in the BCOF zone. (BCOF MIR number 1, p. 5)

**May, 1946:** There is evidence of increasing antagonism against the Occupation Forces in the American area.

- On 2 May a Japanese civilian interpreter was fired on in Fushinobe, 20 km NW of Yokohama.

- On 3 May a US Marine was shot in the shoulder at Yokosuka attacked by Japanese in Tokyo.

- Resentment has been expressed in the past few weeks over the requisitioning of Japanese homes to house the families of service personnel. (BCOF MIR number 1, p. 12)

**May 1, 1946:** A Japanese organization named “Iwate Prefecture Reclamation Unit” is being investigated in the 75th Counter Intelligence Corps area. The unit is composed of ex-Army and Navy personnel and ex-army officers are in command. (GHQ8a, No 243)

**May 1, 1946:** A report from I Corps states that 20 large boulders were placed on a road near Kurayoshi, 40 km west of Tottori City, Tottori Prefecture. These boulders were placed so as to impede vehicular traffic. Subsequently, four Japanese were apprehended and confessed to the act. In addition to this incident, patrols operating in the area reported that civilians encountered in the vicinity were uncooperative. (GHQ8a, No 254)

**May 2, 1946:** Mr. Kazuyuki Harada, chairman of the Tokushima prefectural assembly and mayor of Kokufu (on the island of Shikoku, south of Hiroshima) wrote and distributed to his townspeople three circulars criticizing the Occupation Forces for interfering with the Japanese press and saying that Allied propaganda tended to create dissension among the Japanese people. After being placed under surveillance by the Counter Intelligence Corps, it was found that he was formerly a member of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. In view of these facts, CIC forwarded recommendations that Mr. Harada should be removed from office. (GHQ8a, No 244).

[This episode is of interest in so far that it shows that persons criticizing the occupation were often dealt with by incriminating them for their attitude before the war. In other words, the charge of “ultranationalism” was sufficiently flexible for purging persons that had become undesirable for any other reason or were difficult to handle.]

**May 2, 1946:** ● (38,0,0,185) At 2015 hours an enlisted man of the 5th Cavalry and a Japanese civilian interpreter employed by the US Army were fired on twice in

Fuchinobe (20 km northwest of Yokohama). Neither was hit. A search patrol was dispatched to the area. At 2045 hours the patrol challenged 3 Japanese and shot one of them when they attempted to run. These Japanese are not believed involved in the original shooting. (GHQ8a, No 245)

**May 2, 1946:** A group of Japanese were observed dumping weapons in the Asahi River, Okayama City, Okayama Prefecture under the cover of darkness. Three of them were apprehended and disclosed that the weapons had come from the Okayama Post Office building. It seems that the Post Office officials were afraid to turn over the weapons to the Occupation Forces because the deadline for turning in weapons without being punished had passed. To date 30 rifles, 2 machine guns and 50 bayonets have been recovered. (GHQ8a, No 245)

[It is difficult to understand how these people happened to be caught in the middle of the night except perhaps if they were betrayed by an informer.]

**May 2, 1946:** A plot against the life of General MacArthur was discovered and its ringleader, Hideo Takayama, was arrested. He had spent about 140,000 yens to pay other conspirators. The plot was disclosed to the authorities by one of his assistants. (North China Daily News p. 1)

[Was Hideo Takayama ever tried? So far we were unable to find additional information on this plot.]

**May 3, 1946:** The principal of the Tsuyama Girl's High School (in Okayama prefecture located between Hiroshima and Osaka) stated at a meeting of the student body that if he praised the Occupation Forces, it was because he had to. (GHQ8a, No 245)

[The fact that this speech held in Japanese in a High School came to the knowledge of the G-2 Intelligence section is a testimony of its effectiveness.]

**May 3, 1946:** An American soldier was slightly injured by a stone hurled through the window of an Army railroad coach in the vicinity of Gomen, 10 km east of Kochi City, Kochi prefecture. (GHQ8a, No 254)

**May 3, 1946:** A US Marine was shot in the shoulder by a Japanese at 2020 hours. The incident occurred at Yokosuka when 2 Marines, escorting a Japanese girl, were approached and challenged by 2 Japanese males armed with pistols. A struggle followed in the course of which the Marine was wounded. The assailants escaped. (GHQ8a, No 246)

**May 3, 1946:** Wire crews found the lines cut at the entrance of Uraga Port Detachment, 24 km south of Yokohama. A 5 meter section was removed. (GHQ8a, No 253)

**May 4, 1946:** ● (38,0,0,187) A large Japanese munition dump near Kokura (northern Fukuoka prefecture) was shaken by an explosion at about 1055. Numerous minor explosions occurred throughout the remainder of the morning and afternoon. Two Japanese were killed and 10 injured. (GHQ8a, No 250)

**May 4, 1946:** An American soldier was assaulted by four Koreans in the vicinity of Tsunashima station (near Yokohama). The soldier was waiting in the station for a Japanese girl. When the girl alighted from the train and joined the soldier both were accosted by the Koreans. The Koreans were apprehended and are being held for the Provost Court. (GHQ8a, No 252)

**May 5, 1946:** General MacArthur's directive declaring Ichiro Hatoyama, former Minister of Education and leader of Japan's largest party, the Liberals, an "undesirable person" on the eve of his nomination as the next Prime Minister threw the Japanese into disarray. The order excluded him not only from Premiership but also from holding an elective seat in the Diet or any public office. The directive came as a surprise because the pre-war activities of Mr Hatoyama had been well publicized in earlier weeks (one should recall that prospective candidates were screened with regard to their former activities). A few days earlier a spokesman from Headquarters even emphasized that General MacArthur would accept any of the elected party leaders for the post of Prime Minister. Former Prime Minister baron Shidehara had already informed Emperor Hiro Hito that he intended to recommend Mr Hatoyama as the next head of government. The leaders of the Liberal party drafted an appeal to ask a reconsideration of the directive. (NYT p. 25)

**May 6, 1946:** The investigation of the assault by Japanese people on two US soldiers on the night of 28 April in the southern part of Tokyo disclosed the following facts:

- The two soldiers enroute to their billet were stopped and challenged by several Japanese at 2130 hours. They were berated and then beaten by a crowd that reached an estimate of 20 at the peak of the incident. The Japanese were armed with clubs and sticks. The soldiers were released after incurring cuts and bruises; their injuries were not serious.

- The attack was premeditated and accomplished by an organized so-called "Vigilante" group. It was not the result of any immediate acts committed by the two soldiers but rather the result of a feeling of resentment toward the Occupation Forces which has been growing in this area for a considerable length of time as the result of soldier crimes, fraternization with Japanese girls and general misconduct by US personnel. US soldiers are reported to participate in black market activities and some

of their methods have increased Japanese resentment. One such method has been selling cigarette cartoons from which the cigarettes have been removed, a substance of similar weight substituted and the carton carefully resealed. Another has been to employ particularly desirable items as a means of attracting prospective buyers with cash which has then been taken by force.

- The leader of this group has been identified and apprehended [his name is not given].

(GHQ8a, No 247)

**May 6, 1946:** A stone was thrown through the window of a military train on the outskirts of Matsushida, 25 km northeast of Sendai. A Red Cross Director was struck on the head by the stone and knocked unconscious. (GHQ8a, No 249)

**May 7, 1946:** BCOF reports that on 30 April, 6 May and 7 May sections of the track near Iwakuni (southwest of Hiroshima) were removed causing three train derailments. (GHQ8a, No 250)

**May 7, 1946:** A food demonstration of about 2,500 people took place at the City Hall in Kawasaki, Kanagawa Prefecture. The home of the mayor was ransacked in an effort to find some hoarded stores but other than a small amount of rice, nothing was found. Prefectural authorities have expressed fear that there will be more incidents of this nature. (GHQ8a, No 253)

**May 8, 1946:** 3,000 residents of Tokyo's Omori district demonstrated yesterday in front of Omori Railway station protesting against a 5-day delay in their rice rations. (North China Daily News p. 3)

**May 9, 1946:** Six trucks parked in Camp Schimmelpfenning were disabled by the removal of distributor caps, coil wires and radiator caps during the evening while the occupants were attending a USO [i.e. recreational] performance. One vehicle which had been stolen was found later at the Camp Schimmelpfenning Post Stockade with the wiring torn out. (GHQ8a, No 254)

**May 9, 1946:** A directive for land reform was issued by the Natural Resources Section of GHQ but was not made public; Along with several other memoranda, this directive does not appear in the catalog of SCAPINs published by the National Diet Library. (Grad 1948, Ward 1990, Annex II, SCAPINcat)

**May 10, 1946:** A patrol of the First Cavalry Division observed that the Principal of the Sashiogi Primary School (20 km northwest of Tokyo) and a faculty of 23 are encouraging military practices by appointing leaders in all classes to command the class to attention and bow when the teacher enters. The principal excused this action by saying that students are accustomed to this procedure. The Military Government

has been notified. (GHQ8a, No 251)

**May 11, 1946:** The I Corps reports a violation of SCAP directives pertaining to the abolition of state support for Shintoism. In Toyohashi Shi, Aichi Prefecture, a portion of the money which is collected from the families is still being used to pay the expenses of the Shinto shrines. (GHQ8a, No 252)

**May 12, 1946:** Under General MacArthur's ruling, the provost courts may impose sentences up to 5 years and fines up to 75,000 yen [this represented 5,000 dollars of 1946 that is to say about 45,000 dollars of 2000; however, due to high inflation, the dollar equivalent fell quickly; in 1950 it was reduced to 2,250 dollars of 2000] The correspondent of the New York Times was allowed to attend a number of trials at the Yokohama Provost Court. Based on pleas of guilty, they lasted on average four minutes and a half. Japanese who felt that they have been falsely accused could, if they wished, hire a lawyer and an interpreter. Here are examples of sentences that were delivered during the session: (i) Takao Sato, for the theft of a one-pound tin of beef, 5 months in jail (ii) Shigeru Kamata, for possession of one tin of meat, 4 months in jail (iii) Hideo Ohtaka, for possession of one package of cheese, 90 days of hard labor. (NYT p. 24)

**May 12, 1946:** The First Cavalry Division reported that a total of 518 silver bars have so far been removed from Tokyo Bay in operation "Mudsill". (GHQ8a, No 256)

**May 13, 1946:** Text of **SCAPIN 947** (Civil Information and Education Section): The inclusion of the following subjects in the design of Japanese postage stamps and currency is prohibited.

- (a) Portraits of military and ultranationalist leaders, past and present
- (b) Symbols of militarism and ultranationalism
- (c) Representation of Shinto shrines
- (d) Scenes from territories no longer under Japanese sovereignty
- (e) Any other subjects which are not in harmony with announced objectives of the occupation.

Postage stamps issued since 15 December 1945 which include in their design Shinto shrines and other symbols of Shinto will be withdrawn from sale immediately and destroyed. The design of all future issues of postage stamps and currency will be submitted to this Headquarters for approval. (Woodard 1972, p. 299)

**May 14, 1946:** At 16:00 an enlisted man was attacked by a Japanese in the Kawata Ward area of Tokyo. He was walking with a Japanese girl. A brief fight ensued and when 6 more Japanese approached the man picked up an iron pipe to defend himself. The Japanese moved off. One Japanese who has been identified as one of

the assailants is in custody. (GHQ8a, No 255)

[Does this account not sound somewhat unreal? Why should an iron pipe just have been at hand for the serviceman in the middle of the fight?]

**May 14, 1946:** 100 Japanese demonstrators forced their way into the grounds of the Imperial palace. They represented about 1,000 residents of the Setagaya district of Tokyo who hold a “We want rice” rally protesting an 11-day delay in delivery of the rice rations. (North China Daily News p. 2)

**May 15, 1946:** The I Corps has received a letter from an informant claiming that three detectives of the Kyoto police were implicated in the beating two months ago of a US MP in the Inary Station area and of recruiting 200 ex-soldiers into an organization whose purpose is not known. (GHQ8a, No 255)

**May 16, 1946:** Five American soldiers were hospitalized at Showa Airfield for shock and burns after fire had swept through their barracks last night. The fire forced barrack residents to leap through the windows to escape. (NYT p. 16)

**May 17, 1946:** ●(39,0,0,187) Tokyo. Private John S. Marshak was found guilty by a Fifth Air Force court-martial of the murder of Private John E. Conzer and sentenced to life imprisonment. He shot Conzer after a drinking party on 18 April 1946. (North China Daily News p. 1)

**May 18, 1946:** Property, funds and records of three dissolved secret patriotic organizations were placed under control of the civil property custodian of Supreme Allied Headquarters. These associations are the “Political Association of Great Japan”, the “Imperial Rule Assistance Association” and the “Imperial Rule Assistance Society”. (NYT p. 4)

**May 18, 1946:** A group of people from the village of Makino (40 kilometers west of Tokyo) broke into a Japanese government warehouse and took 60 bushels of grain. The grain was then distributed to the 800 inhabitants of the village. The food situation is very serious in this area. There are reports that seed potatoes have been dug up and eaten for food. (GHQ8b, No 270)

**May 18, 1946:** ●(39,0,0,188) A 18 year-old Japanese civilian, Katsumo Tamura, was hanged at Sugamo prison. On 26 January 1946 he had been sentenced to death for the bayoneting of Private Robert Young in Hokkaido on 19 December 1945 (see at these dates for more detail). (NYT p. 4)

[There are very few mentions in the New York Times of such executions (not related to war crimes) carried out by American authorities. In fact, at this point we do not know how many Japanese were executed for crimes against the occupation.

Sugamo Prison was originally built in the 1920s for political prisoners. It housed

many communists and other dissenters who fell afoul of the Peace Preservation Laws in the 1930s and 1940s. The Allied spies were also incarcerated there, including Richard Sorge who was hanged in the prison on November 7, 1944. The prison was in operation by American military forces from December 1945 through May 1952 (Wikipedia article about Sugamo prison, itself based on the information given on the <http://www.geocities.com> website)].

**May 19, 1946:** US military police in armored cars patrolled Tokyo to prevent riots as 150,000 hunger demonstrators massed before the Imperial Palace; they carried banners attacking Yoshida's cabinet (NYT p. 34). The crowd consisted of a large number of women with children along with postal workers, newspaper workers, railway workers. Red flags were prominent. After a series of speeches centered on the food problem, a small segment of the crowd detached itself and rushed toward the Japanese police guarding the Palace gate. A scuffle followed during which a policeman was tossed into the moat. The group dispersed without gaining entrance. (GHQ8b, No 259)

**May 19, 1946:** Tokyo. The Japanese government was ordered to pay \$500,000 to American telephone companies which had been relaying messages from the occupation forces to the United States. This amount corresponds to a period of 6 months. (North China Daily News p. 1)

**May 19, 1946:** In Tokyo some 250,000 demonstrators demand food. Referring to the emperor, the Communist leader Kyuchi Tokuda asked the crowd: "We are starving, what about him". After the demonstration, MacArthur issued a grave warning to the Japanese in which he said he was prepared to take every necessary step to restore order in Tokyo. (Fifty years 1975, p. 217)

**May 20, 1946:** Letter of George Atcheson to General Derevyanko.

My dear General Derevyanko,

General MacArthur has been pursuing a policy of avoiding interference in internal Japanese political matters, except in cases of extreme necessity.

[signed] Very Sincerely yours, George Atcheson, Jr

(NDL, microfilm YF-A9, reel 2) [Atcheson was writing in his capacity of acting president of the Allied Council for Japan and General Derevyanko was the Soviet member of this council. Probably the Soviet General was trying to understand what was the purpose of the hundreds of SCAPINs that flew out of SCAP offices at a rapid rate. Or may be G. Atcheson had a very narrow understanding of the expression "political matters".]

**May 20, 1946:** At 1345 hours the quarters of the Civil Information Detachment at Kyoto caught fire and burned down. (GHQ8b, No 259)

**May 21, 1946:** A US soldier was struck on the head with a club by an unknown assailant at 2200 hours in the vicinity of the Omiya station, 25 km north of Tokyo. (GHQ8b, No 261)

**May 22, 1946:** American Headquarters for a second time [see above May 5 for the first occurrence] intervened in the formation of the Japanese Cabinet demanding the elimination of two ministers picked up by Shideru Yoshida. His Cabinet which was supposed to be presented to the Emperor this afternoon after 41 days of political turmoil. (NYT p. 10)

**May 22, 1946:** At 2130 hours 5 US soldiers were attacked by 3 or 4 Japanese armed with knives and broken glass. The assailants attacked without warning, wounding one soldier. One of them was apprehended and turned over to the Military Police. (GHQ8b, No 261)

[They were certainly tried by a military court but we do not have any information about this trial.]

**May 22, 1946:** At 2400 hours, several Japanese stoned three US soldiers in Yokohama. Two of the Japanese were apprehended. (GHQ8b, No 261)

[They were certainly tried by a military court but we do not have any information about this trial.]

**May 24, 1946:** A Japanese in a small boat was fired at by a sentry at Kure. He was wounded and taken by civil police to an hospital. (GHQ8b, No 276)

**May 25, 1946:** An explosion occurred in the ante-room of an Officers Mess in Kure (BCOF zone) in which an officer was injured. The officer was butting his cigarette into a porcelain bowl when he heard a fizzing sound like a fire cracker; within 3-4 seconds there was a violent explosion; a portion of the ceiling was blown away, pieces of the bowl were found embedded in the walls 15 meters away. (BCOF MIR number 1)

**May 27, 1946:** ●(39,0,0,189) A Japanese seen near a Kure camp area with a package, subsequently found to be blankets, was shot and killed by a sentry. Some 20 to 30 Japanese began throwing stones when the shooting commenced, the sentry stated. (GHQ8b, No 273)

**May 28, 1946:** ●(39,0,0,190) At 0300 hours, a Japanese who was about to enter a US Army barracks at Kawasaki was shot and killed by a guard. (GHQ8b, No 276)

**May 29, 1946:** It is at the initiative of SCAP that the question of the land reform was put on the agenda of the fifth meeting of the Allied Council for Japan. Grad (1948) observes that as the Council's suggestions became widely known whereas the con-

tents of the memorandum of May 9 remained unpublished, the general impression was that the guidelines for land reform were issued by the ACJ. In reality, however, almost all these suggestions were already contained in the May Memorandum. [This interpretation is in line with the well known fact that the ACJ never had any real decision power.] (Grad 1948, Ward 1990)

**May 30, 1946:** At 0300 in the Kure area a sentry shot and wounded two Japanese and captured another. All were handed over to the civil police. (GHQ8b, No 276)

**May 31, 1946:** There are currently 152,000 US occupation troops in Japan. The occupation costs are being paid by the Japanese government (NYT p. 6).

**May 31, 1946:** It is becoming increasingly apparent that gangs of terrorists and extortionists, with different names but the same memberships as the superpatriotic societies of pre-war days, are still active (NYT p. 6).

**May 31, 1946:** ● (39,0,0,191) . Itazuke Air Base, Fukuoka (Kyushu island). A young Japanese man was shot and killed by a sentry during the night as he was trying to enter the mess. (Letter by Thomas Massey of the 71st Air Engineer Squadron to his parents. Personal communication, 22 February 2016)

**May 31, 1946:** In two months of operation the provost court of the Australian 34th Infantry Brigade tried 52 Japanese (Australian War Memorial Archives, AWM52/18/2/70).

[Under the assumption that this brigade numbered about 5,000 troops, this figure corresponds to an average rate of  $52/(2 \times 0.5) = 52$  trials per month and per 10,000 troops.]

**Jun 2, 1946:** About 190 industrial plants have been seized by the Allies as part of the reparation program; 404 plants had already been seized in January (LM June 2-3).

**Jun 2, 1946:** While walking guard at Schimmelpfenning Camp near Sendai, a sentry was injured by stepping on some concealed explosive material thought to be fulminate of mercury. (GHQ8b, No 270)

**Jun 3, 1946:** Acting on information furnished by an informant, the Military Government Section of the First Corps recovered 37 bars of silver from the bottom of a pond in the northern part of Kyoto. Each bar weighted 37 kilogram and was 99.95% pure. The material is now in the custody of the 800 Military Police Battalion, pending delivery to the Osaka mint. (GHQ8b, No 272)

**Jun 4, 1946:** In violation of SCAP directives the Niimi Agricultural and Forestry School, Okayama prefecture withheld 4 light machine guns, 105 bayonets, and 65

rifle barrels and 31 wooden rifles for bayonet training. The investigation revealed that the principal (a former army officer) together with teachers (who had past military training) and military personnel residing in Miimi had formed a clandestine organization whose aims were the continuation of military training. The investigation undertaken by 36th Military Government is still under way to determine the responsible members of the faculty to be prosecuted. (GHQ8b, No 272)

[In occupied countries the possession of such firearms was punishable by the death penalty; therefore it seems unlikely that this group incurred such a risk solely for the purpose of continuing military training. Yet, the source does not say if this group was responsible of attacks against occupation forces.]

**Jun 6, 1946:** ● (39,0,0,192) Private First Class William E. Hamilton was arrested on charges of killing a Japanese man. He stroke the man more than ten times with a grease gun, took the victim's pocket watch and dumped the body into a nearby canal. He had signe a confession and will be tried by a court martial. (North China Daily News p. 2)

**Jun 6, 1946:** Lieutenant Colonel Hugh H. MacDonald was sentenced to pay a fine of \$900 and his promotion was ordered suspended for 5 years after conviction of selling 42 packages of cigarettes on the black market. (North China Daily News p. 2)

**Jun 9, 1946:** ● (39,0,0,193) At 0530 hours a Japanese who was trying to steal food from a mess hall in Akita, Akita Prefecture. was shot and fatally wounded by a guard. He died at the hospital. (GHQ8b, No 278)

**Jun 9, 1946:** A jeep containing three military personnel was stopped and held up in West Iwakuni by a party of Japanese. The police tried to apprehend the individuals and a struggle ensued during which one corporal was struck on the head and another received hand injuries. Fifteen Japanese were arrested for interrogation. (GHQ8b, No 282)

**Jun 10, 1946:** A telephone wire leading to the control tower was severed at Iwakuni Airfield in the BCOF area. Three meters of wire were removed and were found later on in a nearby canal. (GHQ8b, No 286)

[The fact that the wire was found nearby shows that it was *not* removed in order to be sold on the black market.]

**Jun 11, 1946:** ● (39,0,0,194) At 0730 hours an enlisted man was wounded and a Japanese boy was killed when the carbine of another enlisted man preparing to mount guard discharged. (GHQ8b, No 278)

**Jun 11, 1946:** Five experts of the US Post Office department arrived in Tokyo for a

survey of the postal system in Japan. Subsequently, they will travel to Korea.

**Jun 11, 1946:** A fire destroyed one building of the 12th Cavalry officer's billets (30 kilometers west of Yokohama). No personal were injured. (GHQ8b, No 282)

**Jun 12, 1946:** A fire occurred at Mizuba (35 kilometers south of Otake, Yamaguchi prefecture) which destroyed a large building, three 3-ton vehicle and a gasoline store. The building was used as a military transport park. (GHQ8b, No 287)

**Jun 13, 1946:** ●(39,0,0,195) A guard at a US camp 13 kilometers southwest of Yokohama shot at two Japanese killing one of them while the second escaped. (GHQ8b, No 288)

**Jun 13, 1946:** At 2400 hours a fire completely destroyed the houses allocated to officers' dependents located in Omiya, 17 kilometers northwest of Tokyo. CIC is investigating the cause of the fire. (GHQ8b, No 287)

**Jun 14, 1946:** ●(39,0,0,196) At 0300 hours a guard shot and killed a Japanese at the 229th Base Depot, Yokohama. (GHQ8b, No 287)

**Jun 15, 1946:** The 32nd Military Government provost court in Tokyo took over the trials of Japanese accused of causing the death of other Japanese by selling methyl alcohol [the normal non-toxic form of alcohol is ethyl alcohol] on the ground that the Japanese courts had not been dealing adequately with the case. (North China Daily News p. 3)

[This is one of the few known cases in which a trial was moved from a Japanese to an American tribunal in an affair in which, according to the article, only Japanese people seemed to have been involved.]

**Jun 16, 1946:** The deputy provost marshal told today how a millionaire Japanese contractor and taxicab operator, Akira Ando, had lavishly bestowed geisha parties and gifts upon many high American Headquarters officials including generals to get preference on construction contracts. Agents of the provost marshal and the Army Intelligence Corps started an investigation 7 months ago. A few days ago they arrested Ando. The provost marshal declined to identify any of the officers involved. (NYT p. 8)

**Jun 16, 1946:** A sentry fired on a Japanese breaking into a shed at Kure. Severely injured, he is now in a hospital suffering from abdominal wounds. (GHQ8b, No 287)

**Jun 17, 1946:** There were three incidents in Kumamoto City, Kumamoto Prefecture, in which Japanese had thrown rocks at American soldiers. It is believed that fraternization between soldiers and Japanese women was the cause of the attacks. (GHQ8c, No 293)

**Jun 18, 1946:** ● (39,0,0,204) One ton of dynamite exploded at a railroad station at Suzuka, 12 kilometers east of Nagano. 8 Japanese were killed (3 missing) and 40 were severely injured. (GHQ8b, No 292).

[This was a major but fairly mysterious incident]

**Jun 18, 1946:** A riot by 150 Formosans near Shinjuku station, Tokyo, was quelled by Japanese policemen with the aid of 720 Military Police. Of the 9 Formosans who were arrested 4 were turned over to the Counter Intelligence Corps of interrogation. (GHQ8b, No 290)

**Jun 18, 1946:** ● (39,0,0,205) At 1530 hours a Japanese was shot and killed by an MP after climbing over a fence at Camp Drake, 8 kilometers northwest of Tokyo. (GHQ8b, No 290)

**Jun 21, 1946: Prostitution** A letter intercept says (translation): “How are we to carry on our brothel despite the SCAP directive [suppressing brothels]? The head of our company went to the prefectural office to consult about the matter. After consultation it was decided that we might continue our occupation by changing the name to “boarding house”. We changed the signboard at once. The prostitutes are to be called lodgers or waitress-entertainers and they are to engage in their occupation according to their free will”. (NDL, microfiche GII-02903)

[At the prefectural office the brothel owner probably discussed with Japanese officials. However, this change of names could not be done without the consent of the occupation authorities, especially in so far as it concerned US servicemen.

The affirmation that the prostitutes were engaged in that activity according to their free will is of course a pure fiction. Another intercept in the same microfiche says. “I came here because I was told this house was a chop-house (i.e. a restaurant specialized in serving steaks and other chops of meat) but now I have found it is a disorderly house. Russi and I weep every night. I have to write this letter in the toilet because the master would severely scold me if he knew I was doing such a thing”.]

**Jun 21, 1946:** A small-arm round penetrated a window of the “Yankee Flyer” at 2200 hours. The train was in the area between Matsudo and Fumiabashi north of Tokyo. There were no casualties. This is the 5th incident involving harassment of trains carrying Occupation Force personnel in two months.

i) On 3 May a stone was hurled through a US military coach window at Gomen, near Kochi City.

ii) On 6 May a stone was thrown through a window of a US military car near Matsushima, 25 kilometers northeast of Sendai.

iii) On 13 June at Shirasama (16 km east of Sendai), stones were thrown at a gondola car carrying US vehicles striking a US guard.

iv) On 15 June, 32 kilometers east of Kumagaya, a stone was thrown through the window of a US military coach.

(GHQ8b, No 288)

**Jun 22, 1946:** Headquarters Eighth Army

Subject: Incidents involving United States troops.

General Eichelberger, Commander of the Eighth Army, issued the following proclamation to the troops.

Since publishing my letter to you of 10 June regarding the behavior of our troops, I have received an increasing number of reports of crimes committed by Americans. There are cases of malicious beating of Japanese by both individuals and groups, of breaking into homes and taking trivial amounts of money from needy natives, of destruction of furniture and windows in districts, of assault of women on the highways and in their homes, and in addition many indications of deliberate, arrogant, bullying attitudes on the part of some of our soldiers. The widespread sources of these reports convinces me of their veracity.

Some soldiers appear to feel that it is in their duty to “toughen up” the occupation. The determination of occupation measures is the responsibility of the Supreme Commander Allied Powers and not of individuals who desire to demonstrate their superiority by injuring small and undernourished Japanese. The disgusting actions that I have named above are bringing retaliation on the part of Japanese as they would on the part of any group of men. Unfortunately, revenge has been taken in certain cases on innocent soldiers and not on those persons who have committed these crimes. This condition, a result of assault, crime, and retaliation, is endangering the mission of the occupation, and it must be stopped at once. A drunken man in uniform, fighting, abusing and reviling the people of Japan, offsets the efforts of the great mass of fine, orderly, well-mannered and upstanding soldiers to make the occupation a success. I ask every officer and every enlisted man join with me in the responsibility of halting these unfortunate conditions. This communication will be read to all companies and similar units by the unit commanders.

[Signed:] R.L. Eichelberger, Lieutenant General, USA

(AWM 114 265/3/4)

**Jun 23, 1946:** An American soldier was attacked by a Japanese in Moji City, Fukuoka Prefecture. It is believed that the attack was prompted by resentment of fraternization because the soldier escorted a Japanese girl to a dance earlier the same evening. (GHQ8c, No 295)

**Jun 25, 1946:** Excerpts from the report by BCOF commander J. Northcott.

1) The high incidence of crime by service personnel against civilians is causing con-

cern. Service personnel with civil criminal records and/or long records of military crime will be returned to their countries of enlistment.

2) The present exchange rate of 60 yen to one pound sterling is responsible for black market activities. Discussions with Eighth US Army are in progress on this subject. [Yet, it is only on March 12, 1947 that SCAP would change the exchange rate of the yen.]

3) For the period 13 May 1946 to 12 Jun 1946 there have been 3 attempted arsons and 3 malicious damage to property.

4) There are 5 provost courts operating in the BCOF area.

(BCOF GHQ 1, p. 11, 20, 22)

[This is one of the few GHQ reports in which acts of arson and sabotage are recognized.]

**Jun 26, 1946: SCAPIN-1570-A** Subject: Request for compensation for money robbed by American soldiers. [excerpt].

Investigation reveals that 62,605 yen (about 4,000 dollars of 1946 that is 40,000 dollars of 2000) represents the entire amount of money recovered from perpetrators of the robbery. This amount was returned to the Nakamura Branch Office. The 201,183 yen claimed as the total loss sustained in the robbery was not verified by an official audit.

[Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, R.Y. Hersey for John B. Couley, Colonel AGD.

(Nippon Times 1947 (Directives)).

**Jun 26, 1946:** Investigations showed that American soldiers and officers were sending home more money than the total pay of the occupation force. This was clear evidence of widespread black market operations which though generally known to exist were rarely admitted so far. A new military currency for the payment of American troops will be substituted shortly to the Japanese yen. (NYT p. 12)

[Selling canteen goods to Japanese at inflated prices was one of the techniques used by servicemen in order to make money.]

**Jun 27, 1946:** A heavy underwater cable connecting Eta Jima with Kure was damaged and rendered inoperable. There are 260 Japanese laborers working in the area and each of them had the opportunity to damage the cable. Precautionary steps are being taken by BCOF to prevent recurrence of similar damage. (GHQ8c, No 300)

**Jun 28, 1946:** A General Hospital was established at Kiwa (New Zealand zone) in a tuberculosis sanatorium from which the Japanese occupants were evicted (NZNA Quarterly Report WA-J 68/29).

[The report does not say where the Japanese patients were relocated.]

**Jun 28, 1946:** Several Japanese attempted illegal entry into the Quartermaster Sales Store, Yokohama. One of them was shot at and wounded by a sentinel. (GHQ8c, No 292)

**Jun 29, 1946:** Two Japanese girls working for the occupation forces in Sendai were molested on their way to work. Two Japanese men tried to strike the girls with large sheets of tin. They also cursed the girls because they were working for the Occupation Forces. The people observing the incident seemed to encourage the men. A policeman nearby made no effort to help the girls. (GHQ8c, No 298)

**Jun 28, 1946:** The draft directive on land reform (see above May 9, 1946) was read in secret to the Japanese government but not formally transmitted. (Ward 1990, Annex V) [As the memorandum of May 9, 1946 this directive does not appear in the catalog of the SCAPINs]

**Jun 30, 1946:** At 2100 hours two enlisted men of the 25th Division were walking along a street in Gifu City. They were accompanied by two Japanese girls. They were assaulted by a group of 15 Japanese and ran for help, dodging rocks which were thrown at them by the Japanese. The girls had disappeared by this time. Finding more men in downtown Gifu they came back but were not able to apprehend the Japanese. This appears to be another case of resentment by Japanese youths towards fraternization of Japanese girls with Allied soldiers. (GHQ8c, No 315)

**Jul 1946:** A spectacular blaze occurred in the BCOF area. A half-million gallon high-octave fuel depot exploded in flames at the Airbase of Iwakuni (Davies 2001, 158).

[Such a volume corresponds to a reservoir with a cross-section of 200 square meter and a height of 10 meters; the account does not give the precise date nor does it say if there have been casualties; incidentally, it can be noted that neither the NYT nor the Times mention this conflagration.]

**Jul 1, 1946:** Sixty one boxes containing an amount of Japanese Army yen equivalent to \$26,917,470 were found in a cave in Okinawa. Approval was obtained from CNO (Chief of Naval Operations) and CinCPac (Commander-in-Chief, Pacific) to use this money for any Military Government purposes or for the pay of American Military or Navy personnel. (Report of Military Government activities 2000)

**Jul 3, 1946:** ● (40,0,0,205) A fire broke out in the Officers Club in Ota, 60 kilometers northwest of Tokyo at 0200 hours. The building was completely destroyed. One officer was burnt to death and another was sent to the hospital. An investigation to determine the cause is underway. (GHQ8c, No 302)

**Jul 3, 1946:** There was a riot at camp McQuaide (about 10 kilometer west of Watsonville, California) which was used as disciplinary barracks for US Army prisoners. There were 1,700 prisoners at the camp of which 600 battled guards with rocks and set fire to 36 temporary hutments. No prisoners were reported to have escaped or been hurt. (US Army Corps of Engineers 1997 p. 1-3 and 1-4; NYT p. 48)

[What connection does this article have with the occupation of Japan? Because this disciplinary camp was located in California it seems plausible that many of the soldiers who received long prison terms either during the Pacific campaign or during the occupation of Japan were kept at camp McQuaide. Most of the prisoners held at this camp were probably serving prison terms of more than one years; indeed it seems reasonable that for shorter terms they would have been confined in their unit. The number of 1,700 thus provides an order of magnitude of the the sentences imposed by general court martials. Incidentally, it can be observed that it is quite surprising that a riot of such a magnitude did not result in a single casualty.]

**Jul 6, 1946:** A patrol inspecting schools on Eta Jima in the BCOF area discovered banned textbooks being used at Takata and Miyashi, 8 miles west of Kure. The books were confiscated and 76th Military Government Company was advised. (GHQ8c, No 305)

**Jul 7, 1946:** ●(40,0,0,206) At 0130 hours a guard shot and killed a Japanese caught stealing gasoline from the company mess hall at Yokohama. At 0335 hours another guard from the same unit shot and killed a Japanese who failed to stop when challenged in Japanese. Both bodies were taken to the Yamashita Hospital. (GHQ8c, No 305)

**Jul 8, 1946:** ●(40,0,0,207) Excerpt from Eighth Army G-2 Periodic Report. During the night in Sasebo City, Nagasaki Prefecture, Military Police attempted to apprehend a mob of approximately 20 Japanese armed with clubs who were suspected of molesting Marine personnel who had been escorting Japanese women. The Japanese refused to halt when the MPs ordered them to do so and, in attempting to keep them from escaping, the MPs fired 10 shots. It is not believed that any of the Japanese were hit but one of the people was later found dying from a head injury which had evidently been caused by falling against a rock [bad luck!]. (GHQ8d, No 322)

**Jul 10, 1946:** A Japanese was shot through the foot while trying to enter the mess hall of the 583rd Engr at Sendai. (GHQ8c, No 302)

**Jul 11, 1946:** A British Warrant officer was assaulted by two Japanese in Tokyo as he was sitting on an embankment with a Japanese girl. The officer knocked one of the Japanese down but was cut with a knife by the other Japanese. The Japanese ran away and a subsequent search of the area by MPs and Japanese police failed to find

the assailants. (GHQ8d, No 325)

**Jul 12, 1946:** At 2110 hours in Chori Park, Fukuoka City an enlisted man was attacked by a Japanese who attempted to strike the soldier with a club. The blow landed on the shoulder. The Japanese disappeared in the bushes and could not be found. It is believed that resentment of fraternization was the cause of the attack. (GHQ8c No 313)

**Jul 14, 1946:** General Eichelberger, Commander of the Allied ground troops in Japan wrote a letter [see above Jun 22, 1946] that was read last month to the troops by all American company commanders. Until this morning the letter was withheld from publication. Crimes of GIs against Japanese were increasingly reported from all parts of Japan and comprised beatings of Japanese by individuals or groups, house breaking, thievery, assaults on women. Conditions are aggravated because Japanese hesitate to make complaints against Americans and because the Japanese press is under American censorship and does not print accounts of crimes involving Americans (NYT p. 1).

[This problem was not specific to Japan of course. In the second semester of 1945 French newspapers such as “Le Monde” reported almost on a daily basis incidents (robberies, aggressions, disturbances) involving American soldiers or thieves dressed up as GIs.]

**Jul 15, 1946:** Imperial Ordinance No 311 [excerpts]

Imperial Ordinance No 311 was promulgated by the Japanese Government to implement SCAP’s policy of entrusting to the Japanese people and government the responsibility for executing his directives. Article 1: There will be no public prosecution with reference to the following criminal cases:

1. Crimes committed by united Nations Nationals.
2. Acts prejudicial to the security of the Occupation Forces.
3. Killing or assaulting any member of the Occupation Forces.
6. Refusing information required by any member of the Occupation Forces.
7. Acts in support of any organization dissolved by SCAP.

Article 2: Chief of prison shall detain persons designated by Military Occupation Courts, for imprisonment or for alternative imprisonment *in lieu of payment of fines*. (NARA 11)

[Acts 1 to 3 of Article 1 are anyway not within the jurisdiction of Japanese courts and will not be tried by them.

Article 2 shows that it would be a mistake to think that persons sentenced to pay fines by provost courts will not be taken into custody. It also shows that a fraction (but we do not yet know what fraction) of the detainees in Japanese prisons were in

fact sentenced by military courts.

Imperial Ordinance No 311 became effective on 15 July 1946.

In this connection see also SCAPIN 1740 of 27 June 1947.]

**Jul 17, 1946:** A bamboo spear was thrown through the living room window of the house of J.G. Gelder who lives with his family in the Navy Housing Area in Kanakura. This act may be overt manifestation of resentment felt by the Japanese against the requisitioning of houses. Gelder's home was robbed on 11 July by unidentified burglars. (GHQ8c No 318)

**Jul 18, 1946:** A large rock was thrown through the window of a US military coach in Fujisawa, 10 miles southwest of Yokohama injuring one enlisted man of the BCOF. (GHQ8c, No 314)

**Jul 19, 1946:** ● (40,0,0,208) A Japanese was shot by a guard of the 753 AAA Gun Battalion. at Yokohama. He later died in the Yokohama hospital. (GHQ8c, No 320)

**Jul 19, 1946:** A Japanese youth tried to get entrance into the camp of 897th Company at Yokohama by crawling under the fence. A guard noticed him and when he attempted to escape he was shot in the leg. Military Police was notified and the youth was taken to a hospital. (GHQ8c, No 317)

**Jul 20, 1946:** **Number of provost court trials by military unit.** In the month from 21 June to 20 July 1946, there were 1,309 trials in the 9 following units (number of cases within brackets). I Corps (15), IX Corps (35), 1st Cavalry (95), 24th Inf.Div. (12), 25th Inf.Div. (72), BCOF (161), Yokohama Base (382), Kobe Base (401), 11th Airborne (136).

The total numbers were more or less the same in previous and following months of 1946; the smallest number (namely 1,144) occurred in Nov-Dec and the largest (namely 1,550) in Apr-May.

(NDL, microfiche LS-17633)

[Unfortunately, the charges are given in very vague and general terms such as "Violations of the objectives of the occupation". In some other microforms of this series (namely LS-17540 to LS-17633) the charges are given in more detailed ways but a comparison of the docket numbers (i.e. number in the list of cases awaiting trial) and of the number of cases that are listed suggests that about 50% of the trials were not listed.]

**Jul 21, 1946:** A Japanese was tried by one of the provost courts of the 1st Cavalry Division for discharging his pistol against an occupation forces train. He was sentenced to 2 years at hard labor. (NDL, microfiche LS-17554)

[One would like to know what part of the train was targeted. Whether it was the

windows or the wheels makes a big difference.]

**Jul 22, 1946:** BCOF reports that a sentry on duty at Kure observed a small rowing boat being pulled toward an old Japanese destroyer. When the boat failed to stop the sentry fired. Two Japanese women in the boat were hit. They were sent to hospital. (GHQ8c, No 318)

**Jul 20-25, 1946:** Message addressed by T. Katsube, Chief of the Liaison Section of the Central Liaison Office (through which transited all communication between SCAP and the Japanese government) to V.R. McLeod, Price Control and Rationing Division. Dear Mr. McLeod, With reference to the telephone talk pertaining to the directive "Delivery of certain subsistence to the Eighth US Army" I am satisfied that it was not published in any paper and, to make sure, instructions have been given not to publish it in the future. (MOFA 33)

[The excerpt shows that Japanese officials sometimes took the initiative in the retention of news.]

**Jul 22, 1946:** A Japanese male dressed in a kaki uniform (not US Army) was beaten by 3 unidentified US soldiers near Tsukishima police station, Tokyo. A group of approximately 50 Japanese civilians gathered in the vicinity and began throwing stones at any and all soldiers seen. A soldier from the 71st Signal Battalion was struck on the chin by a stone. Members of the battalion attempted to catch some of the mob and in so doing beat one Japanese believed to be a member of the gang. The Military Police patrol did not arrive in time to disperse the participants.

G-2 comment: This type of reaction may be expected if our soldiers continue assaulting Japanese. (GHQ8c, No 313)

**Jul 22, 1946:** A group of youngsters attempted to raid a BCOF store. The sentries opened fire wounding two of them. They were 11 year old. (Gerster p. 127)

**Jul 23, 1946:** Acting on a tip from an informant, a patrol was dispatched to Kanakura, 10 miles south of Yokohama. They found a suitcase which contained a quantity of platinum later valued at 5,000 dollars (about 50,000 dollars of 2000). Four Japanese have been arrested during the operation. (GHQ8c, No 320)

**Jul 27, 1946:** At approximately 22:30 four Japanese male civilians stoned two American soldiers enroute to their barracks at Wakamatsu, Fukushima Prefecture (about 200 km north of Tokyo). The soldiers pursued the Japanese who after a short tussle in the darkness eluded them. (GHQ8d, No 327)

**Jul 31, 1946:** A mess building at the BCOF Headquarters at Eta Jima, 8 km west of Kure, caught fire at 22:30. It is suspected that a blown fuse started the fire. No casualties were sustained. (GHQ8d, No 325)

**Aug 1, 1946:** Three Australian personnel were attacked by 16 Koreans at Kaidaichi in the BCOF zone. Preliminary inquiries reveal that the the blame for the assault lies with the soldiers who apparently tried to rob them. They were pursued by the Koreans before they reached their unit lines where the unit piquet dispersed the pursuers. (BCOF DIR number 120, GHQ8d No 329)

**Aug 1, 1946:** About 44% of the thermal power plant capacity had been destroyed nationwide during the war. In addition, surviving equipment in some 20 war-damaged thermal power plants had been included among factory machinery which was to be shipped to Asian countries invaded by Japan in part-payment of war reparations. (<http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history/Th-UI/The-Tokyo-Electric-Power-Company.html>)

**Aug 1, 1946:** ● (40,0,0,209) At 22:30 L.W. Andrews from US fleet Activities at Yokosuka shot and killed a Japanese (21 years old) who had been peeking through the window of a room occupied by a Japanese servant. (GHQ8d No 324)

**Aug 2, 1946:** A telephone line of the CIC at Bofu (in the BCOF area) was cut for the second time. (Brindiv 1)

**Aug 3, 1946:** There was a fire at 14:45 at the 221 Medical Detachment in Morioka, Iwate Prefecture which started with an explosion. All personal property and most of the medical supplies were destroyed but there were no casualties. (GHQ8d No 322)

**Aug 3, 1946:** ● (40,0,0,210) The 138 AAA [Anti Aircraft Artillery] Battalion reported that at 2:21 a guard at a warehouse on the central pier, Yokohama shot and killed a Japanese male who was caught pilfering supplies. The guard called for the man to halt in Japanese and fired when he failed to comply. (GHQ8d, No 322)

**Aug 5, 1946:** Excerpt from Eighth Army G-2 Periodic Report. The civilian attitude is best in those predominantly agricultural prefectures (Nagano, Niigata, Yamanashi, Ibaraki, Gunma, Saitama, Togichi) in which we have few troops and worst in the Metropolitan areas (Kagagawa [the prefecture in which Yokohama is located], Tokyo-To, Chiba) where the bulk of our troops is concentrated. (GHQ8d, No 323)

**Aug 5, 1946:** A BCOF soldier was threatened by a Japanese on a civilian train between Miyhoshi and Hiroshima; the Japanese threatened to push the soldier from the train. (BCOF DIR number 120)

**Aug 5, 1946:** Totsuka police reported that between 26 July and 5 August, 540 pieces of dynamite, 1800 boxes of caps and 162 safety fuses were stolen from the Highway Construction Office of the Home Ministry. (GHQ8d, No 333)

**Aug 5, 1946:** **Compliance with the SCAPIN directives** In the late months of 1945

and early months of 1946 the SCAPIN directives were flowing from GHQ faster than the surveillance agencies could be organized to check on their enforcement. SCAP wanted to know the degree of compliance with the directives not only in the cities but in the entire country. As the 441 CIC Detachment was deployed in every prefecture, it was the obvious choice for this surveillance. As a matter of fact, the surveillance exercised by these teams often turned out to exceed their authority in the sense that they showed a tendency to dictate policies to local Japanese authorities.

Thus, on 5 August 1946 SCAP issued an order limiting the power of the CIC teams. For instance, according to this order, only CIS-G2 [i.e. the intelligence branch of the Civil Intelligence Section] was able to initiate action on purge violations.

(History of intelligence activities under General MacArthur 1942-1950, NDL, ISG-1, reel 12)

[In principle the purge was carried out by Japanese commissions but in practice there was much interference from the occupation authorities.]

**Aug 6, 1946:** At 22:30 in the Tokyo area an enlisted man was walking with a Japanese girl when he was attacked by four civilians. One of the assailants was armed with a knife approximately 30 centimeter long. In the scuffle the soldier managed to disarm the Japanese with the knife but in so doing he received a cut in the left arm. All assailants escaped. On 8 August, Seikachiro YAMAKE gave himself up as the man who inflicted the knife wound. (GHQ8d, No 332) [This story is not very clear (i) How can a single man confronted to four assailants disarm them? (ii) Why did Yamake give himself in two days later?]

**Aug 6, 1946:** An enlisted man was injured by an explosion at Camp Schimmelpfenig, Sendai. The soldier walked on ground which, it is believed, was impregnated with fulminate of mercury. He was treated for lacerations of the face. This is the second such incident to occur in the area. (GHQ8d, No 332)

**Aug 7, 1946:** A vigilante group consisting of approximately 20 Japanese has been observed operating nightly in the vicinity of the Regimental Compound in Kumamoto City, Kumamoto Prefecture (south of Japan). The group which is equipped with clubs and flashlights, ostensibly to prevent looting of vegetable gardens has on at least two occasions been observed threatening enlisted men walking nearby. (GHQ8d, No 325)

**Aug 7, 1946:** Hakodate. An enlisted man was struck on the back of the head by a Japanese who claims that the soldier was molesting his wife. He was treated for a skull laceration. The incident occurred at Hakodate, Hokkaido prefecture. (GHQ8d, No 348)

A somewhat different account is given below.

A soldier was molesting Japanese women. One of them, the wife of a former Japanese serviceman, struck him on the head with a brick. The soldier died of the injury and the Japanese was later apprehended. (NDL, microform G2-2901)

[The two stories seem so different that one wonders if it was really the same episode. However, they both occurred in Hakodate, Hokkaido on the same day.]

**Aug 9, 1946:** At 22:00 two lieutenants were travelling in a jeep at Hachioji, Tokyo Prefecture, when a small charge of explosive was thrown into the jeep. The explosion blew off three fingers of one hand of the one of them. Four Japanese were noticed in the vicinity. A subsequent investigation at the home of Gemichi Shimazaki, age 19, revealed 68 sticks of dynamite. Shimazaki has been turned over to Tokyo Military Court. (GHQ8d, No 328 and 373)

**Aug 12, 1946:** At 15:30 450 Koreans who had returned to Japan illegally and were in a stockade near Fukuoka (south of Japan) attempted to escape. Police fired in the air in an attempt to halt the mass exodus. A group of MPs rounded the group up a short distance from the stockade. Five ringleaders have been imprisoned and the remainder of the group have been sent to Sasebo to await return to Korea. Dissatisfaction with the food was given as the cause of the outbreak. (GHQ8d, No 334)

[The report does not mention any casualties; one must suppose that all fugitives could be recaptured without opposing resistance and without trying to go into hiding.]

**Aug 13, 1946: SCAPIN 1131** Subject: Reparation selections of steam-electric power generating plants. [excerpt].

The Imperial Japanese Government is notified that all steam electric generating plants designated in the attached list are hereby taken into custody and control of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. This list designates plants subject to removal under the interim reparations program. There will be made available to the Commanding General, Eighth US Army all personnel, equipment and supplies deemed necessary by him for the establishment of proper custody control and proper maintenance. Within 60 days of the date of this memorandum each plant will be held ready for immediate shut-down. Provisions of this memorandum shall not be construed to preclude immediate shut down and removal of plants that may be designated by subsequent memoranda. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander J.A. Rehe, for John B. Cooley, Colonel AGD (Nippon Times 1947 (Directives))

**Aug 14, 1946: SCAPIN 1136** Subject: Reparations selections within the precision bearing industry.

The Imperial Japanese government is notified that all precision bearing plants on the attached list are hereby taken into custody and control of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers. This list designates plants subject to removal under the interim

reparations program. (History of the non-military activities of the occupation of Japan. Vol. 9, Reparations and property administration. Appendix 11, p. 45 of the appendix section)

[Through SCAPIN 1751/44 of 15 November 1948, the Japanese government was put in charge of packaging and transferring the equipment.]

**Aug 14, 1946:** ● (40,1,0,210) An Indian soldier was killed by a Japanese. Signalman Paul of the Indian Signal Corps had posed as a military policeman to get access to a house. He tried to rape the lady of the house. A friend of the family named Suzukawa Chuji restrained him with a judo grip and broke his neck. (Date: Commonwealth War Graves Commission; story: Bates p. 107, Carter p. 196)

[Considerable coverage was given to this story by the public relations office of BCOF because it was seen as an opportunity to demonstrate the fairness of military courts. The fact that this homicide was tried in a provost court (aimed for small offenses only) shows that from the start authorities had decided on a light sentence. As a matter of fact, Suzukawa was acquitted (see below Sep 17).]

**Aug 15, 1946:** A patrol at the Niigata Primary School (BCOF area, south east of Hiroshima) revealed 20 banned text books. The schoolmaster was uncooperative. Military Government have been requested to have this teacher screened. (GHQ8d, No 331)

[It would be interesting to know the outcome of the screening. The schoolmaster may well have been purged and dismissed because closer scrutiny of his prewar activities lead so some incriminating evidence.]

**Aug 15, 1946:** On 14 August at 22:00 the Niigata Military Government Team requested that a Battery of Division Artillery be dispatched to Niigata for reinforcements. This was in response to information that it received of attempts to be made on the lives of US Army officers. The battery arrived on 15 August at 8:35. (GHQ8d, No 333)

[This is a rare occasion where military reinforcements are asked for to respond to a threat; this instance remains fairly mysterious: what was the point of moving artillery to stave off an attack against US officers? May be it was just a exercise.

**Aug 16, 1946:** [Purge of members of the Teachers Investigation Committee of Fukushima prefecture.](#)

Investigation by the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) reveals that 5 of the 13 members of the "Teachers Investigation Committee" of Fukushima prefecture are not suitable to screen educational personnel as instructed by SCAPIN 212 [this SCAPIN is almost identical to SCAPIN 178 of 22 October 1945 which can be found at this date]. CIC recommends that they be removed. (NDL, microfiche G2-2902)

[For Misume Sueji, one of the 5 to be removed, the source gives the following reason: “He is the author of a book against America and England”.]

**Aug 16, 1946:** An investigation by the Counter Intelligence Corps of concealed weapons found by the 1st Cavalry Division at Sakawa, Kanagawa Prefecture, revealed the presence of additional weapons buried at Honcho Kokumin School. A Japanese male, age 49, and now acting as principal of Odawara Honcho Seinen School buried the weapons on 2 August 1945. The weapons include 285 rifles, 12 machine guns, 100 bayonets and 2 knee mortars. All items had rusted beyond use. (GHQ8d, No 332)

[The last observation appears surprising for rusted bayonets can be cleaned and sharpened fairly easily. Moreover, one wonders what may have been the purpose of burying such weapons without protecting them.]

**Aug 17, 1946:** During the two weeks from Aug 2 to Aug 17 the provost court at Kaitachi (BCOF zone) tried 57 cases of which 26% concerned the unauthorized possession of firearms and 61% concerned black market. 98% of the defendants were found guilty; the average sentence for possession of firearms was 18 months hard labor. (BCOF DIR number 147).

**Aug 17, 1946:** During the night someone, presumably Japanese, fired close to the Guard of the 933th AAA . They returned fire but hit no one. This is the second incident of this nature in the same area. (GHQ8d, No 335)

**Aug 17, 1946:** At 6:40 in Kokura City, Fukuoka prefecture, a guard was forced to fire at a Japanese who was breaking into a railroad car. He was wounded in the arm. (GHQ8d, No 340)

**Aug 18, 1946:** A Japanese was shot in the left wrist by guards of the ship “Sam Dearing” in the Kure dock area; it is assumed that he was in the area for the purpose of pilfering. (BCOF DIR number 135)

**Aug 18, 1946:** ●(40,1,0,211) At 19:00 a 1st Cavalry Division guard shot a Japanese male loitering in the troop area at Fujisawa (not far from Yokohama). The guard ordered, in Japanese, several times that the Japanese halt, but when the man started to run, the guard fired. Wounded in the leg and stomach the Japanese died the next day. (GHQ8d, No 339)

**Aug 18, 1946:** At 0:30 a 1st Cavalry Division guard saw two Japanese boys entering the bakery of Kieo University. The guard apprehended one of the Japanese and turned him over to the police. At 1:15 the guard again saw a Japanese in the area. When the Japanese began to run he fired. A trail of blood was followed to the highway but the wounded Japanese escaped. (GHQ8d, No 342)

**Aug 19, 1946:** In the BCOF area a telephone line was cut at a point where it lies in a stream. The severed ends had been tied together and replaced in the stream. The line was also cut at another place and 50 meters of wire were stolen. (GHQ8d, No 345)

[The cutting of telephone wires is often attributed to thieves wishing to sell the wire on the black market. Here, however, is a case where there was obviously a different motive.]

**Aug 19, 1946:** An American soldier who was walking with a Japanese girl in Yokohama was accosted by a Japanese man who ordered the girl to leave, cut the soldier on the hand with a knife and fled. The soldier chased the Japanese but was unable to catch him. (GHQ8d, No 335)

**Aug 20, 1946:** A map appended as Appendix C to the BCOF Monthly Occupation Intelligence Review 4 which was issued on 20 Aug. gives the locations of various incidents: fires, train derailments, sabotage actions, crimes against occupation forces, violations of SCAP directives. The 7 sabotage actions mainly took place in Kure, Iwakuni and Hiro. (AWM 114 423/11/4)

**Aug 20, 1946:** ●(40,1,0,212) I Corps reports that during the afternoon a guard saw a Japanese near the fence. He shouted for the man to halt; when the Japanese started to run he shot and killed him. (GHQ8d, No 343)

**Aug 21, 1946:** Six Japanese assaulted a guard on duty at Washington Heights. They were sentenced to 6 months at hard labor. (NDL, microfiche LS-17544)

[This was a fairly light sentence. Is it because they seem to have been tried by a “Metropolitan Police Board”?] ]

**Aug 21, 1946:** At 1:35 a fire of undetermined origin broke out and completely destroyed the laundry of American troops in the area of Fujisawa. No personnel were injured. (GHQ8d, No 342)

**Aug 21, 1946:** Derailment of an Allied military train, the Dixie-Limited, near Fukuoka-shi. (NDL, microfiche GII-02903)

[As always, the report includes the sentence: “The investigation failed to reveal the presence of sabotage”. A similar accident occurred on 27 August, see below.]

**Aug 22, 1946:** In a Tokyo provost court Masao Onno, Koji Arai and Shoji Urabe were sentenced to 3, 3 and 2 years at hard labor respectively for keeping an aircraft machine gun and 500 rounds of ammunition. (NDL, microform GII-02850)

**Aug 22, 1946:** In Fukuoka City, Fukuoka prefecture (south of Japan) two American soldiers were involved in an assault case with 2 Japanese men and 3 Japanese women.

The Japanese attempted to prevent the soldiers from molesting the women. In the course of the argument, one of the Japanese was struck on the head with a beer bottle. The other Japanese man then picked up an iron bar and beat the Americans. (GHQ8d, No 351)

**Aug 24, 1946:** At 22:00 an American civilian was stabbed by two Japanese in the vicinity of the Yokohama Engineer Club. (GHQ8d, No 343)

**Aug 27, 1946:** The I Corps reports that at Sasebo, Nagasaki prefecture, there is total of 10,210 Koreans impounded for illegal entry. Of these, 2,230 are on shore and 7,980 are on ships. (GHQ8d, No 341)

**Aug 28, 1946:** At 21:00 a telephone line was cut 5 km north of Hiroshima (BCOF area) and 400 meters of cable stolen. Two further instances of deliberate mutilation of this telephone line occurred on 29 August. At 17:30 a civilian was apprehended while removing wire from this line and is held pending trial by provost court. (GHQ8d, No 352)

[It is a weird idea to remove telephone cable in broad daylight instead of doing that under the cover of darkness.]

**Aug 29, 1946:** At 15:15 a Japanese attacked three US soldiers with a hammer at the Itsuke Airbase, Fukuoka prefecture. The soldiers suffered minor cuts and bruises. The man was found to be mentally disturbed and will be placed in an institution. (GHQ8d, No 354)

**Aug 30, 1946:** A Japanese man attempted to stab an Australian soldier at Jigozen in the BCOF zone. The man attacked the soldier because he saw him in the company of his wife. (BCOF DIR number 149, 174; GHQ8d, No 350, BRINDIV 1)

**Sep 2, 1946:** At 15:50 two Japanese males were shot by a soldier on guard at the 240th Bakery in Yokohama. One was shot in the left side of the chest and the other was shot in the left hip.

**Sep 3, 1946:** In the vicinity of Bofu (BCOF area) telephone lines were cut between 21:00 and 8:00. (GHQ8d, No 350)

**Sep 7, 1946:** The “Hoanden” were shrines maintained in school buildings which contained a photograph of the emperor and the text of the Imperial Rescript on Education. All “Hoanden” are to be converted into cupboards (BCOF DIR number 153)

**Sep 11, 1946:** SCAPIN 1146      **Reparations**

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Imperial Japanese Government  
THROUGH: Central Liaison Office, Tokyo

SUBJECT: Removal of scientific laboratory equipment from present locations to storage.

Scientific laboratory-type equipment deemed suitable for [war] reparations will shortly be selected for movement by occupation forces from present locations to warehouses, there to await final disposition.

Equipment on current inventory lists but which will eventually be judged unsuitable for reparations purposes will be considered at a later date regarding its return to the Japanese Home Ministry.

signed] R.G. Hersey/ John B. Cooley, Colonel, AGD.

[A 7-page section follows, which lists all kinds of equipment which is concerned by this SCAPIN: radio, photography, electronics, mechanical, aircraft engines, physics measurement instruments, and so on.]

(Source: SCAPINS 1952, p. 264-265)

[The removal of this equipment was probably a major disruption for Japanese companies and university research facilities. Even those items which will eventually be returned to the Home Ministry will be unavailable for periods of time which are probably of the order of several months.]

**Sep 11, 1946: SCAPIN 1195** Subject: Compensation for damage caused by allied military personnel [excerpt].

Summary provided by SCAPINcat: Informs the Japanese Government that SCAP recognizes no legal basis for liability with respect to claims resulting from occupation. (SCAPINcat)

**Sep 11, 1946:** The Japanese merchant marine is virtually paralyzed by a general strike of the “All-Japan Seamen’s Union”. (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol. 10, No 5, p. 170))

**Sep 12, 1946:** Since its formation [in early 1946] the Nagasaki Teachers Screening Committee has removed 64 teachers in the prefecture. While most of them were purged for their activities before and during the war, some others were discharged because of improperly marking textbooks and illegally disposing of maps prejudicial to the objectives of SCAP. (GHQ8d, No 354)

[As the population of Nagasaki prefecture accounts approximately for 5% of the Japanese population, one can estimate that about 1,200 teachers were removed in the first 9 months of 1946. It can also be noted that what is invoked in this note is an attitude prejudicial to SCAP’s *objectives*, a much broader notion than SCAP’s directives.]

**Sep 13, 1946:** At 22:30 a disturbance took place near Yokohama resulting in the injury of 3 US soldiers and 2 Japanese civilians all of whom have been hospitalized.

(GHQ8d, No 359)

**Sep 14, 1946:** ●(40,1,0,213) A small rowing boat was fired on by a sentry in the BCOF zone; a Japanese female child was hit and killed; the report says that the boat was in a prohibited fishing area. (BCOF DIR number 160)

**Sep 14, 1946:** A 24-hour “political” strike which was ordered by the Congress of Industrial Unions had two (i) to compel the government to rescind its order for the dismissal of more than 150,000 railway and marine workers. (ii) In a broader way, the strike aimed at the resignation of Prime Minister Yoshida. (Amerasia November 1946, Vol. 10, No 5, p. 170)

[As shown by the following news there was indeed a large-scale strike on the following day.]

**Sep 15, 1946:** 600,000 Japanese workers participated in the one-day strike against the Yoshida government. (Amerasia November 1946, Vol. 10, No 5, p. 170)

**Sep 15, 1946:** colorblue Hiroshima prefecture, BCOF occupation area. In the period 1-15 September Hiroshima prefecture experienced considerable crime. In one case, a group of soldiers were beaten by Japanese youth wielding beer bottles. The patrolling of the area by armored cars reflected the gravity of the situation. (NDL, microfiche GII-002904)

[This account reflects a general rule. In order to get information about problems in the BCOF area one should use US sources (such as this one) and conversely in order to get sensitive information about the US occupation zone one should use British sources.]

**Sep 16, 1946:** Tokyo. US censorship permitted publication of only a highly truncated version of the speech delivered in New York by Secretary of Commerce Henry A. Wallace. (Amerasia November 1946, Vol. 10, No 5, p. 170)

[In his speech, Wallace was critical of the “imperialist policy” of the United States in the Far East.]

**Sep 17, 1946:** A Japanese civilian, Suzukawa Chuji, was put on trial before a provost court of the British Commonwealth Air Force in Iwakuni, on a charge of murdering an Indian member of the BCOF who had tried to rape the lady of the house. The verdict of acquittal was received with great emotion by both the accused and the spectators. (Bates p. 107)

**Sep 17, 1946:** 140 cases of dynamite, 22 cases of fuse and 2 cases of detonators were located in two brick strong rooms in the BCOF zone. The owner was arrested. (BCOF DIR number 163).

**Sep 17, 1946:** At 19:00 hours an object was thrown at the window of a “Allied Limited” train going northward. The incident occurred near the Kobe area. This is the second instance of an object being thrown at the “Allied Limited” within a month. (GHQ8d, No 361)

**Sep 19, 1946:** A total of 18 kilogram of silver was confiscated from Koreans at the Hakata repatriation center, Fukuoka prefecture. (GHQ8d, No 360)

**Sep 20, 1946:** A very high frequency cable was severed in the BCOF area and about 100 meter of cable removed. (GHQ8d, No 371)

**Sep 20, 1946:** The Japanese Diet passed the “Labor Relations Adjustment Act” prohibiting strikes against the Government. (Amerasia November 1946, Vol. 10, No 5, p. 170)

**Sep 21, 1946:** Between 7 and 21 September three cases of “ultra-nationalistic teaching” were reported in on Shikoku island (BCOF area, east of Kobe). At Niihama the teacher was guilty of reporting excessively nationalistic sentiments to the pupils. At Matsuyama the principal is alleged to have urged his pupils to study in order that Japan may in a few years blow up the cities of America by pressing a button. At Asaku, children were openly being taught military songs. (BRINDIV 1)

**Sep 21, 1946:** The Japanese Anarchist League has applied for permission to establish a Freedom League at Mihara (BCOF area). Permission has been granted and the league warned to ensure compliance with allied directives. (BRINDIV 1)

**Sep 22, 1946:** At 23:00 a guard in the unit vehicle park at Okayama City (BCOF area) was attacked by two Japanese. One of them jumped on the soldier’s back while the other snatched his rifle one round being fired in the process. Then the Japanese made good their escape leaving the rifle behind. (GHQ8d, No 371)

**Sep 24, 1946:** A sentry at a unit vehicle park of BCOF at Okayama was attacked by two Japanese. The guard noticed two intruders but before he could use his rifle the Japanese snatched it and escaped. Subsequent search of the area failed to locate the intruders (BCOF DIR number 170)

**Sep. 25, 1946:** Sendai. A general court martial sentenced 3 American soldiers to prison terms of 3 years each for “putting fear” into a Japanese and robbing him of a watch and money. (NYT p. 18). [This short article (only 69 words) does not say how the soldiers managed to scare their victim.]

**Sep. 25, 1946:** Several telephone lines in the Yokohama area have been cut near the boundary of the Atsugi Air Base. (GHQ8d, No 374)

**Sep 27, 1946:** At 21:14 in the Kyoto area a rock was thrown through a window of the “New York” car of the Osaka express. No injury to personnel resulted. (GHQ8d, No 373)

**Sep 28, 1946:** A BCOF army barrack caught fire at Yamaguchi. The building, 100 meters long, was completely gutted and collapsed. (BCOF DIR number 174)

**Sep 30, 1946:** During the 3.5 months since 16 June 1946, a total of 564 injured BCOF troops have been evacuated to their respective countries (9 par air, the rest by sea). This represents an average of 160 per month. (BCOF GHQ 1, 3 Aug: p. 12, 9 Sep: p. 13, 17 Oct: p. 18)

[This information is of high interest because it strongly suggests that the total number of fatalities incurred by BCOF troops is not limited to the burials at the Yokohama cemetery. If one assumes that the evacuations have been going on at the same rate during two years (after that only the Australian contingent remained), it means that  $160 \times 24 = 3840$  injured troops were evacuated. If one further assumes that 5% of those evacuated died subsequently as a result of their injuries, it means that  $3840 \times 0.05 = 192$  additional troops died as a result of their service in Japan. As the number of BCOF troops buried at the Yokohama cemetery is of the order of 200, this would represent a sizeable addition.]

**Sep 30, 1946:** The Japanese government announced that Professor Izutaro Suehiro had been dismissed from his chair at the Tokyo Imperial University. He had been the chief of the Central Labor Board and he has published several books about the rights of labor unions. (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10, No 5, p. 153)

**Oct 1946:** Explosion of ammunitions on Onasama-Shima island near Kure (Elliot 1995, p. 30).

[There were several fatalities but the source does not say how many nor does it give the exact date.]

**Oct 1946:** Barracks of the 27th Battalion of BCOF at Yamaguchi were totally destroyed; during the same month the Australian General Transport Company barracks at Kure were gutted (Davies 2001, the exact dates of these fires are not given in the source).

**Oct 2, 1946:** A mess hall of the 753rd Gun Battalion (Yokohama area) was completely burned out at 3:30. There were no casualties. (GHQ8d, No 371)

**Oct 4, 1946:** Many Koreans who have been repatriated from Japan to Korea are trying to come back for various reasons among which are the appalling economic conditions in Korea; they land in the BCOF zone (whose shore is only 200 km distant from Korea) where many of them are arrested and sent back (NZNA Quarterly

Report, WA-J 68/29).

**Oct 4, 1946:** A recent fire that occurred in the 27th Battalion of the New Zealand force resulted in the total destruction of a whole company living quarters; fortunately, only two men received injuries (NZNA Quarterly Report, WA-J 68/29).

**Oct 4, 1946:** ●(41,1,0,213) . A soldier drowned while swimming at the Itazuki Army Air Base. (NDL, microfiche MISC 00928)

**Oct 4, 1946:** During the July-September quarter the general behavior of New Zealand troops was bad. The Lieutenant-Colonel who wrote this judgment recommended that Court Martial proceedings of major crimes be published in New Zealand newspapers. Examples of crimes are:

- (i) Robberies at point of arms
- (ii) Damage to civilian property
- (iii) Assault including assault on Special Investigative Branch agents.

The bad behavior was attributed to two main factors.

- This expeditionary force came directly from Italy where discipline was already rather loose.
- The end of the war intensified the desire of the troops to return to civilian life. (NZNA Quarterly Report, WA-J 68/29)

**Oct 5, 1946:** The Saitama Military Government Team reported militaristic activities at the Yono Agricultural College. The entire student body stood at attention and sang the national anthem (Kimigayo) while the Japanese flag was being raised. Then the student body participated in typical army exercises, shouting “Long live the Emperor” (Tenno Heika Banzai) three times. The flag was confiscated by the Military Government as evidence and a letter has been sent to SCAP containing a detailed report. (GHQ8d, No 371)

[Dismissal of the head of the College and of some professors was the most likely outcome of this episode.]

**Oct 6, 1946:** The US Army actively intervened in the strike of the “Newspaper and Radio Workers Union” that began on October 5. Collaborating with Japanese police US Military Police broke up two peaceful demonstrations. The union demands included collective bargaining contracts and the reinstatement of employees discharged by the Yomiuri Daily and the Hokkaido Daily several months ago. (Amerasia November 1946, Vol. 10, No 5, p. 172)

**Oct 8, 1946:** Throwing stones at trains or firing pistols at them occurred fairly frequently. A survey of three months of intelligence records reveals 5 incidents of this kind in the BCOF zone. For instance, on October 8 a rock was thrown at an occu-

pation forces train which broke a window, on October 9 a pistol was fired from near the tracks at a train near Seta (BCOF DIR number 185 and 188).

**Oct 8, 1946:** The commander of the New Zealand force notes that “the civilian government of the prefecture remained of course in the hands of the American Military Government staff at Yamaguchi” which confirms that the BCOF had no say in policy making (NZNA Quarterly Report, WA-J 67/13).

**Oct 8, 1946:** A telephone line was cut in the BCOF area for the second time in two months. (GHQ8d, No 386)

**Oct 8, 1946:** Several cases of stone throwing at trains occurred in the BCOF area. At 19:25 a rock was thrown at an Occupation Forces train and one window was broken. At 22:00 a stone was thrown through the window of a civilian train. At 23:30 the window of a civilian train was broken by two stones thrown at the train between Satasao and Damogata. (GHQ8d, No 386)

**Oct 10, 1946:** Hokkaido coal miners began a strike for a 25% wage increase. (Amerasia November 1946, Vol. 10, No 5, p. 172) [The magnitude of the wage increase demanded by the strikers reflects the inflation rate and shows that the condition of Japanese workers had notably deteriorated.]

**Oct 11, 1946:** The bills about land reform (see above 28 June 1946) which had been approved by the Cabinet in late July were passed through the Diet without any modification and became law on October 21. Grad observes that the Diet was given to understand that SCAP supported the bill and that approval was therefore required. (Grad 1948, Kawagoe 1999, p. 29).

**Oct 11, 1946:** ● (42,1,0,213) . Colonel Roy. M. McCutchen, Yokohama Base engineer died in a jeep accident. (NDL, microfiche MISC-00928)

**Oct 11, 1946:** At 21:30 Sergeant Georg W. Croft was standing in the window of his quarters in Tokyo when a shot was fired at him passing inches over his head and imbedding itself in the wall behind. The recovered bullet was identified as from a Japanese 0.38 pistol. The shot was fired from the roof of a shed adjacent to the barracks building. (GHQ8d, No 371)

**Oct 12, 1946:** Occupation authorities suppressed the edition of the Nippon Times which reprinted an editorial from Jiji Shimpō that warned against misplaced adulation of General MacArthur. (Amerasia November 1946, Vol. 10, No 5, p. 173)

**Oct 14, 1946:** A two ton truck was destroyed by fire in a BCOF transport unit at Hiro. This incident can be read in connection with the one of 24 September 1946 (BCOF DIR number 190)

**Oct 17, 1946:** **SCAPIN 1278** (ESS/IN) Subject: Violation of SCAP directive No 1 dated 2 September 1945. This directive required the government to hold intact all factories that produced military items. The violation consisted in moving plant equipment to privately owned firms. The Japanese government is directed to investigate these transfers. (Nippon Times 1947, Directives)

**Oct 17, 1946:** At 21:00 a fire broke out in a barracks of an MP company in Sendai. One half of the company's housing was destroyed. No personnel were hurt. (GHQ8d, No 388)

**Oct 18, 1946:** At 5:55 a fire broke out which destroyed one barracks at the Makamanai Hokkaido Camp. There were no casualties. Investigation is being conducted. (GHQ8d, No 389)

**Oct 18, 1946:** ●(42,1,0,214) At 19:20 a guard on duty 24 kilometer southeast of Yokohama shot and killed a Japanese female, age 30, registered with Fujisawa Employment Bureau and possessing a pass. The guard stated that the woman threw rocks and a coke bottle at him. (GHQ8d, No 389)

**Oct 21, 1946:** Ueno provost court. A school principal was sentenced to 3 years at hard labor for permitting the showing of uncensored movie films to approximately 500 students. (NDL, microfiche LS-17553)

**Oct 22, 1946:** ●(42,1,2,228) On Asamishima. A boat loaded with 83 tons of high explosive caught fire. The 56 laborers and crew after being badly burnt jumped into the sea. The explosion killed one Australian, Private Smith, and 14 labourers. (Excerpt from the citation of Corporal J. R. Sewell who was awarded the George Medal for saving several laborers. He was killed one year later while delousing a mine on Shikoku Island.

<http://bcofonline.com/history.htm>).

[BCOF GHQ 1 also mentions this explosion but without saying that there have been any fatalities; this example clearly suggests that such reports do not give a complete picture.]

**Oct 22, 1946:** At 23:30 a guard at the 138th AAA Group was attacked by a prowler with a Japanese bayonet. There was a scuffle. The guard fired one round at the fleeing trespasser but he escaped leaving the bayonet behind. (GHQ8d, No 389)

**Oct 22, 1946:** ●(43,1,2,228) . A drinking bout with poisoned Japanese whiskey ended in the death of one soldier. (NDL, microfiche MISC-00928)

**Oct 26, 1946:** General Eisenhower, Army Chief of Staff, ordered a report to be made on the behavior of American troops both in the Philippines and Japan. The

inquiry came as the result of bitter criticism in the Filipino Press of American hoodlumism. One may recall that the Philippines became independent on July 4, 1946. (NYT p. 6)

[This report would be of great interest. However, after investigation it does not seem to be available at the American National archives. NARA holds a letter (record group 165, dated 9 Dec 1947 and signed by Major General W.S. Paul) which begins as follows: "The attached Report of Inspection of FECOM (i.e. Far East Command) by Brigadier General Trudeau is forwarded to the Under Secretary of the Army for his information." Unfortunately, it appears that the "attached report" is no longer attached and could not be located. The only other item which is available is a memorandum (sent along with the letter) for the Under Secretary of the Army which lists several recommendations. These are of a very general nature however and contain almost no specific information. I am indebted to Mr. Wilbert Mahoney, archivist at the Modern Military Records section at NARA for these precisions (letter of 13 April 2007).]

**Oct 26, 1946:** ● (45,1,2,228) . Yokohama. Two American women employed at SCAP headquarters in Tokyo were drown when the car in which they were riding plunged over the edge of South Pier at 11 am and sunk into 10 meter of water along side the USS Chicago where Navy ceremonies were about to start. Two other occupants of the car escaped death by smashing the windows after the vehicle struck bottom. (NDL, microfiche MISC-00928)

**Oct 31, 1946:** Repeated sabotage of telephone and VHF (very high frequency) wires. The cutting or damaging of transmission wires of BCOF troops was recurrent; it is mentioned in BCOF Daily Intelligence Reports of August - October 1946 almost every week (BCOF DIR number 141, 143, 149, 169, 171, 190, 196, 197, 202).

**Nov 16, 1946:** ● (70,1,2,228) . **Railroad fatalities.** Railroad accidents to Allied personnel reached an all-time high in October 1946 with a toll of 7 dead. For the 6-month period from May to October 1946 there were 25 deaths including 14 (i.e. 56%) from grade crossings and 7 (i.e. 28%) from fall of trains. (NDL, microfiche MISC-00928)

[Whereas accidents at grade crossings are understandable, it seems surprising that every month at least one soldier fell from a train. This kind of accident is fairly rare except in countries where people travel on the roof of carriages which was not the case in Japan.]

**Nov 21, 1946:** Allied Headquarters in Tokyo revealed the recovery of 25 million dollars in diamonds hidden by the Japanese Army before the occupation (Facts on

File Yearbook 1946).

**Nov 23, 1946:** Requisition of Japanese supplies and labor by occupation forces has been drastically curtailed by a directive from the GHQ of the US Eighth Army. This directive had particularly adverse consequences for the BCOF which was still in the process of trying to improve its accommodation conditions. (BCOF GHQ 1, p. 38)

**Nov 25, 1946:** ●(71,1,2,228) One soldier was killed and 6 injured when their truck overturned and fell into a canal off the highway between Tokyo and Yokohama. (NDL, microfiche MISC-00928)

**Dec 5, 1946:** Aichi ken. In the semi-monthly report of the section of Civil Affairs one reads that among the crimes committed in Aichi in the two previous weeks there were 26 cases of incendiarism. (NDL, microfiche CAS(B)-997)  
[Unfortunately, no more details are given.]

**Dec 11, 1946:** ●(72,1,2,228) Kio University. The body of a soldier who had disappeared on 21 November was found at the bottom of a tunnel shaft. His name was Freeman L. Fitzgerald. (NDL, microfiche MISC-00928)

**Dec 10, 1946:** General MacArthur ordered the assets of the 10 most wealthy Japanese families to be converted (and frozen) into long-term bonds (LM p. 2).

**Dec 11, 1946:** ●(74,1,2,228) Tachikawa. Alcohol poisoning has resulted in the death of two soldiers. The liquor that the men drank was discovered to contain 15% methyl alcohol. (NDL, microfiche MISC-00928)

**Dec 20, 1946:** Excerpt of Spot Intelligence Reports G-2. There was a riot by Koreans before the Imperial Palace in Tokyo upon which 11 Koreans were sentenced to terms of one year. (NARA 5)

**Dec 21, 1946:** An earthquake struck the BCOF area at 4:25 am; it caused 1,500 deaths in the Japanese population but no casualty was to be deplored among BCOF troops (Davies 2001, p. 201)

**Dec 25, 1946:** ●(74,1,2,229) Two United States soldiers were sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor upon conviction by a court-martial of rape and a third was sentenced to ten years at hard labor for manslaughter of a Japanese woman (NYT p. 30).

**Dec 26, 1946:** ●(75,1,2,229) One United States soldier was burned to death and another was injured seriously in a fire that destroyed the barracks of the First Air Force at Komaki Airdrome Sunday (NYT p. 26).

**Dec 31, 1946:** Between July 1 and December 31, there have been about 400 provost

court cases tried in the 34th Australian Infantry Brigade; this corresponds to an average rate of 140 trials per month and per 10,000 troops. (BCOF, Administration of Justice, Australian War Memorial archives, AWM114, 130/3/8)

**Dec 31, 1946:** During the last quarter of the year, a total of 206 injured BCOF troops have been evacuated to Australia and New Zealand (204 by ship and 2 by air). (BCOF GHQ 1. p. 30)

**Dec 31, 1946:** A table entitled “Table of misconducts committed by Allied servicemen during December 1946” shows that there were 2 murders (one in Tokyo and one in Hiroshima) and 105 acts of injury and violence. The total number of offences (including burglary (240 cases) or theft (76 cases)) numbers 586. Thus, the acts of violence against persons represent  $107/586 = 18\%$  of the total number of cases. As an order of magnitude this proportion remained fairly constant (with fluctuations between 10% and 20%) in the course of time. (NARA 6)

## 1947

**Jan 1947:** In early 1947 the St. Louis Post Dispatch published an article written by Mr. David Conde which criticized the way SCAP was censoring the Japanese press. A short time after the story appeared, Mr Conde who worked in Tokyo for International News Service and also for Reuter’s was notified that he had to leave Japan. He was forced to go in spite of a protest by other American newsmen in Tokyo. (Coughlin 1952, p. 125)

**Jan 1, 1947:** In the first nine months of operation the provost court of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force [one brigade numbering 4,200 troops] heard 330 charges (Bates 1993). [This represents an average of 87 trials per month and per 10,000 troops]

**Jan 4, 1947:** Pursuant to SCAP directives Imperial Ordinance No. 1 was taken concerning the removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel from the public service (The World Federation of Trade Unions: Seventh Report (1953), Appendix V).

**Jan 5, 1947:** Before local election are held early this year for the positions of governors and mayors it is estimated that 200,000 incumbents will have passed before examination committees like those which reviewed civil servants (NYT section Magazine 6, p. 12).

**Jan 7, 1947:** Excerpt from “Spot Intelligence Reports G-2”.

Subject: Possible resignation of the Transportation Minister.

Civil Censorship Detachment reported today at 15:30 hours that a message had been

intercepted with information to the effect that Transportation Minister Hirastuka in a visit at 14:30 hours today with Premier Yoshida had declared his intention of submitting his resignation. (NARA 5)

[Apart from its own interest this information also provides a glimpse at how the monitoring of phone communications was working; in the present case it concerns communication between members of the Japanese government.]

**Jan 9, 1947:** Excerpt from “Spot Intelligence Reports G-2”.

Subject: National Council of the Japan Communist Party.

In addition to coverage of the open meetings, Counter Intelligence Corps has informants covering the secret meetings of the Committee. In order that the confidential informants will not be compromised they have been asked not to contact CIC during the convention but submit written reports on 10 January. (NARA 5)

**Jan 9, 1947:** ● (78,1,2,229) Three officers were killed in a fire at camp Schimmelpennig (near Sendai, 400 kilometers north to Tokyo) which destroyed the Bachelor Officers Quarters. They are: Major Morris Anderson (31), the son of the late State Senator J.L. Anderson of Louisiana, Captain Karl W. Niemann (44) and Captain George E. Foreman (42). The fire started during the night at 2am in the ceiling of a second-story room where the sleeping quarters were located. The Eight Army report says that the alarm was given immediately when the fire was discovered and that the building was completely evacuated within approximately 5 minutes from time the fire was discovered. However the fire spread so rapidly that several persons were trapped.

Anderson died in the fire around 2:10am apparently from suffocation due to smoke inhalation. Nieman, Foreman and another officer, First Lieutenant Bernard F. King, were severely burned. Nieman died at 9:32 am at the 172nd Station Hospital, Foreman died at the same hospital at 1am on 10 January that is to say 24h after the fire, whereas King survived.

A very brief account (60 words) was given in the New York Times almost one week after the fire in which only the identity of Captain Foreman was reported. About two weeks after the fire, the French newspaper “Le Monde” gave the following brief account “The GHQ [i.e. American Headquarters] announced that the Japanese once again attempted to set American barracks afire”. In fact, the account is so sketchy and imprecise that it is not clear whether it refers to the same fire or to a later one.

The caskets of the three officers were shipped back to the United States on January 25 together with the coffins of Rufus P. McKibban and William K. Cruikshank (both PFC, i.e. Private First Class) who had died on January 6 and 9 respectively (causes of death unknown).

(NARA 1; NYT 16 Jan p. 15; LM 22 Jan p. 8; Individual Deceased Personal File of

Captain G.E. Foreman).

[What can make a fire spread so rapidly? It is true that there were also frequent fires in Japanese houses, but there is a great difference between a civilian and a military building in the sense that the later is kept under watch and guard even at night. There have been many fires in military buildings in 1945 and 1946, therefore one would expect security rules to have been tightened.]

**Jan 9, 1947:** Excerpt of Spot Intelligence Reports G-2.

The recently promulgated “Labor Relations Adjustment Law” stipulates that in the public sector a dispute must first be submitted to mediation, and if this fails a 15 day advance notice must be given of intent to strike. [The abrogation of this law was one of the main objectives of the strikes which took place in January 1947, notably on the 11th and 28th, as well as of the planned general strike of 1 February which was eventually forbidden by the occupation authorities.] (NARA 5)

**Jan 11, 1947:** According to a statement made by Eighth Army Headquarters, anti-allied acts are on the decrease in Japan. According to officers in a position to know, the cases of violence between the Japanese population and 200,000 Allied personnel generally averaged about a dozen monthly [the real figure is rather of the order of a few hundreds, see below the chapter on quantitative evidence]. The majority of the fights between United States or British soldiers and Japanese were caused by the association of Japanese girls with foreign soldiers. One of the most frequent crimes recently has been the cutting and removing of Allied military telephone lines. In December 1946 there were two cases of throwing rocks through windows of Allied railroad cars. (NYT p. 4)

[It can be noted that these two kinds of incidents, namely anti-fraternization reprisals and attacks on Allied trains were also fairly common in occupied Germany. The sharp discrepancy of the previous figures with those released by the Public Safety Division and given in the chapter on quantitative evidence can be attributed to differences in the definition of what is an “act of violence”. That is why fatality figures are the most reliable indicators (unfortunately they are seldom available).]

**Jan 11, 1947:** **SCAPIN 2998-A** Subject: Property located at 391 Kashiwagi-cho, 2 Chome, Yodobashi-ku, Tokyo [excerpt]. The original buildings on subject property were destroyed during the war and several new buildings have been built which are now occupied by Japanese nationals. The Imperial Japanese Government is hereby notified that in the case of this property as well as as in all similar cases any individual inhabiting a building which he has erected without authority of SCAP on property owned as of 7 December 1941 by a United Nations national does not acquire any rights to such property and that upon restitution he will be required to vacate the

premises promptly. (Nippon Times, Directives, 1947)

**Jan 11, 1947: Description made by a US press correspondent on his way from Yokohama to Tokyo.**

Groups of ragged beggar-children are trampling along roads silently stretching up their hands. Between Yokohama and Tokyo there is a vast wasteland overgrown with thick grass camouflaging the ruins. The center of the Japanese capital where stone buildings stand was not ruined. These buildings are occupied by the officers of the American Military administration.

(NDL, Melby papers, MELBY 3945)

**Jan 15, 1947:** Excerpt of Spot Intelligence Reports G-2.

Subject: Soviet report on misbehavior of U.S. Army personnel.

At 2 am on 15 January, a jeep from the First Cavalry Division drove up to the residence of Mr. Varshavsky, Soviet correspondent. Six enlisted men forced open the gate and told Mr. Varshavsky that they wanted some Russian girls and were willing to pay American dollars or yen. Mr. Varshavsky informed them that he was alone with his wife. At 9:15 pm the six men returned with the same demand. Mr. Varshavsky contacted the Soviet Embassy and a duty officer was dispatched. Realizing that they had gone too far the 6 men departed. [The note also gives the names of some of them.] (NARA 5)

**Jan 15, 1947:** Excerpt of a Memorandum of the Civil Intelligence Section (G-2) of SCAP.

Subject: Offenses against occupation forces.

An article headed "Jap Violence Against Allies Non-Existent" appeared in the "Pacific Stars and Stripes" [journal destined to occupation troops] on 11 January 1947. The article, copy of which is attached, is misleading because it is inaccurate in certain respects. The first paragraph (i.e. "Japanese nationals did not commit a single major act of violence against occupation personnel from July 1 to December 31, 1947") is definitely a misstatement of fact. The Japanese police themselves reported one case of murder in August involving a soldier who was slain by a Japanese in a rape attempt on the latter's wife.

The second paragraph ("Most cases of alleged attacks by Japanese were minor personal quarrels between soldiers and Japanese") implies that the numbers of offenses are very small whereas the Japanese reported over 2,000 offenses against occupation forces during each month from July through October 1947.

"Stars and Stripes" stated that the article was furnished by the Public Relation Office of Eighth Army and reprinted verbatim. (NARA 7)

[It can be noted that the very statements found faulty by G-2 Civil Intelligence sub-

sequently became the accepted truth about the occupation. There is only one difference. Here these claims are made for the second semester of 1946 whereas in the mainstream picture they pertain to the *whole occupation period*. Incidentally, this excerpt provides a way to trace back the formation of this myth from the Public Relation Offices of Eighth Army, SCAP and BCOF to the columns of various journals; for, as shown by the activity reports of the Public Relations section of BCOF, the same kind of reports were distributed worldwide to major newspapers destined to the general public, especially to those which did not have special correspondents in Tokyo. The only point which remains somewhat unclear is how this thesis became accepted also by historians. The fact that there have been few (if any) theses on this specific aspect of the occupation certainly helped by leaving original archive sources undisclosed.]

**Jan 20, 1947:** ●(79,1,2,229) Private Walter Boris (18) died in a fire at Camp Drake (First Cavalry Division) but an officer managed to evacuate the other 128 men in time after the fire started early Monday morning in the ceiling of a second-story room. When the flames reached a room where small-arms ammunition was stored, exploding cartridges sent soldiers scurrying for cover in ditches. (NARA 1)

**Jan 20, 1947:** Excerpt of Spot Intelligence Reports G-2.

Subject: Stabbing of the CIO leader, Mr. Katsumi KIKUNAMI.

The chairman of the Japanese section of the Congress of International Organizations (CIO) was seriously stabbed at his home at 2030 hours. He is now confined to his home in a critical condition. The assailant named Ryutaro SAKUMA is a Japanese who was dressed in an aviator's uniform; he gained entrance by giving the name of the leader of the Electric Worker's Union. Mr. Kikunamu was stabbed five times. Sakuma surrendered to the police on 22 January and will be tried in a Japanese court on the fairly light charge of assault with a dangerous weapon. (NARA 5)

**Jan 21, 1947:** A Japanese was arrested in Kyoto on arson charges. He allegedly tried to set fire to a US Army counter-intelligence office at Saga. The Army said the incident was one of the first cases of such action against Allied forces since the beginning of the occupation (NYT p. 12).

[This last statement is hardly correct; several similar cases are mentioned above particularly in the BCOF area.]

**Jan 21, 1947:** To all members of the Eighth Army [delivered by General Eichelberger, excerpt].

You are members of the most elaborately entertained army in the world. Your free time can be spent pleasantly. Our program of athletics, leave hotels, movies, USO [United Service Organizations, an organization that provides recreational services to

US Military worldwide] shows, clubs and opportunity for travel furnish recreational advantages beyond those most of us could afford in civilian life.

We have among us in Japan a few criminals and tramps in uniform who tend to give us a poor reputation. (General Eichelberger's papers, reel 33).

**Jan 22, 1947:** Fire in the motor pool of the 1731st Engine Utilities Detachment at Kashii near Fukuoka city (Kyushu Island in the south of Japan). Total loss amounts to half a million dollars. (NARA 1)

**Jan 25, 1947:** **SCAPIN 1487** Subject: Rationing of petroleum products [excerpt]. It is apparent that provisions of SCAPIN 1443-A (10 June 1946) are not being adequately enforced. The Imperial Japanese Government will submit to SCAP for approval by 3 February 1947 a plan for rationing of petroleum products to individual consumers. The plan will contain requirements to insure that consumption for non essential purposes (i.e. purposes which are not required in the production or transportation of necessary commodities) is eliminated. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, John B. Cooley , Colonel, Adjutant General Division. (Nippon Times (Directives) 1947)

**Jan 26, 1947:** **Removal of Japanese statues**

Japan will retain old war statues. Only monuments that were put up before the Manchurian incident of 1931 may remain. (NYT p. 36) [The two following examples illustrate this statement.

- A monument of the War dead of the Tanaka battalion that was annihilated by the Red Army in 1918 was removed during the occupation before being rebuilt in February 1968.

- A monument built in 1934 in tribute to the crew members of the Hitachi Maru, an oil tanker torpedoed by a Russian battleship during the Russo-Japanese War was removed during the occupation and buried in 3 pieces. They were unearthed after the end of the occupation and the monument was rebuilt in 1965.

These examples show that the policy of occupation authorities was broader than stated in the article of the New York Times. In the first case the statue was erected before 1931, in the second it was indeed intalled after 1931 but in relation with an event which had occurred in 1905. (retrieved from the Internet in November 2009)]

**Jan 27, 1947:** Excerpt of Spot Intelligence Reports G-2. Subject: Dispersion of a mass meeting by military police. [excerpt] A meeting of about 500 persons representing several unions was being conducted in an orderly manner at Haramachida station, Tokyo when brigades of the Military Police arrived on the scene and dispersed the meeting by firing in the air. One of the shots ricocheted off a steel upright and hit a Japanese in the leg. The Japanese is expected to be laid up about 2 or 3

weeks. (NARA 5)

**Jan 28, 1947:** ● (80,1,2,229) Private Glen T. Collins was killed by a bullet from his own gun while on guard at a motor pool near Sendai (300 km north to Tokyo). The accident occurred about 11:30 pm. Collins was seated on the floor with his carbine over his legs, the muzzle pointed his stomach when the weapon discharged. His body was discovered early Thursday morning. Collins was a member of the 1640 Engineer Utilities Detachment at camp Fowler. (NARA 1)

**Jan 28, 1947:** Excerpt of Spot Intelligence Reports G-2.

Subject: Summary of meetings and demonstrations held throughout Japan on 28 January 1947.

Total attendance at the meetings and demonstrations is estimated to be 350,000 (about 150,000 in Tokyo). [The purpose was to ask for the abrogation of a recent anti-strike law and the immediate resignation of the Yoshida Cabinet.] (NARA 5)

**Jan 31, 1947:** British military tribunals sitting in South-East Asia had by the end of January tried 598 alleged Japanese war criminals and pronounced 221 death sentences. Australian tribunals had tried 685 defendants and pronounced 124 death sentences (The Annual Register 1947)

**Feb 4, 1947:** SCAP Government Section. Memorandum for Central Liaison Office, Tokyo. Subject: Clearance of nominees for responsible positions in the public service [excerpt].

In every instance of nomination of candidates by the Imperial Japanese Government for responsible positions in the Public Service, SCAP sections are consulted as to technical qualifications and general acceptability. The government will submit a duplicate list of nominees to the Government Section [of GHQ] accompanied by a certificate stating that each nominee has been screened on the basis of the new questionnaire. [Signature:] Courtney Whitney, Brigadier General, US Army, Chief of the Government Section. (Nippon Times (Directives) 1947)

**Feb 5, 1947:** There is regret everywhere that the BCOF has been deprived of all participation in the Military Government of its area. There are some 100 US Military Government officers in the BCOF area and the BCOF has only 9 liaison officers to work with them. The BCOF has many competent administrators but there are debarred except in private capacity. One of the most popular subjects of debate throughout the BCOF area is "Why are we in Japan?" (Times p. 5).

[Such reflections explain why British troops left Japan in mid-1947; it can also be added that a dual US-British command was tried during the occupation of Italy but it turned out to bring about much confusion]

**Feb 7, 1947:** Col. Edward J. Murray, under arrest for smuggling more than \$210,000 worth of diamonds and other precious stones into the United States from Japan, said today that he regarded them as “legitimate souvenirs”. He had been the custodian of vaults at the Bank of Japan but claimed that he had not taken the 528 gems from the Bank. He related that he got them in late 1945 but refused to reveal their origin. He came back to the United States from Japan on February 3 and was searched by custom men on a tip. He wears the ribbon of the Legion of Merit and the Silver Star. (NYT p. 1) (NYT p. 1)

**Feb 7, 1947:** SCAPIN 1512 Subject: Cotton textile capacity [excerpt]. Approval is given for the rebuilding of cotton textile plant capacity to the level of 4 million spindles and for maximum operation of such machinery (Nippon Times (Directives) 1947)

**Feb 8, 1947:** Last year 687,000 tons of food had been imported in Japan mainly from the United States. All those food imports had been commercial, Japan being charged in full at current market prices. However, as a result of world food shortage, the occupation has obtained only a fraction of the food required. Low supplies cut the official ration to 1,042 calories a day. (NYT p. 6)  
[As a matter of comparison, in Germany the official ration was set at 1,500 calories a day by the occupation forces in 1945 (Price 1945).]

**Feb 8, 1947:** MacArthur ordered new elections one week after he prohibited a general strike whose main objective was to obtain the resignation of Prime minister Yoshida. These elections will provide a safety valve for political unrest. (NYT p. 6).

**Feb 11, 1947:** SCAPIN 1518 Subject: Rationing of petroleum products [excerpt]. The plan [of the Japanese Government] for rationing of petroleum products [ordered by] SCAPIN 1487 dated 25 January 1947 [see above] is not acceptable for the following reason. No controls are provided to ensure that non-essential consumption is eliminated. For instance, no means of identification of authorized consumers is provided. The Imperial Japanese Government will submit to SCAP for approval by 15 February 1947 a plan for rationing petroleum products. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, R.G. Hersey for John B. Cooley, Colonel AGD.

**Feb 13, 1947:** Two explosions at Yokohama blew holes about three feet wide in the sidewalk before Memorial Hall. They are believed to have been caused by sewer gas (NARA 1).

**Feb 20, 1947:** SCAPIN 1535 Subject: Marking of export articles [excerpt]. The Imperial Japanese Government is hereby directed to take immediate steps to insure that every article prepared for export after 15 days of receipt of this directive will

be marked, stamped, branded or labeled in legible English with the words "Made in occupied Japan". [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, John B. Cooley, Colonel AGD. (Nippon Times (Directives) 1947).

**Feb 27, 1947: SCAPIN 1548** Subject: Disposition of garbage and waste [excerpt]. Effective thirty days from the publication of this memorandum the Imperial Japanese Government shall be responsible for the collection and disposition of garbage and waste materials from occupation force installations and housing in Japan. This collection will not be considered a service to the Occupation Forces inasmuch as the garbage received by the Japanese Government is equal to or of more value than the cost of collection and disposition. Therefore, no procurement demands will be issued for this service. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, John B. Cooley, Colonel AGD.

**Mar 1947:** In the Japanese budget approved in March the cost of the Allied occupation represented 25 percent. (The Annual Register 1947)

**Mar 4, 1947:** A fire destroyed the leave hotel of BCOF officers in Kyoto. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 19)

**Mar 6, 1947:** The Operational Directive No 33 issued by the Eighth Army further restricted the powers of Corps commanders to order requisitions. All future requisitions will have to be approved by Eighth Army GHQ or SCAP GHQ. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 31)

**Mar 12, 1947:** United States authorities set a new exchange rate between the American dollar and the Japanese yen at two cents for one yen. Until today, occupation authorities had adhered to the (largely formal) rate of one yen equal 6.6 cents. The previous rate had been set immediately after the surrender and was not changed during 17 months. Transactions are still not free in the sense that one can get yen against dollars but one cannot exchange yens to get dollars. This change coincides with a change in the American military currency that US soldiers must use to pay any expenses to the Army. (NYT p. 16, article by Lindesay Parrott)

[An article published in the Far Eastern Survey in 1949 by Orville McDiarmid suggests that until June 1949 several exchange rates were in existence simultaneously; thus, exports and imports were ruled by two different rates each of which was different from the official rate. Unfortunately, the article does not give definite figures for these rates. In order to get an understanding of the question of the exchange rates during the occupation, one would need additional statistical information.]

**Mar 12, 1947:** At the end of February 1947 the Japanese farmers had delivered only 77 per cent of their crop of rice. The agricultural division of SCAP has called an

emergency meeting of Military Government chiefs from all prefectures. The Eighth Army tomorrow will issue orders authorizing Military Government teams and troops to back up Japanese officials and police; road blocks will be set up, vehicles and travelers will be searched to ensure that no rice is moved into cities in illegal channels, arrests and convictions will be made to discourage violators (NYT p. 15)

**Mar 25, 1947:** US courts in Japan have been working for one year<sup>50</sup>. Eighth Army Headquarters. Yokohama (March 24). More than 12,000 Japanese and a handful of [civil] Allied nationals have been tried before the occupation's Provost Courts established almost exactly a year ago. Most of them were sentenced to terms averaging 90 days for offenses against the occupation forces. Considerable comment attended the authorization of these summary courts on March 11 of last year. Observers noted quite correctly that Headquarters decision to set up an Allied judicial system for Allied personnel as well as Japanese offenders against the occupation revived the extra-territoriality that was dropped in Japan for more than a generation before the war. It is now possible to reach some conclusions regarding the manner in which the system has worked out. First, it is evident that almost no actionable crimes have been committed by Allied civilians here despite the immunity from Japanese court proceeding. Second, a year of court proceedings has failed to disclose anything like an organized attempt by the Japanese to sabotage the occupation or to cause damage to American or British property here. Because of the careful investigation of complaints and the willingness to drop doubtful cases, about 90 percent of those tried are convicted. The average term is 6 month with half the sentence suspended on good behavior (NYT p. 4).

[Five remarks are in order.

(i) This article was reproduced verbatim to make clear that the Provost Courts were not concerned with war crimes but with crimes committed against occupation troops.

(ii) If one remembers that there were about 150,000 American personnel in Japan, the 12,000 trials correspond to an average rate of  $12,000 / (12 \times 15) = 66$  trials per month and per 10,000 troops.

(iii) The article gives two separate indications about average sentences, the first one (90 days) seems to be a kind of median, the second (180 days) a sort of average.

(iv) What was the maximum penalty that provost courts could impose? From the excerpt of May 31, 1950 below one learns that a sentence of 10 year hard labor was within the capability of provost courts. Other military courts, the so-called Military Government courts or Military Commissions, could impose death sentences. (v)

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<sup>50</sup>The title of this article is not really correct; there have been trials by US military courts before March 1946; the SCAPIN which was issued at this time only provided more precise indications particularly as far as their relations with Japanese tribunals were concerned.

Because information about sentences passed by Military Commissions is not yet accessible, it is difficult to know whether or not some serious crimes against occupation forces have occurred.]

**Mar 26, 1947:** ● (80,1,4,229) Two officers of the Australian Royal Air Force were burnt to death when the officers' mess at Iwakuni was razed to the ground by a fire (Davies 2001, p. 158).

**Mar 28, 1947:** ● (81,1,4,229) The body of Private First Class Ralph W. Koch was recovered from beneath a pier near Haneda Army Air Base. Koch was a military policeman stationed inside a C-54 Skymaster to guard it after the plane nosed over in the bay upon landing during a heavy rain. A Japanese fisherman spotted Koch's body on March 24 floating under the pier approximately 300 meters from the crash site. The Army had been searching for Koch since March 3 when another guard who went to the plane to relieve him reported he was missing. (NARA 1)

**Mar 31, 1947:** The Eighth Army Safety section announced that during the three months January–March 1947 there were 67 fires which resulted in the loss of US property valued at about one million dollars. (NARA 1)

**Mar 31, 1947:** In March there have been 44,138 persons arrested for other than criminal code offenses. (SCAP, Summation of non-military activities, May 1947, No 20 in Papers of General Eichelberger, reel 28).  
[The source does not say what exactly is meant by the expression “other than criminal code offenses”.]

**Apr 1947 Screening and re-screening.** Prior to the election of April 1947 all candidates were screened. More surprisingly, after the election the elected candidates were screened a second time. Eleven of the members-elect of the House of Representatives were removed. (NDL, microfiche CAS(B)-5339)

**Apr 4, 1947:** A barrack building was burnt down by Japanese arsonists at Yamaguchi in the New Zealand zone of occupation (Brocklebank p. 77).

**Apr 10, 1947:** ● (82,1,4,229) Kyoto. Lieutenant James H. Oakes, was found dead in an alley behind the Kyoto Hotel last Saturday [i.e. April 5] evening. An investigation revealed that he fell from the fire escape of the hotel. He had a crushed skull and broken hip. (NARA 1)

**Apr 10, 1947:** So far 108 candidates who were planning to run this month for the Diet have been rejected by the screening commission established under Allied orders. This represents approximately 5 percent of the candidates. This figure gains additional significance when one considers that (i) 47 percent of the rejected candi-

dates were members of the Parliament that has just been dissolved. (ii) Only those believing to well qualified submitted their names for examination. (NYT p. 14)

**Apr 12, 1947:** Costly fire in a Kobe warehouse; damage is estimated at several million dollars. (NARA 1)

**Apr 15, 1947:** 519 diamonds, 13 emeralds and 17 assorted semi-precious stones were laid out on a table in a dingy Japanese court room as Colonel Edward J. Murray went on trial before a public court martial (see Feb. 7, 1947). Colonel Murray is accused of taking the jewels from the Bank of Japan where they were deposited as reparations and of bringing them back to the United States in two installments: the first in April 1946 and the second when he arrived in San Francisco to retire on 3 February 1947. It was revealed that four of the stones have already been sold for a value of 13,000 dollars. (NYT p. 2)

**April 18, 1947:** ●(83,1,4,229) Kobe. Lieutenant James E. Smith, was killed on April 13 when he plunged 30 meters through the roof of a warehouse while taking pictures of a ship which was unloading. (NARA 1)

**Apr 19, 1947:** ●(83,1,4,234) One GI was sentenced to be hanged and 4 others received life terms for the murder of 5 Japanese during a wild drinking bout on January 31. The five soldiers had roamed up and down the roads in a jeep, attacking pedestrians and motorists some of whom were beaten with clubs (NYT p. 6).

**Apr 23, 1947:** Report of BCOF Commander-in-Chief [excerpts].

1) There have been several cases of sabotage of communication cable in the Kure area during the past three months. In one case this resulted in a complete breakdown of communications with 34 Australian Infantry Brigade. In March several Japanese civilians were arrested.

2) An English speaking Japanese named Kirui who was formerly employed by the British authorities in Singapore has been installed in Kure as a liaison officer with the Japanese press for PR (i.e. Public Relations) (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 10, 14)

**Apr 25, 1947:** National election for the House of Representatives. The turnout which was 72% in April 1946 dropped to 68%. The legal limit for campaigns expenditures was 75,000 yen but it was whispered that a candidate with less than 500,000 yen at his disposal had no chance of winning. In a general way, the past years has shown that legislators awaited Cabinet bills for action; when they came from SCAP passage was assured (Brines 1948).

**Apr 30, 1947:** Purge of a member of the national screening committee. Mr. Ashida Masanobu was appointed a member of the "Educational Screening Committee" in June 1946 on the recommendation of the "Japan Education Association". Faithful

to his duty, he attended the weekly meetings held in the Ministry of Education. He resigned on 30 April 1947 because of his wartime activities as the Education Secretary of Nara prefecture became the subject of criticism. In short, he was screened out by the very committee in which he has been working zealously for a year. (NDL, microfiche CIE(C) 462)

[This story strongly suggest that screening was to a large extent an arbitrary process. Mr. Ashida had of course been screened before being appointed on the screening committee. Yet, without any new formal screening he was compelled to resign. One can be sure that this kind of threat contributed to keep the other members in line with the wishes of the occupation authorities. On this question see also the entries of 22 October 1945 and 16 August 1946 above and 31 July 1947 below.]

**Apr 30, 1947:** There was a suspicion that the fire that occurred at the barrack of the 27th Battalion the New Zealand force may have been the act of Japanese incendiaries but little proof could be found to support this theory. (Monthly Provost Report for April 1947, New Zealand National Archives, WA-J 3/64 Box 23)

**Apr 30, 1947:** During the month of April there had been 112 trials in provost courts in the New Zealand zone; in March there had been 85. (Monthly Provost Report for April 1947, New Zealand National Archives, WA-J 3/64 Box 23).

**Apr 30, 1947:** A total of 134 persons were killed in rail mishaps in April 1947. (SCAP, Summation of non-military activities, May 1947, No 20 in Papers of General Eichelberger, reel 28)

**Apr 30, 1947:** The monthly death rate per 1,000 prisoners was 1.6 in April (SCAP, Summation of non-military activities, May 1947, No 20 in Papers of General Eichelberger, reel 28)

[According to the same source, over 1946-1947 the prison population was on average 60,000. According to the Historical Statistics of Japan, the numbers of convicts in prison and detention houses in the years after 1943 were as follows (a fall to pre-occupation levels occurred only in the 1960s).

1941	1943	1944	1945	1946	1947	1948
27,588	32,779	40,463	33,906	66,094	66,002	70,727
1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1968
58,595	60148	54,081	55,419	51,121	48,164	29,402

How many of these prisoners have been sentenced by military courts? In the the 12 months between April 1946 and April 1947 there were 12,000 trials in the US zone. Adding those in the BCOF zone (see below at the date of 21 May 1947) leads to a

total of about 15,000. Let us assume that the average sentence was 3 months<sup>51</sup>. This gives an annual average number of inmates of  $15000/4 = 3,750$ . As indicated below (31 December 1947) the death rate of 1.6 per thousand was rather a peak value. An average value was 1 per thousand. This rate leads to 3.75 death per month or 45 per year. If this annual rate is extended to the 6 years of the occupation one gets a total of about 270 deaths. Actually, the numbers of trials by military tribunals although not well known have probably experienced a decrease in the course of time (see 31 December 1949).]

**May 2, 1947:** Headquarters, Eighth Army. Subject: Disposition of garbage and waste. [excerpt, note that this is not a SCAPIN, the latter being issued by General Headquarters].

Paragraph 1 of SCAPIN 1548 dated 27 February 1947 (see above at this date) shall be interpreted to include all Allied ships docked or at anchor within harbors in Japan. (Nippon Times (Directives) 1947)

**May 4, 1947:** ● (83,1,4,235) A soldier of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force on picket at Yamaguchi shot and killed a Japanese (Brocklebank p. 186).

**May 5, 1947:** SCAPIN 1656 Subject: British Armed Forces Special Vouchers. Summary: Directs the Japanese government to enact legislation to make unlawful the possession of British Armed Forces Special Vouchers (BAFS) and Australian one penny and one-half penny copper coins on and after 6 May 1947 by any person except those authorized. (SCAPINcat)

**May 6, 1947:** All yen currency held by BCOF soldiers were exchanged against BAFS (British Armed Forces Special Vouchers) banknotes and Australian copper coins as small change tokens. Contrary to previously used B-yens these vouchers are only used to pay troops and it is illegal to use them for transactions with the Japanese public. However, facilities were introduced for the conversion of BAFSV into Japanese yen currency for members desirous of making purchases from the Japanese market. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 21)

[The main purpose of this measure was to curb black market operations conducted by soldiers but it is not clear if it was successful.]

**May 7, 1947:** Memorandum for the Central Liaison Office.  
Subject: Administration of SCAPIN 550 (Ishibashi, Tanzan).

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<sup>51</sup>To our best knowledge, New Zealand is the only country for which a listing of individual trials is available at the national archives (see the section on archive sources at the end) this listing gives the dates, reasons of arrest (except in a few cases) and in about 50% of the cases the sentence. Based on 112 cases one gets an average sentence of 3.7 months. The sentences range from 0 month (only a fine) to 5 years (60 months); due to this high dispersion the resulting mean is fairly sensitive to the occurrence of a long sentences. If these sentences are over-represented in the cases for the information about sentences is missing, our previous average will be an under-estimate.

1. The action taken by the Japanese Government in screening Ishibashi has been reviewed and disapproved. Ishibashi, Minister of Finance, is to be removed from public office and excluded from public service as an undesirable person since he comes within the scope of Category G, Appendix A, SCAPIN 550 [of 4 January 1946, see above].

2. As editor and president of the *Oriental Economist* he was responsible for the policies of that publication which supported military and economic imperialism in Asia, advocated Japan's adherence to the Axis, fostered belief in the inevitability of war with the Western Powers, justified suppression of trade unions and urged the imposition of totalitarian controls over the Japanese people.

[Signed:] Courtney Whitney, Brigadier General US Army, Chief of Government Section. (MOFA 0047)

[Probably these charges were already well known in May 1946 when Mr. Ishibashi became Minister of Finance. Why then are they brought against him at this juncture? For more details on this episode see Masuda 1986, 1987)

**May 15, 1947:** Yokohama. Three American soldiers were found guilty of armed robberies committed between January 7 and 12. One was sentenced to 20 years at hard labor, the two others received 5-year sentences. (NARA 1)

**May 20, 1947:** Two-thirds of Senzaki camp (in the New Zealand zone of occupation) was burnt down (Brocklebank p. 77). The same source mentions a form of passive resistance: New Zealand patrols were sometimes accompanied by Japanese pulling carts which contained excreta to be used as fertilizer and which emitted a very pungent odor.

**May 20, 1947:** In September 1946, the price of a 400-pound bale of cotton yarn was set [by SCAP] at 1,013 yen. Since then, wages have been substantially increased and all mills are operating at a loss and therefore cannot consider buying more raw cotton from the United States. The mills have been asking for a price of 1,800 yen per ball. Stocks amount to only 3 months of supply. SCAP officials issued instructions to the Japanese government that if the mills do not buy additional cotton in June they must slash their production by 20%; if no additional cotton order is passed in August production must be slashed by 40% and by 60% if the situation persists in September [by that time no cotton stocks would remain anyway which suggests that it is rather a kind of wrestling match]. Orders for raw cotton are passed by SCAP to the Commodity Credit Corporation. (NYT p. 37)

**May 21, 1947:** Up to this date, 3,112 cases have been tried by BCOF provost courts. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 21)

**May 22, 1947:** The Eighth Army announced that Major Frank A. Kotches would

be arraigned this month before a general court martial on charges of wrongfully obtaining jewels and other goods valued at \$10,000 from Japanese. The Major asked and received from Japanese 3 diamond rings, one pearl necklace, two strings of pearls, one unmounted diamond, one camera and one roll of silk. Major Kotches was procurement officer of the Hiroshima Military Government Team and is a former city official of Stamford, Connecticut. (NYT p. 11). On 29 December 1947 Kotches was sentenced by a general court martial to 3 years at hard labor (NYT p. 20). [It would be of interest to better understand by what specific means Major Kotches was able to persuade those Japanese people to hand him over their jewels. Another similar case was described above (dates of February 7, 1947 and April 15, 1947). More generally it can be observed that such acts seem to be a natural consequence of the state of military occupation. More recent illustrations are provided by the following accounts which refers to the occupation of Iraq.]

Washington, 15 Dec 2005 (Reuters): A U.S. Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Debra Harrison, 47, was arrested for stealing between \$80,000 and \$100,000 in funds from the U.S. governing administration in Iraq and using the money to install a deck and hot tub in her New Jersey home. Harrison is the second army officer and the fourth person charged in the past few weeks in connection with the scheme. The Justice Department said Harrison was on active duty for the U.S. Army in 2003 and 2004, and was responsible for developing contract solicitations and ordering contracts for reconstruction efforts for the Coalition Provisional Authority in the South Central Region. According to court papers, Harrison and her co-conspirators accepted money and gifts in return for using their official positions to rig contract bids. She is also charged along with her co-conspirators of using the CPA funds to buy dozens of firearms and related military-grade hardware in North Carolina for their own use. If convicted, Harrison faces up to 30 years in prison.

Feb 2, 2006 (BBC): Robert Stein held a senior position in the Coalition Provisional Authority, which administered Iraq after American and allied forces invaded in 2003. He was in charge of overseeing money for the rebuilding of shattered infrastructure in south-central Iraq in 2003 and 2004. In a Washington court, he admitted to stealing more than \$2m from reconstruction funds and taking bribes in return for contracts. Some of the money was smuggled onto aircraft and flown back to the United States in suitcases. He also received gifts and sexual favours lavished on him at a special villa in Baghdad.

**May 25, 1947:** A major fire at Iwakuni completely destroyed the main telephone exchange. Teleprinter communications was re-established on 29 June. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 10)

**May 26, 1947:** ● (83,3,4,235) The latest of a series of fires that have burned down

a number of British barracks in Japan occurred early this morning, when the officers' mess of the British Commonwealth air group at Iwakuni was destroyed. Two British officers of the Royal Air Force, S.J. Chudleigh and H. Myers, were killed. A few days ago the barracks at Senzaki was burnt down. Both fires were officially described as being due to defective electric wiring. (Times p. 4, Bates).

**Jun - Jul, 1947:** In June and July there was an impressive number of drownings (8 altogether).

1 9 June: Near Osaka a soldier drowned while swimming in a pool of the 24th Inf. Reg.

2 13 June, Seoul. Two soldiers of the Special troops of the XXIV Corps drowned after their boat overturned.

3 23 June, Yokota Air Base. Two enlisted men were killed when their jeep plunged down an embankment.

4 4 July, Sendai. A soldier drowned while swimming.

5 10 July, Sendai. First Lt John C. Bradford died while swimming near Sendai. He was with a party of 6 others when he disappeared.

6 21 July, Yutanaka. A soldier drowned while swimming at Yutanaka near Nagano.

(NDL microfiche MISC-00929)

**Jun 1, 1947:** Report on civil liberties in Japan by the "American Civil Liberties Union", 170 Fifth Av., New York, excerpt.

- All international communications are either forbidden or censored. Parcel post is allowed in, not out. No printed matters whatever is allowed, not even a clipping in a letter. No books or magazines or newspapers are allowed except through SCAP channels for libraries and institutions.

- All public meetings, whether held in private or public places, are under the control of notification in advance (2 days in the cities, 5 days in the provinces). The police requires subjects and names of speakers and the meeting is subject to cancellation if not these are not approved. Military Police and interpreters attend the speeches. Criticism of occupation results in prosecution. (General Eichelberger's papers, reel 33)

**Jun 1, 1947:** In Tokyo, MacArthur wrote a letter to the Japanese Prime Minister on 22 March 1947 asserting that the Japanese Government failed to carry out the control of prices and demanding new controls. In Saitama, some 50 kilometer from Tokyo, a young medical corps lieutenant who is a member of the American Military Government team inspected the rural slaughterhouse to check on the public health program

which SCAP ordered the Japanese Government to introduce. If the slaughterhouse is unsanitary the prefectural governor of Saitama will hear from the local Military Government much what the Premier heard from MacArthur. (NYT, Review of the week section, p. E4)

[This article written by Lindesay Parrott is one of the few that documents (too briefly, unfortunately) how Military Government teams control whether SCAP directives are duly carried out at *local level*.]

**Jun 1, 1947:** No one has ever contended that the Allies tell the Japanese whom to elect. But the Allies tell the Japanese who *cannot* appear in political life. There is a long and growing list of “purgees” who are banned from politics. It is the Japanese Government who is supposed to operate the Central Screening Committee, but if its interpretation is unsatisfactory it can be so informed by GHQ. How far it can go was shown when Liberal Party leader Ichiro Hatoyama was ejected from politics after his group had polled the largest vote and as he was about to become Prime Minister. (NYT, Review of the week section, p. E4)

**Jun 3, 1947:** **SCAPIN 1715** Subject: Application of permission to manufacture passenger cars [excerpt].

Authorization is given to manufacture 300 small passenger vehicles annually of 1500 cc piston displacement or under. Except for the assembly of 50 large-sized passenger cars, the manufacture of passenger cars with piston displacement greater than 1500 cc is denied [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander A.J. Rehe for R.M. Levy Colonel, AGD (Nippon Times 1947 (Directives))

**Jun 9, 1947:** ● (84,3,4,235) A young American woman employed by the War Department, Miss Brocha Lvova, was found fatally stabbed in a roadway in Nakano. (NARA 1).

**Jun 13, 1947:** ● (85,3,4,235) An American soldier, Robert E. Gerber, fell to his death from a fifth story window in the Finance Building on Sunday morning [i.e. June 8]. Army officials are investigating the cause of his fall. (NARA 1)

**Jun 14, 1947:** A fire destroyed the New Zealand Army Support Company supply barracks at Chofu. The loss included large quantities of stores held for the brigade (Brocklebank p. 76, Bates).

**Jun 16, 1947:** A stone was thrown at the Occupation Force coach of a train running from Yonago to Tottori (central Japan, west coast). A window was broken but nobody was injured. (GHQ8e 596)

**Jun 20, 1947:** Between October 21, 1946 and June 20, 1947 there were 2,278 provost court trials in the BCOF area. This represents a rate of 86 per month and

per 10,000 troops, which is a 87% increase with respect to the period May 1946–October 1946. (Carter p. 194)

**Jun 21, 1947:** A Japanese civilian, Haruyoshi Matsuda, was arrested and tried for possession of dynamite and fuse; the sentence is not known (NANZ: call number WA-J 76/1, case 894)

**Jun 20, 1947:** A fire which started shortly before midnight completely destroyed the 511st Parachute Infantry gymnasium at camp Haugen located in the vicinity of the city of Hachinohe (500 km north to Tokyo). (NARA 1)

**Jun 23, 1947:** The telephone line in the vicinity of Daito in Nagasaki prefecture was cut. About 1.5 km of wire was removed from the poles. (GHQ8e 599)

**Jun 25, 1947:** By direction of SCAP, an operation was carried out for the purpose of seizing all precious metals, precious stones and jewelry containing precious stones, to be found in Demobilization and Repatriation Offices. This raid was conducted by units of 34 Australian Infantry Brigade. No precious metals, stones or jewelry were found. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 1)

[Although it is not said explicitly one must assume that the Demobilization and Repatriation Offices were held by Japanese nationals.]

**Jun 26, 1947:** Rocks were thrown at a travelling jeep and shattered the left front windshield. The offenders have not yet been apprehended. (GHQ8e No 597)

**Jun 27, 1947:** **SCAPIN 1740** Subject: Exercise of criminal jurisdiction. [excerpt] Monthly reports on the cases tried under Imperial Ordinance 311 will be submitted to this Headquarters, through local military government units, indicating in each case, the location of courts, docket number, gist of offense, number of accused, sentence if found guilty. (NARA 11)

[It would be of interest to found these records. So far we were not able to locate them.]

**Jun 30, 1947:** Up to June [that is to say between March 1946 and 30 June 1947] 3,309 persons have been tried before provost in the BCOF area alone. (Davies 2001) [This figure is consistent with the number of about 10,000 trials in the American zone; indeed the ratio between BCOF and American forces was about 1:3]

**Jun 30, 1947:** A total of 121 courts martial trials were held in the BCOF area during the three months April to June 1947. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 22)

**Jul 1, 1947:** A fire occurred in June at Supply Point in the New Zealand zone on the morning of the departure of the Waitaki draft (NZNA Monthly Provost Report WA-J3/64).

**Jul 7, 1947:** ● (86,3,4,235) An American soldier, George I. Kastanis, fell to his death from the fourth floor of the Finance Building. He was a member of the 406th Medical General Laboratory attached to Headquarters. Army officials are investigating the cause of his fall. (NARA 1)

**Jul 13, 1947:** Corporal Edgar J. Ricer was attacked by 6 Japanese in the town of Yamato. He was admitted to hospital. The Japanese have not been identified. (GHQ8e No 597)

**Jul 15, 1947:** A group of 6 Japanese civilians were arrested and tried by a provost court for the possession of dynamite, detonator and fuse. The sentence is not known. Another arrest under the same charge took place on September 6, 1947. (NANZ: call number WA-J 76/1, cases 895-901).

**Jul 17, 1947:** ● (86,3,4,236) A soldier from the BCOF was convicted of the murder of a Japanese civilian and sentenced to 10 years penal servitude. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 19)

**Jul 25, 1947:** Report of BCOF Commander-in-Chief [excerpts].

- Public Relations: A total of 209 news items and 1,422 photographs were released by PR to the international press during the three monthly period which ended 30 Jun. It is known that Reuters-AAP representative in Tokyo telegraphs a large proportion of news about BCOF based on PR releases. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 12)

[The fact that from the very beginning of the occupation there was a great emphasis on public relations shows that GHQ was quite aware of the importance of a “good” press coverage. Naturally, the news which were released had the objective of giving a picture of the occupation which was in conformity with the goals of US and BCOF authorities. By the very nature of the information that they supply the reports contribute to this objective. Thus for instance, the present report explains that the number of blankets washed during September and October 1947 exceeded 50,000 but the data about “Serious crime” are given without any comment in an appendix which, most often, is not even mentioned in the table of contents.]

- A serious fire recently [precise date is not given] occurred at Iwakuni; it destroyed the Officers Mess and two lives were lost. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 12)

[Curiously, this piece of information is given in section 22 entitled “Maintenance and Accommodation”.]

**Jul 31, 1947:** Letter written by the Secretary to the “Central Inquiry Committee”, Mr. Sagara Ichi (excerpts). “As 1,300 other persons, Mr. Yoshioka Yoshikazu requested a hearing by the “Central Inquiry Committee”. He was found acceptable on July 31. Of course the Central Inquiry Committee did not inform him of the result which is not valid without the approval of the Civil Information and Education sec-

tion [of SCAP]. It is possible that I mentioned the finding about Mr. Yoshioka to officials of the prefectural government but in such cases I always say that the judgment is not confirmed until formally approved by the CIE (. . .)

I once told a prefectural screening committee that when the MG team [of that prefecture] makes a suggestion that such a person should be purged it should be discussed". (NDL, microfiche CIE(C) 462, Record Group 331, Box 5162)

[The "Central Inquiry Committee" was a kind of court of appeal for screening decisions. Therefore its secretary was an important person. It seems that Mr. Sagara incurred the displeasure of SCAP and wrote this letter to explain his record. The very fact that he emphasizes the role of SCAP and of the MG teams in this procedure (particularly when discussing with Japanese officials) shows that he did not have a clear understanding of the policy of SCAP which was to keep its role hidden as much as possible.]

**Aug 1, 1947:** Early in the occupation, the smallest unit could present a procurement demand to the local representative of the Japanese Government. Later on in the occupation [at a date which is not clearly specified] procurement demands were centralized and submitted to inspection by GHQ. (Two years of occupation, published on 1 August 1947, General Eichelberger's papers, reel 33).

**Aug 12 1947:** At 22:35 at the British base of Kure, Hiroshima prefecture, an unknown person made an attempt to set fire to a wooden building with a mixture of kerosene and petrol. Only the prompt action of service personnel prevented a serious fire from developing. But on 15 August at 2:50 a fire broke out in a hangar at an occupation unit in Fukuyama, Hiroshima prefecture. (GHQ8e, No 639)

**Aug 14, 1947:** A Japanese, Kumano Mitsuji, was arrested by New Zealand troops and tried on the charge of arson of occupation forces barracks. The sentence is not known. (NANZ: call number WA-J 76/1, case 799).

**Aug 17, 1947:** On the night of 17 to 18 August 1947 a detachment of occupation force troops had to use force when assisting Japanese police to quell a disturbance which occurred in the Korean compound at Senzaki, Yamaguchi prefecture. (GHQ8e, No 643)

[It would be interesting to know what type of force was used: nightsticks, pistols, gun fire?]

**Aug 18, 1947:** An operational directive of the Headquarters of the Eighth Army gives a definition of the expression: "Offences prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation". It is defined as any acts which violate any directive, formal or informal, issued to the Japanese Government by SCAP (or Japanese regulations or laws issued pursuant thereto) or which violate any orders issued by subordinate commanders to

implement SCAP's directives. (NARA 11)

[In short, "Offences prejudicial to the objectives of the occupation" cover a very broad range of offences, from censorship violations, to assaults against occupation personnel or to black market. This expression is used in particular in recording the activity of provost courts and because of its lack of precision it makes such activity reports of little usefulness for the historian.]

**Aug 25, 1947:** At Nigata (8 km north of Kure in the BCOF area) during the night an Occupation Force soldier was attacked by several Japanese. As a result of the injuries he received he had been admitted to hospital. (GHQ8e, No 653)

**Aug 30, 1947:** ● (86,3,4,236) A shootout (subsequently called the battle of Hiro) which lasted several hours opposed Indian and Australian troops and resulted in at least one fatality. The incident was made public only in 1989 through an article in the "Sun Herald Tribune" of Melbourne when it was mentioned by a veteran in the course of a legal action about his pension (Bates 1993). More precisely, it was re-discovered in 1989. Indeed, although hushed up by BCOF authorities, the story was nevertheless exposed by servicemen on their return to Australia which gave rise to an article published in the "Sydney Daily Telegraph" of October 6, 1947 and entitled: "Australians, Indians fought, soldiers say". The article says that three Indians were killed, whereas a confidential note issued by the BCOF command on 13 October (posted on <http://forum.axishistory.com>) says that one was killed, one seriously injured and three slightly injured. No Australian was injured. The same note says that animosity had existed between the two units for a considerable time and that it turned more bitter after India became independent on 15 August 1947. Although the note was triggered by the article of the Daily Telegraph, it emphasizes that the information that it gives "is not for publication" and that no reference will be made to this message in subsequent unclassified messages. Moreover, in reply to enquiries made by a reporter of the "Melbourne Herald", an Army spokesman declared that "no friction exists between Indian and Australian troops in Japan".

[One may wonder if the account describing the battle as a shootout in the hills is really correct. The BCOF note contends that "rifle firing was commenced by Australian personnel" and indeed the fact that only Indian soldiers were killed and injured rather suggests the latter were ambushed by the Australians.]

**Sep 1, 1947:** Headquarters Eighth Army, G-1, excerpt. Occupation forces: 110,000; Civilian employees: 7,000; Dependents: 16,000; Total: 155,000.

**Sep 1, 1947:** Censorship of No theater plays was lifted; in May and June similar measure had been taken with respect to Bunraku (a form of puppet theater) and Kabuki theater (Mayo 1984).

**Sep 1, 1947:** A fire in the New Zealand Garrison Engineers Store resulted in the loss of nearly five tons of valuable equipment (Brocklebank p. 76).

The same source provides an account of an (undated) episode from an unpublished diary which relates to traffic accidents. It is worth mentioning because this kind of incidents seems to have been rather common: “To my shock there were quite a number of Kiwis [i.e. New Zealanders] who did mean harm. I was horrified on the several occasions where, otherwise reasonable chaps, would not only deliberately accelerate their trucks to give a Jap a fright, but actually boast about it later. One sergeant killed two Japanese after announcing ‘I’m going to get me a gook [derogatory term used in reference to Japanese]’. Well, he got two and the matter was hushed up.” (B. Browley, written recollection p. 202-203, cited in Brocklebank p. 111-112).

The seriousness of the problem can be illustrated by accident statistics. In the three months January to March 1948 there were 10 cases of traffic injury to Japanese civilians in the New Zealand occupation zone, 5 of which were fatal (Brocklebank p. 186). If the same rate is extrapolated from a strength of 4,000 for the NZ force to a strength of 200,000 for all the occupation forces, there would be about 100 Japanese killed in traffic accidents each month.

The same behavior was reported in Korea: “A common form of harassment was to drive vehicles at Koreans for the sake of seeing them jump off the road”. This behavior which was witnessed by Mark Gay as early as 1946 was still common practice in 1950. (MacDonald 1991, p. 17). In the fall of 1946 the Headquarters of EUSAK (Eight US Army in Korea) issued a proclamation to the troops which describes the same kind of behavior. During the occupation of Shanghai (1945-1948) US trucks and jeeps were also reported to cause many accidents (see the chronology of the occupation of China at the date of 31 August 1946).

**Sep 3, 1947:** The IX Corps reports that at 20:30 3 shots were fired at a military coach at Mejiro Station, Tokyo. Shots went through windows and one shot through the body of the coach. There was no injuries. (GHQ8e, No 653)

**Sep 4, 1947:** ● (86,3,4,237) A Japanese girl was thrown into the water from a bridge in the Ginza area by three GIs (Harada p. 156). Similar incidents occurred repeatedly: two other instances for which Harada gives the dates are November 24 and December 9, 1953 (communicated by Eddy Dufourmont).

**Sep 7, 1947:** At 1:30 an enlisted man of the IX Corps was severely injured in a fight with an unknown Japanese at the Daitadashi Railroad station. He was taken to the 49th General Hospital. (GHQ8e, No 657)

**Sep 16, 1947:** SCAPIN 1776 Subject: Liancourt Rocks bombing range [excerpt].

The Islands of Liancourt Rocks (or Take Shima) located 37 degrees, 15 minutes north and 131 degrees, 50 minutes east are designated as a bombing range.

(<http://www.geocities.com/mlovmo/temp10.html>)

**Sep 18, 1947:** The I Corps reported that at 12:27 the Allied Limited train No 1001 was fired on by an unknown person while passing through Shizuoka Prefecture. No one was injured as the passengers of the coach were in the dining car at the time of the shot. (GHQ8e, No 666)

[The subsequent report No 668 says that, in fact, no shot was fired; which one should be trusted?]

**Sep 29, 1947:** General MacArthur revealed that henceforth the Emperor's familiar chrysanthemum will not appear on Japanese postage stamps. (NYT p. 5)

[Why was such a move necessary for the "success of the occupation"? However it certainly contributed to the further deculturation of Japan.]

**Sep 30, 1947:** At 21:55 in Kokura, Fukuoka prefecture, two enlisted men were attacked. One soldier was hit across the face with a bambou pole by a Korean and had to be taken to hospital for treatment. The Korean was later apprehended and is being held until trial by provost court. (GHQ8e, No 678)

[It would be interesting to know the sentence delivered by the provost court.]

**Oct 1947:** During the month of October [the exact date is not given] a number of sticks of gelignite to which was attached a burnt out fuse were discovered in the Bomb Dump at 81 Wing RAAF [Royal Australian Air Force] in Bofu, indicating attempted sabotage directed against the Occupation Forces. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 2)

**Oct 8 1947:** A stone was thrown at the military coach of a train in the northwestern section of Tokyo. A window was broken. (GHQ8e, No 683)

**Oct 12, 1947:** At 16:30 at Hyhoshida two members of the BCOF were attacked by a number of civilians. One of the soldiers was struck on the head with a large piece of wood and had to be hospitalized. (GHQ8e, No 693)

**Oct 15, 1947:** Private Mervyn Allen of the 65th Australian Battalion was tried by a court martial for the murder of a Japanese civilian Kawabe Rihei at Onomichi in November 1946. He was sentenced to 10 years of penal servitude. (Gerster 2008, p. 109)

**Oct 20, 1947:** At 2:35 in Yamaguchi, Yamaguchi Prefecture, a non-commissioned officer was attacked by a Japanese who tried to gain possession of his pistol. The Japanese was shot while trying to escape and is now in a Japanese hospital. (GHQ8e, No 698)

[Like many similar stories, this one sounds fairly implausible. If the Japanese really attacked the soldier unprovoked why should he suddenly change his mind and escape? The only certain information is that one Japanese was wounded through a pistol shot.]

**Oct 22, 1947:** In September 1947, 44 persons were apprehended in the Tokyo Kanagawa area for illegal possession of 16 pistols, 6 hunting guns and 99 swords. (GHQ8e, No 692)

**Oct 25, 1947:** Report of BCOF Commander-in-Chief [excerpt]. Investigations are under way for three cases of arson. (BCOF GHQ 2, p. 20)

**Oct 26, 1947:** There was a fire in a building occupied by a branch of Legal Section in Fukuoka City. The fire destroyed various documents pertaining to war crimes investigations. (GHQ8e, No 695)

[In Germany there were also several bomb attacks against the court houses where war crime trials were investigated.]

**Oct 31, 1947:** Initial war reparations claims filed by eleven Pacific Allies against Japan were reported to add up to approximately \$54 billion (NYT p. 17).

**Oct 31, 1947:** ● (86,3,4,238) A Japanese policeman was shot in the NZ occupation area reportedly because he attempted to break into the Officers Club; the report does not say if he was killed. (Monthly Provost Report, October 1947, New Zealand National Archives, WA-J 3/64 Box 23)

**Oct 31, 1947** [Provost court trials in Hokkaido](#). Between April and October 1947, the numbers of provost court trials in Hokkaido prefecture were as follows:  
 April: 31, May: 22, June: 25, July: 73, August: 27, September: 62, October: 25.  
 The monthly average is: 38.  
 (NDL, Monthly MG activities report, microfiche WOR-20522 to WOR-20527)

**Nov 17, 1947:** Six ammunition warehouses exploded in succession at Ikego, about 60 kilometers south-west of Tokyo. The first warehouse exploded from an unknown cause at 10 a.m. and by noon six had blown apart. An American army officer and 7 enlisted men were injured as well as 7 Japanese (NYT Nov. 17 p. 1, Nov. 19 p. 2).

**Nov 30, 1947:** The testimony of three American soldiers resulted in the sentencing of three Koreans to 3 years imprisonment for attempted bribery, it was announced by the First Cavalry provost court (NYT p. 32).

**Nov 30, 1947:** Between March and November, in the New Zealand occupation zone, an average of 1.6 Japanese were killed each month in traffic accidents by NZ vehicles. Yet a report signals that some units are failing to obey standing orders regarding

the reporting of traffic accidents which seems to imply that the previous figure underestimates the actual number. (Monthly Provost Report March-November 1947, New Zealand National Archives, WA-J 3/64 Box 23)

**Nov 30, 1947:** Between March and November, in the New Zealand occupation zone, according to the Report of crimes there had been a monthly average of 217 crimes committed by Japanese against the NZ occupation force. As most of these crimes are classified under the two categories “Miscellaneous” and “Special”, one is unable to know the nature of these incidents. The monthly reports reveal many cases of illegal possession of explosives (dynamite, gelignite, detonators) by Japanese civilians. (Monthly Provost Report March-November 1947, New Zealand National Archives, WA-J 3/64 Box 23)

**Dec 1947:** In December the magazine Newsweek began a series of articles in which it denounced SCAP’s attempt of breaking up the zaibatsus. These articles were based on a confidential policy document (known as FEC-230) which if implemented would have meant a broad deconcentration of Japanese industrial corporations and banks. It seems that the FEC-230 had been written in 1946 but remained unenforced until the end of 1947. Emphasizing that SCAP’s policy “was far to the left of anything tolerated in this country”, the Newsweek articles brought about a strong reaction in Congress. As a result the economic policy of SCAP was called into question and soon afterward MacArthur weeded out the remaining New Dealers from the ranks of SCAP. (Coughlin 1952, p. 127, Seagrave 1999).

[To understand what lead to this turning point it can first be observed that in a sense the attempt of breaking up the zaibatsus could be seen as a natural continuation of the sweeping land reform promoted by General MacArthur which indeed resulted in the break-up of big landholdings. It seems that the main factor which prevented a similar policy to be applied to banks and corporations was the fact that major American corporations were expecting to recover interest and capital payments on pre-war loans to Japanese firms. If Japan’s biggest conglomerates were broken up into smaller companies it is likely that the latter would not be able to reimburse the loans. As an example, by the early 1950’s Japanese companies owed the Morgan bank nearly 600 million dollars in unpaid interest (payment on all these loans were stopped after Pearl Harbor), principal and reparations. Another major creditor was General Electric (Seagrave 1999).]

**Dec. 4, 1947:** ● (87,3,4,238) A soldier from New York State died in Japan. Private Harry R. Parks of Saratoga Springs, New York was downed Sunday (Nov 30) when his rowboat capsized while he was fishing on Sagani Bay (NYT p. 6).

**Dec 9, 1947:** A Japanese reported to the American Military Police that he had been

assaulted and robbed by 5 Australian soldiers. The Military Police proceeded to the Shinjuku Railway station where five Australian soldiers were located. After questioning they were placed under arrest. (BCOF PRSI)

**Dec 22, 1947:** Tokai-Hokuriku MG region. Governor Tachi was submitting a false questionnaire. A new election will be examined. (NDL, microfiche CAS(A)-13050) [In the local news from the Civil Affairs Section such removals of Japanese regional governors are fairly common. Can one really believe the reason that is mentioned? Perhaps Governor Tachi was not enthusiastic enough about the objectives of the occupation?]

**Dec 23, 1947:** A fire destroyed the Commonwealth club. (BCOF PRSI)

**Dec. 25, 1947:** The US Army frees 182 Japanese (NYT p. 24).

**Dec 29, 1947:** Kure. Two BCOF soldiers assaulted a Japanese; they struck him on the head and face and then robbed him of a fountain-pen and a quantity of money. (BCOF PRSI)

**Dec 29, 1947:** The Army Department has approved a general court martial sentence of 3 years at hard labor for Major Frank A. Kotches convicted of soliciting “gifts” from Japanese. He was procurement officer of the Hiroshima Military Government team. (NYT p. 20)

**Dec 30, 1947:** Kure. Three Australian soldiers struck a Japanese on the head and face with a bottle and then robbed him of 2,000 yen. (BCOF PRSI)

**Dec 31, 1947:** During the year 1947 there have been (at least) 417 general courts martial orders in the Philippines-Ryukyus Command which comprises Okinawa. (NARA, electronic search engine, Archival Research Catalog identifiers: 1166870-1166871).

[One may recall that general courts martial deal with serious offenses such as assault or murder, whereas special courts martial deal with lesser offenses such as drunk driving.]

**Dec 31, 1947:** During the two years 1946-1947, the death rate of prisoners was about 1 per 1,000 and per month with peak rates of 1.5 in January 1946 and in December 1946–February 1946. In 1943 the rate was 5 times smaller, i.e. 0.2 per 1,000 and per month. (SCAP Summations of non-military activities for May 1947, in reel 28 of General Eichelberger papers).

**Dec 31, 1947:** During 1947 17 cases of murder and manslaughter were tried by General Court Martials in the Eighth Army. We do not know how many of these crimes were committed against Japanese people and how many against members of

### A war criminal who was never indicted

Among Japanese war criminals Colonel Masanobu Tsuji was probably one of those whose guilt was the most evident. Nevertheless, after spending two years in China working for KMT intelligence, he was allowed to come back to Japan in 1948, was never indicted and even became a member of the Diet in 1952. It is true that other cases of war criminals who were not indicted are known, for instance those who were working on the Japanese program of biological weapons and accepted to collaborate with the US Army. However, according to his biography reported in Wikipedia, it does not seem that Colonel Tsuji has ever been working for the US, so why did he get a special treatment?

In contrast with many other war criminals, his responsibility is not based on a single episode but on many atrocities. One can mention the following.

- After the capture of Singapore, Tsuji helped plan the Sook Ching screening of Malayan Chinese who might be hostile to Japan. Between February and March 1942 it resulted in the mass execution of thousands of them, (5,000 according to Japanese sources and 10 times more according to Singapore sources).

- In the Philippines he encouraged the brutal mistreatment and casual murder of prisoners in the Bataan Death March. He also ordered the execution of many officials of the Philippines government who opposed the Japanese invasion.

- After spending 1943 in Nanking where he established contacts not only with Chinese pro-Japanese collaborators but also (rather surprisingly) with agents of Chiang Kai-shek's government, he was sent to Burma. There he was reported ordering the execution of American pilots whose plane had been shot down.

The Wikipedia article displays a picture (reproduced here) of the Memorial statue of Masanobu Tsuji in his home town of Kaga in Ishikawa prefecture. The fact that such a person could become a member of the Diet as soon as 1952 and the very existence of his Memorial suggest that, as claimed by the Chinese, Japan hardly called into question its role in World War II.

**Box 6.1: Masanobu Tsuji, a war criminal who was never indicted.** *Source: Wikipedia article entitled "Masanobu Tsuji".*

the occupation forces. (NARA 11)

## 1948

**Jan 1948:** In 1938 the electricity production industry had been unified under state control by the creation of the "Japan Electric Generation and Transmission Company" (JEGTCO). In 1945 the JEGTCO monopoly was transferred to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. In 1948 the JEGTCO monopoly was targeted for breakup by the occupation authorities, along with other industrial and financial zaibatsu . (<http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history/Th-Ul/The-Tokyo-Electric-Power-Company.html>)

[This breakup and the subsequent segmentation into 9 different regions which occurred on 24 November 1950 shut the door to a unification of the Japanese power grid. Ever since, it has remained divided into a 50 hertz area in the East and a 60 hertz area in the west. As a result, it is impossible to transfer substantial quantities




**Fig. 6.1b** Memorial statue of Masanobu Tsuji in the city of Kaga, Ishikawa prefecture. Colonel Tsuji was an ultranationalist who openly advocated Japanese expansion; in Singapore he ordered the mass execution of thousands of Chinese. *Source: Wikipedia article entitled “Masanobu Tsuji” (English version). The Japanese version of the article also displays the picture of the statue.*

of electricity between the Tokyo and Osaka areas. In 2011 The capacity of the three frequency converter stations located on the separation line represented less than 1% of the total electricity production.

Japan is the only industrialized nation whose power grid is divided in such a way. This division reflects foreign influence in the sense that around 1900 the region of Tokyo was supplied by plants imported from Germany (50 hertz) while Osaka was supplied with US equipment (60 hertz). Whereas the post-1938 state control gave a new chance to unification, the segmentation which began in 1948 precluded any further unification. This would have adverse consequences in 2002 when the Japanese government ordered the temporary shutdown of TEPCO’s 17 nuclear facilities and again in 2011-2012 after almost all Japanese nuclear power plants were temporarily closed in the wake of the Fukushima catastrophe.]

**Jan 1948:** Surveillance of telephone, telegraph and postal communications had been



**Fig. 6.x Electric network of Japan.** The Japanese electric network is divided into two parts: the 50 Hz north-east part and the 60 Hz south-west part. This is a fairly rare case among developed countries. *Source: Wikipedia article entitled “Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster”*)

introduced early. The intercepts which were carried out and treated by the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) yielded an ever increasing amount of information. In January 1948 the monthly number of intercepts reached 4 million and in a major organizational achievement the dissemination of the summaries issued by the CCD were forwarded to all sections of the occupation forces in the form of so-called “comment sheets” (previously they were forwarded only to major sections). In a single month, CCD comment sheets disclosed 38 large scale economic violations, leading in turn to the indictment of 93 companies and 217 persons with a recovery of materials aggregating a value of 101,071,017 yen. As a result of only one intercept 52.5 pounds of hoarded platinum, with an official value of 53,679,377 yen, was recovered. (MacArthur 1950, p. 240-241)

**Jan 3, 1948:** Some New Zealand soldiers smashed the windows of a Japanese dwelling after which they attacked the home owner. (BCOF PRSI)

**Jan 4, 1948:** While walking home a Japanese was attacked by two Australian soldiers; he was badly kicked and punched about the head and was robbed of a sum of money. (BCOF PRSI)

**Jan 7, 1948:** Two Japanese were walking in Kure (BCOF area) when two Australian soldiers stepped out from a lane way and assaulted them, knocking them on the ground. They kicked and punched them and snatched a brown leather bag held by one of them which contained the sum of 14,000 yen. (BCOF PRSI)

**Jan 7, 1948:** A gang of 6 Japanese armed with knives attacked 4 Australian soldiers. The soldiers managed to catch one the assailants who is now being held in custody. (BCOF PRSI)

**Jan 15, 1948:** A military commission was convened at Kobe to try Liu Ho and Chen Chun Chou, two Chinese civilians for the murder of Oh Sui Kichi on 14 October 1947. They pleaded not guilty but were sentenced to be hanged by the neck until dead. The sentence was adjudged on 16 January 1948.

[Two comments should be made:

- This case is one of the very few instances where the sources give information about a trial by a military commissions for charges unrelated to war crimes.
- Although the trial occurred in the BCOF occupation zone, it was conducted by the American military authorities. This suggests that even in the British zone the right to hold military commissions was reserved to American authorities.]

**Jan 30, 1948:** **SCAPIN 1854** Subject: Distribution of American tobacco as incentive goods. [excerpt]

The Japanese Government is authorized (a) to distribute cigarettes from American tobacco products as incentive goods to encourage coal production and delivery of rice to the official collection system (b) to offer 250,000 packages [of a total weight of 14 metric tons] of pipe tobacco as incentive goods to coal miners. Detailed distribution plans and prices to be charged for these commodities will be submitted to GHQ for approval prior to actual distribution. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, R.M. Levy, Colonel AGD (SCAPINS 1952, p. 421)

**Jan 31, 1948:** **Fires in US installations.** During the month of January 1948 there were 6 major fires in American installations.

- 1 14 Jan: Fire destroyed the mess hall at Haneda airfield.
- 2 18 Jan: Fire at CIC Headquarters
- 3 20 Jan: Fire at Haneda airfield
- 4 21 Jan: Fire at the Saitama MG team dependent housing
- 5 27 Jan: Fire at the dependent housing project in Osaka
- 6 30 Jan: Fire at quarters of Tokushima MG team.

(NDL, microfiche G2-02725)

[It is well-known that fires were fairly frequent in Japan. However, because military installations were under permanent day and night surveillance by guards and sentries,

one would expect such fires to be less frequent than in civilian buildings. In previous cases the conclusion published by the investigation team is invariably “defective wiring”.]

**Feb, 1948:** During the month of February the GHQ of the First US Corp listed 15 violences against American troops, four of which involved fire arms. (Eichelberger Papers, volume 33, p. 2008, communicated by Eddy Dufourmont).

[This is either a gross under-estimate or is based on a very special definition of an act of violence.]

**Feb, 1948:** Sergeant J.L. Smith of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force who was serving in Field Security was shot and wounded by Korean smugglers in Shimonoseki.

[With the 11 Provost Company and the Special Investigation Branch, the Field Security was one of the investigative unit of the NZEF]. (Brocklebank, p. 132-133)

**Feb 7, 1948:** At 19:00 hours an Australian soldier who was walking along the street was attacked by four Japanese; an Australian sergeant who was nearby came to his assistance. (BCOF PRSI)

**Feb 11, 1948:** Yokohama. Six Japanese were sentenced to be hanged for illegally executing 6 US Naval airmen who crash-landed on the coast of Indo-China in April 1946 (sic). (NYT p. 21)

[“1946” is certainly a misprint. A latter article (NYT 12 June 1949 (p. 34) which reports the hanging of the 6 Japanese gives a more plausible date, namely 26 January 1945.]

**Feb 13, 1948:** ● (87,3,5,238) A new Zealand soldier who had fallen from a civilian train was discovered lying between the railway tracks. (BCOF PRSI)

**Feb 15, 1948:** As Government bought rice from the farmers at a fixed price which was much below black market price, they preferred selling to black market operators. This year, the US Army accompanied Japanese officials into villages backing their threats of punishment. Intervention of occupation troops ensured that the Japanese Government was able to obtain 100% of the rice demanded from the farmers. It is the first year that occupation forces participate in collecting rice. Last year the Japanese government was only able to obtain 74% of the rice. (NYT p. 10)

**Feb 19, 1948:** The Tokyo Correspondent’s Club made public a report that it had addressed to General MacArthur. The report mentioned several cases of correspondents being subject to harassment by GHQ; for instance on at least 9 occasions official letters were sent to employers seeking to embarrass employees and in some cases requesting their removal. (Coughlin 1952)

**Feb 21, 1948:** Three GIs of the 25th Division attacked and robbed four Japanese (Eichelberger Papers, volume 33, p. 2049, communicated by Eddy Dufourmont).

**Feb 21, 1948:** In the vicinity of the Kichijogi Railway station a Nisei employed by the Far East Air Force was assaulted and severely beaten by 7 Japanese of whom 3 were apprehended (IHS1).

**Feb 28, 1948:** Recapitulation of prisoners in the Eighth Army stockade as of February 28, 1948:

- General prisoners: 80
- Garrison prisoners: 280
- Garrison prisoners awaiting GCMO (i.e. General Court Martial Order): 56
- Pre-trial prisoners: 50
- Foreign national prisoners: 85

Total: 551

(General Eichelberger's papers, reel 33)

[The Eighth Army stockade was in principle destined to hold US soldiers; that is why it is not clear which kind of prisoners correspond to the category of "foreign national prisoners". Also we do not know the difference between "general prisoners" and "garrison prisoners". Despite these uncertainties, this recapitulation is of interest because it shows that the Eighth Army stockade held about 10 times more people than the 40 prisoners which are indicated in NARA 2.]

**Feb 28, 1948:** We give below excerpts of a document which was dictated by General Eichelberger on 28 February 1948 and which can be found in the microfilm series of General Eichelberger's papers (reel 33). The document is entitled: Memorandum on Military Government Work. Subtitle: On collection of food, etc.; on publicity. The article suggests that at this time there was some animosity between SCAP HQ and Eighth Army HQ. Four months later, General Eichelberg announced that he would retire from his command of the Eighth Army in Japan (see below at 9 July 1948).

"Recently our Eighth Army Military Government teams have been given the task of tax collection because it was found that only one third of the expected income tax collection had been received. Teams have been added from the combat units to the MG units to assist. Already some prefectures are showing [good] advancement in collections.

Back home sometimes one must get a false impression of what goes on in Japan. It must be remembered that many of the newspapermen hardly leave Tokyo. For instance he had a great tidal wave and earthquake in December 1946 in the Kobe-Shikoku Island area. The publicity gave credit for assisting the Japanese to a Colonel Sams who is Public Health officer in SCAP. To the best of my knowledge I have never

seen this man and none of the MG units in that area have ever seen him either. All he did was to give us a release for certain medicines which we took to that area. But up in Tokyo, he was having his photograph taken and was being publicized as the man who served millions of Japanese. [It is true that the name of colonel Sams is mentioned in an article of the New York Times about the earthquake (24 December p. 5); however, this article also mentioned the name of General Eichelberger.]

George Patton in the Pacific would never have been known because they would have just kept his name off the records. The Third Army in Europe had its own publicity service and correspondents received their news directly from the Third Army. Here any information has to clear through [SCAP] GHQ. For instance, in Manila in March 1945 a correspondent who was with the Eighth Army was in the unhappy position of not being able to write friendly articles on what he saw. If he mentioned the Eighth Army or me by name the chances were that that would be blue penciled out or possibly his news would be so late getting out that the data was no longer news worthy.

If I write about the fighting in the Philippines I shall point out that if I had it to do over again, I would run an air plane daily from Leyte to Manila bringing in the news of that happened at the front of the Eighth Army.” (General Eichelberger’s papers, reel 33)

[This document introduces two interesting points:

- The fact that in 1948 US troops and MG teams have taken part in the collection of income tax.
- The existence of a personal grievance against General MacArthur. This point is somewhat outside of the scope of the present study; we reproduced it because it also shows how efficient MacArthur’s HQ was in news filtering.]

**Feb 29, 1948:** At this date the strength of Military Government in Japan was as follows:

Staff section in Yokohama: 714, including 329 Japanese

Field staff: 5,640, including 3,355 Japanese

Total: 6,354, including 3,684 Japanese.

(IHS1)

[With regard to these data there is an important distinction which is not easy to make however, namely between the attributions of the Civil Affairs Division personnel on one hand and of the Military Government personnel on the other hand. The previous figures refer to Military Government personnel. Apart from the Japanese personnel, it totaled 2,670, of which 1,185 were enlisted men and the rest an equal number of military officers and Department of Army civilians (DAC). This number is probably only for the Eighth Army and does not include the SCAP personnel at Tokyo. It

would be interesting to know the strength of the Civil Affairs Division at SCAP.]

**Feb 29, 1948:** ● (87,3,5,246) According to G-2 (army intelligence) during the month of February there were 15 acts of violence by Japanese against occupation forces, 3 being cases of assault and 4 involving the use of fire arms. Three of the cases involved Nisei personnel. During the same month, American motor vehicles caused the death of 3 Japanese and other accidents [not specified] caused the death of 5 Japanese. In that same month, there were 74 fires which destroyed property of the First Cavalry Division. (IHS1)

**Feb 29, 1948:** During February, 13 street raids by the Tokyo Provost Marshal Venereal Disease Control Section resulted in the examination of 522 girls of whom 58 (i.e. 11%) were infected. (IHS1)

**Feb 29, 1948:** ● (87,3,5,248) During the month of February two Japanese were shot and killed when they attempted to leave Keio University with one US Army blanket and several items of food (IHS1).

**Feb 29, 1948:** During the month of February a shot was fired in the vicinity of Shiogawa City from a train carrying 11 American soldiers from the 11th Airborne Division travelling on that train as hitch hikers. As a result a Japanese was injured. (IHS1)

**Feb 29, 1948:** During the month of February 120 patients of the occupation forces were evacuated in 7 air lifts; as of February 29 there were 1,985 patients in the hospitals (IHS1).

[This means that about 6% of the patients who were ill or injured were evacuated. Those who would die as a result would not die in Japan but their number should be added to the number of fatalities in occupation forces. A monthly fatality rate of 3 per 10,000 (see in this respect Fig. 8.3a) would imply about  $3 \times 15 = 45$  fatalities monthly in the US force in Japan. If we assume (somewhat arbitrarily) that 10% of the patients who were air lifted died as a result of their injuries, this would add 12 fatalities per months that is to say 27%; in other words, this involves a substantial correction and should not be omitted.]

**Feb 29, 1948:** Prior to February 1948, the Civil Information Division of SCAP required MG prefectural teams to translate SCAP press releases into Japanese; this was an undesirable system because it often resulted in releases written in questionable Japanese. This system was supplanted by the holding of press conferences, thus placing the responsibility for accurate reporting on local Japanese newspapermen. (IHS1)

**Mar 8, 1948:** ● (89,3,5,248) Fire destroyed three barracks of the US First Cav-

alry Division at camp Mc Gill south of Yokohama, killing at least two soldiers and injuring 7 others. A major disaster was averted because many of the approximately 500 men normally housed in the barracks were off the post on week end passes. This made an immediate accurate check on victims and survivors impossible (NYT p. 3).

**Mar 21, 1948:** Between February 2 and March 21 there were 5 cases of shots being fired at BCOF personnel. The first four shootings occurred at the New Zealand Field Security Section (an intelligence unit) [no further detail is given]. On Feb 26 a New Zealand soldier was shot in the leg. On March 21 a shot was fired upon a provost patrol jeep but nobody was injured. (BCOF PRSI)

**Mar 31, 1948:** An average number of about 150 Japanese civilians were arrested every month by the British Commonwealth Occupation Force Special Investigation Branch (BCOF SIB) during the first semester of 1948. (BCOF PRSI)

**Mar 31, 1948:** The “History of BCOF provost services” notes the arrest of 2,537 Japanese and 563 BCOF personnel between the arrival of BCOF troops in the spring of 1946 up to April 1948. (Gerster p. 12)

**Apr 1948:** Message from the Minister of Commerce and Industry to SCAP [excerpt; the date is not indicated precisely but it according to the message which precede and follow it must have been in April 1948.]

It is incumbent upon me to stop immediately the strikes and sabotage now happening but I regret very much that my direction is not sufficient to achieve this end. I think it is necessary to eliminate radical elements from coal mine unions in order to secure a production of 36 million tons as planned for fiscal year 1948. To my regret, however, they cannot be removed under the existing labor laws and regulations. In these circumstances I sincerely hope that a fresh memorandum be issued by GHQ; then I shall take the steps mentioned in the attached paper. (MOFA 0047) [It would be of interest to understand more precisely why the Minister needed a directive from SCAP to act.]

**Apr 1, 1948: Abolition of the *shokutaku* system.** The *shokutaku* system (i.e. employment of workers on temporary contracts especially for the benefit of retired persons) shall be abolished not later than 1 April 1948. The deadline for the separation of all employees whose retention is not otherwise authorized is also 1 April 1948. [signed] Carlos F. Marcum, Chief of the Government Section [of SCAP] (NDL, microfiche GS(A)-00532)

**Apr 2, 1948:** ● (90,3,5,248) Private First Class Robert N. Erikson, 19 years old, had been found shot to death Monday (March 29) at Camp Crawford, Hokkaido. An investigation is in progress (NYT p. 14).

**Apr 2, 1948:** A United States Military Commission at Seoul (Korea) sentenced 8 Koreans to death for the murder of Dr. Chang Duk Soo, leader of the Korean Democratic Party [and of the Korean branch of the YMCA (Young Men's Christian Association)] who was shot to death on Dec 2, 1947. The assassins were members of a revolutionary group dedicated to the "liquidation" of national traitors. The verdict is subject to review by Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, Army Commander of Korea. (NYT p. 14)

[Although this episode does not refer to Japan, we mention it because it is one of the few instances where the sentences inflicted by a military commission are made public.]

**Apr 3, 1948:** Letter from Brigadier Whitney, Chief of the Government Section, to the Prime Minister [excerpt].

Dear Prime Minister,

It is becoming a matter of increasing concern that members of the House of Representatives are absenting themselves from its sessions to such an extent that it is difficult at times to secure even the quorum necessary to hold legislative affairs. It is suggested that the leaders of the political parties take the necessary steps to increase attendance at plenary sessions and committee meetings. [Signed:] Sincerely yours, Courtney Whitney, Chief, Government Section. (MOFA 0047)

[This is a case in which it is possible to know both the directive of SCAP and the action taken by the Japanese government as a result (see below at the date of April 6). It can be observed that correcting measures were taken very quickly. It would of course be interesting to know how effective they have been.]

**Apr 4, 1948:** ● (90,3,6,248) At 20:35 hours an Australian soldier from 67 Aust Infantry Battalion was hit and killed by a Japanese tram-car in Kobe. (BCOF PRSI)

**Apr 6, 1948:** [Reply of the Prime Minister, Hitoshi Ashida]

Dear General,

In reply to your letter of April 3 concerning absenteeism in the House of Representatives I beg to state that:

1. I have communicated your message to the heads of the various parties and requested them to take remedial steps at once.
2. The government has made public a statement of which an English version is herewith enclosed.

I hope and trust that these statements will have a salutary effect upon those who, for whatever reason or motive, see it fit to neglect their responsibilities as legislators. (MOFA 0047)

**Apr 9, 1948:** ● (90,4,6,248) A jeep driven by a British sergeant was fired at after

it failed to stop at a check point; the sergeant was killed as a result. (BCOF PRSI)

**Apr 16, 1948:** ●(90,4,6,252) Yokohama. Private Stratman Armistead, 32 years old, of Alabama was sentenced to be hanged for having murdered 4 Japanese with a hammer, having assaulted 3 others and having stolen a \$6 watch from the mother of one of his victims. The sentence is subject to review by Lieutenant General Eichelberger Commander of the Eighth Army, the Department of the Army and President Truman (NYT p. 7).

[Armistead was executed on 16 December 1948.]

**Apr 16, 1948:** GHQ-SCAP to Commanding General, Eighth Army.

GHQ-SCAP has approved draft legislation which is now under consideration by the National Diet for establishment for a Maritime Safety Service [i.e. a kind of coast guards]. (NDL, microform CAS(A)-00157)

[Once again one sees that even in April 1948 all legislation had to be approved by SCAP before being discussed in the Diet.]

**Apr 20, 1948:** SCAP: Statement for the Japanese government [excerpt].

The plan which the Japanese Government has submitted with CLO letter No 656 of 30 January 1948 does not meet the requirements of SCAPIN 1791 [Reorganization of the demobilization machinery]. It is not a detailed plan and it is not clear. It ignores the matter of personnel. The plan is therefore rejected. The Japanese Government will withdraw it and submit, by 5 May 1948, a new plan which will show clearly how each function of the present machinery will be transferred or disposed of. This plan will be devised so that it can be implemented not later than 31 May 1948 unless a delay is ordered or approved by SCAP.

While it is the responsibility of the Japanese Government to work up the details of the plan, it will incorporate the following main features. [The rest of the letter lists 11 recommendations. The revised version of the plan was submitted by 4 May and got SCAP approval by May 20.] (MOFA 0047)

**Apr 24, 1948:** ●(90,4,6,253) A Japanese National was fatally injured at Ube (BCOF area) in a “hit and run” accident (i.e. one in which the driver leaves the victim behind) caused by a BCOF truck. (BCOF PRSI)

**Apr 24, 1948:** **Korean uprising in Kobe.** In early 1948 there were 4 Korean schools in Kobe. On 8 April 1948 Governor Kishida of Hyogo prefecture received a *verbal order* from the Hyogo Military Government to the effect of closing them on 10 April. The Korean school authorities failed to obey the closing order and a meeting was called in the prefecture building in Kobe for the morning of 24 April 1948. At about 10:30 Horikawa came to the office with 3 Koreans. The governor seemed willing to discuss with them. However, at 11:00 a group of 50 persons entered the building.

At about 12:30, while discussions were under way, Captain Cropp and two MPs arrived and tried to escort the governor out of the office. They were stopped by the Koreans who surrounded them to the extent that one of the MP was lifted off his feet. Eventually, the Americans were pushed back. The MP drew their pistols at which three of the Koreans bared their chests and said “shoot here”. Captain Cropp told the MPs not to fire and the three left without further incident.

At about 15:00 the governor signed a revocation of his order after having explained that he did not have such authority [US approval being required which indeed was denied later on].

During the time of the negotiation a crowd of about 2,000 Koreans had gathered at the entrance. Speeches were made and there was singing and shouting. There was also some scuffling with a group of 150 policemen who had arrived but never tried to enter the building. When someone from within shouted that “they have rescinded the order” the people formed a victory parade and marched down Illinois avenue flying the Korean flag. The negotiators came into the street and were joyously greeted.

The arrests were not made during the demonstration but rather in a Korean hunt later on.

(NDL, microfilm YF-A9, reel No 2, Record of US elements of the Allied Council of Japan. Enclosure 2: Review of the Staff Judge Advocate.)

[The cover letter says: “You will understand, I am sure, that the enclosures have not been made public in the form in which they are forwarded to you”.

Nine defendants were tried by a Military Commission on 13 July 1948. 5 were sentenced to 15 years, one to 12 years, one to 10 years and 2 were found not guilty. Nine others were tried by a General provost court and received sentences that ranged from not guilty to 5 years at hard labor (5 years:1, 4 years:1, 3.5 years:2, 2.5 years:1, 3 months:2, not guilty:1.

There was also a trial of 18 Osaka demonstrators: one got 5 years, 2 got 4 years, 6 got 3 years and 7 got 2 years.]

**Apr 24-25, 1948:** During the night three fires occurred in the Headquarters of the British troops in Kure. The first fire started at 11:40 pm in the furniture shed and resulted in its complete destruction. At about 1am the Orderly Officer discovered burning mattresses on the top floor of a two storey building; at the same level, five fire extinguishers had been knocked down and were oozing over the floor. Prompt action saved this fire from becoming serious. The third fire was noticed at 3 am when a box of burning papers was found beneath a staircase. Arson was suspected. (Australian War Memorial archives, AWM52 18/1/11, Jan-Dec 1948)

[It is worth noticing that the BCOF monthly statistical report of incidents lists no arson incident for the month of April 1948].

**Apr 25-26, 1948** The US Provost Marshal of the Kobe Base assumed direction of the Japanese police. Martial law was proclaimed on 25 April. In Osaka on 26 April 40,000 Koreans massed in front of the Prefectural Government Office. A 16-year old Korean named Kim Tae Il was shot to death and many other demonstrators were wounded.

([http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/040th\\_issue/98042904.htm](http://www1.korea-np.co.jp/pk/040th_issue/98042904.htm))

**Apr 26, 1948** Commenting on the Kobe riots, the Eight Army's Intelligence Chief proclaimed: "Communists are behind these disorders just as they are in South Korea. The Japanese police are not physically able to arrest them, so we are doing it. We are using our Kobe troops, Negro troops". Black soldiers promptly arrested the protesters. The following day, in response to renewed demonstrations by some 30,000 Koreans, General Eichelberger issued a "shoot-to-kill" order. Subsequent clashes injured hundreds, many seriously and a 16-year old boy was killed.

(NYT 26 April 1948, Geen 2010, p. 53)

**Apr 27, 1948:** Rioting in Kobe and Osaka. The US Army clamped an iron rule on the cities of Kobe and Osaka to halt Korean rioting. 1,120 people were arrested (NYT p. 14).

[The Koreans protested against the closure of Korean schools. In 1948 there were 610,000 Koreans in Japan.]

**Apr 30, 1948:** During the months of February, March and April an average number of 37 patients were evacuated monthly by sea toward Australia (21), New Zealand (7) and the UK (8). (BCOF PRSI)

[If we assume that the same average holds for 1946, 1947, 1948 that would represent  $37 \times 36 = 1406$  patients evacuated. If, as a rough order of magnitude, one considers that 5% of the patients died during repatriation or after arrival, this would add about 70 soldiers to the BCOF Roll of Honor; this figure is consistent with the fact that about 60 Australians who died in Japan with BCOF are buried in Australia (Letter from Mr. Ron Orwin, secretary of the BCOF Executive Council of Australia dated 24 November 2005)]

**May 7, 1948:** A senior American officer in civilian clothing was assaulted by 5 Australian soldiers while boarding a train at Yuraku-Cho station in Tokyo. One Australian soldier was identified, apprehended and charged with the offense. (BCOF PRSI)

**May 14, 1948:** **SCAPIN 1894** Subject: Responsibilities of the Japanese Government for the packaging, transfer, and delivery of equipment and records allocated to claimant nations under the reparations program. [excerpt].

The [Japanese] Special Procurement Board will be responsible for the contracting of

services necessary to effect removals of reparations equipment and for the payment of all expenditures incurred in such removals. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, R.M. Levy, Colonel AGD  
 [This SCAPIN shows that in mid-1948 the reparation program was still in operation.] (SCAPINS 1952, p. 427)

**May 15, 1948:** A rock or a pallet from an air rifle was thrown or fired at the Dixie Limited Allied train No 2090 in Fukuoka prefecture. One window was cracked. (GHQ8e, No 872)

**May 20, 1948:** ● (90,4,6,254) An American sentry at the ammunition dump in Sasebo, Nagasaki prefecture discovered two Japanese in a restricted area who have come ashore in a small boat. He killed one and wounded the other. (GHQ8e, No 872)

**May 21, 1948:** At 23:00 a Japanese of Kawasaki City, Kanagawa prefecture was stabbed by two unidentified US soldiers. He was taken to Nihon Doai Hospital. (GHQ8e, No 878)

**May 22, 1948:** In Hokkaido a Japanese knocked a soldier unconscious. (GHQ8e, No 887)

**May 22, 1948:** In America the “National Shipping Federation has protested proposals for expansion of the Japanese mercantile fleet. The Federation wants to be consulted before changes are made in the present policy. (NDL, microfiche CIS-1004)

[CIS means “Civil Information Section”; it is the section of SCAP in charge of censorship. The previous article was to appear in “Radio Press” but was suppressed. Why was it censored? Probably because it suggests that a reason for limiting the Japanese fleet was to hold back a possible competitor.]

**May 30, 1948:** ● (91,4,6,254) . Yokosuka. US Navy seaman Glen Robert Surbrook of USS Orleck was struck by a Japanese vehicle while on authorized liberty in Yokosuka. He was taken by an ambulance to the US Naval Dispensary in Yokosuka but died three hours later from multiple injuries. (Deck-log of destroyer USS Orleck, May 1948, available on line).

[In 1948 there were still few Japanese vehicles on the streets. It would be of interest to know what kind of vehicle it was and whether or not the driver was indicted.]

**Jun 1, 1948:** Excerpt from a form destined to the Labor Division of SCAP. This form was destined to provide the decision of SCAP (i.e. approved, disapproved, suggested changes) regarding a draft of law approved by the Japanese Cabinet.

- The first line is blackened.

- (2nd line) Draft of law to be submitted for Government Section approval on 1 June 1948
  - (3rd line) CLCO Number 147 [CLCO=Central Liaison Committee Order] Tel: 57-6010-7845
  - (4th line) Name of law: Law concerning adjustment of laws relating to labor
  - (5th line) Date of Cabinet approval: 25 May 1948
  - (6th line) Section concerned: Labor Division, J.S. Killen
- (NDL microform, call-number GS(A) 1806, title: Labor Ministry , 2nd National Diet. The record comes from Box 2204 of NARA)

[This extract provides one example (selected from a fairly large sample) of the procedure by which drafts of laws approved by the Japanese Cabinet had to be reviewed by SCAP before being discussed in the Diet. After discussion in the Diet, but prior to enactment, the law had again to be approved by SCAP. A similar procedure of approval was required for amending existing laws. In some important cases the draft of the law was written by the relevant section of SCAP.

The previous form is the routing slip for the submission to SCAP. On the same microform there also is a copy of the routing slip giving the result of SCAP's assessment: "This bill or cabinet order has been reviewed by the Administrative Research Bureau."

Signature: [name not readable] Deputy-Director General, Administrative Research Bureau.]

**Jun 3, 1948: Intimidation of a Japanese prosecutor.** G-2 wanted Tanaka, Minoru, a Communist leader, to be arrested by Japanese Police on a theft charge. However, what was called a theft was not really a theft. It rested on the complaint of an anti-communist of the "War Sufferers Association" to which Tanaka also belonged. The complaint was about using gasoline in the activities of this association.

After Tanaka's arrest, G-2 wanted him to be tried promptly. To this effect, the G-2 investigator, Johnson F. Munroe, went to the office of the Tokyo District prosecutor with Osawa Ichiro, Chief of the Liaison Office. They summoned Umayahara Shigeo, the prosecutor in charge of the Tanaka case. Umayahara assured the investigator that the case would be given priority, that he will notify the investigator personally when the trial has been set and also make a report as to the outcome of the trial. (NDL, microform GII-02850)

**Jun 7, 1948:** In Tokyo a stone was thrown at the 1/4 ton vehicle hitting the windshield. The Zama Air Force is investigating. (GHQ8e, No 888)

**Jun 7, 1948:** Letter from the Prime Minister to the Chief of the Government Section [excerpt].

My dear General,

As it is necessary to enact by July 1 laws for the establishment of various offices on ministerial level, the Japanese Government has drafted some 30 bills and has already submitted them to your section through the Central Liaison Office. Of these bills some have already been approved by your office and submitted to the Diet. I shall appreciate it if you could be so good as to give special consideration in expediting the examination of the bills which are yet to be approved.

[Signed:] Yours faithfully, Hitoshi Ashida, Prime Minister of Japan.

(MOFA 0047)

[The message shows that before of being presented to the Diet all bills had to be approved by SCAP, even for matters such as these which were purely domestic.]

**Jun 21, 1948:** Hokkaido. A Japanese was sentenced to 5 years at hard labor by a provost court for assaulting two members of the occupation forces and threatening them with a knife. (NDL, microfiche LS-17621)

**Jun 30, 1948:** New Zealand occupation forces left Japan. During the time they were in Japan, about 1,000 Japanese were tried by NZ provost courts for various offenses that occurred in the NZ sector. During 1946, about 5 percent of the trials concerned illegal possession of weapons (swords, daggers, pistols, riffles, dynamite); in 1947 this percentage jumped to 11 percent. In provost courts the maximum sentence was 5 years of hard labor. For more serious crimes the trial was conducted by Military Commission courts; the archives of these courts do not seem to be available neither for American, Australian nor NZ occupation forces. The NZ provost courts archives are far from complete in the sense that (i) about 10 percent of the cases are missing (ii) For the most serious sentences (over 2 years hard labor) the charge is frequently omitted, and for the most serious crimes (e.g. the possession of dynamite) the sentence is often not mentioned. (National Archives of New Zealand, call number WA-J 76/1).

**Jul 2, 1948:** ● (91,4,6,255) A runaway US Army field gun killed a small Japanese baby in a baby carriage and seriously injured the mother. (Nippon Times p. 3)

**Jul 8, 1948:** ● (92,4,6,255) An American soldier was arrested in connection with the murder of John A. Ryan, the chaplain of Sugamo prison. He is being held and questioned at the Eight Army stockade. (Nippon Times p. 3)

**Jul 9, 1948: Message from Civil Property Custodian to the Economic Section of SCAP** The project [described in entries about Japanese patents] envisages a wholesale looting of Japan's technical and patent resources whose money value will run into the hundreds of millions of dollars. The project cannot be defended legally or morally for the United States is signatory to the Hague Treaty of 1907 who forbids

the taking of private property from a defeated nation except as agreed to in the peace treaty. (NDL microfiche TS-00225)

[As is made clear in the other entries about the issue of Japanese patents, this project was carried out despite the reservation expressed by the Property Custodian. It is likely that the San Francisco peace treaty contained a clause not allowing Japan to raise subsequent protest.]

**Jul 9, 1948:** General Eichelberger, Eighth Army Commander, said he will leave Japan on August 9 (NYT p. 3).

**Jul 12, 1948:** Beginning of the publication of a new anti-Communist Japanese magazine entitled “Shimpu” (the Storm). Apparently, it is a counter-publication to the Communist inspired magazine “Shinso” (the Truth) which came into existence soon after the war. The Shimpu exposes the secret tactic of the Japanese Communist Party, namely its effort to establish a united front with the Social Democratic Party. (Nippon Times p. 1)

**Jul 24, 1948:** SCAPIN-919 banned Hatoyama Ichiro from holding public offices. A document provided by Mr. Hatoyama regarding the purge suggests that he was opposed to the Pacific War and *not* affiliated with the “Imperial Rule Assistance Association”. On 17 March 1947 this document was sent to Prime Minister Yoshida. Mr. Yoshida advised Mr. Hatoyama not to file for revision of the purge and therefore the document was never used. (NDL 1, FOA 5042)

[The source does not say why Mr. Hatoyama accepted to follow the advice given by Mr. Yoshida.]

**Jul 25, 1948:** ●(92,4,6,258) A Dodge traveling at an excessive speed towards Kure (BCOF area) left the road and knocked down three Japanese, wounding them fatally. (BCOF PRSI)

**Jul 28, 1948:** ●(92,5,6,258) Royal Navy divers discovered the body of an English seaman wedged underneath the pontoon near HMS Commonwealth in the port of Kure. (BCOF PRSI)

**Jul 30, 1948:** Occupation train derailed between Kore and Hiroshima. The engine of the train was overturned and the mail and baggage cars were derailed. There were no casualties among Allied personnel. (NDL, microfilm YF-A9, reel 2)

**Jul 31, 1948:** **Cabinet Order 201 about striking right** Following a strongly worded advice given by General MacArthur in a letter of 22 July, the Japanese government issued Cabinet Order 201 through which all public service employees were denied the right to strike. They were also denied the right of collective bargaining. (Takemae 2002 p. 32)

[Subsequently (see below) many workers were arrested for violation of “Cabinet Order 201”.]

**Jul 31, 1948:** In July 1948 the Japanese Diet passed a law which established boards of education somewhat on the model of the boards of education that exist in the United States. In this system, education becomes decentralized in the sense that the boards in each prefecture or city have the power to decide of the organization of the schools (teaching programs, books, etc.). Werth (1949) tells us that all these changes were accomplished under the guiding hand of the Civil Information and Education Section of SCAP. The CIE section used a clever strategy in the sense that the centralized Ministry of Education was allowed to operate for the introduction of the main changes that it had on its agenda, but once this was done, the ministry was dismantled to make room for the decentralized system of the boards of education. Werth (1949) observes that for the election of the boards in October 1948 “not only posters but all available means of information were used to bring to the Japanese voters the three main issues stressed by American education officers. Once elected the boards were subject to considerable pressure from American education officers who held powers of surveillance, encouragement and assistance”. (Werth 1949) [It would of course be interesting to understand through which means this pressure was in practice applied. Perhaps the screening procedure which was still going on at that time was one of the levers. It will be difficult to find out.]

**Aug 1, 1948:** [Flagrant violations of the Press Code for Japan during the period 1 April-1 August 1948.](#) The list of violations comprises some 50 publications (newspapers, magazines, books) with some of them listed for several violations. (NDL, CIS-02565)

[The source does not say how these violations were punished. It is possible that it was through the allocation of paper. Indeed the law concerning the allocation of paper for newspapers and other publications remained in force until 1 January 1952 that is to say almost until the end of the occupation. (microfiche GS(A)-01943)]

**Aug 1, 1948:** Shortly after midnight a BCOF soldier was assaulted by several Japanese; he was later admitted to hospital with a fractured arm and lacerations to head. Three Japanese have been arrested. (BCOF PRSI)

[It would be interesting details about their trial and sentences.]

**Aug 3, 1948:** [Plundering of Japanese patents in scientific and technical fields \(1\)](#)  
SCAP radio to Department of Army.

Authority for this action is JCS 1380/15 par 45 [Joint Chiefs of Staff directive]

You are advised that on 5 June 1948 1,800 secret Japanese patents (as shown on the inclosed inventory) were shipped in 7 wooden boxes by air from SCAP Headquarters

addressed to the “Deputy Director for Research and Development, US Army”. A copy of the inventory is included in box no 7.

All printed copies of the secret patents will be retained in custody of CINCEE and none, repeat none, will remain in the Japanese Patent Office.

Approved by R.M. Levy, colonel, W.F. Marquat, Major General, US Army, Chief of the Economic and Scientific Division.

(NDL, microfiche TS-00023)

[This is an interesting message but it leaves many open questions. For instance, one would wish to know why these patents were more secret than others. As the inventory mentioned at the beginning is in fact not inclosed in the microfiche it is difficult to find out. Why were the patents completely removed? Probably because the United States did not wish to share them with the other members of the Far Eastern Council. This thesis is supported by the fact that the archives contain numerous messages referring to this issue that were exchanged with the Dutch and the Russians.]

### **Aug 6, 1948: Plundering of Japanese patents in scientific and technical fields (2)** **SCAPIN 1925**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Japanese Government

SUBJECT: Access to Japanese scientific and technical information in Japan.

1 The Japanese Government is hereby directed to make available from the date of this memorandum through 31 March 1949 all scientific and technical processes having industrial value of Japanese origin and developed prior to 31 December 1945, to technical representatives of governments members of the Far Eastern Commission.

2 Technical investigators shall upon their request be furnished with opportunity to make copies of drawings, blueprints, etc. They shall be allowed such time as they deem necessary to inspect shops, machinery, equipment, laboratories, pilot-plants. etc.

3 For processes which are claimed not of Japanese origin, the proof will upon the Japanese side.

4 The Japanese Government will give this directive the widest possible dissemination.

[signed] FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER R.M. Levy, Colonel, AGD  
(Source: SCAPINS 1952, p. 437)

[In practical terms, this SCAPIN means that US companies (even those which were in competition with Japanese businesses) could send technical investigators to Japan for the purpose of learning all advanced techniques developed in Japan.

Although the “Far Eastern Commission” comprised 13 nations, the US authorities were in a dominant position for they could refuse (or delay until after 31 March 1949) entrance into Japan to any investigators from countries which would be seen

as major competitors by US companies.]

**Aug 8, 1948:** For the Japanese government the annual cost of the occupation is about one quarter of the total national budget (NYT section Week in Review p. E4).

**Aug 8, 1948:** Last month General MacArthur wrote a letter to the Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida “advising” that the right to strike be withdrawn from Government employees. The Japanese Government accepted this directive as superseding Japanese law, a move that raised much criticism among government workers’ unions. (NYT section Week in Review p. E4)

**Aug. 10, 1948:** Unauthorized stoppages break out all over Japan (NYT p. 9).

**Aug 10, 1948:** Ninety classes of Japanese school children will take part this fall in a test of simplified Japanese writing (Christian Science Monitor p. 13)

**Aug 13, 1948:** An internal document of SCAP authored by the “Civil Information and Education” section explains why certain categories of Japanese military who had been purged in the early times of the occupation were re-integrated, including in education. As of 13 April 1948 some 4,000 military persons had been de-purged. (NDL, microfiche CIE(C)-460)

[We did not cite the reasons listed in this document because they are mere window-dressing. The bottom line is that once the occupation policy had turned against left-wing personnel, it had to rely more heavily on the right. The re-integration of some of them was a way to win over Japanese rightists.]

**Aug 16, 1948:** Iwakuni. Whilst walking along a road near the Kotobuki bridge two Australian soldiers were assaulted by a gang of some 30 Japanese. They had to be sent for medical treatment. (Australian War Memorial archives, AWM52 18/1/11, Jan-Dec 1948)

**Aug 19, 1948:** Sit-down strikers agreed to leave the grounds of Toho movie studios after US tanks and troops were called out. The surrender came after morning-long attempts by Japanese police to force an entry into the barricaded studio grounds and carry out the court order to evict the sit-downers. The 100 police found themselves powerless. (NYT p. 3).

[It would be of interest to understand what argument allowed US troops to obtain peacefully what the Japanese police failed to obtain in spite of several hours of negotiations.]

**Aug. 23, 1948:** Hokkaido. A Japanese was sentenced to 5 years at hard labor by a provost court for assault on a member of the occupation force. (NDL, microfiches LS-17617 to LS-17621)

**Aug. 26, 1948:** Efforts to break railroad strike make little progress; other workers begin to protest against no-strike orders (NYT p. 12).

**Aug 29, 1948:** Iwakuni. An airman of the Royal New Zealand Air Force reported that he had been assaulted and robbed of approximately 1,000 yens by 3 Japanese posing as member of the Japanese Civil Police. (Provost monthly resume of serious incidents in BCOF area, Australian War Memorial archives, AWM52 18/1/11, Jan-Dec 1948)

**Aug 31, 1948:** Iwakuni. An airman of the Royal Australian Air Force reported that whilst riding on his bicycle back to his unit, he was attacked by a number of Japanese. In spite of important efforts made to locate these persons, they are still at large. (Provost monthly resume of serious incidents in BCOF area, Australian War Memorial archives, AWM52 18/1/11, Jan-Dec 1948)

[It is of interest to note that for the month of August the BCOF monthly statistical report of incidents gives no assault incident of Japanese against BCOF soldiers]

**Sep 5, 1948:** Kure. During the night, three Australian soldiers were attacked by a party of 4 Japanese armed with wooden shutters. (Provost monthly resume of serious incidents in BCOF area, Australian War Memorial archives, AWM52 18/1/11, Jan-Dec 1948)

**Sep 21, 1948:** Small arson fires at the Okinoyama coal mine in Yamaguchi-ken. (NARA 10, intercept of a letter between two offices of the Japan Fire and Marine Insurance Company.

[The letter attributes the fires to Communists.]

**Sep 21, 1948:** A Japanese who slapped a member of the occupation forces with his hand was sentenced to two years at hard labor. (NDL, microfiche LS-17545)

**Sep 23, 1948:** A United States Army provost court today sentenced a Hokkaido union official to 3 years in prison for publishing derogatory remarks about the occupation. The defendant, Kazuo Yonekuva, was held responsible for a magazine article criticizing occupation officials' treatment of a worker defying the occupation. (Times p. 5)

[On the question of censorship, Takemae mentions that in the six months from June to November 1948, 148 Japanese were tried for violations of censorship policies; for instance, three publishers were sentenced to terms of hard labor of 2 and 5 years.]

**Sep 30, 1948:** Hokkaido. Some 480 workers, most of them members of the "Japanese Government Railroad Union", were arrested for violation of "Cabinet Order 201" (that is to say the interdiction to strike). (NDL, microfiche WOR-20527)

**Oct 5, 1948:** Organization of the “Board of Education” elections in Aomori pefecture

The “Board of Education” is an American institution transplanted to Japan by the occupation authorities. They realized very well that in order to guaranty the success of this institution it was necessary to make it accepted by the Japanese. A high participation in the election of 5 October was an important step. To this aim a massive public relations campaign was set up which comprised the following actions:

1 The chief of the MG team conducted 26 meetings through the prefecture during September.

2 The Civil Education section asked all schools to have a 15 mn assembly the day before the election.

3 There was no school on the day of the election to enable students to help out at home while parents were voting.

4 The Civil Education section prepared 7 newspaper and radio releases.

5 The Too Nippo, the largest newspaper, sponsored 8 meetings. The three leading newspapers carried over 146 articles during September and radio stations made 58 announcements. [probably because they were asked to do so]. qee6 During intermissions in motion picture theaters there were spot announcements.

7 3,000 posters were posted, 100,000 leaflets and 230,000 sheets giving the profiles of the candidates were distributed.

8 The governor of the prefecture gave speeches over the radio.

Thanks to all these actions, the participation rate reached 60%.

(NDL, microform CAS(A)-00203)

[See a related item at the date of 14 October 1948.]

**Oct 6, 1948:** Tomoya Kawakita, a 28-year-old American born Nisei who during the war served as an interpreter in a Japanese prison camp, was sentenced to death by a tribunal in Los Angeles. (NYT p. 15) [In February Kawakita won a review of his conviction from the US Supreme court. As several hundred Nisei served in Japan during the war, it would be interesting to know how many of them were tried and sentenced after 1945. More details on this point can be found in Roehner (2010).]

**Oct 10, 1948:** A Corsair aircraft of squadron number 14 was set ablaze at Bofu airport in the occupation zone of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force (Brocklebank, photograph).

**Oct 14, 1948:** Report of Educational Board elections by the Niigata MG team. 13 Communists were arrested in Niigata prefecture for distributing pamphlets to voters. These leaflets were in support of the Communist candidates. (NDL, microform CAS(A)-00203)

[For the MG the main challenge was to prevent candidates of the Teachers Union (some of whom were Communists) to be elected.]

**Oct 25, 1948:** A Japanese cyclist was killed on a road between Kure and Hiroshima in a hit-and-run accident. The car was a staff car driven by a BCOF sergeant. (Gerster 2008, p. 110)

**Nov 10, 1948:** In Yoshiura, a coast town between Kure and Hiroshima 7 Japanese were struck by a recklessly driven BCOF vehicle which took off from the scene before the culprit could be apprehended. Two of the victims died in hospital. One was a pregnant woman, the other a young girl. (Gerster 2008, p. 111)

**Nov 13, 1948:** 5 of the 11 Justices of the “International Military Tribunal for the Far East” released minority opinions. Two concurred with the judgment but found it too lenient. Three voiced criticisms against the procedure.

Henri Bernard, the Justice for France, questioned the fact that the definition of the crimes was made *after* they were committed. Bernard V.A. Röling, the Justice for the Netherlands, called for the acquittal of several defendants. In conclusion to his 1235-page dissenting opinion, Radhabinod Pal, the Justice for India, called the trial an act of retaliation by the victors and declared that all the defendants should be freed immediately. The publication of the text of Pal’s opinion was prohibited by SCAP during the occupation. The mere existence of the three dissenting opinions was reported by the Asahi shimbun on 13 November 1948 in a short article (of some 400 characters). A Japanese translation was published in April 1952 that is to say immediately after the end of the occupation, by Masaaki Tanaka (1952). It seems that only little (if any) attention was given by western newspapers to Justice Pal’s dissenting opinion. A search for the name “Radhabinod Pal” in the electronic index of the New York Times returns no results, which means that it did not appear in any of the articles.

During a visit to India in August 2007, the prime minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe, met with Pal’s son Prasenta. It can be recalled that Abe’s grand father Nobusuke Kishi was imprisoned by the Americans as a war criminal but was never tried. (Yoshida 2006 p. 50-52; Wikipedia: article “Radhabinod Pal”)

**Nov 14, 1948:** Shoici TABATA, a lighting technician and a leader of the union, has been sentenced to 5 years in prison [probably by a US provost court but the source does not give the precision] for a speech that he made about the recent Toho strike. Tabata explained how on 19 August 1948 more than a thousand police, backed by US Army Sherman tanks and armed troops forced 900 strikers to evacuate a film studio.

No Japanese newspapers dared to publish the truth about the presence of US armed

forces and American censors deleted from newsreels the scenes showing US soldiers. (The Worker, 14 November 1948 p. 2)

[The presence of US troops was also mentioned in an article published on 19 August 1948 (see above at this date). Whereas this article mentioned 100 police the figure of one thousand that is given here seems more plausible on account of the fact that there were 900 strikers. Incidentally, it would be of interest to know *how* US troops were able to obtain the evacuation while the police was powerless. “The Worker” is the week end edition of the American newspaper “Daily Worker”.]

**Nov 21, 1948:** Intercept of a telegram (in Japanese) between two individuals reads: “Please, send us bombs (bakudan) immediately.” (NARA 10)

[This may have been a joke for all serious saboteurs were certainly aware of the fact that telegrams were read by US intelligence. Whether a joke or not, it is possible that it had dire consequences for the two persons involved, namely: Mr. ISHII from Higashinari-ku, Osaka and Rihei SAKAMOTO from Asomura, Wakayama-ken.]

**Nov 27, 1948:** Excerpt of a cable sent by General MacArthur to the American Bible Society: “Contribution of American Bible Society of inestimable value to spiritual rehabilitation of Japan. Urge plans to be greatly expanded”. (Woodard 1972).

**Dec 1948:** As the Broadcasting bill was under discussion at the National Diet SCAP interrupted the proceedings on several occasions, asking that revisions be made. For example, in December 1948 SCAP’s Legal Section “strongly demanded” that as many as 17 articles of the bill be revised. As a result the discussion of the bill had to be postponed. (Luther and Boyd 1997, p. 53)

[The bill came again under discussion in December 1949, see below]

**Dec 5, 1948:** ● (93,5,6,258) A serviceman in Japan was slain at Jama Air Base. Three soldiers were arrested on suspicion of murder within a few hours after the slaying. The victim was bound, slashed and robbed. (NYT p. 38).

**Dec 5, 1948:** Ube city, Yamaguchi Prefecture. During a protest march by Korean teachers two Australian MPs were stoned and assaulted. 21 of the protesters were arrested and tried in Provost court on Kyushu for violation of SCAPIN 212 [screening of teachers]. (NDL, microfiche CIE(C)-4260)

**Dec 16, 1948:** ● (94,5,6,258) A serviceman, Stratman Armistead, was executed in Yokohama. (Wikipedia article entitled “List of individuals executed by the United States military”)

[Armistead had been sentenced on 16 April 1948, see above.]

**Dec 31, 1948:** On average during 1948, 3.8 Japanese were killed per month in the BCOF occupation zone as a result of traffic accidents involving BCOF vehicles.

(Provost monthly resume of serious incidents in BCOF area, Australian War Memorial archives, AWM52 18/1/11, Jan-Dec 1948)

## 1949

**Jan 3, 1949:** Report from Hans H. Baerwald to Major Jack P. Napier, Government Section, GHQ.

Subject: Proposed re-screening commission.

[This report can be found in the Papers of Hans H. Baerwald who played an important role in the purge. Its title suggests that screening of Japanese employed in education and in various administrations was still alive in early 1949. The table of contents of Baerwald's collected papers can be read online.]

**Jan 6, 1949:** **SCAPIN 1956** Subject: Display of Japanese national flag. Summary: Authorizes the Japanese national flag to be displayed and used without restriction within the territorial limits of Japan. (SCAPINcat)

**Jan 14, 1949:** SCAP issued a directive to the Japanese government to permit foreign companies to acquire business properties in Japan (NYT p. 10, 35).

**Jan. 26, 1949:** ●(95,5,6,258) A GI wounded in an Hokkaido riot died. One of the five U.S. soldiers wounded in a riot that broke out in the enlisted men's club at Camp Crawford, Hokkaido Island, on Sunday night, died today. He died from a bullet fired by the military police who were cornered and forced to shoot their way out (NYT p. 11).

**Jan 27, 1949:** **SCAPIN 1926/3** Subject: Procedures for handling private export contracts. [excerpt].

List of export commodities for which SCAP validation of the export license is required: non-ferrous metals, ships, rolling stock, machine tools, items requiring the use of precious metals, textiles. (SCAPINS 1952, p. 445)

**Jan 30, 1949:** ●(100,5,6,258) Fire swept a barracks at the Yokota base of the U.S. Air Force killing at least 5 American soldiers. Reports said ten others were missing. The barracks housed 90 men. Sergeant C.R. Nilson was awakened by the heat and discovered the fire; he sounded the alarm but the flames apparently had gained considerable headway before the discovery (NYT p. 9).

[The article suggests that in spite of the high frequency of deadly fires occurring mostly during night hours no sentries were posted for the purpose of spotting fire starts and sounding alarm as early as possible.]

**Mar 3, 1949:** The headquarters of General Douglas MacArthur issued a series of

sweeping instructions to the Japanese Government for greater efficiency and higher production in the nation's vital coal mining industry (NYT p. 48)

**Mar 11, 1949:** Two officials of the Korean Student League have been sentenced to 3 years hard labor each by a provost court in Tokyo for violating Eight Army orders by displaying the North Korean flag on the roof of the League on 31 October for about 5 minutes during a meeting of league members. (NDL, Pacific Stars and Stripe, Z92-399)

**Mar 12, 1949:** Virgil L. Aikens and Harold F. Seevers of the 11th Airborne Division are awaiting trial on the charge of staging a series of armed robberies that resulted in the fatal shooting of two Japanese last Thanksgiving night in the Sapporo area.

**Apr 12, 1949:** Yamaguchi prefecture. Some 25 Korean League Schools were officially closed. Among the reasons one can mention the use of unauthorized books, the teaching of communist propaganda, the failure of 17 Korean teachers to comply with the provisions of the teacher-screening ordinance. (NDL, microfiche CIE(C)-4260)

**Apr 18, 1949:** Two Japanese, Sawada Masatoshi and Katagami Masatoshi were arrested for assault against a member of the Occupation Forces. (NDL, microfiche LS-17540)

**Apr 23, 1949:** **SCAPIN 1997** Subject: Establishment of official exchange rate for Japanese yen. [excerpt].

The Japanese Government is directed to put into effect at 00:01 hours [i.e. at midnight] 25 April 1949, an official foreign exchange rate of 360 Japanese yen to one US dollar. Rates for other currencies will be based on this rate translated into US dollar values.

[Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, R.M. Levy, Colonel AGD.  
(SCAPINS 1952, p. 470)

[This SCAPIN shows that in 1949 such important decisions as fixing the exchange rate were still solely made by MacArthur's Headquarters. In subsequent years this responsibility was progressively transferred to the Japanese government, see below 1 January 1950.]

**Apr 29, 1949:** The editor of the magazine "Emancipation News" was sentenced to five years of hard labor (Braw 1991, chapter 7).

**May 7, 1949:** The 1st Cavalry Division was advised to include on "Schedule A" (i.e. the list of cases that were tried) the results for military commission cases tried by it during March to April 1949. (NDL, microfiche LS-17544)

[We found the query but unfortunately we did not find the answer.]

**May 11, 1949:** **SCAPIN 2004** Subject: Securities Exchanges [excerpt]. The request to open securities exchanges in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya is hereby approved and the opening date of those securities exchanges is specified as 14 May 1949. Transactions on all securities shall be subject to such controls as are deemed necessary by GHQ. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander R.M. Levy, Colonel AGD. (SCAPINS 1952, p. 472)

**May 24, 1949:** The “Dodge Line” [Joseph Lodge was an economic advisor to General MacArthur in 1949] stirred the public’s uneasy feelings and this reached the peak on May 24 when the Yoshida cabinet announced a plan to fire some 170,000 public servants out of a total of about 1.6 million. (Fifty years 1975, p. 244)

**May 27, 1949:** **SCAPIN 47/1** [excerpt].

You will direct all research laboratories, research institutions and similar scientific organizations to be open for inspection by duly authorized Allied representatives at all times. You will direct such organizations to render an annual report as of 1 April of each year to GHQ. It will adhere to the form and content prescribed by the sample form enclosed. (SCAPIN 1-600)

**May 30, 1949:** At a mine in Nagasaki-ken two drainage pump motors were burned out. (NARA 10, intercept of a phone call in Japanese)

**Jun 2, 1949:** It was announced by the Japanese police authorities that 65 Communist and left-wing demonstrators which were arrested by Tokyo police last night will be handed over to US Military Courts for trials. (Straits Times p. 1)

**Jun 7, 1949:** Private David W. Worthen of the Eight Engineer Combat Battalion dropped dead during a drill at camp Drake near Tokyo. (NDL, Pacific Stars and Stripes)

**Jun 19, 1949:** The intercept of a letter in Japanese between Hokkaido police stations reports alleged directives of the Japanese Communist Party for a nation-wide armed revolution. (NARA 10, intercept of a letter in Japanese)

[It is difficult to know whether or not these directives are genuine.]

**Jun 20, 1949:** Between 1 January and 20 June 1949 there were 27 dynamite robberies in Kyushu. 12,168 sticks of dynamite, 27,023 percussion caps and 2,241 meters of fuses were stolen. Half of them have been recovered. (NARA 10, intercept of a telephone call in Japanese)

**Jun 25, 1949:** ●(100,5,7,258) Captain J.-P. Smith was killed when the small BCOF bus carrying him and others ran off the road and down a steep embankment into the sea. (Gerster 2008)

**Jun 28, 1949:** On the lines under the control of the Moji Railway Bureau, the frequency of the accidents has been rising since March because of the personnel re-trenchment issue [i.e. dismissal of workers]. During May and June there were 81 accidents which corresponds to a frequency of 40 accidents. Most of them were stones thrown at passing trains and rocks laid on the rails. Two locomotives were derailed. (NARA 10, intercept of a telephone call in Japanese)

[The document does not give any information about possible casualties.]

**Jun 30, 1949:** Japanese Government officials reported that increasing attempts were being made to sabotage railroad transportation following a decision of the Government Railway Workers' unions to use force if necessary to block the proposed dismissal of "surplus" operating employees. (NYT p. 9)

**Jul 1, 1949:** At 19:44 hours a train travelling between Yoshizuka and Mitarai (Fukuoka-ken) was obstructed by bricks and a lump of cement placed on the tracks. (NARA 10, intercept of a letter in Japanese)

**Jul 1, 1949:** In what is called the Taira riot, 400 Japanese leftists stormed a police station 110 miles north of Tokyo. The objective of the action was to release the Communists who had been arrested a few days earlier. They left only after 300 rural police reinforcements approached. (NYT p. 9)

**Jul 10, 1949:** An autopsy established that Sadamori Shimoyana, president of the State Railway Corporation, was beaten to death before his mangled body was found on railroad tracks Tuesday. (NYT p. 22)

**Jul 10, 1949:** Tokyo. A mob of Japanese hurled stones, large chunks of wood and other missiles at a plainly marked Allied occupation car at the Nippori Railroad station near Tokyo seriously injuring an Army Sergeant. A 2-meter length of 4 by 4 lumber struck Sergeant Emanuel Aycock of Tokyo Quartermaster's office knocking him unconscious. (NYT p. 22)

[The episode raises several questions (i) Why did the Japanese attack this particular car? (ii) Why did the soldiers not fire to defend themselves? (iii) Were the aggressors arrested, tried and sentenced?]

**Jul 12, 1949:** ●(101,5,7,259) Gifu. An American soldier fatally stabbed his Japanese sweetheart and then joined her in death by throwing himself in front of an electric train (NYT p. 5).

**Jul 24, 26, 1949:** 176 people were arrested on charges of circulating rumors on wall newspapers of alleged GI attacks on civilians (NYT Jul. 24: p. 11 and Jul. 26: p. 16).

**Jul 26, 1949:** Report to Major Jack P. Napier, Government Section, GHQ, written by Director Mitsusada YOSHIKAWA, Special Examining Bureau at the Attorney-General's Office, [excerpt]

Subject: Yoshio KODAMA, 39, adviser to the Kaiyo Tsusho K.K. [so far we have not been able to find out what this group was.]

[Before the war Kodama was a member of an ultranationalist group which had planned the assassination of Japanese politicians. He was arrested and served a term of 3.5 years. During the war Kodama acted as a procurement agent for the Japanese Army in China. For that reason he was arrested after the war but was released in late 1948. After that, he was instrumental in founding the Liberal-Democratic Party (Japan's ruling party) and became widely regarded as one of the most powerful men in Japan. On 13 March 1976 he was charged with large-scale tax evasion and on 10 May 1976 he was charged with receiving \$1.3 million from a Lockheed official. He was never tried however and died on 17 January 1984.]

- Kodama was designated as a purgee and confined to Sugamo prison on 20 December 1947.

- On 15 June 1948 he submitted an affidavit [i.e. a written statement to be used in a court of law] to Chief A.C. Carpenter of SCAP's Legal Affairs Section.

- Kodama was released on 25 December 1948.

- He wrote an autobiographical account of his life (partly based on the account given in the affidavit) entitled (in Japanese) *Ware Yaburetari* (i.e. We have been defeated) which was published by the Kyoyusha Publishing House on 15 June 1949.

- Several sections of this book are in violation of article 15 of the Imperial Ordinance No 1. However, as Kodama was unaware of this violation we intend to give him only a strict warning.

[A second document sent by Yoshikawa to Major Napier on 8 September 1949, states that the sale of the book entitled "We have been defeated" was suspended. It then goes on to enumerate the six sections which should be deleted from the book before a revised version can be published. This revised book was published on 1 September 1949. In Yoshikawa's terms "in its contents any points extending over political discussion and criticism (sic) is not seen any longer".

The documents contained in NARA 9 provide some excerpts of this book, in particular the 33 pages of the chapter entitled "From the iron window of the Sugamo detention house" which was subsequently deleted. Kodama's rhetoric is characterized by two main features:

- Strong anti-communist and anti-union opinions; an typical sentence is (p. 32): "Arrival of the day of bloody struggle of Japan with the communism for doom or existence seems to be not so late."

- Great admiration for the occupation forces along with a degree of contempt for the Japanese people. This can be illustrated by the following excerpts (p. 22).

“It is now clear even to a child here that without the protection and support given by America, the future Japan could never maintain its existence under any condition.”

“The Japanese people possess a servile nature that makes them blindly submit to the leading influence of the time; but, on the other hand, they are also possessed of such uprightness as never allows them to forget their gritudes.”

(NARA 9; Keesing, Volume 22, July 1976, p. 27840.)

### **Jul 27, 1949: SCAPIN 2033**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Japanese Government

SUBJECT: Cancellation of authorizations for construction of steel ships.

Authorization granted for construction of steel vessels is hereby cancelled. Construction work on subject vessels will not be started or resumed unless future authorization for such work is granted.

[An inclosure lists the names of the shipyards and of the ships. They were mostly fishing vessels.]

(Source: SCAPINS 1952)

[This SCAPIN shows that even as late as July 1949 Japanese authorities had to ask permission for the construction of every single ship. The beginning of the Korean War one year later will mark the true economic liberation of Japan. It can be recalled that the Japanese GDP reached again its pre-war level only in 1953, i.e. 8 years after the end of the war.]

**Jul 29, 1949:** General MacArthur decreed a drastic reduction in the personnel of the US Military Government. This means a return to Japanese autonomy especially at prefectural level. An official announcement disbanded the Military Government sections of the Eighth Army. Also abolished were the GHQ Military Government sections of the First and Ninth Corps as well as the 45 Military Government teams that have over the last four years operated in all Japanese prefectures. These teams have been the real backbone of occupation that checked on Japanese compliance with GHQ directives. All that now will remain will be the 8 regional Military Government headquarters each of which will have jurisdiction over half a dozen prefectures. The Military Government teams have played an important role in rice and tax collection and it will be a challenge to the Japanese to take over. (NYT 29 July 1949 p. 1; NYT 30 July 1949 p. 14; NYT 7 August 1949 p. 9)

**Aug 7, 1949:** Recently GHQ announced the suspension of further reparation ex-

ports. (NYT p. 9)

**Aug 7, 1949:** The railroad through the Kammon tunnel (an under-sea tunnel between Mojishi, Fukuoka-ken and Shimonoseki-shi, Yamaguchi-ken was disrupted due to an accident. All freight cars came to a standstill. (NARA 10, intercept of a telegram in Japanese)

**Aug 7, 1949:** There were a number of incidents at the Nikko plant after the dismissal of 560 workers was announced on 3 August. They included two cases of street-car derailment, damage to water pipes. (NARA 10, intercept of a letter in Japanese)

### **Aug 13, 1949: Honor camps in Japan**

Report concerning Hokkaido honor camp sent to Cr. B.G. Lewis, Chief of the prison branch, GHQ SCAP.

It is a work camp for 3,000 prisoners. However, at present it holds only 2,120 prisoners. The purpose of the report is to understand why it is not filled at full capacity. The prisoners work on railtracks, roads, embankments. It appears that there has been a strong local opposition because it suppressed employment. (NDL, microfiche G2-2325)

[The term “honor camp” seems to be an american expression which designates a prison work camp. There were several in the United States, e.g. Catalina, Kulani and others. So-called prison farms or prison industries are similar places where inmates work during their term. One may remember that in provost court trials a standard sentence is a few months (or a few years) at *hard labor*. Therefore prison work camps must have existed to receive these prisoners. One should also remember that many defendants were subject to a fine that they were unable to pay. In such cases the fine was replaced by prison at hard labor for a term that was proportional to the fine. As a confirmation it can be mentioned that the folder contains a form which had to be used for the transfer of a prisoner to an honor camp. It has three columns. First column is “Offense”, the second is “Term”, the third is “Fine, unpaid amount”.

Unfortunately, the Internet gives no information about Japanese honor camps. One would like to know how many camps of that kind existed in Japan and how many inmates they held. This is important because when prison work camps are omitted in the statistics of prison population this leads of course to gross under-estimates. It seems that the honor camps were started in 1948. One sentence in the same folder says: “The development of honor camps is smooth”. A draft-regulation of the honor [one sees the two spellings] camps is dated from 10 May 1948

Incidentally, similar prison work camps must have existed in Hawaii because the

same provost court system was used.

**Aug 20, 1949:** After 35 disloyal miners of the Niko pit (in Fukuoka-ken) were discharged some of them attempted to wreck a transformer station by throwing mine pillars into it. No great damage resulted. (NARA 10, intercept of a letter in Japanese)

**Aug 12, 1949:** The Japanese Government began today the second round of dismissals of surplus public employes. 11,500 workers will receive dismissal notices. (NYT p. 2)

**Aug 22, 1949:** 98 Koreans were arrested in Shimonoseki, Yamaguchi Prefecture. (Straits times p. 1) [According to occupation directives the Koreans living in Japan should be shipped back to Korea. However many of them have been living in Japan for many years and as they can only take with them \$200 they know that once in Korea they will never be able to recover the property they left behind. Attempts by Koreans to come back to Japan gave rise to numerous incidents.

**Aug 27, 1949:** The Japanese are up in arms over the latest of a series of railroad accidents that have cost a score of lives in the last few months and which, investigations have shown, have generally been caused by sabotage along the tracks. Communists deny the accusation that they are behind fatal crashes. (NYT p. 5)

**Aug 30, 1949:** At about 14:40 hours, a worker of the Kawaminami shipyard, Terukazu NOZOE, exploded a steel tube 19cm long charged with magnesium for photographic use in protest against personnel retranchment [that is to say lay offs). He was arrested at once. (NARA 10, intercept of a phone call in Japanese)

**Aug 31, 1949:** Six Japanese were sentenced to 5 years at hard labor for spreading rumors derogatory to occupation forces. American soldiers were accused of raping Japanese women. The sentences were handed down at Osaka City by the United States Twenty-Fifth Division's Provost Marshal's Court. (NYT p. 15).

**Aug 31, 1949:** At 6:00 hours two driverless busses ran into houses at the Oyodo Market at Miyazaki-shi, Miyazaki-ken. 5 houses were damaged. This incident is considered similar to the Mitaka incident. (NARA 10, intercept of a phone call in Japanese)

**Sep 1949:** Hokkaido. 38 officials all of whom Communists and union leaders were dismissed as being surplus. There were similar dismissals in other prefectures: 24 in Nagasaki, 79 in Yamanashi, and so on. (NDL, microform CAS(A)-00705)

[Incidentally, it can be mentioned that the first item of this microform says that the item was removed by NARA on 11 July 1977 because "it contains restricted informa-

tion”. The designation of the removed file is: Record Group 331, Box 2334, Folder: Miscellaneous investigations, Feb-Oct 1950.]

**Sep. 2, 1949:** ● (101,5,7,260) A GI killed a Japanese woman (NYT p. 14).

**Sep 8, 1949:** Gun-cotton explosions in Tokyo [gun-cotton is a general name for explosive nitric ethers of cellulose obtained by steeping cotton in nitric and sulfuric acids] (Times p. 3, column 5)

[This news appears in the Index of the Times but it was published in only one of the 8 editions of the Times; it does not seem to be listed in the electronic edition of the Times.]

**Sep. 9, 29, 1949:** A publisher, Shichiro Morioka, and a professor, I. Oyama, were charged with violations of censorship policies. As the head of a news service, Associated News Overseas Edition, Mr Morioka was accused of having circulated material in which the British were said to have tortured and executed thousands of Malaysians during the Malaysian insurgency. He was sentenced to two years hard labor (NYT 9 Sep p. 12 and 29 Sep 29 p. 15; Braw 1991).

**Sep 9, 1949:** SCAPIN 2043 Subject: Price and distribution control over potatoes, [excerpt].

The supply of grains in Japan is considered to be sufficiently adequate to make unnecessary the continuation of price and distribution controls over sweet and white potatoes in 1950. This action is not to be construed as lessening the need for controls over grains. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, R.M. Levy, Colonel AGD (SCAPINS 1952, p. 484)

**Sep 14, 1949:** Eun Muam, Korean editor of the New Asia Press Service was convicted of circulating news stories which were not factually true. He was sentenced by a United States provost court to 2 years in prison. (NYT p. 16)

**Sep 19, 1949:** At 18:00 hours the train from Moji, Fukuoka-ken to Kagoshima-shi overturned at a point 200 meters from the Yamato tunnel. At that spot, the railway tracks turn left and nails had been driven into the right rail of the tracks. (NARA 10, this was an intercept of a phone call in Japanese)

[The document gives no information about possible casualties or about the type of the train, e.g. freight, passenger, occupation forces, etc. “nail” is perhaps not a good translation (how can one drive nails in a railway track?), a more appropriate term may have been “spikes”.]

**Sep 22, 1949:** During the storm which lasted from the morning of 21 till the morning of 22 September, 500 sticks of dynamite, 1,100 percussion-caps and 60 meters of safety-fuse were stolen from the gunpowder warehouse at Kongo, Fukuoka-ken

owned by the Koyanose Coal Mine. It was learned that the superintendant was away for the night and the robbery was committed by using a pass key. (NARA 10, this was an intercept of a phone call in Japanese)

**sep 30, 1949** Stone throwing on trains in Shikoku region.

Between 1 July and 30 September 1949 there were about 10 cases of stone-throwing into railroad cars in the area of the "Shikoku Liaison and Coordination Office". In some of these cases, passengers were injured.

In the same time interval there were also about 40 cases of placing stones on the rails. Stones of various sizes were used, from small stones (10 cm) to big ones weighting up to 8 kg.

There were also a few more sophisticated sabotage attempts such as taking off the bolt-nut of joint of track.

(NDL, microfiche CAS(B)-5237, CAS(B)-5238)

[It would be interesting to know if these actions targeted particularly occupation forces trains, but the source gives no information in this regard. There are no mentions of derailments provoked by stone placing.]

**Oct 6, 1949:** The United States has ordered about \$81,000,000 in Japanese gold turned over to France and Thailand in reparation for requisition ordered by the Japanese Government during the war. French Indochina is to receive 37 millions and Thailand 44 millions. (NYT p. 32)

**Oct 7, 1949:** A ten-year prison sentence and a fine of \$10,000 [about 70,000 dollars of 2000] were imposed today upon Mrs. Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aquino, a first generation Japanese-American who was found guilty of broadcasting treasonable statements to American troops from Radio Tokyo during the war. She had already been arrested by U.S. forces in 1945 but was released in 1946 after the Army and the U.S. Justice Department concluded that there were no grounds for prosecuting her. Yet, the Justice Department reopened the case in 1948; Mrs. D'Aquino was arrested in Japan, transported to San Francisco and put on trial in 1949. Although found guilty of only one of the eight treason charges, she was sentenced to 10 years in prison and her American citizenship was revoked. In fact, Mrs. Toguri never broadcast anything else than light entertainment deejay spots. The judge later admitted he was prejudiced against her from the start. In 1976, the TV news show "60 Minutes" told the story from Mrs Toguri's point of view. This led to a full pardon for her from President Gerald Ford in 1977. In sharp contrast with Mrs. Toguri's fate, Australian Major Charles Cousens who as prisoner of war had an important role in the organization of "Zero Hour" (the Japanese propaganda program in which Mrs. Toguri made musical announcements) was never prosecuted. He was interrogated

and charged with high treason, but his case was dropped by the attorney-general of New South Wales on November 6, 1946. (NYT Oct 7 1949 p. 1, NYT Sep 27, 2006 online,  
[http://www.earthstation1.com/Tokyo\\_Rose.html](http://www.earthstation1.com/Tokyo_Rose.html))

**Oct 11, 1949:** Japan's Congress of Industrial Organizations admitted today that the present series of strikes, which affected seamen, railwaymen and the press, has been called for a political purpose (NYT p. 9).

**Oct 20, 1949:** The United States has tried and convicted its last Japanese war criminal. Osamu Satano, the last defendant was sentenced today to 5 years at hard labor for having beheaded American airmen on order of his officers. The trial of war crime suspects by other Allied nations will continue in trials to be held outside Japan. (NYT p. 14)

[Two observations can be made:

- War crime trials have been going on in Japan for about 4 years.
- There is a stark contrast for fairly similar charges between the death sentences of 11 February 1948 (see above) and the present sentence.]

**Oct 25, 1949: SCAPIN 2053**

MEMORANDUM FOR: Japanese Government

SUBJECT: Application for permission to manufacture small-sized passenger cars.

The following is the automotive production program for fiscal year 1949.

[A 2-page section follows which lists in great detail all types of trucks and cars (diesel trucks, buses, trucks 1/4 ton, motorcycles, etc.) and the allowed numbers for each type. Authorized numbers are not only given at national level but also for each separate car maker.]

(Source: SCAPIN 1952, p. 487)

[The numbers given in this document are really small: for instance only 5,000 small passenger cars are authorized, 1,500 motorcycles, 4,800 motorscooters.]

**Oct 26, 1949** Kobe. Two colored soldiers asked Mr. Hizuka to give some wheat-gluten for nothing. As he refused they went away but one of them came back after a while and without saying anything hit him on the rear head with an iron rod and hit his wife in her face with the hand. He then opened the closet, took a portable safe containing 2,000 yen and run away. It took 10 days for the wound to heal.

[signed] Hisao Jikihara, chief of Criminal Affairs section, Kobe city.

(NDL, microform CAS(A)-00158)

[In the same file there are many other accounts of robberies by US soldiers.]

**Nov 29, 1949:** A Korean, Bak Sun Yu, was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment at hard labor by the Eighth Army provost court in Yokohama. This case is mentioned in

the “Monthly Occupation Court Statistical Reports” Although these reports give the nature of the offence in most other (less serious) cases, in this case they do not. However the record says that the defendant pleaded “not guilty” on 9 of the 12 charges. (NARA 2)

**Dec 5, 1949:** In the fall of 1949 the Government Section of SCAP requested several amendments to the Broadcasting bill which the Japanese government was reluctant to accept. It made the point that if the Government Section wanted its wishes to be realized, an official SCAP directive [in other words a SCAPIN] should be issued. However, SCAP wanted to avoid taking such a compulsory measure which would make its role in the drafting of the bill too visible. Finally, on 5 December 1949, a private letter requesting the acceptance of the Government Section’s amendments was sent from General MacArthur to Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. The Japanese government regarded this letter as being equivalent to a formal directive and accepted the amendments. (Uchikawa 1964, Luther and Boyd 1997 p. 52)

[It can be noted that no reference is given by Yoshimi Uchikawa in relation to this episode.]

**Dec 9, 1949:** Sekiya Kozo was sentenced to one year confinement at hard labor by a provost court for assaulting Private First Class Edward House.

**Dec 10, 1949: Destruction of Japanese machine tools.** . Altogether 12,062 machines were destroyed including 3,767 lathes, 2,106 presses, 781 drilling machines, 527 boring machines. (History of the non-military activities of the occupation of Japan (55 volumes), Vol 9: Reparations and Property Administration, Reparations Technical Advisory Committee, Memorandum for Information No 10 dated 10 December 1949. Consulted at the Library of Hokkaido University)

[The intention was to destroy the war industry but such destructions went much beyond that objective. They aggravated the shortage of goods and hindered Japan’s economic recovery of Japan.]

**Dec 15, 1949:** Government Ordinance No 389 prohibited the holding of American currency by Japanese people. In the following months many persons were arrested and detained. (NDL, microfiche CAS(A)-13050)

**Dec 29, 1949:** 2 Japanese youths, sentenced to 30 years for complicity in the bayoneting of private Robert Young on 19 December 1945 (see at this date for more detail), will be freed because of their young age. (NYT p. 12)

**Dec 31, 1949:** 88 provost court trials took place during the month of December. Extension of this figure to the whole year suggest an annual number of about 1,000 provost court trials, in considerable reduction since 1946. (NARA 2)

[It is not clear whether this number refers to the whole Eighth Army or only to one Corps.]

**Dec 31, 1949: Screening statistics** From the beginning of the screening to the end of 1949, some 994,600 persons were screened of whom 4,233 were declared unacceptable. In 1949 some 128,000 persons were screened. (NDL, microfiche CIE(C)-4259)

[The proportion of those found unacceptable was small, about 0.4%. One may think that in the screening process it was the threat that it represented which was the most important factor. As a matter of fact, a substantial number of teachers choose to resign before being screened.]

## 1950

**Jan 1, 1950: SCAPIN 2070** Subject: Foreign exchange and foreign trade control [excerpt].

The Japanese Government will obtain approval of GHQ for all changes in the basic rate of exchange as well as for the export or import of gold, silver and other precious metals. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, K.B. Bush, Brigadier General AGD (SCAPINS 1952, p. 496)

[Prior to this rule the exchange rate was decided solely by SCAP; under the new rule the Japanese government will only have to seek the approval of SCAP.]

**Jan 27, 1950: SCAPIN 2076** Subject: Provision of additional dependent housing for occupation forces. [excerpt].

The Japanese Government will take immediate steps to construct 2,000 houses for rental to occupation force personnel. The houses will be constructed at such places as may be instructed by GHQ, Far East Command. Rentals will be paid by occupants in such manner and amounts as may be determined by GHQ. Action to implement this directive is to be taken in accordance with the following schedule: beginning of construction 1 April 1950, completion of construction 1 August 1950. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, K.B. Bush, Brigadier General, USA. (SCAPINS 1952, p. 497)

**Feb 15, 1950: Violences of US Army personnel in Gifu prefecture between 15 Jan and 15 Feb.**

1 15 Jan 21:15 Mr. Ito Matsujiro was beaten by two army personnels while walking in the street with a friend who was able to escape.

2 1 Jan 01:30 Makimo Hachiro Was knocked down by the automobile of an

army personnel and died.

3 17 Jan 21:50 Three army personnels stole a watch in the watch-store of Tajima Keiji.

4 18 Jan 19:30 Four army personnel stole a ring in the shop of Miyagawa Genjiro

5 27 Jan 19:00 Three army personnels robbed 1,000 yen out of the safe of Matsuda Taihi, a cloth dealer.

6 27 Jan 19:30 Two army personnels intruded into the house of Tanaka Tadashi, threatened him with a pistol and robbed 3,000 yen out of his safe.

7 1 Feb 22:40 Eighteen year-old Hasagawa Shin was beaten in the strret by 3 army personnels.

8 2 Feb 22:30 While riding a bicycle, eighteen year-old Kadofuji Hiroshi was beaten by two army personnels.

9 10 Feb Lebis Steeve of the 24th Infantry Regiment stabbed his former lover Mori Tomiko in the abdomen.

10 10 Feb 00:10 Murase Keiichi was assaulted and beaten in the street by 4 army personnels

(NDL, microfiche CAS(A) 13052)

[For the cases which did not involve any robbery one would like to understand the reasons for such beatings. Such reports of robbery and beating are of course not specific to this time interval. For instance between 22 Feb and 4 May there were 14 cases of this kind (CAS(A)-13051).]

**Mar 11, 1950** ● (102,5,7,260) A serviceman, Robert E. Keller, was executed in Yokohama. (Wikipedia article entitled "List of individuals executed by the United States military")

[Keller was executed for murder but we do not know the circumstances of the crime.]

**Apr 20, 1950:** Kobe. A fire broke out in the Oriental Hotel, a US occupation hotel, around 00:35 and destroyed the building completely. Details have already been reported to the authorities by phone. (NDL, microfiche CAS(C)-3885, NYT 22 April 1950)

**Apr 28, 1950:** From: Ministry of Education, Tokyo  
To: General of the Army Douglas MacArthur. [excerpt]

Your Excellency,

Immediately after the termination of the war, the Education Ministry, for the purpose of eliminating all the militaristic color from education, banned judo and certain other sports from school physical education program. We beg your permission to mention here some of the changes which have been made in the present job. [...] We feel that

time has come for inclusion of judo in its present form into school physical education program. We cordially request your consideration about this matter and ask for permission for reinstatement of judo into school physical education program.

Sincerely yours,

Sotaro Takase, Minister of Education.

(<http://ejmas.com>; archival research made by Jason Couch, edited by Joseph Svinth.)

[It can be noted that according to the Minister's letter, the ban was an initiative of the Japanese government. In fact, on 22 October 1945 the Ministry of Education was notified that "all military education and drill will be discontinued". The fact that judo should be included in this category was probably made clear to education officials by SCAP representatives.]

**May 9, 1950:** ● (102,5,7,261) An army court martial has sentenced two American soldiers to 25 years imprisonment for killing a Japanese. The two privates were found guilty of beating a Japanese and robbing him of 3,300 yen i.e. about 10 dollars of 1950 or 66 dollars of 2000 (ST p. 3).

**May 18, 1950:** Students of the Hokkaido University in Sapporo prevented General MacArthur's education adviser, Dr. W.C. Eells, from lecturing by occupying the speaker's platform after an uproar (ST p. 3).

**May 30, 1950:** South Korean police arrested 112 persons including 30 candidates in to-morrow's general election in South Korea after the discovery of a Communist spy-ring. Twelve more candidates were being interrogated (Times p. 4).

[This event is mentioned in relation with the episode of indictments of declared candidates before the election of 1946 and 1947 in Japan.]

**May 31, 1950:** Five American soldiers who were taking pictures and notes during a demonstration were assaulted and injured. Seven people were arrested and tried by a provost court: one was sentenced to 10 year hard labor and the other six to 7 years. The seven defendants who were defended by two American and three Japanese lawyers pleaded not guilty. (NYT p. 6 and 28; Finn (1992); ST May 31 page 3, June 3 p. 3, June 5 p. 3).

[The headline of the New York Times identifies the demonstrators as Communists ("Tokyo Communists stone U.S. men"). Richard B. Finn, a State Department expert on Japan and a diplomat in residence at the American University, notes that this was "one of the very few incidents during the occupation when Americans were physically assaulted". It is true that it is the first clash which got extensive coverage in the American press. It is possible that one of the objectives was to convince the Japanese government and public opinion to accept the decrees outlawing Communists,

a decree which General MacArthur introduced within two weeks after the incident (see below).]

**Jun 6, 1950:** ● (104,5,7,261) The US Army investigates the death of an officer and an enlisted man who were found dead at an air base near Tokyo. The victims were Lieutenant Henry P. Otlowsky and Private John D. Thomson. (NYT p. 10)

**Jun 6, 1950:** Letter of General MacArthur to PM Yoshida.

Dear Mr. Prime Minister,

I direct that your government remove and exclude the following named persons [constituting the full membership of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party] from public service [a list of 23 names follows].

[Signed] Sincerely yours, Douglas MacArthur

(History of the non-military activities of the occupation of Japan, Vol. 11, Political and legal, Part F: Development of political parties. Appendix 9)

[This order was given *before* the beginning of the Korean War. The style of the letter is perhaps even more interesting than its content. It is remarkable that after serving as PM under Gen. MacArthur for several years Shigeru Yoshida remained full of gratitude.

In a similar letter written one day later MacArthur requested the purge of the editorial staff of the “Red Flag” (in Japanese Akahata)]

**Jun 6-8, 1950:** In a letter of 6 June 1950, SCAP directed the Government to remove and exclude from public service 24 persons constituting the full membership of the Central Committee of the Japan Communist Party. This measure comprised the ban of 17 Communist newspapermen from public office, thus extending the ban to a total of 41 leading Japanese Communists. The purge removed from the Diet (Lower House) Katsumi Kikumani, chairman of the Japanese Congress of Industrial Organizations who, only a few hours before MacArthur’s announcement, was appointed one of the Diet’s eight-man Steering Committee. (The World Federation of Trade Unions: Seventh Report (1953), Appendix V; ST June 8, p. 3).

[This measure was part of a broader process called the “Red Purge” which started in 1949 and continued in 1950. In this process, a total of 21,000 alleged communists and sympathisers lost their job; over 1,100 teachers and other government employees were dismissed. As a matter of fact, the “Red Purge” was the repetition of a similar repression of left-wing organizations and unions that took place in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1928 alone about 3,400 people had been arrested and more arrests occurred in the years that followed (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, Braw 1991).]

**Jun 19, 1950:** Students of the Higher Commercial Department of Osaka University struck against the use of part of the University’s buildings by occupation forces (ST

p. 3).

**Jun 24, 1950:** A US military court sentenced four young Japanese leftists to two years at hard labor for having circulated propaganda against General Douglas MacArthur. The four are the first of 42 Japanese to be tried for having distributed an open letter to MacArthur challenging the purge of Communist leaders from public life (NYT p. 4).

**Jun 25, 1950:** Beginning of the Korean War.

**Jun 26, 1950:** General MacArthur ordered the suspension of the Communist party organ Akahata (NARA 4).

**Jun 29, 1950:** Hundreds of anti-occupation leaflets were dropped from the roof of the Tankyn Department store in Osaka by an unknown person (NARA 4)

**Jun 30, 1950:** Two Hiroshima University students were arrested by police on charges of distributing anti-occupation leaflets; they called for immediate conclusion of a peace treaty and early withdrawal of the occupation forces. Several other people were arrested on the following day for the same reason. In addition raids were conducted in 22 universities which lead to the arrest of many Communists or leftists (NARA 4).

**Jul 2, 1950:** The government banned 67 Communist publications (NYT p. 2).

**Jul 1950:** Formation of the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo) which brought together several unions (representing about 3 millions workers) many of whom had ousted their Communist leaders (Cole et al. 1966)

**Jul 3, 1950:** 100,000 workers responded to a general strike call; 5,000 attended a demonstration in Tokyo (in spite of 27,000 police) (NYT p. 1).

**Jul. 11, 1950:** A group of US soldiers attacked several houses in the town of Ogura committing acts of violence and robberies (Haikyo Vol. 9, p. 82 communicated by Eddy Dufourmont).

**Jul. 17, 1950:** The government extended the ban on political mass meetings and demonstrations to all Japan (NYT p. 6).

**Jul 17, 1950:** ● (104,5,8,261) Death of an Australian soldier, Oscar F. Fitch. [The death is reported by the Commonwealth War Graves Commission but what makes this specific fatality of interest is the fact that we have two versions for the circumstances under which it occurred. According to the Australian Army the soldier fell from a 3-meter high wall while trying to leave the camp. According to the testimony of another soldier, Fitch was hit on the head with a beer bottle by an Amer-

ican soldier in a town near Tokyo during a recreation trip (personal communication of April 6, 2006).]

**Jul 24, 1950:** At Kure a member of the Royal Australian Navy declared that he had been stabbed by a Japanese, but investigations found the allegations to be incorrect; the sailor had in fact been injured when he fell on a bottle that he had in his possession. (Summary of incidents, Assistant Provost Marshal, Australian War Memorial archives, AWM52 18/1/10, Jul-Dec 1950)

**Sep 15, 1950:** **SCAPIN-A 7265** Subject: Reinstatement of school judo.

No objection is offered for the reinstatement of Judo in the physical education and sports activities of all educational institutions as defined in the letter from the Minister of Education, dated 12 May 1950, entitled “Request for restoration of school Judo”. (<http://ejmas.com>; archival research made by Jason Couch, edited by Joseph Svinth.)

[It can be noted that the date of the letter cited in the SCAPIN is posterior to the date recorded above.]

**Sep 30, 1950:** In a trial before a provost court Hitoshi Nishidate, chairman of the Hokkaido section of the Communist Party, was found guilty of having violated “Imperial Ordinance No 311” in his speech of 5 July 1950. He was sentenced to 5 years of imprisonment at hard labor and fined 1 million yen. (NDL, microform CAS(D)-00425)

[In 1950 the yen exchange rate was 1 dollar=360 yen, so 1 million yen represented 2,780 dollars of 1950 or 19,000 dollars of 2000. It seems that such a high fine would allow the authorities to keep Nishidate in jail for as long as they wish after the end of his 5-year term.

It can also be noted that “Imperial Ordinance 311” did not allow freedom of speech.]

**Oct 20, 1950:** Asakichi Fukuchi, chairman of the Mori district (Hokkaido prefecture) of the Japanese Communist Party was sentenced to 2 years imprisonment at hard labor (and a fine of 180,000 yen) by a provost court on charges of having distributed leaflets in violation of Imperial Ordinance No 311. (NDL, microform CAS(D)-00425)

**Nov 20, 1950:** **Red purge in private companies.**

Up to 5 November 1950 9,611 employees in 18 main industries have been purged: 2,137 in the electricity sector, 1,922 in coal mines, 990 in the steel and iron industry, 694 in press and radio. (NDL, microfiche CAS(C)-3885)

[This item shows that the Red Purge was not restricted to teachers or government employees but was extended to all sectors. One would suspect that union leaders

were especially targeted.]

**Nov 24, 1950:** The government invoked occupation powers to force reform legislation through parliament which segmented the electricity production industry. From December 1950, a Public Utilities Commission divided the nation into nine regions, each with a privately owned electric power company, to begin operating in May 1951.

(<http://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history/Th-UI/The-Tokyo-Electric-Power-Company.html>)

[The expression “invoked occupation powers” that is used in the source is not clear. Does it mean that this reform was introduced in response to a demand made by the occupation authorities?]

**Nov 30, 1950:** Manslaughter of a Korean civilian at Taegu by a British sentry (Catalog of the Australian National Archives, Series number AWM114, Control symbol 231/5/1)

**Dec 31, 1950:** During the Red Purge which took place in 1949-1950 1950, 47 media companies were disbanded, about 700 journalists were purged from newspapers, news services and broadcasting companies. About 1,100 teachers and government employees were dismissed as well as 11,000 workers in the public sector (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan).

[This purge paralleled the sweeping purge which occurred in American media and education institutions.]

## 1951

**Jan 11, 1951:** Five Japanese Communists were sentenced to death in the Matsukawa incident. That incident occurred on 17 August 1949 when three passengers died in a railway accident that was called a sabotage. After being sentenced the condemned Communists declared: “We have been sentenced to death on a fabricated charge”. (Shanghai News p. 1)

**Mar 13, 1951:** After Ryozo TANEICHI , 22, spoke nasty words to an occupation employed interpreter in front of the railroad station of the village of Mito-gun (Aomori prefecture), an occupation member of the military police tried to take him under custody but seeing him trying to escape he fired three shots with his pistol. Taneichi was injured on the back of his head. (NARA, Record Group 331, SCAP, Civil Intelligence Section, Box 334, Folder: Pistol shooting incidents)

**Apr. 11, 1951:** General MacArthur was replaced by Lieutenant General Ridgway (NYT p. 1).

**Apr. 16, 1951:** The armed forces gave General MacArthur’s departure all the pomp

they could muster. A battery of field pieces fired a 19-gun salute, 18 jet fighters circled overhead and four B-29 superbombers droned in formation across the Haneda airfield. General MacArthur drove to Haneda escorted by a cavalcade of military police motorcyclists. The Japanese authorities also paid the highest possible parting honor to the General. At the airport there were 500 cars and approximately 2,500 invited guests.

The traffic on the road from Tokyo to Haneda was suspended for more than an hour before the General's take off at 7 am. Lining the route there were American troops, the Japanese police and Japanese people. School children were given time off from classes to line the road; public servants in post offices, hospitals or administrations were given the opportunity to attend also. The Tokyo police estimated that 230,000 persons had witnessed MacArthur's departure. It was a quiet crowd however which gave little outward sign of emotion. This should not be solely attributed to the Japanese character for more than one labor parade in the past four years had been noisier by far than the Japanese farewell. (NYT p. 16, an article by Lindesay Parrott)

[What was the dominant feeling of the people who lined up the road? One way to make a reliable assessment is to examine photographs. The "Nippon Times" of 17 April 1951 published one page and a half of pictures (in addition a free special issue was distributed). In line with Parrott's assessment none of these pictures shows an emotional crowd. Many of the pictures are fairly dark and difficult to read. Only one picture shows people waiting along the road but it is taken from behind so that one cannot see the people's faces. There is no overall photograph of the people lining the road so it is difficult to know if the figure of 230,000 persons is real or inflated.]

**Apr 18, 1951:** Allied trials of Japanese war criminals have come to an end with the Australian trial of 9 April. 5,000 were tried, 1,000 were sentenced to death, and 850 have so far been executed (60 in the Philippines and 12 in Australia are yet to be executed).

A total of 2,051 war criminals are now serving their terms, of which 1,333 are at Sugamo prison [near Tokyo] and the remainder in overseas prisons. (Nippon Times 18 April 1951)

**Apr.25, 1951:** ● (111,5,8,261) Seven American soldiers were burned to death in the fire of an interurban train near Sakuragicho (NYT p. 3).

**May 5, 1951:** Annex to **SCAPIN 2151** Subject: Requisitioning of "Japanese Government Corporation for Housing Allied Personal" houses by procurement demand [excerpt].

Effective immediately, all unoccupied "Japanese Government Corporation for Housing Allied Personal" houses will be requisitioned on procurement demand for use

as billets for bachelor officers. No publicity will be given this change to the housing program. [Signed:] By command of Lieutenant General Ridgway, G.R. Connor Colonel AGC (SCAPINS 1952, p. 520)

**May 30, 1951:** Clearance must be granted by occupation headquarters for the entry of all persons in Japan. (NYT 30 May 1951)

[Such a situation would not be surprising if the country had been ruled by a military government as was the case of South Korea between 1945 and 1948. It attests, once again, that the authority of the Japanese government was nothing but a fiction.]

**Jun 21, 1951:** **SCAPIN 2159** Subject: Removal of certain companies from the Schedule of Restricted Concerns. [excerpt].

The following companies are hereby removed from the Schedule of Restricted Concerns [follows a list of about 65 companies]. (SCAPINS 1952, p. 525)

**Jul 30, 1951:** Fukuoka (Kyushu island in the south of Japan). Excerpt of a recollection posted by a American pilot on duty at Kadena Airbase in Okinawa.

“At the end of the day as we waited for a bus, since we could not afford the luxury of a cab to return to the base before curfew, we waited on a corner in front of a four or five story building under repair of WWII bombing damage. As we waited, a brick shattered on the sidewalk right next to us but we passed it off as an accidental dropping by a workman high on the scaffolding until another brick fell nearby! At the crash of a third, we finally spotted the culprit, a Japanese worker who ducked back behind the wall about four floors above.”

The same website displays the following dispatch.

21st Bomber Command Dispatch June 19, 1945. The USAAF's XXI Bomber Command in the Marianas flew four missions, one mining and three incendiary missions against secondary cities, during the night of 19/20 June. Mission number 211: 221 B-29s attack the Fukuoka urban area destroying 3.6 square kilometer”.

Finally, the author of this post mentions that according to the book “Fall of Japan” by William Craig Fukuoka was one of the hotbeds of hatred and vengeance exercised by the Japanese population against occupation forces.

(<http://www.koreanwaronline.com/history/NoSweat/Pages/Itazuke.htm>)

**Aug 30, 1951:** **SCAPIN 2166** Subject: Authority to negotiate and sign financial and trade agreements [excerpt]. The Japanese Government is hereby authorized to enter into negotiations, on its own behalf, with other countries with a view toward concluding financial and trade agreements. [Signed:] For the Supreme Commander, C.C.B. Warden, Colonel AGD. (SCAPINS 1952, p. 527)

**Sep 10, 1951: Request to SCAP concerning the pension of depurged persons.**

To: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

From: Pension Bureau, Prime Minister's Office

Subject: Request concerning right of depurged persons to receive pensions.

Excerpts (simplified)

It is hereby *requested* that the persons who had been removed from public office [i.e. purged] and who had been depurged by the Japanese Government *with SCAP approval* be released from the restrictions imposed upon them in regard to the payment of public or private pensions.

[Signed:] Norio Mitsubashi, Chief of Pension Bureau, Prime Minister's Office, Kazuyuki Kono, Chief of Budget Bureau, Ministry of Finance.

(MOFA, Central Liaison Office p. 432-433. The title of the microfilm is in Japanese; it contains messages sent by Japanese Ministries to SCAP through the Central Liaison Office)

[In short, this message says that after being purged, the persons were deprived not only of their salary but also of their pension even if old enough to qualify. After being depurged with SCAP approval, another request had to be addressed to SCAP through the present letter to allow them to receive their pension income. For those persons it was of course a very important issue.

Actually, the language used in the message is fairly tortous. Instead of using the term "depurged" as in the title, it says that the persons have had their designation as persons falling under Memorandum (b) [i.e. SCAPIN 550 about removal of undesirable personnel from public office] cancelled. "Purged under Scapin 550" would have been quite as precise and much clearer.]

**Sep 10, 1951: Request to SCAP concerning the naturalization of an Okinawa resident.**

To: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Subject: Transmittal of application for change of status.

Excerpts

At the request of Mr. Iga Kintaro and his family who entered from Okinawa into Japan on 31 December 1950 under temporary visitor status for compassionate reasons, transmitted herewith is their application requesting permission for change of status from temporary visitor to permanent residents in Japan.

[Signed:] Eiji Wajisa, Chief of the Bureau of Control, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
Inclosures: Application, Travel permits, Guarantee letter (the inclosures are not in-

cluded in the microfilm)

(MOFA, Central Liaison Office, frames: 432-433. The title of the microfilm is in Japanese; it contains messages sent by Japanese Ministries to SCAP through the Central Liaison Office)

[The present message shows that for each and every individual, permission had to be obtained from SCAP before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs could grant resident status.

In the same source there are numerous similar requests.]

**Sep 10, 1951:** [Application for approval of scrapping Chikubujina Maru.](#) the scrapping of two Japanese ships

To: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Subject: Application for approval to scrap Hatsukari Maru and Niigata Maru.

Transmitted herewith is a letter of the Ministry of Transportation on the subject matter.

[Signed:] T. Sirehata, Chief of Liaison Section, Liaison Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (MOFA, Central Liaison Office, frame 450. The title of the microfilm is in Japanese; it contains messages sent by Japanese Ministries to SCAP through the Central Liaison Office)

**Sep 30, 1951:** During the three months July-September there were 45 cases of assault on Japanese nationals by BCOF servicemen. This is markedly higher than the quarterly average of 1948 (which is 22), and much higher than the averages for 1949 and 1950 (9 and 7 respectively) (Assistant Provost Marshal, Minute Paper, Australian War Memorial archives, AWM52 18/1/10, Jul-Dec 1951)

**Oct 4, 1951:** [Request to SCAP concerning travel outside of Japan.](#)

To: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Subject: Applications for travel outside of Japan as mariners

Transmitted herewith are applications with their supporting documents, each in triplicate, of mariners for approval of the General Headquarters of SCAP.

[Signed:] T. Sirehata, Chief of Liaison Section, Liaison Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (MOFA, Central Liaison Office, frame 667. The title of the microfilm is in Japanese; it contains messages sent by Japanese Ministries to SCAP through the Central Liaison Office)

[In the same source there are numerous similar requests.]

**Oct 4, 1951:** Request to SCAP concerning the scrapping of two Japanese ships

To: General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.

From: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Subject: Application for approval to scrap Hatsukari Maru and Niigata Maru.

Transmitted herewith is a letter of the Ministry of Transportation on the subject matter.

[Signed:] T. Sirehata, Chief of Liaison Section, Liaison Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (MOFA, Central Liaison Office, frame 670. The title of the microfilm is in Japanese; it contains messages sent by Japanese Ministries to SCAP through the Central Liaison Office)

**Nov 9, 1951:** Leftist students demonstrators in Kyoto attacked a US missionary (NYT p. 9).

**Dec 1951:** Between July 1946 and December 1951 the US Department of the Army sent more than 800 films to Japan. In 1948 the "Civil Information and Education Section" had contracted with 4 Japanese film companies for two kinds of operations (i) Production of Japanese versions of American movies. (ii) Production of Japanese movies based on CIE scripts. (Tsuchiya 2002, p. 198)

## 1952

**Jan 1, 1952:** The United Nations Command disclosed that 6,000 Communist prisoners have died in Allied POW camps which represents 5% of the 120,000 POWs. 37,000 to 40,000 missing Red troops were reclassified and dropped from POW rolls after it was established that they were South Koreans in Communist service. (Nippon Times p. 1)

**Feb 23, 1952:** Communists stage nation-wide anti-U.S. riots (NYT p. 2).

**Mar 23, 1952:** ●(40,1,0,216) Four Japanese farmers were killed by a grenade in a drill area near Sendai (NYT p. 5).

**Apr 3, 1952:** The police arrested 23 Communist leaders for anti-occupation activities. (NYT p. 4)

**Apr 7, 1952:** Memorandum for the Chief of the Government Section.

Mr. Koichi Nishikawa, Liaison Officer, Osaka City, requested an opinion to whether a bill making Osaka City a special city would be cleared or disapproved by the headquarters. He pointed out that a similar bill was disapproved approximately 4 years ago. Major Jay advised Mr. Nishikawa that a specific answer would depend upon a

review of the bill in question. (NDL, microfiche number GS(B)-01984)

**Apr 7, 1952:** Memorandum for the Chief of the Government Section.

Subject: Statistical summary of the depurge program.

- Total number under purge restrictions on 1 Jan 1952: 17,977
- Appeals filed as of 5 Apr 1952: 9,757
- Released from purge designation **after SCAP review**: 5,675
- under review by SCAP: 1,019

[Signed] Edgar N. Jay

(NDL microfiche number GS(B)-01984)

**Apr 18, 1952:** In the biggest strike since World War II, one million workers stroke against the anti-subversive bill (NYT Apr. 18 p. 5 and Apr. 19 p. 19).

**Apr 21, 1952:** Ms. T. Uyemura, Japan's most prominent woman leader appealed to Ms. Ridgway to ask the general to bar American servicemen from Japanese brothels and isolate immoral US troops (NYT p. 2).

**Apr 26, 1952:** Letter from Mr. Shigeru Hori, Chief Secretary of the Cabinet to Mr. Frank Rizzo, Chief of the Government Section, GHQ-SCAP.

“Dear Mr. Rizzo, The government has received from Mr. Iwata a report that the committee deems just to release from the purge designation 29 persons whose names are listed in the inclosure. Request is hereby made for approval by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers.” (NDL microfiche number GS(B)-01984) [Is it not surprising that two days before the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty which marked the end of the occupation Japanese officials were still seeking the approval of GHQ-SCAP? As April 26 was a Saturday the reply could hardly come before April 28.]

**Apr 28, 1952:** The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the US-Japan Security Pact came into effect. While this marks formally the end of the occupation era strong links of dependency remain. One can for instance mention the following.

- (i) In subsequent years the Diet issued recurrent pleas to Allied governments for the advance liberation of Japanese incarcerated as a result of war crime trials.
- (ii) Japan owes a substantial debt to the United States a good part of which dates back to the period before the war. There are ongoing discussions on this question which will notably affect Japanese economic growth.
- (iii) In subsequent years private and public land and buildings which have been occupied by American troops will be progressively reverted to their legitimate owners in a process which may be accelerated or slowed down depending on the good will of the American government.
- (iv) In a long term perspective the crucial dependency concerns the defense of the

country. In the same way as the defense of Europe is entrusted to NATO, the defense of Japan is entrusted to the United States. In a broader sense, defense also includes the safety of the supply routes for basic commodities and in particular oil provisioning.

**May 1, 1952:** Three police posts were bombed in Nagano prefecture, two by time bombs exploded at police stations and the third by a fire bottle (Nippon Times p. 5).

**May 2, 1952:** ● (40,1,0,223) On May Day over one million people demonstrated throughout Japan, expressing their opposition to the Peace Treaty and Security Pact which came into effect on April 28 1952. They shouted anti-U.S. and anti-government slogans, over-turned American cars and set them afire. Seven people were killed, 2,000 injured and 1,200 arrested during the demonstration; one thousand additional people were arrested during the following weeks in relation with the riot. Apart from the protest against the peace treaty and the security pact there was also another issue, namely Yoshida's attempt to pass an Anti-subversive Activities Law which the left saw as a threat to its survival. (NYT p. 3, LM May 3, NT May 26, p. 5, Packard 1966)

**May 9, 1952:** Japan received criminal jurisdiction over U.N. military personnel in Japan except those of the United States. Since the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty on April 28, 1952 the Japanese police in Kure has arrested 6 criminal suspects of the British Commonwealth personnel. (NT p. 1)

**May 12, 1952:** A US soldier from Kentucky, Beleva Sheperd, lassoed a Japanese from his bicycle and dragged him 20 meters down a Yokohama street behind an army truck. The cyclist, Yutaka Tomono, sustained bruises and burns as a result of the roping. No charges have yet been filed against Sheperd, a step which must be taken by his battalion commander (NT p. 5).

**May 31, 1952:** Rioting broke out last night in four large Japanese cities (Kobe, Nagoya, Osaka and Tokyo) and smaller communities throughout the country on the anniversary of the attack two years ago on United States soldiers celebrating Memorial Day in the Imperial Palace plaza in Tokyo. Three people were shot dead, 80 were injured (among them are 3 US newspaper men) and 150 were arrested. (NYT p. 1, NT p. 1)

**Jun 25, 1952:** Acid was thrown at a US General. The second anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean war was marked by a revival of incidents in which crowds of Koreans and students demonstrated violently against the war and American policy. Outside Osaka, a crowd of 1,000 people gathered last night, made speeches round camp fires. Early this morning, one group moved in the direction of the U.S. Air

Force base at Itami shouting slogans such as “Stop the air raids in Korea”. They were stopped several miles from Itami by a strong force of armed Japanese police. Brigadier-General Carter Clarke, the American commander in the south west area of Japan was attacked on the road outside Osaka while driving to work. The windows of his car were broken and acid was flung inside burning his face severely. Moreover, the rioters also threw flaming Molotov cocktails on a compound housing American women and children in Osaka (NYT Jun. 25 p. 1, Times Jun. 26 p. 7).

**Jul. 8, 1952:** Nagoya. 17 persons were injured as 1,500 demonstrators clashed with police. Two American-owned automobiles were ruined by gasoline bombs thrown by rioters. The meeting had begun peacefully by talks given by two Japanese legislators who recently returned from a visit to the Soviet Union and Communist China. The meeting was held under the surveillance of 2,000 policemen. After the meeting about 1,500 of the crowd of 5,000 paraded down the streets. A full scale battle ensued when the police closed in on the demonstrators. (NYT p. 8).

**Aug 6, 1952** The Asahi Pictures News published photographs taken in Hiroshima in the days following the atomic bombing. The text mentions that the initial estimate of the death toll was 80,000 but that a subsequent estimate made by the mayor of Hiroshima in August 1949 was 210,000. (Pal 1953)

[As many similar publications including the Japanese translation of the dissentient judgment of Justice Radhabinod Pal in which these photographs are reproduced, the publication of the Asahi Pictures News was made possible by the end of American censorship.]

**Aug 6, 1952:** Britain demanded of Japan today that she hand over two British sailors imprisoned earlier in the day by the Japanese civil court (NYT p. 1).

**Aug 7, 1952:** Stones and “Molotov cocktails” were thrown at US forces in Urawa district (see below mention of the trial at the date of July 19, 1953).

**Aug 11, 1952:** An incident involving British sailors occurred at Sasebo, a port near Nagasaki. Six sailors from HM Newcastle declined to pay after drinking beer in a local beer hall. Japanese police tried to catch them; after a scuffle they too them to the police station. Six days later they were released to the British authorities. In the past few days, two other incidents involving foreign sailors have occurred. American sailors were involved in a brawl with a Japanese taxi driver at Yokosuka. One sailor who pulled out a knife was arrested. He was later handed over to American naval custody. (Times p. 6)

**Aug 28, 1952:** Japan may try 108 U.N. soldiers. The Chief Procurator of Japan indicated that 106 United Nations servicemen, none of them American, may be tried

in Japanese criminal courts unless a UN-Japan agreement is reached providing for their discipline by their own military. Procurator Sato said that charges against them included theft, assault, burglary, rape and arson. (NYT p. 3)

**Oct 27, 1952:** By V-J day the United States had sunk 80% of Japan's merchant fleet. SCAP scuttled any plan to rebuild the fleet: under the surrender terms, Japan could build not ships for herself bigger than 5,000 tons, or faster than eleven knots. All goods imported from the United States had to be carried by U.S. ships. As a result roughly 25 cents out of every rehabilitation dollar the U.S. was sending to Japan was going to U.S. shipowners. But in December 1949 General MacArthur lifted the restrictions and gave Japanese shipbuilders the green light to rebuild their ocean-going fleet. When shipping rates were boosted sky-high in 1950-1951 by the Korean war it was a time of prosperity for Japanese shipping companies such as the "Nippon Yusen Kaisha" (which is one of the largest). (Time Magazine Oct. 27, 1952)

**Nov 23, 1952:** Jurisdiction row sharpens in Japan. Arrest of two Australians heightens the clash with the Allies. (NYT p. 8)

**Dec 1, 1952:** ● (42,1,0,223) A US tanker exploded in Sasebo harbor while loading oil tied to a buoy about 500 meter from the shore. The explosion claimed the life of two sailors (Nippon Times p. 1)

**Dec 1, 1952:** The people's consumption stands at 90% of prewar level (Nippon Times p. 3).

**Dec 4, 1952:** Nearly 50 square kilometer of land (representing the area of a city such as Hiroshima) has been turned back to Japanese owners by US Army forces (Nippon Times p. 2).

**Dec 5, 1952:** The Special Procurement Board, the Finance Ministry and the Foreign Office will work out a plan for payment of compensation for the damage resulting from the normal military and training operations of the foreign garrison forces in Japan. The first liaison conference is expected to be called within this week. The government is contemplating submission of new legislation for compensation to the next diet. Under the existing law only damages caused by illegal actions of the foreign forces can be compensated. (NT p. 3)

**Dec 5, 1952:** During the three months from May to September 1952 there were 1,008 criminal offenses committed by servicemen and civilians belonging to the various foreign forces in Japan. For US forces, the breakdown is as follows: murders: 4, assaults: 113, rapes: 14, robberies: 90, other: 594; for British Commonwealth forces the breakdown is as follows: murders: 0, assaults: 32, rapes: 8, robberies: 11, other: 124. (NT p. 3)

[These monthly rates are roughly of the same order of magnitude as in the years 1946-1948 (see the chapter on quantitative evidence). It can be noted that the article does not give any data for assaults by Japanese people on servicemen although such incidents were not rare as attested by a number of specific episodes: see for instance the dates of July 31, Aug 17, 19 in 1953.]

**Dec 8, 1952:** The Japanese debt to the United States (2200 billions yen) represents about twice the government receipts in 1952. The Japanese government has recently received a proposal from the US government for the holding of talks on the question of the debt; the method of payment may have a serious effect upon future financial and economic conditions in Japan. (NT p. 1)

**Dec. 9, 1952:** In a statement read to the Diet by his lawyer, leftist writer W. Kaji charged that U.S. authorities kidnapped, abused and held him for over a year in an attempt to make him a US spy. (NYT p. 1).

**Dec 10, 1952:** A resolution calling for the release of the war criminals was in passed in Japan during the plenary session of the the House of Representatives (NT p. 3).

**Dec 16, 1952:** 82 North Korean prisoners of war were killed in the suppression of a mutiny in a camp on the island of Pongam (NT p. 1).

[Similar events occurred in several other Allied camps of Korean POW; such events are mentioned here because of their possible influence on the attitude of Japanese people toward Allied troops in Japan.]

**Dec 16, 1952:** Three Commonwealth soldiers charged with assault and robbery were handed over by the Japanese authorities to their respective Australian and British commands (NT p. 3).

**Dec 18, 1952:** The US Board of Clemency and Parole paroled 6 war criminals (NT p. 3).

**Dec 19, 1952:** Assault of an American soldier on a Japanese policeman (NT p. 3).

**Dec 20, 1952:** Three American soldiers were arrested for robbery in a store (NT p. 3).

**Dec 23, 1952:** An American seaman, L.J. Wills, was beaten up in Yokosuka by two Japanese vagrants; they also took his wrist watch (NT p. 3).

**Dec 26, 1952:** Three Australian soldiers have been arrested for an arson attempt against a Japanese hotel (NT p. 3).

**Dec 27, 1952:** The Bacchus night club which caters to US officers was razed by flames which broke out at about 6 pm; two unidentified charred bodies were discov-

ered (NT p. 1).

## 1953

**Jan 3, 1953:** Two US Army soldiers have been sentenced by a general court martial to 3 years imprisonment at hard labor, forfeiture of all pay and dishonorable discharge for assaulting a taxi driver in Kobe last November (NT p. 2).

**Jan 14, 1953:** Under the administrative agreement governing the Japan-US Security Act, Japan is to pay \$153 million for fiscal year 1952. (NT p. 3)

**Jan 15, 1953:** A total of 61 autonomous police stations were incorporated into the National Rural Police as of January 1 because the local towns were unable to bear the expenses of their upkeep; this reduced the number of autonomous police stations in the country to 145 (NT p. 3) [This is a step in the movement which reversed the decentralization reform which was imposed by occupation authorities]

**Jan 19, 1953:** ● (43,1,0,223) The corpse of a US airman was found at Asahikawa, Hokkaido. It is believed he was killed in a plane crash in last December (NT p. 2) [this tiny article gives very few details, the incident is not mentioned in the NYT]

**Feb. 18, 1953:** A bill to be sent to the Diet will merge the present national and municipal police and set up a more centralized police organization. Top police officials oppose revision (NT p. 1)

**Mar 1, 1953:** ● (44,1,0,223) Major Roblin H. Davis of Denver, Colorado was found dead in his billet of a shotgun blast Sunday, February 22. Davis was attached to the Air Force Logistical Force Headquarters at a base near Tokyo (NT p. 3, no mention of this death in the NYT).

**Mar 1, 1953:** The Lower House will shortly start a full dress investigation of the so-called "Missing diamonds case". The gems were sold during the war by the public to the Japanese government to be used for precision diamond tools. Part of them were kept in the Mitsui Shintaku vaults until being requisitioned by the occupation forces in October 1945. Before being handed over the diamonds were put in 9 thermos bottles by officials who claimed they weighted 106,000 carats in all. The American occupation forces gave no receipt when taking over the diamonds. In addition, 250,000 carats were kept at the Bank of Japan and more than 30,000 carats were kept in Osaka. Of the 386,000 carats of requisitioned diamonds, 127,000 were sent to China, England, France, Holland and the Philippines to compensate for seizures by the Japanese Army during the war. After the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty about 161,000 carats were returned to Japan. Thus, the missing diamonds represent

98,000 carats. (NT p. 3)

**Mar 4, 1953:** Two US soldiers have been sentenced to 6 months at hard labor for assaulting a Japanese woman employee of a liquor shop in Chiba prefecture (NT p. 3).

**Mar 9, 1953:** Two US soldiers were arrested for a jewelry store hold up (NT p. 3).

**Mar 18, 1953:** The Japanese government has been notified by the US embassy of the release on parole of 5 war criminals from the Sugamo Detention House (NT p. 1).

**Mar 22, 1953:** A 45-caliber bullet was shot through the window of Economic Councillor Frank Waring at the US embassy while he was at his desk; he was not injured (NT p. 1).

**Mar 24, 1953:** Conflicting views were expressed by the Agriculture Ministry and the Finance Ministry on the date from which payment of compensation should be reckoned for land and installations that are being used by US garrison forces. The former contends that the date should be April 29 1952 (date of the Peace Treaty) while the latter says that the compensation should be calculated following July 21 (i.e. date of Peace Treaty plus 90 days). (NT p. 3)

[The main interest of this article is to attest to the existence of such compensation payments.]

**Apr 6, 1953:** US forces in Japan returned 751 buildings to their owners (NT p. 3)

**Apr 11, 1953:** Two intoxicated American soldiers were arrested by Japanese police around midnight at Shibuya for picking up fights with Japanese and beating up employees of a night club after being refused admission (NT p. 3)

**Apr 17, 1953:** A hand grenade was hurled into a cafe in the city of Kure by three intoxicated Australian soldiers. It exploded but no one was injured. The three soldiers were arrested by Japanese police; two Japanese policemen were clubbed during the scuffle. British Commonwealth military police asked that the servicemen be handed over to them but the request was rejected (NT p. 3).

**Apr 23, 1953:** The Japanese government asked pardons for three A-class war criminals (NT p. 1).

**Apr 28, 1953:** During the 6 months 1 May 1952–31 December 1952, there were 1259 crimes committed by American troops and 240 by Commonwealth troops (NT p. 3).

**Apr 17, 1953:** Three Australian soldiers were arrested by Japanese police at Kure.

They threw a dummy hand grenade into a cafe causing an explosion but no casualties. When police arrived the Australians assaulted them before being arrested. Australian military police asked for the soldiers to be handed over to them but this was refused. (Times p. 7)

**May 8, 1953:** Five C-class war criminals have been paroled by the American government (NT p. 1).

**May 11, 1953:** The Federation of [Japanese] Economic Organizations asked the government to permit the continuous use of the Uchinada coast (Ishikawa prefecture) by the US garrison forces as shooting grounds. The temporary lease contract expired at the end of April and the residents in the area are strongly opposed to its extension. (NT p. 3) [It would be of interest to know what motivated that move]

**May 12, 1953:** Two US airmen confessed night assault and robbery of two Japanese near Musashino. The airmen told police they beat up the Japanese, handcuffed them and threw them out of a car on the highway after a squabble over a transistor. (NT p. 3)

**May 15, 1953:** Manhunt in the Tokyo area for 7 top leaders of the Japanese Communist party long hidden underground (NT p. 1).

**May 25, 1953:** The crown jewels of the former kingdom of the Ryukyu Islands were surrendered to US customs by an American naval officer who had taken them in 1945. It was also discovered that the same naval officer had brought to America a gold-encrusted royal headdress, sections of a gold and jade necklace, 60 lacquered royal memorial tablets, 22 volumes of the only existing copy of a book similar to the book of Genesis (NT p. 1).

**Jun 1, 1953:** Forty followers of Chief Cabinet Secretary Kenji Fukunaga have been arrested after the April 19 general election for money spent illegally in the campaign. One of them, Chozo Kawakami, committed suicide in detention. (NT p. 1)  
[The fact that campaign expenses exceeded allowed quotas was fairly common and rarely prosecuted so sternly.]

**Jun 5, 1953:** The British Embassy announced that 13 war criminals had won commutation of their sentences. There are still 724 sentenced war criminals in Sugamo prison (NT p. 1).

**Jun 12, 1953:** The former Japanese military policemen, the Kempeitai, formed societies in many prefectures with the objective of fighting Communism and campaigning for the release of war criminals (NT p. 3).

**Jun 19, 1953:** 129 American servicemen died in the crash of a C-124 Globemaster

near Tokyo. (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 20, 1953:** An American soldier fired his rifle in the sky to intimidate steel mill workers; this incident occurred after an automobile [the article does not say what kind of automobile] rammed into a 5-man deep strike picket. (NT p. 2)

**Jun 22, 1953:** Crimes by foreign soldiers during past year (May 1952 - April 1953) totaled 3,383. Detailed data were as follows (the figures within parentheses are for the previous year May 1951 - April 1952): murder 6 (8), assault with injury: 421 (333), rape: 43 (103) (NT p. 3).

**Jun 26, 1953:** Two Tokyo based US airmen have been found guilty of assault, battery and larceny against two Japanese. The two men were sentenced to confinement at hard labor for 3 years (NT p. 2).

**Jun 27, 1953:** The Tokyo District Court ruled that the Ernie Pyle Theater [after the name of an American journalist who died in April 1945 in Okinawa] should be returned to its owner, the Toho Company. The theater was allotted to the American forces by a ruling this spring of the Sequestration Committee after the Tokyo Procurement Bureau [whose role it is to fill the needs of the occupation forces] and the Toho Company failed to reach an agreement on its continued lease to American troops. Toho president filed a suit challenging the validity of the committee decision. (NT p. 3)

**Jun 28, 1953:** President Quirino of the Philippines commuted the death sentence of 59 Japanese prisoners to life imprisonment; they will be sent to Sugamo Prison in Japan (NT p. 1)

**Jul 3, 1953:** In the north west suburb of Tokyo Japanese residents drew off survey crews for the third time, thus preventing the extension of the US Tachikawa air base. (NYT p. 2)

**Jul 6, 1953:** In Yamanachi Prefecture, 4 American soldiers were hurt in a fight between some 30 Negro and 20 White servicemen (NT p. 3).

**Jul 8, 1953:** Over the first six months of 1953 the US Forces returned 2,957 buildings and more than 6 square kilometer of land to Japan; this includes property returned by the British Commonwealth force. (NT p. 3)

**Jul 19, 1953:** ●(44,1,0,224) An American lawyer was arrested on the charge of hit-and-run driving which caused the death of a Japanese (NT p. 3).

**Jul 19, 1953:** Sentences ranging from 5 to 29 years imprisonment with hard labor were passed in the Urawa District Court on 9 communists who threw stones and

“Molotov cocktails” at the US forces last year on the night of 7 August 1952 (NT p. 3)

**Jul 23, 1953:** Japan’s Supreme Court belatedly declared unconstitutional the laws providing punishment for persons guilty of criticizing General of the Army Douglas MacArthur’s Allied occupation of Japan. The regulation included Cabinet order 325 formulated on an order from the Occupation authorities in October 1950. (NYT p. 3)

**Jul 25, 1953:** Netherlands is to parole 12 war criminals (NT p. 1).

**Jul 25, 1953:** A valuable sword made some 300 years ago by the famous swordsmith Seki-no-Magoroku was returned to its former owner by Daniel C. Buchanan who came in possession of the sword in 1946 while he was with GHQ in Tokyo (NT p. 3).

**Jul 30, 1953:** A taxi driver was shot and seriously wounded by two passengers both wearing khaki shirts. The men shot him in the stomach and made away with 2,000 yens (NT p. 3).

**Jul 31, 1953:** During a quarrel with a Japanese girl Private Richard Walker of the Tokyo Ordnance Depot was stabbed in the back by a Japanese man who was arrested (NT p. 3).

**Aug 6, 1953:** ●(46,1,0,227) A former GI with the First Cavalry Division in Omiya has signed a statement saying that he killed 3 Japanese people in 1949 (NT p. 2). [Subsequently, the statement was called in doubt by military authorities as being unreliable.]

**Aug 15, 1953:** After a 48-hour strike Japanese workers at hundreds of US Force installations returned to work. The Japanese government is expected to negotiate with American military authorities regarding the unsettled points in the master labor contract (NT p. 1).

**Aug 15, 1953:** The Japanese ambassador in Washington called on Secretary of State Dulles to thank him in behalf of the Japanese people for the announced return by the United States of the Amani Oshima Islands to Japan. These islands belong to Kagoshima prefecture in the south of Japan; two other islands, Okinoerabu and Yoron are also expected to be returned. (NT p. 2)

**Aug 17, 1953:** An American soldier was shot and seriously wounded by a Japanese guard. While patrolling the shooting range of the US Army base at Magame (Shirosato, Yamatake district, Chiba prefecture) late Saturday night, guard Fumio Uchiyama, 36, saw a man carrying a bundle and challenged him. As the man at-

tempted to assault him, the guard fired his revolver and the bullet hit the man's chest (NT p. 3).

**Aug 18, 1953:** Four American soldiers were arrested by Hodogaya police officers in cooperation with the military police on suspicion of having injured 3 Japanese at different places in Yokohama by hurling empty beer bottles and ice blocks out of a vehicle. One of the victims was seriously injured on the head and right ear (NT p. 3).

**Aug 19, 1953:** An American soldier, Alfred Palmer, was cut on the face by a young Japanese man as he was coming out of a restaurant in Tokyo. It is alleged that Palmer and two other US soldiers had taken too much drink and were teasing a waitress of the restaurant (NT p. 3).

**Aug 28, 1953:** Britain and other Commonwealth nations with troops in Japan intend to follow the American example by recognizing limited Japanese criminal jurisdiction over their servicemen. The revision is aimed at giving Japan the same rights as those granted by the United States to NATO countries (NT p. 2).

**Aug 29, 1953:** The Foreign Secretary of the Philippines reminded Japan to pay her war reparations (NT p. 1).

**Aug 30, 1953:** Four Australian soldiers have been arrested on suspicion of having robbed a Japanese driver of his purse containing 4,500 yen near Ebisu Camp (NT p. 3).

**Sep 6, 1953:** US Forces in Yokohama returned to their owners 94 buildings and 0.7 square kilometer of land (NT p. 3).

**Sep 9, 1953:** There are some 700 US military installations in Japan which occupy 0.38 percent of the land area (NT p. 3).

**Oct 1953:** According to attorney Yoshihito Shinohara who represented victims of crimes perpetrated by US service members in Japan, a secret agreement was made in October 1953 about Japanese jurisdiction over US service men. The Justice Ministry apparently told the United States that it would not exercise this jurisdiction unless the cases are of "material importance to Japan". (Japan Times 24 Oct 2008)

[This is only one instance among several secret agreements. In November 2009 the government of Prime Minister Hatoyama recognized that there had been two secrets agreements which authorized the United States to bring nuclear bombs into Japan. The first one was signed in the late 1950s while the second which concerned Okinawa was made shortly before the reversal of Okinawa to Japan.]

**Oct 29, 1953:** Under article 17 of the administrative agreement between the United

States and Japan, crimes by US troops against Japanese persons or property committed during off-duty hours are subject to the jurisdiction of Japanese courts (Packard 1966).

**Nov 22, 1953:** Explosions and fire ripped through an ammunition bunker at a US Army dump in Hokkaido. No one was injured and soldiers of the First Cavalry Division brought the fire under control. (NYT p. 2)

**Dec 31, 1953:** In 1946 the Japanese government began to pay financial compensations to Japanese households who had suffered injuries or deaths as a result of the occupation. Between 1946 and 1951 these indemnities were paid by the Minister of Health; after the Peace Treaty of 1952 they were paid by Special Procurement Board, the Japanese agency which was in charge of provisioning Allied troops with supplies and materials. In the first years few compensations demands were submitted cases but the numbers increased in the 1950s as can be seen from the following figures giving the number of cases for which compensation was paid: 1946: 20, 1947: 324, 1948: 144, 1949: 212, 1950:290, 1951: 275, 1952: 1,145, 1953: 1,915. The progression in 1952-1953 that is to say after the peace treaty was mainly due to lagged compensation for earlier events. Altogether there were about 10,000 payments of which 4,339 were indemnities for deaths and the rest for injuries. (Tsurumi 1961 p. 579)

## 1954

**Mar 1, 1954:** A hydrogen bomb was exploded at Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands. The bomb was located a few meters above the surface of the water. The energy produced was twice as high as predicted. It created a fireball of a diameter of 7 km and a mushroom cloud of a diameter of over 100 km. This white cloud contained thousands of tons of particles of coral made radioactive in the explosion. As a result, a kind of white dust (the average particle size was 0.3mm) rained down over a very large area which included several inhabited islands. However smaller particles remained in the air for much longer with the result that rain with substantial radioactivity was still detected in Japan two months later.

The crew of a tuna fishing boat, "Lucky Dragon 5", which was at the limit of the forbidden area at the moment of the explosion received an amount of radiation estimated at 200 rem (500 is estimated lethal for 50%) The oldest of the crewmembers who was 40 died 6 months later. Moreover, the crews of several hundred other Japanese fishing boats received smaller but nonetheless significant amounts of radiation. In January 1955, Washinton paid \$2 million in "consolation money", about one third



**Fig. 6.x Lucky Dragon route.** The fishing boat came back to Japan on 14 March 1954. *Source: Internet*

of the damage estimate made by the Japanese authorities. (Japan Times 18 March 2012, Mainichi 26 August 2014, Wikipedia article entitled “Castle Bravo”).

[Why did we describe this event?

- The main reason is because it created considerable tension between Japanese citizens and the United States.
- The second reason is because it provides an ideal case-study example of how to implement a news blackout.

Here are two examples. (i) On 12 March 1954 the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) published a press release which was misrepresentation of actual facts. For instance, it stated that there had been no burns [which was no true] and that the populations of the islands who had been evacuated after 1 March were in good shape<sup>52</sup>. (ii) The first New York Times article which mentioned the “Lucky Dragon” fishing boat came out on 12 June 1954.

At that time the Japanese Prime Minister was Mr, Yoshida, a great friend of General MacArthur and the United States. He tried his best to calm the Japanese public and at the same time not to embarrass Washington.

In fact, there were several issues. The first issue concerned the crew of the “Lucky Dragon”. the second the crews of other fishing boats, the third the populations of the

<sup>52</sup>Source: [http://www.dissident-media.org/infonucleaire/essai\\_bravo.html](http://www.dissident-media.org/infonucleaire/essai_bravo.html)

Marshall Islands, the fourth was the question of the contamination of the tuna. Some information was given by Japanese doctors about the crew of the “Lucky Dragon”; yet, even today it is very difficult to find out what was the fate of the 22 crew members apart from the one who died in October 1954.

On the other issues, very little information was released. For the public, the most important issue concerned the contamination of the tuna. This concerned not only the Japanese tuna industry but also the US west-coast tuna industry. As an illustration, in the US it was handled as follows.

Records of the food and Drug Administration show that two radioactive fish were picked up at one cannery. No details other than that the “radioactivity was insignificant” are available, but it is known that secret meetings took place between representatives of the tuna industry, the Food and Drug Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the State Department. An acceptable level of radioactivity was agreed upon at this meeting but the level was classified as “confidential” and not released to the public.

(<http://www1.american.edu/ted/lucky.htm>)

**Apr 18, 1954:** Japan jailed an American. Honolulu man weeped as 12-year term was imposed in murder case (NYT p. 21).

**May 16, 1954:** Japan indicted 2 GIs (NYT p. 17).

**Sep 21, 1954:** A Japanese court jailed an US Marine (NYT p. 12).

**Oct 3, 1954:** ●(46,1,0,228) A US Military Policeman, Charlie J. Jones, shot and killed a Japanese national, Nimoru Kukushima. He was charged with culpable negligence and sentenced to one year at hard labor. (NYT p. 12).

[He was probably tried by an American court-martial. This short article (56 words) gives very few precisions.]

## 1955

**Feb 4, 1955:** During a one-hour meeting between Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama and Nobusuke Kishi the latter warned him in the strongest possible way against continuing to talk so freely about relations with the USSR and Communist China. He urged Hatoyama to leave foreign policy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (NDL, microfilm YD-398, reel 1)

[Hichiro Hatoyama remained Prime Minister from 19 December 1954 to 23 December 1956. He tried to implement a foreign policy that would be more independent of the United States. After a short interlude by Tanzan Ishibashi, Kishi succeeded Hatoyama as Prime Minister. Hatoyama’s grand son, Yukio, became Prime Minis-

ter on 16 December 2009 and, like his grand father, tried to implement a policy of friendship with China, He remained Prime Minister for less than one year.]

**Apr 5, 1955:** Secretary of State Dulles refused to meet Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu. (NYT 5 April 1955)

**Apr 28, 1955:** The Japanese Supreme Court ruled that the press code passed during the Allied occupation violated free-speech provisions of the Japanese constitution and was accordingly void (NYT p. 31).

**Aug 6, 1955:** The Japanese Government has asked its people to understand that the plan for the expansion of certain United States air bases in Japan is essential to the interest of the country. (NYT p. 1)

**Aug 24, 1955:** The residents of Sunakawa, reinforced by Leftist sympathizers from Tokyo, prevented today a Government surveys of scheduled extensions of a big United States Air Force base near by. (NYT p. 2)

**Aug 27, 1955:** The extension of the runway of the Tachikawa air base near Tokyo is violently opposed by local residents whose land would be requisitioned for the project. Premier Ichiro Hatoyama defended today the controversial expansion. (NYT p. 4)

**Sep 14, 1955:** Policemen held off 3,000 protesting villagers and sympathetic unionists today while a Government team surveyed land in Sunakawa village for expansion of the near-by Tachikawa United States Air Base in the north west of Tokyo. (NYT p. 3)

**Oct 9, 1955:** In sprawling Fuchu Prison on the outskirts of Tokyo there are 53 United States servicemen serving sentences of eight months to fifteen years. They get many privileges denied native inmates. (NYT p. 20).

**Nov 6, 1955:** 16 Japanese people are injured in a clash near the US airbase of Tachikawa. (NYT p. 2)

## 1956

**Jul 5, 1956:** An anti-U.S. rally of 10,000 was held in Tokyo on Independence Day (July 4th). (NYT p. 16)

**Aug 1, 1956:** Several thousand Japanese employed at a United States Air Force base at Tachikawa (north west suburb of Tokyo) struck today in protest against the dismissal of 22 union members as security risks. (NYT p. 4)

**Oct 5, 1956:** Tachikawa. Surveyors mapping runways for US jets are attacked by Japanese people. (NYT p. 2)

**Oct 14, 1956:** Under the protection of 2,000 policemen, Japanese surveyors succeeded in marking off partial boundaries today for expansion of the United States Air Force base at Tachikawa in the Tokyo suburbs. 130 Japanese demonstrators were hurt. (NUY p. 24)

**Dec 1, 1956:** From 29 October 1953 when the administrative agreement went into effect (see above at this date) to 1 December 1956, US servicemen have been charged by Japanese police with 12,581 offenses, i.e. about 400 per month. The Japanese waived jurisdiction at US request in all but 396 cases; of these cases 87 resulted in jail sentences (NYT June 16, 1957, cited in Packard 1966).

## 1957

**Feb 23, 1957:** ●(46,1,0,229) Firing range fatality roused Japan. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II has arrived in Tokyo in the midst of a tempest stirred by the accidental killing of a Japanese housewife on an American Army firing range (Christian Science Monitor p. 4)

[The accident occurred on Jan 30, but this is one of the first articles to mention this issue which subsequently became a bone of contention between the US and Japanese governments.]

**Mar 20, 1957:** ●(46,1,0,230) An US Army soldier, Orvis L.C. Boone (24), was sentenced to death by a Japanese court for murder. He and his associate Miss Sasaki (20), were convicted of having murdered a Japanese woman in Sendai on Sep. 1957, of having robbed her and of having burned down her house. Boone had previously been convicted by a U.S. Army court martial of having murdered another soldier and had been sentenced to life imprisonment. Japanese officials said it remains to be decided which sentence would take precedence. (NYT p. 8)

**May 19, 1957:** The Japanese authorities have indicted an American soldier on a charge equivalent to manslaughter in connection with the accidental shooting of a Japanese woman. The incident occurred on a United States Army rifle range near Tokyo last Jan. 30. (NYT p. 15)

**Jun 1957:** *Visit of PM Nobosuke Kishi to the United States.* The following items are comments about the visit made by officials of the US State Department (Confidential US State Department Special files, NDL, 25 microfilms, LOT-2)

- 17 June 1957. Visit of PM Nobusuke Kishi (needs an interpreter). The Jap-

anese delegation comprises Takizo Matsumoto (speaks excellent English), Renzo Sawada (speaks excellent English), Takeo Fukuda (speaks adequate English), Kogoro Uemura (speaks adequate English), Shintaro Abe (needs an interpreter). (reel 7, frame 87)

- The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file.

Title: Agenda for Kishi talks (8 May 1957)

(reel 7, frame 209, RG 59, Box 00013)

- 3 June. Kishi, in common with most politicians, tended to accept the advice given to him by the Foreign Office bureaucrats. He has not the time nor the background experience to study foreign policy problems and reach his own conclusions. (Memorandum of a conversation held on 3 June 1957 between Shinsaku Hogen and a US diplomat, reel 7, frame 213)

- PM Kishi will have a grand total of one hour and a half discussions with the President. In contrast Adenauer will enjoy a week end visit to Gettysburg. (reel 7, frame 259)

- To the Secretary of State. from Mr. Robertson.

A large meeting is scheduled with PM Kishi beginning at 9:00 Thursday (20 June). The discussions will center around problems of security and defense. It has also been agreed to hold a small intimate meeting with Mr. Kishi between 3:00 and 4:00 pm at which *subjects of the greatest delicacy can be discussed safely with candor*. (reel 7, frame 230)

- PM Kishi returned to Tokyo on 1 July. Excerpt of a statement from the Socialist Party on the US-Japan official communique. “Today the most important to us, Japanese, is introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Even though Mr. Kishi had repeatedly asserted that he would oppose such a project, no reference is made to it in the recent communique. This shows that he betrayed the Japanese people”. In fact, shortly after returning to Tokyo, Mr. Kishi denied that introducing nuclear weapons into Japan had been discussed. (reel 7, frame 159 and 227)

**Jun 9, 1957:** According to an article published in the New York Times there were at this time 60,000 US troops in Japan (stationed in 19 bases) and 35,000 US troops in Okinawa (stationed in 3 bases). (NYT Sunday Section E, p. E5)

[These may be low end estimates. A study published by the Heritage Foundation (<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/troopsdb.cfm>) gives a total of 150,000 for Japan including Okinawa that is to say 50% more than the 95,000 indicated in this article. Naturally, there were fluctuations in the presence of ships or US Air Force squadrons but this can not explain such a big difference.]

**Jul 6, 1957:** Girard case decision is called pivotal in U.S.-Japan ties. The constitutionality of the status-of-forces agreements is now challenged before the Supreme

Court. (Christian Science Monitor p. 5)

**Jul 8, 1957:** Protest of 1,000 student leftist demonstrators near the US Airbase of Tachikawa. (NYT p. 13)

**Oct 4, 1957:** Two Japanese farmers accused serviceman William S. Girard of firing at three or four other Japanese shell scavengers on a firing range the day he killed Mrs. Naka Sakai (Christian Science Monitor p. 6 of section Women Today).

**Nov 19, 1957:** Japanese judge suspended penalty in Girard case (Christian Science Monitor p. 16).

## 1958

**Sep 8, 1958:** ●(46,1,0,231) Memories of the bitter Girard case were stirred by the fatal shooting of a young Japanese music student aboard a tram by an American airman (Christian Science Monitor p. 11).

## 1959

**Jan 19, 1959:** Japan holds a US soldier who is accused of having set fire to a Japanese flag aboard a passenger train. The Commander of the US Army in Japan formally apologized. (NYT p. 4)

**Mar 30, 1959:** Government experts are studying the possibly far-reaching effects of a Tokyo District Court decision today declaring that the presence of United States military forces in Japan is unconstitutional. (NYT p. 1)

**Apr 1, 1959:** The Japanese government of Prime minister Kishi does not plan any shift of policy because of the court decision against the presence of US forces. (NYT p.5)

**Nov 28, 1959:** 500 people were hurt in an anti-US riot in Tokyo. More than 20,000 Leftist-led unionists and university students broke through police lines and stormed into the Diet (Parliament) grounds to demand an end of Japan's security alliance with the United States.

## 1960

**May 20, 1960:** In an attempt to prevent the ratification of the security treaty, demonstrators staged a massive sit-down in front of the office belonging to the Speaker of

the Diet. They were forcibly removed by the police. In protest the Socialists boycotted the session at which the treaty was approved. The treaty was passed by default in the upper house on June 19 when it failed to vote on the issue within the required thirty days after approval by the lower house (Sarantakes 1999, Wikipedia)

**April 10, 1960:** A GI is held after a shooting in Japan. (NYT p. 20)

[A very short article of only 59 words)

**April 26, 1960:** Demonstrations against the ratification of the security treaty between Japan and the United States were organized by the People's Council in Tokyo and other cities. On May 1, there were about 600,000 protesters in the streets. (Sarantakes 1999)

**Jun 15, 1960:** In Tokyo a crowd of 70,000 gathered in front of the Diet. During most of the night police and protesters battled one another with clubs and rocks. One female university student was killed, several hundreds were injured on both sides and about 200 protesters were arrested. After this riot Prime Minister Kishi formally requested President Eisenhower to postpone his visit. (Sarantakes 1999)

**Oct 12, 1960:** Inejiro Asanuma, the charismatic president of the socialist party, was stabbed to death by an anti-communist. The 17-year old assassin died three weeks later by hanging himself in a solitary cell at the Juvenile Classification Office in Tokyo (Staff of Mainichi 1975).

**Jul 11, 1963:** Mr. Jumzo Sato, Advisor to the Japanese Artistic Sword Preservation Association visited the Department of State to request assistance in obtaining the return to Japan of 42 Japanese swords designated as National Treasury by the Japanese Government. They were taken to the United States by the American occupation forces. Some of these swords belonged to the Kumano Hatayama shrine. (NDL, microfilm YE-A1, reel 1)

**Jun 1, 1966:** Fifty Socialist legislators marched to the United States Embassy to protest against the visit of the nuclear submarine Snook to the Yokosuka naval base. (NYT p. 6)

**Jan 1968:** Newsreel about students demonstrating against the arrival of the US carrier "Enterprise" in Japan. A surprisingly large number of the demonstrators are girls. The police used powerful water cannons and made many arrests. Some pictures show demonstrators lying on the ground. American flags were burned, handbills were distributed to American crewmen.

Another scene shows Japanese police patrolling with mini tanks and more arrests made during the night.

(Actualités francaises, available at the French National Library, BNF-INA).

**Jan 18, 1968:** Some 800 leftist students of the militant Zengakuren student organization were beaten back by the police when they tried to invade the United States Navy base here. (NYT 18 January 1968)

**Jan 19, 1968:** Sasebo. The nuclear-powered United States aircraft carrier Enterprise arrived for a visit that Japanese leftist students have protested with three days of rioting and bloodshed. Some 160 were injured and 63 were arrested. The crewmen of the “Enterprise” went ashore unmolested. (NYT 19 January 1968)

**Jan 25, 1968:** The clashes at Sasebo worry the Japanese. Many fear trouble ahead on US defense ties. (NYT p. 17)

**Feb 1, 1968:** Premier Sato indicated he would forbid visits by US ships with nuclear weapons. (NYT p. 1)

[As was learned much later (after the opposition party came to power in 2010) this interdiction was never really enforced.]

## Chapter 7

### Chronology, Okinawa, 1945-1972

For Okinawa reliable sources are even more difficult to find than for mainland Japan especially for the period 1945-1954. This point must be kept in mind in the sense that a lack of data concerning specific incidents does not necessarily imply that they didn't exist; they may have occurred but information may have been withheld. The fact that (at the date of writing i.e. 18 May 2007) some information is still classified is illustrated by the description of the following NARA file chosen fairly randomly among many similar ones; it concerns provost court trials held in Okinawa:

ARC Identifier: 1156896 Semi-monthly report of provost court cases. Creator: Department of Defense. Ryukyus Command. (1953–1957)

Restrictions: Restricted. Possibly FOIA (b)(1) National Security [FOI means Freedom of Information request]. Most documents have been declassified, but some are still classified and unavailable for research.

The phrasing explaining the restrictions is a standard formulation which is used in many files. Note that explicit mention of restrained access is not the rule. Often files which are known to exist just cannot be located. As an illustration see the case of the report destined to Chief of Staff D. Eisenhower mentioned above at the date of Oct 26, 1946 or the case of the “G-2 Periodic reports” which are hold by NARA but without being mentioned in the electronic catalog nor on index cards.

### Summary of the invasion

The present study is devoted to the occupation period. However, in the case of Okinawa occupation years can hardly be understood without taking into account the trauma of the invasion. That is why we give a short account of the period between 1 April 1945 and September 1945. Much of this account is based on a Report of the Military Government for April-July 1945 written by US Marines Colonel Charles I. Murray.

The story of the invasion in fact begins on October 10, 1944 when intense bombing reduced most of Naha, the capital city of Okinawa, to smoldering rubble and resulted in widespread destruction all over the island. Some 70,000 people from Naha and

from other areas refugeed to Japan principally to Kagoshima. Later on when pre-invasion bombardment and naval gunfire became intense people from all parts of the island refugeed to the remoter country villages and to the caves in the hills. They traveled mainly by foot or by cart carrying with them as many of their possessions as they could and occupied whatever buildings they found deserted. When American forces swept over the island these people were brought out or gradually drifted out. They were collected by Military Government into detention camps where able-bodied male adults were segregated in stockades. Thus, during April 1945, 126,000 civilians were put into camps located in a dozen restricted areas. The report says that 110,000 additional civilians were relocated in camps during June but it does not give similar figures for the months of May and July which means that we do not know the total number of people which have been relocated in camps. Relocation may have affected a majority of the population. Camp foremen were appointed which were charged with the supervision of such activities as camp sanitation, labor, food rationing and the like.

Once settled into internment camps the peregrinations of the refugees were not at an end, however. As required by the Base Development Plan, civilians were squeezed out of one area after another, the general movement being northward out of the populous southern third of the island into the relatively mountainous and barren Kunigami region. In the summer of 1945, the American military identified 85 % of the island for base and airstrip development (Cernicky 2006, p. 55). As the Base Development Plan was expanded, modified and constantly revised civilians were always on the move. For instance, in late June 1945 the Motobu Peninsula (north east of the island) was cleared of all civilians with the consequence that within 48 hours 23,000 persons were trucked into the Jizuza (also written Ginoza) area which had only the briefest notice to prepare for them. At about the same time the town of Kin (central Okinawa) was cleared and thousands of civilians were moved out on foot to the Jizuza area. During the months of July and August, interminable files of marching civilians crowded the roads going to the north. The net result was that by the end of August 1945, 80 percent of the some 300,000 civilians then reported on the island were settled north of the Ishikawa-Nakadomari highway a zone which prior to the war had accommodated only about 40,000 persons. The so-called route number 6, the Ishikawa-Nakadomari highway, follows a west-east line which divides Okinawa into two parts south of which most US bases are located up to the present day. In September 1945 the food situation became critical particularly because crops were mainly in the south which necessitated long food hauls over extremely bad roads. From 27 September 1945 until 24 October the civilians were put on half rations (about 750 calories a day on average) and even after this restriction was lifted there were difficulties of supply.

During the invasion, according to the report by Colonel Murray, there was considerable illegal confiscation by American troops of items from Japanese soldiers and Okinawans. Orders were issued to have all this turned in, and while some of it was, much of it undoubtedly found its way back to the United States. As a result of this despoliation, Okinawans lost the few items they were able to save from the destruction of their homes. In August 1946 only about 10 percent of the 100,000 homes of the island were left standing. Part of this destruction was the result of a large scale program of razing the villages in the South of the island to make space for the installation of military bases. This operation lasted 6 weeks from mid-July until the end of the war in late August when it was abruptly ended. Subsequently, as some military camps were deactivated, quonset huts (a prefabricated structure of corrugated steel having a semicircular cross section of about 6 meter by 15 meter) became available which were used as administrative buildings, school houses or banks.

It is often claimed that the people of Okinawa committed mass suicide during the invasion. A wave of suicide in the wake of an invasion is a phenomenon which is not uncommon. Such a case has for instance been documented in Austria in 1945 with the number of suicides in 1945 being multiplied by 2.5 with respect to previous years (Suicide 2003). Yet, even with this inflated rate there were only 5,000 suicides in Austria during 1945. In Okinawa, according to some estimates 4,000 civilians committed suicide during the invasion. If correct, such a figure would represent a rate of about 1,000 per 100,000 population, that is to say at least 10 times higher than in Austria but even with such a high estimate suicide would represent less than 3 percent of the 150,000 civilian deaths. Incidentally, it can be mentioned that there is no mention of mass suicide in the Murray report. An official account written in 1946-1947 also notes that “the initial landings brought no instances on Okinawa of mass suicide of civilians as there had been on the Kerama Islands” (Appleman et al. 1948, p. 415).

Apart from hypothetical mass suicide, the previous account highlights a number of other important casualty causes.

- Bombardments before and during the invasion.
- Herding of the population into detention camps with poor sanitation and insufficient food supply.
- Repeated removal, often through long marches, of the population from one camp to another. In a general way, mass movements of undernourished populations always result in substantial fatality levels especially among the weakest i.e. children and elderly. This has been documented for many refugee crises over the past decades.
- For Japanese troops the ratio of those killed (110,000) to those captured (7,400)

was 15:1 (Appleman et al. 1948, p. 489)

The “Cornerstone of Peace” which was erected on Okinawa in 1995 lists the names of 237,095 people both military and civil who died during the battle for Okinawa; it includes the names of the 12,500 Americans soldiers who were killed during the battle.

Conditions did not improve quickly. From the very beginning, through his harsh attitude intended to achieve the occupation objective at the least possible cost, military governor William E. Crist set a bad tone. As a selfish leader and souvenir hunter he did not win little praise from his subordinates (Murray 2006, p. 54). In 1949 the population still lived in “absolute poverty”. As the conditions for the troops did not improve much either, Okinawa became known as “the worst of all duties for American soldiers” (Cernicky 2006 p. 55). Besides of the land taken over for base development, Okinawans were restricted from constructing buildings within a distance of one mile from any military installations (e.g. billeting, housing or offices) comprising more than 100 people (Cernicky 2006 p. 56).

## Trials by military tribunals

Very few sources are accessible to document the occupation of Okinawa during the years 1945-1955. As an illustration of the obstacles to which historians are confronted, one can mention the following failed attempt. Thanks to the search engine of NARA, the National American archives, one can identify a file which bears a fairly promising title namely: “Semi-monthly report of provost court cases” (ARC identifier 1156896) issued by the Ryukyus Command. As noted previously for the case of Japan, knowing the number of provost court trials is a first step which provides at least an inkling of what were the relations between troops and population. Closer examination reveals that this file covers only the period from February to April 1953 which is a first disappointment. A more serious shortcoming appears when one browses through the file: in fact, it contains only the covering letters which served to transmit the semi-monthly reports. Thus, the page dated 20 Feb 1953 reads: “In accordance with verbal request of Chief of Staff, attached hereto is a list of Provost Court cases reviewed during the period 1 February to 15 February 1953” [signed:] For the Deputy Governor, Earl P. Hall, Lieutenant Colonel. The other pages have a similar wording but no lists whatsoever are included in the file. Thus, the only information gained from these records is that in early 1953 there were some (how many, we don’t know) provost court trials every week and that listings describing them have indeed been produced.

There is however an indirect way though which we can to some extent get an idea

of the activity of the military tribunals. After 1950, clemency was granted to some prisoners on special occasions such as the Christmas. The clemency directive gives the name of the prisoner, the date of the trial, the sentence and the reduction granted through the clemency measure. More detailed information is given below in the chronology section. Globally, during each year of the period 1951-1954 there were on average 92 sentences which gave rise to clemency measures. So we can say that there were (at least) 92 trials by military tribunals annually.

From the same source, we learn that in 1948 two Japanese were sentenced to life imprisonment. This number may seem small, but it must of course be considered in proportion to the population which was at that time around 300,000. In Japan over the period 1960-2000 the number of life terms was on average 50 per year for a population of the order of 100 million (Historical Statistics of Japan, available online). The same rate for a population of 300,000 would imply  $50 \times 3.10^5/10^8 = 0.15$  life terms. Thus, the rate of life sentences in 1948 in Okinawa is (at least)  $2/0.15 = 13$  times higher than in Japan.

## Units

In order to find records about Okinawa in US archives one needs the names of the military units which were stationed in Okinawa in the years 1945-1955. That information is not easily available however. In his book on the American occupation of Okinawa, Sarantakes (2000) mentions that “in the early 1950s, the 29th Infantry Regiment was on the island. In the mid-1950s, a reorganization put the IX Corps on the island but it was no more than a paper organization”.

It is also known that during the 1950s the 1045th Observation, Evaluation and Training Group was based in Okinawa. This group conducted intelligence operations in Tibet and trained Tibetans in guerrilla warfare. For these Tibetan operations, there were also four engined C-118 aircraft<sup>53</sup> which were loaded with Communist-bloc weapons and supplies for parachute drop over guerrilla strongholds in Tibet (Haas 1997, p. 140).

On the old telephone directories which are kept at the Okinawa archives, one can identify the following units stationed in Okinawa around July 1952<sup>54</sup>:

- 29th Infantry Regiment
- 5th Explosive Ordnance Disposal Squadron
- 15th Weather Squadron
- 20th Air Force, 6332th and 6351th Air Base Wing,

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<sup>53</sup>These aircraft were operated by Civil Air Transport, a CIA proprietary airline operating throughout Asia.

<sup>54</sup>I am grateful to Mr. Kaz Nakamoto of the Okinawa archives for his help on this matter.

- 19th Bombardment Group; 28th, 30th, 93th Bomb Squadrons; 307th Bombardment Wing; 370th–372 Bomb Squadrons.
- 26th Fighter Squadron
- 40th Military Police (MP) Battalion; 515th MP (CID); 524th MP; 557th MP (stockade); 116th MP Company; 430th Air Police Squadron.
- 65th and 85th Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA) Gun Battalion; 97th AAA Group; 22nd AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion.
- Army Units number 8103d to 8112th.
- 8116th Army Unit (special troops).

This list shows that it was mainly the US Airforce which was present in Okinawa. This remained true in later years, e.g.:

- The 25th Fighter Squadron was based at Yontan Airfield, Okinawa in October 1946 and at Naha Airfield, Okinawa in May 1947.
- The 413 Flight Test Group was also based at Yontan in October 1946.
- The 9th Special Operations Squadron was based at Kadena Airbase, Okinawa in 1947 and 1948.
- The 93 Bomb Squadron and the 19 Air Refueling Group were based at Kadena Airbase in 1950-1953.

Units of the Marine Corps arrived in Okinawa only in the mid-1950s.

## Chronology

### Fatality numbers

Symbols such as ●(11,15) signal incidents marked by fatalities. The figures total the fatalities since the beginning of the occupation for 2 different categories: (11: American troops, 15: Japanese civilians in Okinawa)

Whereas for American troops all fatalities (whether by accidents or any other cause) are taken into account, for Japanese civilians we count only the fatalities which came about as a direct consequence of the occupation. More detailed explanations can be found at the beginning of the chapter which gives the chronology for Japan.

**Oki, April 4, 1945:** Through Proclamation No 1 issued by Admiral Nimitz on April 4, a Navy Military Government was established in Okinawa which means that the Navy took into its hand all the powers which previously had been exercised by the Japanese government. Proclamation No 2 which was issued somewhat later (the exact date is as yet unknown). The text of these proclamations can be found in “Laws and regulations” (1983). Proclamations No 2 provided a penal code which would be enforced by military tribunals. The following section provides some excerpts of this

proclamation. It may be noted that this code is almost identical <sup>55</sup> to the code issued at the beginning of the occupation of Italy by General Alexander (Proclamation No 2 of 25 August 1943) or to the code issued at the beginning of the occupation of Germany (Ordinance No 1 of the Military Government, issued on 11 September 1944, cf Nobleman 1950, p. 47-48, 209-234)

In order to make provision for the safety of the armed forces under my command and for the maintenance of public order, I C.W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral, United States Navy, proclaim as follows.

Article I: Offenses which may be punished by death.

Any person who:

1. Bears arms against the forces of the United States of America or its Allies;
  2. Kills or assaults with intent to kill any member of the armed forces;
  6. Sends to any person anywhere any communication giving any information whatever concerning the armed forces of the United States;
  9. Assists or conceals any prisoner of war;
  10. Wilfully misleads members of the armed forces in the performance of their duty;
  11. Has in his possession any weapons, ammunition, explosives, or similar war material after the time fixed by public notice for its surrender;
  12. Incites any inhabitant of the occupied territory to insurrection against military authority or organizes any public demonstration or assembly for that purpose;
  16. Interferes with transportation by road, path, sea or air, or destroys or damages any facility of transportation;
  17. Interferes with communication or destroys or damage any facility of communication;
  18. Interferes with the operation of any public services or utility including water supply, electric light and power, sanitation; or destroys any facility of such services;
- shall, upon conviction by an Exceptional Military Court, be liable to punishment by death, or by imprisonment or by any such other punishment as the Court may determine.

Article II: Offenses which may be punished by fine or imprisonment

Any person who: 23. Displays the flag of the Japanese Empire or sings or plays its national anthem; 25. Utters any speech or word detrimental or disrespectful to the Military Government or the Government of the United States; 39. Leaves

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<sup>55</sup>For instance all these codes have about 45 articles divided into three chapters: capital offenses punishable by death, offenses punishable by imprisonment, conspiracies; the formulation of many of the articles is identical word for word.

the island on which he maintains his customary residence without a permit from the Military Government; shall, upon conviction by an Exceptional Military Court be liable to punishment by fine or imprisonment or both or by any other punishment that the Court may determine.

#### Article III: Other offenses

42. Anyone who conspires to do any act constituting an offense under this proclamation shall be punishable as if he had committed the offense. [Thus, this penal code punished intentions of committing an offense in same way as the acts themselves. From a legal point of view the problem with intentions is that they are difficult to prove or to disprove.]

**Oki, 1945:** A Marine unit on Okinawa heard voices coming from a cave and ordered those inside to come out. When they didn't flamethrowers moved in and killed them all. Only then did they discover that the victims were 85 schoolgirls who had been mobilized as nurses and had fled to the cave to hide [this episode is mentioned by Manchester (1980, p. 439) and cited by Dower (1986, p. 63); as no date is given it is not clear if it happened during or after the battle for Okinawa]

**Oki, Jul 15, 1945:** About one month after the end of the battle for Okinawa, three Marines disappeared. A year later, on 15 July 1946, as there was still no trace of them, they were declared missing in action. The mystery of their disappearance was solved more than fifty years later. In 1998, acting on a tip, the police of Okinawa discovered what proved to be the bones of the three Marines (the identification was based on dental records). A New York Times journalist, Calvin Sims, who was able to get testimonies from Okinawan people reconstructed the story of the three missing Marines as follows. After the battle for Okinawa three armed Marines came several times to Katsuyama, a remote mountain village where the remains were found. Women from the village were carried off to the hills and raped. One day, the villagers with the help of two armed Japanese soldiers who were hiding in the mountains, shot and killed the Marines. Afraid that if the Americans found out what happened there would be retaliation, the villagers dumped the bodies in a hillside cave and decided to keep it a secret. (NYT 27 April 2000, NYT 1 June 2000 p. 12)

**Comment:** In this chronology, with the exception of the above episode, we made the decision to omit the question of rapes. There are three reasons for that.

(i) This facet has to some extent been documented by other authors e.g. Takemae (2002) or Tanaka (2002). More recently, Terese Svoboda (2009) discussed this question from a broader perspective. With uncommon lucidity, she managed to identify the factors which contribute to keep relevant data out of the reach of researchers up to the present day.

- (ii) It is well known that even in modern societies in time of peace rapes are notably under-reported. Needless to say, this is even more true in occupied Japan and makes therefore any data that may be available fairly unreliable.
- (iii) Although rapes are more gruesome and criminal than the recourse to prostitution there is nevertheless a connection between the two. The two issues must therefore be analyzed together. Unfortunately, reliable quantitative evidence about the scale of prostitution is difficult to find. Probably all armies have had recourse to prostitution but the magnitude of the phenomenon cannot be assessed easily.

In short, rape rates do not tell us much about the relations between an occupation army and the population. Moreover there is a great uncertainty regarding the number of racially mixed children. This count includes both rapes and normal sexual relations. In February 1953 (that is to say after the Peace Treaty came in force) the Japanese Division of Health and Welfare Statistics cited a figure of around 3,500. However, Miki Sawada who in 1948 established an orphanage for racially mixed children believed that there were up to 200,000 children fathered by American servicemen alone (Gerster 2008). One may wonder on what kind of data this second figure was based, Robin Gerster who reproduces this statement does not provide any indication in this respect.

A document published in 2002 by the “Okinawa Women against Military Violence” records the following numbers of documented cases of rape in the 8 years between 1945 and 1952: 23, 41, 37, 17, 18, 15, 10, 6. As already pointed out these figures may be underestimates but it is likely that the downward trend is of significance. This trend continued in the following years: in the 5-year interval 1990-1994 the average yearly number of rapes was 2.2. At this time there were about 50,000 US troops and family members in Okinawa. In the United States in 1995 the average annual rape rate was 37 per 100,000 population (Statistical Abstract of the United States 2006, p. 194). In other words, the rate for American troops in Okinawa was about 8 times smaller than in the US population. Probably, the decrease in the course of time has much to do with the fact that American bases became more self-sufficient in terms of recreation facilities such as bars, sport installations, movie theaters and so on, a process which diminished the frequency of the contacts with the Okinawan population. A similar process occurred for American bases in Germany which eventually reduced contacts with native people “to the vanishing point” (New York Times 9 Sep 1956, Magazine section p. SM8).

**Ok, Aug 15, 1945:** ● (6,0) 6 enlisted men were killed and 23 injured in an unexplained explosion at a Navy station on Okinawa on last Friday (i.e. on August 10). (NYT p. 15)

**Oki, Aug 20, 1945:** ●(7,0) In Okinawa an American officer was killed by two shots from Japanese rifles as he searched a cave today for enemy souvenirs. Troops with him tossed a hand grenade into the Japanese hide-out, then fired shots into the cave. When they entered however they found that the Japanese had escaped through a rear exit. (NYT p. 2)

**Oki, Oct 20, 1945:** ●(50,0) There were 43 US fatalities (and 30 missing) after a typhoon hit Okinawa. Most of the victims were on board of vessels; 8 have been sunk. (NYT p. 6) [The loss in vessels during this typhoon convinced the US Navy that Okinawa did not offer safe harbors. About half a year later, the Navy ceded the command in Okinawa to the US Army, see below the date of 1 July 1946.]

**Oki, 1946:** In a memorandum addressed by Colonel F. Wisner, Director of the Government Branch of Military Government, to General William E. Crist Commanding Military Government operations, it is stated that “we must hold their wants [i.e. the wants of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus] down and may not supply their needs above minimum humanitarian levels”. This was in reply to a proposition made in order to develop handicraft based on a exchange economy. In contrast, Wisner states that the first goal of the economy should be to support the military occupation [in terms of agricultural production probably] and that importation of civilian supplies should be kept to a minimum. (OPA 2)

[Brigadier General Crist was in charge of Military Government during the battle of Okinawa. He was demoted to the rank of colonel in 1946 (reason unknown) but regained his rank in 1951. He retired in 1954. The above memorandum is not dated, but as it addressed to General Crist it must have been written in 1945 or in 1946 before Crist was demoted.]

**Oki, Jan 8, 1946:** Directive of the US Naval Military Government [excerpt] Subject: Civilian police system.

Article 3: The Provost Marshal is authorized to appoint and remove the members of the Police Department.

Article 7: The Provost Marshal will ensure that the Civilian Police cooperate to the fullest practical extent in facilitating the duties of the Military Government. (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4)

[These articles state clearly that the Civilian Police is under the orders of the military, a feature which is of course not surprising for an area controlled by a Military Government.]

**Oki, Jun 11, 1946:** Directive No 17 of the Naval MG. Subject: Change in basic ration for civilians.

Owing to the extreme shortage of food on the Ryukyu Islands south of 30 degrees or

north latitude, the basic ration is reduced by half until further notice. This means that the maximum rations per person per day is 765 calories for non-workers and 1147 calories for workers. (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4)

[These figures are starvation rations which would have led to many deaths had they been in force for some time; fortunately, this directive was rescinded on June 25. One may wonder then what brought about Directive No 17, may be it was an episode similar to the one mentioned below in August 1948.]

**Oki, Jul 1, 1946:** The command in Okinawa was transferred from the Navy to the Army. Colonel William H. Craig will succeed to Colonel Charles I. Murray of the Marine Corps. This transfer initiated a series of events that ended Murray's career. Army inspectors discovered that half the food rations for the consumption of Okinawans were spoiled. As a consequence, Okinawans were placed on half-rations. A subsequent investigation held Murray responsible. In a letter of reprimand the Commander of the Pacific Fleet wrote: "You are hereby reprimanded for the negligent performance of duty outlined above. (Sarantakes 2000, p. 30-35)

[One wonders how these supply became spoiled; Sarantakes does not give the passage of the letter which outlines the problem.]

**Oki, Fall of 1946:** US Navy MG Proclamation No 3 [excerpt]

Subject: Exceptional military courts.

- Summary Provost Courts: consists of one officer. Can impose punishment for less than one year of imprisonment.
- Superior Provost Courts: consists of one (or more) officer. Can impose punishment for less than 10 years of imprisonment.
- Military Commissions: consists in no less than 3 officers. Can impose all punishments including the death penalty. (Laws and regulations, Vol. 1)

**Oki, Fall of 1946:** US Navy MG Proclamation No 4. All yen currency issued by my occupying force [i.e. B-yens printed in the US] is hereby made legal tender in the Islands of Mansei Shoto [this is another name for the Ryukyo islands]. No person shall refuse to accept such legal tender for the payment of any account. All these yen and all regular yens as well as Bank of Taiwan notes and Bank of Chose notes shall be equivalent and exchangeable one for one. (Laws and regulations, Vol. 1) [This proclamation parallels the currency system set up in Japan. The exact date of the proclamation is not given in the source.]

**Oki, Fall of 1946:** US Navy MG Proclamation No 8 [excerpt]

- Publication of newspapers is prohibited without permit.
- Importation and exportation of printed matter is prohibited.
- Meetings and assemblies are prohibited whether indoors or outdoors. (Laws

and regulations, Vol. 1)

**Oki, Nov 12, 1946:** NAKAMURA Yukishije (29 year old) was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment at hard labor (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

[The “Laws and regulations” source reproduces a number of clemency directives through which sentences were reduced. These directives which begin to be issued in 1950 also give the dates of the initial sentences, therefore indirectly providing some information about the activity of the military tribunals. All information about sentences cited below was obtained in this way.]

**Oki, Jun 17, 1947:** A Japanese civilian was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment at hard labor (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

**Oki, May 22, 1947:** Excerpt of a letter about raids by the Military Police, addressed by Paul Skuse, a naval officer to Brigadier General F.L. Haydn, Military Commander of Okinawa.

“To conduct mass raids of native villages and to confiscate all [American] properties regardless of how they were acquired is an abuse of police powers that is characteristic of the NKVD [Russian security police] Kempei-tai [Japanese security police until 1945] and other feared organizations of fascist and Communist states”. (Sarantakes 2000, p. 38)

[Most Okinawan possessions including clothing came from the Americans. Thus, these raids which intended to confiscate allegedly stolen US property were in fact a means of harassing the population. Sarantakes signals that these raids continued (at least) until 1952.]

**Oki, Sep 20, 1947:** GHQ-SCAP, Memorandum for General Mac Arthur [excerpt]. Mr. Hidenari Terasaki, an adviser to the Emperor, conveyed to me the Emperor’s ideas concerning the future of Okinawa. Mr. Terasaki stated that the Emperor hopes that the United States will continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus. The Emperor feels that United States military occupation of Okinawa should be based upon the fiction of a long-term lease or 25 to 50 years or more. As to the procedure, Mr. Terasaki felt that the acquisition of “military base rights” of Okinawa should be by bilateral treaty rather than form part of the Allied peace treaty with Japan. The latter method, according to Mr. Terasaki, would savor too much of a dictated peace and might in the future endanger the sympathetic understanding of the Japanese people. [Signed:] W.J. Sebald (Enclosure to Dispatch No 1293, The contemporary Okinawa website, <http://www.niraikanai.wvma.net/pages/archive>)

**Oki, Nov 23, 1947:** A Japanese civilian was sentenced to 12 years of imprisonment at hard labor by a Military Commission (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

**Oki, Jan 1, 1948:** A Japanese civilian was sentenced to 11 years of imprisonment at hard labor by a Military Commission (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

**Oki, Jan 31, 1948:** Between February 1947 and January 1948 the annual death rate in the Northern Ryukyu Islands (population of 220,000, located between Okinawa and mainland Japan) was on average about three times higher than in Okinawa (population of 545,000): 0.17% as compared to 0.05%. (Report of Military Government activities)

**Oki, Apr 6, 1948:** A Japanese civilian, OSHIRO Yoshio (28 year old), was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor by a Military Commission. (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

**Oki, Aug 31, 1948:** The “Summation of US Army Military Government Activities” (see below Reference section) have been published every two months until the end of August 1948. The account which they give is wanting in many respects but one may expect that it is mostly by omission and that the data which are being provided are correct. In order to illustrate the omissions one can observe that the third summation mentions 5 murders in January 1947: two men killed in drunken brawls, another killed by rifle shots fired into his house and two Okinawa women killed; no dates nor details are given for these incidents. The table documenting the number of arrests by causes does not include murder (they may be included in “Other causes”). There is no mention of the sentences inflicted by military commissions.

In order to establish a comparison with figures for Japan one can mention the following monthly figures which are averages over the period November 1946 to July 1948.

(i) There were of the order of 600 arrests.

(ii) There were of the order of 70 monthly trials of Okinawans by Superior Provost Courts and about as many by Summary Provost courts.

(iii) There were of the order of 10 fires which resulted in an average loss of 100,000 yens.

(iv) An average of 5 Okinawans were killed each month as a result of traffic accidents. In order to put this figure into perspective one should recall that according to the summation for July-August 1948 there were only about 400 motor vehicles (280 trucks and 90 Jeeps) in Okinawa.

**Oki, Jun 30, 1948:** During the period of May to June 1948, 112 cases were tried in the Superior Provost courts in Okinawa. [The document does not give the sentences]. This corresponds to a rate of 55 per month. (Report of Military Government activities)

**Oki, Jul 31, 1948:** An average of 780 people were arrested monthly in Okinawa over the 12 months between August 1947 and July 1948. This corresponds to an average rate of 65 per month. (Report of Military Government activities 2000)

**Oki, Aug, 1948:** The Military Government asked villages and towns to provide a certain number of laborers to work on Naha harbor. Due to low wages few people volunteered. The Military Government closed the stores and warehouses as punishment until labor was provided as requested. (Yoshida 2001, p. 30)

**Oki, Aug. 7, 1948:** ●(50,106) Ammunition exploded while being loaded on landing craft on the island of Ie (off the west coast of Okinawa); the blast killed 63 Okinawans. Subsequently, the number of fatalities was increased to 106. The U.S. Forces paid 7,000 B-yens (roughly 58 dollars) for the death of each of the 11 Okinawan laborers employed by the military unit stationed on the island but nothing for the other fatalities. (NYT Aug 7 p. 16; LM Aug. 8 p. 1; NYT Aug 9 p. 8; Yoshida 2001 p. 100)

**Oki, Oct 16, 1948:** A Japanese civilian, UEHARA Kici (26 years old), was sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor by a Military Commission. Another Japanese civilian was sentenced to 17 years of imprisonment at hard labor. (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

**Oki, Dec 31, 1948:** By the end of 1948, Kamejiro Senaga was listed on the “Automatic Arrest List”.

**Oki, Mar 1949:** Major General L.A. Craig, inspector general of the US Army toured Okinawa and noted that: “Troops training, living conditions and recreational facilities are far below accepted Army standards”. (Sarantakes 2000)

[It should be kept in mind that the main part of the occupation troops were Air Force troops not Army Troops.]

**Oki, April 1949:** The Okinawa Advisory Council resigned in mass, an action advocated by Kamejiro Senaga when the Military Government disapproved a petition for direct election of a Governor. (OPA 1)

**Oki, Oct 1949:** Kamejiro Senaga spoke against the establishment of a pleasure resort or entertainment district (OPA 1).

**Oki, Dec 31, 1949:** In 1949 (at least) 15 civilians were sentenced to imprisonment terms comprised between 5 and 10 years (more precisely  $5 \geq \text{term} < 10$ ) and (at least) 17 to terms comprised between 1 and 5 years (more precisely  $1 \geq \text{term} < 5$ ) (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

[These estimates are based on clemency directives; not all prisoners may have bene-

fited from clemency, hence the “at least” qualification.]

**Oki, May 1950:** The US Army played a large role in establishing the University of the Ryukyus which opened in May 1950 with a faculty of 28. Its first president was Shikiya Koshin, the first civilian governor installed by the occupation forces. This university had a rapid development: its enrollment was multiplied by 6 within 20 years. (Sarantakes 2000)

**Oki, Dec 31, 1950:** In 1950 (at least) 7 civilians were sentenced to imprisonment terms comprised between 5 and 10 years (more precisely  $5 \geq \text{term} < 10$ ) and (at least) 30 to terms comprised between 1 and 5 years (more precisely  $1 \geq \text{term} < 5$ ) (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

[These estimates are based on clemency directives; not all prisoners may have benefited from clemency, hence the “at least” qualification.]

**Oki, Apr 3, 1951:** A Japanese civilian, KANESHIRO Eibun (28 years old), was sentenced to 15 years imprisonment at hard labor by a Military Commission. (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

**Oki, Aug 1951:** 72% of the electorate signed petitions for Okinawa’s return to Japan which, it was hoped, would influence US and Japanese representatives at the San Francisco Peace Conference. Unfortunately, this was not the case. (Aldous 2003)

**Oki, Oct 20, 1951:** ●(50,112) A fuel tank was dropped on a private house from a US Airforce fighter in Naha. It burned the house and killed 6 people. Military authorities failed to offer any compensation. (Website of the Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles, Yoshida 2001, p. 100)

**Oki, Dec 31, 1951:** In 1951, (at least) 22 civilians were sentenced to imprisonment terms comprised between 5 and 10 years (more precisely  $5 \geq \text{term} < 10$ ) and (at least) 155 to terms comprised between 1 and 5 years (more precisely  $1 \geq \text{term} < 5$ ) (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

[These estimates are based on clemency directives; not all prisoners may have benefited from clemency, hence the “at least” qualification.]

**Oki, Dec 31, 1951:** During the six years from 1946 to 1951 there were (at least) 10 sentences to terms of more than 10 years. As one knows, such sentences can only be inflicted by Military Commissions. Thus we know that there were (at least) about 2 trials by Military Commissions per year.

**Oki, Apr 20, 1952:** ●(50,257) The government of the Ryukyus listed 315 Okinawans killed prior to 28 April 1952 as a result of the occupation. This number includes 145 killed in traffic accidents which represents an annual rate of 20 per

100,000 population. As a matter of comparison this is approximately the same rate as in the United States in 1950 but in Okinawa the number of cars relative to the population was much smaller. (Yoshida 2001, p. 98) [The 145 killed in traffic accidents were added in the counter of Japanese fatalities (second figure within parenthesis) because they have not been counted so far. It also would be interesting to know the causes of death of the other  $315 - 145 = 270$  victims.]

**Oki, Jun 30, 1952:** Kamejiro Senaga directed the strike of 250 Ryukyuan employees of the Japan Road Construction Company and took an active part in a labor dispute at the Matsumura Construction Company. (OPA 1)

**Oki, 31 Dec, 1952:** Throughout 1952, Kamejiro Senaga was instrumental in fomenting labor unrest and anti-American feeling; for instance he declared:

- That he was delighted by the fact that the workers who have been suppressed for the past seven years have united and arisen,
- That due to rapes there are more than 2,000 half-breeds in the Ryukyu Islands. (OPA 1)

**Oki, Dec 31, 1952:** In 1952 there have been (at least) 7 civilians sentenced to imprisonment terms comprised between 5 and 10 years (more precisely  $5 \geq \text{term} < 10$ ) and (at least) 81 to terms comprised between 1 and 5 years (more precisely  $1 \geq \text{term} < 5$ ) (Laws and regulations, Vol. 4).

[These estimates are based on clemency directives; not all prisoners may have benefited from clemency, hence the “at least” qualification.]

**Oki, Jan 1953:** USCAR announced the deferral of direct public elections of Okinawan governors indefinitely (Tanji 2003, p. 116).

**Oki, Mar 1953:** From March 1953 to July 1955 the land areas in the Okinawa villages of Aja, Gushi, Isahama, Maja and Mekaruru were forcibly cleared and those who resisted were arrested (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan 1983).

[These expulsion procedures brought about tense relations between the population and the American military]

**Oki, Apr 1953:** In the April election Tengan Choko, a member of the Socialist Masses Party and vocal opponent of American policies won a seat on the (consultative) legislature of Okinawa. However he was removed from office by a directive of USCAR and replaced by a member of the liberal party (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan 1983, Tanji 2003, Yoshida 2001, p. 59)

**Oki, April 3, 1953:** Following Ordinance 109 issued by USCAR, the US military conducted land expropriation on Okinawa for the purpose of extending existing bases. In the villages of Mawashi and Oruku armed soldiers and bulldozers flattened

houses and crops. This came as a second blow after the suffering and destruction caused by the invasion in 1945. (Tanji 2003, p. 118-121)

**Oki, Aug 18, 1953:** Ordinance 116 prohibited employees paid by U.S. government funds from participating in any strike. The same ordinance also made strikes illegal in public utilities and transportation and (like the Taft-Hartley law in the United States) required pledges by union leaders to the effect that they had no sympathy for communists.

**Oki, Dec 1953:** After having spent 6 months in Japan where he tirelessly campaigned for funds to rebuild the schools of Okinawa, Chobyō Yara chairman of the Reversion Association, returned to Okinawa. Labeled a Communist by the military government he had his passport withdrawn and banks refused to lend him money (Aldous 2003). In November 1968 Yara became the first elected Chief Executive of the government of the Ryukyu Islands (Time Magazine Nov. 22, 1968)

**Oki, Dec 31, 1953:** During 1953, Kamejiro Senaga continued to criticize the Occupation forces. He declared that since the end of the war, American Military and Civilian personnel have committed 1,800 acts of murder, robbery, arson and other similar acts against the inhabitants of the Ryukyus. (OPA 1)

[It is not known on which source the figure is based but a comparison with mainland Japan would suggest that it is probably a conservative estimate.]

**Oki, Mar 1954:** USCAR announced that it would acquire clear title to the lands by making lump-sum payments to the owners. The payment would be equal to the total rental payments for a period of 16.5 years, the rental having been calculated at 6% of the land value. On 30 April the legislature passed an unanimous resolution opposing the lump-sum payments as well as further land acquisitions and requesting just indemnities for damages done to landowners' properties. Subsequently, these demands became known as the Four Demands. (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan 1983)

**Oki, Aug 27, 1954:** In Okinawa 44 members of the People's party were arrested on the charge that they had harbored a member who had been deported previously to Japan (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan 1983).

**Oki, Sep 27, 1954:** Yoshiki Hatake, recently sentenced to 1 year in prison for violating a deportation order was placed on stand as witness in the perjury trial of Hajime Uehara. Hatake refused to answer questions and received additional 3 months in prison for contempt in court. (OPA 1)

**Oki, Sep 27, 1954:** There are nightly rallies at present time in protest of the trials of Matayoshi, Uehara and Hatake; there was a large attendance at most rallies. (OPA

1)

**Oki, Oct 6, 1954:** Headquarters of US Army, Far East, Office of the Adjutant General, Radio Division, 8 Oct. [excerpt].

Okinawa Civil Police apprehended Senaga Kamejiro, Secretary-General of the Okinawa People's Party (OPP) and member of the GRI [Government of the Ryukyu Islands] Legislature on 6 October at his home in Naha and is presently held at Naha district police station jail. Shortly after Senaga's arrest Naha police arrested 19 Okinawans for putting up posters branding Senaga's arrest as illegal and calling upon Okinawan people to congregate at the police station. Following this series of arrests the Civil Police raided OPP headquarters and arrested Owan Kisaburo, member of the Secretariat of OPP and member of GRI legislature. Owan was charged with supervising the writing and distribution of the posters in violation of the law prohibiting printing and publication without a license. Further arrests are expected. (OPA 1)

[This note shows that the "Okinawa Civil Police" in fact enforced the regulations set by the military; this is of course a general rule in countries under military occupation.]

**Oki, Oct 12, 1954:** Kamejiro Senaga, a leftist and anti-US activist of Okinawa was arrested and charged for his part in a case concerning Japanese hidden on the island after being served with a deportation order. Subsequently, he would be sentenced to a term of two years in prison. (NYT p. 7, Times Dec. 29, 1956 p. 5)

**Oki, Oct 12, 1954:** Another leftist leader, Kisaburo Owan, was arrested along with 26 members of his party on charges of printing and circulating inflammatory literature (NYT p. 7)

**Oki, Oct 18, 1954:** Headquarters of US Army, Far East, Office of the Adjutant General, Radio Division, 18 Oct. [excerpt].

Senaga Kamejiro currently on trial has contacted Japan Liberal Lawyers Group requesting lawyers be provided for his defense. Public Safety Officer of USCAR request these lawyers to be denied entry [to Okinawa] to defend Senaga. Request RYCOM G2 to be informed to any projected travel. (OPA 1)

[This note shows that in Okinawa mail was still controlled by military authorities in 1954. This had also been the case in mainland Japan in earlier years but was of course no longer practised in 1954].

**Oki, Oct 21, 1954:** Headquarters of US Army, Far East, Office of the Adjutant General, Radio Division, 22 Oct. [excerpt].

Senaga Kamejiro, leader of Communism in Ryukyo Islands was found guilty and sentenced to 2 years at hard labor by USCAR Superior Court on the following charges: (i) Aiding and abetting a fugitive (ii) Perjury (iii) Two counts of subor-

nation of perjury.

Mathayoshi Ichiro, leading functionary in Senaga's Okinawa People's Party was also found guilty of charge (i) and sentenced to 1 year at hard labor. (OPA 1)

**Oki, Jan 13, 1955:** The Asahi Shimbun newspaper published a full-page report on the land issue in Okinawa and the tactics that had been used by USCAR (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan).

**Oki, Mar 11, 1955:** In Ie Jima, an island off the coast of Okinawa, inhabitants of the village of Maja were ordered to evacuate to make place for a missile practice range (Tanji 2003, p. 123-124).

**Oki, Apr 15, 1955:** Report of Investigation Subject: Senaga, Kamejiro [excerpt, this report provides a short biography of Kamejiro Senaga.].

Subject was born in Okinawa on 16 June 1907 and received his education both in Okinawa and Japan. Prior to World War II, he was employed as a newspaper reporter and served a prison term in Japan for being involved in the Japan Communist Party. At the end of World War II, the subject was listed by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police on a Prefectural Government Blacklist (dated 29 April 1945) as a class B Communist. On 20 July 1947, the Okinawa People's Party was formed. In March 1950, subject publicly expressed sympathy with Communist China and the so-called "blood brothers" of Japan. In a letter to an officer of the Military Government [Captain Haughton, Public Information Officer] he claimed that all his efforts were toward the improvement of living conditions on Okinawa.

**Oki, Jun 15, 1955:** Thirty two Iejima islanders (off the coast of Okinawa) were sentenced to 3 months imprisonment (Aldous 2003).

**Oki, Sep 4, 1955:** ●(50,258) Yumiko-chan, a six-year old girl was found dead in a bush in Kadena town (Okinawa) near the US Air Force Base. The murderer was sentenced to death by a US court martial but the sentence was mitigated to life imprisonment and the prisoner returned to the US. (Tanji 2003, p. 149)

**Oki, Apr 11, 1956:** Kamejiro Senaga was cheered as he got out of prison at the end of his two-year jail term. He is the founder of the leftist Okinawa People's Party. In spite of being branded a Communist by American military authorities he has always denied being a Communist. (NYT p. 10, Times Dec 29 1956, p. 5)

**Oki, May 13, 1956:** There are 59 sentry dogs on American bases in Okinawa. Through a six-week training during which they were subjected to systematic annoyance, they were converted into man-hating furies. No human but the handlers can come near the beasts. (NYT p. 28)

**Oki, Jun 1956:** A subcommittee of the US House of Representatives headed by Congressman Melvin Price released a report (subsequently known as the Price Report) which recommended that the four demands should not be granted. There was an unanimous public outcry. USCAR threatened to cut off financial aid to the University of Ryukyu and to place the towns near military bases off-limits to all servicemen. This measure affected Okinawan business and dwarfed the opposition. (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan 1983)

**Oki, Jun 20, 1956:** As protest against the Price report mass rallies were held throughout the island with a reported turnout of about 250,000 people or roughly 25% of the population of Okinawa. (Yoshida 2001, p. 72)

**Oki, July 1956:** During 1955 American divisions were moved from Japan to Okinawa which resulted in the occupation of more agricultural land. The Price Report released in June 1956 set the lump-sum compensation to be received by the land owners. In July demonstrations against the conclusions of the Price Report drew 15% of the population of Okinawa into the streets. The protesters were strongly opposed to the lump-sum payment procedure. Other rallies were held across Japan (Sarantakes website)

**Oki, Aug 12, 1956:** US military commanders on Okinawa have placed a large area of the south-central part of the island off-limits to service personnel. The order regarding the heavily populated area, results from the large increase, this week in anti-United States agitation on Okinawa. (NYT p. 12)

[It can be noted that according to the index of the NYT there have been no articles in previous weeks documenting this agitation.]

**Oki, Aug 18, 1956:** Ryukyu University (which was founded by Americans after the war) has expelled 6 students on charges of instigating anti-American activities. The action followed withdrawal of private American support to the University after a series of anti-American demonstrations. The University is the only institution of higher learning in the Ryukyu Islands. (NYT p. 12)

**Oki, Sep 7, 1956:** ●(61,258) 11 Marines were drowned swimming off Okinawa. A company of men engaged in a field exercise went swimming during a rest period. Before they were waist deep they were knocked off their feet by an undercurrent which was not visible at the surface. Eleven of them were swept to sea and lost. (NYT p. 5) [In Okinawa in September the water is warm enough to permit a swimmer to survive for several hours; it is difficult to understand why the swimmers were not rescued.]

**Oki, Dec 27, 1956:** Kamejiro Senaga who recently completed a two-year prison

sentence [see above Oct 12, 1954 and Apr 11, 1956] was elected mayor of Naha, the capital city of Okinawa. He demanded the immediate return of Okinawa to Japan, the ending of American land requisitioning for military purposes and the abolition of American control on trade and finance. After his election the American military authorities have decided to suspend payments to the city by the Ryukyu Bank which is under US control and to freeze deposits. (NYT p. 1, Times Dec 29 p. 5)

**Oki, Jan 6, 1957:** The United States Army announced that it would sharply reduce its acquisition of land on Okinawa, this fortress island in the western Pacific (NYT p. 11)

**Oki, Jun 3, 1957:** Through Executive Order 10713 President Eisenhower appointed Major General James Moore as High Commissioner of the Ryukyus. This order begins by saying that “the United States is exercising all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory including territorial waters, and inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands”. It empowers the military government to veto any bill, annul any law and remove any public official from office. The (so-called) Chief Executive is a Ryukyuan appointed by the High Commissioner. (Tanji 2003, p. 116, Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan)

**Oki, Jun 18, 1957:** The municipal council of Naha (Okinawa) passed a vote of no confidence in the mayor, Mr Senaga (by 24 to 6). Consequently, the mayor dissolved the council and called for new elections. (NYT p. 7, Times Nov 26, 1956)

**Oki, Aug 6, 1957:** In the election Mr Senaga doubled his support which gives him enough seats to bar his ouster (which requires a two-third majority vote) (NYT p. 4, Times Nov 26, 1957)

**Oki, Nov 24, 1957:** Until the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972 the island was ruled by the United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyuan Islands (USCAR), a branch of the US Military Government. USCAR had the power to abolish or overturn all the decisions made by the elected legislature of Okinawa. An illustration was provided on November 24, 1957 when Lt-General J.E. Moore, the High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands (to which Okinawa belongs) changed the regulations of the municipal government so that it became possible to remove the mayor by a simple (instead of two-thirds) majority vote in city council. (Sarantakes website)

**Oki, Nov 26, 1957:** The new regulation enabled the city council of Naha to remove Senaga as mayor on November 25 on a 16-10 vote. New elections are set for January 12, 1958. (Times p. 8, Sarantakes website)

**Oki, Jan 13, 1958:** In a vote which dealt the US Army a blow, a left-wing mayor was elected in Naha. In fact both candidates were demanding the end of American

military rule in Okinawa. It was the most outspoken candidate, Saichi Kaneshi, who was elected by a small margin. Subsequently, however, he parted with his supporters and chose to compromise with USCAR. (NYT p. 1, Times Jan 14, 1958 p. 6, Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan 1983)

**Oki, Jan 18, 1958:** Okinawa's most vocal pro-American newspaper, "Okinawa Shimbun", was seized by a private bank because of financial difficulties. It owed more than 700,000 dollars to Naha banks including the US controlled Bank of the Ryukyus. It is the second pro-American paper to close in 3 years. The closing leaves the editorially independent "Okinawa Times" and "Ryukyu Shimpt" as the only Okinawan dailies. (NYT p. 6)

**Oki, Feb 4, 1958:** Leftists won 7 new seats in Okinawa Council. (NYT p. 14)

**Oki, Apr 21, 1958:** Saichi Kaneshi, leftist mayor of Naha was indicted on charges of violating election regulations because he used an official automobile for campaigns aimed at electing candidates of his party. If recognized guilty, he may be sentenced to three years in prison. (NYT p. 3)

**Oki, Nov 3, 1958:** A settlement was concluded between the US government and the Okinawa landowners through which the lump-sum method of payment was abandoned and replaced by periodic payments; in return the landowners accepted further land occupation. (Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan 1983)

**Oki, Jun 30, 1959:** ●(61,275) Around 10:30 am and American jet fighter crashed into the Miyamori elementary school at Ishikawa City (Okinawa) and went up in flames. Seventeen people including 11 children were killed, and 210 people including 156 children were injured. The pilot was able to eject before the crash. (Tanji 2003, p. 152)

**Oki, Dec 29, 1959:** ●(61,276) Brigadier General John Ondrick expressed profound regret over the fatal shooting of a 35-year old Okinawan woman by an American sergeant who was hunting for boar. The sergeant said he had mistaken the woman for an animal (NYT Dec 29 p. 2, NYT Dec 30 p. 4).

**Oki, Feb 22, 1960:** ●(64,276) Three Marines were killed in Okinawa when their truck slid off a road and ran down an embankment (NYT p. 7).

**Oki, Feb 22, 1960:** Excerpts from an article in Time Magazine.

Okinawa's Kadena Airbase was last week proving that life in a remote US military outpost facing Red China can indeed be beautiful. Each evening busloads of pretty Okinawan hostesses pull up before the Kadena's Airmen's Club and gaily chattering girls, each of whom has passed a physical exam, hurry inside to dance with GIs.

Airmen are not allowed to board the buses that take the girls home at 11 pm (2 am on Saturdays). [However, there is an] annex known as the Key Club: "It's for couples only, a place where they can hold hands". (Time Magazine, 22 February 1960). [Major General Dale O. Smith, the commander of the Kadena Airbase at that time, explains that this article raised a national scandal in the United States which cost him his third star (see the article "How to get promoted" in "Airpower Journal" of Spring 1990, available online).]

**Oki, Jun 10, 1960:** In protest against the pending visit of President Eisenhower demonstrators stopped the car of White House Press Secretary James Hagerty on the road between Haneda airport and Tokyo. Chanting in English "Go Home Hagerty" and "Go Home Yankee" the demonstrators smashed the windows of the car and rocked it. Hagerty was delivered by police about 15 minutes later and flown by an helicopter to the U.S. Embassy. (Sarantakes 1999)

**Oki, Jun 19, 1960:** President Eisenhower appearing glum and dejected emerged from the office of the Chief Executive Seisa Ota. Outside, hundreds snake-dancing Okinawans were shouting "Yankee go home". A line of Ryukyu police held back the crowd. Combat ready US Marines stood between the police and the Capitol bayonets fixed. Fifteen minutes earlier the president had entered Naha and waved to a crowd estimated at 200,000 Ryukyuns and American personnel. In the two blocks before the Capitol red flags and anti-American slogans became more frequent. There were shouts of "No U2 [a spy plane flying at high altitude] on Okinawa", "Ike return to the motherland". Concerned with the President's safety, officials took him to Naha Air Base, three miles away by a back road so that he would not have to pass by the shouting crowds. The road was full of holes so that the motorcade had to proceed slowly. (NYT p. 23)

**Oki, Fe 10, 1964:** Racial violence broke out on Okinawa in the so-called Koza district (near Kadena Air Base) as 50 Negro GI's stormed a police post to protest the arrest of a Negro serviceman by a white military policeman. Rocks were thrown and the police fired shots to disperse the crowd. No injuries were reported. (NYT p. 10)

**Oki, Mar 29, 1964:** There are 50,000 occupation troops in Okinawa plus 35,000 American dependents.

**Oki, Mar 31, 1964:** ●(65,276) A 20-year Marine was found beaten to death on a basket ball court in Naha near his barracks (NYT p. 9)

**Oki, Aug 17, 1964:** ●(66,276) A US Marine was killed and another was injured in a fight with 4 Okinawans near Camp Sukivan (NYT p. 2).

**Oki, Oct 31, 1964:** Rioters on Okinawa prevented the nomination of a pro-US

leader, Mr. Seiho Matsuoka an US educated businessman. Yesterday, 1,500 demonstrators picketed the Legislature; today there were 5,000 demonstrators and at 6 pm the Legislature announced that the nomination of Mr. Seiho Matsuoka had not taken place. Three persons were injured in the fighting and taken to the hospital.

**Oki, Aug 20, 1965:** A crowd of demonstrators barred Prime Minister Sato from his hotel. At his request the police waited until the crowd of 7,000 had dwindled to 1,000. Finally, they charged into the crowd with clubs flailing. At least 18 demonstrators, handcuffed and bloody, were arrested. (NYT p. 4)

**Oki, Dec 3, 1965:** Five, including three university students, were indicted for their role in the rioting that marred the visit of Prime Minister Sato on August 19-20. (NYT p. 20)

**Oki, Feb 25, 1967:** 15,000 teachers, union members and students battled policemen in a demonstration against proposed legislation that would bar teachers from politics. At least 30 policemen were injured. (NYT p. 8)

**Oki, Nov 19, 1968:** A B-52 bomber loaded with bombs on its way to North Vietnam crashed right after taking off the Kadena Base; the incident gave rise to a large campaign to demand the withdrawal of B-52 bombers from Okinawa. Many unions decided to organize a general strike; however, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohio) got split over the issue and the strike in February 1969 was hardly a success. (US military bases in Japan p. 9;

[http://www.jca.apc.org/wsf\\_support/2004doc/WSFJapUSBBaseRepoFinalAll.html](http://www.jca.apc.org/wsf_support/2004doc/WSFJapUSBBaseRepoFinalAll.html))

**Oki, Nov 22, 1968:** Last week, Okinawans voted in the first popular election of a chief executive permitted by the U.S. command since World War II. The winner was Chobyō Yara, 65, a onetime high school physics teacher who campaigned on the simple platform of “fukki”, meaning literally “return again,” or reunion with Japan at once. His conservative opponent, Junji Nishime, called for “ittaika”, literally “making one body,” or reunion with Japan in a more gradual fashion Yara’s election offers no immediate threat to the U.S. presence for the islands’ legislature is still dominated by conservative Liberal-Democrats. (Time Magazine Nov. 22, 1968).

**Oki, Feb 5, 1969:** Okinawans protested against the use of Okinawa-based B-52s over North Vietnam. Despite the forebodings of American, Japanese and Okinawan authorities, a massive demonstration in driving rain in front of the huge American airfield ended without a threatened invasion of the base by extremist students. (NYT p. 1)

**Oki, Jun 5, 1969:** Several demonstrators including a legislator had been injured when US soldiers pushed back strikers at the entrance of a military base. Japanese

workers at US bases began a 24-hour strike for higher wages and retraction of mass-dismissal notice. (NYT p. 53)

**Oki, Jun 6, 1969:** Ten demonstrators were hurt as Okinawan strikers scuffled with US troops. At one point military policemen with fixed bayonets moved forward to push back demonstrators (NYT p. 7).

**Oki, Jun 17, 1969:** Demonstrators tried to storm the US Army headquarters and clashed with 900 riot policemen. At least 12 were hurt. (NYT p. 11)

**Oki, Dec 21, 1970:** ●(66,277) After the acquittal by a military court of a serviceman who had killed an Okinawan pedestrian in a traffic accident an angry crowd overturned and burned more than 80 American vehicles with yellow license plates. Moreover a group of demonstrators managed to penetrate into Kadena Air Base and set fire to American school buildings. (NYT p. 3; Yoshida 2001, p. 156)

**Oki, Nov 15, 1971:** Fifty demonstrators were hurt in protests against plans for a continued American military presence on Okinawa after the island's reversion next year; 50 people were hurt and 317 were arrested. (NYT p. 10)

# Chapter 8

## Quantitative evidence

### Offenses by/against occupation forces

As early as September 1945 the Japanese government began sending to SCAP observations about the misconduct of occupation forces. The reply of GHQ came in the form of SCAPIN 91 of Oct 3, 1945, by which the Japanese government was asked to provide precise information (date, time, location, offenders) about all cases of misconduct. Thereafter, the information collected by the Ministry of Home Affairs was sent to the Civil Intelligence Section in the forms of tables written in Japanese which were translated by SCAP translators. In the fall of 1946 these data were summarized in the form of maps and graphs such as those represented in Fig. 8.1a,c. The number of offenses by/against occupation forces are roughly divided by two between September 1945 and October 1946; during this time interval the number of Allied troops was also roughly divided by two which means that the offenses per soldier remained more or less constant.

Other summations may have been issued in later years but so far we were not able to locate them at NARA. Simultaneously, data about misbehavior of American troops were collected by the Military Police and transmitted to the Provost Marshal section. It is of interest to observe that the orders of magnitude of the two series are roughly the same; for instance for the 9-month period from August 1946 to April 1947 the monthly average of the number of offenses against Japanese was 511 according to the Provost Marshal source and 582 according to the Japanese police (NARA 5).

The total number of offenses is of interest because it gives a global measure of the frictions between troops and population but it is even more revealing to know the types of offenses. Fortunately, the tables of offenses against Japanese people provide a classification into different categories of offenses. There are two broad categories: (i) injuries and other physical offenses (ii) offenses against property. On average the first category represents about 40% of the total number of cases. The category of physical offenses is further divided into several subclasses: murder, injury, rape, etc. Murder represent about 1% of the cases, whereas cases with injuries represent 10%.




Fig. 8.1 a Offenses by the occupation forces against the Japanese. Source: NARA 6

The number of rapes is small (about 10 by month) but it is well known that rapes are largely under-reported. In the category of offenses against property, the robberies are by far the most common representing about 30% of all cases. A more detailed table is available for the first months of the occupation which gives the items that have been stolen. Thus, in the month of September 1945, according to official sources, about 40 swords, 110 motor cars or bicycles, 130 watches, 40 pieces of clothing were stolen; moreover there were 270 cases of robbed money. The figures for October and November are somewhat similar.

Average number of cases for the period from September 1945 to October 1946 are summarized in the following table.

**Offenses by occupation troops against Japanese, monthly average, Sep 1945–Oct 1946**

	All monthly cases	Murder	Injury	Robbery
Numbers	450	4	58	150
Percentage	100%	1%	13%	30%


Note: These data refer only to damages through misconduct of occupation troops. Other sources of damages for Japanese people were shootings by sentries (about 3 fatalities per month) and traffic accidents (about 50 fatalities per month, in this respect see the chronology at the date of 1 September 1947).

Source: NARA 6.


Unfortunately we do not have a similar subdivision into detailed categories for the offenses against occupation troops. There is only a broad distinction between offenses against persons (murder, assault, battery) and offenses against Allied property (theft, destruction). These data are summarized in Fig 8.1b.

One would expect that at least some of the Japanese people who were charged with murder or assault were tried by military commissions. It would be odd to have thousands of Japanese charged with fairly light offenses tried in provost courts, and those charged with serious crimes tried by Japanese courts. As the total number of murders, assaults and so on is of the order of 500, one would therefore expect trials by military commissions (for crimes against occupation forces not for war crimes) also to number in the hundreds. Whenever they become available, the records of such trials will provide a good source of information. Until then, in order to get a more detailed view of such incidents, one can rely on the cases described in the chronology, particularly for the months between April and October 1946 for which the G-2 Periodic Reports could be consulted.

For BCOF troops a distinct set of data is available which is summarized in Fig 8.2 a,b. The main distinctive feature of these data is that they cover the broader time period 1946-1951. These data were produced by BCOF authorities and distributed to various BCOF units as well as to Eighth Army Headquarters. With respect to the



**Fig. 8.1 b Offenses by Japanese against occupation forces.** The scale on the left-hand side is for the solid line curves (offenses against persons) whereas the one on the right-hand side is for the broken line curves (all offenses). As the data were recorded by the Japanese police and released by the Ministry of Home Affairs, they may be incomplete in several respects. For instance, in cases of fires in barracks the investigations were conducted by Allied intelligence sections and the conclusions (whether the fire was accidental or due to arson) were not released. For the same reason, sabotage actions against Allied installations were not investigated by the Japanese police and are therefore not included in the present data. Most offenses were directed against Allied property; it can be noted that whereas the rate of the offenses against property decreased in the course of time, the rate of offenses against persons was multiplied approximately by a factor of 5 between mid-1946 and mid-1949. From the data given below in Fig. 8.2a for the BCOF one is inclined to think that this increase continued after 1949 during the years marked by the Korean War. On average for BCOF troops the rate for offenses against persons is about twice as high than it is for American troops: 1.6 per month and 10,000 troops against 0.8. At this point it is difficult to say if this is due to different recording procedures or if it represents a genuine difference. Note that the two thick curves were smoothed by a 3-year moving average. *Source: NARA*



**CIC SABOTAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES**  
SEP. 1945 to MAY 1946

**Fig. 8.1 c Sabotages (upper curve) and subversive actions in Japan, September 1945 to May 1946.** While a ten-fold increase is recorded in sabotage actions, there was rather a decrease in subversive actions. It would be of interest through some examples to understand what the CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) calls sabotage or subversive actions. One would also like to know similar data for subsequent months and years. *Source: NDL: History Intelligence Activities under General Mac Arthur 1942-1950, 12 reels, ISG-1, reel 12.*






Fig. 8.1 c Offenses by Japanese against the occupation forces. Source: NARA 6



**Fig. 8.2 a Offenses by Japanese against BCOF personnel.** Burglaries and robberies were due to the great scarcity that existed in Japan in the first post-war years. The main interest of this curve is to provide a consistency check of the curve for the number of assaults of Japanese on BCOF personnel. *Source: Carter (2002, p. 309, thesis submitted to the Australian Defence Academy at the University of New South Wales.*

data produced by the Japanese police or by the American Military Police, they show a good deal of under-reporting. For instance, if we consider the month of November 1946 the Japanese police reported 107 offenses by BCOF troops against Japanese people whereas BCOF headquarters recorded only 70 cases. The simplest explanation is to assume that the under-reporting is due to different criteria for the definition of offenses; under such an assumption the under-reporting will be fairly constant in the course of time which means that the evolution displayed in the graphics is nevertheless meaningful.

The increase that occurs after 1950, that is to say after the beginning of the Korean War, is seen in all four curves. One can think of two explanations: (i) During the Korean War Japan served as recreation ground for Allied troops fighting in Korea. Each unit would benefit from a stay of several weeks in Japan before returning to Korea. Unfortunately such movements are not well documented which means that we do not know the average number of Allied troops present in Japan in the years



**Fig. 8.2 b Offenses committed by BCOF troops against Japanese people.** These numbers are based on BCOF statistics. The ratio of the number of assaults of BCOF personnel on Japanese to the number of assaults of Japanese on BCOF forces is  $522/42 = 12.4$ . *Source: Carter (2002, p. 287, 289, thesis submitted to the Australian Defence Academy at the University of New South Wales.*

1950-1953. The additional troops present in Japan may have led to an increase in the total number of crimes but not necessarily to an increase in the *rate* of crimes. (ii) Troops coming from a war theater may have had a more belligerent attitude than the troops who occupied Japan between 1946 and 1949. In this case one would indeed expect an increase in the rate of crimes as shown in Fig. 8.2a,b.

## Fatality rate among BCOF troops

For BCOF forces it is possible to know the number of troops who died during their time of service in Japan. This is due to the fact that most BCOF soldiers who died in Japan were buried at the Yokohama War Cemetery<sup>56</sup>. On the contrary, the caskets

<sup>56</sup>Except for an undetermined number whose remains were buried in their home country. For instance, this was the case of personnel who became seriously ill or were wounded in Japan, were transported to Australia or New Zealand by ship or aircraft and died either on the journey or in the weeks after repatriation. For Australian personnel this number was of the order of 60. I am grateful for this information to Mr. Ron Orwin, secretary of the Executive Council of Australia,

of American troops who died in Japan were shipped back either to the Philippines, to Hawaii or to cemeteries in the continental part of the United States. The National Personnel Records Center - Military Personnel Records (NPRC - MPR), located in the St. Louis suburb of Overland, Missouri holds military records of deceased military but these archives are not accessible to historians. These are some of the reasons which explain that we do not know the number of American servicemen who died in Japan during the occupation.

The number of troop fatalities is an important variable for the historian because it is largely independent of the censorship policy which was enforced during and after the occupation. However, it must be interpreted with care because it comprises all causes of death. In order to assess how peaceful an occupation really was a simple criterion is to compare the death rate of the troops to the standard military death rate in peace time. Naturally, such a comparison only makes sense if the number of death due to illness is consistent with a “normal” death rate. The occurrence of an epidemic such as the influenza in 1918 would invalidate such a comparison. Similarly, in tropical countries death rates can be inflated due to specific tropical illnesses. During the occupation of Japan no major epidemic occurred among occupation troops. The typhus epidemic mentioned in the chronology remained confined to the population. The annual numbers of fatalities are represented in Fig. 8.3a


For the purpose of establishing comparisons it is best to express fatality numbers in normalized form. The number of deaths per month and per 10,000 troops is a convenient normalized variable<sup>57</sup>. For the sake of brevity we will refer to it as the normalized fatality rate (NFR). What is the range of variation of this rate? This is a question which one needs to address because in any army there are fatalities due to illness or accidents. According to British defense statistics (National Statistics of the United Kingdom 2005, p. 20) in time of peace for a force which is stationed at home or in friendly foreign territory, the normalized fatality rate is 0.70 per month and 10,000 troops. At the high end of the spectrum, one can mention the rate of 25 / (month  $\times$  10<sup>4</sup>) for American troops in Vietnam in 1968; such a rate characterizes a situation which is intermediary between occupation and open warfare.

It can be seen that during the whole period covered by Fig. 8.3a the normalized rate is above the threshold of 0.70 / (month  $\times$  10<sup>4</sup>); in 1946–1949, that is to say before the outbreak of the Korean War, it is on average equal to 2.2. After the outbreak of the Korean War the rate is somewhat unsure due to the lack of information on the number of Australian troops present in Japan (yet, temporary stays of troops from Korea have been estimated and taken into account).

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British Commonwealth Occupation Force.

<sup>57</sup>10,000 is approximately the strength of a division; in fact, depending on circumstances the strength of a division can be somewhere between 8,000 and 18,000; usually the strength is reduced in peace time.



**Fig. 8.3 a Soldiers, officers and civilians of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force (BCOF) who died in Japan.** Solid line (left-hand side scale): number of members of the BCOF who died yearly in Japan and are buried at the BCOF cemetery in Yokohama; this count underestimates the number of fatalities because the remains of some had been shipped back to their home country; for instance, about 60 Australian servicemen who died in Japan are buried in Australia (for the other BCOF countries, we do not know). Thin line (right-hand side scale): fatality rate per month and per 10,000 troops. The average rate is 3 per 10,000 and per month. If we assume the same fatality rate of 3 per 10,000 and per month for the American forces it would imply 3,400 fatalities over the period 1945-1951. To this figure one must add the number of those of where fatally injured in Japan but were evacuated and died outside of Japan (see chronology at 29 February 1948). For the purpose of comparison it can be noted that the fatality rate was about  $4.5/(\text{month} \times 10^4)$  for the American force occupying Iraq in 2003-2005. The dotted line at the bottom of the graph (at level 0.7 per 10,000 and per month) shows the level of fatalities to be expected in time of peace. After the beginning of the Korean War there were continuous movements of troops between Korea and Japan; as a result the number of troops stationed in Japan was not well defined. Source: BCOF Council of Australia. Many thanks to Mr. Ron Orwin for his help.

## Fatality rate in US Armed Forces

Would it be possible to write a reliable history of the US occupation of Iraq without any data about fatality numbers? This question emphasizes how important it is to find information on fatalities. In the first section we propose a rough estimate based on what we know about BCOF fatalities. In the following sections we discuss various attempts to get fatality data.

### Fatalities in the three months July-September 1946

In the catalog of the microforms held at the National Diet Library in Tokyo there is an entry entitled: “Casualties among Allied personnel, 1947 January - 1947 July”.

Apart from giving press releases for individual accidents the documents include also a sentence about the total number of fatalities in the three months July-September 1946. "Accidents were responsible for 104 of the 108 deaths which occurred in the Eight Army. Under recent War Department order, the remains of all civilian and military personnel who have died in Japan since 1 July 1946 will be returned to the United States by the first available transportation." (NDL, microform "Misc-00928")

How do these numbers compare with the death rates for the US population of same age and sex. The answer is given by the data contained in the "Vital Statistics of the United States" (1947, Part II, p. 240-241 and 146-47).

The data are given by 5-year age groups, which means that we must sum the figures for the 15-19 and 20-24 age groups. Thus, for the **male, 15-24 age group** one is led to the following results.

- Death rate from all causes: 21,300 (1.95 per 1,000)
- Death rate from diseases: 10,500 (0.95 per 1,000)
- Death rate from accidents: 10,800 (1.0 per 1,000)
- Death rate from motor-vehicle accidents: 5,800 (0.54 per 1,000)
- Death rate from accidents other than motor-vehicle: 5,000 (0.46 per 1,000)

These death statistics are very different from those observed in the Eight Army in the sense that Eight Army deaths due to disease represent only  $4/108 \simeq 4\%$  of the total mortality whereas in the US population they represent  $10500/21300 \simeq 50\%$ . This low death rate from disease may be explained by the fact that soldiers who were severely ill were probably transported back to the United States and therefore did not die in Japan.

At the same time the deaths by accident were much higher in the Eight Army than in the US population. Assuming a strength of 150,000 one gets an annual death rate by accident of  $104 \times 4/150000 = 2.8$  per 1,000 whereas in the US population it was only 1.0 per 1,000.

In fact, the difference was even larger because it is reasonable to assume that the proportion of soldiers who died in motor vehicle accidents was much smaller than in the civilian population. In other words, the rate of 2.8 per 1,000 should in fact be compared with the death rate from accidents other than motor-vehicle which is 0.46. In short, in the US occupation force the death rate from accidents was between 3 and 6 times higher than in the US civilian population of same age and sex.

### **An estimate of US fatalities**

We know the number of BCOF fatalities (358); if we assume that the fatality rate was the same in the US and BCOF zones, we will be able to derive an estimate of US fatalities by taking into account the fact that the US forces were more numerous

(about 200,000 on average against 40,000) and stayed longer (6.5 years instead of 2.5 years for BCOF troops).

The calculation goes as follows:

$$\text{US fatalities} = (\text{BCOF fatalities}) \times \frac{\text{Number of US troops}}{\text{Number of BCOF troops}} \times \frac{\text{US occupation time}}{\text{BCOF occupation time}}$$

In numbers:

$$\text{US fatalities} = 358 \times (200000/40000) \times (6.5/2.5) = 358 \times 5 \times 2.6 = 4,600$$

This result rests on many assumptions. It should be seen as giving merely an order of magnitude, which means that it may differ from the real fatality number by a factor 2 or 3 (but probably not 10). In other words, the real number (if we ever happen to know it) should be somewhere between 2,000 and 8,000.

It may be interesting to compare the lowest of these estimates to the number of all US fatalities that are listed in the chronology chapters, namely: 78 for Japan (mainland) + 66 for Okinawa = 144. This means that about 93% of the deaths (i.e. 100% - 144/2000) so far escaped our scrutiny.


For BCOF troops, the chronology identified 12 deaths (5 British + 7 Australian and NZ) in a total of 358; thus, in this case 96% of the deaths (i.e. 100% - 12/358) escaped our scrutiny.

We now examine possible sources for fatality data.

### Using death gratuity statistics

It is possible to get an idea of the fatality rate among US Armed Forces worldwide through death gratuity statistics. The death gratuity is a lump-sum (equal to 6-month pay) which is paid to the family of a deceased soldier by the Department of Defense. The death gratuity is paid in all cases except where the death is a result of misconduct or where there is no eligible beneficiary. For the period 1972-2004, death gratuity statistics are available in “Military compensation background papers 2005”. As expected the number of death gratuity paid is closely correlated with the number of active duty military deaths<sup>58</sup>. So far, we were not able to find similar data for the period 1945-1971. However, a congressional report entitled “Report on veterans’ benefits” and published in 1956 gives death gratuity data for the 11 semesters from 1942 to 1946. In fact, this publication makes a comparison between actual numbers of deaths and numbers of death gratuity paid. Not surprisingly, the two series are highly correlated to the point of being almost identical (the correlation is 0.9998). Fig. 8.3b shows the data for the three semesters following the end of World War II.

<sup>58</sup>Except for the years 1991 and 2003 where the death gratuity displays high spikes reaching a level of 6,000, about three times the level of 2,000 reached by military deaths data.



**Fig. 8.3 b Mortality rate of US Armed Forces worldwide (expressed in number of deaths per month and per 10,000 troops).** In July 1945 fighting was almost at an end in Okinawa. Yet, during the second semester of 1945 there were about 24,000 fatalities in US Armed Forces. The number of fatalities fell to 8,200 in the first semester of 1946 and to 3,300 in the second semester. Solid line: Mortality rates per month and per 10,000 troops; these rates were obtained by dividing the number of deaths by the strength of US Armed forces given in the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1948, p. 228). The levels corresponding to peace time and to the occupation of Iraq have been indicated for the sake of comparison. The question marks express the fact that the graph will have to be completed once similar data for subsequent semesters have been found. In 1946, American troops were present in many parts of the world notably in China, Germany, France, Belgium, Italy, Japan, Korea, Okinawa and the Philippines. Yet, in none of these countries was the United States involved in open warfare. That is why the high level of the mortality rate shown in the graph calls for an explanation. In June 1950, according to the statistics of the Department of Defense, out of a total of 1.46 million troops, only 328,000 were stationed abroad (Department of Defense: Deployment of military personnel by country). *Source: Report on veterans' benefits (1956, part 7, p. 104, table II.*

### Data describing the activities of Graves Registration Platoons

Through the search engine of NARA one can locate a file (ARC 1220123) entitled:

“108th Quartermaster Graves Registration Platoon History [2 folders] 1949”. It is known that this unit operated in Japan in 1947 because it is mentioned in the Individual Deceased Personal File of Captain G.E. Foreman who died in January 1947 (see the chronology). So we ordered photocopies of this file from NARA which we received in March 2008. These confirm that this unit indeed operated in Japan and it tells us that monthly “Unit Historical Summary Reports” were published which describe its two main activities, namely the handling of current deaths (as in the case of Captain Foreman) and the location, disinterring and repatriation of World War II deceased remains. Presently, we would be interested in the first of these activities. The photocopies that we received contained only 11 pages consisting of (i) A 3-page annual historical report for 1949. This report briefly documents the search of World War II remains but gives no information about the handling of current deaths. (ii) Eight one-page monthly reports (February to December 1949) giving information about the number of enlisted men who joined the unit or were dropped of its rolls. There is no information whatsoever about the number of deaths that have been handled during the month. It seems bizarre that the main activities of this unit are not described. A possible explanation may be that these pages are only the presentation pages of the reports. Further investigation will be required to find out.

## Fatalities in the Japanese police

Allied troops shared the task of keeping order with the Japanese police. Are data for police fatalities available? A book by Christopher Aldous (1997) about the Japanese police during occupation gives the following information. At the beginning of 1946 the Japanese police totalled approximately 100,000. During 1945 and 1946 the numbers of policemen who died were 1,650 and 2,200 respectively (unfortunately, Aldous does not give similar figures for later years). Surprisingly, the fatality figure is higher in 1946 than in 1945, a year marked by large scale population losses due to the fire bombing of Japanese cities.

More specifically, the fatality figure in 1946 represents 2.2% of the force. If one remembers that a “normal” fatality rate in peace time for an army force is about 0.8%, the figure for 1946 is found to be 2.7 times higher. Even when allowing for a correction (from 0.8% to 1.1%) of the peace time figure due to the fact that on average policemen are older than servicemen, the 1946 figure remains two times higher than expected.

## Compensation paid to Japanese victims of the occupation

A third source of information is the number of Japanese people who applied for and

received compensation for deaths or injuries which occurred in their family as the result of the occupation. These have the advantage of including all causes of death, particularly traffic accidents (largely due to careless driving, in this respect see the chronology at the date of 1 September 1947) which was probably an important source of fatalities.

## Data

Through SCAPIN 1195 issued on 11 September 1946, the GHQ of the Allied forces made clear that it will not recognize claims from Japanese who suffered damages (whether physical injuries or damages to property) by actions of the occupation forces. Such a decision contrasted with the policy which was applied during the occupation of Iceland. In this case a “Joint Claims Committee” was set up comprising both Icelanders and members of the occupation forces and which settled the damage claims made by Icelanders. Thus, in Japan it was the government which collected damage claims and granted compensations. Altogether, compensation was granted for death or injury in 9,998 cases, of which 4,339 were for deaths and 5,659 for injuries<sup>59</sup>(Tsurumi 1961, p. 583). This provides a lower bound for the number of fatalities in the sense that the figure includes only the victims whose family made a request for compensation. Many requests were made several years after the occurrence of the casualties; it is probable that a substantial number of families did not make a request.

Between 1946 and 1951 it was the Ministry of Health which was in charge of compensation. In 1952, compensation matters were transferred to the Procurement Agency, an agency which played the role of a liaison office between American bases and Japan authorities particularly on the question of logistics and materials procurement. The Procurement Agency was reorganized on November 1962 as the Defense Facilities Administration Agency, The DFAA has been incorporated into the Ministry of Defense in September 2007. The administration in charge of compensation matters at the Ministry of Defense is the First Compensation Branch, Compensation Division, Bureau of Local Cooperation<sup>60</sup>. On 3 October 2007, through an email received from Mr. Katsuyuki NAKAMA of the Compensation Division of the Ministry of Defense, I was told that the “Ministry of Defense does not have the documents [regarding compensations for damages suffered during the occupation years] due to [the fact that] the preservation periods of those documents had expired.” This is of course most unfortunate for it was the most detailed source for damages suffered by

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<sup>59</sup>The figure of 2,536 fatalities given in another table published in Tsurumi’s book is the number of fatalities recorded by the Japanese police but with the proviso made in the notes to the table that several figures for some of the most populated prefectures were incomplete. This may explain that this figure represents only 58% of the figure for compensation cases.

<sup>60</sup>I am grateful to Mr. Masahiko Fujita of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs for this information (10 September 2007).

見舞金はどのくらい支払われたか

種別 年度	死亡見舞金		障害見舞金		療養見舞金	
	件数	金額円	件数	金額円	件数	金額円
昭和21	20	87,912	2	8,321	6	4,896
22	324	361,400	44	19,136	399	1,227,695
23	144	224,300	24	28,318	308	1,982,790
24	212	6,824,437	77	999,140	433	5,234,540
25	290	14,289,702	96	2,234,600	726	7,247,735
26	275	32,856,086	142	5,703,390	597	7,983,750
27	1,145	80,259,725	528	25,810,642	701	8,775,666
28	1,915	91,426,284	669	16,438,557	886	6,564,173
年度不明	14	14,000	2	1,000	19	90,364
計	4,339	226,343,846	1,584	51,243,155	4,075	39,111,609
総計	9,998件		316,698,610円			
備考	1. 昭和21~26年度は厚生省の主管で支給された。 2. 昭和27年度からは調達庁において支給された。 3. 27~28年度分は、これまでの支給済れ件数と、21年度にさかのぼっての差額を追加支給した件数が大部分である。従って講和条約以降に発生した事件と補償金支払の実状はこの表にはふくまれていない。 4. なお本表には、未申請の件数や強姦件数はふくまれていない。					

調達局労働組合調べ

調査の行脚がはじまる。  
 占領軍の暴行にたいして、調達庁の見舞金を支払った件数は、一九四六年二八件、一九四七年七六七件、一九四八年四七六件、一九四九年七二二件、一九五〇年一、一一二件、一九五二年二、三三四件とだんだんふえている。それは早くとどけても支払いがおくれたのと、はじめのころには、おそれとどけでなかつた例が多かつたのである。最初の年に暴行をうけた人たちが、どのようにこれに対したかは、次の例で明らかである。  
 一九四六年一月十一日午後八時ごろのこと。

583 廃墟の中から 占領されるということ

**Fig. 8.4 Compensation paid by the Japanese government to Japanese people for damages incurred as a result of the occupation.** The title of the table is: Amount of compensation paid. Each line corresponds to a year from 1946 (Showa 21) to 1953 (Showa 28); the columns to the right of the year give information about the cases for which compensation was paid in the corresponding year. The line under Showa 28 is for the few cases for which the year is unknown. The following line gives the totals: 4,339 is the number of indemnities paid for deaths; 1,584 and 4,075 are for permanent physical damages and medical care expenses respectively. For the historian it would be of great interest to be able to read the description of these cases. However, on 3 October 2007 the author was informed that the preservation period of these documents had expired and that they were no longer available (email from Mr. Katsuyuki NAKAMA of the Compensation Division, Bureau of Local Cooperation, Ministry of Defense). *Source: Tsurumi (1961, p. 583). Many thanks to Ms. Annick Horiouchi (Department of Japanese Studies, University of Paris 7) who brought these data to my attention.*

Japanese people.

For the 78 months of the occupation (Sep 1945 – Mar 1952), one gets an average monthly number of Japanese deaths of  $4339/78 = 56$ . It would of course be of interest to know how these deaths occurred. This information must be available in

the archives of the ministries who received the requests, that is to say the ministry of Public Health and subsequently the Special Procurement Board and the Japanese Ministry of Defence (created in 2006). So far, however, we were not able to locate these records. According to a message received from a person in charge of compensations in the fall of 2007, the records have been destroyed.

### Summary of Japanese fatalities

Based on the monthly averages given above, a rough breakdown of **monthly Japanese fatalities** would be as follows:

- Killed by sentries: 3<sup>61</sup>
- Murdered by (or killed in brawls with) soldiers: 3
- Killed in traffic accidents by military vehicles: 45
- Other causes such as explosions or aircraft crashes: 5
- Died in prison: 5 (see the chronology at the date of 30 April 1947)

### A note about rapes

In a general way, rapes are known to be largely under-reported and this was particularly true during the occupation. That is why I left this question aside. The figures that I have seen for rapes committed in Japan were usually small but in this respect it can be useful to bear in mind rough orders of magnitude.

The current rape rate in the United States is around 35 per 100,000 inhabitants (Statistical Abstract of the United States 2008) or 70 per 100,000 male inhabitants. If we further exclude the children and the men over 70 one gets a rate about 20% larger that is to say about 85 per 100,000 males aged 10 to 70.

For a group largely composed of young males and in addition in a position of authority such as the occupation force (see below the paragraph about “institutional” rape) one would probably not expect a smaller rate than in the general US population. Thus, for a force of 200,000, one would expect the annual number of rapes to be at least:


$$85 \times 2 = 170 \text{ per year}$$

**“Institutional” rapes** In the papers of Alfred Hussey, a prominent member of the Government Section of SCAP, there are accounts of what can be called “institutional” rapes (reel 9).

Under the cover of screening Japanese women for venereal diseases, US soldiers (accompanied by interpreters) arrested young women on their way home from their work for instance in the subway or in the streets. After being confined they were pressed to have relations and/or were examined by Japanese doctors in the presence

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<sup>61</sup>As a matter of comparison, during the 12 years from 1952 to 1964, 30 Filipinos were killed by American sentries guarding US bases in the Philippines; this represents a monthly rate of 0.2 (Baker 2004, p. 116). In order to make the comparison more significant one would need to know the number of Filipino fatalities in the period 1945-1961.



**Fig. 8.4 Number of sentences of penal servitude.** Thick solid line: annual number of sentences of penal servitude for life (scale on the left-hand side); thin solid line: annual number of sentences of penal servitude for a term (scale on the right-hand side in thousands). These figures include the sentences inflicted by military tribunals as well as those inflicted by Japanese courts. The vertical lines delimit the occupation period. The source which provides these data does not give the number of death penalties. However, one knows from the “Vital Statistics of Japan” (1949, Part II, p. 76) that in 1949 there were 47 legal executions; in 1951 there were 21. Sources: *Historical Statistics of Japan*.

of servicemen. Eventually those who were found to be without disease and who were unwilling to “cooperate” were released in the middle of the night.

Officially, up to February 1947, 35,846 women and girls were controlled by the Eighth Army (this figure is for only 4/5 of the prefectures). Among them there were about 10,000 students. The overall percentage of those carrying VD was 19%.

## Number of convictions to penal servitude

One of our main interrogations about the occupation concerns the activity of military tribunals. Table 2.1 gives some data about the number of trials but one would also welcome some information about the sentences. The data about sentences given in this section (Figure 8.4) are not restricted to military tribunals but include also those inflicted by Japanese tribunals. The penalties inflicted by military tribunals may be derived from these data by subtracting the contribution of Japanese tribunals (yet to be found).

The Historical Statistics of Japan contain data for the number of convictions to penal

servitude during the occupation years. The notes appended to the table say that the “data include new convicts tried by the military trial of the Occupation Force.” Between 1942-1944 and 1946-1948 the average number of convictions more than doubled.

This is a phenomenon which occurs on a fairly regular basis after wars; it can for instance also be observed in Britain or in France in the years after 1945. Among the plausible reasons for such an increase, one can mention the following facts. (i) Deserters have no source of revenue whatsoever, may be armed and may resort to theft and larceny. This effect was particularly important in Britain because of the large number of Allied troops which have been stationed in the country before and after D-day. (ii) Demobilized soldiers are in a fairly similar situation: they may find it difficult to adjust to civilian life and might be tempted to use their military experience in robberies or hold-ups.

In short, no definite conclusion can be drawn from the curves in Fig. 8.4 unless one can find data on penalties inflicted by Japanese courts.

## Quantitative analysis of provost court sentences

The main question that we want to explore is: what proportion of the trials resulted in imprisonment sentences rather than acquittal, probation, suspended sentences or fines. We will see that this proportion is somewhere between 28% and 80%. We will explain in a moment why this interval so broad. But first of all we must describe the sources on which our analysis is based.

### Provost court trials in the New Zealand zone

The New Zealand force numbered only about 4,200 troops; it was the smallest component of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force and it remained in Japan only for about 2 years, basically from March 1946 to mid-1948. As a result there were only about 1,000 provost court trials held in the NZ zone. In contrast, in the American zone there were of the order of 50,000 trials. Needless to say, it is much easier to analyze a set of 1,000 trials than one which is 50 times larger.

There is another reason which makes the NZ data of special interest. The data that we have so far been able to obtain for the American zone seem to be a *selection* of cases (see the discussion below). As we do not know how this selection has been done, such samples cannot provide a satisfactory coverage of provost court trials.

The NZ data are arranged in 7 columns:

- (1) Case number, e.g. No 884
- (2) Name of defendant, e.g. Haruyoshi Matsuda
- (3) Address of defendant, e.g. Suetakenaka Kudamatsu

(4) Place of occurrence of offence, e.g. Kudamatsu

(5) Date of arrest, e.g. 884, e.g. 21-6-47

(6) Whether at time of trial, e.g.

the defendant was under house arrest, close arrest (i.e. in custody) or open arrest (i.e. left free but with obligation to report to police station every day for instance), e.g. House arrest

(7) Name of witnesses, e.g. Kiyomi Kawano, Haoichi Matsuo

The nature of the offence is typed on the following line, e.g. “Possession of dynamite and fuse etc.” For about 5% of the cases the nature of the offence is not given

The sentence is added in hand-writing on the left- (or right-) hand side of the table, but sometimes it is missing. Thus, for case No 884 there is no sentence. For the most serious cases fairly often the sentence is missing. Globally the sentence is given in 56% of the cases.

When given, the sentence is written using abbreviations, for instance:

6 mths H.L. = 6 months at hard labor (case No 770); other commonly used abbreviations are:

“Dt”=Detention; “Ref De” (or simply “R.D.”)= Reform detention; Fined 300 yen I.D. 30 days I.H.L. (case 57) = Fined 300 yen, in default 30 days imprisonment at hard labor.

A fairly common form of sentence is :

60 days H.L. Susp, Fined Y1500 OR 4 months H.L. (case No 767)

which means that the 60 days H.L. is a suspended sentence, but that the person will have to serve a 4 months term in default of paying the fine of Y1500.

**Proportion of prison sentences** For the 193 cases (out of 343<sup>62</sup> for which the sentences are known, one has the following decomposition:

P: Sentences with imprisonment: 46%

NoP: Sentences without imprisonment (probation, dismissed, etc.): 13%

Mixed: Sentences with fine or imprisonment if the fine is not paid: 40%

It is this last class which brings much uncertainty because the source does not say whether or not the fine has been paid. If we assume that *all* fines have been paid, the last class becomes a “No Prison” class; under this assumption the proportion of prison sentences is 46%. If, on the contrary we assume that *not a single* fine was paid, then the mixed class must be added to the “Prison” category, which means that the proportion of sentences resulting in imprisonment becomes:  $46 + 40 = 86\%$ .

**Nature of the charges** About 80% of the charges are related with “Possession of

<sup>62</sup>The series held at the National Archives of New Zealand has gaps around July 1947 which was the time when most trials occurred. The decomposition of the number of cases by quarter is as follows: 1946,Q1: 0; 1946,Q2: 30; 1946,Q3: 138; 1946,Q4: 82; 1947,Q1: 154; 1947,Q2: 232; 1947,Q3: 265; 1947,Q4: 44; 1948,Q1: 0; 1948,Q2: 0; 1948,Q3: 20. We are grateful to Ms. Heidi Kuglin of the National Archives of New Zealand for this information.

occupation forces property”; this property may have been stolen or obtained through the black market. The second largest category is “Possession of weapon” which represents about 10% of the cases. Within this class, there are different degrees: possession of a dagger or of a hunting rifle clearly does not have the same significance than possession of a “Japanese Army pistol and Mauser machine pistol” (case No 23). A related category is “Possession of explosives” which represents 2.6% of the cases.

Other charges are “Suspected arson of occupation force barracks”, “Damaging a military truck”, “Impersonation of Military Government agent”, “Traffic violation”.

None of the charges that we have seen refers to sabotage (severed telecommunication lines for instance) or to assault on occupation personnel; yet, one knows (see above) that such incidents were fairly frequent in the BCOF zone. How can one explain that such cases do not appear in provost courts. The simplest explanation is that they were too serious to be tried in provost courts. They were perhaps referred to the American forces to be tried by military commissions.

**Distribution of sentences with respect to length of detention** What was the proportion of the cases in which the length of detention was equal to (or longer than ) 1 year? The answer is provided by the following results:

- Terms equal to (or longer than) 3 months: 40%
- Terms equal to (or longer than) 6 months represented 20%
- Terms equal to (or longer than) 1 year represented 5%
- Terms equal to (or longer than) 2 years represented 2%

These proportions are with respect to all trials on the assumption that no fines were paid; under the opposite assumption that all fines were paid the above results must be divided roughly by 2.

### **Provost court trials in the American zone**

Through key-word searches in the online catalog of NARA one can find several files which refer to provost courts or in a more general way to “Military occupation courts”. At present time (June 2008) we have been able to explore only one of them which is described in the list of references under “NARA 2”. The NARA 2 cases concern November-December 1949. They refer to two kinds of provost courts: “General provost courts” for fairly serious cases and “Special provost courts” for lighter cases. There are 20 cases of the first kind (which all resulted in prison sentences) and 147 of the second sort. Of these 147 trials only 27 resulted in prison sentences, all others resulted in suspended prison sentences and fines<sup>63</sup>.

Consequently, the overall proportion of cases which resulted in prison sentences are

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<sup>63</sup>In contrast to the NZ sentences these sentences do not say “fine Y1500 *OR* 4 month at hard labor”, they just specify the fine; however it seems clear that there must have been some form of confinement or constraint in case of non-payment for otherwise it is doubtful that any fine would have been paid at all.

as follows:

- If one assumes that no fine was paid:  $166/167 = 99\%$  (there is only one defendant who was acquitted, namely an American named Benjamin Norton). What makes the present assumption fairly unrealistic is the great variability in the level of the fines from \$5 to \$125<sup>64</sup>; that is why the proportion of 99% should not be taken very seriously.

- If, on the contrary, one assumes that all fines were paid, then the proportion of prison sentences becomes  $47/167 = 28\%$ . This proportion can probably be accepted as a reasonable lower bound.

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<sup>64</sup>It can be noted that whereas in NZ courts the fines were set in yen, in American courts they are set in dollars.

# Chapter 9

## Conclusion

What are the objectives of these notes? First there is an immediate fact finding goal; secondly we will explain what makes this issue particularly important from a comparative perspective.

### Fact finding

The objective of the fact finding task is to get a more realistic and more plausible picture of the occupation. In the introduction we emphasized that the main difficulty comes from the fact that the sources which would permit to draw a clear picture of the occupation years are not yet accessible. Among these sources the most important are the following.

- The Roll of Honor of American occupation troops. A (partial) Roll of Honor is available for BCOF troops; it shows that 363 soldiers and officers of the BCOF died in Japan; this represents 4.5 deaths per 10,000 troops and per month, a rate which is about 6 times higher than the rate of 0.70 death per 10,000 troops and per month which is observed for an army force in peace time.
- The archives of all court martials and provost courts that took place in Japan between 1946 and 1952.
- The archives of Military Commission courts which tried the most serious crimes against occupation troops. In this respect one must remember that the sentences delivered by provost courts were limited to 5 years of hard labor. In contrast, Military Commission courts could deliver longer terms as well as death sentences. It is in these courts that the most significant confrontation incidents were tried.

Until these archives become accessible, one can use the following alternative sources: (i) Newspapers in English (ii) Correspondence and personal notes of military commanders (iii) Oral testimonies of Japanese people and of GIs who took part in the occupation.

So far, we used mainly the “Times” and the “New York Times”. Other newspapers written in English such as the “Nippon Times”, the “Manichi Daily News”, the “Strait Times” and the “Shanghai News” were explored over short time inter-

vals only. The papers of General Eichelberger represent a large set of microfilmed archives that our colleague Eddy Dufourmont explored in a cursory way. To use of oral testimonies, a method used by author Monica Braw, would require a good knowledge of the Japanese language. In the past two years we tried to contact Japanese historians who might be interested in this project. So far, and in spite of the valuable help provided by the Department of Japanese Studies of the University of Paris 7, our quest was not successful.

## Comparative perspective

Providing a reliable account of the relations between occupation troops and the Japanese population would be a valuable goal in itself. The question becomes even more important if one looks at it from a comparative perspective. Occupation of a defeated country by a military force is a phenomenon which occurred recurrently in history. To comparative historians and sociologists it offers an ideal “laboratory” for studying how a society reacts to divide-and-conquer strategies, to coercion, to hardship, etc. Naturally, the sample of episodes must be unbiased and factually correct, otherwise no sound conclusions can be drawn. Any comparison becomes meaningless if the episodes under consideration are flawed. In its standard presentation, the history of the occupation of Japan contrasted sharply with other known episodes. In other words, it stood in the way of any global understanding of this phenomenon.

## A government’s perspective

For government officials there is of course a permanent temptation to present the data in the way that suits them best. There can be little doubt that the strict censorship installed by General MacArthur was the right thing to do in order to preserve “peace and harmony”. In his “Reminiscences” MacArthur observes that he knew “that the whole occupation would fail if we did not proceed from the basic assumption that the reforms had to come from the Japanese.” To give that impression it was essential to suppress any mention of opposition movements against occupation authorities. It was also essential to suppress as far as possible explicit mentions of the influence that SCAP had on the Japanese government and any account of the control exerted by Military Government at the level of each prefecture.

As a more recent illustration of this policy one can mention the fact that in May 2003, the first month of the occupation of Iraq, 81% of the 31 fatalities among occupation troops were attributed to accidents (USA TODAY May 28, 2003). Subsequently, as resistance actions against occupation troops and the puppet government became more numerous, it became useless to maintain the fiction that almost all fatalities

were due to accidents. However, had monthly fatality numbers been steadily decreasing, then it would have been sensible to continue to under-estimate the percentage of fatalities due to hostile actions. Similarly, so long as crashes of American helicopters in Iraq remained rare events (about one per month) official US Army statements attributed them to mechanical failure (pending further investigation whose conclusions were rarely if ever released) even in cases of mid-air explosions for which such an explanation is fairly unlikely. Thus, the public was unable to know how many of the 57 crashes of American military helicopters between May 2003 and February 2007 were due to mechanical failure and how many were due to hostile fire (The Independent 8 February 2007, NYT 12 February 2007).

In his review of a volume of “Selective data on the occupation” published by SCAP, the reviewer N.D. Harper (1951) regrets that the publication closely reflects the political agenda of occupation authorities. He concludes his review by saying that “the public relation officer who confuses objective history and the inspired gloss does a disservice to truth”. For scientists and comparative historians the issue is indeed whether historical truth will eventually prevail against the the smoke screen put in place by well-meaning governments and historians. The answer to this question conditions the very existence of social research as a science. No science can grow and thrive on unreliable and shaky evidence.

## The search for documents

When searching for documents about the occupation of Japan the historian faces some special difficulties. Whereas some documents are easy to find others on the contrary are very difficult to find. Why is this so?

### A case in point

An illustration of this kind of problem is provided by a publication that is available on the shelves of the room devoted to post World War II history at the National Diet Library in Tokyo. This publication is a compilation of documents issued by occupation authorities such as memoranda, SCAPINs or press releases. Each volume covers one month. In the volume for November 1945 one finds the well-known “Basic initial post-surrender directive to SCAP for the occupation of Japan, November 1 1945” (excerpts of this important document have been given in the chronology chapter). The directive begins with the following sentence:

“This directive is divided into: Part I: General and political; Part II: Economic and civilian supply; Part III: Financial

Yet, suprisingly, in the following line on the same page one finds the title: “Part II”. So where is Part I? The fact that something is missing is confirmed by the fact that the first instruction (all instructions are numbered) has the number 11 instead of 1. In short this compilation presents a truncated version of this directive. Why? May be it is because the first part concerns some “sensitive” aspects such as the establishment of military tribunals to try offenses against the occupation forces or the arrest of “ultranationalists”.

This directive has never been considered as a confidential document so the fact that part I is missing seems somewhat weird. After I made the observation that something is missing to the librarian we quickly found another compilation <sup>65</sup> almost on

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<sup>65</sup>Its front page is shown in Fig. A.1a.

the same shelf in which the whole directive (including part I) is reproduced. This directive is also available online on the website of the National Diet Library. Yet, the fact remains that at some point part I has been suppressed. How should this be interpreted? One must remember that during the first occupation years a strict censorship was enforced in Japan. In the chapter on censorship we mention the fact that fairly often articles published in western newspapers could not be reproduced in Japanese newspapers. Naturally, this means that the “New York Times” was certainly not on sale in Tokyo. As a matter of fact, no printed documents whatsoever could be introduced into Japan without the authorization of SCAP. In such an atmosphere it becomes more plausible that a well-meaning censor could find it appropriate to excise part I of the directive.

## Two phases

The previous illustration concerns the availability of documents in Japan, but there was a similar mechanism at work in American (and Australian) archives. Immediately after the war, quite a number of files which were considered confidential were closed to researchers<sup>66</sup>. Then, in the course of time, little by little, some files were declassified. The problems that the historian faces in 2008 are basically the result of this double mechanism, namely an initial censorship and filtration procedure followed by progressive relaxation of restriction rules. This has important consequences which can be illustrated by the two following cases.

- In the chronology chapter we mentioned that the file concerning a report ordered by General Eisenhower (Oct 26, 1946) which is kept at NARA contains the letter of transmission but not the record itself. According to the archivists the latter is not available at NARA. This has a clear explanation in the previous interpretation. The report has probably been removed in the period of strict censorship and has not been replaced afterward. Indeed, if it is easy to remove a confidentiality label, the matter becomes more difficult when the files have been altered. It takes a lot of time and care to bring them again in their initial condition. As one knows, in most western countries the number of archivists does not increase at the same pace as the number of documents with the obvious result that they are overwhelmed with work. Thus, the files which have been submitted to a filtering process will probably remain in that state for a long time.

- There are probably also a number of documents which are still considered confidential. In Roehner (2007, table 5.4) we list a number of topics for which the files could not be located. For some of them, it seems clear that there has been a filtering process. Such is the case of the trials by military commissions for offenses

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<sup>66</sup>As one knows, documents which cite the names of persons (e.g. defendants who appear in a trial) are usually withheld for a number of decades; however, as we are not interested in personal names but rather in anonymous and quantitative data this factor is only of little significance in the present discussion.

against occupation forces. Indeed the files which bear this title at NARA contain only a (probably tiny) sample of the cases. Yet, in this case there is some hope that the complete file will some day become available. The document reproduced in the next section provides another example of a file which we know to exist but cannot locate. For some other files the situation seems even more hopeless. Such is the case of the demands of compensation made by Japanese people. As mentioned earlier, we were told by the person in charge of these records that the files have been destroyed.

### **An illustrative document**

The two documents presented in Fig. A.1a,b,c are letters exchanged between SCAP and the Central Liaison Office. The role of this office was to permit contacts between SCAP and the Japanese government. It transmitted the directives issued by SCAP to the Japanese government and it also forwarded the responses, objections or questions of the Japanese government to SCAP. The documents in Fig. A.1 is of interest for several reasons.

- They provide an example of the question-answer process between the Japanese government and SCAP. A question raised by the Japanese government on 26 April 1946 is answered by SCAP on 11 September 1946 that is to say about five months later.

- The issue raised in the first document concerns the important problem of the compensation to be paid to Japanese people who suffered some damage as a result of the occupation. The hopes of the Japanese government that the US government will contribute financially in some way were dashed by SCAPIN 1195 of 11 September 1946. As a result of this reply, the Japanese government set up a procedure by which it would provide compensation itself.

- The first document comprises an enclosure consisting of three tables. These tables would be of interest because they contain *quantitative* data about incidents between American troops and the Japanese population. The fact that the enclosures are missing is a feature which is not specific to this document. As a matter of fact, the enclosures are missing for all documents which have been collected (and made available online) by the record office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). This is particularly unfortunate because most of the messages of the period 1950-1952 are only covering letters of transmission: “Hereby we transmit you the enclosed document”. Thus, if the enclosed document is not available the message becomes worthless.

- To the inquiry that we sent to the record office of the MOFA it was responded that the enclosures are not held at the MOFA. This is of course somewhat surprising because these documents were produced by the Central Liaison Office which was

# 日本占領及び管理重要文書集

第2巻 政治、軍事、文化篇

外務省特別資料部編

DOCUMENTS  
CONCERNING  
THE ALLIED OCCUPATION AND CONTROL  
OF JAPAN

VOLUME II POLITICAL, MILITARY AND CULTURAL

COMPILED BY  
DIVISION OF SPECIAL RECORDS, FOREIGN OFFICE,  
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

昭和24年3月  
MARCH 1949

## 44. 連合軍將兵による損害に対する賠償 要求に関する日本政府覚書

TO : GENERAL HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUPREME  
COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS.  
FROM : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.  
SUBJECT : Compensation for Damage Caused by Allied Military  
Personnel.

C.L.O. No. 1952 (PP-K)

26 April 1946

1. With regard to the above subject the Central Liaison Office invited the attention of the General Headquarters in November 1945, by an informal letter addressed to Colonel F. P. Munson, G-2, from E. Sone, Director of the First Division, Central Liaison Office, to the following three cases, in which this Office deems compensation to be claimable:

- a. Cases in which actual violations of the law by the Allied Military Personnel have taken place and there is sufficient evidence therefor.
- b. Cases in which violations of the law by the Allied Military Personnel are established by witnesses but the offender cannot be traced.

**Fig. A.1a** Letter of 26 April 1946 sent by the Central Liaison Office to SCAP-GHQ, part 1 The letter concerns the question of compensation for damage occasioned by occupation forces. *Source: The book from which this document is excerpted is available at the National Diet Library (Tokyo)*

formely part of the MOFA. The enclosure may be available at NARA but so far we were not able to locate it.

非日本人の日本における地位

c. Cases where no violation of the law is involved but compensation for damage or injury is deemed equitable (e.g. damage caused by the disposal of explosives and gun powders).

2. The Central Liaison Office inquired whether the General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, takes the view that compensation is claimable in the above cases, and, if so, whether it will be advisable for the Japanese side to set up some kinds of commission to assist the Allied authorities in determining the extent of compensation.

3. The Central Liaison Office was informed by Colonel Munson's informal letter dated 30 November 1945 that the matter of investigation, adjustment and payment of claims resulting from the occupation was presently being considered by the Chief, Claims Division, Office of the Judge Advocate General, Washington, D.C., who was then in Tokyo, and the Deputy Chief of Staff of the General Headquarters.

And later on 13 December, 1945, Colonel Munson informed this office that a policy for the disposition of claims arising in Japan by reason of the occupation was under consideration by the U.S. War Department. Until such time as this policy was determined, no action by the General Headquarters could be taken.

4. The Central Liaison Office has since been eagerly waiting for a determination of policy by the General Headquarters in this matter, but has not yet received any directive in this connection.

5. On the other hand, misconducts and accidents involving Allied military personnel have reached considerable numbers, as set forth in the Enclosures 1 to 3, and not a few of the victims stand in need of speedy relief.

6. In view of the above circumstances, the Central Liaison Office ventures to renew its request to the General Headquarters for favourable consideration in this matter.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

(Sgd.) S. Iguchi  
(S. Iguchi)  
Director of General Affairs,  
Central Liaison Office.

Enclosure\*: 3 tables.

\*Enclosure omitted.

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**Fig. A.1b** Letter of 26 April 1946 sent by the Central Liaison Office to SCAP-GHQ, part 2 The letter concerns the question of compensation for damage occasioned by occupation forces. *Source: The book from which this document is excerpted is available at the National Diet Library (Tokyo)*

An article on the occupation in the New York Times

政治、軍事、文化篇

45. 連合軍將兵による損害に対する賠償拒否  
に関する總司令部覺書

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS  
SUPREME COMMANDER FOR THE ALLIED POWERS

AG 150 (11 Sep 46) GS  
(SCAPIN-1195)

APO 500  
11 September 1946

MEMORANDUM FOR: IMPERIAL JAPANESE GOVERNMENT.  
THROUGH : Central Liaison Office, Tokyo.  
SUBJECT : Compensation for Damage Caused by  
Allied Military Personnel.

1. Reference is made to C.L.O. No. 1952 (PP-K) of 26 April 1946 requesting consideration of the establishment of procedure for the investigation, adjustment and payment of claims resulting from the occupation.

2. The Imperial Japanese Government is informed that the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers recognizes no legal basis for liability with respect to such claims, and accepts no responsibility for the adjustment and payment thereof.

FOR THE SUPREME COMMANDER :

(Sgd.) C. Z. Shugart  
for JOHN B. COOLEY  
Colonel, AGD  
Adjutant General

**Fig. A.1c Letter of 11 September 1946 sent by the SCAP-GHQ to the Japanese Government** This letter is the reply of the US Government to the question raised in the message of 26 April 1946. *Source: The book from which this document is excerpted is available at the National Diet Library (Tokyo)*

Lindesay Parrott was the chief of the Tokyo Bureau of the New York Times; he has written 453 articles over the period from 1 September 1945 to 31 May 1950. We read a large part of his articles. Almost all of them present a view of the occupation which appears much more realistic and plausible than the picture which became widely accepted by scholars in the following decades.

A case in point is the relation between occupation headquarters and Japanese authorities. The main-stream view is that occupation headquarters provided only advice that the Japanese government free to follow or not. In an article published in mid-1947 (Fig. A.2a,b) Parrott makes clear that Japanese officials had no other choice than to follow the directives or be dismissed. Incidentally, this view is confirmed in an article (that we have already mentioned) which is written by a person who took part in the Military Government in Yamanachi prefecture (Braibanti, 1948).

More specically, the article presented in Fig A.2 describes the relations between the American occupation authorities (which included SCAP but also the Eighth Army and its Military Government teams) and the Japanese authorities at government as

well as local level. The Military Government teams established in each of the 45 prefectures were in charge of ensuring the implementation of the directives issued by SCAP. Braibanti explains that although Military Government teams were not supposed to take any action without specific orders from GHQ, in practice non compliance with directives could result in various sanctions including sentences in provost courts. Parrott's article also explains that the so-called "purge" of "ultra-nationalists" was used as a means of discarding Japanese who objected to some aspects of the occupation. A number of examples of this kind are given in the chronology.

Through the articles by Parrott and Braibanti we get a *general* understanding of the procedure and machinery through which the directives issued by SCAP were implemented. However, in order to get a more effective and practical view one would need to read the letters exchanged between Military Government teams and local Japanese authorities.

Having tried to find such archives in Japan we came to the conclusion that they are not yet accessible. Most of the prefectural archives were created in the 1960s or 1970s; the responses that we obtained from several prefectural archives located in the Kanto region around Tokyo confirmed that they do not hold material pertaining to the occupation. The National Archive located in Tokyo also holds only few files regarding the occupation. Most of the documents about the occupation are at the Tsukuba Annex (about 50 km from Tokyo, to get there from Tokyo one must take a train and then a 30mn-bus from the station to the Annex) However, this archive is organized in a way which makes research virtually impossible. Before a file can be consulted it must be screened. This screening is made in Tokyo. The files are transmitted to Tokyo every Wednesday. Once screened and approved, they are re-sent to Tsukuba on the next Wednesday. Thus it takes almost two weeks before a file can be read. This, at least, was the situation in the fall of 2007.

New York Times: 1 June 1947 (p. E4)

# CABINETS CHANGE, M'ARTHUR GOVERNS

By **LINDESAY PARROTT**

Special to THE NEW YORK TIMES.

**TOKYO, May 31**—Formal investiture last week of Tetsu Katayama, first Socialist Premier of Japan, and attempts of the Socialists to form a coalition Cabinet under Socialist auspices, again have brought into the limelight one of the fundamental questions of the occupation. It is: To what extent is Japan to be permitted to govern herself as the nation moves toward a peace treaty which presumably will mark the end of foreign military control?

It is the word "Socialist" which underlines the question, conjuring up as it does a picture of wide social and economic change, with nationalization of resources, equalization of wealth and better days—perhaps—for the common man.

Whatever may be true in other parts of the world such a mental picture fails completely to correspond with the facts of Japan. For no Japanese Government, no matter what its complexion, is or can be a broad policy-making body while the occupation remains on present terms.

The major lines that Japan must follow were laid down long ago in the Potsdam Declaration. They received closer definition in the basic directive for the occupation framed by the United States State, War and Navy Departments, approved by the President and radioed to Gen. Douglas MacArthur as far back as Sept. 6, 1945. They have been implemented in nearly two years of Allied control by hundreds of directives, instructions, orders and memoranda which cover every phase of Japanese life from over-all national planning to the preservation of sea lions in the Western Pacific—and the latter is an actual case.

## Socialist Premier in Japan Must Follow His Directives

In effect what the Allies have done is to remove the "what" from the Japanese Government. No Japanese administration can decide on a broad basis "what" Japan shall do. That right the victors reserved to themselves. No Japanese Government, for instance, even with a 100 per cent popular vote, could decide to rearm or regime.

### Determining Method

Of governmental "how," a certain amount (not much) has been left. But to a certain degree, the Japanese are permitted to determine how—by what specific measures—the nation may put into effect the policies laid down for it. Largely, however, election of the new Japanese Government today is a matter of "who"—who is selected to run for the Allies' administrative machine which was permitted to remain after surrender as the local executive arm of the occupation. This time it is the Christian and Socialist Katayama.

There should be nothing particularly novel or surprising in those statements—though the facts may have been lost to sight somewhat in the passionate claims and counterclaims which treat the Japanese election as though it were one held by an unoccupied power. The situation in which the Allies order and the Japanese administration

Fig. A.2a A New York Times article by Lindsay Parrott, part 1 This part describes the relations between SCAP and the Japanese government.

executes was clearly outlined in General MacArthur's original instructions.

In brief summary they read: "The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government will be subject to the Supreme Commander. The Supreme Commander will exercise authority through Japanese governmental machinery and agencies which will be permitted, under his instructions, to exercise normal powers in matters of domestic administration. The policy is to use the existing form of Government in Japan, not support it."

#### System Extends Down

After two years that system has extended downward into the smallest crannies of Japanese life. In Tokyo MacArthur writes the Premier, as he did on March 22, asserting that the Japanese Government failed properly to carry out the national wage and price policy and demanding new controls.

In Saitama, some thirty miles away, a young medical corps lieutenant who is a member of an American Military Government team inspects the rural slaughterhouse to check on the operation of the public health program which SCAP ordered the Japanese Government to introduce. If the slaughterhouse is unsanitary, the prefectural governor of Saitama will hear from the local Military Government much what the Premier heard from MacArthur.

There are forty-five of these Military Government teams under Lieut. Gen. Robert L. Eichelberger's Eighth Army—one for every prefecture outside the Tokyo-Yokohama area. They are divided into sections covering economics, education, health, etc., much as the headquarters' administrative machinery is divided.

Their duty is to see that SCAP's directives in all fields are properly administered.

Those local authorities are elected now instead of being appointed by the Home Ministry, as in the pre-war days of centralized control. No one has ever contended that the Allies tell the Japanese whom to elect, but in the field of governmental personnel, both national and local, the occupation's hand is also felt.

#### Long List of "Purgees"

For the Allies have plainly told the Japanese who cannot appear in political, intellectual or economic life. There is a long and growing list of "purgees" who are outlawed under the Allied directive banning totalitarians and their supposed supporters. Characteristically, the Japanese Government through its central screening committee operates purges and interprets the Allied order against various categories of undesirables. If its interpretation is unsatisfactory, it can be so informed from headquarters.

How far it can go was shown at the general election before this one when Liberal party leader Ichiro Hatoyama was ejected from politics after his group had polled the largest national vote and as he was about to become Premier.

#### Government's Functions

There is no question that the Japanese Government fulfills many functions—which might take an occupation army of a million men to perform if the Allies had undertaken the whole task themselves without the Japanese administration machinery which the surrender terms preserved.

The existence of that Government and the work it does constitute one important difference between the character of occupation here and in Germany. But "government" is really a misnomer. "Administration" would be a better word. The Government of Japan in the generally accepted sense of terms is still an Allied responsibility and is treated as such.

Fig. A.2a A New York Times article by Lindesay Parrott, part 2. This second section describes the relations at prefectural level. At this level the occupation authorities were represented by Eighth Army Military Government teams backed by Eighth Army units.

## Introduction

### MOFA plus EU's foreign policy.

The gist of the matter is as follows. Observation shows that the structure and main properties of a complex organization are determined when it is created and that they change only very little afterward (unless there is a “big” event such as a revolution). This rule seems to apply to natural systems as well as to human organizations. Let us keep it in the back of our mind in the following discussion.

During the 6 years of the occupation the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) was in fact replaced by the Central Liaison Office (CLO) which linked SCAP and the Japanese government. Typically, a regulation drafted by SCAP officers would be transmitted to the CLO for the purpose of being adapted and translated into Japanese before being presented to the Japanese government or to the Diet. In order to be able to perform this task the Japanese public servants working in the CLO had to be very fluent in English which means that almost all of them had spent several years in the United States. Moreover, their daily work required to have continuous contacts with their American counterparts. In other words, the CLO set up two rules for potential employees: (i) to have a good knowledge of English and to be in sympathy with the US way of life (ii) to be capable of friendly cooperation with US colleagues.

These rules were maintained after 1952 when the CLO became the MOFA. As a result, it is almost unthinkable for the MOFA to implement a policy that would not be at variance with the objectives of the Department of State. In the two or three occasions when a prime minister tried to have a different policy he was urged to drop the matter and to leave foreign policy to the MOFA. This is what Nobusuke Kishi told PM Ichiro Hatoyama in early 1955 (as mentioned in the chronology chapter). For an ambitious MOFA public servant the ideal trajectory would be as follows: to spend several years in the United States, to become part of the section in charge of US relations, to become ambassador in Washington, to become Minister of Foreign

Affairs and then, why not, to become prime minister.

The previous argument can also be made for the Ministry of Defense. As the United States assumes an active role in the defense of Japan, close cooperation between the Self Defense Force and US Forces is vital.

It is interesting to observe that the same mechanism has been at work in Europe.

It is well known that the creation of NATO put the armed forces of all NATO members virtually under US command. The reason for American domination is not only due to the fact that the general in command of NATO is chosen by the US president but also to US leadership in matter of military technology.

A similar process, probably less known, occurred in the field of European Union's foreign relations. In October 1999, Javier Solana became the European Union's second "High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy". As a matter of fact, he was virtually the first one because his predecessor, Jürgen Trumpf, remained in this position for only one month. At the same time Solana was also appointed Secretary-General for the Council of the European Union. During the 10 years that Solana spent in the position of High Representative he built up an organization of more than 1,000 persons. It comprises an inner cabinet, a policy unit, an intelligence unit and an operations center. In short, it was the closest thing one could imagine of a Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the EU.

Who was Javier Solana? Born in 1942, he had spent 6 years from 1965 to 1971 studying and then teaching in American universities. After studying at the university of Chicago he got a PhD degree in physics from the University of Virginia. A former foreign minister of Spain, he served as Secretary General of NATO from 1995 to 1999. In other words, one can expect that the organization that he set up during his tenure as High Representative was quite as pro-US as the MOFA. This orientation will probably last for decades. In 2009 Solana was succeeded by Catherine Ashton but the policy remained the same.

The only real difference between Japan and the European Union is the fact that the High Representative for Foreign Affairs of the EU has limited power as shown by the fact that on important problems each European country has his own foreign policy. This can be illustrated by the two following cases.

- Britain, Spain and Italy took part in the US-led occupation of Iraq while France and Germany did not.
- Britain and France took part in the bombing of Libya while Germany did not.

### **Status of US bases in Japan**

There are two US air bases near Tokyo: the US Navy Atsugi Air Base in the west and the US Air Force Yokota Air Base in the north-west. Atsugi is the largest US Navy

air base in the Pacific Ocean. When one walks around the fence which encloses the base (some 4.5 square kilometer in area) one sees all along small shields which say “Property of US Navy”. Indeed, US bases are not under Japanese jurisdiction, they are foreign enclaves. What are the consequences which derive from such a status?

- In the years 2010-2012 it was suspected that barrels containing Agent Orange, a defoliant used in Vietnam, had been buried on some US bases in Okinawa. Yet, the Japanese government did not have the ability to send investigation teams into the bases (see below). It is true, that even in areas which had been US bases in the 1960s but were recovered by Japan in the meanwhile and where the Japanese government would have been able to investigate, it refrained from doing so. Why? It is of course difficult to answer this question because the relevant archives may not be open to investigation.

- As the previous example concerns Okinawa where US bases have in many respects a specific status, one might think that a different situation prevails on the mainland. However, a story which occurred in mid-2012 suggests that even there US bases are foreign enclaves. The story concerns the introduction of a new aircraft, the Osprey V-22, on the Iwakuni air base (not far from Nagasaki) of the US Marine Corps. As this aircraft has had recurrent accidents ever since the program was started back in 1983, there was widespread opposition against this deployment that was shared by the population, the governor of Yamaguchi prefecture and, to a more limited extent, the Japanese government. Yet, on 16 July 2012 Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda said that under SOFA (Status of Force Agreement) rules, Japan has no say in the Osprey plan and that his government had no choice but to accept Washington’s plan to deploy the Osprey (Japan Times 17 July 2012).

On 23 July 2012 some 12 Osprey planes were delivered to Iwakuni air base.

- There is another point of importance. The SOFA between Japan and the United States does not require the United States to consult with the Japanese government before it carries out any test flights (Japan Times 23 July 2012). This means that Japan has but limited sovereignty over its air space. This means that the Ospreys will be able to carry out low-altitude test flights in spite of the strong opposition of the population.

Because low-altitude training during night-flies is an important part of the practice routine to evade enemy radar, the average flying altitude of the Osprey aircraft will be 150 meters. Moreover, during 7 am and 10 pm they can fly as low as 60 meters. Such training flights will take place on (at least) 7 different routes over mainland Japan (Japan Times 26 July 2012).

The fact that even such low altitude flights can be carried out by the US Marines Corps without any supervision of the Japanese authorities appears somewhat surprising. Can one imagine an allied foreign country doing the same kind of flights over

the United States without having to ask for any permission from US authorities?

- It was revealed in 2010 that in 1966 nuclear weapons were moved to Iwakuni air base for storage from Okinawa, something which was in violation of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan or at least in violation of the part of the Treaty which was made public (Wikipedia article entitled “Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni”). As a matter of fact, it was learned that for years US naval facilities in Japan had permanently hosted US warships carrying nuclear weapons.

It must be realized that for US bases to have the status of foreign enclaves<sup>67</sup> is something quite unusual. In Spain, it is the Spanish flag which flies over US bases. Even in the Philippines, a former US colony, the bases were leased to the United States instead of being US property.

The following sections detail other cases which illustrate the extent of US influence in Japan. Let us begin by describing two episodes which suggest how difficult it was for the Japanese government even in 2011 to go against the wishes of the Pentagon.

The following account is based on an article published in the “Japan Times” of 14 February 2012.

### **The storage of Agent Orange in Okinawa**

Ever since the 1960s residents of Okinawa around Camp Schwab knew that the area had been exposed to Agent Orange, the dioxin-tainted defoliant that was used during the Vietnam War. This exposition came in three ways.

- Residents living near camp Schwab in the 1960s and 1970s observed that seaweed was wiped out and that clams emitted a black oily substance. They attributed a number of sudden and suspicious deaths among local people to the consumption of such clams.

In 2010 an army truck driver explained that while serving on the docks between 1965 and 1966 he had been loading and unloading drums containing defoliants which often leaked out of the drums. This claim was recognized by the US Department of Veterans Affairs and he was awarded a compensation.

Yet, when in November 2011 residents requested dioxin tests to be conducted on Camp Schwab the Japanese Okinawa Bureau rejected their demand.

- In August 2011, a former soldier claimed that in 1969 he witnessed the burial of dozens of barrels of Agent Orange on Hamby Airfield (current-day Chatan Town). His claim created alarm because this place is now a popular tourist area. In 2002 non-buried barrels leaking a tar-like substance and bearing American markings had been found near the alleged burial site.

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<sup>67</sup>The fact that they host some units of the Japanese self-defense force does not change anything in this respect.

Yet, the barrels had been incinerated by the local government before they could be tested for dioxin.

- Near the village of Higashi, residents observed that young trees withered and died once their roots reached a depth of approximately 50 cm. In 2011 a former US military official confirmed to the “Okinawa Times” that defoliants were tested near this village between 1960 and 1962.

One resident said he would like some tests to be conducted by an independent company because he did not trust the government and thought that it would not reveal the true results.

This story shows that during over 40 years the Japanese government <sup>68</sup> as well as local authorities have ignored the wishes and their concerns of their citizens. The only reason for doing that that one can imagine was to to shield the Pentagon against any criticisms and any claims for compensation.

If barrels containing dioxin had been buried by a Japanese company in an area of California (or elsewhere in the United States) the outcome would certainly have been very different. Not only would the company be compelled to pay compensation but it is likely that its directors would face criminal charges.

In this respect one can recall that in February 2012 Two Japanese auto suppliers had to pay more than half a billion dollars in criminal fines for a price-fixing conspiracy in the sale of parts to US automakers. Moreover, four executives of Yazaki Corporation, all Japanese citizens, had to serve two years in US prison.

### **The burden of US bases in Okinawa**

Apart from the chemical pollution problems mentioned above, US bases in Okinawa are also a source of noise pollution. As a result, ever since the occupation of Okinawa by US troops, the population welcomes a reduction in the number of units stationed on the island. However, in contrast to what happened in France in 1966-1967 <sup>69</sup> it seems very difficult for the Japanese government to obtain a reduction of US troops in Okinawa. It is likely that the restitution agreement contains some binding condition in this respect. However, there are other US bases in Japan that the Japanese government could possibly use as bargaining arguments.


Just to show the fairly weak position of the Japanese government in such discussions one can mention the following episode (Japan Times 25 March 2012).

Under a deal made in 2006 for the relocation of 8,000 US Marines from Okinawa to Guam, Japan accepted to pay \$ 2.8 billion for the construction in Guam of the

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<sup>68</sup>One should realize that this question has become a national issue especially in recent years which means that although the Japanese government tried to limit its involment it could not abstain from taking position.

<sup>69</sup>Until 1966 there were 12 US Air Force bases in France. In 1967 President de Gaulle asked for their closing or tranfer to the French Air Force. This move was achieved within 2 years.



**Fig. xx US military facilities in mainland Japan.** Although some 70% of US military personnel is located in Okinawa there are also a substantial number of facilities in mainland Japan which range from large US Air Force or US Navy airfields to smaller facilities. *Source: New Pacific Institute at newpacificinstitute.org*

US command center and of living facilities for the families of the military. In other words it will cost Japan \$ 350,000 per Marine transferred to Guam.

However, this was not the end of the story. In discussions held in March 2012, the number of Marines transferred to Guam was reduced to 4,700; yet at the same time, Japan was asked to pay \$ 1 billion more. This would put the transfer cost of each Marine to \$ 810,000. The “Japan Times” says that Tokyo has been reluctant to agree so far.

## US military facilities

The most visible legacy of the occupation is the lasting presence of US forces in Japan.

The fact that in the course of time the integration of Japanese forces into the US strategic network has become stronger rather than weaker can be illustrated by the following episode (Japan Times 27 March 2012).

Until March 2012 the command center of the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) was located in the Defense Ministry in Tokyo. Under a bilateral agreement

reached in 2006 between the US and Japanese governments, it was decided that it would move to the US Yokota Air Base in the western suburb of Tokyo. Yokota is hosting the headquarters not only of the USAF in Japan, but of all US military forces in the country.

At Yokota Japan and the US set up a joint operations coordination center in an underground part of the ASDF's new command post that is linked to the US Air Force by an underpass. The ASDF's command center mainly dealing with airspace intrusions and ballistic missile interceptions.

The article of the Japan Times ends with the following sentence.

One senior ASDF official wondered whether the ASDF Command can truly be independent while on the premises of a US installation. "It's odd that the top command is placed on a base under the control of a foreign military even if that is of an ally," the official said.

This observation takes even greater significance if one remembers that the "Japan Times" is itself a pro-US newspaper.

In this respect, it can be mentioned that the same situation prevails in South Korea. From an episode which occurred on 12 December 1979 it can be learned that the headquarters of the ROKA (Republic of Korea Army) and the headquarters of the American Eighth Army were located on opposite sides of the same street and that there were tunnels connecting the two command centers. On this day there was a power struggle between two factions of the ROKA and many Korean officers fled through these tunnels in order to avoid being arrested (Cumings 1997 p. 375).

Almost at the same moment (26 March 2012) a "Blue Book" published by the Japanese Ministry of makes clear that this close alliance and partnership is directed against China. It says:

Japan will deepen its alliance with the United States and seek to play an active role in the security of the Asia-Pacific region as China's military grows. It notes that the United States has made a strategic shift to focus on the region in order to keep China in check. It deplores the strengthening of Chinese defense capabilities in a nontransparent manner and the intensifying of its maritime activities which are a matter of concern to international society.

In August 2011, Japan placed 23 uninhabited islands around Okinawa under state control but the 4 Senkaku islands (which are also claimed by China<sup>70</sup>) "were left exempt out of consideration for China". However, on 26 March 2012 one of the four Sensaku islands named Kitakojima was registered as a Japanese national asset.

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<sup>70</sup>The article of the Japan Times (26 March 2012) says that they are claimed by "both China and Taiwan", a statement which implicitly contradicts the "one-China" policy upheld by the US and its Japanese ally.

## Political influence

Several historians, e.g. Dubroc and Kaplan (1995), Chalmers Johnson (1995), Michael Schaller (1995), have argued that the United States continued to have a determined influence on the political life of Japan after the peace treaty went into effect in 1952 and up to the present time. This is certainly an interesting question but it is also a difficult one. Indeed, as suggested by the previous authors, most of the means through which this influence is exerted are not well publicized. At the macro level of policy making, one can mention the funding of Japanese political parties, the destabilization of “unsympathetic” political leaders or using diplomatic pressure to avert inauspicious government decisions. At the micro level of public relations campaigns, one can mention the inclusion of “sanitized” or pro-American sequences into Japanese films<sup>71</sup>, payoffs to the NHK (Nippon Hoso Kyokai, i.e. Japan Broadcasting Corporation), invitations to professors, journalists or other opinion makers to travel to the United States at US government expense, support for anti-communist writers (or, more generally, writers whose works contribute to publicize some of the themes favored by the Department of State).

Such mechanisms are by no means specific to Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, these questions are of great interest from a general perspective. Throughout history great powers have tried to influence the policy of smaller countries or of former colonies. Just as an illustration, it can be mentioned that in Australia the British Crown is still (in 2008) represented by a Governor-General. Although most of the time his role is fairly nominal in some special circumstances he may play a crucial role<sup>72</sup>.

This question is of even greater interest in the case of Japan because Japan is by no means a small country (at the time of writing, it is the third largest economy in terms of Gross National Product after the United States and China). At the same time, however, in spite of its economic power Japan is in a fragile strategic position firstly because it must rely on the United States for its strategic defense, secondly because 70% of its oil consumption comes from the Middle East, a region which except for a few countries is under the control of the United States and thirdly because the legacy of the occupation has given much leverage to the Department of State in many crucial

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<sup>71</sup>The term “sanitized” may seem fairly unclear. The following example illustrates one of its possible meanings. During the occupation the media were required to make as if the occupiers were no longer present in the country. Kyoko Hirano (1992, p. 87-88) mentions an interesting anecdote. In the Japanese film “Children of the beehive” (Hachi no su no kodomotachi, 1948) by the director Shimizu Hiroshi, it is surprising to see that all traces of the presence of the occupying military have been expunged. At that time large railroad stations were crowded with occupation soldiers. Nevertheless, in the railroad scenes, there is not the slightest sign of soldiers; the RTO (military Railroad Transportation Office) signs seen all over the place at the time are not shown in the film. Incidentally, this example shows that censorship could take quite subtle forms.

<sup>72</sup>After winning the 1974 election, Labour Prime Minister E. Gough Whitlam was dismissed in 1975 by Governor-General Sir John Kerr.

sectors of the Japanese polity (e.g. the media or the army). It is on this last question that this chapter will focus: how did the structures put in place during the occupation pave the way for the enduring influence of the United States in Japan<sup>73</sup>.

In other words Japan is a good laboratory for studying how a power *A* is able to influence a power *B*: what means and structures are used, which ones are the most effective, what are the risks of a backlash?

Although it does not specifically refer to Japan, a book published in 1975 by Philip Agee, a former C.I.A. officer, provides a helpful introduction into some of the methods used by CIA stations throughout the world<sup>74</sup>. The book emphasizes the crucial role of agents<sup>75</sup>. In Equator, Uruguay and Mexico, the three countries where the author has been working, the CIA had a broad network of agents: Benite Nardone, president of Uruguay in 1960, the Equatorian ministry of interior in 1963, even the president of Mexico, Gustavo Diaz Ordaz is referred to as a very good friend of the chief of the CIA station in Mexico-city. There were also so-called “penetration agents” in the Communist or socialist parties as well as in unions or leftist student organizations. Naturally, it is impossible to get any information about whether (and to what extent) a specific person is an agent<sup>76</sup>. Probably the only way to get some insight into what happens behind the curtain is to identify recurrent patterns. It is likely that the ways an agent is recruited, “incubated”, “nurtured”, pushed forward and used follow similar patterns in different countries and time periods.

Apart from this covert kind of influence there is a fairly common mechanism which relies on economic pressure. We will give an illustration which concerns more specifically Britain; however it is fairly obvious that the same kind of pressure can be applied in a broad variety of situations.

In October 1961, the Foreign Office asked Washington’s approval for a sale of 6 Vickers Viscount planes to Communist China<sup>77</sup>. This move was motivated by the existence of an agreement between Western countries not to sell to Communist countries items of strategic value. As the aircraft was purely civilian and fairly outdated,

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<sup>73</sup>From a historical perspective, such an influence is quite uncommon. Thus, just to mention one point, in the history of the past two centuries, there are few (if any) cases where after a military defeat a great power maintained bases set up by the victors. No Allied or German bases were set up in France after 1815 or 1871, no Japanese bases were set up in Russia after 1905; even after 1918 the Allied occupation of Germany or Turkey did not last more than a decade.

<sup>74</sup>CIA stations are usually established in American embassies, in consulates or in military bases in those countries such as Germany, Japan or Korea where there is a substantial US military force.

<sup>75</sup>In CIA terminology, the word “agent” is never used to describe the CIA career employees also known as case officers. The term “agent” refers to citizens (e.g. Japanese citizens) who work for the CIA or have friendly relations with CIA officers. Most often they are contacted by CIA officers in a most casual way, during social meetings, in golf clubs or other sport activities. Some agents may be retributed on a regular basis, but for people of important social standing and especially for journalists or politicians, the “company” (as the CIA is called by its employees) will help them to progress in their career for instance by providing broad and favorable press coverage.

<sup>76</sup>It should also be kept in mind that the CIA is only one among 16 other American intelligence organizations.

<sup>77</sup>This four-propeller plane had been in use during the 1950s.

the British did not see any problem with this sale. Although the opinion of the State Department was different, Prime Minister Harold Macmillan wanted the sale to proceed. One snag was that the last version of the plane had a radar which was manufactured in Britain by a subsidiary of the American corporation ITT. Naturally, ITT had to follow the directives of the State Department. Eventually, the planes were nevertheless delivered to China in 1963 but we will probably never know for sure if they had an older, British made, radar or, in spite of the American interdiction the new ITT radar (for more details see Engel 2007).

Then in 1965 British Aircraft Corporation (which had absorbed Viscount) began discussions in China to sell the VC10, a four-engine jet, once again much to the displeasure of the American government. At about the same time, BAC was trying to find customers for its new two-engine short-range jetliner BAC111. Four American companies passed orders for a total of 40 aircraft; in contrast, the sales of the VC10s to China never materialized. The New York Times made the following comment<sup>78</sup> The company [BAC] did not want to jeopardize the American market for the sales of the BAC111s by selling VC10s to China.

Ironically, less than 7 years later, once the United States had established diplomatic relations with China after the historic visit of president Nixon in February 1972, aircraft were among the very first items exported to China. Within weeks after Nixon's visit, the Chinese ordered 10 Boeing 707, a four-engine jet, thus giving Boeing a serious toehold in what would become the world's greatest emerging market. In 1994, China represented 10% of Boeing's foreign sales and over the 34 years between 1972 and 2006 it sold a total of 678 aircraft to China<sup>79</sup>.

In what follows we will restrict ourselves to events and facts which can be documented in a meaningful and convincing way. For instance, it has been argued (see Johnson 1995) that Yoshio Kodama played a crucial but hidden role in the Japanese political arena during the 1960s and 1970s. More specifically, it has been said that big amounts of money were transferred by the CIA to Japanese political parties and that Kodama acted as an intermediary in such operations. Unfortunately, and for fairly obvious reasons, such allegations are difficult to prove. The records concerning Kodama that are currently available at NARA are few and of little interest, an observation which suggests that either Kodama did *not* play the role which historians did attribute him or that the relevant records are not yet declassified.

## Funding of political parties

One of the milestones in the investigation of the role played by the CIA in Japanese

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<sup>78</sup>11 April 1965, Sunday, Section Business, page F12.

<sup>79</sup>New York Times: 9 June 1996 and 7 May 2006.

politics was an article published in the New York Times on 30 January 1995 and entitled: “CIA spent millions to support Japanese right in the 1950s and 1960s”. Two fairly convincing pieces of evidence presented in this article were:

- The photocopy of a letter dated 29 July 1958 and addressed by the US ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur II (nephew of General MacArthur), to one of his colleagues at the Department of State.

American Embassy, Tokyo, 29 July 1958

Dear Jeff,

I thought you and Howard P\*\*\*[unreadable] would be interested to know that Eisako Sato, Kishi's brother, has tried to put the bite on us for financial help in fighting Communism. This did not come as a surprise to us since he suggested the same general idea last year and recent conversation with him have indicated that he had this in mind.

I am enclosing a memorandum of Sato's conversation with Stan Carpenter which for obvious reasons should be held rather closely in the Department. When I am in Washington this September I will fill you in further on this.

All the very best,

Sincerely

Douglas MacArthur 2nd.

Eisako Sako was at that time Japan's Finance Minister. The accompanying memorandum is not reproduced in the article but it seems that the authors have been able to read it because they provide a short summary which says that Mr. Sako was worried because “a secret fund established by Japanese companies to help the conservative party was drained”.

- The statement made by U. Alexis Johnson, US ambassador to Japan from 1966 to 1969: “We were financing a party on our side”. He added that the payments continued after he left Japan in 1969 to serve as US Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs at the Department of State.

Is this kind of influence a legacy of the occupation? After 1947 countering Communist influence became the major objective of the occupation authorities. In purges that took place after this date the target shifted from “ultra-nationalists” to leftists. The Japanese government followed this lead all the more easily because of its earlier record in the repression against Communists in the 1930s. Thus, very naturally, anti-Communism provided a strong and enduring bond between Japanese and American interests. It is this bond that the demand presented by Eisako Sato to ambassador MacArthur was invoking.

It is true that anti-Communist policies were implemented in many other countries most of which have not been occupied. Thus, in order to understand more specifi-

cally, in which ways anti-Communist policies in Japan were a legacy of the occupation one would have to compare the ways and means which were used<sup>80</sup>. During the occupation Japanese ministers had numerous contacts (both official and private) with American officials. It is in this sense that the demand presented by the Minister of Finance to the American ambassador can be seen as the perpetuation of occupation practices.

## Japanese medias

There is a close partnership between several Japanese and US medias. Here are some illustrations.

- In 2008 both the “Japan Times” and the “Daily Yomiuri” which are the two main newspapers published in English incorporated in each issue about 3 to 5 articles reproduced from American newspapers such as the the “Washington Post”, the “Los Angeles Times”, or even from Internet posts<sup>81</sup>. It can be argued that it makes sense for a newspaper in English to include articles published in English-speaking countries. However, one can observe that apart from the United States there are no articles from other English-speaking countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia or India. Moreover, this is a fairly recent phenomenon. The Japan Times has been in existence for more than a century and even in the 1950s after the end of the occupation at a moment when the links with the United States were very strong it reprinted no (or very) few US articles.

- A second example is provided by the Japan Advertisement Council (often called “Japan Ad Council”). It was created in 1972 on the model of an American sister company called “Ad Council”. The later was established in February 1942 (i.e. shortly after Pearl Harbor) as the “War Advertisement Council”. Both organizations are sponsored by businesses<sup>82</sup> for the purpose of setting up advertisement campaigns. Although the themes of these campaigns may seem very reasonable (anti-crime, anti-littering) the way they are treated does of course reflect the options of the sponsors. For instance it has been observed that the anti-littering campaign conducted in the US did not mention littering by cigarettes butts, probably because

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<sup>80</sup>Although anti-Communist policies were also implemented in France, especially after 1950, it is difficult to imagine the French Minister of Finance openly asking the US ambassador for anti-Communist funding. If such requests were ever presented (which we do not know) they were probably made through different channels.

<sup>81</sup>On 3 Decembre 2008 the Yomiuri had an article entitled: “Yes, he was a contractor [in Iraq] and a hero” written by the wife of a contractor. Besides an engaging picture of the contractor in Iraq holding a soccer ball, the article provides a fairly unrealistic apology of private contractors. At one point the contractor’s wife observes: “My husband *and his fellow contractors* answered a call and didn’t do it for money”. Well, she may have been aware of what her husband thought but how could she know the motivations of his colleagues?

Two days later, on 5 December, the Yomiuri reprinted a long article from the Washington Post about a US Army doctor who created an organization in Baghdad which provides free medical treatment to Iraqi children.

<sup>82</sup>Some 1,300 Japanese companies support Japan Ad.

the tobacco company Philip Morris was one of the sponsors.

In the next section we examine the important question of television in Japan.

## NHK

Between the Japanese surrender and the coming into effect of the Peace Treaty in 1952 the United States was able to direct Japan's policy in many fields. During this time a great number of "controls" were installed in many Japanese organizations (army, police, education, media, etc.) through which US wishes could be channeled. Were all these controls removed immediately after April 1952? Probably not. In some cases, as for instance regarding the decentralized organization of the police, the structures put in place during the occupation were replaced by others which were more in conformity with Japanese traditions but such a shift took a number of years. Probably there are some sectors in which the structures put in place during the occupation were maintained.

Keeping some degree of control over the NHK was obviously one of the main means through which the United States would be able to keep a long-term influence over Japan's policy. Therefore, one would expect that some of the controls put in place during the occupation were designed in such a way that they could continue to work after 1952. Which ones and how did they work? As in the case of the funding of political parties, the main question is whether appropriate archive documents can be found. Because this is more a question of organization than of funding the task will perhaps be easier. In this respect one can make the following observations.

- The simplest way to put NHK on the "right" track for a long time was of course to pilot the way its personnel was recruited so that to ensure that they would be sympathetic with the objectives of the United States. During the occupation the NHK was under the control of three organizations (Luther and Boyd 1997). (i) The Civil Communication Section (CCS) of SCAP, The Civil Information and Education section (CIE) also of SCAP, the Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) which was rather part of military intelligence. The offices of the CCD and CIE were situated in NHK's main building in Tokyo. CCD was dissolved in October 1949. Thereafter American media experts (including employees of NBC and CBS) were recruited as CIE personnel. Their task was to cooperate with Japanese personnel in order to set up programs which were more in line with Japanese ways than had been done previously. Moreover, during the "Red Scare" there was a screening of media personnel both in the United States and in Japan in order to eliminate leftists.

- Originally NHK's Advisory Committee was established to permit the public to have a voice in NHK programming. It was dissolved by SCAP on 4 May 1949. The invoked reason was that it had been a temporary institution which was no longer

needed. Actually, it was reported that 80% of the committee's members were alleged leftists (Luther and Boyd 1997 p. 50). As a result, NHK became increasingly conservative and all discussions about communism were effectively suppressed.

- Although the Japanese Ministry of Communications was officially credited for having drafted the first Broadcast Bill according to the archives of the Status of Legislation it was actually formulated under the close supervision of SCAP (Luther and Boyd 1997 p. 51). These pressures took the form of (i) SCAP interventions during the discussion of the bill in the Diet in December 1948 (ii) a letter written in December 1949 by General MacArthur to the Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in which he demanded that the amendments required by the Government Section of SCAP be accepted. Through Yoshida's influence the Japanese government yielded. After minor revisions the bill received approval from the Diet on 30 April 1950 and became effective on 1 June 1950.

- Through the search engine of NARA, one can find in Record Group 331 as many as 1,214 files containing documents issued by the "Civil Communications" section of SCAP. This shows that the question of media and communications received great attention. Some of these titles (chosen fairly randomly) read as follows (the numbers at the end of each title are the ARC identifier and box number):

- 1) Monthly Summations, 1945-1951 (377606, 3223)
- 2) Nihon Kyodo Radio Co., October 1945-August 1947 (377527, 3221)
- 3) BCJ, Project, September 1947-December 1948 (377469, 3219)
- 4) First Plan of Communication Reconstruction Program, August 1948, January 1949 (377470, 3219)
- 5) BCJ, Purge, February 1946-June 1947 (377500, 3220)
- 6) BCJ, Personnel Lists, December 1948-June 1951 (377501, 3220)

[To be continued]

# 12

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The present draft is still provisional and in many respects unsatisfactory, but I am convinced that with the help and support of my friends and colleagues it will be possible to bring this project to a successful completion.

# 13

## Japanese words and abbreviations

### Japanese words

ken: prefecture

ku: ward, block (area inside a city)

shi: core city

### Abbreviations

AAA: Anti-Aircraft Artillery

AAA (AW): Anti-Aircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons)

ABCC: Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (US organization which conducted research on atomic bomb survivors)

ACJ: Allied Council for Japan

AFIP: Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (was in charge of research conducted in Japan during the occupation on atomic bomb survivors)

AFPAC: Army Forces Pacific

ARC: Archival Research Catalog (online research engine for US National archives (NARA))

AWM: Australian War Memorial (it is an annex of the National Archives of Australia which holds most of the Australian archives regarding the Second World War; its catalog can be searched by using the search engine of the National Archives)

BCOF: British Commonwealth Occupation Forces

BCOF DIR: British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, Daily Intelligence Reports (see below)

BCOF MIR: British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, Monthly Intelligence Review (see below)

BCOF PRSI: BCOF Provost Monthly [or Weekly] Resume of Serious Incidents (see below)

BRINDIV: British and Indian Division (along with the Australian and New Zealand forces, Brindiv formed BCOF)

CCD: Civil Censorship Detachment

CIA: Central Intelligence Agency (one of the 16 American intelligence agencies)

CIC: Counter Intelligence Corps

CID: Criminal Investigation Division. It is a service of the US Army which investigates law violations within the US Army. Nowadays it is called "US Army Criminal Investigation Command" but the former CID acronym has been kept.

CIE: Civil Information and Education Section

CINCAFPAC: Commander in Chief, American Forces in the Pacific

CIS: Civil Intelligence Section (comprised CCD and CIC)

CLO: Central Liaison Office (assured contacts between SCAP and the Japanese government)

CLO-M: Central Liaison Office Message (message sent by the Japanese government to SCAP via the CLO)

ESS: Economic and Scientific Section of SCAP-GHQ

FD: A financial section of SCAP-GHQ

FEC: Far East Command

FI: A financial section of SCAP-GHQ

G-2: Ground [i.e. Army, as opposed to Navy or Air] Intelligence

GA: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1

GB: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

GCMO: General Court Martial Order [there are 3 kinds of court martials: (i) Summary (for the lightest offenses) (ii) Special (iii) General (for the most serious offenses)]

GHQ: General Headquarters [in addition to the GHQ of SCAP in Tokyo, there was also the Eighth Army GHQ in Yokohama]

GRI: Government of the Ryukyu Islands (formed in April 1952)

GSW: Gun Shot Wound (used in G-1 medical reports)

HQ: Headquarters

JSOB: Japan Special Operations Branch

LAT: Los Angeles Times

LS: Legal Section of SCAP

MD: Military District

MG: Military Government

MID: Military Intelligence Division (a division of the War Department)

MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

MP: Military Police

NAA: National Archives of Australia

NARA: National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, United States.

NARA 1,2,...: see below

NANZ: National Archives of New Zealand

NCDN: North China Daily News

NDL: National Diet Library, Tokyo (the National Library of Japan)

NYT: New York Times

POW: Prisoner of war

ONI: Office of Naval Intelligence

OPP: Okinawa People's Party

SCAP: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers; it designates General MacArthur but most often it refers to the headquarters of the military government in Tokyo (which was distinct from the headquarters of the Eighth Army in Yokohama)

SCAPIN: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Instruction

SWNCC: State, War, Navy, Coordinating Committee

SWPA: South West Pacific Area

USAFFE: US Army Forces in the Far East

USCAR: United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyuan Islands

V-J Day: Victory over Japan Day (15 August 1945)

### Archive records

*All the documents used in the “Occupation project” including those listed below (plus a number of others which have not been used yet) are available in the so-called “Fonds Roehner 434 W” belonging to the archive bureau of “University Pierre and Marie Curie” (UPMC), 4 place Jussieu, 75005 Paris.*

*In addition to archive records there are also several books, for instance a book with many pictures of the 1941-1945 period in Iceland and two volumes about the occupation of South Korea published by Hallym University.*

*Altogether there are 8 boxes which have the reference numbers: 434 W 1-8.*

- *434 W1-4: Japan*
- *434 W5: Hawaii*
- *434 W6: South Korea*
- *434 W7: South Korea, China, Iceland.*
- *434 W8: Germany*

BCOF DIR: British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, Daily Intelligence Reports: Australian War Memorial, series AWM 114, 130/1/8

BCOF GHQ 1: Reports by Commander-in-Chief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. January-December 1946, Part 1 of 6, AWM 114, 130/1/11 [It is a fairly poor source in the sense that none of the incidents described in GHQ8a,b,c are mentioned in this report.]

BCOF GHQ 1: Reports by Commander-in-Chief to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. January-December 1947, Part 2 of 6, AWM 114, 130/1/11

BCOF MIR: British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, Monthly Intelligence Review: Australian War Memorial, series AWM 114, 423/11/1

BCOF PRSI: BCOF Provost Monthly [or Weekly] Resume of Serious Incidents: Australian War Memorial, series AWM 114, 213/4/7 (Dec 1947-Jul 1948)

BRINDIV 1: Brindiv fortnightly intelligence review No 9 (7 Sep.-21 Sep. 1946).

Call number WO 268/768 at the UK National Archives.

- GHQ8a: Headquarters Eighth Army, G-2 [Army intelligence], [Daily] Periodic Report, April-May 1946, Reports No 223-261, AWM 114 423/10/61
- GHQ8b: Headquarters Eighth Army, G-2 [Army intelligence], [Daily] Periodic Report, June 1946, Reports No 269-293, AWM 114 423/10/61
- GHQ8c: Headquarters Eighth Army, G-2 [Army intelligence], [Daily] Periodic Report, July 1946, Reports No 295-320, AWM 114 423/10/61
- GHQ8d: Headquarters Eighth Army, G-2 [Army intelligence], [Daily] Periodic Report, 1 August 1946 - 23 October 1946, Reports No 321-389, AWM 114 423/10/61 [Subsequent reports are not available at the AWM. This is of course understandable because most of the the Commonwealth force left Japan at about that time. These records should be available at NARA; however, according to NARA archivists, they are not included in ARC (which is the online search engine) and they are not catalogued on index cards (letter of September 26, 2007)].
- GHQ8e: Headquarters Eighth Army, G-2 [Army intelligence], [Daily] Periodic Report, June 1947 - November 1947, Reports No 596-716. We give also a few sample cases for 1948. Available on microfiches at the NDL, call numbers: e.g. WOR 17177 to WOR 17184.
- IHS1: SCAP, Information and Historical Service, Monthly summary No 20, February 1948, this document is available in General Eichelberger's papers (microfilm, reel 33)
- MOFA 9: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Record Office. Microfilm No A-0009. Messages addressed by the Japanese government to SCAP (11 Sep 1945 – 31 Oct 1945). [In 1946 there were about 400 messages per month whereas in 1951 the frequency had decreased to 200 monthly messages. The messages have been microfilmed, digitized and are available through the Internet at:  
[http://gaikokiroku.mofa.go.jp/mon/mon\\_a/a100.html](http://gaikokiroku.mofa.go.jp/mon/mon_a/a100.html).  
The microfilms can be found at the National Diet Library. They were reprinted in book form available at open stack at the NDL.]
- MOFA 11: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Record Office. Microfilm No A-0011. Messages addressed by the Japanese government to SCAP (2 Jan 1946 – 1 Apr 1946). [see MOFA 9 for more detailed notes]
- MOFA 28: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Record Office. Microfilm No A-0028. Messages addressed by the Japanese government to SCAP (1 Aug 1951 – 28 Apr 1952); at the end of the microfilm are messages sent by SCAP to the Japanese government in the time interval 11 Sep 1945 – 3 Dec 1945) [see MOFA 9 for more detailed notes]

MOFA 33,47: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Record Office. Microfilms No A-0033, A-0047 These microfilms consist of miscellaneous messages exchanged between CLO and GHQ; the messages addressed personally to SCAP officers by CLO directors are of particular interest because they provide a “non official” perspective. [see MOFA 9 for more detailed notes]

NARA 1: U.S. National Archives at College Park Title: All releases on casualties among Allied personnel, including fires, accidents, and crimes. 1946 (1 record), January 1947-July 1947. [Press releases destined to newspapers] Creator: SCAP - Public Information Section Record group: 331, SCAP Box 22; Stack area 290, Row 9, Compartment 32, Shelf 5.

[Press releases destined to newspapers. Except when stated otherwise, the dates given above based on the records are the dates of the releases rather than the dates of the events.]

NARA 2: U.S. National Archives at College Park Title: Monthly occupation court statistical reports, Yokohama Command (21 November 1949–14 December 1949)

Creator: Eighth U.S. Army. Office of the Judge Advocate.

Record group: 338, Box: 1522 Stack area: 290, Row: 67, Compartment: 25, Shelf 2.

[This series consists of statistical reports of criminal cases heard in military occupation courts. The report gives the date of the trial, name of defendants, charge, sentence. The charge is often very sketchy, for instance “Violation of SCAP directive number 1” which can designate almost any violation of SCAP orders. Somewhat suprisingly, about 75% of the persons tried were Chinese or Koreans rather than Japanese. There are 88 cases (0 Military Commission, 20 General Provost Courts 66 Special Provost Courts) listed in NARA 2; this file covers 3.4 weeks which provides an estimate of  $52 \times 88/3.4 = 1340$  provost court trials for 1949. This figure is about 4 times smaller than the figure for 1948 which is probably due to the fact that this list is restricted to the Yokohama Command and does probably not include the trials in other Corps or Divisions. Obviously defendants from Hokkaido in the north or from Kyushiu in the south were not brought to Yokohama just to be tried in provost courts.

It should be noted that this file provides a selection of cases rather than an exhaustive listing. This can be seen from the fact that there are gaps; for instance there is a small gap as the numbering jumps from SP-92 to SP-110 and a much larger gap as it jumps from SP-140 to SP-1160 (“SP” means “Special Court” which were the provost courts which tried less serious cases than the “General Courts”). It is probably because of this selection procedure that most of the defendants turn out to be American, Chinese and Korean rather than Japanese.

It can also be noted that in this selection almost all charges are of an economic nature: forgery, black market, etc.]

NARA 3: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Title: Supplement March 1946, G-2 History - "Blacklist" operation, 22 April 1946. Record Group 407, Box 2863, Folder 108-109 [1 page]

NARA 4: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Anti-occupation activities, SCAP, Record Group 331, Box 279, File # 17

NARA 5: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Spot intelligence reports G-2, January 1947, SCAP, Record Group 331, Box 290.

NARA 6: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Record Group 331, SCAP Civil Intelligence Section, Box 290, Folder: Annual file, offenses by the occupation forces against Japanese, September 1945–July 1948.

ARC identifier: 311180

[The file gives monthly data by prefecture.]

NARA 7: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Record Group 331, SCAP Civil Intelligence Section, Public Safety Division. Title: Offenses against Occupation Forces.

Stack area 290, Row 10, Compartment 9, Shelf 2, Box 288. ARC identifier: 311126.

NARA 8: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Record Group 331. SCAP, Adjutant General Section.

Title: Index of SCAPIN Administratives 5999-7507.

Stack area 290, Row 10, Compartment 33, Shelf 6, Box 774. ARC identifier: 317439.

NARA 9: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Record Group 331. SCAP, Adjutant General Section.

Title: KODAMA, Yoshio.

Stack area 290, Row 13, Compartment 17, Shelf 3, Box 2275 G, Folder 40. ARC identifier: 358020.

NARA 10: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Record Group 331. SCAP, Civil Censorship Detachment.

Title: Sabotage, 1945-1949.

Stack area 290, Row 22, Compartment 4, Shelf 4, Box 8701.

The copy at my disposal has 56 pages and covers the period from 21 September 1948 to 22 September 1949.

[This files contains records of intercepts made by US censors. These intercepts concern letters, telegrams and phone calls exchanged by Japanese citizens, in particular journalists, business managers or railroad executives or Japanese po-

lice officers. The file also contains information about the objectives of the Japanese Communist Party provided by infiltrated agents working for US intelligence.]

NZNA: New Zealand National Archives [the call numbers are detailed in the chronology].

OPA 1: Okinawa Prefectural Archives: Kamejiro SENAGA, Vol. 1, call number: 0000037475.

[the records contained in this file are mostly issued by the Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and by the Office of the Adjutant General, Headquarters of US Army for the Far East. The file has 145 pages, but the excerpts which are presented in the chronology are from the first 30 pages.]

OPA 2: Okinawa Prefectural Archives: Military Government issuances and correspondence files. [first 30 pages of the microfilm] Call number: U81101373B.

[The subtitle in the electronic catalog is “Monthly operational reports” but this does not seem to describe the content of the first 30 pages which are mainly economic directives.]

SCAP-MOFA 1: Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Microfilm No A-0001. Messages received by the Central Liaison Office of the Japanese Government from American Occupation Forces (31 Aug 1945 – 31 Mar 1946).

[This includes SCAPINs, SCAPIN-As or messages which were not issued by SCAP but rather by the Headquarters of the Eighth Army; see also MOFA 9 for additional notes]

Hussey Papers [Hussey, Alfred Rodman Jr], Microfilm, 12 reels.

[Hussey is mainly known because of his contribution in the drafting of the Japanese constitution, but he played a key-role in many other questions. The documents about the drafting of the constitution can be consulted online on the website of the National Diet Library at the address:

[http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/library/06/hussey/hussey\\_0031.html](http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/library/06/hussey/hussey_0031.html) These documents represent only about 15% of the whole microfilm.]

NARA 11: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Title: 8th Army Historical Report, Judge Advocate General,

Record Group 407, Oct 1945-Dec1947

Stack area 270, Row 52, Compartment 12, Shelf 5, Box 2389.

[I have seen only the first 20 pages]

NARA 12: U.S. National Archives at College Park, Title: Katsunori Tamura, Sadatsuga Saito, Tatsuzo Shimizu

Record of trial by Military Commission at Sapporo, 22 Jan 1946, Hokkaido.

Office of the Judge Advocate General, Record Group 338, Box 1504.

[I have seen only the first 27 pages]

NDL 1: Tokyo National Diet Library's microfiche copies of NARA documents relating to foreign occupied areas. The call numbers of these microfiches begins with FOA. It is an extensive collection of several thousand microfiches.

## Newspapers and periodicals

Amerasia: "Amerasia: a fortnightly review of America and Asia", American periodical, New York.

[This leftist review was published from 1937 to 1947. As indicated by the subtitle, it was first published every fortnight but after 1945 the periodicity became monthly. Its first part consists of mainly political papers about the foreign relations of the United states with Asian countries. The second part gives a chronology of the main facts that occurred during the period covered by the issue in question. Although much shorter than the first part, this 2-or 3-page chronology is of interest.

In early 1945 the editor Philip Jaffe was arrested by the FBI and charged with divulging secret military information. Although the matter was eventually settled by the payment of a fine, the exact terms of the agreement that was struck are not known.]

GL: "Gazette de Lausanne", Swiss newspaper, Lausanne

Keesing: Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives) [It is not a newspaper but a compilation of news published at regular intervals since 1931.]

LM: "Le Monde", French newspaper, Paris

NT: "Nippon Times", Japanese newspaper, Tokyo [the title was subsequently changed into "Japan Times"]

NCDN: North China Daily News, Shanghai edition, available at the Zi-Ka-Wez library in Shanghai.

NYT: "New York Times", American newspaper, New York

NYTI: Index of the "New York Times", available on the NYT's website

PSS: "Pacific Stars and Stripes", newspaper read by US troops

SN: "Shanghai News", Chinese newspaper, Shanghai

ST: "Straits Times", Malaysian newspaper, Singapore

Times: "Times", British newspaper, London

Except when stated otherwise, the dates indicated in the chronology are the dates of the newspaper articles.

## Books and articles

Agee (P.) 1975: *Inside the company: CIA diary*. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth (England).

French translation: *Journal d'un agent secret. Dix ans dans la C.I.A.* Editions du Seuil, Paris (1976).

[Apart from the translation in French the book has also been translated in several other languages including German, but apparently not in Japanese]

Aldous (C.) 1997: *The police in occupation Japan*. Routledge, London.

Aldous (C.) 2003: *Achieving reversion: protest and authority in Okinawa 1952-1970*. *Modern Asian Studies* 37, 2, 485-508.

Allen (G.) 1950: *Hawaii's war years*. University of Hawaii Press

Ando (N.) 1991: *Surrender, occupation, and private property in international law: an evaluation of US practice in Japan*. Oxford University Press, New York.

Haas (M.E.) 1997: *Apollo's warriors. US Air Force special operations during the Cold War*. Air University Press. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Appleman (R.E.), Burns (J.M.), Gugeler (R.A.), Stevens (J.) 1948, 2000: *Okinawa: the last battle*. Center for Military History, United States Army.

[The book was written in 1946-1947 (the preface is dated 1 July 1947), published in 1948 and made available online in 2000].

Baez (F.) 2004, 2008: *A universal history of the destruction of books. From Ancient Sumer to modern-day Iraq*. Atlas and Co.

Baillie (H.) 1959: *High tension. The recollections of Hugh Baillie*. Harper and Brothers, New York.

[In the 1940s Baillie was president of the United Press. During 1944-1946 he visited Japan, China and Korea and meet with many important figures, e.g. Chiang Kai-shek, Hirohito, Konoye, MacArthur, Rhee, Tojo.]

Bates (P.) 1993: *Japan and the British Commonwealth Occupation Force 1946-1952*. Brassey, London.

Bodard (L.) 1972-1973: *La guerre d'Indochine*. 5 volumes. 1. L'enlèvement 2. L'illusion 3. L'humiliation 4. L'aventure 5. L'épuisement. Gallimard, Paris.

Braibanti (R.J.D.) 1948: *Occupation controls in Japan*. *Far Eastern Survey* 17, 18, Sep 22, 215-219.

Braibanti (R.J.D.) 1950: *The role of administration in the occupation of Japan*. An-

- nals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 267, (Jan 1950), 154-163.
- Braw (M.) 1986, 1991: The atomic bomb suppressed. American censorship in occupied Japan. East Gate, Amonk (New York State)
- Brines (R.) 1948: MacArthur's Japan. J.B. Lippincott Company, New York.
- Brocklebank (L.) 1997: Jayforce and the military occupation of Japan 1945-1948. Oxford University Press, Auckland.
- Carter (C.) 2002: Between war and peace: the experience of occupation for members of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force 1945-1952. PhD Thesis, NSW University and Australian Defence Force Academy.
- Cavaleri (D.P.) 2005: Easier said than done: making the transition between combat operations and stability operations. Combat Studies Institute Press, Fort Leavenworth (Kansas) [especially Chapter 3: Case study: occupation of Japan, 1945-1952]
- Ceplair (L.) 2011: Anti-Communism in twentieth-century America. Praeger, Santa Barbara.
- Cernicky (Lt. Col. A.W.) 2006: Moral power and hearts-and-minds strategy in post-conflict operations. Chapter 3 of "Strategic challenges for counterinsurgency and the global war on terrorism" edited by W. Murray. Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.
- Cole (A.B.), Totten (G.O.), Uyehara (C.H.) 1966: Socialist parties in postwar Japan. Yale University Press. New Haven.
- Coughlin (W.J.) 1952: Conquered press. The MacArthur era in Japanese journalism. Pacific Books, Palo Alto (California).
- Cumings (B.) 1997: Korea's place in the Sun. A modern history. W.W. Norton and Company, New York.
- Davies (G.) 2001: The Occupation of Japan. The rhetoric and the reality of Anglo-Australian relations 1939-1952. University of Queensland Press, St Lucia (Queensland).
- Dower (J.W.) 1986: War without mercy. Race and power in the Pacific War. Pantheon Books. New York.
- Dower (J.W.) 1999: Embracing defeat: Japan in the wake of World War II. Free Press, New York.
- Dower (J.W.) 2003 a: Occupation preoccupation. New York Times March 30, p. 9.
- Dower (J.W.) 2003 b: Bush's comparison of Iraq with postwar Japan ignores the fact. Los Angeles Times December 8, p. 11.

Documents concerning the Allied occupation and control of Japan (1949, 1989). 6 volumes. Volume II. Political, military and cultural. Compiled by the Division of Special Records, Foreign Office, Japanese Government. [This compilation was issued in 1949 but reprinted in 1989. It is a bilingual English-Japanese edition. It is available in the room for modern Japanese history of the NDL.]

Eichelberger (R.L.) 1951: *Jungle road to Tokyo*. Odhams Press, London.

Eichelberger Papers: General Eichelberger's papers. Edited on microfilm by Adam Matthew Publications, London.

Elliott (M.) 1995: *Occupational hazards: a doctor in Japan and elsewhere*. Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, *Australians in Asia Series No 14.*, Griffith University, Queensland.

Engel (J.A.) 2007: *Cold war at 30,000 feet. The Anglo-American fight for aviation supremacy*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts).

Finn (R.B.) 1992: *Winners in peace: MacArthur, Yoshida and postwar Japan* University of California Press, Berkeley.

[Richard B. Finn participated in the Occupation as a young naval officer. After his stay in Japan he became for 32 years a civil servant at the Department of State. Therefore it is perhaps not surprising that the account of the occupation given in this book omits all aspects that are not consistent with the view promoted by SCAP; in other words, the aspects which have been removed from the news during the occupation are also (for the most part) omitted here. It is in this sense that one can speak of an "official" version of the history of the occupation.]

*Fifty years of light and dark. The Hirohito era, 1975*. Edited by the staff of Mainichi Daily News. Tokyo.

Gerster (R.) 2008: *Travels in atomic sunshine. Australia and the occupation of Japan*. Scribe, Melbourne.

[From an account published in 2008 (that is to say 60 years after the occupation) one would expect that it adds some substantial information on important points left pending by former publications. In this respect the book is fairly disappointing. For instance, despite its title which promises a thorough investigation of the question of radioactive contamination of Australian troops, it provides almost no solid information on that issue. Not even the health data collected by association of veterans are given.

The book is quite as disappointing on other issues; for instance, in the index there are no entries for the words "provost court", "arson", "assaults".]

Ginn (J.L.) 1992: *Sugamo prison, Tokyo. An account of the trial and sentencing of Japanese war criminals in 1948 by a US participant*. McFarland and Company.

[This book gives a list of the 60 Japanese executed at Sugamo prison with names and dates of execution.]

Goldstein (L.C.) 2005: Irak: Befreier in Ketten. [Iraq: liberation or occupation.] Internationale Politik, November 2005.

Goldstein (L.C.) 2008: A strategic failure. American information control policy in occupied Iraq. Military Review, March-April 2008, 58-65.

Grad (A.J.) 1948: Land reform in Japan. Pacific Affairs 21,2,115-135 (June).

Green (M.C.) 2010: Black yanks in the Pacific. Race in the making of American military empire after World War II. Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Haikyo kara no shuppatsu. Kodansha, Tokyo [chronology in Japanese several volumes].

Hanayama (S.) 1955: The way of deliverance. Three years with the condemned Japanese war criminals. Translated by Hideo Suzuki, Eiichi Noda and James K. Sasaki. [Translation revised by Harrison Collins] Gollancz, London.

[The list of executions given in this book confirms the one given in Ginn (1992) but it ends on 31 December 1948.

It can be noted that the version of the crime charged on Katsunori Tamura who was not executed for war crime is completely different from the version given by military authorities (see the chronology at the date of 19 December 1945). Here it is said that Tamura robbed and beat to death a US soldier; the fact that this is a more “unforgivable” crime than the one actually committed by Tamura (if we believe that the account by military authorities is correct) may be related to the fact that the Japanese version of this book was published in February 1949 and was therefore subject to American censorship.]

Harada (H.) 1994 [in Japanese]: MP no jipu kara mita senryoka no Tokyo: dojo keisatsukan no kansatsuki. Tokyo [Recollections of Hiroshi Harada who was fireman and policeman in Tokyo].

Harper (N.D.) 1951: Review of “Selected data on the occupation of Japan”. Pacific Affairs 24,1, March 1951, 87-88.

Hashimoto (T.) 1952 [in Japanese]: Senryo chika no tatakai. Tokyo. [Resistance under occupation].

Hirano (K.) 1992: Mr. Smith goes to Tokyo. The Japanese cinema under the American occupation. Smithsonian Institute, Washington DC.

Indian Mutiny 1: Letters from Secret Committee of court of directors of East India Company to Governor General, March 1858, relative to policy towards natives of provinces lately in state of hostility, 1857-1858, XLIV Library of Cambridge University, call number mf 63.373.

- Indian Mutiny 2: Records, correspondence. 2 volumes. Lahore 1911. Library of Cambridge University, call number OP.3282.900.01 (7-10).
- Israel (F.L.) 1967: Military justice in Hawaii 1941-1944. *The Pacific Historical Review* 36, 3, 243-267.
- Johnson (C.) 1995: The 1955 system and the American connection: a bibliographic introduction. Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper No 11, July 1995.
- Kapur (J.) 2005: The return of history as horror: Onibaba and the atomic bomb. in: *Horror International* edited by Schneider (S.J.), Williams (T.). Wayne State University Press.
- Kawagoe (T.) 1999: Agricultural land reform in postwar Japan: experience and issues. World Bank Report, May.
- Knightley (P.) 1975, 2004: The first casualty. The war correspondent as hero and myth-marker from the Crimea to Iraq. John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
- Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan 1983, published by Kodansha, Tokyo.
- Krueger (W.) 1953, 1979: From Down under to Nippon. Zenger Publishing, Washington DC.
- Lauterbach (R.E.) 1947: *Danger from the East*. Harper and Brothers.
- Laws and regulations during the U.S. administration of Okinawa 1945-1972. Compiled by Gekkan Okinawa, published by Ikemiya Shokai and Company (1983); 4 volumes. [It should be noted that these volumes do not provide an exhaustive list of the proclamations; the foreword warns the reader that “of the 121 proclamations known to have been issued, only 57 could be collected”. More specifically, there have been:
- (i) 10 Navy Military Government Proclamations (1945-1946) all of which are reported
  - (ii) About 40 Military Government Special Proclamations (1947-1950) of which only 5 are reported.
  - (iii) About 40 Civil Administration (actually a misnomer for this administration was dominated by the military) Proclamations (1950-1956) of which 14 are reported.
  - (iv) 27 Civil Administration Proclamations (1957-1972) all of which are reported. For instance, it is known that Special Proclamations No 12 and 20 (not given in the compilation) are about the creation of a court system (Japanese version of Wikipedia)]
- Liesner (T.) 1989: *One hundred years of economic statistics*. Facts On File. New York.

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- MacArthur (D.) 1964: *Reminiscences*. McGraw-Hill, New York.
- Manchester (W.) 1980, 1987: *Goodbye darkness*. A memoir of the Pacific War. Dell Publishing Company, New York.
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- Moore (R.A.), Robinson (D.L.) 2002: *Partners for democracy. Crafting the Japanese state under MacArthur*. Oxford University Press. New York.
- Morris (J.) 1947: *The phoenix cup*. Some notes on Japan in 1946. The Cresset Press, London.
- Murray (W.) 2006: *Strategic challenges for counterinsurgency and the global war on terrorism*. Strategic Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

- Nippon Times 1947: Directives of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. There are 4 booklets: 1945, 1946 (Jan-Jun), 1946 (Jul-Dec), 1947 (Jan-Jun). [The publication reproduces the text of some 800 memoranda and SCAPINs addressed to the Japanese government. Surprisingly, there is no introductory section about the circumstances of this publication; even the date of publication is not clearly indicated; it may be supposed that it was published in late 1947 or early 1948 because it does not cover the second semester of 1947.]
- Nishio (K.) 2010: Breaking the seal on the GHQ burned books. Available online on the website of the “Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact”. It is the English (probably only partial) version of: “GHQ enjo tosho kaifu”, 3 Volumes. Tokyo, Tokuna Shoten. [This 70-page document describes the circumstances of the confiscation of about Japanese 220,000 books (corresponding to 7,769 titles) by SCAP authorities between 1946 and 1948. It provides about 30 pages of copies of original SCAP documents.]
- Nobleman (E.E.) 1950: American Military Government courts in Germany: their role in the democratization of the German people. Published by the Provost Marshal General’s School, Training packet No 52.
- O’Donnel (P.) 2005: In time of war. Hitler’s terrorist attack on America. The New Press, New York.
- Okamoto (S.) 2001: The man who saved kabuki. Faubion Bowers and theatre censorship in occupied Japan. Translated and adapted by S.L. Leiter. University of Hawaii Press. Honolulu. [This is an edited translation of the original book in Japanese in the sense that a number of sections have been left out because the translator had the impression that they would not interest western readers.]
- Packard (G.R. 3rd) 1966: Protest in Tokyo. The Security Treaty crisis of 1960. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
- Pal (R.) 1953: Dissentient judgment of Justice Pal: International Military Tribunal for the Far East. Sanyal and Co, Calcutta. [Justice Radhabinod Pal who represented British India was one of the 11 judges of the court which tried 28 defendants, mostly high ranking Japanese officials. Justice Pal delivered one of the three dissenting opinions. A Japanese translation of his opinion was published in 1952 immediately after the end of the occupation. An English edition was published in Calcutta in April 1953 which in addition had a photographic appendix about the atomic destructions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Justice Pal summarizes his judgment in the following words (p. 697): “For the

reasons given in the foregoing pages, I would hold that each and everyone of the accused must be found not guilty of each and everyone of the charges in the indictment and should be acquitted of all those charges”. In his conclusion he observes (p. 700): “It has been said that a victor can dispense to the vanquished everything from mercy to vindictiveness. But the one thing the victor cannot give is Justice”.

In many instances, Justice Pal complains that (p. 682) “the majority of the evidence is the statement of persons of unknown reliability *taken out of court* without any guarantee of trustworthiness. Both the ability and willingness of these persons to declare the truth remain untested”. Moreover, he remarks that (p. 626): “Practically for each kind of story only one witness is produced, may be to minimize the possibility of discrepancies and contradictions.”

Justice Pal’s suspicions received a late confirmation through the testimony of Benjamin Ferencz, a lead US prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal (reported in the “Washington Post” newspaper of 24 July 2005). Ferencz, then 85 year-old, explained: “You know how I got witness statements? I would go into a village where, say, an American pilot had parachuted and been beaten to death and line everyone one up against the wall. Then I would say: ‘Anyone who lies will be shot on the spot.’ It never occurred to me that statements taken under duress would be invalid”. It is most likely that similar methods were used in gathering testimonies for the Tokyo trial.

Justice Pal examines successively the political and criminal charges.

For the first which consist basically in a charge of pro-war conspiracy he points out that the laws under which such acts became a crime were enacted after the war and therefore post-dated the facts. In addition, he argues that the occupation of Manchuria and part of China was a classical case of military conquest in which the main impetus was provided by fairly easy victories without necessarily implying a conspiracy by political leaders. He emphasizes that at least until 1937 there was a collaboration between Japan and the Nationalist government as is shown by the agreements (e.g. the Ho-Umezu Agreement of 10 June 1935) that were concluded. For the charges in relation with massacres of civilians and prisoners of war, he emphasizes that: (i) Almost all these charges were based on testimonies without any possibility of cross-examination of the witnesses. (ii) No official documents were produced by the prosecution which would show that these massacres were approved by the government officials under trial. (iii) There is hardly any army of any of the Powers including the victors, where similar stray occurrences of atrocities did not take place (p. 628).

By comparison with the rules of law in use in Western countries the procedure of the Tokyo Tribunal strongly favored the accusation. This can be illustrated by the

following two rules. (Charter of the IMTFE)

- Voting. All decisions and judgments of the Tribunal, including convictions and sentences, shall be by a majority vote of those Members of the Tribunal present. In case the votes are evenly divided, the vote of the President shall be decisive<sup>83</sup>. (Article 4b)

- Judgment and review. The record of the trial will be transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for his action thereon. A sentence will be carried out in accordance with his order. He may at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentence except to increase its severity. (Article 17)

The majority rule contrasted with the unanimity, two-third or three-fourth majority rules commonly adopted in western nations. The second rule eliminated the possibility of a review of the trial. In this regard discretionary power was given to a single person, namely General MacArthur<sup>84</sup>.

In contrast to the Tokyo tribunal there was no public witness to the US military tribunals which convicted B/C war suspects. Thus, although they sentenced about 140 Japanese to death, these trials gave them minimal legal guaranty for a fair trial.]

Piccigallo (P.R.) 1979: *The Japanese on trial. Allied war crime operations in the East 1945-1951.* University of Texas Press, Austin.

Price (B.) 1945: Report of Byron Price to the President. Relations between the American Forces of occupation and the German people. Department of State Bulletin Dec 2, 1945, p. 885-892.

Reday (J.Z.) 1949: Reparations in Japan. *Far Eastern Survey* 18,13,145-151.

Report on veterans' benefits in the United States 1956: Government Printing Office, Washington DC, issued on 9 May 1956. [This publication comprises 7 staff reports; the 7th report entitled "Survivors benefits for service connected deaths" provides data about the number of death gratuity payments.]

Report of Military Government activities for period from 1 April 1945 to 1 July 1946. 2000. [Written by Colonel Charles I. Murray of the US Marine Corps who commanded Military Government operations in Okinawa during 1945-1946, this report was republished in 2000 in Japan in a volume which also contains the "Summations of US Army Military Government activities" (see below)]

Roehner (B.M.), Syme (T.) 2002: *Pattern and repertoire in history.* Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts).

Roehner (B.) 2004: *Cohésion sociale.* Odile Jacob, Paris.

[In particular chapter 8: *Résistance à une occupation étrangère (Resistance to*

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<sup>83</sup>The rules of the Tokyo trial closely followed the rules of the Nuremberg trial with the important difference that at Nuremberg: "Convictions and sentences shall only be imposed by affirmative votes of at least 3 of the 4 members of the tribunal." At the Tokyo trial, 5 of the 11 judges expressed dissenting opinions.

<sup>84</sup>At the Nuremberg trial this power was given collectively to the "Control Council for Germany".

foreign occupation).]

Roehner (B.M.) 2007: *Driving forces in physical, biological and social phenomena*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. [The section entitled “Interaction between Japanese population and occupation troops” (p. 90-98) is a condensed version of the present study; it includes in particular the graphs on quantitative statistical evidence.]

Roehner (B.M.) 2010: *Relations between military forces and the population of Hawaii*. LPTHE, University of Paris 6, Working Report.

Sarantakes (N.E.) 1999: *Alliance in doubt*. *American Diplomacy* 4,4

Sarantakes (N.E.) 2000: *Keystone: The American occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese relations*. Texas A& M University Press [the letters A& M refer to the earlier name of “Agricultural and Mechanical College”]

Sayers (M.), Kahn (A.E.) 1942: *Sabotage! The secret war against America*. Harper and Brother, New York.

SCAPINS 1952: *Supreme Commander for the Allied Power’s Instructions to the Japanese Government issued by Economic and Scientific Section from 4 September 1945 to 8 March 1952, not including administrative instructions designated as SCAPIN-A’s*. General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 20 March 1952. [This publication which gives the text of about 800 SCAPINs issued by one of the sections of SCAP is available only in a few European libraries. One of them is the documentation center of the International Labour Office in Geneva. It is also available on line on the website of the Diplomatic Record Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan. It should be noted that the Economic and Scientific Section was not in charge of agricultural problems; this is why the well-known directive about land reform (SCAPIN 411 of 9 December 1945) is not included in this volume; it is the “Natural Resources Section” which was in charge of agriculture.

In this volume one can find the text of the SCAPINs which organized the removal of items (industrial or scientific equipment as well as commodities) which were taken away for reparations purposes (e.g. see 1023, 1146, 1894, 1925).

SCAPINS 1-600: *Records of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), 1945-1952*. Microfilm distributed by Thomson-Gale, London.

Schaller (M.) 1995: *America’s favorite war criminal: Kishi Nobusuke and the transformation of U.S.-Japan relations*. Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper No 11, July 1995.

Schmidt (P.) 2002: *Capital punishment in Japan*. Brill, Leiden.

[This book contains data for the annual number of death sentences and executions inflicted by Japanese tribunals. A graph on p. 37 shows that there was a huge increase in the number of death sentences during the years 1947-1948: it jumped from about 20 in 1946 to 105 in 1947 and 116 in 1948 and then fell again to 55 in 1949. However, most of these sentences were not carried out (in 1948 there were only 33 executions). The author does not explain what brought about this upsurge in death sentences. Incidentally, it is also surprising that the author does not devote a single line to the sentences and executions inflicted by Allied Military Tribunals.]

Schrijvers (P.) 2002: *The GI war against Japan*. New York University Press, New York City.

Seagrave (S.), Seagrave (P.) 1999: *The Yamato dynasty*. Broadway Books.

Selected data on the occupation of Japan and activities of General Headquarters, Supreme Commander Allied Powers and Far Eastern Command. 1950. General Headquarters SCAP.

Shaw (H.I. Jr) 1961,1969: *The United States Marines in the Occupation of Japan*. Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.

Staff of Mainichi Daily News 1975: *Fifty years of light and dark. The Hirohito era*. Mainichi Newspaper, Tokyo.

Suizide von Männern in Österreich. Statistisch-epidemiologische Untersuchung. 2003. Bundesministerium für Soziale Sicherheit, Generationen und Konsumentenschutz. Vienna.

Summations of US Army Military Government activities in the Ryukyu Islands. [There are 12 volumes each of which in principle covers a two month period. These "Summations" have been republished in Japan in 2000 as Vol. 9 in a series of about 20 volumes of documents about the Ryukyu Islands. Volume 9 is the only volume which (because of its content) is in English.]

Svoboda (T.) 2008: *Black glasses like Clark Kent. A GI's secret from postwar Japan*. Graywolf Press, Saint Paul (Minnesota).

[In 1946, Terese Svoboda's uncle served as a military policeman in occupied Japan. He was assigned to the 8th Army stockade in Tokyo where he guarded fellow GIs who had been sentenced by court-martials. After her uncle committed suicide in 2004 leaving behind him audio-tapes about his experience in Japan, Terese Svoboda began her own investigation. Digging through countless files at the National Archives and contacting the few surviving veterans who served with her uncle progressively made her aware of the fact that a thick blanket of censorship still covers many aspects of the occupation of Japan.

This book has won the Graywolf Press Nonfiction Prize.]

Svoboda (T.) 2009: US courts-martials in occupation Japan: rape, race and censorship. *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus Newsletter* No 21, 25 May 2009.

[Taking the question of rape in occupied Japan as a starting point, this article sets out to examine how such sensitive aspects were “erased” from the collective memory. Terese Svoboda identifies two key-mechanisms (i) A strict censorship policy during the occupation; this policy was all the more effective and successful because it was a hidden censorship in the sense that it was strictly prohibited to mention it. (ii) “Soft censorship” in the decades following the occupation which managed to direct the attention of researchers away from sensitive topics and kept a number of crucial data (e.g. the number of GIs who died during the occupation) confidential.]

Takemae (E.), Ricketts (R.), Swann (S.) 2002: *Inside GHQ. The Allied occupation and its legacy.* Continuum, New York.

[This is more than an English translation of the book entitled “GHQ” which was published by Takemae in Japanese in 1983. In fact the collaboration between Takemae and his two American co-authors resulted in a book which is a substantially revised and expanded version of the earlier book; the book of 1983 had 214 pages whereas the present one has 751 pages. It was republished in 2003 under the broader title: “The Allied occupation of Japan”.

What was the incidence of having this book co-edited by American and Japanese scholars. Clearly a book about the French occupation of Algeria that would be co-edited by Algerian and French scholars would not be the same (in tone as well as in the selection of facts) as a book written solely by Algerian historians. Robert Ricketts, whom I had the privilege to meet in Tokyo in November 2007, is certainly a remarkable person. There are probably few Americans who are able to speak fluent French and to read (and speak) Japanese. He became fluent in French thanks, if I remember correctly, to a long stay in Algeria where he was working for an American cooperation organization linked to the Department of State. In Japan, where he has been living for over 10 years, he teaches at Waco University in the vicinity of Tokyo. However, he does not belong to the Department of History but to the Department of Human Relation. To what extent is he still in contact with the Department of State is difficult to say. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that the Department of State, in some way or another, is in touch with a substantial number of professors and scholars stationed abroad. This is something to which we, Europeans, are not so used.]

Tanaka (M.) 1952: *Nihon muzairon: shinri no sabaki* (On Japan’s innocence: the truth on trial). Taiheiyo shuppansha, Tokyo.

- Tanaka (Y.) 2002: Japan's comfort women. Sexual slavery and prostitution during World War II and the U.S. occupation. Routledge, London.
- Tanji (M.) 2003: The enduring myth of an Okinawan struggle: the history and trajectory of a diverse community of protest. Thesis, Murdoch University, Australia.
- Tanji (M.) 2006: Myth, protest and struggle in Okinawa. Routledge, London.
- Textor (R.B.) 1951: Failure in Japan, with keystones for a positive policy. John Day Company, New York.
- Trainor (J.C.) 1983: Educational reform in occupied Japan. Trainor's memoir. Meisei University Press, Tokyo.
- Tsuchiya (Y.) 2002: Imagined America in occupied Japan. (Re-)educational films shown by the US occupation forces to the Japanese 1948-1952. *The Japanese Journal of American Studies* 13,193-213.  
[As an example of "imagined America" the article present "Steel town", a movie shown in Japan in 1946. It portrays a classless and race struggle free America where native-born and immigrants work side by side and share their leisure time.]
- Tsurumi (S.) 1961 [in Japanese]: *Haikyo no naka kara, 1945-1952* [A new edition of the book was published in 2002]
- Uchikawa (Y.) 1964: Process of establishment of the new system of broadcasting in post-war Japan. *Studies of Broadcasting*, March 1964, 2, 51-80.
- US Army Corps of Engineers 1997: Preliminary assessment, camp McQuaide, Santa Cruz County, California. Environmental Design Section, Sacramento District.
- Ward (E. E.) 1990: Land reform in Japan, 1946-1950, the Allied role. Rural Cultural Association. Distributed on Internet through Japan Publications Trading Co.
- Watari (N.), Nagato (C.), So (K.), Youn (S.K.) n.d.: Intergovernmental relations in Japan.
- Werth (R.) 1949: The development of boards of education in Japan. *American School Board Journal*, March 1949.
- Wood (J.) 1998: The forgotten force. The Australian military contribution to the occupation of Japan 1945-1952. Paul and Co Publishing Consortium [available online of the website of the AWM]
- Woodard (W.P.) 1972: The Allied occupation of Japan 1945-1952 and Japanese religion. E.J. Brill. Leiden.
- Yoshida (K.) 2001: Democracy betrayed. Okinawa under U.S. occupation. Western Washington University, Bellingham (Washington).
- Yoshida (T.) 2006: The making of the "rape of Nanking". History and memory in Japan, China, and the United States. Oxford University Press, New York.

## Websites

National Diet Library: <http://www.ndl.go.jp>

SCAPINcat:

[http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/kensei\\_shiryosenshyo/pdf/SCA\\_1.pdf](http://www.ndl.go.jp/jp/data/kensei_shiryosenshyo/pdf/SCA_1.pdf)

Provides a list of the 2,133 SCAPINs issued between 2 September and 26 April 1952. Note that this list does not include the memoranda which have not been registered as SCAPINs

INCLIST: Okinawa Peace Network of Los Angeles:

[http://www.uchinanchu.org/history/list\\_of\\_crimes.htm](http://www.uchinanchu.org/history/list_of_crimes.htm)

Provides a list of incidents that occurred during the occupation in Okinawa. Note that this list comprises only 2 incidents for the period 1945-1950.

Sarantakes website:

<http://tamu-commerce.edu/sarantakes/Time.html>

## Occupation episodes and analytical history


By education the present author is a physicist, so it may not be surprising that he tried to transform history into a testable science. How to do that was explained in a book he co-authored with Pr. Tony Syme and which was published by Harvard University Press in 2002.

The main step in transforming history into a testable science is to study not just one case but several similar cases. Indeed, a physicist does not just study the fall of one kind of bodies (e.g. apples), he wants to describe and understand the fall of all kinds of falling objects (e.g. iron balls, drops of water, hailstones, and so on).

Actually this requirement is not specific to physics, it is common to all testable sciences. Thus, in medicine one does not wish to describe solely the influenza of Mr. Martin; one wants to understand *all cases of influenza* whether they occur in China, Europe or the United States.



Bertrand Roehner (Oct. 2012)



Harvard University Press (2002)

That is why the present study is part of a series of several books devoted to various occupation episodes.

### Studies of “occupation” episodes by the same author

#### 1 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan

2 Relations between Allied forces and the populations of Germany and Austria.

3 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Iceland

4 Relations between US forces and the population of Hawaii

5 Relations between American forces and the population of China

6 Relations between American forces and the population of South Korea

7 Relations between American forces and the population of Australia

All these studies are available on the author's website at:

<http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/roehner/occupation.html>

## Modules and submodules

What we call modules of a major historical episode are simpler elements. Occupation episodes are modules of the Second World War, but these modules have themselves several aspects that can be called submodules. It turns out that many of these submodules are common to several occupation episodes.

As examples of such submodules one can mention:

- Military tribunals
- Clashes between soldiers and the population
- Looting of art items
- Purge of undesirable elements in education and the medias
- Control of political activity
- Introduction of a special currency
- Creation of new universities
- Establishment of exchange programs for teachers or officers in the police and armed forces

For each submodule the various occupation episodes will provide several realizations. These realizations parallel the repeated experiments conducted by a physicist who wants to study a specific phenomenon.

Of course, defining the submodules and collecting all information about them is only the first step. Once this has been done, the historian is in the same situation as a physicist who has finished a first round of experiments.

The next challenge is to make sense of the data. This means asking the right ques-

tions in order to find some hidden order behind them. Once a regularity has emerged, a new set of observations can be planned which will permit to improve its accuracy.