RELATIONS BETWEEN US FORCES AND THE POPULATION OF CHINA

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“The men of Ying [i.e. the British] have treated us like dogs on our own earth! They have lorded it over us since they won those wars against us, opium wars they called them, but they were wars of conquest. Their battleships have sailed our rivers and their soldiers have paraded our streets. They took land from us for their own. They refused to obey our laws and here in our country they have set up their own laws for themselves, and their own courts and their own judges, and when one of them robbed us or even when one of them killed one of us, there has been no justice. Their priests have paid no taxes. Tax free they have gone where they liked and preached their religion which is not ours. They have turned the hearts of our young away from our elders. They have sat at our customs gates and taken the toll of our merchandise.”

[Contention of a Chinese general who was ordered by President Chiang Kai-shek to go with his troops to the help of the British in Burma. In March 1942 three Chinese divisions crossed the border into Burma under the operational command of General Stilwell in what quickly became a military disaster.]

—Pearl S. Buck, Promise, chapter 2 (1943)

“Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?”
“Yes, to the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.”
“The dog did nothing in the night-time.”
“That was the curious incident,” remarked Sherlock Holmes.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze (1892)

There is a strong family resemblance about the misdeeds, and if you have all the details of a thousand at your finger ends, it is odd if you can’t unravel the thousand and first.

—Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, The Valley of Fear (1915)
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Version of 14 June 2014. Comments are welcome.

We hope that these notes will enable us to get in touch with Chinese scholars. Needless to say, this is an essential condition for the success of this project. Please, if you happen to know people who have a working interest in this kind of historiography do not hesitate to send them a copy of the present manuscript.

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Why is this study particularly, albeit not exclusively, focused on the role of US forces? The reason is very simple.

In this book we do not wish to repeat what has already been well documented. The role of Japan which eventually led to a protracted war is well known. The invasions by British or French troops during the wars of the 19th century were also fairly well described. In a general way, just because they are so conspicuous, military interventions have been well studied. For instance, many accounts of the Boxer Rebellion and its suppression have been published. On the contrary, “soft” foreign interventions have been less studied and that is why it is on this kind of events that we wish to focus our attention.

During the concession era foreign troops from various countries were stationed in many Chinese cities. However, the high time of the concession era was the late 19th century and early 20th century. As we will see later on, the broad agreement between western powers already began to falter after the First World War. The present study is mostly (albeit not exclusively) focused on the 20th century and more particularly on the period after the revolution of 1911. During this time interval the United States was not the only power which pursued a soft intervention strategy. In the west and north-west of China, Russia carried on an infiltration policy which eventually led to the outright secession of Outer Mongolia and its transformation into a de facto satellite of the Soviet Union. However, to tell this story appropriately, one would have to know Russian in order to be able to read Soviet archives and newspapers.

In short, the scope of this study was shaped by three constraints. (i) The wish to focus on episodes and aspects fairly neglected by earlier historians. (ii) Our own language capabilities. (iii) The fact that this study is part of a series of comparative studies about occupation episodes by US troops.

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1Through the reparation treaty which followed the Boxer Rebellion the Western powers and Japan obtained enclaves in 12 more cities in addition to those already in existence.
READING ADVICE
This is a history book but a fairly unusual one. Its main parts are its chronologies. However it is well known that, just like dictionaries, chronologies are not easy to read and indeed they are destined to be read from first to last page. The chronologies contained in this book provide detailed (almost daily) accounts of major events but do not provide a uniform coverage of all events. In other words, this book presupposes some broad prior knowledge of the history of China.
How to read this book depends upon what potential readers already know and what they wish to find.

- Readers (particularly Chinese readers) who are already familiar with the main events which occurred between 1840 and 1949 may wish to learn more about the role played by foreign powers in these events. Depending on whether they are interested in military, political, or economic aspects, they may use the relevant sections in the chapters preceding the chronology chapter.

In addition, the chronology can be explored by key-word search. For instance, if one is interested in the collaboration between the Nationalists and the Japanese one may use the key-word “Ho Ying-chi” who was a KMT official who played a key role in this collaboration policy.

- Readers who do not have an overall notion of the history of China can start by reading a summary on the Internet and then focus on special episodes by searching the chapters of this book, and particularly the chronology which is by far the longest one, with specific key-words in relation with these episodes. There, they will find detailed accounts. For instance readers who wish to focus on the anti-Communist repression of 1927, the Xian mutiny of 1936 or the foreign influence in Tibet will find detailed accounts in the chronologies.
Chapter 1
Introduction

Overview of foreign intervention in China

Foreign encroachments and military interventions in China seriously began with the First Opium war in the middle of the 19th century. As a matter of fact, the history of China between 1840 and 1949 presents a fairly unique case as far as foreign intervention is concerned.

An unexpected turn of history

It is an ironic twist of history that from 1925 to 1949 the very forces which tried their best to engineer the suppression of Communist influence in China in fact contributed to its success. How?

The broad lines of the answers are fairly simple.

- By getting northern and eastern China under their control (and under the control of Chinese puppet governments both in Manchuria and elsewhere) Japan weakened the Nationalist government by cutting off the collection of taxes in the richest provinces. This occupation also fanned the flames of popular resistance which played into the hands of the Communist-led guerrilla warfare.

- The same phenomenon occurred (albeit to a smaller degree) with British encroachments in the south. By occupying Tibet, by encouraging the secession not only of Tibet itself but also of southern Sinkiang, by supporting the de facto autonomy of the Cantonese government, Great Britain weakened the Nationalist government in the south by making tax collection difficult or altogether impossible.

- These encroachments made the Nationalist government impotent. Between 1929 and 1932 military expenditures and the service of the foreign debt on average absorbed 58% and 49% respectively of government receipts. As the total is larger than 100% this made the Nationalist government completely dependent on foreign loans and unable to provide any service to its population in terms of education, famine relief or economic development\(^2\). Unable to win the support of its population, the Nationalist government had more and more to rely on a policy of re-

\(^2\)Naturally, with the subsequent extension of the zone controlled by Japan the financial situation became even worse.
pression. An American thesis (Huang 2002) estimates that some 17 million Chinese civilians were killed or died as a result of such repressive KMT policies.

- In accordance with the Silver Purchase Act passed by the US Congress in June 1934, the US Treasury began massive purchases of silver worldwide. Two countries were especially concerned: Mexico, at that time an important silver producer, and China whose monetary system was based on silver in spite of the fact that the country was not a substantial producer. As a result of the American purchases, the price of silver tripled which was indeed one of the objectives of the Silver Act. While Mexico profited, this price increase was detrimental to China in several respects: it increased the foreign debt based on silver, it drained silver from the whole country toward the financial center of Shanghai thus bringing about a country-wide deflation and at the same time a speculation frenzy lead by major banks controlled by the Nationalists. Due to the silver shortage, the Nationalist government decided in November 1935 to nationalize silver and to issue a fiat paper money. This move emulated a similar action for gold made by the Roosevelt administration in March 1933. The issuance of such an unbaked currency eventually led to the hyper inflation of the late 1940s. More information on this point will be given later on.

- Finally, in 1945-1946 the last stroke was the occupation of several coastal areas by some 100,000 American troops. Although the United States had put an end to the Japanese occupation, the arrival of so many foreign troops was certainly disliked by many Chinese people even among the Nationalists. Moreover, the United States soon became perceived as encouraging the civil war that Chiang Kai-shek once again was waging again the Communists.

The rapid and complete collapse of the Nationalist armies and indeed of the whole Nationalist regime in 1948-1949 came as a great surprise to many. The suddenness of such a shift in a huge country like China suggests that it was similar to what is called in physics a phase transition. For instance, the swift freezing of water already at a negative temperature in a state of supercooling provides a striking example of phase transition.

As a similar example one may mention the revolutions of 1848 in Europe. The seeds of these revolutions were sowed by the French revolutionary armies somehow in the same way as the seeds of land reform were spread throughout China by the Red Army. In appearance, those revolutionary aspirations seemed to have been buried in the wake of the monarchic reaction which set in throughout Europe after 1815. Yet

\[This total does not include civilians killed by warlords, by the Japanese or by the Communists. The detailed figures by time interval are as follows:
1927-1937: 4.7 millions
1938-1945: 9.7 millions
1945-1949: 3.0 millions
Naturally such estimates may have a broad margin of error but they provide at least an approximate picture.\]
The seeds were still there. In 1848 they were brought to life anew with the result that the monarchies were rocked once again all over Europe.

**Military versus economic intervention**

The most massive foreign military intervention occurred after 1942 with the presence in China of some 50,000 American forces. After 1945 the strength of American forces in China reached some 100,000 ground forces plus an important number of Navy forces. These forces supported the Nationalist side in terms of troop transportation, protection of railways, air reconnaissance but they did not take part directly in the fighting between the Nationalist and Communist armies. Nevertheless, by their mere presence and through the incidents that were inevitably generated, these forces lead to anti-foreign demonstrations which eventually played in the hands of the Communists by winning over the urban Chinese population.

A large part of this study will be devoted to these events. Yet, it is impossible to understand them without taking into account previous waves of anti-foreign demonstrations. This movement developed quickly and broadly because it was a replication of former episodes. The Boxer Rebellion was a manifestation of anti-foreign feelings, the so-called Northern Expedition of 1926-1927 which led the Nationalists from Canton to Shanghai rode on a wave of anti-foreign demonstrations.

Most historians focus their attention on the economic aspects of foreign intervention. They describe the unequal treaties, the extraterritorial privileges, the low tariff policy which allowed the inflow of western products and hampered the economic development of China, the absorption of custom duties by creditors, the foreign ownership of railroads, water utilities or even postal services. Of course, they also describe a number of foreign military interventions such as the Opium wars or the Boxer Rebellion, but they pay less attention to the permanent foreign military forces in China.

This permanent military presence comprised four components.

- **Legation guards.** The role of these guards was to protect the legations established by foreign powers in many Chinese cities. As an estimate of their total strength, the “China Weekly Review” gives in 1926 the number of 1,000 (20 November 1926).

- **Railway guards.** The Boxer protocol of 1901 allowed foreign powers to establish garrisoned outposts on the railroad from Beijing to Tianjin and some other railroads. The Treaty of Portsmouth which settled the war of 1904-1905 between Russia and Japan allowed the Japanese to establish 16 railroad battalions (each numbering 600 guards) in Manchuria.

The fact that most Chinese railroads were owned by foreign companies provided the foreign powers with an easy argument in the sense that the role of these guards was to “protect foreign property” in cases when the Chinese government was unable to
Fig. **Population of China (1812-2010).** The figures prior to 1949 are estimates because there was no census before that date. For the crisis of 1960-1961 it is more appropriate to use the expression “food crisis” rather than “famine” because a large part of the excess mortality of 12 millions was due to a sharp increase in infant mortality. **Sources:** 1812-1928: The China Year Book, 1939; 1949-1985: Ren kou tong 1949-1985 (official compilation of censuses published in 1988, in Chinese); 1990-2010: Internet

- Corps of foreign volunteers. These corps constituted a kind of militia which had the role of a police force in the foreign concessions. The most well-known example was the “Shanghai Volunteer Corps” which was an international militia numbering some 1,500 men.
- Naval forces. This was the main foreign military force in China. While the cruisers and destroyers could patrol only the lower parts of the main rivers, the gunboats were able to navigate the Yellow River or the Yangtze River as far as 1,500 kilometers from the seaside. The additional troops which were brought in during periods of disturbances were almost always Marines whose capacity of intervention
was based on the naval forces. In a special section devoted to this question we give the strength of the naval forces of the main foreign powers.

Western countries (such as Belgium) which had no naval force in China were considered weak and unable to maintain their economic privileges. This happened in 1926 when the bilateral treaty between Belgium and China was abolished by the Chinese government. Such an episode clearly suggests that there was a strong link between the weight of the foreign forces and the political decisions taken by the Chinese side.

**Foreign interventions in Chinese political conflicts**

Most historians fail to describe how by providing loans, arms and subsidies to one side or the other Great Britain, the United States Japan or Russia were able to shape the course of events in China.

Through her colonies in India, Sri Lanka, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Burma, Great Britain dominated the foreign trade of China. The following table shows that by 1908 the weight of Britain in China’s imports was still three times larger than the combined imports from the United States and Japan. The later, however, were growing faster than the former.

| Table 1.1 Chinese imports from Britain, Japan and the United States, 1875-1937 |
|---------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
|                                 | 1875   | 1890   | 1908   | 1937   |
| Coming from                     |        |        |        |        |
| UK and British colonies         | 95%    | 91%    | 73%    | 26%    |
| Japan                           | 3.7%   | 6.2%   | 15%    | 29%    |
| United States                   | 1.5%   | 3.1%   | 12%    | 45%    |

Notes: The percentages represent the shares in the total of the 3 countries. In 1937 the share of the 3 countries in the total imports was 51%. The data show a rapid fall for Great Britain paralleled by a fast growth for the United States. The part of Japan in 1937 is underestimated because it does not take into account the exchanges between Manchuria and Japan. Source: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1911, 11th edition, Vol. 6, p. 179; The China Year Book 1939, 20th issue, p. 38-39 (Value of Shanghai foreign trade by countries).

What was the role of foreign powers in the failure of the Taiping Rebellion, in the Revolution of 1911, in the shift to the right that occurred within the Kuomintang in 1926-1927, in the success of the “bandit extermination” campaigns in 1935? The fact that these questions are still largely unanswered can be illustrated by the following examples.

- Few historical narratives give a detailed account of the role played by General Homer Lea as a close adviser to Sun Yat sen. Few (if any) historians point out that in spite of not holding an official position in the American military, Lea nevertheless had close connections with the military establishment. This can be inferred from
several little facts; for instance: (i) the US Chief of staff wrote a laudatory preface for one of his books. (ii) Lea attended the maneuvers of the German Imperial Army as an official guest.

- There is evidence which suggests that in late 1926 the Western powers already knew that Chiang Kai shek would turn against the left wing of the Kuomintang. In December 1926 the “China Weekly Review” already predicted that “the Kuomintang may eat up its Russian advisers” (4 December 1926).

As a similar indication, in spite of the fact that the official program of Chiang Kai shek included the abolition of all unequal treaties and the end of foreign economic privileges, US business circles were not afraid by the perspective of his victory. Probably did they already know that this program would be shelved as soon as Chiang would be in power.

The fact that the western powers were informed in advance by the Chinese authorities of the raid of 6 April 1926 on the Soviet embassy in Beijing (see the chronology) is rarely mentioned in historical accounts. Does it not suggest that the repression against the left of the KMT (which was accused of being controlled by Russia on the basis of papers allegedly discovered during this raid) was planned in agreement with western powers?

Although the present study will mainly focus on a few decades before and after World War II, it is important to keep in mind the historical background, especially because western historical accounts often tend to belittle foreign intervention.

**Belittling foreign intervention**

An American movie of 1966 which features Steve McQueen relates the patrol of a US Navy gunboat on the Yangtze River in 1926⁴. The purpose of its mission was to protect American citizens and property during the anti-foreign agitation which accompanied the Northern Expedition. During the whole film this gunboat is the only US Navy ship which is shown. Even the beginning of the film which takes place in Shanghai hardly suggests the real extent of the US Navy presence in the port of Shanghai. To suggest that the US Navy in China consisted mostly of gunboats was a clear understatement. At that time the American fleet in China comprised 6 cruisers and 15 destroyers. Other major Western powers as well as Japan had also large naval forces in China, in particular on the Yangtze River (more details are given below).

In other words, foreign military intervention in China was described to some extent in this movie but its full scale was not acknowledged.

A similar stance can be identified in the books written by Ms. Pearl Buck. Her

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⁴Entitled “The Sand Pebbles” the movie was directed by Robert Wise who was also the director of “Executive Suite” (1956), an insightful film about the competition between industrial and financial capital. Incidentally, it was industrial capital which was the victor in this film.
novels entitled “The Patriot” and “The Promise” were published in March 1939 and October 1943 respectively. Both books have as their background the war between Japan and China which unfolded after 1937.

The first part of “The Patriot” describes the “betrayal” of Chiang Kai-shek. Much admired by I-wan (the book’s main character), he is shown striking a deal with the Shanghai bankers among whom was I-wan’s father. In return for their support, he lead the repression against union leaders and Communists. Yet, this episode does not show any link between Chinese and foreign bankers. At the end of the book in 1937 I-wan returns to China after having spent 10 years in Japan and in spite of his experience of 1927 enters into the service of Chiang Kai-shek for the purpose of fighting the Japanese. No mention is made of any foreign military aid. Yet (as can be seen in the chronology) military cooperation between the United States and China began as early as 1932 when Lieutenant Colonel John H. Jouett started to build up the Chinese Nationalist Air Force. After 1935, US loans allowed China to buy American arms and ammunition. From January 1939 on, American pilots began to operate military airplanes in China.

“The Promise” takes place in 1942 and relates the attempt of Chinese and British armies to prevent the invasion of Burma by the Japanese. As one knows, Lieutenant General Joseph W. Stilwell who became Chief of Staff under Generalissimo Chiang on 11 March 1942 was in command of the 5th and 6th Chinese armies in the Burma theater. As in the “Sand Pebbles” movie some forms of foreign military presence are acknowledged. For instance, a squadron of “Flying Tigers” (the US air force in China under General Claire Chennault who was also aviation adviser to General Chiang Kai-shek and his wife) makes a brief appearance\(^5\), the fact that the Chinese Divisions were under the command of an American general who “is able to speak Chinese” is mentioned\(^6\).

However, the fact that American advisers (e.g. military advisers such as Major General Lewis H. Brereton or Brigadier General C.L. Bissel, transport advisers such as Maurice L. Sheahan, political adviser such as Owen Lattimore) were present at many levels of the Chinese government is not mentioned. During the war there was a full scale US command structure in the Chinese war-time capital of Chungking which

\(^5\)It is a brief but outstanding appearance: 4 Flying Tigers oppose a squadron of 14 Japanese fighter planes and manage to down 6 of them compelling the 8 remaining opponents to flee. This action takes place on the border between China and Burma. Surprisingly, in the following days as the Chinese divisions move southward and closer to Japanese airfields, no other Japanese aircraft try to hit them.

\(^6\)“The Promise” is an unreserved and unequivocal apology of General Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. It is resolutely critical of “British colonialists” who, it is said, were hated by the Burmese people. With respect to General Stilwell (who is never mentioned by name), the novel provides a fairly mixed picture. For instance, it is observed that although Stilwell could speak some Chinese, his command of the language was fairly rudimentary with the result that he did elicit little sympathy among Chinese generals. In his role as army commander, he is described as well meaning but powerless and isolated.
comprised several buildings such as the “American Army headquarters” or the “US Office of War Information”. In “The Promise” one of the chapters takes place in Chungking at the headquarters of General Chiang Kai-shek; yet, there is not a single mention of any US adviser.

Is this omission due to the fact that Ms. Buck had little interest in foreign policy matters? Quite the contrary. In fact, Ms. Buck took an active role in discussing US policy in China. She wrote long Sunday articles in the New York Times (e.g. 31 May 1942, p. SM3 or 28 February 1943, p. SM4) and on 19 January 1942 she wrote a 15-page memorandum for Colonel Donovan, the head of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) who became in 1947 one of the founding fathers of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). In this memorandum Ms. Buck provides advice in a way that suggests that this was not her first letter to Colonel Donovan. For instance, she writes (State Department 1)

“The great danger to the United States today is to become identified with England in the minds of the people of Asia.”

“There ought to be complete liaison between Wavell [Field Marshall Sir Archibald Wavell, commander of all troops in the Burma theater of war] and Chiang Kai-shek, political as well as military. It is doubtful whether Wavell can do this and therefore he must be supplemented by others who can help him.”

The fact that foreign military help is mentioned only grudgingly by historians is by no means specific to the case of China. On the contrary, it is a fairly universal rule. For instance the help provided by the United States to French military fighting in Indochina (1949-1954) remains unmentioned even in detailed French (or American) accounts of this war. Yet, this help was massive and ubiquitous. Almost all the arms were given by the United States, many planes were flown by American pilots, French strategic plans had to be approved by the Pentagone and operational plans had to get the approval of local US military advisers 7.

American influence in China was not confined to military aid, it also extended to cultural and economic matters. American missionaries were very active in China especially before the campaign directed against foreigners in 1926-1927.

**American influence in education**

Before the Second World War there were 13 American-supported colleges and universities in China, many of which had been created by religious congregations (Caldwell 1972). Moreover, an important percentage (of the order of 50%) of the Chinese professors had studied in the United States for some time. In short, there was a strong

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7More details can be found in Roehner (2007, chapter 7, section 7.1) entitled “Role of the United States in the first Vietnam war”.
cultural connection between China and the United States.

Incidentally, it can be noted that after an eclipse between 1950 and 1990, the American influence in Chinese higher education has again become significant. For instance it can be mentioned that:

- The “China Central Economic Research Institute” of Peking University is supported by the Ford Foundation. In an article published in June 2002 Professor Makoto Taniguchi explains that US-style economics is astonishingly popular among the young researchers and students in Peking University.

- At Tsinghua University the “Institute of International Studies” organizes many summer schools and workshops which are sponsored by American institutions such as the “Ford Foundation”, the “Ploughshares Fund” and the “John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation”.

Moreover in 2002 there were over 50,000 Chinese students studying in US universities.

**Cyclical pattern of ups and downs in Sino-American relationship**

As will be shown below, the strategic connection between the United States and China became particularly close after the accession to power of General Chiang Kai-shek in 1928.

As a matter of fact, it is remarkable that when considered from a long-term perspective the relations between the United States and China have displayed a cyclical pattern. Between 1839 (beginning of the Opium Wars) and 1928, the relations were good because the United States was seen as acting as a counterbalance to British encroachments. After 1928 they became even better as the United States actively supported the war that the Nationalist government waged against the Communist and Japanese forces. Naturally, the situation changed completely in 1949 after the Communists had defeated the Nationalists. However, as will be seen later, anti-American feelings already grew in the educated urban population in the period after 1946. With the Korean War and the Vietnam war there was a state of more or less open warfare between the two countries. As is well known, the relations improved in the wake of President’s Nixon visit in 1972. The accession to power of President Deng and the fact that China became a major trading partner of the United States contributed to warming up the relations between the two countries. Who knows what the future has in store?

**Permanent military presence**

There have been American military forces in China throughout the 1920s, espe-
cially in the Shanghai concession. After the war between China and Japan entered a more active phase in 1938, Chinese forces were supported, armed and trained by the United States. However, since there was not yet a state of war between America and Japan, the participation of US troops remained confined to logistics and support. Most of the American troops who stayed in international concessions in Shanghai or Beijing were withdrawn a few weeks before Pearl Harbor. The few American servicemen who had remained in China in regions controlled by the Japanese were imprisoned after the outbreak of war. Some of them may have been repatriated as part of exchanges with Japanese nationals from Hawaii but the rest of them remained in Japan as prisoners of war until the end of the war. At the same time, in areas of China controlled by the Nationalists about 30,000 American GIs joined the fight against the Japanese army. It is not surprising, therefore, that throughout the war the United States was very popular among Chinese people (see in this respect the date of 3 August 1946 in the chronology).

**US military and incidents**

When victory finally came, the US troops who poured into China were hailed as heroes by Chinese people. Yet, within less than two years, the sentiment changed and anti-American rallies became daily occurrences. What aroused the hostility of the Chinese in such a short span of time?

It could be argued that this was just a consequence of the fact that the Nationalists (whom the Americans supported) became more and more unpopular. This is a short-sighted explanation however. Indeed the argument can well be reversed: why, at the contact of the Americans and with their help, did the Nationalists not become more receptive to the wishes of the Chinese people? Why was General Marshall not able to convince Chiang Kai-shek to adopt more democratic ways?

An alternative explanation would be to attribute the change in the attitude of the Chinese to the behavior of US troops. Why was the battle for the “hearts and minds” lost?

In order to shed some light on this question, one must, first of all, know what happened at the grass-level of ordinary citizens. A preliminary question is to know where the US troops were located. Yang (1998) gives the following indications. In Qingdao there was the 6th Marine Division and the 1st and 3rd Marine Airwing Squadron; the 5th Regiment of the 1st Marine Division was in Tianjin; the 1st Regiment of the same Division was in Beijing and its 7th Regiment was in Qinhuangdao. These troops of the US China Theater were successively under the command of General Wedemeyer.

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8Foreign powers and in particular Britain and the United States played an important political and military role in China even before the Revolution of 1911. A subsequent chapter describes the role of Homer Lea, an American who had a close relationship with Sun Yat-sen.
(until May 1946), then under the command of the 7th Fleet (until September 1947), and finally under the Western Pacific Command. The Marines were only one of the components of the US force in China but it was the force which stayed the longest.

The question of the relations between these troops and the Chinese population has received only scant attention. The few articles and books which devote some attention to this aspect mostly focus on specific issues e.g. the Anping incident or the rape of Ms. Shen Chung.

- In the book by Hong Zhang (2002) one finds statements which suggest that there were many incidents:

  For instance she writes (p. 88) “Chinese newspapers had been reporting rape cases committed by the GIs for over a year” and speaks of “countless brutal acts of violating Chinese lives and properties” (p. 98). She concludes that “The frequency of the clashes with American troops made the development of mutual antipathy inevitable”.

However, such statements remain unconvincing and difficult to control unless a reliable list of incidents is indeed produced.

- The article by Suzanne Pepper (1971) concentrates on four episodes of protest by students. The second episode was a protest against “violent actions of American military personnel in China”. But it is difficult to understand such a movement without any knowledge of how frequent such violent actions were.

- The paper by Xixiao Guo (2001) provides a striking picture of the change that took place in public opinion but it focuses on four specific incidents. In the last section of the paper Guo tells us that “as early as in the spring of 1946, Marshall had tried to get the Marines out of China because he believed that their presence severely undermined his mediation. He could not overcome the Navy’s opposition.” Once again, if we do not have a list of incidents it is difficult to understand why American Marines were seen as an obstacle. After all there have been several thousand Marines in Shanghai during the 1930s.

The strategy of the Kuomintang government was to belittle and minimize the incidents by presenting them as fortuitous, isolated events which should not be taken too seriously. However, it is likely that specific incidents such as the Shen Chung rape had a great impact only because they occurred after a long string of similar cases; so to say, they were the last straw that broke the camel’s back. In order to see if this explanation through a process of accumulation is correct we need to identify all incidents which occurred between American forces and the population of China (or at least all those which have been reported). This is the objective of the chronology section below. Because the Kuomintang government was often perceived as acting
on American directives, we will also include anti-Kuomintang protests. Naturally, the relations between occupation troops and population were influenced by the general military situation which is why we also include some landmark events of the civil war between Nationalists and Communists.

It must also be kept in mind that the system of the foreign concessions had brought about strong xenophobic feelings\(^9\). Anti-American sentiment surfaced on several occasions. One of the most important was the boycott of American products in 1905 (see for instance Wong 2001). Although western countries had renounced to their concessions during the war, this long tradition of anti-western protests certainly facilitated the emergence of anti-American demonstrations in 1946-1948.

**The foreign occupation of China before World War II**

In the *Cambridge History of China* (Volume 12: 1912-1949) there is a 80-page chapter entitled “The foreign presence in China” which describes different aspects of this presence: diplomatic representations, missionaries, government agencies, economic interests. Curiously, there is no mention of the foreign military forces which were present in China, nor is there any map of the numerous foreign concessions.

**Foreign enclaves**

Before World War II China was subject to semi-colonial occupation by several European countries, the United States and Japan. Foreign enclaves were of three primary types: (i) Treaty Ports, (ii) Settlements and (iii) Concessions.

The general term, treaty port, applied to all cities, usually on the coast or along navigable waterways, that were open to foreign commerce. These “ports” contained a foreign administered Chinese Maritime Customs office\(^10\). Located within treaty ports were also the foreign consulates and local offices of foreign business concerns. In most instances the treaty ports and customs stations had no de jure foreign district.

The other two types of treaty ports, settlements and concessions were true enclaves of foreign control. Concessions were de jure colonies. Settlements were separate municipalities from the surrounding Chinese cities. They provided the normal municipal services. Without exception the settlements’ municipal councils were dominated by foreign nationals.

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\(^9\)A comment made by an American working as a bank teller in a concession makes such reactions more plausible and palpable. “If a Chinaman does not at once make room for me in the street I would strike him with my cane. Should I break his noise or kill him, the worst that could happen would be that he or his people would make complaints to the consul who might impose a fine of one dollar for the misdemeanor, but I could always prove that I just cause to beat him” (cited in Zhang, 2001, p. 28). This statement is somewhat puzzling because it completely ignores the possible reactions of Chinese bystanders.

\(^10\)The fact that customs stations were administered by foreigners is due to the fact that the payment of the interest of the Chinese foreign debt was ensured by the transfer to custom revenue to foreign powers.
Fig. 1.1 Foreign concessions and Treaty Ports in eastern China in 1932. This map shows about 19 concessions/settlements and 34 treaty ports/customs stations. Customs stations were in foreign hands because it is on custom duties that were paid interest and redemption of foreign loans granted to China by foreign powers. 
*Source: New York Times 7 February 1932 Section: Science-Resorts-Travel-Steamships p. XX.*

Under the principle of extraterritoriality nationals of treaty nations were subject to the laws of their home nation rather than the laws of China. By the beginning of the 20th Century, 18 nations\(^\text{11}\) had treaties with China that established consular court jurisdiction over their nationals.

**Foreign naval forces**

At the beginning of this chapter we mentioned an American movie of 1966 which

\(^{11}\)Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Brazil, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the United State (http://www.geocities.com/treatyport01/TREATY01.html)
features the patrol of a US Navy gunboat on the Yangtze river. The movie leaves the impression that the US Navy had only a small force in China whereas there was in fact a considerable US naval force in China consisting of 6 cruisers, 15 destroyers and 8 gunboats (NYT 11 April 1927 p. 2).

In a general way in the 1920s and 1930s the largest foreign forces in China were naval forces. Such forces should not been seen as making temporary visits to Chinese ports but rather as ship squadrons permanently affected to the Chinese theater.

Broadly speaking there were three kinds of ships:

1. Aircraft carriers, cruisers and destroyers which were restricted to sea and to the lowest parts of the main rivers.
2. Large gunboats (with crews of about 100) which patrolled the main rivers.
3. Small gunboats (with about 50 sailors) which, thanks to their shallow draft, were able to patrol the upper parts of the rivers e.g. the Yangtze above Yochow.

In 1927 the foreign fleet in Chinese waters totaled 202 vessels (172 fighting ships and 30 naval auxiliaries) belonging to 8 nations. The British fleet was the largest with 76 ships, followed by Japan (49 ships) and the United States (30 ships). (NYT 11 Apr 1927 p. 2)

- In 1932 the British naval force consisted of 55 vessels comprising one aircraft carrier, 7 cruisers, 9 destroyers, 17 gunboats, 6 submarines and a number of other vessels.

(http://www.hmsfalcon.com)

- In 1930 the US naval force in China consisted of 41 vessels comprising some 9,000 sailors and Marines (6,000 sailors + 3,000 Marines); the main presence was in Shanghai with 5 cruisers, 4 destroyers and one gunboat; there were also ships on the Yangtze and in North Coast ports. (NYT 11 April 1927 p. 2; 1 August 1930 p. 6). The number of units of the “American Asiatic Fleet” present in China was connected with the events occurring there. A maximum was reached in 1927 during the anti-Communist repression in major ports and cities. After that, some units were withdrawn to Manila, only to be rushed back to Shanghai during the short conflict between Japanese and Chinese forces. In short, each period of renewed tension
brought back American naval reinforcements.

Among the ships that were present in China at one time or another the following are mentioned in the articles of the New York Times: Pittsburgh (flagship), Isabel (flagship), Omaha (light cruiser, flagship); among the destroyers one finds: Edsall, Ford, Houston, Peary.

- In the 1930s the French naval force comprised one cruiser and 10 gunboats. Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal had one cruiser each.

Between 1929 and 1936, during the Nationalist suppression campaigns against Communist areas, these naval forces played an important role by the support that they provided to the Nationalist forces. As many of the most important cities are located on rivers, they could by shelled either to prevent Communist take over or to cover Nationalist forces trying to recapture them. This aspect was particularly important in the 1929-1933 time interval when the strategy of the Communist party aimed at occupying big cities. After 1934 the strategy advocated by Mao Zedung which relied on the control of the countryside rather than of major cities prevailed, a change which reduced the usefulness of foreign naval forces.

So far we were not able to find an exhaustive list of the foreign units stationed in China. However, as a rough approximation it can be considered that in the 1930s Britain, France and the United States each had about 10,000 sailors and marines on board of their ships and 10,000 troops disseminated in the various foreign concessions. This gives a total of about 60,000 foreign troops. This total excludes Japan whose situation was of course fairly different in the sense that it had much broader goals in China.

**Link between commercial treaties and naval presence**

The fact that there was a direct connection between the privileges granted by commercial treaties and the naval presence can be illustrated by the following episode which occurred in 1926.

On 7 November 1926, after Belgium had refused to renegotiate her commercial treaty of 1865 with China when it came to expire, China took the decision (which at the time was considered a fairly bold one) to abrogate it. The commentary about this event made in the “China Weekly Review” (13 November 1926) is even more revealing than the event itself.

If Belgium had had a navy sufficiently large for the purpose of forcing China to renew the treaty on Belgium terms, she might have been able to enforce her position. But since Belgium is a weak country she was in no position to enforce her viewpoint.

The Sino-Japanese treaty has also expired. The subject of its renewal is a matter
of present negotiation. Of course, for obvious reasons, in this case abrogation is highly unlikely.

Incidentally, the fact that in this predicament the cause of Belgium was not taken up by the other powers (e.g. Britain or France) who had a naval force in China shows that in 1926 the common front presented by western powers was no longer as strong as it was at the time of the Boxer Rebellion.

The episode described in the following subsection leads to the same conclusion. It seems that 1926 was really a turning point for foreign hegemony in China.

**Incidents brought about by the presence of foreign naval forces**

The right for foreign warships to patrol Chinese rivers even deep inside western China was not explicitly recognized in any treaty. Foreign powers claimed that it was a necessity because of the inability of the Chinese government to protect Christian missionaries and foreign business people. However, with the increase in Chinese nationalist feelings after World War I, the presence of foreign warships became more questionable as was revealed by a serious incident which occurred on 7 September 1926 near Wanhsien (for more detail see the chronology).

What makes this incident important is not only the fact that it cost the lives of 7 British sailors and officers and of some 200 Chinese civilians. In fact, it marked the end of the common front of western powers against the Chinese authorities. After such a heavy loss the British wanted to carry out a reprisal as was customary in such cases. In this respect it can be recalled that in October 1860 the Summer Palace\(^\text{12}\) was burned on the order of Lord Elgin by an Anglo-French invasion force in retaliation for the death of 20 foreigners who were taken prisoners by the Chinese.

However, after the United States categorically refused to take part in any retaliation action the British dropped the idea. Back in the 19th century they would probably have acted without the support of the United States, but in 1926 the situation was no longer the same.

Moreover, after having lost all her rights in China in the wake of the First World War, Germany was no longer interested in supporting the existing concession and treaty system. In short, by 1926 the common front of western powers was broken. The time of the broad common front displayed during the Boxer Rebellion had come to an end. After the success of several boycott movements of American, British or Japanese products this kind of action was much feared by foreign businessmen. The “China Weekly Review” explicitly says that in Shanghai after the Wanhsien incident

\(^{12}\) This Summer Palace is distinct from the present day Summer Palace. It was located in the north of Beijing whereas the present one is located in the north west. The present Summer Palace is beautiful but it is said that the former one was much more magnificent. It consisted of many splendid buildings which contained rare books as well as valuable art items.
“many businessmen opposed strong action because of possible boycott”.

American presence in China

**Historical outline**

From the middle of the 19th century on, the United States have had a presence and a visibility in China which in many respects surpassed that of other powers like Britain, Japan, France or Germany. It is true that British influence was very visible in Hong Kong, and that France had a large concession in Shanghai\(^{13}\) but what distinguished the American influence is the fact that it was global, built up in a long-term perspective and had a close connection with the life of Chinese people, at least for the fraction of them who were living in the cities. This presence took different forms.

- In the 1920s there were several thousand American missionaries in China and many of them had developed schools and universities.
- After the Boxer uprising China had to pay indemnities to the countries whose residents had suffered damages or losses. The United States decided to convert the compensations that it received into a fund devoted to financing the studies of Chinese students in the United States. This possibility attracted a large number of Chinese students to American campuses and in the course of time created strong links between American and Chinese universities (even with those of them who were not backed by US sponsors).
- In the first decades of the 20th century the Rockefeller Foundation established an hospital in Peiping which was one of the best. In 1931, Vice-Marshel Chang Hsueh-ling, the governor of Manchuria, was treated there for a case of typhoid fever\(^{14}\).
- After General Chiang Kai-shek turned against the Communists in April 1927, he received support from the United States in particular in the form of arms and loans\(^ {15}\). First measured\(^ {16}\), that support became massive after 1936 as a means to counter the Japanese military inroad. Delivery of American arms (particularly bombers) to the Nationalists began already in the late 1920s (see the chronology at the date of 10 January 1930).
- As mentioned earlier, there was also an American military presence before

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\(^{13}\) The French quarter of Shanghai still attracts tourists nowadays.


\(^{15}\) When browsing through the New York Times articles about Chiang Kai-shek one perceives a clear feeling of relief after 14 April 1927 marked by the massacre of the Communists in Shanghai. Before that date he is referred to as the “Shanghai robber” and the “new strong man” (14 Nov 1926); he is reported as calling the US government “imperialistic” (26 Dec 1926) and as still having “comrade Borodin”, a Russian envoy, as his adviser (23 Jan 1927). After 14 April 1927, he is referred to as “Generalissimo” and “a new China is seen rising under Chiang” (14, 15 April 1927). For more details see the chronology.

\(^{16}\) A plan set up by a subcommittee of the US Senate in 1931 was implemented fairly slowly.
World War II but it was relatively discrete.

**A case in point: Dr. Chiang Moulin**

The life of Dr. Chiang Moulin provides an illustration of the way the American influence was supported by Chinese officials. It is summarized in a letter from Mr. Albert Ravenholt to the “Institute of Current World Affairs” dated 17 June 1949 (ICWA 4)

As many other Chinese students at that time, Mr. Chiang went to the United States for his studies. He got his Bachelor degree from the University of California. During those 4 years in San Francisco (1909-1912) he was also in charge of Sun Yat-sen’s American newspaper “The Chinese Free Press”. Chiang remained in the United States until 1917 and was awarded an MA and a PhD in Education from Columbia University.

After returning to China, he became the publisher of the magazine “New Education” in Shanghai. He also translated Woodrow Wilson’s speeches which enjoyed a wide popularity in China. In 1919 Chiang became Chancellor of Pei Ta [also written Beida] University in Peiping [a very quick promotion to a high position]. With the exception of an interval of two years, 1928 to 1930, when he served as Minister of Education and organized Chekiang National University, Chiang remained as Chancellor of Pei Ta until 1937 when the university retreated to Kunming. Chiang remembers that Mao-Tze-tung came to Pei Ta University as a poor young student from Hunan province and Chiang authorized the library to give him a job as a $17 a month clerk to support himself while he studied.

After the war, Chiang became Secretary General to the “Executive Yuan”, better known as China’s Cabinet. In August 1948, he became chairman of the Joint (Sino-American) Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) which was established by authority of the “China Aid Act” passed by the US Congress in 1948. Along with this function, he retained his position as a member of the “Central Political Council” which is the principal policy-making body of the Kuomintang.

Published in 1949, this article about Chiang ends with the following words:

> Chiang hopes to work toward the establishment of a competing pattern of life which may in time have an attraction for people in Communist dominated areas of China.

Throughout his carrier, thanks to his fluency in English and his background as a PhD graduate from Columbia, Dr. Chiang was able to play an important political role as an intermediary between the American and Chinese governments. The hope expressed in the conclusion of the article is also worth noticing. It shows that at that time despite anticipating the victory of the Communists, many Chinese
expected that the Kuomintang would be able to remain a magnet and that the Communist experience would not last very long. After 1949 he KMT was indeed able to hold some pockets in the southwest fringe of the country but they were hardly a magnet and the attempt failed quickly.

Methodology of this study

This is not an isolated study. It belongs to a set of parallel investigations of various occupation episodes. In this part we wish to describe the methodological framework of this set of comparative studies.

In the first section we explain the rationale of the chronological method of exposition that we have chosen. The second section discusses the reasons for providing a comparative perspective. In the third section we emphasize that this study could not have been carried out, at least not in this form, before the advent of the Internet.

Making historiography into a cumulative body of knowledge

The part devoted to the chronological listing of events represents some 70% of the content of this book. As this is a fairly uncommon feature for an historical account, a few words are in order to explain why, in our opinion, chronologies should be seen as a key element in historiography.

The chronology part and the chapter on quantitative evidence are the core of this report because they contain the information that comes from the sources and documents found in various archives and in primary sources such as newspapers. The other chapters contain comments on the events mentioned in the chronology. The main drawback of these comments is their subjective nature. They concern issues which at the time of writing were considered “important” but 30 years earlier or later historians would probably focus on different points. On the contrary, the chronology part can be seen as an objective list of events in the sense that it is largely (if not completely) independent of the personal interests of the historian. It becomes even more “objective” when it is a collective production of many historians (see below).

Why is the distinction between subjective and objective historical accounts essential?

One of the most basic features of a science is the fact that it is (and must be) a process of accumulation. From Bernard de Chartres to Descartes to Newton, this has been widely recognized:

“We are like dwarfs perched on the shoulders of giants” said Bernard de Chartres in 1124. “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” wrote Newton in a famous letter to Robert Hooke (1676).

In Britain the phrase “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants” was even included on
the edge of a 2 pound coin issued in 1997.

For subjective comments one can hardly speak of a cumulative process. One set of comments that is found quite interesting at a given moment will be found outdated thirty years later and replaced by another set which will of course experience the same fate a few decades later\(^\text{17}\).

On the contrary, chronologies present facts (not opinions) which will have a lasting interest for historians\(^\text{18}\).

Moreover, it is easy to add complementary information to such files. Suppose, for instance, that in 2020 an historian discovers a record (not found or not accessible earlier) that describes a series of events. Thanks to the chronology structure it will be easy to check whether these events are already known or whether they are really “new”. In the later case they will be incorporated at the appropriate dates. In this way, the chronology will grow year by year, always remaining the ultimate source of reference. In the future\(^\text{19}\), it may even be possible to make the *primary documents* available to readers. This will allow them to judge the degree of reliability of the events which are mentioned, a feature of crucial importance.

The methodology of such multi-layered chronologies has been proposed in Roehner (2002, p. 370-373) where the construction of very large chronicles (VLCs) was advocated. Such VLCs should be seen as huge computerized chronologies resulting from a process of *collective production* (somehow like the Wikipedia encyclopedia).

**Why it is crucial to adopt a comparative perspective**

In medical research there are basically three successive phases.

1. First there is the need to describe and categorize the various illnesses. Clearly this phase is of crucial importance. If one cannot make a clear distinction between an attack of bronchitis and a lung cancer, any cure will be hazardous.

2. Then one has to identify the mechanisms (bacteria, virus, mutation and so on) which are responsible for the disorder.

3. The last step is to find a cure.

One faces the same kind of challenges for social events. Suppose for instance that

\(^{17}\) This could appear as a fairly cavalier judgment. Unfortunately, it seems to apply even to the work of historians who adopted a comparative perspective. Consider for instance the work of the renowned British historian Arnold Toynbee. Under the title “A study of history” he published a 12-volume study of the rise and fall of civilizations. Naturally, we are not going to argue that forty years after its publication the work is no longer useful. For one thing, it shows how such a synthesis can be done and sets a model for similar attempts; in that respect it is certainly a stimulating answer to the specialising tendency of modern historical research. However, precisely because of its originality and specificity, it would be difficult to link up this work with subsequent studies. Thus, it does not seem to be a step in a cumulative process. Naturally, such monumental studies have also another potential usefulness. Once digitized and made searchable by key-words, they will become valuable pools of facts and references of primary sources.

\(^{18}\) The same observation holds for evidence which takes the form of quantitative data.

\(^{19}\) Thanks to the possibilities of the hypertext format and to the fact that more and more archive resources will be digitized and made available online.
one has a detailed account of 10 different riots. The first question is to see if they follow a common pattern. If they do not, a closer examination may perhaps show that there are in fact two different patterns; this opens the way to a classification of riots. As in medicine the second step is to find the mechanisms which are at the root of the different types of riots. Once these mechanisms are well understood, it may become possible to assess the likelihood of riots, may be even to prevent them.

For an isolated event the only thing one can do is to describe it. In order for a phenomenon to be studied scientifically, one needs many observations. This has been well understood by many sociologists and historians. Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Marc Bloch, Ernest Labrousse, Fernand Braudel and many others developed various forms of comparative analysis. Basically, the broader the phenomenon the more cases one needs in order to study it in a meaningful way. For instance, economic growth depends upon a staggering number of parameters which explains why it is so difficult to come up with well-defined conclusions. On the contrary, for a sharply defined phenomenon, one can expect to draw clear-cut results even from a relatively small sample of less than 10 observations.

For all these reasons, the present study is not isolated but is part of a set of studies which centers around the phenomenon of military occupation. There have been various occupation episodes during and after World War II; several of them are examined in the various studies which compose this project. All these studies follow the same format and focus on the same variables.

They turned out to be more time consuming than was realized when this project was started because we had to pierce the smoke screen of military censorship. As a matter of fact, comparative analysis was instrumental in suggesting which accounts are most affected by censorship. For instance, if one sees a substantial number of incidents in cases A, B, C and none in a case D which is similar in other respects, then it can be suspected that censorship was stricter in this last case. Naturally, the obstacle of censorship can be overcome only if access to previously restricted sources has been made possible. Many important files still remain closed.

We concentrated on post-World War II episodes for in this case archive sources are much more numerous than for episodes that occurred in earlier times. In the United States there does not seem to be a 50-year rule for the opening of archives. For instance, most of the files of the “Military Advisory and Assistance Groups” (MAAG) which worked in many countries in the wake of World War II are still closed.

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20By which we mean that one needs more parameters to define it.

21Apart from keeping a file closed there are several other ways of making it inaccessible. If it is not included in the catalog (or if the title under which it is catalogued has no connection with actual content) nobody will be able to request it. Keeping apart a record and its inclosures is a way of making the inclosures inaccessible. Sometimes such problems may occur just by inadvertance but there are also cases in which one suspects that it was done by purpose.
is likely that at least some parts of them will remain closed for ever.

**The crucial role of the Internet Revolution**

The Internet is not just one additional tool. For the social sciences it truly represents a Revolution. This word is justified by the fact that many investigations which were strictly impossible before the Internet have now become possible. The role of the Internet in the present study can be illustrated by three examples.

- All the studies in the present project are based on the analysis of *microsocial events*. Such events can only be found in databases of newspapers or news agencies. Selecting these events from a set of many thousands articles would have been a daunting and almost impossible task before these databases had been computerized and made searchable by keywords. For the present studies, the databases of the articles of the “New York Times” and of the “Times” have been searched extensively and this information has provided (at least sometimes) a first insight\(^{22}\).

- The advent of the Internet has completely changed the way we work in archives. Nowadays, the catalogs of many national archives have been computerized\(^ {23}\) and it has become possible to search them by key-words as well as by other characteristics such as “record group” or “file creator”. Once the item in which one is interested has been located it is possible to get photocopies (or files of scanned images) from the archives. It is in this way that we have been able to work with archives located in various countries: Australia, Britain, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, United States without leaving Paris.

- Finally, many documents once available in only a few libraries are now directly accessible on the Internet. This observation also extends to personal testimonies which had never been available in libraries and can now be read on the websites set up by veterans or their descendants.

In the following pages we briefly examine some key points in order to provide a general perspective for the events mentioned in the chronology chapters.

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\(^{22}\) Of course, during wars major newspapers are also subject to censorship (pre-censorship, post-censorship or auto-censorship); in such cases one must find alternative sources of information.

\(^{23}\) At the time of writing (2008) this process is still in progress. For the archives which are the most advanced in this respect, about 50% of the entries have been included in the electronic catalog.
In *Adventures of Sanmao, the orphan*\(^{24}\), a comic strips created by the famous cartoonist Zhang Leping in 1947, American GIs figured significantly. They gave a fairly negative image of American military personnel as reckless, drunken, lascivious and haughty. Albeit indignant toward the ill-behaved GIs and sailors, Sanmao could do nothing to stop their offenses while the rich Chinese would do nothing but bow to them obsequiously (Fig 2.1).

\[\text{Fig. 2.1 A cartoon entitled “There is always a bigger bully”. Excerpted from Adventures of Sanmao, the orphan published in 1947 by Zhang Leping. Source: Zhang (2002)}\]

**Incidents between US troops and the Chinese population**

According to Hua-lun Huang (2002, p. 248) there were 3,800 recorded (physical) assaults of American servicemen on Chinese civilians in a 16-month period from August 1945 to November 1946. This represents an average rate of 230 per month. Such incidents range from assaulting rickshaw runners or taxi drivers to robbing Chinese people in the street to holding up banks or jewelry stores. A number of instances

\(^{24}\)Sanmao which means “three locks of hair” in Chinese, is a popular traditional nickname for children.
are described in the chronology chapter.

**Reading guide.** In the chronology chapter there are red circles in front of the incidents which resulted in fatalities. Such fatalities can be of two sorts (i) American soldiers who die as a result of the incident (these cases are counted by the first of the two numbers that follow the red circle). (ii) Chinese people killed (intentionally or not) by US soldiers. Thus, in order to get a quick overview a possible reading method is to browse through these cases. Although they are only a subset (about 1/3) of all incidents they represent the most serious cases.

**Traffic accidents**

From Germany, to Japan (see in this respect “Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan, chronology chapter at the date of 1 September 1947) to Korea to China, the high frequency of traffic accidents provoked by military vehicles of occupation forces has been a recurrent feature. The psychological root of this phenomenon is probably captured in the following statement reported by Oliver Caldwell, an American officer who stayed in China in 1944-1945.

GI drivers frequently developed a completely calloused attitude toward the lives and the properties of Chinese. One GI truck driver told me his previous officer had said to his men, “I don’t care how many of the slopeys [derogatory term for an Asian person] you hit, but when you run into them, be sure to kill them. I don’t want them to live to complain to me”. (Caldwell 1972, p. 209)

The same kind of story was reported in Korea by journalist Mark Gayn (1948): “You try to see how close you can drive to a gook [Korean] to scare him to death without touching him” declared a military.

See also the data given in the chronology chapter at the date of 10 January 1946.
This chapter has three objectives.

- Firstly, it delineates the successive stages in the civil war between Nationalists and Communists. Military victories or defeats obviously affected the political as well as the social or economic situation and must therefore be kept in mind.
- In the second section we wish to understand the conditions of the military co-operation between Americans and Chinese. This aspect is of interest because it is one of the first occasions where US forces equipped and trained the troops of a foreign country. In addition, American military advisers assisted Chinese commanders both at headquarters and at division level. In spite of the fact that the Chinese experience did not end successfully (from a US perspective) it served as a model for several subsequent episodes. One can mention the following instances.
  (i) Training and equipping South Korean troops for fighting Communism (1945-)
  (ii) Equipping and advising French troops in their fight against the Vietminh in Indochina (1949-1953)
  (iii) Equipping, training, advising and supporting South Vietnamese troops in their fight against Communists in South Vietnam (1954-1971)
  (iv) Equipping, training, advising and supporting Afghan troops fighting the Talibans (2001-)
  (v) Equipping, training, advising and supporting Iraqi troops in their attempt to suppress the armed rebellion against the military occupation (2003-)
  (vi) Equipping, training, and advising Georgian troops (2003-)

The previous list is restricted to cases marked by a conflict. There are of course numerous other countries in which armed forces and police were trained and equipped by US military forces or CIA officers.

- In the last section we try to understand why the Communist forces were eventually victorious. It is of course easy to say that the Nationalist generals were corrupt and inefficient, but this kind of explanation falls somewhat short.

The great novelty in these operations is the fact that they were conducted in countries which were (at least formally) sovereign countries. In that, they were radically different from similar operations conducted by colonial powers in their colonies. For
instance, the 100,000 men-strong British Army in India was composed of Indians under the command of British officers. In this case British domination was clearly acknowledged and there was no attempt to present this army as an independent Indian force.

Of the 6 cases mentioned in the previous list, how many were successes from a military perspective? (i) was a success, but (ii) and (iii) were failures. For (iv), (v), (vi) it is still too early at the time of writing to draw clear conclusions.

**Strategic situation**

It is often stated that American troops came to China after the Japanese surrender in order to repatriate Japanese troops to Japan. This was certainly one of their objectives but it would not have been necessary to commit 140,000 troops to this task; moreover, it appears that by later 1945 the repatriation of the Japanese had hardly begun. One immediate goal of the American strategy was to help the Nationalists in their struggle against the Communists.

This included the following tasks.

1. To ensure that Japanese troops deliver their arms and ammunition in the hands of the Nationalist (rather than Communist) forces. In many places before being disarmed Japanese troops sided with the Nationalists for instance by securing railroad lines. By the end of 1945 only about 10% of the Japanese troops had been repatriated to Japan (for more detail see below in this chapter and the chronology at the date of 31 December 1945).

2. In Manchuria Japanese forces had been disarmed by the Soviet troops, but it was essential for the Kuomintang to occupy the province after the evacuation of Soviet troops at the end of 1945. An agreement had been concluded with the Soviet Union to the effect that upon leaving they would hand over the cities to Nationalist forces. In order to make possible the occupation of these cities several hundred thousand Nationalist troops were transported by the US Navy from Burma, India and South China to Manchuria. Many specific instances are mentioned in the chronology chapter.

By the end of 1945, the Nationalists were in a very favorable position while, in the terms of an American military expert writing at that time, the Communists were “completely outclassed” (Field Artillery April 1946, p. 238). (i) The Nationalists occupied the main cities and a large part of Manchuria (ii) About one fourth of their divisions were trained and equipped by the Americans. (iii) The fact that most of the Japanese troops had complied with the directive issued by General MacArthur to surrender their forces in China only to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek resulted in
the Kuomintang receiving a vast quantity of Japanese arms, munitions and supplies. Nevertheless, in October 1945 the Communists reported that 57,000 Japanese troops surrendered to them in Shantung and in adjacent areas (Field Artillery January 1946, p. 43) (iv) The Nationalist troops had a great numerical superiority: according to American estimates the Communist armed forces had about 600,000 men by the end of 1945 while the Nationalists had at least three to four times more. (v) The Nationalists had their own aviation and benefited from the support of the US Air force and US Navy for transportation of troops and supplies; moreover American aircraft carried out observation and strafing operations (see the chronology at the date of 17 November 1945) directed against the Communists. (vi) In contrast the Communists had no aircraft, no antiaircraft defense and very little artillery, not more than 24 batteries according to an American source (Field Artillery April 1946, p. 237).

Such great strategic assets cannot just be discounted; one must explain why they were ineffective. In addition one must explain why China did not end up being partitioned into two (or more) zones like Korea or Vietnam. That such plans were indeed under consideration in 1947 is plainly explained by Colonel Lanza in his “Field Artillery” column (Sep-Oct 1947, p. 322).

According to dispatches from Shanghai a solution is to split China into three parts: North to the Communist which would fall to Russia, Center to the Kuomintang under US influence and a new state in the south which would be in connection with the British whose colony of Hong Kong is a haven of refuge for wealthy Chinese.

Concurring to the same objective was the plan set up in mid-1948 by the Nationalist government to clear of all Communists the region south of the Yellow River (see the chronology at the date of 9 April 1948).

**SACO**

The Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) was a cooperation program between the US Navy and the Chinese “Bureau of Investigation and Statistics”, Chiang Kai-shake’s secret police. The two main figures of this organization were Tao Li, the chief of the BIS and US Navy Captain Milton E. Miles. Although Miles left China in 1945 it should be noted that the SA CO program did not end with his departure. It was still active in November 1946 as shown by a New York Times article entitled “SACO residual activities continue” (NYT 13 November 1946, p. 17). It also survived to Tai Li who died in an aircraft accident in late March 1946 (NYT 25 March 1946).
Conflicting views about the American role in SACO

There is a broad consensus about the awful role played by Tai Li and his secret police in torturing and executing a large (but not well known) number of Communists or Chinese people who helped the Communist insurgency in one way or another. Therefore one can understand that in subsequent decades, American officials (as well as historians) tried to dissociate the US government from such a wicked person.

There is also a consensus on the fact that SACO has run a school (the so-called “US Naval Unit number 9”) for training Chinese police officers. This school had nothing to do with fighting the Japanese but was intended for helping the Kuomintang to fight dissenters, the prime target being of course the Communists (Schaller 1979 p. 240-241, Wakeman 2003).

This leads us to question the role of US intelligence officers in China and whether or not they took part in tortures and executions? On this question there are conflicting answers.

In spite of the fact that this was indeed what US intelligence did in Vietnam (see the Phoenix program), in Afghanistan (see the caption of Fig.3.1) and in Iraq (where there were special commandos specialized in night-time executions), most if not all American studies conclude that Americans had nothing to do with the tortures and executions carried out by the KMT secret police.

On the Chinese side there has been a marked shift in the official position over the past decades.

After 1950 the central section of the SACO compound in Chongqing was turned into a museum which was named the “US and Chiang Kai-shek criminal activities exhibition”.

Until the 1980s, the role of US advisers was denounced. It was said that Chinese torturers were instructed by Americans. This position is well described in “Red Crag”, a novel written by two Kuomintang generals, Luo Guangbin and Yang Yiyan (1961), who were arrested and incarcerated in a concentration camp located near Chongqing25. Here are some excerpts.

- At one point Xu Pengfei, the intelligence chief in Chongqing says to an arrested Communist: “May be you will withstand 8 or 10 of the American tortures but not all 48.” (p. 187 of the French translation).
- On p. 361, one of the main characters says “So many of our comrades have been tortured with American or Chinese devices”.

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25In their novel the authors use the expression “US-Jiangjieshists” (which refers to Chiang kai-shek’s name in pinyin namely “Jiang Jie-shi”). This was also the expression which was used in the name of the museum when it was set up in Chongqing.
Chapter 3

Fig. 3.1 US-run Parwan detention facility near Kabul. This detention facility was opened near Bagram Air Base in 2009. In April 2011 it was holding 1,900 detainees. Before 2009 the Afghan prisoners were held in several prisons located on Bagram base and in other US bases in Afghanistan. However an Associated Press article of 8 April 2011 provides statements made by US officials according to which secret prisons for the interrogation of detainees continued to remain in existence after 2009 under the “Joint Special Operations Command”. The Pentagon has previously denied operating secret jails in Afghanistan in spite of the fact that human rights groups and former detainees have described the facilities. Detainees could be held in those jails for up to 9 weeks, depending on the value of information they produced. The 9-week limit could be extended by special order. Testimonies made by former prisoners show that they were submitted to harsh treatments such as forced to strip naked, then kept in solitary confinement in windowless, cold cells. Such cells were not very different from the solitary confinement cells of Bai prison as described in “Red Crag”. In short, as for SACO, there is a dual picture: a public image such as the Parwan prison on the one hand and more secret prisons using harsher methods on the other hand. Source: Associated Press, 8 April 2011, article entitled: “Terror suspects in Afghanistan held in secret for weeks”.

- On p. 434, an inmate describes a specific American method of torture in which one applies plastered bandages which are then removed quickly.
- In the special hospital of SACO a US truth drug injection is given to a Communist under the supervision of an American adviser (p. 398-403).
- On p. 606 the Deputy Chief of the American Mission orders Xu Pengfei to execute Xu Yunfeng, one of the main Communist leaders. On p. 620 it is stated that in the days before the arrival of Communist troops the execution of Communist prisoners was planned by the American Mission before being carried out by Chinese execution squads.

Michael Schaller (1979) mentions that in 1974 the Chinese government initiated a campaign to denounce the role played by Americans under SACO. There were gruesome reports in the press about human remains which had been unearthed at SACO’s “Happy Valley” headquarters near Chongqing.
According to the publisher’s description “the novel was written by two ex-inmates of the US-Chiang Kai-shek secret service concentration camps in Chongqing, Sichuan Province, China.”. The novel was published in China in 1961 and foreign language translations were produced and published in China in the 1980s. For instance a French translation was published in Beijing in 1983 under the title “Roc rouge” and with the same picture on the cover.

In 1978 an English translation of the previous novel was published in Hong Kong by the “Peace Book Company” (there may have been earlier editions). In 1983 the novel was translated and published in French by the Chinese Foreign Language Department in Beijing. In other words, at that time there was no attempt to exonerate the United States.

By 2011 the Chinese official position had been completely reversed. On visiting the new museum in Chongqing one sees an account in which the US role is reduced to almost nothing. Of course, the US participation in SACO is mentioned but SACO is completely disconnected from any evil events such as torture or executions. As a matter of fact, even Tai Li is presented in a favorable light through a photograph where he is shown in the middle of his family. There is also a picture of Michael Schaller’s book entitled “The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1945” which conveys the (wrong) idea that the role of the United State in China ended in 1945.

In contrast with many other official buildings in China where the English inscriptions
are in “Chinese English” with some funny expressions too literally translated from Chinese at the Chongqing museum all the explanations and photograph captions are written in fluent English.

This position is well summarized by the short article devoted to the “Red crag” novel on Wikipedia. It says: “The novel contained a highly negative portrayal of SACO although in reality the prisons were ran by the KMT secret police service BIS and had no American involvement.”

So, what is the truth? This is the question that we examine in the next section.

**What was the US role in SACO?**

Depending on the source, this role is presented in very different ways that can be described in the following ways.

1. US servicemen serving in SACO listened to the radio messages from Japanese vessels with the purpose of transmitting this information to American submarines. Along with their Chinese allies they monitored naval Japanese traffic in Chinese ports. They also recorded and forwarded meteorological information. It is this very restrictive role of SACO that is presented in a biography of Captain Miles available on the Internet and also in the present-day (2011) Chongqing Museum.

2. By August 1945 US participants of SACO operated 10 guerrilla training camps and also supplied weapons to Tai Li’s “Loyal Patriotic Army” which had a 15,000-man strength. Moreover, former FBI agents operated a police training school in Chongqing whose curriculum included interrogation methods. Altogether, between 1942 and 1945 some 3,000 Americans served in SACO. This is the account that can be found in Schaller (1974). Schaller also states that there were mass trials of Communists conducted by Tai Li and attended by Miles. After being sentenced the political prisoners were buried alive. This account is based on the following sources:

(i) Report on Naval Unit No 9, 1 August 1945, chapter 27.
(ii) John Service and Raymond Ludden to Wedemeyer [the Chief of the US military mission in China], 19 February 1945, Box 11, Wedemeyer files.

3. Finally, as already said, there are accounts which imply that American agents taught new torture methods to their Chinese counterparts and ordered executions. This is the picture that can be found in the “Red Crag” novel.

Of these different versions, which ones should be accepted? The second version is attested by primary US sources and it is also the account given in articles published
by major American newspapers. So, the two questions which remain are whether or not US participants in SACO taught new torture methods, and whether they ordered executions. The answer to the first question is not clearly defined unless one has given a precise definition of the word “torture”. For instance, should sleep deprivation, hanging people from hands or feet for a long time, injecting truth drugs be considered as forms of torture? Due to such uncertainty it is best to leave this an open question. Similarly, the question of whether executions were requested by US advisers may never be settled because such orders are usually not put in writing.

At least, can one know whether or not US servicemen were aware of the fact that torture was being practiced in SACO camps. The answer is yes. Through the testimony of Oliver Caldwell (1972, p. 77), we know that “hour after hour” he heard “the terrible screams of a woman being tortured” (for more detail see the chronology at the date of 31 December 1945).

See also the chronology at the date of 31 December 1945.

**US involvement in the war in China**

The following excerpt from the “Hyper Text History of the Second World War” explains the increasing American involvement in arming and training Chinese forces. That involvement started in late 1944 and continued after the Japanese surrender. One major obstacle that the following account does not address is how the language barrier between American advisers and Chinese officers could be surmounted. This question is of particular importance in China because reading and writing Chinese characters is a highly demanding task. In 1944-1946 there were probably not many persons in China who were able to read and write Chinese and speak English. Moreover, it is not clear whether students with the required skills would wish to work for the KMT.

In November 1944, provoked by American bomber raids from China on southern Japan, the Japanese began a major offensive to eliminate the airfields used for staging the air attacks. On 11 November, less than two weeks after Wedemeyer’s arrival in China, the Japanese Eleventh Army captured Kweilin, 400 miles southeast of Chungking and one of the Fourteenth Air Force’s largest bases. Under the threat of further Japanese advances Chiang Kai-shek agreed to the creation of a force of thirty-six infantry divisions under a combined Chinese-American staff. The divisions, which were referred to as the ALPHA Force after a plan of defense, code-

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26e.g. “Times Magazine” 8 April 1946, see the chronology at the date of 31 December 1945; NYT 14 September 1945 (p. 1), article entitled: “Secret warfare in China bared”.
named ALPHA, would be equipped, trained, and supplied by Americans. The Chine-
sese troops who were trained in India at the Ramgar Training Center were referred
to as the RAMGAR force. This force which comprised the divisions No 14, 22, 30,
38 and 50 was considered as an elite force (Wedemeyer 1958, p. 203).

Every Chinese ALPHA Force commander down to regimental level would have an
American adviser. This meant approximately one adviser for 1,000 Chinese soldiers.
If a Chinese commander refused to accept the advice of the American working with
him, the matter would be referred to their next higher Chinese and American supe-
riors, ultimately ending up with Chiang Kai-shek and General Wedemeyer. Eventu-
ally, General Middleton operated 7 service schools and training centers, the majority
located near Kunming. All 36 divisions of the ALPHA Force received American
advisers and liaison personnel, some 3,100 soldiers and airmen, all linked by radio.
Each advisory team had about 25 officers and 50 enlisted men.

In April 1945 a renewed Japanese offensive began. General Okamura deployed
approximately 60,000 troops for the new offensive against about 100,000 Chinese
defenders. From the beginning of the enemy advance in early April until its end
in June 1945, the Japanese suffered 1,500 killed while Chinese forces had at least
6,800 killed. The Chinese units of the ALPHA Force were, in many respects, little
better than those that had suffered defeats in the past. Lack of time had prevented
the completion of the planned 23 weeks of training. Nevertheless, Chinese military
operations continued to be carried out under American supervision; in early 1946 the
chief of staff of the Chinese forces and most of the operating staff were American
(Field Artillery May 1946 p. 303).

What can be said about the relations between American advisers and Chinese com-
manders? The following account of one specific episode in late 1944 gives a flavor
of the contentious relations that prevailed at the highest level; it is excerpted from
General Wedemeyer’s memoirs (1958, p. 299-302).

The advisers attached to Marshal Wei’s headquarters and to each major echelon,
including divisions throughout his command were Americans under my direct
control. The equipment of his troops was preponderantly American. I wanted
Marshal Wei to attack the Japanese at a certain hour on a certain date. So I said:
“Marshal Wei, it is my considered judgment, with which the Generalissimo
agrees, that we must attack. Therefore I am ordering you in the name of the
Generalissimo to launch the attack as outlined”. Marshal Wei’s eyes narrowed.
If Marshal Wei would not attack, I would relieve all of the Americans now on
duty with his troops and take all the American equipment from him. The day
of the scheduled attack arrived but nothing happened on the Salween front. I
decided to wait another day before taking action. The following day, the attack
was launched at 5:00 am.

**Failure of Nationalist forces against the Communists**

Before considering the period after World War II, one must try to understand why Chiang Kai-shek was not able to crash the Communist forces between 1927 and 1943? As is well known, he tried repeatedly. Barbara Tuchman lists 6 “extermination campaigns against the Communists” before the beginning of the war. There were three more campaigns in 1940, 1941 and 1943, The description of some of these campaigns will help to explain why they failed.

**Chiang Kai-shek’s “extermination campaigns” against the Communists before 1945**

How is this question connected with the topic of the present study? It pertains to US involvement mainly in two ways. (i) As shown in the chronology, the United States supported Chiang in his drive against the Communists by providing arms (in particular bombers) and loans. (ii) This cooperation was of course prefiguring the one which would take place in 1945-1949.

1 Chiang dismissed his Soviet advisers in March 1926 (Mackerras 1982 p. 306) that is to say before starting on the Northern Expedition but he took an overt anti-Communist stand only in April 1927 with the massacre of the Communists at Shanghai soon to be followed by a similar move in the south-west region controlled by his troops. This was the first step.

2 His second campaign against the Communists was in November 1930 when about 100,000 troops moved on Communist areas in central provinces.

3 His third campaign was started in September 1931 in Kiangsi. As all subsequent campaigns it was called a “Bandit Suppression campaign”.

4 In February 1933, as the Japanese were threatening the province of Hopei in northern China, he launched 250,000 of this best troops in a fourth Bandit Suppression campaign against the Communists.

5 In 1934, with 700,000 troops, he began his 5th campaign.

6 The 6th campaign was planned in October 1936 but it was foiled by the so-called Sian incident which will be explained in a short moment.

It is a fact that the Sian mutiny lead Chiang Kai-shek to abandon the “bandit suppression” policy which had been his central strategy since 1931. The major Japanese offensive which began in Shanghai in mid-1937 of course showed the urgent necessity to close ranks against the aggression, but the Sian mutiny was 8 months earlier at

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**27**It is certainly by purpose that she uses the expression “extermination campaigns” in preference to other possible expressions such as “Communist suppression campaigns” because, as described below, these campaigns were indeed more focused on destruction and terror than on military confrontations.
a time still marked by a fairly close cooperation between the Kuomintang and Japan. Moreover, with the exception of the USSR, all the powers (e.g. Britain, Germany, Japan, United States) with which China was in contact strongly backed the suppression of the Communists. On 21 August 1937 at the height of the Battle of Shanghai the Nationalist government signed a treaty with the USSR. In short, had the Sian mutiny not taken place, the fight against the Communists would have lasted only a few additional months anyway.

What was the strategy used by the Nationalists during these campaigns. It is described in the following terms by Barbara Tuchman (1970, p. 141):

The policy practiced by the Nationalist forces was to exterminate the local peasantry who had amalgamated with the Communists and turn the region into a wasteland incapable of supporting the guerrilla troops. Houses were burned, cattle and people driven away, fields left untilled, piles of bodies were left rotting in the streets. Through execution or starvation, the Nationalists wiped out countless fellow Chinese.

For an historian the expression “countless fellow Chinese” is of course not satisfactory but, so far, we were not able to find any detailed, reliable estimates.28

An article written in 1935 by Frederick Field gives a number of additional indications. First, it observes that the military suppression campaigns were but the last phase in a process which also included a complete economic blockade of the Communist areas and the destruction by air-bombing of economic enterprises in those areas. Naturally, such tactics were likely to bring dearth, famine and economic ruin. The tactic was not completely effective because the Communists were able to establish contacts with merchandise brokers on the fringe of their territory.

A second key-point is the fact that for the encirclement to succeed, the concentration of Nationalist troops had to be done within a short time. This is why, as explained in an article published in the New York Time (see the chronology at the date of 3 November 1930), the offensive was conducted by land, water and air. “By water” means that gunboats (including foreign gun boats) were used, “by air” implies using air-bombers.29 Against this threat the Communist defense was to march at night and to take advantage of bad weather.30

This strategy can be illustrated by the offensive of 1934 directed against the Communist forces in Kiangsi, a province located midway between Shanghai and Canton.

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28 One possible way to get estimates would be to start from year-by-year population pyramids at the level of those provinces which have been submitted to scorched-earth policies. Massacres and dispersion of population will result in high infant mortality and deficit of birth which in turn will translate into visible “cuts” in the age structure of the populations. From these cuts it should be possible to estimate the intensity of the repression.

29 A natural question is whether these planes were piloted by Chinese air force fliers and, if so, who trained them.

30 A similar tactic was used by Chinese troops during the Korean War.
The scorched-earth policy was implemented not only in Kiangsi where the Communists were established but even in the regions which they might cross in their attempt to break the encirclement. Thus, Chiang Kai-shek had also cleared a large part of southern Hunan (the province adjacent to Kiangsi on its western border) of every inhabitant, every building, every harvest. The Communists indeed marched through this territory but they were able to cross it quickly enough to make the scheme collapse\(^31\). It is often said that during the Boer War in South Africa, the British Army invented a strategy to defeat a guerrilla force through a combination of scorched-earth policy and resettlement of the hostile civilian population in concentration camps\(^32\). This is indeed the modern strategy as used extensively during the Vietnam war, but the strategy which consists in denying local resources to an advancing enemy force had been a standard warfare technique for a long time. For instance, this is how the Russians fought the armies of Napoleon.

**Why did the strategy of the Nationalists not work?**

First, one must observe that in fact, at least to some extent, it did work. Indeed the Red Army had to retreat to inner provinces which were sparsely inhabited. As a result, its influence as a political force at national level became marginal. By the summer of 1934, the size of the Communist-held territories was reduced to 15% of that in 1932. To avoid being totally destroyed, the Communists had to abandon their bases in Kiangsi. They lost all their previous achievements such as the land reforms and the primitive industrial factories for the manufacture of military weapons. The Kuomintang simply suppressed all social measures introduced by the Communists\(^33\).

Yet, if Chiang’s objective was to destroy the Communists in the same way as it had suppressed them in Shanghai, then one must recognize that he was only partly successful.

One of the tactics which allowed Communists forces to escape was to create diversions. Through globally largely outnumbered by the Nationalist forces, their number was nevertheless large enough to be able to threaten provincial cities protected by local garrisons. One must remember that the main support of the Kuomintang came from the upper middle class of the cities, thus each time a city was threatened, Nationalist troops had to be rushed to the place, a move which disrupted the

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\(^31\) When one considers the distances covered by the Red Army during the Long March one gets an average velocity of about 10 kilometer per day. As a matter of comparison, the speed of Napoleon’s armies during the invasion of Russia was 11 kilometer per day; during the retreat it reached an average speed of 19 kilometer per day but this was an exceptional speed due to specific conditions. The German armies which invaded Belgium and France in the summer of 1914 advanced at a speed of 11 km/day. In other words, for an army progressing on foot and carrying only light artillery, 10 km/day was a standard speed. For more details on the question of the speed of armies, see Roehner (2002, p. 329-331).

\(^32\) In the case of China, we do not know how the displaced populations were fed and given shelter. The total civilian death toll critically depends upon the conditions under which this was done. As a matter of comparison, during the Boer War the outbreaks of epidemics in the camps where the Boer civilians were kept cost thousands of lives.

\(^33\) Source: [http://www.thecorner.org/hist/china/china1928-37b-text.htm](http://www.thecorner.org/hist/china/china1928-37b-text.htm).
encirclement and allowed the Red Army to escape.

The previous reasons are purely military. While important, they probably fail to give the main clue which resided in the appeal that the social program of the Communists had for Chinese peasants. Field (1935, p. 124) writes that the Communists were often able to win “them over, together with arms and supplies”. As mentioned in the section on the situation after 1945, desertions became really massive in 1946-194934.

In the review of a biography of Chiang Kai-shek published in the US newspaper “Christian Science Monitor”, Gerard DeGroot observes that his “various campaigns to retain power cost the lives of 18 million Chinese” (Christian Science Monitor 6 January 2004) 35. Does this estimate only include civilians or does it also include military deaths? A more precise discussion based on a history thesis published in the United States is given in a subsequent chapter.

**Chiang Kai-shek, the anti-Communist drive and the Japanese invasion**

There is conclusive evidence to the point that Chiang never considered the Japanese as a major threat and kept his best armies posted against the Communist areas even at the height of the Japanese invasion. This thesis can be illustrated by the following points.

- In February 1933, as pointed out above, while Japanese troops were threatening the northern province of Hopei, Chiang launched 250,000 of his best troops against the Communist areas in southern China.

- On 31 May 1933 the Nationalist government concluded the Tanggu Truce with the Japanese which was a de facto recognition of the existence of Manchukuo. This agreement create a demilitarized zone extending 100 kilometers south of the Great Wall from Beijing to Tianjin. The Japanese were allowed to use reconnaissance aircraft or ground patrols to ensure that the agreement was maintained. Public order within the zone was to be maintained by a lightly-armed “Demilitarized Zone Peace Preservation Corps” (Boyle 1972, Wikipedia).

- On 10 June 1935 the Nationalist government concluded the He-Umezu (also written Ho-Umezu) agreement. Ho Ying-chin was Minister of War of the Kuomintang government and Chiang’s one of the most trusted military officers. Lieutenant General Yoshijiro Umezu was the Commander of the Japanese garrison of Tientsin. The agreement gave Japan virtual control over the province of Hopei in which 28 million people were living. It included the following conditions (Boyle 1972, p. 36)
  1. Withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Hopei.

34 It would of course be very interesting to have systematic and reliable desertion data, for that would allow us to assess the morale of the Nationalist troops in a quantitative way. It would be a parameter far more instructive than the number of killed and wounded.

2 Dissolution of Kuomintang party organs and anti-Japanese secret societies in Hopei.

3 Prohibition of anti-Japanese activities throughout China. Demonstrations staged by students of the great universities in Peiping and Tientsin were ruthlessly suppressed by the Chinese police.

- The Qin-Doihara (also written Chin-Doihara) Agreement was signed on 27 June 1935 between the Kuomintang and Japan. It ended the so-called North Chahar incident (Chahar was the name given to Inner Mongolia between 1912 and 1936) and gave Japan control over Inner Mongolia. The terms were somewhat similar to those of the He-Umezu Agreement.

  1 Withdrawal of Nationalist troops from Inner Mongolia.
  2 Dissolution of Kuomintang party organs and anti-Japanese secret societies in Inner Mongolia.
  3 Maintenance of peace and order in the province was to be entrusted to the Peace Preservation Corps.
  4 No Chinese were to be permitted to settle in the northern part of Inner Mongolia province in the future.
  5 The commanders of the Chinese division that detained Japanese soldiers were to be dismissed and punished.

- In November 1935, a declaration of independence was issued in Tungchow (a city 20 kilometer east of Peiping) which severed the northeastern third of Hopei (with a population of 5 million) from the Kuomintang government. It was referred to as the “East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Communist Council\(^\text{36}\).” In proclaiming the new regime, its founders expressed their dissatisfaction with the inability of the Kuomintang government to rid China of Communism.

- In December 1935 the Japanese government addressed an ultimatum to the Nationalist government to recognize the autonomy of northern China, which after the separation of Manchuria represented another step in the disintegration of China. After unsuccessfully trying to elicit some support from the United States, desperate Chinese officials made the ultimatum public which triggered massive patriotic protests. From Beijing the demonstrations quickly spread to other cities, a protest that became known as the December 9th Movement. A “National Salvation League” was organized and over the next two years 30 groups for patriotic defense against Japan were formed.

Chiang, however, did follow this trend only in words. Not to be diverted from pursuing the annihilation of the Communists he arrested the leaders of the anti-Japanese

\(^{36}\)This is the name given in Boyle (1972); according to Pal (1953) it was called “East Hopei Autonomous Anti-Comintern Council”.
groups and suppressed the “National Salvation League” (Tuchman 1970, p. 151-152).

Although this point is not mentioned by Barbara Tuchman, it must be realized that after signing the He-Umezawa Agreement Chiang had no other choice than to suppress anti-Japanese groups.

In summary, by the end of 1935 for the sake of fighting Communism the Kuomintang had relinquished all the northern part of China (Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Jehol, Hopei) to Japan. In the short-term the strategy seemed successful in the sense that the Red Army was indeed defeated and compelled to face the ordeal of the Long March, but it also seems clear that the residents of the northern provinces would have little faith in a government which failed them at such a critical juncture and in spite of their protests. After 1945, the northern part of China was the first to come under the control of the Red Army despite the huge inflow of Nationalist troops from the south.

- In November 1936, Japan joined Germany in the Anti-Comintern Pact, thus making itself the champion of anti-Communism in Asia. Under such circumstances, Japan and Chiang Kai-shek were truly united by a common objective. In December 1936, two Kuomintang armies, the Northeastern under Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang and the Northwestern under General Yang Hu-cheng, were stationed in and around Sian in the province of Shensi where the Red Army had arrived some time before. Conscious of the necessity of a united front against Japan, the troops and their commanders were not eager to start Chiang’s sixth extermination campaign. When Chiang came to Sian to incite them to fight, the two commanders demanded that Chiang unite with the Communist party to resist Japan. Chiang turned down the demand, became even more active in his military preparations and massacred the anti-Japanese youth of Sian. The two commanders then took joint action and put Chiang under house arrest. This was the famous Sian incident of 12 December 1936. On 15 December, Zhou Enlai arrived in Sian to negotiate a united front against Japan with the imprisoned Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang was forced to call off the campaign and to accept a form of nominal coalition with the Communists. While Chiang’s fate was still uncertain, the foreign military attachés were ordered to Loyang, the Nationalist city nearest from Sian in the hope that their presence might exert some pressure for Chiang’s release. Joseph Stilwell, the American attaché, reached Loyang on 25 December, but his trip proved superfluous for Chiang was released the same day. In spite of the fact that an agreement seemed to have been reached, Chang Hsueh-liang was placed under house arrest and remained in that condition for several years37.

37This story is based on three sources which differ only in details: Tuchman (1970, p. 155-156), Mackerras (1982, p.
• In the summer of 1938 after Peking had been occupied there was an apparent change in Chiang Kai-shek’s attitude. Within a few days, imprisoned leaders of the National Salvation League were released and the ban on resistance songs was lifted; now they could be heard in the streets and were even broadcast on the radio. By the end of August it seemed that all Chinese military forces would fight side by side. This was not to last however.

• During 1943-1944 when general Stilwell was chief of staff of president Chiang Kai-shek in the Nationalist capital of Chungking, the main disagreement between them was Stilwell’s intention to bring the Communist troops in a coalition against the Japanese and to leave them have a share in the supply of American war material. On 13 September 1944 he received a visit from two Communist emissaries who brought greetings from Chu Teh (the military commander) and Mao. He told them that he would visit them in Yenan and after the meeting he wrote to General Marshall (American Chief of Staff): “They will fight under my command but not under a Chinese command designed by Chiang Kai-shek”. In a memorandum to Patrick Hurley, the personal envoy of president Roosevelt, he wrote: “The 18th Group Army [i.e. Communists] will be used. There must be no misunderstanding on this point.” Stilwell, of course, was well aware of Chiang Kai-shek’s fierce opposition to any coalition with the Communists.

In this confrontation Chiang eventually got the upper hand. On 5 October 1944, President Roosevelt acceded to his demand that Stilwell be recalled\textsuperscript{38}.

Although not eager to fight the Japanese, Chiang Kai-shek was neither inclined to stop the war by concluding an armistice. In the fall of 1938, after taking Hankow and Canton, the Japanese tried to end the war by proposing a settlement centered on a New Order for Asia based on an anti-Communist bloc comprising Japan, China and Mandchukuo. To negotiate such a settlement they were able to won over Wang Ching-wei, vice-president of the Kuomintang. But on December 26, Chiang Kai-shek publicly reaffirmed his opposition, thus rendering further negotiations useless (Tuchman 1970, p. 195). What was the part of American influence in Chiang Kai-shek’s decision is difficult to say. At that time, US exports to Japan still included such strategic items as steel, gasoline\textsuperscript{39}, oil, iron scrap. Yet, the perspective of an inevitable military confrontation between Japan and the United States was in the minds as shown by the numerous books which were written on this theme both in Japan and in the United States.

Chiang Kai-shek was aware that its policy of non-resistance to Japan was disap-

\textsuperscript{362}, Mao Tse-tung (1945)

\textsuperscript{38}This was by no means the first time that Chiang had asked the recall of Stilwell, but whereas his previous demands were turned down, this one, for some reason, was not.

\textsuperscript{39}Aviation grade gasoline was exported to Japan until 26 July 1940 (see the chronology below).
proved by most people. In one of the speeches he used to make to the Cadets of the Central Military Academy he is reported as having declared (Boyle 1972, p. 26) “I would only have to declare war against Japan. Then, the whole nation would praise and extol me. Then, why do I not do so? Why, on the contrary, am I suspected of non-resistance? I cannot let the life of the nation be lost.”

In commenting on this fairly cryptic expression, John Boyle says: “The reason the life of the country was in danger of being lost, Chiang firmly believed, was Communism.

**Civil war during 1945-1949**

The following paragraph which is excerpted from “The Field Artillery Journal” (February 1946, China and Mongolia 19 November – 18 December, p. 114-117) describes the strategy used by the Nationalist and American forces in late 1945 and early 1946 in order to occupy Manchuria.

The forces which were shipped by sea to Chinwangtao circumvented the Communist forces destined to occupy Manchuria which Russian troops had agreed to evacuate by 2 December 1945. The Kuomintang was anxious to enter Manchuria first, thereby not only seizing vast industrial establishments but also the material of the Japanese.

The US 1st Marine Division held the railroad from Peiping to Chinwangtao. Japanese troops covered and operated all other usable railroads north of the Yellow River. As a further aid to the Kuomintang the Japanese detailed a battalion of 1,000 men to operate and guard the railroad from Peiping toward Chengteh with a view of enabling the Nationalist armies to advance beyond the Great Wall. With the combined American and Japanese forces holding the important lines of communication, it was believed that the Communist armies would be unable to debouch from their stronghold in the mountains west of Peiping and attack the Kuomintang forces going into Manchuria.

Nevertheless, in February 1946, three Communist armies had been able to occupy some parts of Manchuria. Traveling over country devoid of roads and with no motor transportation the Communists were reported to be able to cover 600 kilometers in 14 consecutive days which represents an average of velocity of 40 kilometer per day (Field Artillery April 1946, p. 238 and October 1946 p. 597). Moreover, the Communists continued to raid the lines of communication and the coal mining area near Chinwangtao. They operated in groups of about 80 men who attacked the places where protection was light.

Despite American training and the fine equipment which a substantial number of their troops have had issued to them, the Kuomintang troops have thus far shown little combat efficiency. It must also be observed that the troops which
Military operations

had been brought in American transportation from South China, which is tropical, were not equipped for the cold weather which they found in Manchuria. The transplantation of troops from South China to Manchuria also made them feel and being perceived by the local population as occupation troops. The language spoken by the troops was unintelligible to the Manchus. The officers were extraordinary grafters and were hated by the local population. (Field Artillery Sep-Oct 1947 p. 322)

A lucid assessment of the military situation in China in 1947 can be found in the “Field Artillery Journal” of May-June 1947.

The Chinese method of warfare is not likely to lead to a decision in the Civil War. The Kuomintang continues to attack cities rather than the enemy; the Communists attack lines of communications rather than hostile forces. Each side claims that in time it expects the other side will be worn out and will yield. A possible solution is that the expense of maintaining the huge Kuomintang armies of nearly 5 million men will cause the economic collapse of the Nationalist Government. To avoid that possibility a loan from the United States is desired. This has been refused and this action may force the Kuomintang to do something to end the war. The economic condition of China is going from bad to worse.

**Economic collapse**

This is indeed what happened as is made clear by a book which analyses the economic situation in China (Chou Shun-hsin 1963). Between 1946 and the end of 1948 the revenue of the Nationalist government had been divided by 3 when expressed in yuans of 1936.

From the middle of 1947 on, numerous Nationalist Divisions and even entire Armies deserted in mass and joined the Communists. A number of examples are given in the chronology at the dates of 25 April 1947, 21 September 1948, 21 October 1948, 16 November 1948. The Nationalist Air Force took refuge in Taiwan as early as January 1949. After Communist troops had crossed the Yangtze in April 1949, the governors of the remaining Nationalist provinces joined the Communist one after another.

The economic collapse that occurred in 1948 was largely brought about by the end of US aid. What made the American Congress over the years more and more reluctant to grant aid and loans to the Nationalist government? There may have been several reasons but one crucial factor was certainly the dissatisfaction experienced by

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40 This is no surprise when one recalls the conditions under which conscription was carried out. An American officer, Oliver Caldwell, notes that in 1944 “it was a common sight to see conscripts trussed up with their hands tied behind their backs, attached to a long rope, being led off to the barracks” (Caldwell 1972 p. 111). In addition, even officers were poorly paid. Caldwell writes that in 1944 their average monthly pay was equivalent to 15 dollars (Caldwell 1972 p. 29).
Fig. 3.3 Government revenue and price index. Thick solid line: Revenue of the Nationalist government expressed as an index adjusted for inflation (logarithmic scale on the left-hand side). Broken line: ratio of the expenditure to the revenue (scale on the right-hand side). Despite US funding the expenditures largely surpassed revenue for most of the time. About 75% of the expenditures were for military purpose. Thin red line: monthly wholesale price index in Shanghai; the scale (not shown on the graph) is logarithmic with minimum: 0.3 and maximum 10^7.

After 1945 the situation improved mainly due to American funding. After 1944 the Chinese government put unlimited amounts of Chinese dollars at the disposal of the American forces in China (for more details see the chronology at the date of 26 March 1945), a circumstance which certainly contributed to the inflation process although we do not know to what extent.

When US financial aid decreased the budget deficit again reached high levels. After 1948, price inflation exploded in a hyperinflation episode; during April 1949 prices were multiplied by 82 and in the 3 years between May 1946 and April 1949 they were multiplied by 7,400,000. The hyperinflation certainly contributed to the military collapse of the Nationalists because it hit cities (which were the power base of the Nationalists) much more than the countryside (from which Communists mainly draw their power). Source: Chou (1963).

by American business. Over 1946 and 1947 the Chinese economy became more and more controlled by the state (an evolution which is inevitable in time of war) and imports were subject to ever broader restrictions (as can be expected from a government which tries to reduce the trade deficit). Several articles which are cited in the chronology chapter clearly describe this turn of mind. Eventually the organizations representing American economic interests in China (such as the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai) decided that the situation could hardly be worse under a Communist government. This is indeed the subtitle of an article published in the “Far Eastern Survey” on 20 April 1949: “China outlook: business conditions couldn’t be much worse under Communists” (Gould 1949).
Censorship

In the case of China under Kuomintang rule the important point is not really whether or not the medias had to submit to an official censorship procedure. The main factor was rather the fact that the Nationalist government maintained an authoritarian rule of which the control of the press was just one aspect. For instance, in Shanghai all newspapers were supposed to report the news issued by the official News Agency. As illustrations of instructions given by the government to Chinese newspapers see the dates of 21 October 1946 and 18 August 1948 in the chronology. Moreover, newspaper editors who did not comply were physically eliminated (see the chronology at the date of 11 May 1946).

Apart from government control, there is also the influence of corporations. As a case in point, the influence of British corporations on the “North China Daily News” (one of our main newspaper sources) is quite visible. For instance the journal regularly carried news about the performance of new British commercial aircraft; in contrast, little information is given about American commercial aircraft. On 8 June 1946, the anniversary of Victory Day, there were entire advertisement pages for the Shell Company and for British banking institutions established in Shanghai or Hong Kong.

Because US troops were not supposed to take part in military operations there is, quite understandably, a tendency for American military records to belittle the role of US forces and to underestimate their losses. Thus, the official history of the US Navy (including the Marine Corps) lists two US fatalities in the 6 months from January 1946 to 30 June 1946, whereas based on information released by Chinese newspapers (e.g. the “North-China Daily News”) it appears that 25 US soldiers were killed during these 6 months. Even this figure is probably only a lower bound because (i) as already said, Chinese newspapers were submitted to various forms of restraints (ii) we do not know to what extent military sensitive information was released by

41 The control of the tribunals was another important facet, in this respect see the chronology at the date of 18 August 1948.
American forces to Chinese newspapers.

In a lucid article published in the “Far Eastern Survey”, Eugene Johnson (1946) observes that censorship occurred not only at the source but also when dispatches written by correspondents were submitted to their respective journals. More specifically, what Johnson calls “censorship of filtration” occurs when the factual content of a correspondent’s dispatch is filtered out as it passes through the hands of the editor, the rewrite man and the headline writer. As an illustration he presents an excerpt from “one of America’s prominent weekly news magazine” [it is an article about General Marshall’s mission in China published in “Time Magazine” of 26 March 1946):

“This intense popular demand restrained Chinese Communist intransigence [against a coalition government] and gave Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek a chance to set in motion the machinery of political reconstruction.”

Johnson observes: “This comment deserves some recognition as one of the most glib [spoken too quickly to be true] distortions yet written about the China scene. For the opposition to the coalition government idea comes mainly from ultra-right-wing elements within Chiang’s own Kuomintang party. It is generally recognized that it is within the Kuomintang itself that “intransigence” will have to be restrained. The effect on the casual reader of this sentence is to create the impression that all would be well within China were it not for the refusal of the Chinese Communists to participate in a genuinely democratic government” 42.

This question of censorship must have been of concern in 1946 for a second article on this topic was released in the same issue of the “Far Eastern Survey”. The writer notes that “Few government specialists in Asia will attempt to write articles because of the emasculation which government censorship almost inevitably imposes on any material. In the case of China, the right wing of the Kuomintang and in the case of the Philippines, the associates of the pro-Falange Soriano. are the elements whom our largest organs of communication present to their readers in roseate hues [i.e. in nice pink color].” (Salisbury 1946)

**Arrests and assassinations**

The title of this section should rather be “Arrests and kidnapping”. Indeed many arrests were done not by the police but by secret services or by para-military organizations such as the “Blue Shirts”, a movement which had about the same semi-official status as the “Black shirts” in fascist Italy or the S.A. (“Schutz Abteilungen”) in Nazi

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42 Naturally, as we know, the position held by Johnson consisting in giving some credit to the efforts of the Communists for a peaceful settlement will be barred altogether in subsequent years.
Fig. 4.1 Ting Ling and her child. Ms. Ting Ling became renowned through her first novel that she wrote in 1927 at the age of 23. In this novel which is entitled “Miss Sophia’s Diary” a young woman describes her unhappiness with her life and her confused romantic and sexual feelings. Arrested by the Kuomintang in 1933, she spent two years in prison before being released. In 1936 she was able to join the Communist area. Source: China Today, December 1934.

Germany.

This is why many people after being arrested were never tried or even never told for what crime they had been arrested. In an article about “Blue Shirts” published in “China Today” (December 1934) it is said the “To be kidnapped is to be murdered”. It is true that many people who were arrested were killed in prison or died because of bad detention conditions. This was for instance the case of Hu Yepin, husband of the famous writer Ting Ling, who was executed in prison in 1931 for being a Communist. When Ms. Ting Ling was arrested two years later in June 1933 many people were convinced that she would meet the same fate as her husband. In an article published in “China Today” in December 1934, one reads: “A short time before 15 June 1933, Ting Ling was kidnapped and never heard from again. As a matter of fact, so convinced were their friends that she was no longer alive that the caption of her portrait (Fig. 4.1) in the same article says: “Murdered by the Blue Jackets”. In fact, this was not true. After two years in prison she was released and in 1936 she was able to escape to the Communist capital of Yenan where she was welcomed.

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43Twenty two years later during the Cultural Revolution she got again into troubles when she was sent to a village in the countryside.
Chapter 5

“Bandit extermination” campaigns

After 1928 the elimination of the Communists was the main objective of General Chiang Kai-shek. Many observations reported in the chronology chapter suggest that it was probably also a major motive in the American occupation which followed the end of World War II. As already mentioned, there have been about 8 military campaigns led by the Kuomintang armies against areas occupied by the Communists. These campaigns have received different names such as: “encirclement campaigns”, “annihilation drives”, “extermination campaigns”. All these expressions which were used in Nationalist newspapers emphasize that the objective of Nationalist forces was not just to defeat the Communist forces, but to suppress them.

The fifth of these campaigns which started in the summer of 1933 eventually led to the retreat of the Communists through the Long March (see Fig. 5.1).

First we define the problem that we wish to solve and we explain why it is of interest from an historiographical perspective. Then we discuss the casualty estimates provided in a book by Rudolph Rummel (1991).

Historiographical problem of the annihilation campaigns

We have to solve two different questions.

1. How many people died in the areas which had been under Communist control and were subsequently “liberated” by Kuomintang forces?

2. Once reliable fatality estimates have been obtained for each area, these numbers must be broken down according to different possible causes of death.

The first question can in principle be solved by using demographic methods. Of course, one may suspect that censuses (or other population registrations) that were carried out in the 1930s were not reliable especially in regions in which military operations took place. However, it is possible to use age group population data from the 1950s, 1960s or 1970s in order to reconstruct birth and death rates in the 1930s that is to say one or two generations earlier. For this part of the investigation there is no need to rely on historical accounts.

On the contrary in order to answer the second question one must rely on qualitative
historical accounts. To get an insight into various possible causes of death we consider the case of an area that was first occupied by the Communists and subsequently re-conquered by the Nationalists. This leads to the following questions.

- How many Nationalist and Communist troops died in the battles which took place when the Communists occupied the area?
- How many civilians were killed by the Communists after they occupied the area?
- How many died of starvation during the Communist occupation until the area was submitted to economic blockade by the Nationalists?
- How many died of starvation as a result of the economic blockade?
- How many civilians died as a result of the population displacements ordered by the Nationalists in preparation of their suppression campaigns?
- The suppression campaigns required the construction of extensive networks of blockhouses; how many of the peasants mobilized for this work died either during the construction work or subsequently of starvation because this work was done at the expense of productive agricultural work in the fields?
- The suppression campaigns required the mobilization of thousands of coolies for the transportation of ammunition and other army supplies. How many of them died?
- During the suppression campaigns thousands of soldiers had to be quartered in areas which were often already in a situation of food dearth or famine. How many civilians died as a result?
- How many soldiers were killed on each side during the warfare which lead to the occupation of the area by Nationalist forces?
- How many civilians were killed by the Nationalists after they occupied the area?

In some areas the previous process took place several times in the sense that after the Kuomintang troops moved away the area was re-occupied by the Communists and had to be re-conquered by the Nationalist forces a second time.

Why is it important to distinguish between various causes of death? According to the accounts given by Kuomintang officials which were reprinted in all foreign newspapers published in the part of China controlled by the Nationalists, there were only two causes of death apart from battle fatalities.

(i) Deaths due to the massacres allegedly committed by the Communists when they occupy a new area.
(ii) Death by starvation because Communist collectivization allegedly leads to a collapse of agricultural production.

Such views will be illustrated in the next section.
Communists as seen by newspapers

About 20 foreign periodicals were published in China in the 1930s by American, British, French or Japanese publishers. Most of them were daily newspapers, about 5 were weekly and two were monthly periodicals. In addition 4 British newspapers were published in Hong Kong44. We were able to examine half of dozen of them; unsurprisingly they are very similar in the form of their accounts about Communism in China. Apart from Kuomintang censorship this can also be attributed to the fact that they represent western business interests established in China which, of course, had no reason to look at Communists in a favorable way. This argument applies in particular to the newspapers published in Hong Kong and therefore not subject to Kuomintang censorship.

North China Herald

As an illustration let us consider the “North-China Herald” (weekly, British newspaper). In line with Kuomintang rhetoric it uses the words “Red bandits” to designate the Communists. Here are some typical sentences.

- “Red suppression work: Bandits under Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung totaling more than 50,000 are concentrating at Sinfeng (South Kiangsi)” (NCH July 1932 p. 130).
- “Although General Chiang Kai-shek is personally directing the anti-Communist campaign in Hupeh, bandit forces are enlarging the scope of their activity” (NCH 3 Aug 1932 p. 170).
- “Bandit suppression work in Fukien province by the 19th Route Army. The 60th Division and a part of the 78th Division are engaged in a drive, pressing on Loongyen, the last stronghold of the Red troops in the province” (31 Aug 1932, p. 337).

Apart from revealing the vocabulary which was in use at that time, the excerpts also show that suppression campaigns were conducted in parallel in different provinces. As shown by the maps given below there were Communist areas (and suppression campaigns) in almost all provinces of central and south China.

Of course, expressions such as “Red bandits” reflect a negative and derogatory view. How was such a perception brought about? According to the view of the Nationalist government the Communists were nothing more than terrorists who subjected the areas that they dominated to a reign of terror. The following descriptions are fairly typical of the way Communists are seen in the the North-China Herald.

“The mark of the Communist wild beast lies heavy on this formerly prosperous section of western Hupeh. What is left are depopulated districts of empty

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44This is based on a table entitled “Principal secular foreign periodicals in China” published in the Cambridge History of China.
villages and untilled fields.” (North-China Herald 21 Dec 1932, p. 476, article entitled “Tales of Red excesses”)

“Refugees from the Paoning area [not far from Pachow] tell us that when the Communist arrive they kill at once all who will not join them and then brand on the hand of all who agree to join. Thus, they are left to the tender mercies of attacking soldiery when the Reds are driven out who find it hard to believe that those branded are not real Reds.” North-China Herald (19 April 1933, p. 91)

A logical conclusion from this excerpt is that Nationalist troops had good reason to think that all inhabitants who remained after the Communists had left were themselves Reds who should be eliminated. Many articles also emphasize the rehabilitation efforts of the Kuomintang in the areas it had reconquered.

**Times**

Such negative accounts were not limited to western papers published in China. There are similar accounts in the Times. The circumstances which lead to such accounts are always the same. After an area had been “swept clean of bandits” by Nationalist troops, reporters were invited to take part in guided visits by Kuomintang officials. What they saw were devastated regions which had been deserted by their population. Naturally they were told that this was the result of Communist rule. As a typical illustration one can mention the following article from the Times (3 February 1933 p. 9):

*From our correspondent in China*  In the triangle formed by the Yangtze river and the Han river the choice given to the peasants was death or Communism. Two-third of the whole population disappeared altogether. At one village visited the inhabitants had fallen from 3,000 to 140. The greater part of it fled but many were ruthlessly massacred. The homes of the well-to-do were wrecked, temples destroyed. Land was expropriated and made communal. The Communists established a military academy for training the lower ranks, an arsenal for making rifle ammunition, a mint for coining copper, a press for printing soviet bank notes, postage stamps and propaganda. A thousand Chinese are in Moscow where they are studying in various Soviet institutions such as the “Lenin Oriental School”.

During the campaign of summer 1932 two Red divisional commanders were killed and a third captured and executed. Some 100 modern machine guns were taken. Moreover, during the past year the police have been periodically raiding Communist nests in Shanghai.

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45 Yet, the “Times” also published a few articles which were more balanced. An excerpt from such an article (14 November 1933) is given below.
From such accounts it is impossible to determine the reason which prompted the peasants to leave. Were they massacred or driven away by the Communists or did they flee for fear of retribution and vexations by incoming Kuomintang troops or did they leave because of the economic blockade established by the Nationalists.

The same views were carried by the Japanese who were confronted to Communists in Manchuria and north China or by the French who were confronted to Communists in Indochina. As an illustration one can mention a report published by the Direction of Political Affairs of the “Gouvernement Général” of Indochina. It is entitled: “La terreur rouge en Annam” (Red terror in Annam, Annam was the central region of Indochina).

**Nippon Times**

A similar view was spread by Japanese newspapers after 1945. Here is a typical excerpt:

> Red horror in China. The Reds lay the victim [Trappist monk] on the ground with his head on a large slab of rock. A heavy stone is raised upon him and when dropped crushes his head into pulp. Today 14 of the Trappist monks are still unaccounted for. (Nippon Times 5 July 1948 p. 1)

It can be noted that the article does not positively say that the Communists killed the Trappists; it just describes an horrendous killing method and charges it on the Communists without giving any precision about date or location. This article was published during the occupation of Japan at a time when Japanese newspapers were controlled by US occupation authorities.

When the same view is spread by so many different sources it is tempting to give some credit to it. With the benefit of hindsight it is difficult to take these accounts very seriously however. Why should the Kuomintang have lost the support of the Chinese population (as became clear after 1946) if its actions were so beneficial and the Communist policy so harmful? The crux of the matter is that all the sources that we mentioned shared a common motivation for giving biased accounts of Communist policies.

**A few balanced reports**

Occasionally, however there were a few more balanced articles. As an illustration one can mention the following: (Times 14 November 1933 p. 15).

> For the last 3 years there have been permanently garrisoned in Kiangsi between 100,000 and 200,000 government troops. The inhabitants freely admit that the situation would not have been worse if the whole province, instead of only half of it, had been in the hands of the Red. Press gangs [compelling people to serve in the military usually by force], conscript labor, extra-taxes, and many forms of
indignity and extortion have made their lives a burden. If anything is calculated to make the Chinese peasants turn spontaneously to Communism it is having troops permanently billeted on them.

**Qualitative aspects of Nationalist suppression campaigns**

Pélissier (1963) and Wilson (1971) give the following account of the 5th encirclement campaign.

Fiery walls of scorched earth were thrown about the Communists and narrowing circles of concrete blockhouses dubbed “tortoises” by the Red Armies, and linked by barbed wire fences, were constructed. New roads were built to open up the area to Chiang’s motorized units. Day after day the Nationalist Air Force [400 planes] bombed and machine-gunned soldiers and civilians alike in its effort of annihilation. The peasant population suffered enormously.

Can we get more detailed information from newspapers? In fact, newspaper articles give mainly information about the movements of troops, their victories or their defeats, but give very little details about grass-root conditions of this warfare. Nevertheless, there are a few points on which additional explanations can be found.

**Scorched earth policy**

Many documents point out that the Red bandit suppression campaigns were preceded by scorched earth policies but, partly because of military censorship, there are few accurate quantitative descriptions. At a qualitative level this aspect can be illustrated by the following episodes.

- In September 1932 the Nationalist headquarters in Hankow (refers to the city of Hankow nowadays included in Wuchang (Wuhan)) for the 4th Encirclement Campaign ordered that in the soviet area all able-bodied men be killed, all houses burned, and all grain, except that used by Nationalist troops, be destroyed (Mackerras 1982 p. 342)

- Naturally, the Nationalists made similar charges. “According to an official report presented by General Ho Ying-chin who has had charge of the anti-red drive in which 200,000 of the Government best troops were involved, in Kiangsi province alone, 186,000 persons had been massacred by the Reds and 2.1 million forced to flee to other provinces. More than 100,000 houses had been burned.”

**Road construction**

Communist troops had only light machine guns which allowed them to move quickly and most often during the night. In contrast, the Nationalist forces had heavy guns, aircraft, patrol ships on the rivers and large numbers of troops. For such an army
the transportation of ammunition, oil, food and other supplies was essential. This required roads, trucks and coolies. There were several international programs for the construction of roads by various non governmental organizations. Roads were important for famine relief but one must also be aware that they were often the first step in suppression campaigns.

These aspects are illustrated by the following episodes.

- **Between 1921 and 1922, Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell (1883-1946) worked as Chief Engineer of road construction in Shanxi and Shaanxi provinces. He took part in the construction of a 130-kilometer famine relief road for the American Red Cross.** [This was a decade before the suppression campaigns conducted by Chiang Kai-shek. Yet, the rift between Communists and anti-Communists had already started. In September 1920 Mao Zedong and Li Dazhao initiated socialist groups in the south of China and similar groups appeared elsewhere. The First Congress of the Chinese Communist Party met in July 1921 in Shanghai.]

- **In March 1933 an urgent wire was sent by General Chiang Kai-shek who is directing a bandit-suppression campaign in Kiangsi to the Nanking government in which he ordered engineers to Kiangsi for the purpose of completing several trunk roads and highways. Highway experts of the League of Nations have already started for Kiangsi. Total expenditure for the road program is estimated at $100 million. It is understood that these roads will be essential for the campaign. During the past two years much attention was given to road building especially in connection with bandit suppression work.** (NCH 8 Mar 1933 p. 376)

  Experts of the League of Nations also took part in the rehabilitation of former Communist areas. (NCH 29 Nov 1933 p. 329)

**Recruitment of coolies**

The following excerpt describes how coolies were “recruited”.

**Tzeliutsing, Szechuen [near Chengtu] 19 December 1932:** On 18 November 1932 Kuomintang soldiers poured into the town in thousands, accompanied by coolies and ponies carrying their ammunition, guns, supplies and money in silver dollars. All the available coolies and farmers too were rounded up to act as carriers. Some coolies refused to be impressed and the soldiers opened fire on them killing some outright. This is only one incident that came to our notice. (North-China Herald 18 Jan 1933, p. 92)

**Economic blockade**

Prior to the suppression campaigns Communist areas were subject to economic blockade as illustrated by the following episodes.

- **The starvation campaign in Kiangsi is succeeding.** Driven to despera-
tion the Reds are reported to have made arrangements with smugglers to have food brought into their areas. But would be smugglers are reminded of the determination of the authorities to mete out the extreme penalty to law-breakers. (NCH 28 Sep 1932 p. 492)

[Unfortunately, the article does not give any information about the number of people who died from starvation or about the number of smugglers who were executed.]

- **Total blockade of the Soviet areas**  The Nanchang (Kiangsi) headquarters of the 5th Encirclement Campaign ordered a total blockade of the Soviet areas including all mail and provisions. (Mackerras 1982 p. 346)

**Execution of village headmen**

The following excerpt describes one episode of this kind which occurred in the Shantung region of Anhui province after the region was re-occupied by Nationalist troops after having been occupied by Communist troops for some time.

“In one county seat 21 village elders were shot on one day, one of them a woman”. The article also claims that “hostages by the hundreds were carried away by the Communists and have perished.”

The article does not say for what reason the Communists should have taken these hostages with them. By no means would they be a guarantee of safety; on the contrary, they would slow down the movement of the troops. That practice would also be in contradiction with the way (described in the same journal) prisoners of war were treated (see below). May be that claim is a way to explain the disappearance of a great number of villagers after the return of the Nationalists?

**Arrests and execution of Communists in cities**

As one knows mass execution of suspected Communists occurred in Shanghai after the Nationalist troops took the city in 1927. It seems that similar mass executions also occurred in the following years whenever a city was threatened by Communist troops. An illustration is provided by the case of Hankow (Hupei). where numerous executions of Communist suspects occurred in August 1939 as the city was threatened by advancing Communist troops (NYT 10 Aug 1930 p. 1).

Communists were also arrested so to say on a regular basis by the Nationalist police in cities such as Canton, Peking or Shanghai. Most often they were executed after being summarily tried by military tribunals. Communists were also arrested in foreign concessions by the so-called International Settlement police who handed them over to the Nationalist police. Arrests of Communists also occurred in Japan and in Japanese-occupied Korea and Manchuria.

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46 In 1863 the American concession joined the British Settlement to become the Shanghai International Settlement. The French concession remained independent and the Chinese retained control over the original walled city. The International Settlement maintained its own police force, the Shanghai Municipal Police.
The following excerpts illustrate these various aspects.

- Canton, 2 November 1932. Twenty five Communists, among them 3 girls, were executed in Canton as members of the Communist Youths Corps. They were youngsters captured in the East River district. (NCH 2 Nov 1932 p. 169)

- Canton, 16 November 1932. Twelve Red bandit leaders were arrested when the police raided a house in the eastern suburb of Canton. A trial was immediately held by a military court. Seven Reds, among them one woman, were sentenced to death. (NCH 16 Nov 1932 p. 249)

- Peking police raided Communist places. When the alleged Communists resisted the police opened fire. (NCH 9 Aug 1933 p. 207) [The article gives no information about fatalities.]

- $100,000 were offered by the Nationalist government for the capture of each of the bandits commander-in-chief Chu Teh and Mo Tseh Tung (sic)47. Smaller amounts were offered for the capture of other leaders. For instance, $30,000 were offered for every Division Commander (a rank equivalent to a 3-star general).

- In collaboration with the Chinese authorities, the Shanghai Settlement police arrested 11 Communists in December 1932. It raided 6 red propaganda bases and sized 5,000 copies of Communist books; of the 127 feature films which were examined by the Settlement authorities, 68 were censored and 59 were approved48. (NCH 25 Ja 1933 p. 135) [The fact that Communists were arrested in the foreign concessions of Shanghai and turned over to be executed also appears in the testimony of a US Marine which was given in the chronology at the date of 22 March 1927.]

- About 20 Korean Communists have been arrested and prosecuted on a charge of trying to establish a Communist party in Korea. (NCH 8 Fe 1933 p. 207) [The article gives no information about the sentences.]

- Heavy sentences for Communists imposed by a Japanese court in Tokyo. A total of 182 Communists were sentenced. Four of the accused were sentenced to imprisonment for life, among them Gaku Sano who was arrested in Shanghai over 3 years ago. All others were given terms ranging from 2 to 15 years. (NCH 2 Nov 1932 p. 179)

**Execution of suspected Communist sympathizers**

It is widely recognized that the Communists were able to find substantial support among the peasantry. A major objective of suppression campaigns was to cut such links. Through threats and punishments the Nationalists tried to deter peasants from having any contact with Communists. According to the Wikipedia online encyclo-

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47 Great variations in the spelling of the name of Mao Zedong can be found in the articles of the NCH.

48 As an example of a movie which was censored one can mention “The rebel” which tells the story of popular resistance in Tyrol against Napoleonic troops.
pedia (entry “Blue Shirts Society”) one method was to introduce collective responsibility. Every family who pledged not to have contacts with Communists and on the contrary to report their movements to the Nationalists was linked to 4 other families who had made the same pledge\(^{49}\). Any violation of the pledge, for instance by not informing the Nationalists that Communist troops had visited the village, would be punished either by execution or imprisonment in concentration camps of all these families. The same article says that the Nationalists set up “hundreds of concentration camps around Shangrao in Jiangsi where they tortured and executed residents and Communist captives”. One may wonder if it is not an exaggeration to speak about *hundreds* of concentration camps. It is true that there is a site of a concentration camp in the suburbs of Shangrao that can still be visited\(^{50}\) but were there really hundreds like this one? Furthermore, it should be possible to confirm claims of mass executions by the discovery of mass graves.

**Lenient treatment of prisoners and population by the Communists**

In a rare article of the North-China Herald which is not presenting the Communists in a bad light, there is a description of how they treated Nationalist prisoners.

Three divisions, the 11th, 52nd and 59th were defeated by the Communists in February 1933. The story of their captivity was related by a military surgeon of the 11th Division. He was taken before a bare-footed uniformed man who was in fact a Divisional Commander (i.e. a three star general). He told him that officers and Communist troops dressed alike and received similar treatment. At lunch time the prisoners found the Commander to have the same food as themselves. The surgeon was eventually released and given $10 as traveling expenses. (NCH 26 Apr 1933 p. 131)

It is not clear why this article passed the screen of Nationalist censorship. Of course, one may think that it was a clever piece of Communist propaganda. Yet, the fact that over the 1930s and even more after 1946 whole Nationalist divisions surrendered and passed over to the Communist side suggests that they were fairly well treated after surrender.

Curiously, the Times of London is less critical of Communists than the British newspapers published in China. This can be illustrated by the following excerpt:

The Communist troops are apparently regularly paid while the government troops receive only a fraction of their pay and often provision themselves by looting the countryside. The Communists designely treat the peasantry well with the result that their intelligence service is superior and that they are con-

\(^{49}\)It is unclear how people could be “convinced” of making such pledges.  
\(^{50}\)Imprisoned revolutionaries staged the so-called “Maojialing Uprising” there on May 25, 1942. A martyr cemetery was built in Maojialing in 1955.  
stantly able to forestall movement by retiring in front and attacking from the flanks and rear.

This excerpt is so completely at variance with the others that it leads to the conclusion that for that matter newspapers are totally untrustworthy. During these extermination campaigns there were but few correspondents in the field and apparently none on the side of Communist forces.

Organization of Communist areas

After 1937, due to the deepening rift between Western powers and Japan, the Chinese Communists (who were engaged in fighting Japanese troops) got more understanding press coverage in Britain and in the United States.

Yet, a few fairly balanced accounts were published even in earlier years such as for example the articles by Peter Fleming. In “Life under Red regime” (Times 14 November 1933 p. 15), he compares favorably the areas under Communist rule with those which are suffering under the burden of the occupation by Kuomintang troops.

The Lytton Report (1932) describes the extension of Communist areas as follows: “Large parts of the provinces of Fukien and Kiangsi and parts of Kwangtung are reported to be completely sovietized. Communist zones of influence are far more extensive. They cover a large part of China south of the Yangtze and parts of the provinces of Hupeh, Anhwei, and Kiangsu north of that river” (cited in Pal 1953 p. 305).

Descriptions of life in Communist areas can be found in the Survey of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. “When a district had been occupied by the Red Army the program of action consisted in the cancellation of debts, the distribution among landless and small farmers of land forcible seized, either from large private owners or from religious institutions such as temples, monasteries and churches. Taxation is simplified. The peasants have to contribute a certain part of the produce of their lands. Steps are taken to develop irrigation, rural credit systems, and cooperatives. Public schools, hospitals and dispensaries may also be established” (cited in Pal 1953, p. 306).

After 1938, the Communist areas of Yenan received favorable coverage as shown by the following article from the Times (25 July 1938 p. 13). The article is entitled: “With the Eight Route Army and its author begins with the observation that the terms “Red” or “Communist” should no longer be used. He mentions two organizations which were developed in Yenan and in some of the areas occupied by the Japanese.

- The “Resist to Enemy Association” (Kan Ti Ho Yuen Hui) which was a self-defense corps whose members drilled for 2 hours a day from 6 to 8 am [it would be
interesting to learn more about the training which was given]. This organization also helped in time of special agricultural requests

- Under the “Little Teacher System” each child as he (or she) learned a few words in class had the duty of teaching family members. The “Young Vanguards” went out with drums and cymbals and sang vigorously and in tune some of the new martial songs.

The author emphasizes that such activities permitted the women to gain autonomy with respect to the authority of mothers-in-law.

In comparing such areas to those held by the Nationalists, the author observes that in Nationalist districts the people were urged to help the government and the army to win the war, whereas in Communist areas the army was supposed to help the people to drive out the Japanese invaders.

Written in mid-1938, the author’s conclusion seems both lucid and prophetic: “The immediate task is to drive out the invader. When that is done it seems reasonable that the methods which had won the war may be equally effective in winning the peace”.

**How western powers supported Chiang Kai-shek’s warfare**

Western powers, particularly the United States and Germany, supported the war against the Communists by providing loans, aircraft and other weapons. They took a more direct part in the war by conducting patrols on Chinese rivers in conjunction with suppression campaigns, in providing pilots for Nationalist aircraft. As seen above they contributed to the construction of roads which were instrumental for suppression campaigns. Moreover in foreign concessions they arrested Communists and handed them over to the Nationalists.

The following excerpts illustrate these various aspects.

- In June 1933 the Nationalist government was granted a loan of $50 million by the United States and in July 1933 Britain granted a loan of 5 million pounds ($25 million); both loans will serve to buy American and British goods. In July China will receive 36 Curtiss-Hawk fighting aircraft ordered at a cost of $1 million. (NCH 21 Jun 1933 p. 442;

The New York Times mentions that at this time the US Navy had in the region a presence consisting of 41 naval vessels with 6,000 sailors and 2,900 Marines onboard (NYT 1 Aug 1930 p. 6). There is no mention of the bombing of Changsha but the articles mention that the city is burning which is attributed to the “Red torch”.]
Protected by foreign warships, the Nationalist troops were able to retake Chansha on 5 August 1930 (Mackerras 1982 p. 330). In the following days there was a mass execution of suspected Communists (NYT 11 August 1930 p. 1).

- The Nationalist government claimed to have cleared the immediate vicinity of the Yangtze on both banks as far as Ichang [located in Hupei to the west of Hankow]. The patrols of foreign gunboats have been a very important factor. (NCH 19 Oct 1932 p. 93)
- According to a report of the Japanese government 45 American non-commissioned army officers are serving with the Chinese air force. The same report mentions that the Japanese were irritated by sales of American planes to China. (NCH 18 Ja 1933 p. 92)

**Reliability of Rummel’s estimates**

In chapter 3 we mentioned an estimate given in a book by Jonathan Fenby (2003) according to which the campaigns wages against the Communists and against War Lords opposed to the Nationalists had a human cost of some 3 million deaths. This figure in fact comes from Rummel (1991). In order to understand to what extent it is reliable one must examine on what kind of information it is based.

Rummel’s book which is full of tables and figures tries to give estimates for all episodes of the history of China from 1900 to 1990. Although the author tries to give to his analysis an appearance of accuracy in providing low, median and high estimates or by offering definitions of new concepts such as the notion of democide, there are two main problems with the methodology that he uses.

- Rummel is not an historian of China, but rather specializes in the compilation of fatality data in wars and internal disturbances. In his book on China he relies exclusively on secondary English sources. Thus, the reliability of his data is dependent on the reliability of the sources that he uses. Evidently, in the 1930s American, English or German sources had a tendency to favor the point of view of the Nationalists. In this respect one should recall that Chiang had German military advisers and that the cost of his campaigns was largely supported by American loans (see the chronology).
- Rummel does not try in any way to check the figures that he finds in his sources. How this can be done is discussed in the next section.

**What do contemporaneous sources say?**

As already noted, reports from the Nanking government can hardly be taken at face

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51 Although most of them were bought and won over by bribery rather than by military force
value without additional checks. Edgar Snow was one of the few Westerners who visited the Communist side in the 1930s. In the book that he published in 1937 he writes (p. 186): “The Kuomintang itself admits that one million people were killed or starved to death in the process of recovering soviet Kiangsi [Jiangsi]”. Unfortunately, Snow does not give the reference of the source on which this statement is based.

This sentence is reproduced verbatim in Pélissier (1963) and in Rummel (1991). The same figure of one million fatalities is also cited (without reference) in Clodfelter (1992, p. 657).

**Toward reliable fatality estimates**

The methodology that we recommend relies on comparative analysis. It includes the following steps.

1. First we need to know what was the extension and population of the areas controlled by the Communists before the Nationalist campaigns were able to drive them away.

2. Secondly, one must closely examine the kind of warfare conducted by the Nationalists. To what extent did it rely on burning villages and driving villagers away? How many troops have been living in the field and for how long? Were villagers suspected of being Communists killed or put in prisoner camps? How long were the prisoners held and what was the mortality rate in those camps?

Once the main features of this war have been defined, it will become possible to establish comparisons with similar (and possibly better known conflicts). In this way it will be possible to get fatality estimates.

3. The third step consists in verifying if these estimates are consistent with demographic data. For that purpose one needs census data consisting of age-sex pyramids for each one of the provinces under consideration. Naturally, the technique for deriving mortality rates in the 1930s from age-sex pyramids based on subsequent censuses (for instance in 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990 or 2000) must first be tested in cases in which the death rate is fairly well known.

As can be seen from this discussion such a study represents a substantial amount of work. In this respect, one may recall that physicists have a long tradition of conducting accurate measurements.

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52. During the past two centuries there have been many civil wars. Some are better documented than others. For an historian who, like myself, can only read English, French and German the best documented cases are the civil wars during the French Revolution or the American Civil War.

53. As an illustration one can mention the determination of the density of the earth. In 1772 the Royal Society set up a “Committee of Attraction” to determine the density of the Earth. Some people had proposed measuring this by finding a very uniformly shaped mountain and measuring how much it deflected a plumb bob. Since gravity is so weak, this would be a tiny effect, but the committee, including Cavendish, nonetheless tried it. Using a large mountain in Scotland, they came up with a value for the density of Earth of about 4.5 times the density of water.
Fig. 5.1 Communist areas in October 1932. On the basis of newspaper articles it can be added that the 12th Red Army occupied the south east of Fukien province. Source: North-China Herald 19 October p. 93.

Population of areas controlled by the Communists

The strategy of the KMT campaigns consisted in encircling large areas in order to destroy Communist forces. The Boer War, the Vietnam War as well as similar conflicts has shown that such a form of warfare is very costly in civilian lives for at least two reasons. (i) Male people between the age of 18 and 40 are frequently assimilated...
Fig. 5.2a  Communist areas in the summer of 1934. This map shows Communist areas (called “Soviet districts” in the caption of the map) and Red partisan areas in Manchuria. Juikin, the capital of the Communist area in Kiangsi, was evacuated by the Communists and occupied by the Nationalists in November 1934. Subsequently, there were two major changes: (i) a reduction of Communist influence in the South East (Kiangsi, Anhwei, Honan) and (ii) a strengthening of their influence in northern China including Manchuria. This second aspect became apparent only after the defeat of Japan in 1945.

Incidentally, it can be observed that on this map published in 1934 China includes Outer Mongolia. The independence of Outer Mongolia was recognized by the Communist government in 1950 but it is still not accepted by the Kuomintang in Taiwan.


to guerrillas and as a result are killed or herded into prisoner camps in which there is a high mortality rate. (ii) The population of villages in the war zone is often transferred away to prevent them from providing food or shelter to groups of guerrilla fighters. Such transfers of population in times of food scarcity inevitably results in high mortality rates especially among the most vulnerable groups e.g. children and elderly people.

It is clear however that the fatality number can be only a fraction of the population initially present in the zones affected by the war. Thus, a first check is to estimate the overall population of these zones.

A brief account of the situation is given by Sven Hedin (1940). Hedin was a Swedish
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geographer who visited China several times in the 1930s. The fact that he was a friend of Germany, suspicious of Soviet expansion in Asia and an admirer of Chiang Kai-shek, explains that he had little sympathy for the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless he writes (p. 35-36):

“There is no doubt that the poor peasants who were being impoverished by landlords, officials and militarists welcomed the Communists.”

Chiang Kai-shek’s campaign in 1930 and 1931 against Communism met with no success. The movement was already spreading like an epidemics. It was embraced by 10 provinces and on 7 November 1931, these provinces established their own government in Kiangsi. The Marshal had 900,000 in the field against the Communist armies in Kiangsi, Hanan, Anhwei, Honan and Hopei. In April 1933 the Marshall had not yet succeeded in getting the better of the Communists whose army then consisted of 180,000 men. It was only the 5th campaign, when Chiang followed the advice of General von Sekt and surrounded the Communist forces by a system of blockhouses that he won a decisive victory, costing the

Fig. 5.2b Communist areas in the spring of 1935. It can be seen that the Communist bases of Kiangsi, Hopeh and Hunan have been evacuated. In spite of the Nationalist attempts to destroy the Red Army, most of their divisions were able to break the encirclement. After that, they moved to other places. So, in a sense, this retreat contributed to spreading the Communist message further.

Source: China Today, May 1935.
Fig. 5.2c  Communist areas and the Long March. The hatched zones in red indicate the zones occupied by the Communists in 1932-1934; at the time they were called Soviets of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) which is the expression used in the legend of this map. The zones which are marked with a cross are those which were eliminated during the Kuomintang (KMT) 4th extermination campaign waged from December 1932 to March 1933. It is the 5th campaign that started in the fall of 1934 which lead to the retreat of the Long March. A 6th campaign which was to start in 1936 was brought to an end by a rebellion of several Kuomintang Army commanders. Anti-Communist campaigns on a smaller scale were conducted even during the war against Japan (1936-1945). Source: History Department of the US Military Academy, West Point; the map is included in a Wikipedia article entitled “Long March”.

lives of 60,000 soldiers and innumerable civilians.”

Fig. 5.2 enables us to identify the zones which were affected by the 4th and 5th campaigns. How can we estimate the population of these zones in 1932-1934? To begin with, we will make a rough order of magnitude estimate in the following way. (i) The population of each province will be taken from present day census data. These numbers will be converted into estimates for 1932 by applying a factor 1/3 which is the ratio of the total (estimated) population of China in 1932 to the population in 2004. (ii) As the areas shown in Fig. B.1 cover only a fraction of the provinces in which they are located we will apply a reduction factor of 1/3 or 1/2 depending on their respective sizes.
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The 4th campaign affected:
- the west of the province of Anhui (reduction factor: 1/2). In 2004 Anhui had a population of 64 million and a density of 463 inhabitants per square kilometer.\(^{54}\)
- The west and south of the province of Zhejiang (reduction factor: 1/3). In 2004 Zhejiang had a population of 47 million and a density of 464 per sq km.
- The west of the province of Jiangxi (reduction factor: 1/3). In 2004, Jiangxi had a population of 43 million and a density of 257 per sq km. This last figure indicates a region which may have some sparsely inhabited parts as we know to be indeed the case of Jiangxi which has hills and some mountains.

Thus, one is lead to the following estimate for the population affected by the 4th campaign:
\[
\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) \left[\frac{64}{2} + \frac{47}{3} + \frac{43}{3}\right] = 21 \text{ million}
\]

The 5th campaign affected:
- the east of the province of Jiangxi (reduction factor: 2/3).
- the north-west of the province of Hunan (reduction factor: 1/3). In 2004 Hunan had a population of 67 million and a density of 316 per sq km.
- the north-east of the province of Sichuan (reduction factor: 1/3). In 2004 Sichuan had a population of 87 million and a density of 180 per sq km (which denotes a region with some sparsely inhabited areas).

Thus, one is lead to the following estimate for the population affected by the 5th campaign:
\[
\left(\frac{1}{3}\right) \left[\frac{43}{1.5} + \frac{67}{3} + \frac{87}{3}\right] = 27 \text{ million}
\]

By adding together the populations affected by the 4th and 5th campaigns one arrives to a total of 21 + 27 = 48 million. At this point we cannot draw any conclusion regarding the number of fatalities in the civilian population for at least two reasons.
- We have no information about civilian fatalities during the suppression campaigns.
- After 1945 there was another protracted civil war between Communist and Nationalist forces which certainly caused many deaths in the civilian population.

There is a claim that one extermination campaign in the area of Mount Dabie in Northern Anhui, which used to be the base of the 4th Red Army, cost the lives of 500,000 people (Wikipedia, entry “Blue Shirts Society”). It can be noted that this estimate concerns another area than Kiangsi where the number of fatalities was said (see the citation of “Red star over China” by Edgar Snow) to be of the order of one million. However, one must remind that claims of this kind are difficult to verify.

\(^{54}\)The density enables us to judge whether it is a region of plain or on the contrary a region of mountains. A density under 100 means a region with mountains, a density over 400 indicates a region with fertile plains.
Unfortunately, we have even less information about these campaigns than about the suppression campaigns.

The previous calculation rested on a number of assumptions the most important of which is of course that the map provided in Fig. 5.1 is indeed reliable.

**Chinese civilian victims caused by Kuomintang policy**

In a thesis submitted to the University of Kansas in 2000 and published in 2002, the author, Hua-Lun Huang, provides estimates for the number of civilian fatalities caused by Nationalist policy between 1927 and 1949. These estimates do not include the victims caused by warlords, by Communist forces or by Japanese forces. The global figure for the whole period is of the order of 17 million\(^5\). It will appear that

\(^5\)For separate sub-periods one has the following fatality numbers and rates:
behind most of the episodes described below the main motive was the will to destroy the Communists.

It is by purpose that we used the expression “of the order of”. It helps to remind that such figures have an intrinsic accuracy which is probably not better than 50%.

Why? The main reason is that it is very difficult to draw a line between direct and indirect consequences of Nationalist policies. When an area occupied by the Communists was submitted to an economic blockade by Kuomintang troops, a number of civilians died from starvation and others died from illnesses caused by malnutrition. The people who starved to death were direct victims, while those who died from related diseases should be considered as indirect victims, but there is no clear line between them. The same observation applies to many other episodes as well. For instance, the excessive taxes and rents imposed on Chinese farmers also resulted in direct and indirect deaths.

At first sight a fatality estimate of 17 million may come as a surprise. We are more used to seeing casualty figures due to Japanese forces in China. However, if one keeps in mind the several episodes of repression and outright massacres mentioned below a high fatality number does not appear unrealistic. Let us briefly describe such episodes.

1. **Suppression of uprisings** Before 1926 the Kuomintang comprised an important fraction of Communists and leftists. As one knows, by the end of 1926 there was a sudden shift to the right. As a result the insurrections of workers in several southern cities (Shanghai, Nanchang, Canton) were crushed. Thousands were executed.

2. **Purges within the KMT** In the years 1927-1932 there were recurrent purges in the Kuomintang which eliminated its left-wing members.

3. **Civilian casualties of the extermination campaigns** The extermination campaigns against the Communists lead to economic blockades and large-scale displacements of population. It is a well-know fact that displacing villagers from their vil-

- 1927-1937: 4.7 millions (0.47 million/year)
- 1938-1945: 9.7 millions (1.4 million/year)
- 1945-1949: 3.0 millions (0.75 million/year)

56 This means that the “actual” figure may be somewhere between 8 and 25 millions.

57 There was a similar “phase transition” in the German National-Socialist party in 1934 when Hitler turned against Ernst Röhm, the leader of the SA (Sturz Abteilungen, a paramilitary movement of the National-Socialist party). Röhm was taking seriously the socialist promises of National Socialism and wanted wide-ranging socialist reforms to be initiated in Germany.

58 The historical museum of Shanghai gives surprisingly little attention to the uprising in March-April 1927. It is true that a newsreel can be seen on a TV screen which shows Communist workers being shot in the head on an execution ground, but this sequence last less than one minute.
4 Famines aggravated by the billeting of troops The armies fed themselves seizing food from the peasants. When a region was already on the brink of famine this had tragic consequences. The thesis contains the statement that “the famine areas corresponded almost exactly to the main billet areas” of Nationalist troops. But no evidence is given in support of this strong assertion.

5 Death marches of conscripted people Conscripts for the Nationalist Army were routinely abducted in villages by pressgangs, then chained together for the long march to the barracks where they would receive military training. During these marches they received little food and no medical attention. The mortality rate was very high. The Cambridge History of China estimates that some 60% of the Kuomintang conscripts did not make it through their basic training, with some 40% deserting and the remaining 20% dying of starvation before full induction into the military. Such death marches caused the death of several million people. After the instruction period, the soldiers were marched from the barracks to the front line. As officers had to prevent them from escaping this resulted again in harsh conditions. The fact that whole regiments or even divisions defected to the Communist side instead of fighting gives a good indication of the condition of soldiers in the Nationalist armies. Even in 1946 starving Nationalist troops were trying to catch the pet dogs of American troops (White and Jacoby 1946, p. 133). In 1946 American doctors who dealt with the recruit camp at Chengtu compared its horrors with those of the German concentration camps of Belsen and Buchenwald (White and Jacoby 1946 p. 275).

6 High taxes on starving people During the numerous famines (e.g. in 1929, 1930, 1931) the Kuomintang insisted on collecting taxes at same levels as in normal years. Often farmers had to sell their tools or their domestic animals to pay the taxes. This policy seriously aggravated the effects of the famines. The case of Honan in 1942-1943 is described in more detail below.

7 Flood of the Yellow River (1938) In 1938 in a desperate attempt to slow down the advance of the the Japanese troops, the Nationalists blew up the dikes of the Yellow River (Hwang Ho, ho=yellow, now Huang He). The flood of the Yellow River destroyed most of the fertile farmland of the province of Honan (i.e. nan=south of Yellow River, now Henan), It meant death for the approximately 900,000 Chinese who lived in the river valleys of central China. It took 9 years for the Yellow River to resume its original course. Instead of providing relief the Nationalist government continued to collect taxes just as it had during famines in other regions.
In November 1946, while Chinese people paid by UNRRA were working on the reconstruction of the dikes, there were frequent Nationalist air attacks on the dike workers; 96 workers were killed. Such attacks were motivated by the fact that the restoration work was taking place in the “Liberated Area”, i.e. under Communist control. (Belden 1949). The work had to be continued during the nights.

8  Changsha Fire (Nov 1938)  Unwilling to defend the city, Chiang Kai-shek ordered Changsha to be burned to the ground. Due to an organizational error the fire was begun at 2 am without any warning to the residents of the city. The fire lasted for three days, destroyed two thirds of the city and killed 20,000 civilians. For more details see the chronology at the date of 13 November 1938.

9  Aggravating the famine in Honan (1942-1943)  Although Honan was a fertile province with a population of 30 million, its crops failed for two successive years in 1941 and 1942. Nevertheless, the KMT insisted for collecting the taxes. In many places they exceeded what the land had produced with the result that the peasants had to sell their land. This was an expropriation process similar to what had occurred in Ireland in the mid-nineteenth century and had a similar outcome. According to estimates made by two British journalists who journeyed through the province by horseback for two weeks in March 1943, 3 million people had fled the province and another 3 million had died of hunger and disease (White and Jacoby 1946). Although it is difficult to know what percentage of the 3 million deaths should be attributed to tax collection, an event which occurred in April-May 1944 showed the amount of accumulated hatred. In mid-April 1944 the Japanese started an offensive. The 300,000 KMT troops were soon on a rout. The peasants had waited for this moment. With bird-guns, pitchforks and knives they disarmed the soldiers and took their revenge. Their commander, General Tang En-po, a favorite of Chiang Kai-shek, was detested by everybody.

10  Blowing up dikes (1946-1947)  KMT officers did not hesitate to blow up dikes if they thought it would bring them any military advantage. For instance, in 1946 the KMT broke open the Grand Canal dikes and flooded the whole area. An American journalist Jack Belden (1949) reports that he saw the local match factory still filled with mud left behind by the flood. In February-March 1947, after Shantung had become a liberated area, Chiang Kai-shek ordered his air force (which at that time included a number of American pilots) to bomb the dikes of the Yellow River and to shot those who attempted to fix them. Millions of hectares of farmland were destroyed.
11 Reprisal actions against collaborationists (1945) During the war a large part of China was administered by a puppet government led by Wang Jingwei. After the Japanese defeat in August 1945, collaborationists were hunted down\textsuperscript{59}.

12 Reprisal actions in formerly liberated areas 1945) During the war, the Communists were able to extend their area of influence. After 1945, thanks to American logistic help, the KMT was able to re-occupy several of these areas. The landlords whose land had been confiscated by the Communists came back with the KMT troops, a movement known as the counter-settlement. Very often those who had engaged in the struggle for the reduction of rents were buried alive. If the men could not been found their families were buried (Belden 1946, p. 224).

13 Restrictions in UNRRA aid (1945-1947) Aid from UNRRA [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] was destined to all populations who had suffered during the war. However, as it was organized by the United States, responsibility of its distribution was given to the Nationalists. Naturally, such help did not arrive to liberated areas.

14 Repression of the insurrection in Taiwan and White Terror (1947). The uprising of February 1947 and its suppression by Nationalist troops is described in the chronology. The end of the uprising marked the beginning of the Kuomintang’s White Terror period in Taiwan in which thousands more Taiwanese were killed or disappeared.

15 Massacre of Communist prisoners in 1949. More than 13,000 people were sent to concentration camps by the KMT’s secret police during the period from September 1945 to June 1946 (Huang 2002, p. 244). Although this source does not give the numbers for 1947-1949 it can be assumed that they were as large if not larger. This would mean that $13,000 \times 4 = 52,000$ people were sent to concentration camps.

How many were already detained in 1945? Relying on two Chinese sources, Huang (2002) writes that around 1942 there were at least 40,000 Communists in 7 concentration camps established by the Nationalists in Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hunan, Shaanxi, Sichuan, Yunnan. Apart from these camps which were mostly created in 1942, there were also some older concentration camps for which we have no data.

In late 1948 and 1949 when the oncoming victory of the Communists became clear.

\textsuperscript{59}As one knows similar reprisals occurred after the war in countries formerly occupied by Germany or Japan.
many of these prisoners were massacred. One of these victims was a young woman who later became known in China as Sister Jiang. She was killed in a camp not far from Chungking (now Chongqing). An opera, a movie and a television series were written to celebrate her sacrifice. She became a symbol of all those unknown people who were arrested, tortured and eventually killed.

Such massacres are a recurrent feature in all similar historical circumstances. Because those who are about to be defeated do not want the prisoners to be able to strengthen the enemy, there is a strong incentive to kill them. There have been many similar cases (see Roehner 2002a p. 129-131); one of the most tragic was the massacre of Korean Communists during the retreat of the American and Korean armies in 1950.

16 Fire of Chongqing, 2 Sep 1949  As the city was about to be taken by Communist forces, Chiang Kai shek ordered Chongqing to be burned down. Depending on the estimates the fire killed between 2,800 and 10,000 civilians.

For all the episodes mentioned in the previous list, Huang gives fatality estimates. It is true that his data most often come from secondary sources. However, they have the advantage of being summarized in clearly presented tables. In case of disagreement, it would be necessary to find primary sources. This would be a long work. As far as I know it has not been undertaken yet (i.e. in 2010).
Chapter 6
Economic facets

This chapter examines two microeconomic facets, namely black market and the socio-economic consequences of the Japanese occupation.

Black market

Numerous episodes are given in the chronology which show that personnel of the American Forces sustained and bolstered the black market by selling American army goods to Chinese traders.

The mechanism which brought about black-marketing by servicemen was basically the same in all areas which were occupied by American troops during or after World War II.

- As the pay of servicemen was much higher than the salary of the working people, the presence of a substantial number of American troops in a city increased the demand to the point of locally creating a state of scarcity\(^\text{60}\) which inflated non-official open-market prices (i.e. prices of goods available on the black-market) even though prices subject to official price-control may have remained unchanged. For instance, in the Chinese port of Tsingtao the arrival of about 25,000 American Marines in September 1945 provoked a huge (twenty-fold) rise in local prices.

- Once the price of black-market goods was higher than the price of canteen goods it made sense for servicemen to buy canteen goods in order to sell them with a profit to local traders.

- Naturally, such sales were even more profitable if military goods or equipment could be misappropriated by servicemen. In contrast to the sale of canteen goods for which one had to wait until local goods had become sufficiently expensive, black marketing in misappropriated goods could start almost immediately after a unit had taken up quarters in a city.

Through this process American servicemen could send home amounts of money in excess to their pay. It has been estimated that in the decade following 1940 the total

\(^{60}\text{Needless to say, this effect was stronger in countries such as China, Germany or Japan where industrial facilities had been partially destroyed during the war.}\)
sent home exceeded the total pay of the GIs by $530 million\textsuperscript{61}.

**Microeconomic consequences of the Japanese occupation**

In his renowned novel “Four generations under one roof” (1946, 1998) the Chinese writer Lao She (1899-1966\textsuperscript{62}) gives a detailed description of the life in Beijing under the Japanese occupation (1937-1945). Although the book is a novel rather than a history book, by following the life of several families, the reader gets an understanding of the mechanisms through which foreign military occupation impacts the life of people. Many of these mechanisms are not proper to this specific case but can be seen in any occupation. Let us mention some of them; the page numbers refer to the French edition of 1998.

1. Soon after the beginning of the occupation the Japanese introduced a currency exchange in which the banknotes issued by the Kuomintang government were replaced by a currency issued by the pro-Japanese government in Beijing (vol.2, p.40). Such currency changes also occurred in many US occupation episodes (Japan, South Korea, Italy, France, Denmark, Norway).

2. Bookshops had to replace their pre-occupation books by new books whose message was consistent with the perspective set forward by the occupation authorities. (vol.2, p.41) A similar screening took place during the Japanese occupation of eastern China. The Four Books of Confucianism became one of the most celebrated works. In a general way, anything which could emphasize the common roots of China and Japan was actively promoted by the Japanese. They wanted to establish a sphere of Asian co-prosperity of which they would be the head in the same way as Britain was the head of the British Commonwealth. Movie theaters could no longer show western movies but had to restrict themselves to “new movies” which advocated Sino-Japanese cooperation, e.g. “Red Lotus shrine destroyed by fire”. (vol.2, p. 530)

3. People had to deliver their radio sets to the Japanese authorities and buy new ones manufactured in Japan (vol.2, p.31) This had a double advantage for the Japanese. First it provided a valuable outlet for the Japanese industry, secondly the wavelengths that the new sets could receive were selected in such a way as to be restricted to Japanese broadcasting frequencies.

\textsuperscript{61}This figure is given in Rundell (1961) but the author does not say on which primary source it is based. The article also emphasizes that even when servicemen were paid in local currency (as was for instance the case in Iceland after February 1942) they were entitled to exchange the local currency against dollars which they could send to the United States by money order at no cost.

\textsuperscript{62}From 1924 to 1929 he taught Chinese at the University of London. In March 1946 Lao She traveled to the United States on a two-year cultural grant sponsored by the State Department, lecturing and overseeing the translation of several of his novels. In fact, the last chapters of “Four generations” were written in the United States. He stayed in the US from 1946 until December 1949 (Wikipedia article entitled “Lao She”). It is said that he was mistreated during the Cultural Revolution which started in May 1966, and that he committed suicide on 26 August 1966.
4 The Japanese occupation was not only a military occupation it was also a colonization which means that a substantial number of Japanese settled in China in the same way as they had settled in Korea or Manchuria\textsuperscript{63}. This increased the demand for houses and apartments in Beijing and lead to an increase in real estate prices. Speculation in housing property was also amplified because many Chinese people had little confidence in Japanese banknotes and wanted to shelter their assets from inflation by buying houses (vol.2, p. 242).

5 In order to reduce inflation trends, the Japanese authorities imposed price control for many commodities (vol.2, p.597). As a result, the margin of shop keepers was greatly reduced. As the Japanese authorities also prohibited bankruptcy, many shopkeepers were confronted to an impossible situation. In the novel this leads one of the members of the Qi family to commit suicide.

6 The Japanese authorities decided that each family had to deliver one kilogram of iron monthly or to pay a tax equivalent to such a delivery\textsuperscript{64}.

7 The Japanese created an incriminatory atmosphere in the sense that everybody could be punished for failing to denounce anti-Japanese elements or actions. This created distrust among people that neutralized and destroyed any social cohesion that could be based on common anti-Japanese feelings. In the wake of the Japanese defeat at Changsha in September 1939 a campaign was started for the elimination of Communists. In the novel a Chinese collaborator set up a section of spies working for the Japanese (vol.2, p. 497). As a result, there was a wave of arrests and denunciations especially in schools and universities.

Incidentally, it can be observed that similar screening campaigns are a fairly universal method for eliminating any structured opposition. During the 20th century it was used many times. For instance, it was used by the Nazis immediately after their accession to power in 1933 in order to eliminate left-wing groups and even the SA (\textit{Sturm Abteilung} i.e. Assault detachment) movement which had been a close ally of the Nazis. It was used by Stalin to eliminate any opposition in the Party and in the Soviet Army through numerous trials. It was used in the United States for eliminating radical unionists, e.g. in 1918-1920 hundreds of members of the “Industrial Workers of the World” (IWW) were tried or killed, or Communists during the witch hunt which took place after World War II.

8 A similar group control technique was to organize demonstrations celebrating Japanese victories (which were of course Chinese defeats) that all school boys and school girls had to attend.

\textsuperscript{63}According to the novel, by 1941 some 200,000 Japanese had already settled in Beijing (vol.2, p. 659).

\textsuperscript{64}For many of the poorest families such a request was impossible to fulfill. One may wonder if this episode really occurred or if it was rather invented by the writer.
Chapter 7
American influence in South China: Homer Lea

Homer Lea: overview

Homer Lea was a mysterious person. Although he did not hold any official position in the United States, he had close connections with important political leaders not only in China but also in the United States, Japan and Europe. Thus, in 1909 former US Army Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Adna Chaffee, wrote a laudatory introduction to Lea’s book, “The Valor of Ignorance” (see below at the date of 1909). In 1911 Lea attended German Army maneuvers with the Kaiser Wilhelm II[^65]. In his biography Eugene Anschel reports that after Lea’s death many of his papers were burnt by his wife.

Training Chinese troops

We have seen that during the decade 1939 to 1948 the United States trained and armed Chinese troops. As a matter of fact, relying on western military leadership was not uncommon in China. As an example one can mention the role played by the American Frederick T. Ward (1831-1862) who was succeeded by Charles G. Gordon (1833-1885), a British officer. Ward, who became a Chinese citizen in 1861, trained and armed a force of several thousand Chinese which became the nucleus of the “ever victorious army” that Gordon led against the Taipings. In this respect, one can also recall that until 1942 Claire L. Chennault was in the service of the Chinese Air Force as a private person. He was at that time a retired officer of the US Air Force and it is only after Pearl Harbor that he was again called to active duty.

What was uncommon in the plan carried out by Lea was rather that his force was trained in the United States and that it was aimed at overthrowing the Imperial government whereas Ward and Gordon had been supporting it. In this respect the attempt seems closer to the training of Tibetan guerrillas in the United States and of Nationalist troops in Burma in the 1950s and 1960s.

Another puzzling feature of Lea’s life is that in contrast to Ward and Chennault, he

[^65]: Source: Information Access Company, Smithsonian, July 1993
The forgotten role of Homer Lea

To this day (22 June 2014) Lea’s role remains largely unnoticed. The Wikipedia article (in English) entitled “Sun Yat-sen” has only one line about him: “Sun returned to China accompanied by General Homer Lea on 21 December 1911”. Not a word about their fund raising campaigns or about the training of volunteers.

The fact that Lea’s role is not further recognized despite two websites (in 2014) giving substantial information about him, is not difficult to understand. No great power is eager to make known the ways and means through which it is able to influence the political decisions of other countries.

Just to show how mysterious Lea’s life remains even today, one can read the following excerpt from a the website of the Los Angeles High School that Lea attended.

“Homer Lea graduated from the school in 1901 [not correct]. Though afflicted with hunchback from an early age, he enjoyed an active childhood and youth. After attending Occidental College for one year, it’s told that he somehow managed to get an appointment to the US Military Academy at West Point, but was dismissed after one year for health reasons. According to other accounts he never entered West Point at all. Whether he ever attended West Point or not is beside the point; his brilliance as a military strategist would not be hindered. Leaving West Point, he entered Stanford where he studied military history and also became enamored of the Chinese culture.

The first sentence can hardly be correct because in 1901 Lea would have been 25. Elsewhere we are told that Lea entered Stanford University in 1896.

Lea’s army seen in Chinese perspective

A front-page article in the Los Angeles Herald of 25 June 1905 is entitled “15,000 armed Chinese in the United States. Military men of this nation involved. Government authorities investigating” (see picture below). Some 6 years later an article published in the New York Times of 29 December 1911 (see the chronology below at this date) tells us that Lea’s army comprised some 8,000 Chinese people. However, it gives no information whatsoever about who were these people. It seems that the author of the article had interviewed several of the American instructors, but, for some reason, he did not speak with the Chinese people who were trained. In this sub-section we wish to learn more about them.

What was the population of ethnic Chinese in the United States? Its evolution is

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66It is possible that the “Mule”, one of the main characters of Isaac Asimov’s saga-novel “Foundation”, was modeled on Homer Lea. The Mule (alias the Clown) was a general who, despite his poor physical appearance, managed to conquer most of the galaxy.
summarized in the accompanying graph. The important point that must be kept in mind is that around 1900 the female population was about 10 to 20 times smaller than the male population. This had obvious consequences in terms of birth rate as will be seen below.

There were two landmark years for the Chinese population in the US.

- The “Chinese Exclusion Act” of 1882 almost stopped the immigration of Chinese people to the US.
- On 28 March 1898 the Supreme Court ruled that children of Chinese nationals born in the United States should be granted US citizenship. Prior to that, in spite of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution passed by Congress in 1868, it was not clear whether this amendment should apply to the children of foreign nationals.\textsuperscript{67}

The Chinese people serving in Lea’s army were destined to be shipped to China to take part in the revolution but probably most of them wished to return to the United States after the revolution. This is a natural assumption because the economic situation in China did hardly improve ever since extreme poverty compelled them to leave the country. For these volunteers to be able to come back to the US they had to be born in the US; let us recall that Chinese or Japanese nationals could not apply for naturalization. This point has two obvious implications.

- If a substantial part of the volunteers were first generation immigrants they would certainly not wish to be shipped to China. But in this case, what was the point in training them?
- On the contrary, if almost all volunteers were second generation immigrants they may indeed do military duty in China for the success of the revolution.

To help us to decide which of these views is correct, we must estimate the number of second generation Chinese in the United States. Because of the small number of women\textsuperscript{68} we do not expect a very large number of second generation Chinese. How can we get an estimate?

\textit{Estimate of the number of second generation Chinese in the US}

In 1935 (one of the earliest years for which data are available) there were 970 births for a population of 15,000 women of Chinese descent (Vital Statistics of the US 1935, p. 88). This gives a birth rate of \( \frac{970}{15} = 64 \) per 1,000 women. Incidentally it can be observed that this rate was substantially higher than the rate for the whole US population which was: \( \frac{2,155,000}{60,000} = 36 \) per 1,000 women.

\textsuperscript{67}The ruling of the Supreme Court was brought about by the case of Wong Kim Ark. Wong was born in San Francisco from parents who were not US citizens. In 1890 he visited China and upon his return to the United States he was readmitted without incident. Yet, in 1895 after another visit to China the San Francisco port authorities denied him permission to enter the country arguing that he was not a US citizen.

\textsuperscript{68}In addition, it was almost impossible to marry someone not belonging to the same ethnic group. In many states this was prohibited by law.
Let us assume that in previous decades the birth rate per 1,000 Chinese women was more or less the same.

![Graph showing Chinese population in the United States from 1840 to 1960 with labels for Male, Female, and Male/female (right).](image)

**Fig. 7.1** Chinese population in the United States. *Source: Historical Statistics of the United States, 1975 p. 14, Wikipedia, article “Chinese American” for the population in 1851.*

Let us assume that the age range of the volunteers was 20-40. This means that the volunteers present in 1905 were born between 1865 and 1885. Similarly the volunteers present in 1911 were born between 1871 and 1891. The graph shows that between 1865 and 1891 the number of women was almost constant and approximately equal to 4,200. With the annual birth rate of 64 per 1,000 women, we get \(64 \times 4.2 \times 20 = 5,376\) Chinese Americans in the 20-40 age range. As this number includes both genders, the number of males in the same age range is \(5376/2 \approx 2,700\). This number is 5.5 times smaller than the 15,000 claimed by the article of the Los Angeles Herald in 1905 and 3 times smaller than the number of 8,000 claimed by the article of the New York Times in 1911.

Although fairly small the 2,700 estimate certainly overvalues the number of Chinese who could attend the military training for the obvious reason that there were training centers only in a limited number of cities and towns. For instance, one knows that
26% of the Chinese population was living in rural districts (Mortality Statistics 1910, p. 14). For these people it was impossible to visit a training center. By subtracting them from the 2,700 one gets 2,000. In order to get a more precise estimate one would need to know the list of the cities in which there were training centers. However, this will not much change the fact that the number of second generation Chinese people is much smaller than the numbers of troops claimed in newspaper articles.

*Estimate of the number of first generation Chinese*

Can we also estimate the number of first generation Chinese present in the United States in 1905 and who were in the 20-40 age range? This is possible by making two reasonable assumptions.

- Let us assume that almost all immigrants were young males in their 20s. This assumption is in line with what the standard description of Chinese immigration in the US (see for instance the Wikipedia article entitled “Chinese American”)
- Let us assume that the immigration came to an end after the introduction of the “Chinese Exclusion Act” of 1882. The graph shows that this is certainly true for the net immigration, that is to say the difference between arrivals and departures⁶⁹. There was almost no increase in the Chinese population after the census of 1880. All the 20-year (or more) old Chinese who arrived before 1880 were (at least) 45-year old in 1905 and therefore were not in the 20-40 age range. In other words, only few Chinese (of the order of a few thousands) were available for military training in 1905.

If the numbers of both first and second generation Chinese were small, why are the numbers given in newspapers so inflated?

**Possible explanations**

To solve this paradox one can think of four possible explanations.

- It is possible that, for some reason, newspapers grossly overstated the size of this operation. It can be observed that the pictures that can be seen on the Internet show groups of soldiers numbering a few dozens, never several hundreds. If this explanation is correct one would of course wish to understand what was the motivation for making such overstatements.
- Perhaps the volunteers were exiles who wanted to return to China once the government of the Empress Dowager would be overthrown. However, because of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 one must suppose that they came to the United States before 1882. This means that by 1912 they had been in the US for 30 years. It seems unlikely that after such a long stay many of them wished to return to China.

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⁶⁹The Wikipedia already mentioned tells us that between 1881 and 1890 there were 61,711 Chinese immigrants. This is surprising but does not invalidate our argument because we are interested in the net immigration.
and stay there.

- If the volunteers were paid\textsuperscript{70}, one could assume that in addition to Chinese people there were also people from different origin, for instance American people or Filippino people. In this way, it would be possible to reach a strength of several thousands claimed by newspapers. Yet, if this explanation is correct there should also be articles describing their shipment (when and from where did they leave and on what kind of vessels?) to China and the battles (if any) in which they took part.

- Chinese volunteers were indeed trained but not for the purpose of waging war in China. In this case, even first generation immigrants could have participated and may be even those older than 40.

Of course, this raises the question of the real purpose of this training. May be they were to serve as a kind of militia in chinatowns of the west coast. In other words, they would have been a kind of Chinese California State Militia. In 1942, such a militia was organized in Los Angeles and San Francisco. It attracted only few participants however: only 37 in San Francisco (see the box).

**Armies trained by foreign instructors in comparative perspective**

Regarding armies trained by foreign officers there are two possible cases:

1. Armies trained in their own country.
2. Armies trained in a foreign country.

The first case is very common. From South Korea between 1945 and 1950, to South Vietnam in the 1960s, to Afghanistan and Iraq in the 2000s, there are many examples of this kind.

On the contrary, there are very few examples of armies trained abroad which played a key-role in a civil war. Among the few cases\textsuperscript{71} that come to mind, the army was trained in a neighboring country. Cases of armies of several thousand soldiers trained thousands of kilometers away and then playing a key-role in a civil war do not seem to exist for obvious logistic reasons. Lea’s army would have been the only one of its kind. A standard troop transport ship of 7,500 tons had a capacity of some 1,000 persons. Thus, one would need a convoy of 10 troopships to carry Lea’s army to China. In addition, one needs to transport the horses (some pictures show cavalry training), artillery, ammunition. The organization of such an operation would have attracted much attention. In other words, no matter how many were trained, it seems fairly clear that they were not sent to China.

This would have been completely useless anyway, because there were enough troops

\textsuperscript{70}It seems that they were not. On the contrary an account given by O’Brien says that they had to pay 50 cents a month to the Pao Huang Hui to help finance their training.

\textsuperscript{71}e.g. (i) the Cuban force which overthrew Batista was trained in Mexico before transferring to Cuba. It numbered less than one hundred. (ii) In 1963, a Tutsi guerrilla invasion into Rwanda from Burundi was suppressed by the Hutu government.
A Chinatown militia unit in San Francisco in 1942

http://www.militarymuseum.org/Chinatown.html

Excerpts of an article by Norine Dresser which appeared in the December 1992 issue of the “Gum Saan Journal”, published by the “Chinese Historical Society of Southern California”.

San Francisco Chinatown Militia Unit
Company F, 17th Infantry, California State Militia

In early 1942 Captain Maurice Auerbach of the “California State Militia” had approached Thomas Chinn, who had been an Air Raid Warden, about organizing a Chinatown militia unit to be known as “Company F of the 17th California Infantry”. Chinn agreed and brought in Johnny Kan as Assistant Commander. Chinn recalled, “It was difficult to recruit members. It was mostly by word of mouth. At that time, if you put something like that in the Chinese newspaper, you would start people on a scare and they would be afraid that something was going to happen”.

Drill practice took place Friday nights from 7:00 to 9:00 p.m. The San Francisco Chinatown militia unit never had access to actual weapons. Instead they purchased wooden bayonets from an Army surplus store. They had only one parade through Chinatown and that was under the guidance of a few police inspectors.

Although they ultimately recruited some 34 men, many dropped out of the organization because there were no rewards in being members.

In the Chinese communities of both Los Angeles and San Francisco, the militia units were short-lived. Most participants recall taking part for one year or less.

There is no documentation of these efforts in military records. Information is also missing about specialized Korean and Mexican divisions of the State Militia, as well as on a “Philippine Suicide Squadron” and a “Women’s Suicide Squadron”.

in China which under the de facto command of General Yuan Shikai, a man which had a close connection with the British and US governments. He was in command of the so-called “Newly Created Army” (renamed “Beiyang Army” in 1902) which was trained in China by German and American officers. As it was the first western style army, in the decade 1900-1910 it became a model for all Chinese provinces who wished to create a militia. This created a huge demand for instructors which lead Sergeants of the US Army to China as explained in the article of the New York Times of 29 December 1911. It was the “Beiyang Army” which brought about the revolution of 1911 as confirmed by the fact that Yuan ShiKai became president of China on 10 March 1912.

Incidentally, it can be observed that the article of the New York Times of 22 January 1905 (see below at this date) adds to the confusion by presenting an army of
Chinese soldiers trained in the US for the Chinese government. Were there several training operations under way, one on behalf of the Chinese government and another on behalf of the opposition? That seems dubious.

**Homer Lea’s advisor role seen in comparative perspective**

Lea’s political activity had two facets: (i) The organization of an Army of volunteers (ii) His contacts with Chinese opposition leaders, first with former prime minister Kang Yu-wei, and then with Sun Yat-sen.

We have already discussed the first point and concluded that this operation was vastly overstated by US newspapers. The plan of sending them to China was likely a hoax. There may have been a few hundred soldiers which were probably never sent to China. In the present subsection we wish to discuss the second point.

If, in line with the rule according to which one should examine *several similar cases* instead of just a single one, we try to find other examples, the figures of Gertrude Bell (1868-1926), Lawrence of Arabia (1888-1935) or (more recently) Neil Heywood (1970-2011) immediately come to mind. All three were working for British intelligence (for Heywood see the article by Jeremy Page, 2012). Bell and Lawrence worked for the “Arab Bureau” and played a role in the Arab revolt against the Ottoman empire and the subsequent establishment of the states of Iraq and Jordan. This leads us naturally to question whether Lea was working for US intelligence.

However, a little reflection immediately suggests that the question should be formulated in a different way. Indeed, intelligence officers usually hold cover positions, which means that one will never be able to find a contract-document stating that a person was employed as a spy.\(^\text{72}\)

In other words, the previous question should be replaced by the following.

- Were Lea’s political goals in line with those of the State Department and with the interests of the business community?
- Were Lea’s projects supported by the US government?
- By whom was Lea replaced after his death in 1912?

On account of the facts mentioned in the present chapter, one must answer “yes” to the first two questions. For instance, in June 1904 Lea met with President Roosevelt and got his “go ahead”.

Regarding the third question, one should observe that Lea was not the only person linked to US business interests in the small group of Sun Yat-sen’s friends. Another prominent person was Charlie Soong (1863-1918). A graduate from Duke and Vanderbilt University, Soong became a friend of Sun Yat-sen in 1894 that is to say some

\(^{72}\)The case of Heywood clearly shows that nothing should be expected from official statements; convincing evidence that he was a MI6 informant did not prevent an official denial by the Foreign Office; see Page (2012)
10 years before Lea and Sun met one another. Although Charlie Soong died in 1918 his influence in Chinese politics survived him through three of his children.

i Soong Ching-ling who married Sun Yat-sen in 1915.

ii Soong May-ling who married Chiang Kai-shek in December 1927.

iii Soong Tse-ven, usually known as T.V. Soong. As Finance Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs and chief negotiator of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945, Soong played a crucial role in determining the foreign policy of the KMT government. Throughout his career T.V. Soong kept a close connection with the US State Department. He once remarked that there were no State Department memos sent from China that he did not have access to within a few days (Davies 1972 p. 266).

In short, to come back to our previous question, Lea did not have to be replaced. The State Department had other assets in China’s ruling circles.

It is clear that in this respect the victory of the Communists in 1949 marked an abrupt change. The so-called “Tawny Pipit” operation [the tawny pipit is a bird that sings loudly in flight] was an attempt for covert intelligence-gathering that was planned by the State Department in the wake of the Communist victory (New York Times 24 December 1999). “Tawny Pipit” was never implemented or was a failure.

It was not until the 1980s that closer relations could be re-established between the State Department and some individuals in Beijing’s ruling circles. The names of Hu Yaobang (1915–15 April 1989) and Zhao Ziyang (1919–2005) come to mind in this respect. In the 1990s and 2000s an ever larger number of Chinese students graduated from US universities. Thus, one would expect that in subsequent decades it will become easier for the State Department to establish close connections with individuals holding leading positions.

A last word is in order to say that instead of focusing on Homer Lea, this chapter should also analyze the role of other influential persons such as Charlie Soong or T.V. Soong. Whereas the role of the two Soong mostly consisted in discussions held behind close doors, Lea’s military activities are much easier to identify.

Biographical chronology of Homer Lea

Lea, Nov 17, 1876: Birth of Homer Lea in Denver, Colorado. (Starr 2002, p. 52)

Lea, 1888: At about age 12, Lea went to the National Surgical Institute in Indianapolis, which specialized in treating deformities, to receive treatment for his af-
Lea, Nov 17, 1889: Homer Lea’s family moved to Los Angeles. (Starr 2002, p. 52)

Lea, 1894-1896: Homer Lea attended Los Angeles High School (located west of North Hill Street and below the south side of Fort Moore Hill) from 1894 to 1896.

Lea, 1896-1897: As a freshman at Occidental College (1896-1897) in Los Angeles, Homer Lea participated in debates at nearby Central Square Park.

Lea, 1896 or 1897: Lea entered Stanford University. At Stanford, Lea became a member of the P. Wond Wui society dedicated to the overthrow of the Empress Dowager and the restoration of the boy emperor. (Starr p. 260)

Lea, 1897-1898 We are told by Kevin Starr that “after graduation Lea returned to Los Angeles and with the assistance of Ansel O’Banion, a former sergeant in the US Fourth Cavalry, began to organize a military company of pro-emperor Chinese volunteers. He drilled them, took them on maneuvers and took part in the Tournament of Roses Parade. (Starr p. 260)

Lea, 1900 In July Lea traveled to China and offered his services to Kang Yu-wei, a former prime minister of China. Lea was able to convince Kang to give him com-
mand of a Chinese armed force.

[The sources differ on the size of this armed force: Wikipedia says a “small volunteer force” while the obituary published in the “Times” on 4 November 1912, says that he commanded 4 divisions”. What is the truth?

The other entries clearly show that the “Times” obituary is misleading. As Lea was on the side of the opposition to the Empress Dowager who was then in power, it is very unlikely that he got any official commission as a general. In fact, as is said in an article published in 1901 in the “Sunday Call”, his troops consisted of “men ready for mobilization in the province of Kwantung”. The same article says that across China there were altogether 400,000 men “ready to take up arms for the rescue of their emperor”. This suggests that all these men were “virtual soldiers” rather than real troops.]

**Lea, 1900** During the relief of the besieged international concession in Beijing, Lea fought alongside General Adna Chaffee also from Los Angeles. (Starr p. 260)
[Adna Romanza Chaffee (senior) was 58 year old in 1900. Although he had been a Major-General in the Volunteers who fought the Spanish-American War, in 1900 he was still a Colonel in the regular US army.]

**Lea, Jun 22, 1900** On June 22, 1900, Homer Lea boarded the Pacific Mail steamship China in San Francisco, destined for China. (http://homerlea.org/photoarchives.htm)

**Lea, Jul 11, 1900** On his trip from California to China during the summer of 1900, Homer Lea stayed at the Grand Hotel in Yokohama, Japan, after arrival there on July 11, 1900. (http://homerlea.org/photoarchives.htm)

[This website does not give Lea’s arrival date in Tianjin. As the siege of the foreign embassies ended on 14 August 1900, it is possible that Lea met General Adna Chaffee toward the end of the siege.]

**Lea, Jul 5, 1901** Excerpt of a letter written by Kang Youwei. “People like Homer Lea and Yung Wing all do things in the Western style. They just ask for thousands and millions of dollars from our association. They suggest that such and such arms should be purchased for several million and such and such a steamboat worth several million should be acquired. They do not know that our association is about as big as the blood from a mosquito. The money you raise from different cities ranges from thousands of dollars to a few hundred.” (http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?searchterm=027_baohuanghui.inc&issue=027)

[The letter clearly shows a disagreement between Lea and Kang. Later on, Lea also received financial support from American businessmen probably in return for promises of economic privileges. This was Sun Yat-sen’s standard fund raising technique (see below). The present letter was addressed to Tom Leung who founded the Los Angeles chapter of the “Baohuang Hui” (China Empire Reform Association).]

**Lea, 1902** Baohuang Hui’s Commercial Corporation. The Baohuang Hui’s Commercial Corporation, was founded in Canada in 1902. Although its broader goal was to recover “our nation’s economic rights”, a more pressing goal was to raise funds for Baohuang Hui institutions, including schools, sending students abroad, creating newspapers companies and so on. A number of strictly remunerative activities would be incorporated under this clause, from running hotels and restaurants to establishing banks, and even buying and selling real estate. Many of these ventures directly involved Kang himself. Running so many businesses while trying to carry out a political mission was a challenge, but at first this multinational conglomerate would grow rapidly until it was hit by the worldwide financial panic of 1907. This crisis contributed to the rapid decline of the organization after 1909.
Fig. 7.4  Front page of the “Sunday Call” of 21 April 1901. The title on the left-hand side reads: “How I was made a general in the Chinese army” by Homer Lea.

In the article Lea says almost nothing about his role in China. It is a political article directed against Russian influence in China. It is said that it was Russian diplomacy which brought about the war between China and Japan. Instead, Lea advocates an alliance between China and Japan which will prevent China from being drawn into the Russian sphere of influence. The article is also directed against the Empress Dowager who holds the emperor prisoner in order to prevent him from carrying out his plan of modernization of China.

On the right-hand side there is an article by the director of the “Chinese Empire Reform Association” who expresses his strong approval for Lea’s action directed against “the Empress Dowager who usurped the throne”. Incidentally, it can be noted that due to his opposition to the Empress Dowager one would not expect her to make him a general. Lea was made a general by the CERA, an opposition organization.

It is said that his personal guard consists of only half a dozen soldiers and that his two aide-de-camp act as interpreters.

According to these articles Lea was able to meet several important Chinese and Japanese statesmen, e.g. president Yung Wing of Macao, Kang Yu Wei, a personal adviser of the emperor, Japanese ex-prime minister Shigenobu Okuma and Marquis Ito Hirobumi.

Source: http://homerlea.org/photoarchives.htm

(http://www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/features.php?searchterm=027_baohuanghui.inc&issue=027)

Lea, 1902  By 1902 Lea began to train Chinese soldiers at his Western Military Academy in Los Angeles with the professional help of former Sergeant Ansel O’Banion, formerly of the 4th US Cavalry Regiment. O’Banion had been encouraged to join Lea by his regimental colonel who showed him a letter from the War Department
advising him to incite retiring military men to join Lea’s operation. The men were paid better than they were in the US Army. The training program soon expanded to many cities across the United States and Canada which had substantial Chinese populations.

Lea did not run this operation alone. He belonged to an group of influential men which comprised:

- Harrison Gray Otis, former general during the Spanish-American war and owner of the “Los Angeles Times”.
- General Adna R. Chaffee (senior) who was Army Chief of Staff from 1904 to 1906.
- Charles B. Boothe, a wealthy lawyer.
- W.W. Allen, a wealthy New York businessman.
- Julian S. Carr, a wealthy southern businessman.
- Kang You-wei, leader of the “Chinese Empire Reform Association”

By 1910 they had managed to raise $9 million (i.e. some $170 million in dollars of 2000) (http://www.chineseamericanheroes.org)

[What was the attitude of the American authorities with respect to this operation? The source mentioned in this entry makes a fairly plausible parallel. It says that the Chinese Imperial Army (CIA) formed by Lea was similar to the anti-Castro paramilitary groups that received military training in Florida. This means that most of the time Lea’s operation enjoyed the support of the US government as is clearly shown by the encouragement given to former military to join Lea’s group. This, however, did not exclude that sometimes there may have been investigation into their activities. Thus, in 1912 O’Banion (who by then had become a captain) was tried and sentenced for smuggling Chinese into the US for military training. Clearly, the authorities wanted to keep the operation under control.]

**Lea, Nov 14, 1904** New York Sun article (excerpt). American representatives are recruiting throughout the western states American officers for the “Chinese Imperial Reform Army”.

7,000 commissioned officers, it is said, are wanted to officer in a Chinese reform army of 200,000 which is being organized in south China for the apparent purpose of overthrowing the Dowager Empress. A large number of officers have already signed and are going to China this winter as individuals. Secrecy has been maintained marvelously, up to date. The movement is known to army officers. (Kaplan 2010)

**Lea, Nov 25, 1904:** The Western Military Academy was incorporated as a company in Los Angeles. The five trustees of the company were all members of the Los
Angeles Chamber of Commerce. It is under this company that Military training centers were established in more than 21 American cities.

(Lea, 1905) US Secret Service Chief John E. Wilkie investigated the “Chinese Empire Reform Association’s” military companies, including a visit to Los Angeles in 1905.

[What was the US Secret Service mentioned in this entry? As shown by the accompanying picture it was a secret service of the Treasury Department. Created in 1865 to deal with the tremendous amount of counterfeit money in circulation in the wake of the Civil War, it was later extended to the protection of the president as well as to a number of other missions as shown by this entry. As Wilkie was appointed in 1898 his personal papers contain testimonies of Secret Service Operatives about the assassination of President McKinley in September 1901.]

Lea, Jan 22, 1905: NYT article entitled: “Drill nucleus here for Chinese army”. The Chinese Government [not the CERA] has been drilling soldiers in the United States for several months to form an army of Western standards for the Chinese Empire. The President of China’s new Military Board who is a Prince of the Imperial Family is soon to arrive in New York for the purpose of inspecting the recruits. George McVicker who is one of the drill master has received a commission of Major in the Chinese Army. The recruits have been armed with rifles. Although they have been taught all about loading and firing they have had no rifle practice as yet. It is intended to give them rifle practice in a rifle range on Long Island in the coming

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74 In 1905 a “New Army” established on western standards already existed in China itself. Yüan Shih-k'ai, the Chinese official who was in charge of this force: he became one of the main leaders under the imperial government. His army played a key-role in the revolution of 1911.
Fig. 7.6  Chinese Empire Reform Association cadets, Fourth Infantry Regiment, Portland, Oregon, 1905. The strength of a regiment is supposed to be at least 2,000 men. The group of 30 cadets that we see on this picture is rather a (small) platoon. Whether or not the cadets carry real weapons is difficult to say.

Source: http://homerlea.org/photoarchives.htm

summer. The uniform equipment of the recruits is similar to that of the US Army and they are drilled according to drill regulations of the US Army. In New York the drills have been conducted indoor on the top floor of a building at 6 Mott Street in the rooms of the Oriental Club which is composed of Chinatown’s leading merchants. (NYT p. 16)

[Several statements made in this paper are fairly confusing. It is suggested that the volunteers were trained for the Chinese government. Foreign military instructors were already employed in China for the training of the “New Army”. There was no point in training additional soldiers in the US. The article also tells us that the New York branch had 150 volunteers and that there were 30 branches in the US. As New York had 1/10 of the Chinese population, a rough estimate would be 1,500 volunteers for the whole country.

http://baohuanghui.blogspot.fr/2012/12/the-baohuanghui-on-mott-street-new-york.html]

**Lea, 1905**  Lea organized a force of volunteers among the young Chinese residing in California. In 1905 he held a review of the volunteers in company of Kang Yu-wei. (Bergère 1994)

[Who provided financial support for the training of these volunteers? In her biography of Sun Yat-sen, Marie-Claire Bergère (1994) mentions that Lea had close links with Charles Boothe, a former banker. In addition to the training of volunteers, arms and private military men were sent to Guangdong to train the Chinese forces. Financial support for this operation reached $10 million. Financial circles expected to get commercial and financial privileges for instance in the form of a share in custom revenue.

**Lea, Jun 1905:**  Homer Lea and Kang Yu-wei met President Theodore Roosevelt in Washington in June 1905. The president tacitly approved the Chinese Empire Reform Association’s military training program.
However, it must be observed that there was another group sharing the same purpose under the direction of General Richard A. Falkenberg. It was called the “Chinese Imperial Reform Army” (CIRA).

Lea, Sep 30, 1905: Sun Yat-sen was honored with a banquet at the Los Angeles Chinatown. On a later visit to California, Sun Yat-sen visited Lea at his home and at his “headquarters” located in the Lankershim hotel in Los Angeles. (McWilliams 1974, p. 94)

Lea, Sep 13, 1906: Excerpt from an article of the “New York Tribune” entitled “Chinamen in Parade”.

New York. Members of the “Chinese Empire Reform Association” (CERA) in Chinatown were jubilant over the news they had received of the first public parade in Shanghai of the 1st Chinese Volunteers. These Chinamen were reported to have received their military training from Chinese drillmasters educated in New York at the Military Academy, No. 12 Mott street.

This article tells us that the Chinese people trained by the CERA returned to China to serve as drillmasters for training Chinese soldiers. The present article is about New York but the CERA had probably similar plans in other cities. Such a plan makes sense. On the contrary, it would not make much sense to drill the soldiers in the US. There are two main reasons for that.

- The number of Chinese people available in the US was not large enough to produce a significant number of troops.
- Moving such troops from the United States to China would represent a major logistic problem.

75Falkenberg was a Major in the US Army; he claimed to be a 4-star general in the Chinese Reform Army.
Lea, 1907-1909 6 uprisings directed by Sun Yat-sen from Hanoi took place in the area of Canton with the hope that one would succeed but they all failed. Other coups were attempted in Hankow and Peking where Dr. Sun’s lieutenant Wang Ching-wei went to blow up the Prince Regent. He was discovered and sentenced to life imprisonment. (Tuchman 1970, p. 36)

Lea, May 28, 1907: New York City. “Chinese regiment disbands” was the title of a New York Times article of May 28, 1907 which reported that CERA [China Empire Reform Association] held a graduation ceremony at the Tuxedo Chinese restaurant for students completing the full three-year course of the Military Academy in Mott Street. This was the length of the course promised in the original announcement in 1904. After their graduation it was the duty of the student to return to China and serve as drill masters. This is what Mr. Singleton who presided told them: “Your work is by no means done. It is your duty to stir up in China that same spirit which you yourselves have already displayed in your work here”.

http://baohuanghui.blogspot.fr/2012/12/the-baohuanghui-on-mott-street-new-york.html

[US newspapers always overstate numbers. This can be seen from the title, A regiment is supposed to comprise about 3,000 soldiers. According to previous articles the New York Academy had between 100 and 200 students. This should be called a company rather than a regiment.]

Lea, Nov 15, 1908: Death of the Dowager Empress against which the action of the CERA was mainly directed.

Lea, 1909  Lea published ”The Valor of Ignorance”.

• The book has two introductions. The first is by Lieutenant-General Adna R. Chaffee, former Chief of Staff of the US Army, the second by Major-General J.P. Story. In a general way, these two officers approve the positions of the author. In particular, they share his criticism of coastal forts and reliance on the militia.

• In this book Lea predicts the expansion of Japan in the Pacific area. Rather than the prediction itself, what is remarkable is the early date of this prediction. In the 1930s numerous books were published both in Japan and in the United States which predicted a confrontation between Japan and the United States. A war between the United States and Japan had also been prophesied in Lea’s time by Price Collier and Richmond P. Hobson (see in this respect New York Times 21 November 1911, p. 8).

• While Lea’s predictions about a Japanese strike at the Philippines and Hawaii were plausible (and turned out to be correct) his prediction of a Japanese invasion of California and Washington State (to which is devoted a substantial part of the book) was hardly consistent with the logistic capabilities of the Japanese navy. Lea argues that transportation by sea is much easier than transportation by land which is
of course correct but the distance of 8,000 kilometers between Japan and the American west coast nevertheless was a formidable obstacle. Whereas the American war industry was able to produce enough tonnage to overcome that obstacle this would have been impossible for the Japanese economy. In this respect one must recall that in 1939 the Gross Domestic Product of the United States was about 10 times larger than Japan’s GDP.

**Lea, Mar 10, 1910**  Creation of a syndicate to float loans intended to support the uprising and the revolutionary government of China. Homer Lea, Charles Boothe and Sun Yat-sen agreed to raise $3.6 million from American financiers. The agreement gave Sun Yat-sen control over only 10% of this amount. The rest was earmarked for the transportation and maintenance of 5,000 men and accompanying American officers and Chinese interpreters as well as for ammunition, horses and medical supply. The contract promised a 300% remuneration: “Money to be advanced by the financiers is to receive a legal rate of interest and is to be paid back *three fold* for the risk involved.” In addition the agreement promised substantial privileges once the new government would be in control of China: “This Syndicate will have the right to negotiate all loans of the government; moreover, the Syndicate has within its power to grant [railroad] concessions as may be deemed proper”.

The agreement also stipulated that members of the Syndicate would be named commissioners of the customs in Kwantung for a period of 15 years and that they would be given the right to manage the telepostal service and monopolize trade in petroleum and wood-pulp.

(Chong 1984)

[One is really surprised that Dr. Sun was ready to accept such conditions. Did they not imply the continuation of the concession system? which had been in force for decades and had thwarted any real development. One is even more surprised to see that Sun Yat-sen is still highly honored in Taiwan as well as in the People’s Republic.]

**Lea, Mar 24, 1910**  A letter sent by Sun Yat-sen to Lea shows that at this time they knew one another very well already. (Anschel 1984)

[We do not know when exactly Sun Yat-sen met Lea for the first time. In September 1905 Dr. Sun visited Lea in Los Angeles, but it is quite possible that their first meeting was earlier. Given the interest of Lea for China and the fact that Sun made many visits to the United States in order to raise money, their meeting and subsequent cooperation was almost ineluctable.]

**Lea, Jun 1911**  Dr. Sun Yat-sen was Homer Lea’s guest at the Lankershim Hotel in Los Angeles, where they made plans for the Chinese Republican Revolution.
Lea, Aug 10, 1911  In a letter to Lea, Sun writes: “I was exceedingly glad to hear that you made such a great success with the government and the Senator.” (Anschel 1984)

[Unfortunately, we do not know to which “great success” Sun referred in this letter.]

Lea, Aug 20, 1911  The Kaiser liked Homer Lea’s book “The Value of Ignorance”. After reading the book, Emperor William and Prince Henry of Prussia have expressed themselves about it in most enthusiastic terms. It is known that the Kaiser wants the Powers to unite against the Yellow Peril. He popularized that idea in a drawing some 15 years ago. (NYT section 3, p. C2)

Lea, Oct 10, 1911:  Wuchan uprising. It can be seen as the first step in the turmoil that eventually led to the end of the Imperial regime.

Lea, Oct 14, 1911:  Excerpt of a letter addressed by Sun Yat-sen to British bankers. In order to make sure of our success we need a loan of 500,000 pounds [about $2.5 million] which will enable us to capture at least two rich provinces. As to the [Chinese] Navy, through hitherto no arrangement for its support has been made, an understanding can be easily concluded if funds for the purpose could be provided. I think we can repay the money many times as soon as a city like Canton is captured.

(NYT p. 1)

[This letter (along with many similar writings) suggests that the method favored by Sun in order to win over Chinese support was to use systematic bribery. By making bold promises to his financial bakers, he took the risk either of alienating them if the promises were broken or to upset the Chinese people if the promises were fulfilled and Chinese wealth sold out to foreign interests. The sway held over China by foreign companies was a very sensitive issue at the time which makes Sun’s method even more questionable.]

Lea, Oct 14, 1911:  Excerpt of Sun Yat-sen’s Manifesto.

“Any foreign loan incurred by the Manchu government will be acknowledged without any alteration of terms and will be paid by the Maritime Customs as before”. (NYT p. 1)

[Not only did Sun recognize former loans, but (as seen in the previous entry) he asked for new ones, thus increasing the dependency of China on foreign powers.]

Lea, Oct 14, 1911:  Riot and fires in Hankow. Many Manchus were slain. 500,000 people are in flight. (NYT p. 1)

Lea, Oct 20, 1911:  Lea met Sun Yat-sen in London at a time when the Revolution
was already under way. According to Bergère, Lea submitted a plan to the Foreign Office during his visit in London. (Bergère 1994)

[At that time there was an implicit agreement between western powers and Japan about respective zones of influence in China. Moreover, the southern part on China was in the British influence zone. That is perhaps why Dr. Sun had to give guarantees to the British government.]

**Lea, Nov 4, 1911:** The revolutionists moved from Canton to Shanghai where they found asylum in the foreign concessions. On 4 November, an arrangement was made whereby Shanghai accepted the Republic. (Tuchman 1970 p. 37)

[This episode shows that the foreign powers established in Shanghai were not opposed to the revolution. That is not really surprising when one considers the promises for economic privileges made by Sun Yat-sen. It can be observed that in contrast these same foreign powers had helped the Imperial government to crush the Taiping rebellion between 1860 and 1864.]

**Lea, Nov 18, 1911:** Archibald Ross Colquhoun, a Scottish businessman and traveler in an article in today’s “Daily Telegraph” outlined the program of the Chinese revolutionists in the following terms.

- The Revolutionary Committee has summoned Dr. Sun Yat-sen, one of the instigators of the present revolt and he will shortly arrive in Shanghai.
- There will be a period of 3 years of martial law under a military government under the direction of General Homer Lea. Major administrative reforms will be undertaken during this period.
- It will be followed by another period of 3 years in which the military government will be assisted by certain elected bodies. At the expiration of this time it is expected that the country will be ready for a constitutional republican government with a president and two elective chambers. It is believed that Dr. Sun will be the first president. (NYT p. 3)

**Lea, Nov 18, 1911:** Strength of foreign troops in China.

- Considerable bodies of British troops are maintained in North China with headquarters at Wei-hai-Wei and another branch at Tientsin under Brigadier General Cooper.
- The US guard at Peking has been increased recently from 100 to 200 men and a regiment [about 3,000 troops] at Manila is held ready to proceed to Chin-wangtao (see also 7 January 1912).
- On November 13, about 1,500 Russian troops have left Vladivostok for Peking. (NYT p. 3)

**Lea, Nov 23, 1911:** Lieutenant Joseph Stilwell (who was to play an important role
in China during World War II) reached Shanghai for what was to be a total of 17 days in the country. He took a lot of notes during his stay. (Tuchman 1970, p. 39)

[During the first part of his career, Stilwell made many trips abroad as an envoy of the Military Intelligence Division. During World War I he was assigned to France on intelligence duty.]

Lea, Nov 25, 1911: Sun Yat-sen spent four days in Paris with General Homer Lea before sailing from Marseilles to China. (NYT p. 5)


Lea, Dec 21, 1911: Sun Yat-sen eventually arrived in Hong Kong. He was accompanied by Lea who served as his chief of staff. Lea met with the American Consul General George E. Anderson. In a letter addressed to Secretary of State Knox on 22 December 1911, Anderson stated that “Lea represented a persuasive American influence over the Chinese leader which would bode well for American interests in the Far East.” (Bergère 1994, Chong 1984, p. 156)

[The fact that Sun and Lea entered China through the gateway of the British colony of Hong Kong might suggest that they were indeed working in the framework of a plan supported by the Foreign Office.]

Lea, Dec 29, 1911: It has now been shown beyond dispute by means of investigations started by the War Department that the success of the revolutionist army in China is due to a most remarkable campaign of preparation that for two years prior to the outbreak of the revolution had been in progress. Some 8,000 men were drilled in the United States. The persons responsible of the conception and working of the plan were Dr. Sun, Wu Ting-fang and General Homer Lea. (NYT p. 5, the whole article is reproduced in the accompanying figure.)

Lea, 1912 Lea published “The Day of the Saxon”.

[In this book Lea develops a thesis about the importance of racial purity which sounds gruesome nowadays but was common place in those days; he writes for instance (p. 36): “Racial supremacy and political intelligence in a nation are diminished as is lengthened the catalog of its races”. Such notions were also developed at about the same time by Houston Stewart Chamberlain, a British philosopher (1855-1927) who emigrated to Germany in 1909 and later became a supporter of the Nazi party.]

Lea, Jan, 1912: In his attempts to raise more funds, Sun Yat-sen was in discussion

76 Wu Ting-fang, a member of the English bar, has served as Chinese ambassador in Washington during several years. He was very popular in the United States. For instance, he was allowed to deliver an Independence Day Oration at Philadelphia on 19 August 1903.
REBELS WERE DRILLED HERE.

Story of Employment of American Instructors Turns Out True.

Special to The New York Times.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 28.—It has now been shown beyond dispute by means of investigations started by the War Department that the success of the revolutionist army in China is due to a most remarkable campaign of preparation that for two years prior to the outbreak of the revolution had been in progress in this country.

This discovery came about through the desire of many officers in our army to obtain the re-enlistment of a number of fine drill Sergeants, who, on the expiration of their enlistment periods, disappeared. It has now been learned that they received offers from the Chinese revolutionary party, in some cases even before our time was out, to undertake to drill Chinese living in the United States in order to form the basis of an army that might be employed to overthrow the reigning dynasty and bring about the establishment of a republic.

Reports have come to high officers in the army as to the various places where these drills were conducted and as to the identity of the non-commissioned officers employed as drill masters. The organization which furnished the funds for financing this preparation of an army had its headquarters in San Francisco and was directly under the orders of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, who for the greater part of the time was in New York and Honolulu. His chief representative in the United States was Gen. Homer Lea.

Gen. Lea suggested, it is said, the formation of companies of Chinese recruits in this country and Hawaii, and took active charge of many organizations. The Chinese in the United States proved very apt military pupils, and the brightest of them were taught to become commanders of detachments and companies, so that in the course of the two years there was formed secretly within the boundaries of the United States an army estimated to number over eight thousand effective, well-drilled men.

A large number of these Chinese were drilled in New York in halls that they hired, and a large part of their training was acquired behind locked doors. Many have wondered, and our own army officers have been continually mystified, to read that the Chinese army, on which many millions had been spent since the war between China and Japan, could not cope with the revolutionary army. American army officers were soon satisfied that the revolutionary army was either a remarkable conglomeration of natural Chinese warriors, officered by very competent students of the military art, or had been formed in some other country under excellent military instructors. Our military students were kept wondering from day to day as the revolution progressed, why the apparently well-trained imperial army was continually being defeated by a smaller but far more active force, evidently handled by excellent tacticians.

It is now known from letters received from former soldiers in the United States Army that not only was a small army raised in this country by the revolutionists, but that several scores of non-commissioned American soldiers went to China to go into service of the revolutionists. The agents of the revolutionary party seemed to have plenty of money to finance their project, but they did so with good judgment and with economy.

Army officers marvel at the amazing secrecy of the whole enterprise and say that no other race on earth could have put it through successfully and without any inkling of it becoming public until the project had become practically an established success. The impute to Dr. Sun, Wu-Ting-Fang, and Gen. Homer Lea the conception and working out of the plan.

Fig. 7.8 Article published in the New York Times on 29 December 1911. This article describes the military aspect of the cooperation between Homer Lea and the Chinese revolutionists. In spite of the surprise shown by the author of the article, a similar story was already reported by the New York Times on 22 January 1905. In an article published on 11 October 1911 and entitled “Plan behind China revolt is revealed”, the correspondent of the New York Times in London claims to give information on the financial backing of the revolutionists. The article, in fact, provides very little real information, but we now know that an agreement signed on 10 March 1910 (see at this date) between a syndicate of American businessmen and Sun Yat sen promised $3.6 million.
with the Japanese to sell them the Hanyeping Company (shipyards, coal mines). (Bergère 1994)

[In her book, Bergère also makes the point that Sun was not opposed to a secession of South China from the government in Peking. At one point he seemed to have been ready to sell Manchuria for 20 million yen and equipment for two army divisions.]

**Lea, Jan 7, 1912**: Rebels are sure of triumph. Our own troops only wait word from Calhoun [William J. Cahlhoun, American ambassador to China] to sail from Manila. The War Department looks askance on the task of sending a regiment from Manila to Peking in the dead of the winter but if troops must go, General Wood would prefer as little delay as possible. (NYT Section 3, p. C4)

[The article does not say what would be the purpose of the troops that should go to Peking.]

**Lea, Feb 12, 1912**: The Empress Regent abdicated on behalf of the dynasty. (Tuchman 1970, p. 41)

[The main objective of the revolution of 1911 was to get rid of the Manchu dynasty. Once this goal had been achieved the momentum of the revolution faltered.]

**Lea, Feb 1912**: In February 1912, the US Congress passed a resolution which congratulated the Chinese people in the hope that under a republican form of government “the happiness of the Chinese people will be secure and the progress of the country insured”. (Tuchman 1970, p. 41)

[This wish would not be fulfilled. Until 1949 subsequent decades would be marked with chaos, wars and misery for the people.]

**Lea, Feb 13, 1912**: General Homer Lea, the American adviser of president Sun is very ill. (NYT p. 5)

**Lea, Feb 14, 1912**: Yuan Shi-kai was elected Provisional President of the new Chinese republic.

**Lea, May 2, 1912**: Homer Lea, the former commander of the Chinese revolutionists is partly paralyzed. (NYT p. 5)

**Lea, Aug 25, 1912**: The Kuomintang was founded in Guangdong Province from a collection of several revolutionary groups and Sun Yat-sen was chosen as its first president.

**Lea, Nov 1, 1912**: Homer Lea died in Ocean Park, California at the age of 35. (Short obituary in the “Times” of 4 November 1912, p. 9)

**Lea, May 2, 1913**: The US Senate formally recognized the regime of Yuan Shi-kai in Peiping. (Cho 1984)
Chapter 7

Fig. 7.9 1969: Military band escorting the ashes of Homer Lea to the Yangmingshan cemetery in Taiwan. One wonders what brought about the transfer of the ashes in April 1969 rather than sooner or later. 
Source: http://homerlea.org/photoarchives6.html

Lea, Jul, 1913: A second revolution directed against the rule of Yuan Shi-kai was attempted by the Kuomintang but ended in failure. Its members, including Sun Yat-sen, fled into exile to Japan. The Kuomintang was dissolved by Yuan Shi-kai in November 1913.

Lea, Sep 10, 1917: Sun Yat-sen became the Generalissimo of the Canton regime. (Chong 1984)

Lea, Oct, 1923: Borodin, special envoy of Communist Russia, came to Canton and quickly established strong links with Sun Yat-sen. The same year Sun sent his young chief of staff, Chiang Kai-shek, to Moscow with letters of introduction for Lenin and Trotsky. (Spence 1969)

Lea, Mar 12, 1925: Sun Yat-sen died on March 12, 1925, at the age of 58 at the Rockefeller Hospital in Beijing. (Wikipedia, article on Sun Yat-sen)

Lea, 1926: In the spring of 1926, Chiang kai-shek arrested a number of Chinese Communists and placed the Russian advisers under home arrest. At the same time he also moved against some rightists. (Spence 1969)

Lea, Mar 5, 1934: Mrs. Ethel Lea, widow of Homer Lea, died after a brief illness. She is survived by two sons of a first marriage. She went to China with her husband in 1911 and brought him back in 1912 when he became ill. Later president Sun invited Mrs. Lea to China to serve the republic as an adviser but she declined. (NYT p. 15)

Lea, Apr 19, 1969: The ashes of Homer Lea arrived by plane from the United States on 18 April and the interment ceremony took place the following day. (http://homerlea.org/photoarchives6.html)
Chapter 8
British, Russian and US influence in Tibet

In the course of our investigation we came across newspaper articles or accounts by foreign visitors which provide an historical view about several issues of interest about Tibet:

- What influence did western powers (and in particular Britain, Russia and the United States) have in Tibet?
- What were the relations between Tibet and the central government of China?
- What was political situation in Tibet before 1950, particularly with respect to the rivalry between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama.

Invasion of Tibet by Great Britain in 1904

**Apr 2, 1904:** The India Office has issued long dispatches sent by Col. Younghusband, commanding the British mission to Tibet which confirm the story of The Associated Press concerning the engagement between the British and Tibetans near Guru yesterday. Natives retreated solemnly in lines through hail of bullets. (NYT p. 3) [According to this story the British force barely escaped a military disaster. In fact, the end of the excerpt points to the episode mentioned below: the native force being mowed down by British machine guns. The news about the avoided military disaster may be just a convenient mantel for the subsequent massacre.]

**Apr 3, 1904:** TUNA, Tibet, April 2. The Tibetan General, the whole of his personal escort, and five high Lhasa officials were among the hundreds killed in the fighting of March 31 at Guru. The slaughter in Tibet has roused much feeling in Great Britain, and it is possible that Col. Younghusband will not be allowed to proceed further with the expedition. He has 120 kilometer more to travel before he reaches Gyangste, where he has been ordered to stop and parley before actually demanding entrance into ancient Lhasa, distant another 260 kilometer. (NYT p. 1)

**May 7, 1904:** Another fight occurred in Tibet in which natives were routed with heavy loss. Two British were wounded. (NYT p. 1)
May 30, 1904: A British officer was killed in a battle in which the natives experienced heavy loss. (NYT p. 1)

Jun 5, 1904: The British expedition into Tibet is reported to have killed a Lhasa general. (NYT p. 4)

[According to a Wikipedia article citing a testimony of a British officer, the expedition numbered 3,000 fighting men and 7,000 sherpas and porters.

At the encounter between the British Tibetan forces the Tibetans were mowed down with machine guns as they fled. “I got so sick of the slaughter that I ceased fire, though the generals order was to make as big a bag as possible,” wrote Lieutenant Arthur Hadow, commander of the Maxim guns detachment. According to British sources there were 700 fatalities among the 3,000 (badly armed) fighters of the Tibetan force.]

Jul 7, 1904: The Gyang Tse Fort was captured by General Macdonald’s troops. Exchanges of views are taking place between America and Great Britain with respect to Tibet. Hay asked Great Britain what it intends to do there. (NYT p. 1)

[Obviously, the American government followed with great attention the advance of the British force in Tibet. This is reflected by numerous articles on this topic in the New York Times which all appear on the front page.]

Sep 10, 1904: Tibet is now under the control of Britain. Colonel Younghusband, head of the British mission, and the Tibetan officials signed a formal treaty to-day in the apartments of the Dalai Lama at Potala. The agreement was signed in the absence of the Dalai Lama (NYT p. 9)

Oct 22, 1904: Chumbi Territory was seized by the British as lien on a war indemnity. (NYT p. 49)

Apr 15, 1905: China and Great Britain eventually reach an understanding on Tibet. (NYT p. 5)

Jul 13, 1908: In the Spring of 1904 Col. Sir Francis Edward Younghusband of the British Army led a British column over the mountain passes of the Himalayas and fought his way into the Holy City of Lhasa.

In the eyes of all true Buddhists this was desecration, and ever since then the Dalai Lama, the religious head of the Buddhist faith and ruler of Tibet, has been a wanderer over Northern China. (NYT p. 6)

Dec 22, 1908: The Dalai Lama left Peking for Lhasa, his capital, and his departure marks the beginning of the end of his four years of wandering over Northern China. The Lama started out from Lhasa shortly after the arrival there of a British column under the command of Colonel Sir Francis Younghusband. (NYT p. 7)
Mar 4, 1910: Tibet is not tranquil. Force is needed to preserve order. (NYT p. 4)

Aug 30, 1912: The proposed incorporation of Tibet as a province of the Chinese Republic has met with strong opposition from Great Britain. The British Government contends that Tibet should be permitted to manage its affairs without Chinese interference. (NYT p. 4)
[This episode is a forerunner of the opposition shown by the United States about the incorporation of Tibet into the People’s Republic after 1949.]

Sep 2, 1912: China will keep Tibet as a result of the rejection by the Peiping government of the British demand. (NYT p. 4) [Other entries about the claim for independence made by the Living Buddha in 1912 (and encouraged by Britain) can be found in the main chronology.]

1914: Tibet [under British control] ceded the city of Tawang and the area around it to British India. (Newsweek.com 19 October 2009, p. 30)

Jul 11, 1914: A warning that trouble is likely to result from China’s refusal to sign the convention in regard to what territory shall compose Outer and Inner Tibet reached by the recent convention at Darjeeling, India, was issued to China today by Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary. (NYT p. 3)

Aug 19, 1919: China and Britain conclude an agreement about Tibet. (NYT p. 6)

US reaction to the British invasion of Tibet in 1904

Among the great powers the United States was the only one which did not have a firm foothold in China or at its periphery. Britain was present in India, France in Indochina, Japan in Korea and Taiwan, Russia in Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. That is why the key US demand was to preserve the “open door” status of China. In this way, the other countries would not be able to use their geographical presence to gain economic advantages.

Therefore it is quite understandable that the US State department was unhappy with the British invasion of Tibet in 1904. Incidentally, it can be observed that Russia had ground to be even more displeased because of the close connection between Mongolia and Tibet. Fortunately for Britain, in March 1904 when the invasion really started (it had been in preparation for several months) Russia was at war with Japan. This is very well expressed in the title of an article published in the New York Times on April 2, 1904:
Headline: “Russia calm over Tibet. Too busy with Japan, anyhow – Better disposi-
tion toward England.”

How did the New York Times voice the dissatisfaction of the State Department about the invasion of Tibet? In 1904 the United States and Britain were already close allies, therefore one would expect fairly soft statements. It is interesting to see how they were formulated.

The main rule of a successful public relations campaign is to use statements made by third parties\(^7\). The New York Times used this rule very cleverly. Here are some illustrations.

- **French papers used as third party.**
  December 3, 1903. Headline: “Continental alarm over Britain’s move on Tibet. French papers point out that control at Lhasa means supremacy over the 500,000,000 Buddhists”.

- **British women used as a third party.**
  February 14, 1904. Headline: “A British woman’s protest”. “Their murderous forces are now seizing Tibet”.

- **Russia used as a third party.**
  February 26, 1904. Headline: “Russian irritation regarding Tibet. May have caused Benckendorff’s [Russian ambassador] return to St. Petersburg”.

- **The English Liberals used as a third party.**
  April 14, 1904. “The Commons agree to the employment of Indian troops in Tibet, but the Liberal leader denounces the expedition”.

- **Mongolians used as a third party.**
  June 2, 1904. “Are the Mongolians anti-British? The correspondent of a Russian Paper says they will aid Tibet.”

Instead of denouncing the savagery of British (in fact mostly Indian) troops an indirect technique is used which consists in lauding the courage of the Tibetan soldiers and to mourn their losses.

- **May 9, 1904.** Headline: “British repulse night surprise attack at Gyang-Tse. Daring feat by [Tibetan] pioneers who scale a precipice to outflank the [British] position.

- **April 3, 1904.** Headline: “Slaughter in Tibet rouses England. Possibility that Col. Younghusband [British commander in Tibet] may be recalled”. [needless to say, there was not the smallest chance that he might be recalled.]

Finally, the NYT encourages a Tibetan guerrilla resistance directed against the British

\(^7\)This was one of Edward Bernays’s favorite techniques for manipulating public opinion. It may be recalled that together with Walter Lippmann, a prominent American journalist, Bernays (18891-1995) was one of the founders of the public relations industry.
occupation.

- May 15, 1904. Headline: “Holly war preached in Tibet. 2,000 warriors marching to join army besieging the British.” Although completely unrealistic [were the British ever besieged by a Tibetan army?] this is a call to arms. Did the US government support the Tibetan resistance only in words or did it also provide more tangible support? This remains an open question.

- June 20, 1904 “The British have flybd brave foe in Tibet. Future opposition to their advance is likely to be serious. NATIVES LEARN HOW TO FIGHT . The natives learn to fight and are being supplied with better arms [by whom?]”

- February 12, 1906. Neither the Foreign Office nor the India Office has any confirmation of the report that the British garrison in Tibet is surrounded by hostile tribes. [One wonders what is the information source on which this news is based.]

A few accounts of diplomatic actions by the State Department can be found but they come as late as July and are very moderate.


Then, eventually, on 18 September 1904, the British enter Lhasa. The Dalai Lama fled to Mongolia and was replaced by a pro-British leader.

September 19, 1904. Headline: “Dalai Lama is ousted. Pro-British Tashi Lama succeeds him.”

Finally, on 24 April 1906 [more than two years after the beginning of the invasion] the signature of a Treaty between China and England regarding Tibet emphasized British recognition of the fact that Tibet is part of China.

April 24, 1906. Headline: “Tibetan Treaty is signed. Britain recognizes China protectorate. Trade is open for India.”

**Rivalry between the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama in the 1930s**

Below is a long article published in the “North China Herald” in 1932 which gives an account of the relations between the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama on the one hand and the Chinese government on the other hand. It brings also to light the conflicts between the two Tibetan dignitaries.

For the benefit of the readers who do not wish to read the whole article we give a few excerpts below.

- The decade-old quarrels between the Panchen and Dalai Lamas have broken anew. The two leaders have recently submitted their respective petitions to the Nanking government. (p. 1, second column)
THE TROUBLE IN TIBET

Cause of the Present Fighting: The Dispute Between the Lamas

FROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT

Nanking, July 12.

Advices from Chengtu, capital of Szechuan, state that the fighting now in progress between the Tibetans and the Chinese on the Sikang-Tibetan border is developing in favour of the latter and the city of Kantze, a border city which was captured by the Tibetans under the Dalai Lama many years ago, has been recaptured by the Szechuan troops under General Liu Wen-huei. The Tibetans assumed the offensive on June 17 on all fronts with a total strength of nine “taibens,” each “Taiben” being equivalent to one Chinese battalion. The general reserve troops in the Tibetan army were stationed at Changtu, a city about 400 li west of the Kinsha River in Sikang with a total strength of nineteen “taipeins” or 17,400 men armed with rifles, revolvers, light artillery and mountain guns all of the latest design.

At first the Chinese remained on the defensive contenting themselves in holding back the Tibetans. On June 26, General Liu Wen-huei ordered the counter-attack which turned out a great success driving out the Tibetans from Kanchan, practically annihilating several Tibetan detachments. Following this victory the Szechuan troops started to consolidate their positions in the newly occupied territory instead of driving home their advance, thereby giving time to the Tibetans to reassemble the remnants of the Tibetan troops for a renewed attack on the Chinese troops. The Tibetan second attack was launched on June 29 which again turned out a failure suffering enormous losses.

Following the heels of the Tibetans the Szechuanese carried out their second counter-attack and succeeded in capturing Paiyuh on the eastern bank of the Kinsha River, not far from Changtu, the base of the Tibetans. The Tibetans are reported to have withdrawn to Tachin with the Szechuanese quickly following after them. The Szechuan authorities are now appealing to the Central Government for military supplies with the obvious intention of driving out the Tibetans from their occupied territory in Sikang.

While fighting is in progress in Sikang the decade-old quarrels between the Panchan and Dalai Lamas, two spiritual leaders in Tibet, have broken out anew, each accusing the other of being responsible for the recent troubles on the Sikang-Tibetan border. The two leaders have recently submitted their respective petitions to the Nanking Government explaining why and how the recent fighting occurred, but each has a different version to tell and invariably they hold each other responsible for the affair and request the Government to mete out severe punishment to each other.

Undoubtedly the Government is at a loss to know which version is correct for so far nothing seems to have been done in that direction by the Government. It will be remembered that the Government recently appointed Shih Tsing-yang, Chairman of the Tibetan and Mon-

Fig. 8.1 Dispute between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, page 1. A “li” is a traditional Chinese measure of distance equivalent to about 0.5 km. The strength of a battalion is about 1,000 men. The most interesting part of the article begins in the middle of the second column. Source: The North-China Herald, 27 July 1932 p. 132
Fig. 8.2 Dispute between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, page 2. The summary of the petition of the Dalai Lama to the Chinese government begins in the middle of the first column. Source: The North-China Herald, 27 July 1932 p. 132

- The Dalai Lama affirms in his petition his loyalty to the Chinese government saying that all reports to the contrary were the propaganda of his enemy the Panchen Lama.

The summary of the petition of the Dalai Lama to the Chinese government begins in the middle of the first column. Source: The North-China Herald, 27 July 1932 p. 132
Dalai returned to Lhasa. Again Panchan effected an understanding with the Manchu Commissioner in Tibet to send for three thousand Szechuan troops for the protection of Lhasa. These troops later attacked Lhasa, forcing the Dalai again to flee to Tachilin. With the establishment of the Republic, Dalai returned to Lhasa and the Szechuan troops there were driven out from that city by those loyal to the Dalai. From thence forward Tibet has been in a semi-independent state in its relations with China. For this undoubtedly Panchan has to be blamed.

"Nevertheless, Dalai never entertained the thought of revenge on Panchan and he was given control as usual of the monastery of Chaslumbo. However, Panchan never accepted the order and, in order to find an opportunity to overthrow the reign of Dalai, fled from Tibet in disguise to Urga in the hope of enlisting the support of the Living Buddha at Urga in his new adventure of driving out Dalai from Lhasa. But the Living Buddha at Urga died before Panchan reached there and he was forced to proceed to China Proper thinking of embarking on some other means to carry out his plan. He was, however, much dissatisfied with the dispatch by the Central Government of a representative to Tibet to negotiate with Dalai so he made a further attempt to enlist the support of the lamas in Tsinghai in his plan to stage a comeback in Tibet. It was after repeated persuasions on the part of General Chang Hsueh-liang that Panchan abandoned his scheme.

"The Sikang-Tibet trouble had its origin in 1930 when the Paili and Tachieh monasteries at Kantsê, Sikang, started a dispute over their property problem. Such issues could be settled through amicable means. But through the instigation of Panchan's representatives at Tachienlu and Tsinghai, the Szechuan authorities openly took side with the Paili Monastery to oppress the other. In desperation the Tachieh Monastery appealed to Dalai Lama for assistance which was readily granted. This incident has given rise to the present entanglement, the dispute between two monasteries having developed into an open battle between the Tibetans and the Chinese.

"Before the Central Government sent its representative to Tibet in February, 1931, Dalai sent a long telegram to the Government explaining the cause of the Sikang-Tibetan dispute and urging the Government to send a special commissioner to investigate into the affair and effect an early settlement. However, the telegram never reached the Government. Investigations revealed the fact that when the telegram reached the Tibetan and Mongolia Affairs Commission, General Ma Fu-hsiang, then Chairman of the Commission, ordered the telegram be submitted to the Government immediately. But a sectional chief named Chu Fu-nan, who was an adherent of the Panchan, purposely detained the telegram so it never reached the Government, thus creating further misunderstanding between Dalai and the Central Government.

Fig. 8.3 Dispute between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, page 3. Petition of the Dalai Lama to the Chinese government (continued). Source: The North-China Herald, 27 July 1932 p. 132

Lama. (p. 2, top of second column)

- In the wake of the British invasion Tibet has been in a state of semi-independence with respect to China. (p. 3, first column)
"Following this incident fighting broke out anew on the border districts which necessitated the Government’s delegate to proceed to Tibet immediately. In April, 1931, Panchen Lama, fearing that the Government might attempt an amicable settlement, rushed to Nanking from Peiping and appealed for a military expedition against Dalai and at the same time requested that a title be given him by the Government. Being ignorant of Panchen’s tricks the Government, at the request of Shih Tsing-yang, acted on Panchen’s requests accordingly, thus causing some further misunderstanding on the part of Dalai of the real intentions of the Government. Since then Panchen has sent his representatives to Sikang, Tsinghai and India to spread various kinds of rumours about Dalai. It is now learned that Panchen will proceed to Hsinin shortly to organize an expedition against Tibet with a view to reinstal himself. His plan is to first capture Tsinghai and then march into Tibet from that direction. Besides, Panchen is now in secret communication with Soviet Russia and his representative Chiao-chukanpu is now stationed at Urga.

"In view of these reasons if Panchen is permitted to return to Tibet the present trouble would probably develop into an open war in Tibet. Mr. Shih Tsing-yang is really connected with the anti-Dalai scheme. If Shih is sent to Tibet it will probably further aggravate the situation. The Dalai Lama hopes that Government could send an impartial commissioner to Sikang to investigate into the trouble and effect a peaceful settlement as soon as possible."

Against this petition the representative of Panchen Lama in Nan-king also submitted a petition to the Government enumerating the crimes of Dalai Lama and way Panchen had to leave Tibet. He urges the Government to order a military expedition against Dalai and the arrest of Dalai’s representative in Nanking. The two petitions are so conflicting that no one knows which one is giving the correct version. Similarly the Government is at a loss to know whose advice to take. The matter has not yet been decided, in fact the Government does not know exactly how to decide. But it is understood since the Dalai Lama is so opposed to Mr. Shih Tsing-yang’s trip to Sikang somebody else might be chosen to take up the mission to Kante, the war zone. Recently a woman employee of the Government, Miss Liu Man-ching, who is a Tibetan, has left Nanking for Tibet on an investigation trip. But she is not the official representative of the Government.

The petition submitted by Panchen’s representative is a very lengthy document, of which the following is a brief summary:—

"Because Tibet is situated very close to India, Buddhism was first introduced into Tibet before it entered China. The Tibetans have so much faith in Buddhism that it has been the custom in Tibet that Buddhist priests also hold administrative power of the land concurrently."

"The founder of the Yellow Lamaism was Kenachu who had two disciples, one called Panchen and the other Dalai. When Kenachu was breathing his last he willed that Panchen and Dalai should both become spiritual and political leaders in Tibet. During the Ming Dynasty it was arranged that Panchen should maintain his in Upper Tibet, each

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Fig. 8.4 Dispute between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, page 4. The summary of the petition of the Panchen Lama to the Chinese government begins in the middle of the second column. Source: The North-China Herald, 27 July 1932 p. 132

- From the early days of the Tsing Dynasty [1644] Panchen Lama has been remaining loyal to the Chinese government and he was responsible for bringing whole
having full control over political and religious affairs in their respective territory. Owing to the fact that Lhasa, the capital of Dalai Lama, was centrally situated where the Chinese Commissioner was stationed, the place soon developed into the centre of politics in Tibet, thereby giving Dalai a unique opportunity to realize his political ambitions. However, the faith of the Tibetans in the two spiritual leaders had never been changed. There is a saying in Tibet even to-day that “In heaven sun and the moon, on earth Dalai and Panchan.” Therefore, the charges made by Dalai against Panchan are absolutely without foundation.

“From the early days of the Tsing Dynasty Panchan Lama has been remaining loyal to the Chinese Government and he was responsible for bringing whole Tibet into the fold of China. However, when the present Dalai Lama got into power he has been doing everything to wipe out the influence of Panchan and dictate everything in Tibet. He also on several occasions attempted to declare independence from China and enter into secret treaties with certain foreign Powers. Thinking that trouble would soon occur in Tibet under the tyrannical rule of Dalai the Panchan Lama left Tibet for China in 1922 with a view to appealing for support in his scheme to redeem Tibet from the Dalai Lama.

“After Panchan left Tibet Dalai became more tyrannical than ever. The following are some of the unlawful acts perpetrated by Dalai during the absence of Panchan:—

1. Taking advantage of the 1911 Revolution in China he drove out the Chinese Commissioner from Lhasa.

2. Instead of pledging his support to the Government Dalai entered into secret agreement with foreign Powers.

3. Killing of the ruler Temuhtokto and putting himself in the throne of Tibet.

4. Annihilation of several monasteries who had been in secret communication with the Chinese Government.

5. Adoption of the most cruel punishment of mutilating the bodies of political offenders.

6. Confiscation of all property belonging to Panchan and his followers during their absence in China.

7. Prohibition of free trade between China and Tibet.

8. Selling mines to foreign enterprises.

9. Imposition of so-called double-car and four-feet taxes, which means everything having two ears, human being included, and everything which walks on four feet must be taxed while beggars must be taxed two Tibetan dollars a month before they could be permitted to beg on the streets.

10. Launching attack on Sikang and Tsinghai to extend his influence into the neighbouring provinces.

“For these reasons it is hoped that, if the Government want to settle the Tibetan situation fundamentally, a military expedition should be sent against Dalai and as a first step the Dalai delegation in Nanking should first be driven out from the capital.”

Fig. 8.5  Dispute between the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama, page 5. The “foreign powers” mentioned in point 2 (second column) certainly include Britain (see text). Source: The North-China Herald, 27 July 1932 p. 132
China and he entered into secret treaties with certain foreign powers. (p. 5, first column).

- After 1922, the Dalai Lama prohibited free trade between Tibet and China and he sold mines to foreign enterprises. (p. 5, column 2, point 8)

In his petition the Panchen Lama does not specify the foreign powers with which the Dalai Lama entered into secret treaties nor does he specify the foreign enterprises to which he sold mines. According to several articles published in the New York Times, Britain was one of the powers with which the Dalai Lama made an agreement. Here are some excerpts.

- “Tokyo, Sept. 11 1932. The Peiping correspondent of the newspaper Asahi reported tonight that Tibetan forces, mobilized with British assistance, were advancing on Yunnan Province with the object of declaring the independence of Greater Tibet.” (NYT 12 Sep 1932, p. 1)
  - “Political agents of four nations quietly push forward their government’s influence: the Soviet Union works in Mongolia; Britain is said to be encouraging Tibetan independence; Japan extends its influence in northern China.” (NYT 27 Nov 1932 p. E8)
  - “London, Dec 19, 1933. The Daily Mail’s Bengal correspondent said that he was informed from a usually reliable source that the Dalai Lama was poisoned. The Dalai Lama was pro-British (NYT 20 Dec 1933 p. 22). His death is expected to result in a anti-British move in Tibet. (NYT 21 Dec 1933 p. 13)

Jan 27, 1940: A message that Chungking regards as significant of Tibetan recognition of Chinese sovereignty was received in the Nationalist capital by President Lin Sen from the “Living Buddha” Jeh-chen Hutuku, Prince Regent of Tibet. (NYT p. 5)

Jul 1942: An office of foreign affairs was established by Tibetan authorities which was supposed to replace the “Chinese office of Tibetan and Mongolian affairs” established in Lhasa. This arrangement which was a step in the direction of independence was not accepted by the KMT government. (Wikipedia article in French entitled “Jamphel Yeshe Gyaltsen”. This person was the 5th Réting Rimpoché, a Tibetan dignitary.)

This episode once more confirms the rule that whenever the central government becomes weak the regions at the periphery try to proclaim their independence.

Jul 13, 1942: In a memorandum to the British government the US State Department declared that it had no reason to question the suzerainty of China over Tibet. (See the text in the main chronology)

1947: Destruction of monasteries by the Tibetan Army. The Tengyeling temple
was destroyed in 1917. The Réting monastery, one of the oldest in Tibet, was plundered and destroyed by Tibetan soldiers in 1947. The same year the Sera monastery was bombed and taken over by the Tibetan Army with a death toll of 200 persons. (Wikipedia article in French entitled “Jamphel Yeshe Gyaltsen”. This person was the 5th Réting Rimpoché, a Tibetan dignitary.)

[The source suggests that these disturbances occurred as the result of an internal power struggle but without giving much details.]

**Dalai Lama’s cooperation with Beijing: 1949-1958**

The power vacancy in Lhasa between the end of the rule of the KMT and the arrival of the Communists did not last very long.

**Jul 23, 1949:** A revolt had broken out in Lhasa against the Chinese Nationalist Government. (NYT p. 1)

[In July 1949 the Nationalist government had lost control of most of China to the Communists. It is a well-known rule that centrifugal tendencies appear in the periphery every time the control of the central government loses its effectiveness. Just to mention a few cases this happened in France during the Revolution of 1789-1793, in Russia during the semi-revolution of 1905, in China after the Revolution of 1911.

An article published in the New York Times two days later (25 July 1949 p. 5) claimed that the revolt was due to a group of Communists. The specific reason of the agitation does not really matter. The fact is that when the liaison between the center and the periphery weakens any factor can become a pretext for agitation.]

**Oct 17, 1949:** Lowell Thomas, author and newscaster, returning to New York yesterday after an expedition to Tibet, said that its rulers “would like to know if they can get aid” from the United States in case the Communists should try to take control of their country. (NYT p. 25)

**Oct 25, 1949:** Recognition of Tibet as a free and independent country is a possibility that the State Department is considering. (NYT p. 5)

[Such a step would have incensed not only the Communists but also the Nationalist government which was at that time (and still is) a close ally of the United States. In this respect, it can be remembered that to this day (28 April 2010) the Kuomintang claims sovereignty over continental China *including Outer Mongolia*. Nevertheless, the previous announcement gives a clear indication of the policy that the American government would follow over the following decades, if not openly at least in covert ways.]

**April 29, 1950:** The Mackierman episode.
An American Vice-Consul, Douglas S. Mackierman, was killed by frontier guards as he tried to enter Tibet. Another American, anthropologist and Fulbright scholar Frank Bessac, who was with him was severely wounded. The two Americans were coming from Mongolia and the incident took place near Shentsa (north west of Lhasa). (Time Magazine 4 December 1950).

[“Time” published the account given by Bessac a few weeks after he arrived to the United States. For instance, he explains that during his stay in Tibet he was received twice by the Dalai Lama.

This story raises two questions: (i) What were these Americans doing in China at that time, shortly after the Communists took power. Obviously this was a troubled time and it was a fairly weird idea to conduct an anthropological study at this time; moreover this does not explain the presence of the Vice-Consul. (ii) Why were they shot at almost without warning?

As often in such cases, an answer came only much later through a book published in 2002. The author, Thomas Laird, who has links with the CIA, explains that the two Americans were in fact on a mission for the CIA (understandably, he does not say what was exactly this mission). It is well known that scholars, journalists or diplomats commonly serve as cover for CIA officers. This, however, does not explain why they were shot at.

The author gives another information which provides at least a plausible reason. In mid-April there was a battle near Lake Barkol between a tribe of Kazakhs (who was supported by the CIA) and the Red Army. The clash resulted in a severe defeat for the Kazakhs: “Kazakh fighting men died by the hundreds” (a subsequent account in “National Geographic” of November 1954 is mentioned). It is understandable that this incident made the border guards pretty nervous.

The end of Bessac’s adventure came in July 1950. It took him and his Russian companion 27 days to make the trip from Lhasa to the Indian border. Another account of Bessac’s story was published in “Life” magazine of 13 November 1950. In this account Bessac was not injured by the border guards.]

**Oct 31, 1950:** India’s representative in Lhasa has reported that Chinese Communist forces have penetrated in Tibet. They are still some 350km away from Lhasa. (NYT p. 1)

**Nov 12, 1950:** While Chinese Communist troops advanced deeper into Tibet, General Liu Po-cheng’s headquarters issued a new proclamation to the Tibetan people reaffirming the promise of regional autonomy, religious freedom and the retention of their armed forces as part of China’s national army. (NYT p. 13)

**Nov 16, 1950:** El Salvador surprised United Nations delegations by demanding ime-
diate debate by the General Assembly on the Chinese Communists’ invasion of Tibet. (NYT p. 8)

**Nov 18, 1950:** India will back Tibet in United Nations on invasion. (NYT p. 5)
[That was at least the hope of the State Department. However, one week later this hope was dashed when India announced an opposite decision.]

**Nov 25, 1950:** At the United Nations India said she was convinced that a peaceful settlement could be reached between the Chinese Communists and the Tibetan government. (NYT p. 3)

**Dec 26, 1950:** Title: Dalai Lama flees Tibet.
Kalimpong, India. With a new threat to Lhasa developing in the Communist Chinese drive from Western Tibet, the Dalai Lama is at last leaving his sequestered Himalayan state for sanctuary in India. (NYT p. 1)
[This news later on proved to be wrong but it nevertheless provides a good indication about the wishes of the State Department. It seems that the Dalai Lama indeed left Lhasa to go to southern Tibet but did not cross the border into India. It should be recalled that in 1950 the Dalai Lama was only 15 year old.]

**Dec 31, 1950:** India advised the Dalai Lama to remain in Tibet as long as possible. (NYT p. 3)
[This advice was in line with the position taken by India on 25 November 1950 at the United Nations. It frustrated the wishes of the State Department.]

**Jan 12, 1951:** A place just outside Tibet is being made ready to serve as a refuge for the Dalai Lama if needed. (NYT p. 6) [By whom was this place prepared? Probably not by the Indian government who dissuaded the Dalai Lama from coming to India, according to the New York Times. This move foreshadows the flight of 1959.]

**Jan 20, 1951:** The Chinese drove into Tibet’s Chamdo fortress without a shot. Fireworks alone won Tibet’s Chamdo fortress for Communist China from a terror-stricken garrison. (NYT p. 1)

**May 28, 1951:** Lhasa accepted the suzerainty of Peiping in a 17-Point Pact which incorporated Tibet in Red China. The Communist government announced that this agreement settled the peaceful liberation of Tibet. (NYT p. 1)

**Jul 9, 1951:** The elder brother of the Dalai Lama, Taktser Rimpoche, arrived in the United States to study. (NYT p. 8)
[In a New York Times article of 2 August (p. 4) he expressed his dislike of the Chinese Communists. He was 28 year old at that time that is to say 12 years older than the Dalai Lama. It seems that this brother played an important role later on in
convincing the Dalai Lama to leave Tibet.]

**Aug 18, 1951:** The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa. (NYT p. 3)

**Oct 28, 1951:** The Dalai Lama signed the pact which ratified Chinese rule over Tibet. (NYT p. 2)
[This news was given in a tiny article of only 98 words. The news that the Tibetan Parliament ratified the Chinese rule over Tibet was given on 21 November in an article which was even smaller (only 84 words).]

**Apr 24, 1952:** Public agitation against the Chinese Communist occupation of Lhasa, capital of Tibet, has risen to the point where the Tibetan Government has been forced to make official representations to the Chinese authorities asking them to remove a large part of their garrison lest there be an uprising. (NYT p. 2)
[The fact that garrisoned troops usually arouse complaints in the civilian population is a timeless rule.]

**May 22, 1952:** The Dalai Lama ousted his aide, Sawang Lukhang for his role in recent anti-Chinese demonstrations. (NYT p. 8)

**Aug 22, 1952:** Resentment smoulders angrily beneath the surface of the present apparent subservience to Red occupation. It waits an opportune moment to burst into flame. (NYT p. 2)

**Nov 10, 1952:** Title: 40 killed in Tibet riot against Chinese troops. Thirty Tibetans and ten Chinese soldiers have been killed in rioting between Communist garrison troops and fiery Khambas tribesmen. (NYT p. 2)
[This news was given in a very small article of 91 words which was not followed by any other on the following days. Was it really true?]

**Mar 11, 1955:** The Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama returned to Tibet after their visit to Peiping. (NYT p. 3)

**Aug 15, 1955:** The US Department of State gave political asylum to the elder brother of the Dalai Lama, Thubten Jigme Norbu. (NYT p. 3)

**May 5, 1956:** According to reports from Nepal, thousands rose against Communist rule in Eastern Tibet, home of the Khamba tribesmen. (NYT p. 2)

**Jun 21, 1956:** Anti-Communists, including Dalai Lama’s brother, protested to Prime Minister Nehru that no Asian country has protested the bombing of Tibetans in Litang, Szechwan Province. (NYT p. 2)

**Nov 26, 1956:** The Dalai Lama arrived in India on an official visit. (NYT p. 18)
Aug 26, 1958: The Dalai Lama has alerted Tibetans against what he called “secret agents of the Chiang Kai-shek clique” in Tibet, according to a statement he recently made. (NYT p. 3)

This news suggests that at that time the Dalai Lama was still acting in accordance with the pact that he had signed in 1951. Yet, less than one year later he fled Tibet and became a staunch supporter of Tibet’s independence (before shifting back to a more moderate position in the early 1990s). What brought about this change? This may seem an interesting question; however, it is not a scientific issue because it is just a single event for which many answers can be proposed. It is not because one answer looks more “plausible” that it is necessarily “true”; as a matter of fact, the word “true” has no clear meaning in such a case.]

Dec 14, 1958: Khamba guerrillas are reported to have won local successes in their stubborn struggle against the Chinese Communist rulers of Tibet. (NYT p. C2)

The flight of the Dalai Lama

The flight of the Dalai Lama in March 1959 was a major setback for the Chinese government. It is natural, therefore, to wonder why it was not able to prevent it. The following account is based on a comparison between two American sources: the New York Times on the one hand and the story told by members of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) Tibetan Task Force who were in charge of this operation.

This comparison provides at least a partial answer to our question in the sense that it shows how well the flight was organized. One can mention for instance the following features.

- It is often said that the event which triggered the flight of the Dalai Lama was a revolt in Lhasa and the ensuing repression by the Chinese authorities. The confrontation of the two sources suggests that this interpretation is perhaps not correct. The CIA source (as well as other American accounts published some time later) says that the Dalai Lama left Lhasa on 17 March 1959. The CIA source says that riots in Lhasa began on 10 March and that the flight of the Dalai Lama was in reaction to these riots and their suppression by Chinese authorities. On the contrary, in the New York Times the very first mention of riots in Lhasa comes on 21 March 1959.

- According to the CIA source the Dalai Lama and its escort of 37 persons reached the Indian border on 31 March 1959. They were admitted in India because

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78 The following persons were mentioned and interviewed for their participation in this operation:

- Ken Knaus, Tibetan Task Force, 1958-1965
- Athar and Lhotse, two Tibetan CIA-trained radio operators with the Dalai Lama’s escape party.

Source:
of a demand made by the Tibetans via the US Department of State. In the “New York Times” there is not a single mention of a flight of the Dalai Lama before 31 March 1959. On this day an article mentions that Chinese planes and paratroops combed Himalayan valleys and mountain monasteries.

If one admits as a plausible working hypothesis that (as is so often the case) the “New York Times” worked hand in hand with the Department of State it becomes obvious that this operation was very well coordinated.

Still, it is not clear why the Chinese troops did not secure the few passes which lead from Lhasa to India. One has the impression that this would have been fairly easy. One possible explanation would be that the flight actually occurred by air. Indeed, in order to avoid the risks of a 14-day trip through the Himalaya it would have made sense for the CIA to fly the Dalai Lama from a point near Lhasa to the Indian border. In this case, the story of his flight told on the Internet simply serves as a useful myth in the whole saga.

So far we were not able to read the Chinese version of this story. Perhaps it would bring some new light.

**Chronology of the flight**

**Mar 1, 1959:** In Lhasa the Dalai Lama ceremonially passed the Gishe, a five-fold examination in classical Buddhist logic, canon law, philosophy and metaphysics last Sunday. Traditionally this has to be completed by every “incarnate Lama”. (NYT p. 23)

**Mar 21, 1959:** The populace joined a rebel group in resisting Red attempt to seize
the Dalai Lama. Open warfare against the Chinese Communist overlords of Tibet has broken out in Lhasa. (NYT p. 1)
[This article suggests that the uprising began with a commando operation whose purpose was to close access to the Potala Palace, the residence of the Dalai Lama, to Chinese authorities.]

**Mar 23, 1959:** Communist China’s apparent determination to crush the Tibetan revolt gave rise today to concern about the personal safety of the Dalai Lama. (NYT p. 2)
[The article suggests that the Dalai Lama was still in Lhasa.]

**Mar 31, 1959:** The Chinese Communists have started dropping paratroops south of the Brahmaputra River in Tibet in an effort to intercept the Dalai Lama before he can reach India. (NYT p. 1)
[According to the CIA account, the Dalai Lama was already in India on 31 March.]

**Mar 31, 1959:** The Dalai Lama crossed the Indian border at the Khenzimana Pass, and is now resting at the Tawang Monastery, 80 km inside the Indian border [in the Tawang district of the Indian province of Arunachal Pradesh]. (BBC)
[This BBC dispatch comes in confirmation of the CIA account.]

**Apr 1, 1959:** More than 50,000 Chinese Communist troops combed Himalayan villages and mountain monasteries today in a desperate effort to intercept the Dalai Lama before he could reach, India. (NYT p. 1)
[The figure of 50,000 troops seems an exaggeration. To bring so many troops (about 4 divisions) to such a remote place would have required a huge logistic effort.]

**Apr 1, 1959:** Soon after the arrival of the Dalai Lama in Tibet, approval was extended by President Eisenhower for continued paramilitary action in support of the Tibetan resistance. (Conboy and Morrison 2002).

**Apr 4, 1959:** On the night of March 17, according to reports reaching the outside world last week, a dramatic trek began in the remote mountain country of Tibet. The Dalai Lama reached safety in India by a perilous 15-day trek over some of the world’s most treacherous mountain territory. (NYT, 4 April 1959 (p. 2) and Sunday 5 April 1959 Review of the week editorials, p. E1)
[These articles outline what is destined to become the official American version of the flight of the Dalai Lama.]

**Possible scenarios for the flight of the Dalai Lama**

Was the Dalai Lama and his party really able to carry out the trip from Lhasa to the Indian border in 14 days? To put this question in perspective, let us make a
comparison with the similar trip performed by Bessac and Zvansov in July 1950 (see above at the date of 29 April 1950). They traveled on horse or mule back exactly as the Dalai Lama and his escort. But it took them 27 days to make the 480km-trip to the Jelepla border pass (which is at an altitude of 4,320m) where members of the American embassy welcomed them (“Life” magazine of 13 November 1950 p. 141). This was in the month of July. In late March there was certainly much more snow which made it more difficult for the horses to walk. Yet, the trip was done in 14 days only. A possible way to resolve this inconsistency is to suppose that the Dalai Lama was airlifted. We come back to this hypothesis below.

![India-China Trade Route](image)

**Fig. 8.7 A route from Lhasa to the Indian border.** The distance from Lhasa to Kalimpong is 575km. From Lhasa to the Indian border it is about 480km. In former times it was a traditional trade route. In the 1950s it was a mule track, but it is now a motorable road. According to the BBC, the Dalai Lama rather crossed the Indian border on the eastern side of Bhutan, not far from the city of Tawang. The distance from Lhasa to Tawang is 240km as the crow flies. It is somewhat shorter than the route which arrives to Nathu La. At this point it is unclear why the traditional trade route between Lhasa and India was through Nathu La pass rather than through Tawang; despite being longer, it was perhaps more convenient in some ways.

An article published in the “Nation” (a leftist American magazine) in January 1974 acknowledges the role of the CIA in the flight of the Dalai Lama and says that “the Chinese could have blocked the Dalai Lama’s escape, but only at the risk of his death or injury. Rather than risk the stigma of harming the Dalai Lama’s person, the Chinese did not stand in his way.”. In this interpretation the Chinese authorities did not try to prevent the Dalai Lama from seeking refuge in India. Of course, that would be a possible explanation for the ease of his escape. However this interpretation is contradicted by the attempts made by the Red Army to stop the escape party (see above the New York Times articles of 31 March and 1 April).

\[79\text{This pass links the Chumbi Valley of the Tibetan Plateau to the Indian region of Sikkim.}\]
A second possible scenario is the following. The Dalai Lama indeed left Lhasa on 17 March. Nothing happened until March 21. Then, for some reason, the Chinese authorities wanted to visit the Dalai Lama. It is at this point that access to his residence was blocked by a commando. The siege lasted long enough for the escape party to reach the Indian border. The fact that heavy fighting in Lhasa was concentrated in the Potala area comes as a confirmation of this scenario.

A third possible scenario is that the Dalai Lama left Lhasa on 17 March and then was airlifted from a point near Lhasa to a point near the Indian border. This scenario would be consistent with three facts: (i) As already mentioned, it would resolve the paradox of the much longer Bessac trip. (ii) The film taken during the Dalai Lama flight (available on a CIA website) shows a caravan moving with very light equipment in mountain landscape almost without snow. One does not see how the party spent the nights in the mountain. At such an altitude the nights are still very cold in mid-March. No tents, no Tibetan villages are visible. (iii) The article published in the “Nation” says the CIA “flew air cover for the Dalai Lama’s party, dropping supplies and money and strafing Chinese positions”. If the CIA indeed had planes available in the sector, why not use them to transport the Dalai Lama. Of course, for public relations reasons it was much better to say that he fled by his own means. In this scenario, the Dalai Lama would arrive in India at least one week earlier than 31 March and the main usefulness of the uprising in Lhasa would be for propaganda purposes.

As said earlier, Chinese sources will certainly throw a new light on this episode.

**Attitude of the Dalai Lama after his flight**

One can distinguish two different phases, namely before and after the Nobel Prize award; let us call them phase 1 and phase 2.

In phase 1 the Dalai Lama stood for nothing less short of complete independence. For instance on 10 March 1960 he appealed to the United Nations “to help restore the independence of Tibet”. In phase 2 he said he was willing to discuss some broad form of autonomy. Although both claims may have been suggested by his advisers and backers, the second one seems smarter than the first one. To put it differently, the independence claim may have been consistent with an uprising scheme such as the one of 1956 in Budapest whereas the autonomy request is more in line with a peaceful movement.

**Jun 21, 1959:** The Dalai Lama charged today that Communist China was engaged
in exterminating the Tibetan race and the culture and religion of his country. He talked of executions, forced labor and influx of millions of Chinese. (NYT p. 1) [This declaration shows that immediately after his flight from Tibet the Dalai Lama took a very offensive attitude toward the Chinese government.]

**Jul 1, 1959:** The Indian Government declared that it would not recognize the Dalai Lama as heading a “separate” government of Tibet functioning in India. (NYT p. 8)

**Aug 31, 1959:** The Dalai Lama appealed to the United Nations and the non-Communist world to support Tibet in her fight for “freedom and justice” against Communist China. (NYT p. 1)

**Sep 1, 1959:** The United States promised “immediate and sympathetic consideration” for the Dalai Lama’s appeal for the support of the United Nations in Tibet’s struggle against Communist China. (NYT p. 3) [Of course, one could hardly expect less.]

**Sep 9, 1959:** India took issue officially with the Dalai Lama today on the question of the legal status of Tibet. It contends that Tibet legally is part of China and expressed disagreement with raising the Tibetan question in the United Nations. (NYT 8 September 1959 p. 10, NYT 9 September 1959 p. 5)

**Oct 24, 1959:** Two brothers of the Dalai Lama expressed thanks for the aid sent to Tibetan refugees in India through “Church World Service”, a department of the National Council of Churches. (NYT p. 6) [On 16 May 1959, one of the first declarations of the Dalai Lama after his arrival in India was to thank the Taiwan Nationalists for supporting the Tibetan revolt.]

**Nov 15, 1959:** Mussoorie, India, Nov. 24. The Dalai Lama repeated his charges that Communist China had engaged in wholesale slaughter in Tibet. But he was unable to document his accusations for a team of international jurists that visited him. (NYT p. 42) [The same accusations were repeated decade after decade. Were they more justified later on than in 1959? Were the fatality data more reliable? See in this respect the book written by Patrick French in 2005. One of the few persons who got permission to see the primary data and read the testimonies kept by Tibetans in exile, he concluded that they relied on hearsay evidence and duplicate (or triplicate) data for the same events being boldly added together. As a matter of fact, the same kind of pseudo-impartial inquiry and data collecting was already used by the British in Ireland after the Irish insurrection of 1641 to inflate the number of English protestants killed by the Irish (see Roehner 2002b, p. 44).]

**Feb 5, 1960:** The Dalai Lama’s treasure (mostly in gold and valued about $1.7
million) was moved to Indian banks prior to the arrival of the Communists in 1950. (NYT: 5 February 1960 p. 11, 5 March 1960 p. 12)
[A related question is what happened regarding the treasure of the previous Dalai Lama after the arrival of the British force in 1904.]

**Mar 10, 1960:** The Dalai Lama appealed to the United Nations General Assembly “to help restore the independence of Tibet”. (NYT p. 3)
[The fiction that Tibet was a fully independent country before 1950 was spread far and wide by western medias. Thanks to unrelenting repetition over several decades it was made into a “fabricated historical truth”.]

**Aug 21, 1965:** The Dalai Lama said that thousands of Tibetans were killed in the recent uprising. (NYT p. 3)

**Feb 10, 1971:** Excerpt of a speech made by the Dalai Lama in Upper Dharmsala, India: “According to every principle of international law and custom, whether historical, geographical, cultural or linguistic, we Tibetans are an independent nation distinct from China.” (NYT p. 43)
[This is a fairly ambiguous statement because by invoking international law it suggests that Tibet has always been politically independent without however saying it explicitly. What can be the meaning of the term “independent” as far as history or geography are concerned?]

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**Fig. 8.8 The Dalai Lama in company of Major General Uban in June 1972.** Left-hand side picture: The Dalai Lama and General Uban review the Special Frontier Force (SSF) at Chakrata (India). In the photograph on the right-hand side the Dalai Lama addresses the SSF with General Uban on his left. General Uban is an Indian officer who was adjoined to the Dalai Lama in October 1962 as a military adviser. According to Conboy and Morrison (2002, p. 230) ever since the arrival of the Dalai Lama on Indian soil, the CIA had channeled some $180,000 a year to the Dalai Lama and his entourage. The money was collected in his Charitable Trust. The Dalai Lama was awarded the Peace Nobel Prize in 1989. *Source: Conboy and Morrison (2002).*
**Oct 23, 1977:** Unwilling to irritate China, Taiwan or India, the State Department is quietly blocking a proposed American visit by the Dalai Lama, the exiled religious and temporal leader of Tibet. (NYT p. 18)

[This policy under president Jimmy Carter was in sharp departure of previous and subsequent policies. It did not last very long however. In the fall of 1979 the Dalai Lama visited the United States. The speeches that he made during this visit mostly focused on his religious message. That was probably the deal made with the State Department.]

**Dec 22, 1987:** A law signed by President Reagan authorized the funding of 15 scholarships for Tibetans in American universities. (Goldstein 2006)

**Jun 15, 1988:** The Dalai Lama addressed the European Parliament in Strasbourg. He described a possible constitution for Tibet modeled on the US constitution. His speech marked the first time that he openly stated his willingness to settle for something less than complete independence. (Goldstein 2006)

**Mar 5, 1989:** After protest demonstrations occurred in Lhasa, martial law was proclaimed which lasted for about one year. (Goldstein 2006)

### Tibet as an issue in international affairs

It is obvious that from a geographical and cultural perspective Tibet is very different from provinces such as Hebei or Guangdong. This, however, has nothing to do with the question of independence. The French island of “La Réunion” located in the Indian Ocean is certainly very different from metropolitan France, but is nevertheless a part of France. Similarly, Alaska is certainly very different from the other US states but nonetheless it is an American state. In contrast, the Principality of Monaco in the south of France is certainly similar to France in many respects. Yet, it is an independent country and a member of the United Nations since 1993.

In other words, with respect to the question of the independence of a country or territory what matters is the recognition of the international community. Between 1815 and the middle of the 20th century Britain was the leading world power with the effect that British decisions with respect to independence recognition were followed by a large part of the international community. Since 1945 it is the United States which plays the same role.

Therefore, if one wishes to assess the status of a territory it is useless to study its history or cultural idiosyncrasies. What matters is the position of the leading powers that is to say mainly Britain and the United States.

- Many episodes which occurred before 1930 show that every time that the
Whether or not Tibet is or has been an independent country is a question of international relations which has nothing to do with linguistic, cultural or historical characteristics. Culturally, the French speaking parts of Belgium or Switzerland have longer and closer ties with France than the islands of Corsica or Guadeloupe; yet the two islands are part of France while the two other regions are not.

Consequently, the only sound way to answer the previous question is to ask what is and was the international consensus of "great powers". For instance, one way would be to have a look at maps of China in encyclopedia published by major powers (e.g. editions of the "Encyclopedia Britannica" published before 1904 that is to say before the invasion and occupation of Tibet by Great Britain). As an alternative, here we show a map of China that was published in an American magazine in 1934. China includes not only Tibet but also Outer Mongolia. In this connection it can be recalled that the Nationalist government of Taiwan is still (as of April 2010) claiming sovereignty over Outer Mongolia.
cussed them mainly with the Chinese government and when an agreement was reached the Chinese government was invited to sign it. This can be observed in 1888 (see the chronology at the date of 26 September 1888) or in the wake of the invasion of 1904. It is true that after 1911, taking advantage of the weakness of the Chinese state, Britain tried to encourage Tibet to claim its independence, just as Russia encouraged the independence of Outer Mongolia. While the Russian attempt succeeded\textsuperscript{81}, the British attempt did not.

What was the attitude of the United States? Before 1945, the State Department considered Tibet a part of China. This is attested by the maps which were published at that time (such as the map shown in the figure). After the victory of the Communists we know (see the chronology at the date of 25 October 1949) that the State Department shortly considered recognizing the independence of Tibet. For a number of reasons it decided eventually against such a recognition\textsuperscript{82}. Today (June 2014) there is not a single country which recognizes the independence of Tibet. Even the few, small countries (mostly under US influence such as the Kiribati Island or Guatemala) which still recognize Taiwan instead of the People’s Republic, do not recognize the independence of Tibet.

\textsuperscript{81} According to Wikipedia (see the article in English about Outer Mongolia) the independence of Outer Mongolia which had already been considered at the Yalta conference was accepted by Chiang Kai-shek in return for Stalin’s pledge not to help the Communists. This is certainly the reason why KMT troops were able to occupy the cities of Manchuria after the departure of the Russian troops.

\textsuperscript{82} Probably the United States would not have been followed by Britain who needed to keep friendly relations with Beijing because of Hong Kong.
The following chronology focuses particularly on events in relation with foreign occupation and encroachments. It will be seen that western powers and Japan played a notable role in all major events from the Boxer uprising, to the revolution of 1911, to the suppression of leftists in Shanghai and Canton in 1927, to Chiang Kai-shek’s “bandit extermination campaigns or to the Xian mutiny of December 1936.

The main difference between Japan and western powers like Britain, Germany and the United States is that Japan officially acknowledged that his policy aimed at eliminating the “threat of Communism” in China, whereas western powers followed basically the same policy without however making any official claim in this respect, thus preserving the myth that they did not wish to interfere with the internal affairs of China.

Before 1900

The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 and its aftermath was a major step forward in foreign penetration. However, western powers and especially Great Britain had a strong grip on Chinese tax resources long before 1900. As an illustration, one can mention the following facts.

**Unequal treaties**

**1820s:** In the 1820s, Britain was exporting 900 tons of opium annually to China. On order to realize the meaning of this figure one needs to give some precisions about the effects of opium on humans. Opium is a narcotic that contains about 12% morphine which means that a gram of opium contains about 120 milligrams of morphine. About 200 milligrams of morphine consumed as a single dose at a time is considered as a lethal dose which means that it would kill 50 persons in a sample of one hundred. In other words, 900 tons constituted about $900 \times (120/200) = 540$ million lethal doses of opium if taken in single doses. The population of China was about 350 millions.

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83In the same way as for alcohol the lethal dose highly depends on whether or not the person is used to using morphine
Of course, one can make a similar calculation for the consumption of alcohol. According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (1994) the per capita consumption of distilled spirits (which includes whiskey) was about 10 liters. One liter of whiskey taken in less than one hour can be considered as a lethal dose.

**January 20, 1841:** The two so-called Opium Wars (1839-1842 and 1856-1860 respectively) are often seen as the first interferences of western powers in China. However, what was at stake in those wars was much more than the opium trade. The British objective was to open China to its trade and to get special rights for establishing concessions. On 20 January 1841 Hong Kong was ceded to Britain and in addition China had to pay 6 million dollars to British authorities (Haydn p. 231).

**August 29, 1942:** *Treaty of Nanking.* A Treaty of Peace between England and China ended the First Opium War and was signed on 29 August 1842 on board the British warship Cornwallis. It carried harsh conditions for China (Haydn p. 231).

(i) China had to pay 21 million dollars. (ii) The cities of Amoy, Canton, Foochoofoo, Ningpo and Shanghai were to be opened to British trade with consuls allowed to reside in these cities. (iii) The cities of Chusan and Ku-lang-su were to be held by Britain until the provisions of the treaty were fulfilled. (iv) Moreover, the treaty confirmed the session of Hong Kong to England in perpetuity.

**July 3, 1944:** *Treaty of Wanghia.* This treaty between the United States and China was signed in a temple north of Macao. Modeled on the Treaty of Nanking, it contained the following points.

- Extraterritoriality, which meant that U.S. citizens could only be tried by US consular officers.
- Fixed tariffs on trade in the treaty ports.
- The right to buy land in the 5 treaty ports and erect churches and hospitals there.
- As a gesture of goodwill the opium trade was declared illegal.

(Wikipedia article entitled “Treaty of Wanghia”.)

[Contrary to the treaties with Britain and France, this treaty was not signed on a western warship. In addition the point about the opium trade gave a satisfaction to the Chinese which did not cost the US anything for the simple reason that only the British were trading opium.]

**October 24, 1844:** *Treaty of Huangpu.* Huangpu (or Whampoa in cantonese) was an island on the Pearl River. This treaty between France and China was signed on a French warship by Théodore de Lagrené and Keying, the Viceroy of Liangguang, who held responsibility for the provinces of Guangdong and Guangxi. It gave France
the same privileges as given to the British by the Treaty of Nanking. These privileges included the opening to French trade of 5 ports, namely Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Ningbo, Shanghai and Xiamen. It also ensured fixed tariff rates and the protection of French missionnaries.

**Feb 1849** After protracted negotiations, de Lagrené was able to obtain from the Daoguang Emperor the legalization of the practice of Christianity in China which had been prohibited since 1724. (Wikipedia article entitled “Treaty of Whampoa”.)

**Jun 29, 1858: Signature of another Peace Treaty** It says that war expenses will be paid by China. It guarantees toleration of Christian missions and freedom of trade. (Haydn p. 232). Once again, it can be seen that these conditions are much broader than the question of the opium trade.

**Hostility toward foreigners**

Not surprisingly the encroachments by Western squadrons created hostility against such persons who were the only foreigners present in China in large number, namely the missionnaries. This hostility also extended to Christian converts who were seen as betraying their nation. There were numerous incidents which culminated in the uprising of the Boxers.

Haydn’s chronology describes a number of such incidents but the count is probably not complete because it mentions almost only British, American and French missionnaries.

Below we give a selection of cases which cover the period 1870-1900.

(i) 1870, 21 June: Some 22 (non-Chinese) Catholics were killed in Tientsin. Among them were the French consul, several priests and sisters. In addition an unknown number of Chinese converts (including children) were also murdered.

(ii) 1870, 22 August: A viceroy of Nankin favorable to Europeans was assassinated. (Haydn p. 233)

(iii) 1875, 21 February: An English explorator, Mr. Margary, was killed in South China. In the following months, English envoys repeatedly asked for redress. Margary’s murderers were (seemingly) executed in May 1876. (Haydn p. 233)

(iv) 1889, January: There were riots directed against foreigners at Chin-Kiang. The British consulate was burnt along with several houses of foreigners. (Keller p. 786)

(v) 1891, 12-13 May: Anti-European riots at Wuhu. The British consulate was wrecked but the consul and his wife escaped. The following month the Emperor issued a decree for the protection of foreigners which had little effect however. In December 1891, the Chinese government had to pay indemnities amounting to 100,000 pounds to Christian missions. (Keller p. 786)

(vi) 1891, 11 September: The American mission at Ishang was destroyed. (Keller p.
(vii) 1894, 15 September: A Presbyterian missionary, the Reverend James Wylie, was murdered by soldiers. The fact that the murder was committed by soldiers strongly suggests that the hatred of foreigners was shared by some Chinese officials. This fact became very clear during the uprising of the Boxers when a large part of the Chinese government (including the Empress Dowager) took positions and issued decrees directed against foreigners (Keller p. 786)
(viii) 1895, 1 August: R.W. Stewart, a British missionary, and 10 other persons were killed near Ku-cheng by members of a sect called Vegetarians. On 15 October 1895 the Chinese government agreed to the trial of those convicted. (Keller p. 787) (ix) 1898-1899: It seems that there was a marked increase in the number of the attacks against foreigners after the reform party led by Kang-Yu-Wei was removed from power through a coup in September 1898. Between October 1898 and January 1900 the chronology by Helen Keller mentions the murders of 6 foreigners (5 missionaries and 2 French naval officers) in 5 separate incidents.
In short, it was time for the western powers present in China to stop what was seen as a drift toward an anti-foreign attitude not only on the side of the population but also on the side of the Chinese government itself. This would be the role of the foreign intervention of 1900. During the military campaign of June-August 1900, a huge public reaction campaign was set up in western countries particularly by majors newspapers such as the “New York Times” which (as will be shown below) grossly exagerated the threats against foreigners and justified in advance the repression against anti-foreign members of the Chinese administration and army that would be conducted by the Allies after the military occupation of Tientsin, Beijing and other cities.

Oct 7, 1860: The Old Summer Palace, known in China as the “Gardens of Perfect Brightness” was ransacked, destroyed and burned by British and French troops in October 1860 during the Second Opium war. The Old Summer Palace was located just outside the west gate of Tsinghua University, north of Peking University, and east of the present-day Summer Palace.
On October 18, 1860, the British High Commissioner to China Lord Elgin, in retaliation for the execution of almost twenty European and Indian prisoners ordered the destruction of the palace. To this day, this act is still regarded as a symbol of foreign aggression in China. What remained intact after 1860 was destroyed in 1900 during the foreign intervention. (Wikipedia, entry “Old Summer Palace”; more details can be found in Brizay (2003)).
[The ruins of the Old Summer Palace can still be visited because the Chinese government decided to keep the ruined site to teach future generations about the conse-
quences of being dominated by foreign powers. However the explanations (mostly engraved on stones) are so sketchy that visitors without any prior knowledge will hardly understand what really happened and why China was so weak at that time.]

**Nov 1861:** The board of regents instituted by the late emperor was liquidated and its head executed. Prince Kung who was favorable to foreign interests became prince counselor. After this date there was a substantial increase in the aid given by western powers to the central government in its war against the Taiping rebellion. (Teng 1971)

**Jan 9, 1863:** A British order-in-council permits British naval and army officers to serve in the Qing forces. (Mackerras 1982, p. 90)
[This permission was given in relation with the aid that Britain gave to the Chinese government in fighting the Taiping Rebellion.]

**Nov 30, 1863:** Sir Robert Hart became “Inspector General of [Chinese] Imperial Maritime Customs”. He will keep this position until his death on 20 September 1911. On 25 October 1911 another British person, Sir Francis Aglen, was appointed in replacement of Hart.
It can be noted that on 30 March 1896 Sir Robert Hart was also appointed superintendent of posts and telegraphs. (Keller, China, p. 787, 797)
[This information suggests that the Chinese maritime customs came under British control as early as 1863 and that the Chinese Posts and Telegraphs came under British control in 1896.]

**March 1874:** During the separatist rebellion in Xinjiang the British sent a distinguished Indian officer, Sir Douglas Forsyth, with a numerous suite to Kashgar (a city in the south of Xinjiang) to make a treaty with Yakooh Beg, the successful rebel who was treated as an independent sovereign. (Times 22 December 1887)

**Jan 17, 1887:** A treaty was recently concluded between the British and Chinese governments regarding the relations between India and Tibet. In particular, Britain accepted that the state of Bhutan should be considered as a dependency of Tibet. In the Burma Convention (which was ratified in the summer of 1886) Britain promised not to urge the Chinese to open Tibet to British trade until they have had time to use their influence to make Tibetan people accept the presence of foreigners. (Times 17 January 1887 p. 5, 22 December 1887 p. 10)
[There was strong pressure by the Bengal Chamber of Commerce to re-open the trade between India and Tibet. Some 20 years later this would lead to the invasion of Tibet by British troops.]

**Sep 26, 1888:** *First British attack of Tibet.*
In December 1887 a memoir from the Bengal Chamber of Commerce urged the re-opening of the trade between India and Tibet. Tibet is the last of the hermit nations [that is to say closed to foreign trade] in Asia.
The rajah of Sikkim resides in Tibet for half the year. For some time he enjoyed an annual allowance of 150 pounds. He appears to be completely under the influence of Tibetan advisers.
The Sikkim road is the shortest route from India to Tibet. In January 1888 the Sikkim expeditionary force consisting of 1,000 troops, 300 workers and 500 mules was dispatched in order to repair the Sikkim road leading to the Jelapla Pass between Sikkim and Tibet. On 8 March 1888 an ultimatum was given to the Tibetan troops occupying the fort of Lingtu, mid-way on the route between Darjeeling and the Jelapla Pass. Measures for the expulsion of the Tibetan troops had already been considered in August 1887 but were delayed after the Chinese government asked for a respite. On 26 March the fort of Lingtu was taken without opposition.
On 25 May, in a battle near Lingtu, the Tibetan lost 100 killed whereas on the British side there were only 3 killed. On 26 September some 400 Tibetans were killed or wounded during the attack on Jelapla Pass.
On 24 December, negotiations between the British and Tibetans started at Gnatong (5 kilometers from Lingtu). In these negotiations the Tibetan officials would be treated as subordinate to the Chinese legate.

(Times 22 December 1887, 27 January 1888, 8 March 1888)

1898 At the annual meeting of the “National Association of Manufacturers” speaker after speaker called for government support in developing American commerce in the Pacific. The “New York Chamber of Commerce” sent a memorial to President McKinley urging him to take immediate action. (Dulles 1946, p. 100)

Feb 13, 1898: The Zongli Yamen [i.e. the government council in charge of foreign affairs] declared that it will always appoint an Englishman to the post of inspector-general of maritime customs for as long as British trade with China will be greater than that of any other nation. (Mackerras 1980, p. 188)

Jun 3, 1898: The Hundred Days Reform. The Emperor Guangxu issued a decree supporting reforms, thus starting the “Hundred Days Reform”. He gave an audience to reformer Kang You-wei and agreed to his proposals. The movement was sudenly stopped on 21 November 1998 by a coup d’État through which the Empress Dowager resumed the regency and placed Emperor Guangxu under house arrest in the Summer Palace. Several reformers were arrested and beheaded but Kang You-wei was able to take refuge in Hong Kong. After arriving in Victoria (Canada) he created the “China Empire Reform Association” (CERA) which in following years spread across the
world to the Chinese communities of many countries. (Mackerras 1982 p. 190, 192)

[One must remember that in those days the practical powers of the emperor were very limited. In the United States the CERA will be able to train Chinese volunteers with the project of removing the Empress Dowager. See the chapter about Homer Lea.]

**Oct 27, 1898:** Lord Charles Beresford visited the army under the command of general Yuan Shi Kai. The strength of the army was 7,400. He was allowed to see everything including the pay-sheets of the officers. (Beresford 1898)

[This episode shows that the British government had very good relations with general Yuan Shi Kai as early as 1898.]

**Nov 7, 1898:** Excerpt of a report about piracy by a British Consul in Canton. “I have found no less than 41 cases of piracy, accounts of which have been given by the local press. In only one case has any arrest been made. Matters have now reached such a pass that trade on the inland waters of the province [of Guangdong] is being very seriously interfered with. In my opinion the best plan would be the special appointment of a military officer with an adequate force who would at once be dispatched to the scene of piracy and devote all his energies to the discovery and punishment of the offenders.” (Beresford 1898)

[Obviously the central government was no longer able to maintain security. This was certainly a major reason for the establishment of warlord armies which were equipped and funded by foreign countries in their respective spheres of influence.]

**Mar 15, 1899:** The Tsungli Yamen (which was so to say the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China) granted special rights to foreign Christian missionaries. Priests were given the same status as judges, bishops got the status of local governors and archbishops the status of viceroys. This privilege was granted as a result of unrelenting pressure by the foreign powers on the Chinese government. (Messadié 2012, p. 117)

**Mar 22, 1899:** Three German engineers were beaten up near Rizhao (Shantung) by some 100 villagers. In reprisal German troops looted and burned two villages from which the crowd involved in the incident had come. (Mackerras 1980, p. 194)

**Apr 15, 1899:** The people of Kowloon (Hong Kong) rose up against the cession to the British. The uprising lasted 3 days until suppressed by British troops. (Mackerras 1980, p. 194)

**Jun 22, 1899:** The French consulate in Mengzi (Yunnan, some 100km south of Kunming) was attacked and burned. (Mackerras 1980, p. 194)

**Nov 16, 1899:** China signed a treaty leasing the Guangzhou Bay to France for 99
1900: Outline of the Boxer war

**Western response to anti-foreign agitation**

The steps which led to the Boxer war can be summarized as follows.

- As explained above, toward 1900 there has been a growing number of actions directed against foreigners. The Boxers were only one among several anti-foreign societies. According to Clodfelter (1992, p. 643) in 1900 there were 170,000 members of the Boxer society (30,000 of them in Peking). According to the same author during 1900, 106 missionaries (including family members) were killed. Keller (p. 790) gives 242 killed and adds that most of them were British.

- 5 March 1900. Trouble brewing in China.

A meeting took place on March 5 at Peking between the Empress Dowager and the Grand Council. Protests were read from the Viceroy’s and Governors of nine of the eighteen provinces against the policy of the Empress Dowager. (NYT 12 April 1900) 8 April 1900. An ultimatum was sent to China. The Powers demand the suppression of the Society of Boxers. They say that they will land troops unless this is done within two months (NYT 8 April 1900). This news shows that the military action of the 8 nations was not started through the siege of the legations.

- The siege of foreign legations started after the murder of the German representative Baron von Ketteler in Beijing on 20 June 1900.

- How many troops took part in the Boxer war? The figures given by different sources show marked discrepancies.

(i) Michael Clodfelter (p. 644) says that “the relief force [which marched from Tientsin to Peking] totalled 18,700: 10,000 Japanese, 4,800 Russians, 3,000 British (including a Chinese regiment led by British officers), 2,100 Americans, 800 French, 100 German, 58 Austrian, and 53 Italians.

(ii) The Wikipedia article entitled “Boxer Rebellion” gives the following figures: Total Eight-Nation Alliance: 50,000: 21,000 for Japanese, 13,000 for Russia, 12,000 for Britain, 5,000 for the US, 1,000 for Germany, 300 for Austria-Hungary.

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84 It can be observed that this author does not say a single word about plundering by Allied troops in Tientsin, Beijing and a number of other cities. In short, because plundering was so widespread, Clodfelter’s account should be seen as highly one-sided.

85 The Allies, and particularly the Germans, gave a symbolic significance to this event. This impression is confirmed by the following episode. On 25 July 1901, Prince Chu, the Emperor’s brother, arrived in Hong Kong where, as requested by the Peace Treaty imposed to the Chinese government, he would present an official apology to the German government for the murder of Baron von Ketteler. (Johnston 1995, p. 18)

86 President McKinley had sent these troops to China without consulting Congress.
The New York Times (26 August 1900) gives the following figures: Total: 42,500 consisting of: 2,600 Frenchmen, 6,000 British, 2,900 Americans, 16,000 Japanese, 10,000 Russians, 2,500 German marines.

Keller (p. 790) says that on 14 September 1900, Allied troops in Beijing totalled 62,000 including 19,000 Japanese, 22,000 Russians, 5,000 British [no detailed figures are given for the other countries].

Due to the time required to organize the transportation of thousands of troops to China, it is impossible that the murder of Baron von Ketteler (on 20 June 1900) started their mobilization. On 30 May 1900, western diplomats, led by the British Minister, requested that foreign soldiers come to Beijing to defend the legations. However, even this date is too late to give enough time for the troops to reach China in June, except perhaps for the Russian contingent because at that time, there was already a large Russian force in Port Arthur. For the other 7 nations taking part in this war, it must have taken at least 2 months from the decision to land units in Tientsin to their arrival there. This suggests that the decision was taken in March or April 1900. This is indeed confirmed by articles of the New York Times cited above.

**Public relations campaign of misrepresentation in western newspapers**

**Jun 20, 1900:** The troops of the Allied powers ransacked Tianjin. (Messadié 2012, p. 188)

**Jun 23, 1900:** Beijing. During an attack by Chinese troops on an European stronghold in the northern part of the city there was a sand storm which compelled the two sides to stop fighting. (Messadié 2012, p. 177)

[Such sand storms (usually blowing from the desert in the north west of Beijing) are an annual occurrence.]

**Jul 5, 1900:** “All foreigners in Peking dead. 500,000 men said to be necessary to subdue Northern China alone. Horrible cruelties perpetrated on prisoners”. (NYT 5 July 1900)

[Along with similar articles in the “Times” of London, this article started a campaign of disinformation and misrepresentation.

- In fact, none of the foreigners who stayed in the legations had been killed.
- Future events showed that the claim about the 500,000 force was completely unwarranted.
- The claim about the cruelties perpetrated on prisoners was a trick commonly used in order to justify actions of retaliation.
- A subsequent article of 17 July 1900 was entitled: “All China now aflame”. This was even more a fabrication in the sense that telegraph lines with Shanghai or other Chinese cities had not been interrupted which means that the New York Times...
knew very well that this news was inexact.

- Another article of 19 July 1900 claimed: “China is ready for a great war. The extraordinary preparations for war on the part of the Chinese are only just being discovered. It is stated that prince Tuan has mobilized 950,000 men”. This was false too or at least greatly exaggerated.

- On 26 July 1900 another article of the New York Time repeated the title “All China now aflame” and added the following precision: “There is a movement northward of southern troops to join the main army gathered to oppose the foreign advance on Peking”. This was a complete lie. In fact these fairly modern troops were under the command of general Yuan Shikai who was in the service of the British. In the Times of London, a flow of articles were published by George E. Morrison, the journal’s correspondent in China, which all presented Yuan Shikai in the best possible light and as the great friend of western countries that indeed he was.

What was the purpose of this disinformation campaign? Probably to prepare those western people who still had some sympathy for China to welcome punitive rules

**Aug 12, 1900**: American, British, Japanese and Russian troops ransacked Tungchow, some 20 km east of Beijing. (Messadié 2012, p. 191, NYT 12 August 1900)

**Aug 20, 1900**: The War Department received official confirmation of the fall of Peking and the rescue of the besieged foreigners. (NYT 20 August 1900)

[Many earlier articles of the NYT had emphasized the strength of the Chinese troops which opposed the Allied forces in its march toward Beijing. This was a misrepresentation for indeed the Chinese resistance had been very weak.]

**Aug 20, 1900**: Part of Peking is on fire. (NYT 20 August 1900)

[This is of course a common outcome when fighting takes place in a city which has many wooden houses.]

**Aug 21, 1900**: Hsu-Tungr and Yi-Lien-Yuan of the anti-foreign party have been decapitated by the Chinese authorities. In addition the Allied powers had asked the Chinese government to deliver to them Yu Hsien, Kang I, Ying Nien, Chao Chu-chian and prince Tuan. (NYT 21 August 1900, Messadié 2012, p. 246-247)

[These summary trials and executions of those held responsible (in spite of the fact that the people in the legations were not harmed) prefigured the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II.]

**Aug 25, 1900**: Peking is now entirely under foreign control. Looting is proceeding in a very systematic way. (Messadié 2012, p. 203, NYT 25 August 1900)

[Reports indicate that the Allies divided Beijing into different areas which were allotted to the different Allied countries.]
Chapter 9

Aftermath of the uprising

One should not think that the foreign occupation ended when the legations were liberated in August 1900. In fact, the occupation of Beijing lasted until 17 September 1901 and the occupation of Tientsin lasted until 15 August 1902 (Keller p. 792)

It is well known that the Treaty which was imposed on China after its defeat in the Boxer war extended and amplified the unequal treaties. An aspect which is not so well known is how the Boxers and other anti-foreign leagues were suppressed. In this respect it should be remembered that (as shown by the NYT articles listed above) the western powers demanded the suppression of the boxers three months before the siege of the legations started.

How were the anti-foreign association to be outrooted? The occupying forces had to find ways which would be effective but at the same time would be accepted and endorsed by the Chinese government. In short, the challenge was to induce the Chinese government to repress nationalistic movements in its own country. After their victory following the Second World War Allied forces were confronted to similar challenges in Germany and in Japan. In these cases, the purpose was not limited to the suppression of nationalistic organizations. It took the broader form of nation-building, by which one means the redefinition of the political, economic and social framework of a nation to bring it in compliance with the wishes of a foreign power.

In short, the aftermath of the Boxer war was probably the first attempt in modern history in which the victors try to reshape the social fabric of a nation.

The main steps which were taken in this direction can be summarized as follows.

- **Punishment of anti-foreign officials** In our perspective the interesting point is not to determine the number of officials who were punished but rather to what extent the Chinese government followed the demands of the Allies. As an illustration one can consider the case of the punishments demanded by the American ambassador as described by the following excerpt from an article of an American newspaper (Deseret News 21 February 1901)

  A cablegram has been received at the State Department from Minister Conger stating that the Chinese plenipotentiaries have informed the foreign ministers that the emperor has agreed to all the punishments named in his [Conger’s] telegram of 6 February 1901.

  The persons named in the telegram referred to, with the punishments prescribed, were as follows:
  (i) Princes Tuan and Lan: degradation and exile.
  (ii) Chuang, Yu Hsien, Chih Liu, Hsu Shey (the two later being prisoners of the Japanese): death penalty.
(iii) Posthumous honors for the 4 members of the Tsung li yamen who were executed in last August by the Chinese because of their intercession for the foreigners.
(iv) Chaio Shu Chaio, Ying Nien, Chi Hsu, Hsu Cheng Yu: to be punished in some method to be determined.
(v) General Tung fuh Siang: to be punished whenever it will become possible.

On 21 February 1901 the following edict was issued:
(i) Prince Tuan and Duke Lan to be disgraced and exiled.
(ii) Prince Chuan, Ying Nien and Chaio Shu Chaio to commit suicide.
(iii-iv) Hsu Chen Yu, Yu Hsien and Ki Hain to be beheaded.
(v) General Tung fuh Siang to be degraded.

This is not exactly what the ministers demanded but it is considered acceptable. This excerpt shows that, except for a few changes of marginal importance, the Chinese government had no other choice than to follow the directives given by the Allies. There was no real negotiation.

The previous list refers to high officials. In a sense it is the analogue of the sentences imposed by the Nurnberg and Tokyo trials (except that in the present case there were no trials whatsoever). In addition to political leaders, several hundred Germans and Japanese were tried and executed by the Allies. Similarly, many Chinese provincial governors and leaders of nationalistic associations were executed (a partial list is given in Keller p. 791-792).

- **How was the Chinese government compelled to participate in its own chastisement?** If the leaders of the uprising had been executed by the Allies, if political reforms had been imposed too overtly, that would have exacerbated xenophobic feelings. In the view of the Allies (led in this matter by the British and Americans) it is the Chinese government which had to endorse and enforce the demands made by the Allies. It also had to publicly acknowledge and accept the guilt, blame and shame. As illustrations one can mention that monuments were to be constructed where foreigners had perished or had been maltreated. In addition, missions were to be sent to Japan and Germany to convey regrets for the deaths of Sugiyama and von Ketteler respectively.

- **Political reforms imposed by the Allies.** From a long-term perspective this is certainly the most important part. However, it is an aspect about which little information seems to be available even in detailed chronologies such as Keller 1934 or Mackerras 1984. Keller, for instance, has the following entries. Jan 1901: New judicial system imposed by the Allies.
30 Jan 1901: Imperial government reform decrees issued.

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87These views prefigured the occupation policy applied in Germany and Japan after 1945.
Fig. 9.x  Tientsin’s foreign concessions in 1912. Occupied by the Allies on 13 July 1900, Tientsin came under Allied administration through the “Tientsin provisional government” which included the City of Tientsin, and the neighbouring district on both sides of the Peiho, as far as the port of Taka inclusive (some 50 km east of Tientsin). The Allied provisional government lasted until 15 August 1902 when the area was returned to Qing control. However the foreign concessions remained until the city was completely taken over by the Japanese in December 1941.


1 Feb 1901: Edict suppressing anti-foreign societies.
23 Apr 1901: The “Privy Council” replaced by a general board of state affairs.
19 Aug 1901: Edict forbidding examinations in all cities where foreigners were killed.

It is very difficult from such an enumeration to understand the real significance of these steps. We will explain a few cases for which we were able to find enough evidence.

The Tientsin Provisional Government (TPG) It was established in mid-July after Allied troops were able to occupy the city. It lasted until 15 August 1902. This government was composed of 6 military representatives of the Powers who had troops in the area. It had absolute authority over the Chinese. It could tax, confiscate and sell property and administrate justice. However, it had no power over foreigners which means that it could not stop the looting by foreign troops.

Protestant missionaries tried to use the distribution of relief as a means for gaining new converts (Bickers and Tidemann 2007) It seems that, depending on the circum-
stances, the TPG either supported them or opposed them (one must keep in mind that there was a turnover among the 6 Allied representatives)

**Sep 1, 1902:** Looting in Peking. Only Americans refrain from it. (NYT 1 September 1902)

[It would be interesting to see what the Times of London or the Japan Times were saying in this respect. In the same way, as one does not expect the New York Times to recognize looting by US troops, one neither expects that other nations would acknowledge plundering by their officers and troops. In fact, plundering was only one aspect. Another was punishing the boxers and those who supported them.]

**Sep 7, 1902:** The Boxer Protocol which settled the Boxer Rebellion was signed between China and 11 foreign nations (Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Britain, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain, United States). Later labeled as an unequal treaty, it comprised the following clauses.

- China had to pay an indemnity of 450 million taels over a period of 39 years (see below).
- It conceded to the Powers the right to occupy 12 additional cities.
- The importation of arms and ammunitions by China was prohibited for a period of 2 years which could be extended.
- Government officials and Boxer rebels who took part in the uprising were to be punished. Many were sentenced to death, imprisonment or deportation [ten high ranking officials were beheaded but we do not know the numbers of those who were imprisoned or deported].

(Mackerras 1982, p. 202; Wikipedia, entry: “Boxer Protocol” in English and French) [Mackerras calls the 450 million a “gigantic indemnity” but in order to get a more precise idea one must compare it to other indemnity figures. At that time annual imperial revenues totaled roughly 100 million tael (Fairbank and Goldman 1994, p. 248); this put the indemnity at 4.5 times annual government receipts. In the 1900s the custom receipts of the main Chinese ports totaled around 30 million. In the following years they were partly taken over by the foreign powers for the payment of the indemnity. Under the exchange rate of the time (1 tael = 0.7 dollar = 0.14 pound sterling) the 450 million tael represented some 60% of the receipts of the US federal government or 50% of the receipts of the British government.

As a matter of comparison, according to the Treaty of Frankfurt (10 May 1871) which settled the Franco-Prussian war, France had to pay an indemnity of 5 billion franc which was equivalent to twice the receipts of the French government in 1872. It was paid within two years.

In contrast the payment of the Boxer indemnity lasted until 1940 and as there was
a 4% interest charge, the amount which was paid totaled 982 million tael. In other words, over these 39 years the average annual indemnity payment was about 25 million tael which represented approximately one fourth of the government’s receipts; those receipts were of course highly dependent upon the size of the area that the central government was able to control.

In 1908 the US Congress decided to devote $11 million of the indemnity to the education of Chinese students in the United States (the US indemnity represented $24 million, 7% of the total, of which 20% had already been paid by 1908). In 1925 Congress redirected the rest of the indemnity to establishing and improving Chinese libraries.]

**Mar 31, 1904: British invasion of Tibet** In an article about the British invasion of Tibet, Dr. Nachiketa Das gives the following estimates for Tibetan fatalities.

- 31 March, Guru massacre: 700
- 9 April, Red Idol Gorge battle: 200
- 5 May, Chang Lo battle: 160
- 9 May Battle of Garo Pass: heavy Tibetan casualties

Unfortunately, the author does not give the sources on which these figures are based. To put these fatality numbers in perspective one should recall that the population was very small. According to the author it numbered 50,000. If this figure is correct, the total fatalities represented a sizable proportion of the young male population.


**May 16, 1905:** Merchants and commercial bodies of China declared a boycott against commodities imported from the United States as a means of compelling Congress to amend the Chinese Exclusion Act directed against Chinese immigrants. This boycott was active mainly in Shanghai, Beijing, and other cities. (NYT p. 8)

[The 1905-1906 anti-American boycott became China’s first mass movement, with overseas Chinese contributing funds.]

**Jun 28, 1905:** Newspapers join the boycott by refusing American advertisements. The exclusion of Chinese from Hawaii and the Philippines seems to be the chief issue. Importers can hardly obtain assistance in the unloading of American products. (NYT 28 Jun 1905 p. 4, NYT 29 Jun 1905 p. 4)

**Feb 5, 1906:** Nationalist sentiment forced Yuan Shi-Kai, Viceroy of Chih-li Province, [Chih-li (also written Zhili) was before 1928 the name of the province of Hebei which surrounds Beijing and Tianjin] to discharge Prof. C.D. Tenney, the foreign Director of Education, who organized the new school system in this province. (NYT p. 4)

[Yuan Shi-Kai who was basically friendly to western powers played a great role in the Chinese politics before and after the end of the empire in 1911.]
Fig. 9.1 **General Yuan Shi-kai.** Viceroy of Hebei, General Yuan Shi-kai was one of the most powerful officials until its dismissal in January 1909. In 1900 during the Boxer uprising he ignored Empress Dowager Cixi’s declaration of war against the foreign powers and continued to suppress the Boxers. In addition to not fighting the Eight Nation Alliance and suppressing the Boxers in Shandong, Yuan and his army (the Right Division) also helped the Eight Nation Alliance suppress the Boxers after the Alliance captured Beijing. Yuan Shikai’s forces massacred tens of thousands of people in their anti Boxer campaign in Zhili. Because of its friendly attitude, Yuan was much in favor with Western powers and especially with the British. *Source: Wikipedia, entry “Yuan Shi-kai” (public domain).*

**Aug 27, 1906:** Due to the boycott, Standard Oil lost half of its Canton trade. The boycott also lead to the manufacturing of Chinese cigarettes. (NYT p. 5)

**Jan 4, 1907:** The boycott of American goods is spreading all over China. (NYT p. 6)

**Nov 30, 1908:** Signature of the Root-Takahira agreement between the United States and the Empire of Japan about the territorial situation in East Asia. Elihu Root was the US Secretary of State and Kogoro Takahira was the Japanese Ambassador to the United States.

With the occupation of Hawaii and the Philippines, the United States had become a major power in East Asia. In the agreement Japan recognized the American annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii and the Philippines.

What Japan obtained in return became clearer in the following years. Basically it was the right to colonize Korea and to extend its economic influence in Manchuria. These rights materialized in two subsequent developments.

The assassination of Count Ito on 23 August 1910 gave Japan a pretext for the annexation of Korea. The country was to be ruled by a Japanese governor and Japanese was made official language of Korea.

Secondly, through the US-Japanese trade agreement of 1912 the United States gave up their interests in Manchuria, thus leaving the door open for Japan’s de facto annexation.

*(Clio, chronologie du Japon)*

**1909:** Chinese students in the US. The total amount of the Boxer indemnity was $330 millions of which the American part was $25 millions. In 1909 the US Con-
gress remitted to China a sum of $12 millions which was to be used for educating Chinese students in the US. The Chinese government sent a first group of 47 Boxer indemnity students to the United States in 1909. By 1929 the total of those who had been sent was 1,268.
Moreover, in the 1920s the Christian universities constituted nearly one half of the Chinese institutions of higher education.
(Cambridge History of China, Volume 13 p. 383)

1911-1926: the Revolution and its aftermath

1909-1911: British approval of the overthrow of the Qing dynasty. In October 1909, Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing held an assembly in the British colony of Penang (now in Malaysia). The assembly decided to stage uprisings in Guangzhou. On 13 November 1910 there was another conference in Penang where the uprising of April 1911 (see below) was planned. In the spring of 1911, Huang established the “Department of the Guangzhou Uprising” in Hong Kong. (Wikipedia articles entitled “Huang Xing”, “1910 Penang conference”, “Second Guangzhou Uprising”)
[The fact that these conferences were held in British colonies clearly shows that the British were not opposed to the overthrow of the Qin dynasty. This is confirmed by the fact that General Yuan Shikai, one their close allies, played a key-role in the revolution of 1911.]

Apr 27, 1911: Huanghuagang uprising in Guangzhou. This uprising was planned by Sun Yat-sen and Huang Xing. Huang Xing and nearly a hundred fellow revolutionaries forced their way into the residence of the viceroy of Guangdong province. The uprising was successful in the beginning, but after the arrival of reinforcements it turned into a bloody defeat. Most revolutionaries were killed. Huang Xing was wounded but was able to escape. Afterward, some 72 bodies were recovered. (Wikipedia article entitled “Second Guangzhou Uprising”)
[This was (at least) the third failed uprising attempted by Sun Yat-sen in Guangdong. Previous ones occurred on 26 October 1895 (First Guangzhou uprising), on 8 October 1900 (Huizhou uprising). In each of these attempts many of the participants were executed but it seems that Sun Yat-sen did not take part personally in any of them. He was mostly a fund-raiser.
The source says that most of the revolutionaries knew that the battle would probably be lost and that they would be killed. In this sense this action was similar to the 1916 Easter rising in Dublin (Ireland) against British rule.]

Sep 12, 1911: All the American naval strength in China is being concentrated as near as possible to the scene of disorders. Admiral Murdock sailed on his flagship,
the cruiser “Saratoga”, from Shanghai to Nanking accompanied by the cruisers “New Orleans” and “Helena”. Against the strong current of the Yangtze Kiang the three cruisers will make slow headway. They are expected at Nanking by tomorrow where they will relieve light gunboats which will push on up the river to a point in Sze-Chuen Province and afford asylum to the missionaries who have been obliged to leave Cheng-Tu. Blood has been spilled there when over 20 rioters and a number of soldiers were killed.

In Northern Ngan-Hwei and Kiang-Su provinces, 27 counties have been devastated by the floods of the Yangtze. (NYT p. 4)

**Jan 10, 1912:** 500 American troops assembled at Manila for duty in China have been ordered to China to help to protect the Peking-Tientsin railway. The order is the outcome of advice from the American Minister at Peking. (Times p. 3) [In the period 1945-1948 the protection of the Peking-Tientsin railway was again one of the main tasks of US troops.]

**Did Britain favor the Chinese Revolution?**

**Aug 1, 1912:** Dr. George Ernest Morrison, Peking correspondent of the London Times was appointed political adviser of the President of China, Yuan Shi-kai. In March 1913 a US citizen, F.J. Goodnow, was appointed Constitutional advisor to the Chinese government. (Keller, China p. 798)

Emperor Pu-yi (5-year old) had abdicated on 12 February 1912. The appointments of Morrison and Goodnow strongly suggest that the new regime was seen with much sympathy in Britain and in the United States. On 2 May 1913, the Republic was formally recognized by the United States (and simultaneously by Mexico). On 7 March 1912, less than one month after the abdication of the Emperor, a group of international bankers granted a loan to the provisional government. It was a small loan of only $700,000 but it already showed that Western powers saw the end of the Qin dynasty with favor. More substantial loans would follow:

- 30 August 1912. A loan of $24 million was granted to the provisional government by a British syndicate. This so-called “Chinese Government 5% Gold loan” was guaranteed by revenues of the salt tax,

- 12 January 1913. A so-called “Six power loan” of $125 million was agreed upon by a group of bankers of Great Britain, France, Japan, Russia and the United States. After the refusal of President Wilson to support the loan the American bankers withdrew. The “Six power loan” became the “Five power loan”.

(Keller, China p. 798)

**Sep 15, 1912:** Telegram about Tibet from Vice-President Li to President Yuan.
The independence of Tibet was declared by the Living Buddha several months ago.
However the lamas did not join the revolt. They merely followed the Living Buddha. It will be of benefit to send someone versed in Tibetan affairs to inform them of the goals of the Republic. It is with the assistance of certain foreign nation [namely Britain] that the Living Buddha was able to declare independence. Once the assistance of this power is withdrawn the Living Buddha will become helpless. (USMIR 1, reel 14, frame 508)

[Two observations are in order.

• This dispatch was sent by the American Legation in Beijing to the Secretary of State. According to the text of the dispatch the letter was published in Chinese newspapers.

• The sending of a Chinese military force to Tibet drew international criticism but the American Consul in Chongqing observed that “foreign interference is not as justifiable as certain proponents have us to believe”. His point was that denying China the right to send an expedition to reassert its rights in Tibet would void such rights altogether. He also observed that “this expedition was met with little resistance.” (USMIR 1, rel 14, frame 559).]

Oct 6, 1912: Excerpt from a statement about the situation in China made by the leader of the opposition party in Japan.

“China today may be compared with Japan at the time of the restoration. At that time the Japanese were divided into many parties and the foreign powers tried to avail themselves of the chaotic conditions. But the strong patriotism of the Japanese saved them from all foreign interference. Chinese on the contrary not only have not resisted foreign interference but have asked for it. After the outbreak of the revolution, the Imperialists and the Revolutionists were eager to obtain foreign help to beat their enemy. The sudden activities of Great Britain in Tibet have initiated the partition of China. There is only one hope for China, namely to give up all her outlying territories and try to form one compact country out of a few provinces.”

(NYT Sunday 6 October 1912, Section 4-5, p. 6)

[At that time, this could be seen as a fairly lucid assessment. Yet, in contrast with what happened to the Ottoman Empire after World War I, China was able to retain most of its “outlying territories”.

Oct 6, 1912: One of the main causes of the opposition of the provinces to the central Imperial government was the decree of 9 May 1911 through which provincial charters for railroads were canceled. The central government took construction and maintenance of the railroads into its own hands. (NYT Sunday 6 October 1912, Magazine Section, p. SM4)
**Apr 1913:** The 5-power loan already mentioned above contained harsh conditions. First, China had to accept that foreign inspectors would supervise how the 25 million pounds would be spent. Secondly, as a guaranty, the powers were allowed to take over the receipts of the salt trade. (Bensacq-Tixier 2014, p. 27)

**May 1913:** The USA was the first power to recognize the Chinese Republic in May 1913. (Dulles 1946 p. 139)

**Aug 6, 1918:** Uprising in Tibet. Tibetans were reported in revolt under German leaders. (NYT 6 August 1918)

[What was the purpose of Germany in Tibet? On 19 May 1918 Japan and China had signed a treaty of mutual protection for the duration of the Great War (NYT 19 May 1918). Thus, with China on the side of the Allies, it made sense for Germany to try to trigger a separatist uprising in Tibet. One would expect similar attempts during World War II.]

**May 4, 1919:** Demonstrations in all China after it became known that the Treaty of Versailles transferred to Japan all the privileges that the Germans had in China. In addition to the allies and Japan, the demonstrators target also the Chinese officials. For instance the houses of the minister of communication and of the ambassador of China in Tokyo are ransaked. (Bensacq 2014 p. 27)

**Oct 17, 1919:** During the visit in Paris of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, the French government observed that in contrast to the other four powers France did not have any political adviser in the Chinese government. In exchange China asked for permission to establish consulates in the French colony of Indochina, something that the French government did not wish to grant. (Bensacq 2014 p. 27)

**Dec 16, 1919:** General Kolchak [a commander of the White forces which opposed the Communists with the support of western countries and Japan] has informed the United States Government that he may cede a part of Siberia to Japan to save the rest of Russia from the Bolsheviki, unless the Allies support the White armies. (NYT p. 17)

**Dec 18, 1919:** Siberia is to have a real parliament. The Sobor will consist of elected members and will have legislative powers. (NYT p. 17)

[It seems to be a standard pattern that after a revolution, the powers which are opposed to the new regime try to encourage secessionist movements in order to keep one or several enclaves out of the rule of the new regime. This was tried by Britain after the Revolution of 1789 particularly in Toulon (in the south of France), in Brittany by supporting the Chouans and in the Vendée. This was also tried after the revolution of 1949 in south-western China particularly in Tibet (see below) and of]
course in Taiwan. With the exception of Taiwan, such attempts were unsuccessful.]

**Jan 6, 1920:** Heavy Japanese reinforcements have been rushed to Irkutsk to aid the anti-Bolshevik forces of Admiral Kolchak. The Japanese have about 70,000 soldiers in Siberia. (NYT 6 January 1920 p. 21, 17 January 1920 p. 10)

**Jan 13, 1920:** The US anti-Bolshevik force of about 9,000 will quit Siberia in a few weeks. It was also revealed that British ships will bring out the Czechs, Poles, Jugoslavs and Romanians. Japan will have to guard the Trans-Siberian railroad and to protect loyal [i.e. anti-Bolshevik] Russians. (NYT p. 1)

**Jan 18, 1920:** Japan warned China that it will hold the government responsible for losses due to the boycott of Japanese products. (NYT p. 8)

**Jan 22, 1920:** Japan is to withdraw its army from Siberia and not to interfere further in Russian affairs. On 18 December Japan and the United States had agreed to cooperate in supporting the Czechoslovak troops in Siberia. (NYT p. 3)

**1920-1924:** The United States and Britain jointly encouraged warlords Tsao Kun and Wu Pei-fu to wage civil war and supplied them with large quantities of arms and money. (Shanghai News 26 November 1950)

**Jun 16, 1922:** Attempted elimination of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. The residence of Dr. Sun Yat-sen in Canton was attacked by the warlord Chen Chiung-ming (also written Chen Jiong-ming). During a prolonged skirmish between the troops of the opposing forces, Sun and his wife Soong Ching-ling narrowly evaded heavy machine gun fire and were rescued by gunboats under Chiang Kai-shek’s direction. They boarded the cruiser “Whampao”. This is said to have followed a definite breach between Dr. Sun and Chen Chiung Ming who was formerly his commander-in-chief. (Washington Post 17 June 1922, Wikipedia article in English about Chang Kai-shek,

[What produced this breach and why did Chen try to eliminate Sun? The answer relies on two observations.

(i) As Sun’s efforts to obtain aid from Western democracies were ignored, in 1920-1921 he turned to the Communists and the Soviet Union. In the summer of 1920 he wrote to the Second Communist International (Comintern) in Paris for support. In 1921 he approached the Communist Party of China which had been founded in Shanghai in July 1921. Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin praised Sun for his work and sent advisers to help establish a military academy.

(ii) However, Canton (which is only some 100km north of Hong Kong) clearly belonged to the British zone of influence. The British government was certainly not happy to see Sun cooperate with the Communists. This is in fact confirmed by the title of an article published in the Washington Post (15 May 1921) namely: “British
accused by Sun Yat-sen”.
As a natural conclusion of these observations one would expect the warlord Chen Chiung Ming to be in the service of the British. Is this confirmed by historical sources? In Goikhman (2014) one reads: “The Hong Kong government was clearly opposed to Sun Yat-sen whom the British suspected of turning Bolshevist and they saw Chen Jiongming as the better for western powers. The British governor of Hong Kong, Reginald Stubbs, appealed to the British government to give financial support to Chen.”

**Feb 7, 1923:** The warlord Wu Peifu [supported by the British and Americans] ruthlessly broke the great Hankou-Beijing railway strike by sending in troops to violently suppress the workers and their leaders. Over 35 workers were killed and about 200 wounded. Peking students held a protest mass meeting. (Mackerras 1982 p. 293, Wikipedia article entitled “Wu Peifu”.)

**1924:** Tibet. After the occupation of Tibet by British forces in 1903, the Dalai Lama who had hitherto been hostile to Britain soon swung over to a pro-British policy. In 1924 the schism between the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama reached the point where the latter was forced to flee Tibet. However after the death of the Dalai Lama in 1933 the influence of Britain in Tibet weakened. (SDI, reel 1, Part 17, Survey of Tibet 85 p)

[More details can be found in the chapter about Tibet.]

**Jan 1924:** At the first congress of the Kuomintang, thanks to the support of the Soviet Union, Sun Yat-sen is able to impose an organization based on the Leninist model. Among the 24 members of the Central Executive Committee there are 3 Communists. In May the creation of the Whampoa military academy follows closely. (Bensacq 2014 p. 37)

**May 1924:** The Whampoa military academy is created with the help of Soviet advisors. It is located on an island of the Pearl River 25 km south of Guangzhou. Chiang Kai-shek who has just come back from Moscow is its first director. Zhou Enlai is deputy director. (Bensacq 2014 p. 37)

**May 31, 1924:** Article 5 of the Sino-Russian agreement of 31 May 1924 recognizes that “Outer Mongolia” is an integral part of the Republic of China and respects China’s sovereignty therein. (CUS 1, reel 16)

[Despite this statement and because of the weakness of the Chinese state, Outer Mongolia had become practically a satellite of the USSR. A 48-page report entitled “Economic results of the Soviet policy of isolating Outer Mongolia from China” says that “the Russians have employed young Mongols to promote the anti-Chinese movement and have bribed Mongolian officials”.}
Being a small state in close contact with much bigger states, Mongolia has been like a float on a fishing line which follows the strongest current. After the collapse of the USSR in 1990 Mongolia became a client-state of the United States. As many other countries in the world it was ruled by presidents and prime ministers who had studied in American universities. Toward the end of the decade 2000-2010 Chinese influence came into conflict with American influence. In short, this small state can be considered as a kind of indicator of ongoing power struggles.

Jun 19, 1924: A 28-year old Vietnamese named Pham Hong Thai detonated a bomb at a welcoming reception given in Guangzhou for the French Governor General of Indochina, Martial Merlin, who was visiting China. Hunted down by the Chinese authorities, he drowned himself in the Pearl River to avoid capture. Five persons were killed but the governor was not. Although the assassination attempt was unsuccessful it fanned nationalist sentiments in Indochina against French rule. (Bensacq p. 85, 179, Wikipedia entitled “Pham Hong Thai”)

Oct 10, 1924: Sun Yat-sen suppressed an uprising of Cantonese merchants. (Bensacq 2014 p. 42)
[This is a fairly mysterious episode. For instance, one would like to know the reason of the uprising. Bensacq says that the revolt was suppressed with the help of cadets from the Whampoa academy, However, that academy was created only in April 1924. Were 5 months sufficient to form new officers? What troops did they command? The most likely explanation for the uprising is that it was a British attempt to eliminate (or at least weaken) Sun Yat-sen and his Soviet advisers.]

Oct 26, 1924: Warlords controlled by foreign powers.
• Feng Yuxiang has a close connection with the “Young Men’s Christian Association” (YMCA). Although initially created in Europe in the mid-19th century, the YMCA became mostly an American organization after being in charge of supporting US troops in France during the First World War. Later on, in 1925, Feng Yuxiang changed side and was supported by the Soviets.
• Zhang Zuolin has the support of Japan
• Wu Peifu is supported by the British and the Americans because they think he can counter the Japanese influence.

However, on 26 October 1924 near Tianjin the army of Wu Peifu (about 80,000 troops) was severely defeated by Zhang Zuolin. (Bensacq 2014, p. 41) [After 1925, the main objective of both Japan and the western powers became to eliminate the red threat represented by Feng Yuxiang and his Soviet supporters. It became essential to prevent a possible connection between Feng in the north and the red base of Guangzhou.]
Nov 3, 1924: In Peking a new cabinet canceled the Abdication Acts of the late dynasty depriving the ex-emperor of his title and giving him the name of Mr. Pu-yi. (Keller p. 805)

[Through the Abdication Act the emperor did not only keep his title but also his court and the right to use the Forbidden City and the Summer Palace. The cost of supporting the court was a burden for the Republican government.]

Mar 12, 1925: Death of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, the leader of the Kuomintang. (Keller p. 805)

Mar 20, 1925: Chiang Kai-shek arrested Communists and Russians in anti-Communist raid in Canton (Keller p. 805)

[This was one of the first actions taken by Chiang Kai-shek against the Communists. The entry does not say how many persons were arrested but one would expect the number to be fairly limited, perhaps of the order of a few hundreds. Much broader raids resulting in thousands of arrests and executions were carried out in 1927.]

May 29, 1925: On 10 May 10,000 cotton workers who had been on strike in the Japanese-owned cotton mills in Qingdao (Shandong) since 12 April resumed work after winning most of their demands. Under Japanese pressure, Chinese authorities arrested the leaders of the strike on 25 May. A new strike began as a result. On 29 April Chinese troops sent by Zhang Zongchang opened fire on the workers killing several (depending on the sources the number which is given is between 2 and 6). (Mackerras 1982, p. 303; Yang 1998)

May 30, 1925: May 30 Shanghai incident.

On the morning of May 30, 1925 in the International Settlement, Shanghai Municipal Police arrested 15 ringleaders of Chinese student protests against foreign-run industries and their treatment of the native workforce. Later on that day British troops opened fire on a group of Chinese students and workers in Shanghai. This incident in which 12 Chinese were killed was called the Shanghai incident, but it was only one case in a series of recurrent incidents between the foreign troops and Chinese demonstrators. (Tuchman 1970, p. 92)

[This incident which became known as the May 30th incident brought about many demonstrations and strikes throughout China (see below for more details); it led also to a boycott of the port of Hong Kong which will lasted 16 months (see below). Different accounts of this incident can be found on the Internet. The force which opened fire was in fact part of the Shanghai Municipal Police. To some readers this may suggest that it was a Chinese force but in fact the Shanghai Municipal Police was in charge of maintaining order in the International Settlement and it was under foreign (mainly British) command. On May 30th it is the British commander, Ed-
ward Everson, which gave the order to open fire to his force composed of Sikhs and Chinese soldiers. According to the account given in the English Wikipedia article, Everson fired himself into the crowd with his revolver after giving the order to open fire.

Fig. 9. Posters in the aftermath of the movement of May 30 1925. (a) A foreign businessman and a local warlord torturing a Chinese patriot. (b) Shootings of demonstrators. Source: Wikiwand.

**Jun 1-4 1925:** General strike declared at Shanghai accompanied by rioting. American, British and Italian marines landed in Shanghai to protect the international settlement. (Keller p. 805)

**Jun 23, 1925:** In Canton, Chinese seamen employed by British shipping companies walked out on 18 June and three days later they were joined by practically all the Chinese workers employed by foreign companies in Hong Kong and Shameen, the Canton foreign concession. On 23 June a demonstration of students, workers and military cadets paraded in Canton. As they passed the Shahe Road Bridge, British and French machine guns opened fire on the marchers which resulted in 52 killed and 117 being wounded. A boycott of British goods and a general strike were immediately declared. (Isaacs chapter 4)

[A completely different account regarding the circumstances of the shooting is given on the website http://www.onwar.com (an American website related to the Dupuy Institute); it says:

“Fifty Whampoa Military Academy Cadets were killed in an armed engagement with
British and French troops."
This version is called in doubt by the fact that none of the accounts given on the Internet mentions fatalities on the side of the British and French soldiers; in an “armed engagement” there would most likely have been a few fatalities among them.

As a matter of fact, the account given by the New York Times is very much in line with the version told in Isaacs’ book except regarding the casualties.
“British and French marines protecting the British concession used machine guns against Chinese demonstrators who were parading along the Bund and around Shameen, the European quarter. One man was killed and several men were wounded” (NYT 24 June 1925, p.1)
Another article on the following day (NYT 25 June p. 1) tries to put the blame on the Chinese (“All accounts of yesterday’s shooting at Shameen are that native aggression was primarily responsible for it.”); this article mentions shots fired by demonstrators: “Students forming the tail of the procession fired on Shameen, killing the French silk merchant, Pasquier, and wounding a number of British subjects.”
Clearly however, these accounts do not support the version that there has been an “armed engagement” with “Whampoa cadets”.
The account given in Bensacq (2014, p. 180) mentions 37 demonstrators killed.

**Jul 4, 1925** Anti-foreign riots at Swatow. (Keller p. 806)

**Jul 14, 1925** Soviet activities in China. Dispatch from the US embassy in Peiping. Since the death of Sun Yat-sen the leadership of the army in Canton is practically in the hands of Borodin and Tortunatoff. There are Communistic nuclei in each regiment, the total number being about 15,000.
In Shanghai all propaganda is in the hands of Jebrovsky, a graduate of the Vladivostok Oriental Institute. At his disposal are about 70 Russian agents and about 50 Chinese Communists who have recently arrived from Moscow. On 15 June 1925 the number of Communist members was about 7,000. (USMIR 1, rel 11, frame 355)
[This report also describes Soviet plans for the future, for instance the establishment of a separatist republic that would join the Union of Soviet Republics. Such a plan would indeed materialize in Outer Mongolia. In that case Russian influence was in competition with Japanese influence.]

**Jul 24, 1925** Anti-foreign riots at Canton (Keller p. 806)

**Jul 31, 1925** Anti-foreign riots at Nanking (Keller p. 806) [These anti-foreign riots occurred two years before the much more serious anti-foreign Nanking incident of March 1927.]

**Sep 25, 1925** General Chang Tso-lin has issued a warning that the bolshevisation of
the north-western provinces of China will not be tolerated. He has called on Japan to cooperate with him in the task. (NYT p. 4)

[General Chang Tso-lin was one of the most prominent anti-Communist Chinese generals. It can be noted that this declaration was made about 18 months before the Kuomintang turned against the Communists, both within and outside its own ranks.]

Oct 20, 1925  Boiled German soldiers: revelation of a British propaganda action in World War I.

The way in which the story really started that Germany was boiling down the bodies of her dead soldiers to utilize the fat for fertilizer was told for the first time by Brigadier General J.V. Charteris who was Chief of Intelligence of the British Army during World War I at a dinner at the “National Arts Club”.

During the war, England was worried by the attitude of China who seemed to favor Germany. One day General Charteris came across two pictures. One was showing a train taking dead horses to the rear so that fat and other things might be obtained from them and the other showed a train taking dead Germans to the rear for burials. Knowing how the Chinese revere their ancestors and their dead, he had the caption telling of cadavers being sent to fat factories transposed to the picture of the dead soldiers. Then the photographs were sent to a newspaper in Shanghai [probably the British newspaper “North China Daily News”].

A person in Charteris’ department began to write a diary of a German soldier telling from his transfer to a factory and his horror at finding that he was to assist there in boiling down his brother soldiers. He obtained to be transferred back to the front where he was killed somewhat latter. The plan was to put the forged diary in the clothing of a dead German soldier so that it could be “discovered” by a war correspondent. However, General Charteris decided that the deception had gone far enough and the plan was not carried out.

(NYT p. 10)

[Many propaganda tricks are used in time of war. In a subsequent entry for 1927 we will see an example of another common trick which is to plant forged subversive papers in the premises of an organization that one wants to discredit and then to claim that they were “discovered” during a police raid.]

Nov 4, 1925  Ten right-wing members of the Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist Party held a meeting in the Western Hills outside Peking in which they decided to expel all Communist members. Later this group became known as the Western Hills Clique. It included Lin Sen, Zou Lu and Ju Zheng. (Mackerras p. 308)

[The Central Executive Committee had 233 members (according to Myers and Lin 2007); therefore a meeting of only 10 of its members has little significance by itself.]
However, it is true that this decision was the forerunner of the shift to the right which occurred in the KMT in 1926-1927 (see below).

### 1926-1936: Anti-Russian and anti-leftist drive

The suppression of unionists and Communists in Shanghai in April 1927 and in Canton in December 1927 was only one aspect of the struggle between right and left in China. The raids against the Russian embassy, legations and consulates (e.g. Canton, Hankow) shows that this struggle was also directed against Soviet influence. In Canton the Soviet vice-consul was executed by KMT troops. The fight between left and right took also place within the KMT army. In several cities foreign warships shelled left-wing KMT troops.

#### 1926

With the assistance of the anti-Communist Sun Yat-sen Society, Chiang Kai-shek purged the First Army Corps of all Communists. (Wei 1978, p. 29)

This was probably one of the first anti-Communist moves made by Chiang. It would be interesting to have more details on this episode.

What was the Sun Yat-sen Society?

The following excerpts provide some insight about its origin. “In November 1924 a substantial section of the leadership of the Kuomintang, calling itself the Sun Yat-sen Society, met outside Peking, proclaimed itself the Kuomintang Executive, expelled all Communists from the KMT but nonetheless affirmed the KMT’s friendship with the Soviet Union, its arms supplier.” (Nigel 1978). This move was probably of marginal importance because at this time the heart of the KMT was not in Peking but in Canton. That is why the following excerpt is probably more significant. “In 1925 the Whampoa cadets were politically united in the Sun Yat-sen Society from which the Communists were excluded. Later leftist cadets formed another organization called the “Union of Military Youth.” (Gannes 1937). The two excerpts confirm the anti-Communist orientation of the Sun Yat-sen Society.]

#### 1926

The march of the Kuomintang army toward the north, the so-called Northern Expedition, began in July 1926. Starting from the Canton area it headed toward the region of Shanghai. Thanks to good logistics and training, the Kuomintang troops which numbered about 100,000, were able to capture many cities previously occupied by warlords. Peasants and workers rose to help the new armies. (Spence 1969, Tuchman 1970 p. 94)

[A discussion of the circumstances surrounding the Northern Expedition is given below at the date of 1 July.]

#### Jan 25, 1926

**Anti-Russian drive (1): Chang Tso-lin turned Harbin into a military**
camp.

Harbin was the arrival point of the railway line built and owned by Russia. It had also a large Russian community. It was the place chosen by Chang Tso-lin (and his Japanese and western backers) to start a power struggle with Russia.

The Soviet Consulate was isolated by Chinese troops and only its employees were allowed to access. Chinese troops also occupied the telegraph office, the Russian clubs and the trade union premises. White guards have captured the telegraph line. The Chinese police arrested entire groups that had gathered to express pro-Soviet sympathies.

(NYT p. 6)

[There are two interpretation of this action. A short-sighted interpretation is to say that it was Chang’s reaction after the Soviets asked him to pay for the transport of his troops on the railway. A more lucid interpretation starts from the fact that Chang was the ally of the Japanese and of the western powers (at this time the foreign powers were still a fairly united group) whose main objective was to reduce Soviet influence in China. The military occupation of Soviet property was a step in this campaign. Seen in this light it is a continuation of the fight against the Soviet Revolution first attempted by the expeditionary forces sent by several powers, including Japan and the United States.

The article expresses the hope that this violation of Russian rights in Harbin would not trigger an intervention of the Red Army (see below).]

Feb 28, 1926  Soviet activities in China. A report was received according to which Feng Yu-hsiang has received $3 million in cash from the Soviets. He will also receive from them munitions to the value of $3 million. (USMIR 1, reel 11, frame 341)

[It seems that the US embassy had one (or several) spies at the Soviet embassy. This report gives the names and titles of 13 Russians who took part in a conference at the Soviet embassy. They held various positions in China, for instance, Goldman was the Secretary of the Advisory Committee at Canton. Feng Yu-hsiang was called the Christian general. In 1926 he became close to the Soviet Union but during the Northern Expedition he made alliance with Chiang Kai-shek.]

Mar 18, 1926  March 18 Massacre  The event known in China as the “March 18 Massacre” occurred in Beijing when students who were demonstrating against the unequal treaties were beaten and shot by Chinese troops on order of governor Duan Qirui who was in charge of Beijing.

According to the Wikipedia article entitled “March 18 massacre”, the protest demonstration was triggered by an incident involving a Japanese warship. On 12 March 1926 four Japanese torpedo boats were fired upon from the Taku (pinyin spelling is Tanggu) forts east of Tianjin. Three officers were injured. The ships fired back
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killing several Kuominchun (KMC) troops [this expression refers to the troops of so-called Christian general Feng Yuxiang]. The reason which motivated this bombing is not explained in the Wikipedia article. The most likely reason is that, Feng Yuxiang being supported by Russia, to fight him was to fight Russian influence in China. The act was treated by the Japanese as a violation of the Boxer Protocol. Four days later, some of the countries that were signatory powers of this Protocol sent additional ships to confront the fort: 9 Japanese ships, 6 US ships, one French ship and one Italian ship [curiously, this list given in Bensacq (2014 p. 56) does not include any British ship]. Then, these powers sent an ultimatum to the Beijing government of Duan Qirui which demanded the destruction of the Taku forts. KMC troops had to give in and left the fort.

A protest march against the foreign powers and the Beijing government who was unwilling to confront them ended in a square in front of the government headquarters. It was on this square that the military police fired on the demonstrators. This led to 47 protesters being killed and 200 injured. Among the people who died was Ms. Liu Hezhen, a student of Beijing Normal University and two other students of that university. There is a memorial column on the campus of this university that recalls the event. After the massacre Communists and members of the Kuomintang were hunted down. The warlord Zhang Zuolin ordered schools and universities to be searched for any books published by the Communists or by the Kuomintang [The Wikipedia article does not give the reason of this anti-Communist move].

(Wikipedia article entitled “March 18 massacre”.)

[As often in such incidents, the question of whom fired first remains disputed. The warship incident and subsequent ultimatum of foreign powers can hardly explain why the repression targeted especially the Communists and their allies of the KMT. At about the same time Chiang Kai-shek expelled Soviet advisers and broke relations with the Communists (see below). One wonders if this watershed event and the events in Beijing were not somehow related. One of the facets that needs to be mentioned is the fact that the Kuominchun was supported by the Soviet Union.]

**Mar 20, 1926** Influenced by rumors spread by the right that the Communists were going to make a coup against him, Chiang Kai-shek abruptly dismissed his Russian political and military advisers. Nonetheless, he continued to maintain an appearance of unity with respect to leftist members of the Kuomintang. (Gannes 1937)

**Mar 20, 1926** In Guangzhou (Canton) Chiang Kai-shek ordered the arrest of Li Zhilong and some 50 other Communists who were accused of mutiny. He also ordered the Soviet advisers to leave China. (Bensacq p. 58, Mackerras p. 306)

[However, Borodine (together with other advisers) was called back because Chiang
was in need of the Soviet military support for the planned Northern Expedition. In other words, at this point the actions against the Communists could still be seen as an attempt to limit their influence rather than an outright confrontation.

**Apr 18, 1926** The takeover of Peking by troops belonging to a coalition led by Zhang Zuolin resulted in a fierce anti-Communist campaign. Many left-wing newspapers were closed. Reporters and university teachers left the city. (Mackerras 1982 p. 309)

**May 1926** Excerpt of US Military Intelligence Report. Characteristics of prominent men of the Kuomintang. Chiang Kai-shih [later became written as Chiang Kai-shek] is more closely connected with the US than all other military leaders. Ho Ying-chin is very devoted to General Chiang. (USMIR 1, reel 11, frame 798)

**May 16, 1926** The Central Executive Committee of the Nationalist government approved Chiangs proposal to curtail Communist influence in the KMT. (Mackerras p. 308)

**Jul 1, 1926** Chiang Kai-shek ordered the Northern Expedition to begin. It had received material support from Russia and several Communist generals took part in it including Zhu De, Lin Biao and Liu Bocheng. At the same time negotiations were started with Britain to end the deadlock of the strike in Guangzhou and Hong Kong. (Bensacq p. 58, Mackerras p. 308)

[Two comments are in order about this event. (i) Moves against the Communists which occurred in both Northern and Southern China (especially in Canton) between January and July 1926 suggest that the drive for unification was in appearance directed against warlords serving foreign interest but was at the same time directed against unions and Communists. (ii) Such an expedition has been the dream of Sun Yat sen since 1911. For this objective he has been soliciting financial support from the western powers and Japan and was even prepared to give up ownership rights on major infrastructure assets such as railways. Nonetheless, his requests met little success which is why he eventually turned to the Soviet Union. As Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition was from its very outset directed against workers and Communists he could hardly expect any funding from Moscow. This then raises the question of the provenance of the resources which made this expedition possible.]

**Sep 5, 1926** In retaliation against the detention of two British ships by a Chinese warlord, British marines shelled the town of Wanxian (Sichuan). According to the Peking government several hundred people were killed. (Mackerras 1982 p. 308) [Further details are provided below. The importance of this incident arises from the fact that the US government did not want to take part in any concerted action. This
position was made clear on 10 September and was reiterated in the following days. It marked a turning point in the sense that it fractured the facade of a common western attitude with respect to China.]

**Sep 8, 1926** The Chinese attacked two British gunboats near Wanhsein (Wanxian). Three British officers and four sailors were killed and the two warships were forced to withdraw without being able to take possession of the two British merchant ships which had been seized by the troops of General Yang Sen. (NYT 7 September p. 9 and 8 September p. 1)

[According to the “China Weekly Review” (20 November 1926) the origin of this incident was as follows. First it is necessary to explain that the Upper Yangtze is very narrow and very swift. The high-power steamers which go upstream throw out high waves which may overturn heavily-laden junks which go downstream. Therefore there was a kind of gentleman’s agreement whereby the steamers slow down when passing junks.

But this arrangement was not respected when a steamer passed some of General Yang Sen’s junks were overturned. Apart from soldiers they also carried silver for the payment of troops. Although normally friendly toward British interests, the general got very mad and seized two British cargoes which happened to be in the Wanhsien harbor. Before releasing the ships the general wanted an indemnity for the loss of his soldiers and silver.

During the confrontation British guns razed a thousand Chinese homes and mowed down men, women and children alike. Hundreds of Chinese civilians were killed.]

**Sep 10, 1926** The British government is weighing sending a new expedition to free the merchantmen held at Wanhsien. Many British vessels are available in China for such an expedition. (NYT p. 4)

[As a matter of fact there were about 50 foreign warships on the Yangtze river of which 9 were American and at least as many British (CWR 13 November 1926).]

**Sep 10, 1926** The Wanhsien incident is regarded by the American government as a question of British concern in which the US government is not directly interested. It does not plan any conference with Great Britain, France and Japan for a concerted action. (NYT p. 4)

[By not supporting the British call for force, the American government actually ended the common front of western powers in China.]

**Sep 11, 1926** Karakhan, the Soviet Minister (i.e. ambassador) in Beijing was deported by the Peking government. (Keller p. 807)

**Sep 17, 1926** When the US gunboat Pigeon was fired on by Cantonese batteries above Hankow, she replied vigorously with machine guns. There were no American
casualties. (NYT p. 2)

[The expression “Cantonese batteries” means that these troops were coming from Canton as part of Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern expedition.]

**Oct 10, 1926: End of the boycott of Hong Kong.** It had lasted since June 1925. Some 250,000 Hong Kong strikers left Hong Kong and took refuge in Guangdong. Trade in HK fell by 50%. The British government provided a 3 million pound loan to prevent the economy of Hong Kong from collapsing. (Bensacq p. 59, 191, 192, Wikipedia article entitled “CantonHong Kong strike”)  
[Neither Bensacq nor the Wikipedia article say how the 250,000 persons who left Hong Kong could support themselves. It can be observed that in January 1922 there had already been a strike which paralyzed the port until the end of February 1922.]

**Nov 13, 1926:** In the waterway between Shanghai and Wanhsien there are now about 50 foreign warships. Nine of them fly the American flag. (China Weekly Review Vol. 38, No. 11)  
[This gives a picture that is very different from the one suggested by the movie “The sand pebbles” in which the US gunboat does not meet any other foreign warship during the whole Yangtze patrol.]

**Nov 13, 1926:** The Kuomintang’s Women’s Division in Canton will assign 200 members to assist the “Anti-British Boycott Extension Society” to help in labeling British goods so as to forbid their sale after the end of the year. (China Weekly Review Vol. 38, No. 11)  
[This boycott probably followed the Wanhsein incident.]

**Nov 14, 1926:** Chiang Kai-shek is seen as Shanghai Robber by foreign settlements who hold old charges over the victorious general. The new strong man now holds half of China. (NYT p. 18 and p. SM6)

**Nov 20, 1926:** Japanese friendship policy.
- Sino-Japanese clubs are being organized.
- Delegations of Chinese are taken to Japan on sight-seeing trips, all expenses paid.
- Innumerable delegations of Japanese are touring China, telling the Chinese how the Eastern people should stand together against the West.
- When the Chinese tell them about the 21 demands the Japanese say that they are sorry about that.

(China Weekly Review Vol. 38, No. 12)  
[At this time Japan had already set the invasion of Manchuria as an objective. As a matter of fact, it was even partially realized though, following the Washington conference, Japan had to withdraw its troops which it did only formally. In other
words, it was clear that the friendship policy could not last for very long.]

**Dec 4, 1926:** The “American Association of China” which was created in 1897 merged with the “American Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai”. (China Weekly Review Vol. 39, no 1)

**Dec 4, 1926:** The British municipal police in Tientsin raided the KMT headquarters which was located in their concession, arrested 14 Chinese (all young men) and turned them over to the Fengtien militarists [the Fengtien Army designated the army of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, see below]. (China Weekly Review Vol. 39, no 1)

[For many years the foreign concessions in Tientsin have been filled with political refugees. It would be interesting to know what brought about this raid. After 1927 the situation changed dramatically in the sense that the British authorities would arrest Chinese leftists and turn them over to the KMT.]

**Dec 18, 1926:** In the past few years the Japanese have made great progress in penetrating China. They have steamships in every coastal and river city; they have also 5 railroads, one telegraph line and 10 iron mines. (China Weekly Review Vol. 39, no 3)

**Dec 25, 1926:** Marshal Chang Tso-ling [also spelled Zhang Zuolin, he is sometimes called the “Old Marshal”] was the main warlord in Manchuria and North China. Although he was considered as Japan’s proxy in North China, in 1926 he had several British advisers, in particular General Sutton. In December 1926 it was reported by the Japanese that Chang had received a British loan amounting 5 million dollars. He was killed by a bomb planted by a Japanese Kwantung Army officer on 4 June 1928. (China Weekly Review Vol. 39, no 4)

[This episode shows that it is not easy to follow the connection between Chinese warlords and their foreign supporters because the situation was basically unstable. Was Chang killed because he switched side? If is difficult to know.]

**Dec 26, 1926:** According to an interview with General Chiang Kai-shek published in the Hankow Herald of 23 November, he suggested that the imperialistic character of the United States is revealed by its occupation of the Philippines. (NYT Editorial General News p. E2)

**1927** With 8,000 Protestant and 4,000 Catholic missionaries (in about 1,500 stations) the missionary establishment was at a peak. It is the foreign treaty system which facilitated their presence in China for instance by allowing them to own land and property. It can be recalled that in June 1900 the Boxer Rebellion began with the murder of about 200 missionaries and 20,000 Christian converts. A recurrent feature until 1950, such xenophobic outbursts were brought about by the privileges
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of extraterritoriality (also called extrality at the time) enjoyed by foreign powers and companies. As a matter of principle, the American government claimed its wish to reestablish China sovereignty and rights but argued that before extrality could be relinquished it needed proof and evidence that a stable, responsible and well respected Chinese government would be able to take over the administration of foreign concessions. As foreign interference largely contributed to the disintegration and paralysis of the Chinese central government, there was no way out. (Tuchman 1970, p. 30, 96, 97)

1927 The 15th Infantry Regiment of the US Army was quartered in three-story barracks buildings in Tientsin. The regiment also maintained a post at Tongshan, 140 kilometer to the southeast, which guarded the Peking-Mukden Railway and a summer training camp on the seacoast. The overall command of the United States Army Forces in China (USAFC) was held by Brigadier General Castner.

A program to teach the rudiments of spoken Chinese had been introduced in 1924. Consisting in four one-hour lessons a week, it was compulsory for officers but voluntary for the enlisted men. As attested by the venereal disease rate which was 3 times that of the American Army as a whole, there were some kinds of contacts with the population. (Tuchman 1970, p. 98)

Jan 4 1927 Chinese workers stormed and took over the British concession at Hankow. Instead of using force as in 1925, the British government opened negotiations. On 19 February an agreement was signed with Eugen Chen according to which the British concession of Hankow passed under the control of the Chinese municipality. (Bensacq p. 60, Spence 1969)

Jan 1, 1927 The Nationalist Government under the control of its left wing moved to Hankow (about 500 kilometers west of Shanghai). Mme Sun Yat-sen was the presiding spirit, Michael Borodin, the envoy of the Komintern was the gray eminence, and Eugene Chen was its new Foreign Minister. Although western educated he did not have much sympathy for western powers. (Tuchman 1970, p. 95)

Jan 3, 1927 The British concession at Hankow was attacked by a mob of Chinese. They were dispersed by Chinese soldiers. British marines landed. (Keller p. 808)

Jan 6-7, 1927 Chinese invaded the British concession at Kiukiang. British subjects were evacuated. Moreover, all foreigners were evacuated from the British concession at Hankow. (Keller p. 808)

Jan 14, 1927 The foreign missions at Fuchow were invaded and looted. (Keller p. 808)
Jan 23, 1927  Chiang Kai-shek has a triumvirate of advisers composed of Comrade Borodin, his Soviet adviser, Mr. Hu the Chinese Bolshevist leader and Loo Wang (or Loo Wab) who is thought to be a former American criminal. (NYT 26 December 1926 p. E2; NYT 23 January 1927 p. 2)

[As shown by the present title, in late January 1927 the “New York Times” did not wish to give a good image of general Chiang Kai-shek. Its attitude will soon become more friendly.

Jan 23, 1927  Most of China’s important foreign loans were issued in London and taken principally by British investors. Many British railway loans to China are secured on railroad revenue, but the three major loans floated in London are secured in the revenue of the Maritime Customs of China. In recent times the increased turmoil brought about a substantial drop in the revenue of railroads. In railroad loans usually it is the railroad itself which is mortgaged as a security. But, as observed by the under-secretary of Foreign Affairs in London, the right to foreclose on railroad property could only be exercised with the help of armed support. (NYT p. 2)

[From this article one learns that at this time two of the most important attributes of the Chinese state, namely its customs and railroad system were in the hands of foreign, mainly British, investors. The under-secretary of Foreign Affairs lucidly emphasized that, unless an agreement can be arranged with the Kuomintang, the investors’ rights would have to be upheld by armed forces.]

Jan 27, 1927  British troops landed in Shanghai for the protection of foreigners. (Keller p. 808)

Feb 4, 1927:  Additional American warships and marines started for Chinese waters today, and when they arrive there the American forces available to protect our nationals in an emergency will total 33 ships and more than 2,500 marines. (NYT p. 1)

[Of course, the number of ships is of much greater significance than the number of Marines. Present in most Treaty ports they ensured a pervasive presence in all large cities established on Chinese rivers.]

Feb 17, 1927  While the Nationalist army was at 70 km from Shanghai, a strike is started which is directed against the warlord Sun Chuanfang. It is violently suppressed with much bloodshed by the general Li Baozhang. (Bensacq p. 61)

[This was so to say a rehearsal for the uprising of 21 March 1927 and the bloody repression which followed.]

Mar 10, 1927  Chiang Kai-shek is replaced by Wang Jingwei as president of the Kuomintang. At the same time two Communists, Xu Chaoren and Tang Pingshan become member of the government. (Bensacq p. 61)
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[It seems that these changes were not of great significance for they only reflected a split between two competing fractions within the party: the Wuhan fraction led by Eugen Chen and the fraction led by Chiang Kai shek which was in control of the army.]

Mar 11, 1927  The US Consul General at Hankow protested in person to Eugene Chen, the Cantonese Foreign Minister, against the looting of American property during the disorders attending the Cantonese occupation of Wuhu. (NYT p. 1)

[The term “Cantonese” designates the Nationalists who during their March to the North started from Canton with the objective of submitting the rest of China to their authority, an endeavor that Sun Yat sen tried several times without success. The previous news shows that there were many occurrences of anti-foreigners acts during the March to the North. In other words, the looting and killing in Nanking in late March was by no means an isolated event.]

Mar 22, 1927  1,500 American Marines under the command of General Butler were landed at Shanghai to protect American life and property in the international settlement. (NYT p. 2)

March 22, 1927  Coming from San Diego, the 4th Marine Regiment (later called the 4th Marines) disembarked at Shanghai to reinforce the Marines which were already there to protect the American concession. Together they formed the 3rd Brigade (about 5,000 men) under the command of Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler. Apart from the American troops, the French had 4,000 troops and the British 2,500. The International Settlement consisted of approximately 7,000 British and 2,000 American citizens, France and Japan (15,000 citizens) maintained separate concessions. There were also a few Dutch, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish military units.

A Marine, Pete George, describes the stay in Shanghai in the following terms: “Most of our duties were strictly guard. Standard Oil Company was over there and we used to guard them. And so it was one day on and two days off. The first thing you do is buy a teakwood chest. Then you go down, you start buying whatever you could afford. The ivory was the most important thing that we could buy. It was real, real inexpensive. The 4th Marines had their own club in town [with bowling, billiards, gymnasium, library, restaurant, movie theater].”

According to the same Marine “It was Mao and his group that we would catch and then turn over to the Japanese. The Japanese would execute them every other day at 5 o’clock in the afternoon. We watched a lot of killings over there.”

[The fact that Communists were arrested in the foreign concessions and then handed over to the Chinese or (more surprisingly) to the Japanese, is also confirmed by
articles published in the British press (see in Appendix C the section entitled “Arrest and execution of Communists”].

The 4th Marines remained in Shanghai until 1941 when the threat of a war between the United States and Japan became greater; it departed Shanghai for the Philippines on 27-28 November 1941. According to the website of the 4th Marine, “thousands of cheering people waving Chinese and American flags lined the streets to see the regiment, which had played such an intimate part in community life for over 14 years, parade through the International Settlement for the last time”.


Mar 24, 1927: Nanking incident. Nationalist forces entered Nanking on March 24. Their troops ransacked the British, Japanese and US consulates. At least 6 foreigners were killed including two missionnaries and the vice-president of Nanking University, John E. Williams. As news of the “massacre” leapt by telegraph across China, missionaries fled to the rivers for protection of gunboats; 5,000 left the country. Schools, colleges, YMCA [Young Men’s Christian Association] establishments closed down or were taken over by the Nationalists. In the 1930s, some missionaries began coming back but never again reached the numbers of the period before Nanking. (Tuchman 1979, p. 103-104)

[At that time Nanking had a population of about 300,000; 600 foreigners were living there, 400 of whom were Americans. (NYT 25 March 1927 p. 2)]

Mar 25, 1927: News from Nanking, Hankow, Wuhu and other cities on the Yangtze River show that assaults upon foreigners were widespread. In many places uncontrolled Chinese troops fired on western rescuers. (NYT p. 1)

Mar 26, 1927: A Standard Oil dispatch put dead American residents of Nanking at 30. In addition 6 US soldiers of a landing party were reported slain. (NYT p. 2)

[Later newspaper articles put the US toll at a much lower figure of just a few killed. For instance, a NYT article of 27 March (p. 2) mentions just one dead. What is the truth? It can be said that the magnitude of the foreigners’ flight suggests that more than one person were killed.]

Mar 28, 1927: So far the list of foreigners killed in Nanking includes 7 persons: Dr. Smith (of the British consulate), Dr. Williams (British Vice-Principal of Nanking University), Mr. H. Huber (British harbormaster), a British sailor of the Emerald, two French Jesuits (one of them named Father Manara), a Japanese stocker.
Monseigneur de Guébriand of the Société des Missions Étrangères said that none of the 250 missionaries present in the south-west of China had been killed but all of them had been expelled from their churches. (Times p. 14)

Mar 29, 1927: At Wuhu propagandists are rousing the populace to fury by tales that foreigners killed 200,000 Chinese at Nanking. According to the German socialist journal “Vorwärts” a bombardment by British ships and aircraft on Bias Bay, Faiyang district (near Canton) occurred on 23 March. More than 2,000 houses were burned down and 2,000 Chinese lost their lives. This is in addition of the Anglo-American bombardment of Nanking. The Izvetia, the official Soviet newspaper, put the number of the Chinese killed by British and American ships at Nanking at 7,000. It added that these shellings were not intended to save the life of Westerners but were an interference in the struggle between the left-wing and right wing of the Cantonese army.

In its conclusion the article says that the western troops were sent to assist the right wing of the Kuomintang to strangle Chinese workmen and peasants. (Times 29 March 1927 p. 14, Times 30 March 1927 p. 15)

This article raises two important questions:

(i) How many Chinese were really killed? In order to give at least a reliable estimate one would need to know how many shells were fired as well as their caliber. This information should be available from the logs of the ships.
(ii) What was the real purpose of the intervention by Anglo-American ships? Massive shelling indeed seems a weird way for protecting western residents because it may further infuriate Chinese troops. In other instances such bombardments were done as retaliations once residents had been brought into safety but such an action made little sense while residents were still trying to escape.

The fact that the Soviet embassy in Peking was invaded by Chinese authorities with the explicit consent of the western powers (as reported above) also suggests the existence of a concerted plan.

Mar 31, 1927: British and American nationals were evacuated from Chengdu to Chongqing on gunboats. At the same time the British consulates in Yichang and Changsha were closed. (Bensacq p. 128)

Mar 31, 1927: Chongqing. During a demonstration near the French consulate the troops of general Lai Xinhui opened fire killing many people. (Bensacq p. 128)

[As often in such cases, it is not clear whether the first shoots were fired by demonstrators or by the troops. The number of casualties is also unclear. Laurent Eynard, the French consul in Chongqing, writes that several hundreds were killed, but is that estimate reliable?]
April 2, 1927: It is a relief to learn from none other than General Chiang Kai-shek, Commander-in-Chief of the Cantonese forces, that only 6 Chinese were killed when the American and British warships laid down a barrage in Nanking in order to rescue the Americans and other foreigners who had taken refuge in the Standard Oil Company’s compound. (NYT p. 16)

[The expression “laid down a barrage” means that the ships shelled parts of the city. In other similar instances such bombardments of densely inhabited areas made hundreds of fatalities. So, a figure as low as 6 comes indeed as a surprise. It is difficult to avoid the feeling that there was a kind of agreement between western powers and Chiang to the purpose of minimizing the numbers of victims on both sides. However, the number of foreigners killed was small. If the intent of the looters had been to kill foreigners the death toll would have been in the hundreds.]

April 2, 1927: Prior to the Nanking affair American naval officers had instructions to avoid firing unless absolutely necessary. There are American warships in all Treaty ports and they have now been given instruction to return fire and silence hostile attackers. (NYT p. 1)

April 6, 1927: In Peking armed police raided the Soviet legation. This move was made by Zhang Zuolin in agreement with Chiang Kai-shek and the foreign powers. Documents were seized which, allegedly, disclosed evidence of the Soviet penetration of Chinese affairs. 19 Chinese Communists, including the leader of the party, Li Ta-chao (or: Li Dazhao), were arrested and subsequently executed for treason. (Bensacq p.63, Mackerras 1982 p. 312; Tuchman 1970 p. 105)

[Soviet presence in China comprised the team of Michael Borodin, and also some troops such as the Russian Infantry brigade of about 3,000 under General Netchaev which was seen by Joseph Stilwell in Hsuchow (500 kilometer north west of Shanghai) in March 1927. However, it must be added that raiding an embassy (or a legation), and claiming the discovery of incriminating evidence is a trick which is commonly used by secret services. During the 1960s it was used repeatedly against Cuban embassies in Latin America. In such cases, historians must exercise some caution before trusting the content of the documents which have been “discovered”.]

April 7, 1927: Beijing. A raid carried out with the agreement of foreign powers. At 10:30am, some 100 Chinese policemen and 200 Chinese soldiers from Marshal Chang Tso-lin bodyguard entered the embassy. At the same time, armed British Tommies with bayonets fixed and guns loaded made their appearance as guards on the British Legation wall on the north side of the embassy.

The decision to permit the raid on the Soviet embassy was reached at a meeting of the Boxer Protocol Powers [i.e. America, Belgium, Britain, France, Italy, Japan,
the Netherlands and Spain\textsuperscript{88} at which unanimity was reached, Mr. MacMurray the American Minister concurring with the others.

(The China Press p. 1)

[This article in the “China Press” (an American newspaper published in China) says very clearly that the raid was authorized (and probably even encouraged) by the foreign powers. The same newspaper also provides evidence to the point that foreign powers gave a hand to Chiang Kai-shek when he made his raid on unions and Communists in Shanghai (see below at the date of 12 April). In fact, the raid against the Russian embassy marked a new step in the campaign against Soviet interests in China. The raid of 25 January 1926 against Russian property in Harbin which was also carried out by Chang’s troops was an earlier episode in the same campaign. The present operation marked the beginning of a vast repression against Chinese Communists both within the Kuomintang’s own ranks and outside as in Shanghai and other cities. Because at that time Russia had a strong influence over Chinese Communists this purge was indirectly another step in the campaign against Soviet influence.]

\textbf{Apr 8, 1927:} The Shanzi warlord Yan Xishan issued orders for the suppression of the Communists. (Mackerras 1982 p. 312)

\textbf{Apr 11, 1927:} China’s troubles have brought together in Chinese waters the greatest international naval concentration ever seen in the Orient for the protection of foreign lives and interests. Altogether, there are 172 warships and 30 naval auxiliaries. Britain leads with 76, Japan’s force is second in size, the United States is third. (NYT p. 2)

\textbf{Apr 12, 1927:} In Shanghai Chiang Kai-shek carried out a bloody purge against the left of the Kuomintang. Communists and leftists were hunted down. At least 300 were killed. In addition he began a massive purge in the south-east provinces that his forces were occupying. (Mackerras 1982 p. 312; Tuchman 1970, p. 105)

[The novel “Man’s Fate” by the French writer André Malraux describes an episode of the repression. In one marking scene at the end of the novel, Chinese Communists (including one of the novel’s main character, the Soviet emissary Katov) are burned alive in the chambers of steam locomotives.

In a surprising contrast, back in 2009 the Shanghai historical museum (located at the bottom of the Shanghai television tower) provided very little information about this important episode of the history of Shanghai. A newsreel presented on a TV screen showed the execution of people who were being shot in the neck on an execution ground. The sequence lasted less than 10 seconds and would certainly be overlooked by anybody not already aware of this episode.]

\textsuperscript{88}Germany was of course also a Boxer Protocol Power but it seems that it lost its role in China after the defeat of 1918.
Apr 12, 1927: Western authorities of the International Settlement collaborated with Chiang Kai-shek.

In the night from Monday 11 April to Tuesday at 4am a warship in the harbor sounded a single toot of a siren. Then the machine guns which were positioned around all suspected spots broke loose in a steady roll which lasted for half an hour. From a dozen spots the Nationalist troops and police poured a hail of lead into the guerrilla strongholds. As the Nantao [an area in the center of Shanghai] shooting died down, Chapei [a suburb in the north of Shanghai, now spelled Zhabei] became active. The last to surrender were the guerrillas who had been encamped in the headquarters of the Commercial Press Club. General Chiang Kai-shek’s troops raided the Shanghai Labor Union Quarters and killed numbers of radical agitators.

This campaign of extermination was reported exclusively in the “China Press” of yesterday (12 April).

Extra guards were posted along the boundaries of the International Settlement before the raids were commenced, the intentions of the Nationalists having been made known to the Settlement authorities earlier in the evening.

(China Press 12 April 1927 p.1, 13 April 1927 p.1)

[For the success of the operation it was of course crucial to prevent the leftists from taking refuge in the International Settlement where Chiang’s troops would not be able to capture them. It seems that the authorities of the French concession were not informed in advance because the article says that troops were put at the entrance points only after the raid had started.

The account given in the China Press article is substantially different from what can be read in other sources. For instance, the Wikipedia article entitled “Shanghai massacre of 1927” says:

Before dawn on April 12 gang members began to attack district offices controlled by the union workers, including Zhabei, Nanshi and Pudong.

In other words, the operation carried out by army and police is in this article attributed to gang members. Surprising. For what benefit should gang members suddenly decide to attack union workers?

It seems that the business community had also been informed of the raid in advance. In Pearl Buck’s novel “The Patriot” (1939), the main character, Wu I-wan, is told about the raid by his father, an important businessman.

However, it seems that the workers were not aware that Chiang Kai-shek would turn against them. The “China Press” cites handbills which were waiting to be distributed on the day of the arrival of Chiang’s troops. They said: “Let us support the Kuomintang Party, Welcome the Nationalist Revolutionary Army. Support General Chiang Kai-shek”.]


Apr 14, 1927: The Paosan Road massacre.
The general strike ordered by the “Shanghai General Labor Union” proved partially effective: 90,000 workers struck, cotton mills and tobacco factories were idle.
During a peaceful meeting which took place at Paoshan Road (now spelled Baoshan Road) the troops opened fire. They had surrounded the meeting place and the mob was caught in a cross-fire. Many of the wounded were left to die where they dropped.
In addition there was the work of several executioners’ squads yesterday and last night.
A raid was conducted against the Soviet consulate at Shanghai.
(China Press p. 1)

Apr 14, 1927: Activity of the British Navy.
- At Chinkiang (north of Shanghai, now spelled Zhenjiang) HMS Woodcock reported that she was fired on. The firing came from Deer Island where there are fisherman’s huts. The ship replied with machine guns and 6-inch (15cm) guns.
- HMS Carlisle has sailed for Weihei-wei [a port in Shandong province] where trouble is expected.
(China Press p. 1)

Apr 15, 1927: The Moscow Communists regard the news from Shanghai that the local trade union leaders have been arrested and the workers disarmed as a grave setback for the left Nationalist movement in China. They denounce General Chiang Kai-shek as a traitor to the Chinese Revolution. (NYT p. 4)

Apr 15, 1927: Chiang Kai-shek’s successful stroke against the Reds brought that change in the Chinese situation that the Japanese had been hoping for. They now expect him to deal with the Communists before resuming his drive on Peking. (NYT p. 5)
[Chiang indeed tried to eliminate the Communists before advancing decisively toward Peking; to this effect he waged several large scale military campaigns, see below.]

Apr 16, 1927: Pukow. The American destroyer USS Ford shelled Chinese soldiers with her 4-inch guns. (NYT p. 1)

Apr 16, 1927: Shanghai. At 5 am on 15 April, more than 200 members of the British Defense Force surrounded and raided the “Great China University”. Considerable damage was done. A number of students were injured and two are in serious condition. (North China Herald, p. 124)
Apr 16, 1927: The Northern expedition was largely directed against foreign influence. Wherever southern armies went, mission premises were looted. Literally hundreds were despoiled. (North China Herald p. 136) [This article shows that the anti-foreigner disorders in Nanking were part of a broader pattern.]

Apr 18, 1927: The political council of KMT Central Executive Committee issued a statement, vowing to eradicate communist influence in order to complete the revolution. (The Nanking-Hankow separation, chapter 4, No 33)

Apr 19, 1927: Fight between foreign sailors
“Blood Lane”, Shanghai’s hottest cabaret quarter was the scene last night of the fiercest fight between foreign forces which has been staged in Shanghai for many months. It was a mad scramble between American, British, French and Italian sailors. The surprising feature is that there were no fatalities but at least 8 Americans were injured. (China Press p. 1)

Apr 20, 1927: Hankow Reds declared war on Chiang Kai-shek. (NYT p. 1) [At this date the Kuomintang was split into two forces: the left wing who controlled the Nationalist government of Hankow (still officially recognized by western powers) and the right wing under Chiang Kai-shek established in Shanghai and who had the implicit support of western powers. On April 18 one of Chiang’s advisers had declared that it would take 3 months to “clear out the Reds”. Although, the Hankow government indeed disintegrated in a matter of months, pockets of remnant leftists subsisted throughout the country. In spite of six successive extermination campaigns waged by Chiang in the following years (see below) the Communists could not be rooted out. During the war against Japan, there was, at least in appearance, a united front between the Communists and the Nationalists but the conflict resumed afresh in the fall of 1945.]

Apr 20, 1927: Tientsin. 14 Kuomintang agents were executed. They were arrested in November 1926 in the British concession by British police and handed to the Chinese authorities. They admitted to the court martial of the Chihli Military Government [the province of Chihli is now called Hebei, in that time it also included Beijing which is now a separate administrative region] that they had been organizing a branch for Kuomintang propaganda in the British concession. Kuomintang labor unions have urged a boycott of British goods and banknotes in Tientsin. (China Press p. 2) [This affair is not very clear. Why were these Kuomintang agents sentenced to death by a Kuomintang court martial?]
Apr 20, 1927: A new Cabinet is established in Nanking by General Chiang Kai-shek. The downfall of Communism is the keynote of the new regime. General Bei Tsung-hsi, one of the two generals who commanded the KMT troops during the repression, belongs to the new government. (China Press p. 1)

Apr 20, 1927: Foreign warships in Shanghai harbor. Japanese (14), British (10), US (8), French (3), Italian (1), Dutch (1), Spanish (1). Altogether there were 38 foreign warships. (China Press p. 13)

Apr 21, 1927: In Hankou 35 foreign warships were moored along the Bund. On 21 April the French 10,000 ton cruiser “La Vindicte” arrived there. Within one week 6 other warships of the British, US and Japanese navies joined them. At that time the foreign concessions in Hankou occupied a total area of 110 hectares. (Bensacq p. 141, Wikipedia article entitled “Hankou”.)

Apr 21, 1927: Tan Shu-ching telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek, reporting that the Kuomintang branch at Chianghsi Province was destroyed. It was necessary to hunt down the rebels. (The Nanking-Hankow separation, chapter 4, No 36)

Apr 21, 1927: Startling document made public as outcome of the raid on the Soviet embassy in Beijing. Headed “Strictly confidential, it gives instructions to bring about all kinds of disorders in China. For instance:

- “Destroy Chang Tso-lin’s credit and brand him as a tool of international capitalists”.
- “Stir up mob violence against Europeans in general and the British in particular”.

(China Press p. 1)

[Discovering such papers, whether genuine or forged, was of course the main objective of this raid. So it is quite natural that western newspapers publish such news on their first page. A similar article appeared in the same newspaper on 24 April.]

Apr 21, 1927: Chiang Kai-shek executed 100 Reds. Among the beheaded is the chief of the Seamen’s Union. (NYT p. 1)

Apr 24, 1927: HMS Keppel was attacked by riflemen while passing the Mud Fort beacon on 22 April. As a result the Keppel and HMS Wolsey bombarded the shore. The number of shells fired by both ships is not stated but the damage is known to have been considerable. (China Press p. 5)

[It would be interesting to know what kind of damages were done and how many people were killed.]

Apr 24, 1927: A concentration of 43 Allied warships has been gathered off the Bund at Hankow. The purpose of this concentration has not been explained for there
are but few foreigners left in that city. A landing party of bluejackets [US Navy sailors] went ashore to protect the Standard Oil installations where the laborers have been behaving in a hostile manner for several weeks past. (China Press p. 1)

**Apr 24, 1927:** General Bei has issued orders to furnish Chinese military guards to American factories located in the Chinese territory of Shanghai. (China Press p. 1)

**Apr 27, 1927:** The USS Penguin, a gunboat, was shelled near Nanking. Five sailors were wounded. Reprisals are looming. (China Press p. 1)

**Apr 27, 1927:** The “Shanghai Chinese General Chamber of Commerce” decided to hold a mass meeting in celebration of the establishment of a Nationalist government in Nanking. (China Press p. 2)

[In business circles and in foreign embassies there was a sense of relief after the success of the repression. In an earlier issue of 17 April the “China Press” expressed this feeling by saying that “the Nanking group have placed themselves in a favorable light due to their rigid suppression of Communist laborite activities”.

**Apr 30, 1927:** Over 600,000 workers were organized in Shanghai and in a successful insurrection the unions seized the city and drove out the Northern troops of Chang Tso-lin. A few weeks later Chiang Kai-shek founded the anti-Communist Nanking government.

- In Shanghai over 5,000 labor leaders and their followers were exterminated. In the following years the Settlement police, run by the British, repeatedly arrested Chinese labor leaders and handed them to the Kuomintang for imprisonment or execution.
- Chiang’s Nationalist government made it a crime punishable by death to be a Communist or a member of any organization or union considered as such.
• In 1936, the Nationalist government officially agreed to prohibit strikes in the Japanese mills of Tsingtao. 
(Snow 1940 p. 81, 122)

[There has been much speculation about what brought about Chiang Kai-shek’s change of mind. In his book Snow explains that Chiang did not change his mind. In fact, he had always been a conservative and was drawn to an alliance with the leftists only for tactical reasons and because this had been Sun Yat-sen’s strategy (Sun died in March 1925). It is his stay in Moscow which propelled him to the presidency of the Whampoa Military Academy.]

**May 13, 1927:** The American destroyer Edsall was fired on by rifles from the south bank near Nanking and retaliated with machine guns. (NYT p. 4)

**Jul 1, 1927:** Surtaxes on imports and exports imposed by the Nationalist government.

In addition to the surtax of 2.5% agreed upon with reservation by the Washington conference (referred to as the “Washington surtax”), the Nationalist government at Nanking will collect an additional 2.5% surtax on all imports classified as luxuries. This makes the total duty on luxuries 10% *ad valorem* that British merchants [as well as merchants from other countries] will have to pay after 4 July 1927. 
(The Straits Times, 1 July 1927, p. 9)

[This decision of the Nationalist government made sense because importation of luxuries was a burden for the Chinese economy. Naturally it raised protests. In November 1926, the Nationalist Government (at that time still at Canton) had already decided a similar surtax. On 3 November 1926, through a declaration of the diplomatic corps at Peking, the powers had already refused to recognize the legality of the Canton surtax. In July 1927 it was still the Peking government which was recognized by most powers but the position of the Nationalist government was much stronger.

On 1 February 1927 when the first surtax of 2.5% came into effect the Inspector General of Customs, Sir Francis Aglen, refused to levy it. He was dismissed by the Peking government and replaced by A.H.F. Edwards.]

On 4 October, the US government told the Chinese authorities that it did not accept the “illegal surtaxes of 30% on tobacco and 50% on alcoholic liquors instituted by the Nationalist government”. (The Straits Times, 5 October 1927, p. 9)]

**Jul 7, 1927:** Shanghai. The British War Office has announced that the strength of the “Shanghai Defence Force” will shortly be reduced by the return to India of the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade. The British government is satisfied that there is now less danger to British lives and property largely owing to the ascendancy of the Mod-
erates in the Chinese Nationalist movement. (North China Daily News p. 1) [In other words, the British government was reassured by the anti-Communist blood-bath in Shanghai.]

**Jul 7, 1927:** Shanghai. Hu Shih-ying, a Chinese from America, was charged at the “Special Military Court” and found guilty of opposing the Kuomintang. He was executed at Lunghua on July 4. (North China Daily News p. 2) [An article on the same page says that Dr. Chen Tu-hsiu, chairman of the Chinese Communist Party was executed. However, another source (Wikipedia) says that he died in 1942 in Chongqing. What is the truth?]

**Jul 7, 1927:** Beijing. A delegation from the Peking Chamber of Commerce comprising 300 persons marched to Marshal Chang Tso-lin [supported by Japan] on his assumption of the Dictatorship. They gave him a rousing ovation. (North China Daily News p. 1) [These business people probably did not realize that this was just a step in the Japanese plan for taking Beijing under their control.]

**Jul 7, 1927:** Tsingtao. Some 500 US Marines landed in Tsingtao for the protection of the American residents. (North China Daily News p. 1)

**Jul 8, 1927:** Shanghai. During the past fortnight the agents of the 26th Army have arrested 12 Communists. All of them will be tried in military courts. (North China Daily News p. 5)

**Jul 8, 1927:** Tsingtao. At a conference of the consuls of Britain, Japan, America and Germany it was agreed that America should send 1,000 bluejackets while Britain would send a contingent from Shanghai. (North China Daily News p. 1) [The order in which the 4 countries are cited is interesting. Britain comes first because the NCDN is a British newspaper, then Japan which took over Tsingtao from Germany during the war but had to agree to a more open-door policy as a result of British and American pressure, then the United States, and finally Germany, the former occupier.]

**Jul 17-18, 1927:** Anti-Communist coup d’état at Hankow effected by General Ho Chien. Martial law was proclaimed and Communists were arrested. Then, on July 27, Michael Borodin, a Russian Communist was expelled and returned to Russia. (Keller p. 809) [The source does not say if arrested Communists were executed. However, it is likely that the same kind of extermination policy was implemented as in Shanghai and Canton. This is confirmed by a later episode reported in Keller’s chronology (p. 810), namely:
On 16-20 December 1927 the Soviet consulate at Hankow was raided; Russians and Chinese were arrested; the Chinese were executed and the Russians expelled.

**Oct 1, 1927:** The United States is the first government to recognize the KMT government. (Wikipedia article entitled “Gouvernement de Beiyang”, in French)

**Dec 11, 1927**  
Foreign assistance in the suppression of the Canton uprising. At 3:30 the sounds of gunshots marked the beginning of the revolution. The main streets were covered with slogans written on canvas “Down with the counter-revolutionary Kuomintang”. The KMT troops were forced out of the city but even at that time they outnumbered the revolutionists by 6 to 1.

The counter attack was carried out with the assistance of foreign warships. The US cruiser “Sacramento” and the British warship “Moreau” carried KMT troops to various points of the city. Then the advance of Li Fu-lin’s army was covered by a bombardment from 4 warships laying in the harbor. Japanese marines landed in Canton on the 11th and attacked the red forces. One of the revolutionist leaders, Chang Tai-bei, was killed at the beginning of the counter attack.

The number of death sentences meted out by the revolutionists was between 200 and 700. After KMT troops took Canton, some 5,000 people were killed. Their bodies were laid down in the streets to throw fear into the heart of the people.  
(China Today, Dec 1934)

**Dec 11, 1927**  
Red uprising in Canton. The leaders of the rebellion were Ho Lung, Yeh Ting and Chu Teh. It is stated that 700 “enemies of the people” were killed by the rebels and that the government troops in the period following immediately the putting down of the revolt killed 6,000. (CUS 1, reel 16, frame 11)

[At the beginning of this reel there is a 124 page-booklet written by Vice-Consul O. Edmund Clubb and entitled: “A study of Communism in China”. The author says that he used newspaper sources in particular the “Peking and Tientsin Times” (in English) and the “Ta Kung Pao” and also Communist documents which cannot be found in Chinese libraries because of “the current official anti-Communist stance”. Bensacq (2014, p. 187) says that Russian diplomatic personnel was also targetted: The Consul General was taken prisoner, the vice-consul was killed as where also 11 Russian personnel. Bensacq briefly describes the mode of execution: mostly by machine gun on rows of 40 prisoners at a time.]  
gives some details about the mode of executions.

**Dec 13, 1927:** Red uprising in Canton. Two American gunboats are there and a third one is on its way to Canton. (NYT p. 1)

[According to testimonies made by Communist leaders of the Canton uprising, foreign ships bombarded the areas held by the insurgents and landed Marines. Accord-
ing to western newspapers their intervention had no other role but to protect the life and property of western citizens. It should also be noted that the repression against leftist people and union members in Canton began much earlier (see 20 March 1926); the December uprising was a last and desperate attempt to avoid annihilation.]

Dec 16-20, 1927: The Soviet consulate at Hankow was raided; Russians and Chinese were arrested. The Chinese were executed and the Russians were expelled. (Keller p. 810)

Dec 17, 1927: The Soviet vice-consul at Canton was executed by the Kuomintang. He was among hundreds put to death in ruthless round-up of Reds in South China. Nationalist troops arrested droves, roped women together and terrified hospital patients. The [Soviet] Consulate at Hankow was raided. (NYT p. 5)

Dec 18, 1927: Six women belonging to the consular staff of the Soviet Consulate in Canton were executed. (NYT p. 27)

Dec 20, 1927: 600 Reds were put to death at once in Canton by Nationalist troops. At about the same time the Soviet trade mission in Shanghai was raided. (NYT p. 1) [According to the Wikipedia article a fairly conservative estimate is that about 10,000 were killed and disappeared. In fact, the anti-Communist repression in Canton began before 11 December and the uprising can be seen as a last ditch counter-offensive. As a matter of fact some of the armed groups were able to leave the city in time and to form what became later the Fourth Division of the Red Army.

These events should be put in parallel with similar events which occurred in early April 1927. At that time the Soviet embassy in Beijing was raided just a few days before the beginning of the massacre of Communists and unionists in Shanghai. This suggests fairly clearly that the free hand given to Nationalists in their anti-Communist campaign by western powers was a way to counter Soviet influence in China.

The massacres of Communist workers in industrial cities opened the way to a Communist movement relying on the peasantry. Thus, ultimately, they had the effect of replacing a minority revolutionary movement by one supported by the majority.

It can be noted that similar uprisings also occurred in neighboring countries:

- In British Burma there was the so-called Saya San Rebellion (1930-1932) against foreign occupation and heavy taxes. It resulted in several thousand deaths among the insurgents. Saya San was hanged in 1937.
- In French Indochina there was an uprising against foreign occupation and heavy taxes. Led by the Communists, it started in May 1930, culminated in Oc-
October of the same year and ended progressively in April-May 1931. The repression made at least 1,200 deaths among Communists (Histoire, April 2001, p.84-85).

1928

**Anti-Communism as a mantle for the Japanese occupation of Manchuria and northern China in the 1930s**

In June 1928 all Chinese newspapers published the text of a secret treaty between Marshal Chan Tso-ling and the Japanese which reads as follows (China Weekly Review 2 June 1928 p. 24).

**Article 1** The Japanese government has long realized that China is under the menace of Red domination which constitutes a menace to the Far East, hence Japan is prepared to dispatch troops [10 divisions] for the purpose of assisting Marshal Chang Tso-ling and the Peking government to stabilize the situation. When the purpose of this action has been accomplished, Japan agrees to withdraw her troops.

**Article 3** Japan agrees to lend to Marshal Chang Tso-ling a sum of money from 50 million yen to 100 million yen ($25 – $50 million) covering the expenses of the anti-Red expedition and China agrees to pay Japan interest at the rate of 8%.

**Article 4** China agrees to pay Japan the right to construct a number of railways in North China [the regions which are described correspond to the eastern part of North China which will indeed be occupied by Japan in the 1930s.

As for all supposedly secret treaties it is difficult to assert to what extent this text is genuine. Yet, Japan’s proposal to help in the anti-Red campaign was repeated by Japanese officials on several other occasions.

**Jan 21, 1928:** Execution of 30 Communists as plotters of revolt. (Keller p. 811) [The source does not say if they belonged to the KMT]

**Apr 1928:** Chu Teh and his troops established a Soviet government in Chinhanshan (Kiangsi province). Ho Lung and Yig Ting established village soviets in eastern Guangdong. Around the same time Mao Tse-tung had already occupied Chenchow, Tzuhsin and Leiyang in Hunan. Communist troops were a heterogeneous conglomerate of remnants of the Red Kuomintang army, regular Communist troops and outlaw bandits.

During this first phase the Communists exercised little discrimination but as soon as the beginning of 1930 they became much more selective as regards the sections of the population that they stigmatized as “enemies of the people”.

(.Clubb 1932)

**Apr 11, 1928:** Chien Ta-chun telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek, reporting that the Shanghai Picket Troop had joined to the Communists. A temporary martial law
was implemented for three days under approval of the Military Commission. (The Nanking-Hankow separation, chapter 4, No 51)

**May 1928:** The first campaign against the Communists in Kiangsi was launched in May 1928. It ended in disaster for the KMT. Three KMT Divisions were ambushed by Chu Teh and attacked on their rear by two regiments under the command of Mao Tse-tung. Several hundred prisoners were captured. (Wei 1978)

**Jun 9, 1928:** Yen Hsi-shan telegraphed Chiang Kai-shek, reporting that he had followed anti-communist measures in Peking. (The Nanking-Hankow separation, chapter 4, No 53)

**Jul, 1928:** Trade agreements were signed between China and several western countries. The series started with a Sino-American treaty on 25 July 1928. It was followed by similar agreements with Germany (20 August), Belgium (22 November), Britain (20 December) and France (22 December) (USMIR 1, rel 12 frame 872)

**Jul 1928:** The governor of Sinkiang, General Yang Tseng-hsin, was assassinated at a banquet in Urumchi. He had been governor since 1912. In Kashgar (Southern Sinkiang) an independent Muslim Republic of Eastern Turkestan was set up which lasted about two months. (Times 16, 17 December 1935 p. 15)

[These articles belong to a series of three entitled “Rivalries in Sinkiang”. They describe the power struggle between Britain, Russia and Japan and observe that around 1900 all travelers were convinced that the growing Russian influence would soon be followed by de facto annexation. Yet, Russian pressure experienced eclipses during the crises of 1905, 1914-1915, 1917-1920 which diverted Russia from its objective. However, in 1935 every bazaar in the province was still flooded with cheap Russian goods: sugar, china, cigarettes, clothes and so on.]

**Sep 13, 1928:** Tibet. Not only is there an arsenal in Lhasa to provide the Tibetans with munitions for defense against the Chinese army but many of the Tibetan troops are dressed in British uniforms. (NYT 13 September 1928 Magazine p. SM 10)

**Nov 1928:** Communists suppression in Hainan. Included in the Papers of John F. Melby is a report entitled: “Communists suppression in Hainan by the 101st

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89 Xinjiang (also written Sinkiang or Hsin Chiang) means New Dominion. This article observes that this region, which is also called Eastern Turkestan, “formed part of the Chinese Empire during the last 150 years.

90 John F. Melby was a State Department diplomat who served in China from 1945 to 1948. Because he had been the lover of playwright Lillian Hellman who was (wrongly) accused of being a member of the Communist Party, he was dismissed from the State Department on 22 April 1953. After his dismissal Melby was unable to find work for several years. In spite of the fact that the press did not give any account of the reasons of his dismissal, he was so-to-say blacklisted. The Department and anti-Communist officials blocked him from positions in other government agencies. Moreover, the political climate made academic institutions wary of hiring someone who had been dismissed from the State Department. For instance, he was considered for two positions at George Washington University. Although the negotiations appeared settled, no offer came, “only vague apologies”. (Wikipedia, article entitled “John F. Melby”).
Division of the 11th Army of the National Revolution Army”. The subtitle is: “Reorganization and extinction of the bandit gang under Mo Ju-shu, Chang Men-an, Lin Shu-piao and Chen Pi-tung”.

The account contains the typical sentences of all anti-Communist accounts that were published between 1927 and 1937. Here are a few examples:

- The Communists killed the inhabitants and set houses on fire. Such incidents happened every day and the Red Terror spread far and wide.
- We shot to death all the ring leaders and all bogus officers from above the rank of sergeant.
- The people cooperated with us. The wholehearted welcome of the population toward our troops could not be expressed in words.

The report contains an appendix giving the number of bandits shot to death. The total is 503.

1. Those who were handed over by the Division to the Rehabilitation Committee of the Southern Section and shot to death: 312
2. Those who were shot to death on the spot by the troops: 191
3. Those who were shot to death without being included in the table: no figure (may be it means that there were none)

The total number of people killed in Hainan is estimated at 4,200 along with 10,000 houses burnt. Naturally, all these destructions were attributed to the Communists.

According to this report, one of the slogans of the Communists was: “Down with the legitimate husband and give support to the adulterers”.

A proclamation to the population includes the following advice for the “youth led astray”. “You will be pardoned if you kill some Communist leader, if you set Communist provision and munition on fire, if you can guide our men to attack some big group of Communists, if you have some proper gentry as guarantor”.

The last condition shows that in Hainan as elsewhere the KMT was on the side of the upper class landowners.

The file contains a telegram of felicitation addressed to the commander of the KMT troops by the Chamber of Commerce of Hainan in Hong Kong. (NDL, Papers of John F. Melby)

[In 1950 Hainan was recovered fairly easily by Communist troops.]

**1929**

**Mar 24, 1929:** The 3,200 Marines who came to Tientsin in September 1927 have all sailed back. Only the 15th Infantry Regiment remains in Tientsin. (NYT p. 155)

**Apr 17, 1929:** Signature of the “Sino-American Aviation and Post Contract” which brought Chinese civilian aviation under American control. (Shanghai News 26 November 1950)
**Jun 1929** When the American journalist Edgar Snow visited Inner Mongolia he found a drought-stricken area where, he says, some 3 million people eventually starved to death. (Snow 1940, p. 93)

[As a matter of fact, between 1910 and 1949 there were dozens of famines in China. Some were due to unfavorable weather conditions (flood or drought), others were the effect of the civil war or resulted from a combination of several factors. The famine of 1961 should be seen in this light, namely as the last of a long string of famines.]

**Aug, 1929:** The Rockefeller bloc bought the “Shanghai Municipal Electricity Department” and reorganized it into the present “Shanghai Power Company”. In the same year the “Pan American Air Lines” grabbed from China the right of civil aviation when it partially bought the “China National Aviation Corporation”. In 1930 the “International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation” bought up the “Shanghai Mutual Telephone Corporation”. (Shanghai News 29 Nov 1950 p. 3)

**Sep 28, 1929:** The American Red Cross decided not to organize Chinese famine relief. The decision was taken after a Red Cross investigation commission visited China in the summer of 1929. The report of the commission was published in October 1929 (see American National Red Cross (1929) in the reference chapter). (NYT p. 6)

The decision not to solicit the public on this issue was based on two main reasons:

- It is the inability of the railroad system to function beyond a fraction of its normal capacity rather than the scarcity of grain itself which brings about famine in some regions.

- China is permanently at the edge of famine. Even in “normal” years it is estimated that 30 million people (10% of the population) have less than the minimum required for subsistence and that about 3 million die annually of starvation. The average death rate was around 4% in the 1920s. This situation is likely to worsen in the future if the population growth continues. At the present rate one expects the present population of 340 million to double by the end of the century. (American National Red Cross (1929), Banister (1991))

[In fact, due to the reduction of the death rate after 1949, and in spite of the one child policy that started in the 1980s, between 1929 and 2000 the Chinese population was multiplied not by 2 but by 3.6]

The American Red Cross “China Advisory Committee” comprised the manager of the Peiping Branch of the National City Bank of New York, the manager of the

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91During the famine of 1960-1961 the excess mortality amounted to around 12 million deaths. Put in perspective, this large number represented the famine death toll of 4 “ordinary famine years”. Moreover one should not forget that between 1929 and 1960 the Chinese population almost doubled. In other words, in relative terms, the famine of 1960-1961 represented about 2 ordinary years of the 1920s and 1930s. This calculation does not take into account the exceptional famine years mentioned below in the chapter devoted to the mortality due to KMT actions.
Standard Oil Company of New York, the manager of the British-American Tobacco Company in Peiping, a representative of the American Catholic University in Peiping, a representative of the Methodist Mission in Peiping a representative of the the Rockefeller Foundation in the Far East.]

**Dec 5, 1929:** Dispatch No 1857 of the American Legation to the Secretary of State. A Chinese sampan (small boat also used as an habitation) owner died from wounds received in an altercation with an enlisted man of the US Navy. (Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1929, Vol. 2, China)

**Dec 12, 1929:** The Nationalist Government has made application to the State Department for an export license covering machine gun ammunition and airplane bombs for use in putting down the civil war with which it is confronted. In Washington there is the fear that a victory for the Nationalists would lead to an end of extra-territoriality. (NYT p. 5)

[The reservation contained in the last sentence means that Washington preferred a weak (but reasonably quiet) China to a united country under a strong Nationalist government. Thus, the US government had to walk a tightrope between supporting Chiang Kai-shek and at the same time rationing its aid.]

**Jan 1930:** One Chinese dollar (also called Mexican dollar probably because based on silver) was worth 0.35 US dollar. In June 1930 the exchange rate had fallen to 0.26 US dollar. (CUS, reel 16, frame 742)

**Jan 10, 1930:** The continued deliveries of American bombing planes to the Nationalist government were sanctioned by the State Department following the recognition of the Nationalist government in Nanking. In addition the German government also provided military assistance in the form of shipments of munitions and military advisers. However, factions who are opposed to Chiang Kai-shek encourage the boycott of American and German goods. (NYT p. 6)

**Feb 1930:** The French consulate in Longzhou (Guangxi province) was ransaked and put on fire by “bandits”. One officer, Captain Baronna, was killed and another, Captain Auclair, was kidnapped and released only after payment of 20,000 piastra. (Bensacq p. 219)

**Mar 16, 1930:** Lieutenant C.M. Winslow was wounded on an American steamer on the Yangtze River as the vessel was attacked by gunfire from bandit soldiery. (NYT 16 Mar 1930 p. 19)

[“Steamer” is a very general term which does not specify if it was a civilian or a Navy vessel. In this case “gunboat” would probable be more accurate. As the articles of the New York Times never mention any offensive action against Chinese “bandits”]
one would draw the conclusion that all attacks on US ships were unprovoked and that the sole role of these vessels was to protect American missionaries and property. Such a conclusion would be incorrect however. Other sources (e.g. Mackerras 1982) give evidence of the participation of this naval force on the side of the Nationalists in their war against the Communist forces (see Appendix C).]

**Apr 8, 1930:** Chiang Kai-shek telegrammed Lu Ti-ping and Wang Yun-yen, saying that the candidates for county mayors should be carefully screened. The death penalty should be used with those who had had remained in position after a Communist invasion. (The Anti-communist campaigns, Chapter 1, No 11.)

**Jul 6, 1930:** An American seaman, was killed during an attack by Chinese Communists on the US gunboat Guam at Yochow, on the Yangtse River. (NYT p. 9)

**Jul 28, 1930:** Some 10,000 Communists under Peng Teh-hwai took the city of Changsha in Hunan. Many public buildings including the Japanese consulate were burned. All Americans were safely evacuated with the assistance of the warship USS Palos and other foreign naval vessels. (CUS reel 16)

[The same event is reported in Keller’s chronology in the following form.]

**Jul 28, 1930:** Changsha taken by Communists who burned and looted the city and killed the inhabitants.(Keller p. 815)

[This report is probably taken from one of the British newspapers which reproduced KMT information. Keller’s chronology has many other entries. For instance: “On August 20, 1930 Communists burned Wusueh on the Yangtse after robbing the inhabitants”.]

**Jul 31, 1930:** Communists at Changsha fired on the American gunboat USS “Palos” wounding 5 sailors. (Keller p. 815)

**Aug 5, 1930:** With the aid of American, Italian and Japanese gunboats, Ho Chien retook the provincial capital of Changsha, Hunan on the lower reaches of Xiang river, a branch of the Yangtze River. (Clubb 1932)

[Changsha is the city where Mao Tse-tung attended school and met his wife who was later killed in that same city by the Nationalists (Wikipedia article entitled “Changsha”.).]

**Aug 20, 1930:** More than 100 Communists were arrested in raids on Communist headquarters in Peping and Nanking. (Keller p. 815)

**Oct 4, 1930:** After the city of Kian was taken by the Communists there were numerous killings before the arrival of Chu Teh’s regular troops. In December 1930 the city was retaken by the Nationalists with great slaughter of civilians. (Clubb 1932)
**Nov 1930:** The American Legation in Peiping estimated that some 150,000 people had been killed in the province of Kiangsi within the last two years. (CUS, reel 16, frame 833)

**Nov 2, 1930:** G-2 report: Communism in Honan. After the completion of the first “Northern Expedition” numerous students and bobbed-haired girls were executed for refusing to apostatize from Communism. (USMIR 1, reel 12 frame 202)

[In the United States in the early 1920s, short-cut hair was seen as a statement of independence in young women, as older people were used to girls wearing long dresses.]

**Nov 2, 1930:** G-2 report: Communism in Honan. In May 1930 the Communists established a new stronghold in the large market town of Nanhsidi in the district of Shangcheng. There can be no doubt that these insurgents are Communists and not bandits. They despoil and occasionally kill the wealthy classes and officials but treat the farmers and workers with great consideration. They are opposed to all religion. After the city of Loshan was occupied by a force of 10,000 Red soldiers the women of the city were set to work sewing uniforms for the soldiers made from cloths confiscated from the city shops. For this work they were given rice and paid at the rate of 50 coppers a day.

It is reported that the majority of the people welcomed the Reds because of the burden of oppression imposed upon them by military and civil authorities. The Reds are also reported to be implacable foes of the bandits. (USMIR 1, reel 12, frame 202)

[This fairly lucid report stands in clear contrast to many western newspaper articles who repeated the KMT thesis that Communists murdered the population indiscriminately and ravaged the areas that they occupied.]

**Nov 3, 1930:** By land, water and air 100,000 Nationalist troops moved on the Communist areas in central provinces. Planes were leading them. “The troops are moving against the Communist and bandits which have ravaged the central provinces for months”. (NYT p. 9)

[The last sentence is far from correct because quite on the contrary it was the policy of the Nationalists to use a scorched earth strategy in order to starve the Communists.]

**Nov 5, 1930:** G-2 report about Communism. At present 9/10 of Kiangsi, 1/5 of Hupeh, 1/3 of Hunan, 1/2 of Fukien and 1/10 of Kwantung are in the hands of pseudo-Communists. The Communist armies probably total 200,000 men. It is reported that money is being sent from Moscow but proof is lacking.

The Nanking government has ordered 150,000 troops to Communist infested areas to put down the Red disorder. The capable Ho Ying-chin has been placed in command
of the forces for Communist suppression. Practically every day a foreign ship is fired upon on the Yangtze. All fire is returned with interest.

17 foreign hostages (American, British, French, Norwegian, Spanish, Swiss) are in bandit or Communist hands.

[Signed] Lieutenant-Colonel Nelson E. Margetts, Military Attaché.

(USMIR 1, reel 12, frame 208-210.)

-Nov 14, 1930: Murder of Mao Zedong’s wife- The daughter of Yang Changji, head of the Hunan First Normal School and one of Mao’s favorite teachers, she married Mao Zedong in 1920. She joined the Communist Party of China soon after it was created in 1921. In October 1930, the local warlord Hei Jang of Kuomintang (KMT) captured her along with her son, Mao Anying. The KMT put them in prison. They wanted her to renounce Mao and Communism publicly. She still loved her husband and would not speak out against him. Anying, then 8, was forced to watch as the KMT tortured and killed his mother.


-Nov 19, 1930: Anti-foreign argument given in a Chinese middle school textbook.- Chao San asked: “Why is it that foreign goods are so inexpensive?”

His father replied: “China cannot fix the customs rates according to her desire. The rates are fixed by foreigners and are very low, so their goods can be sold here very cheaply. Chinese goods cannot compete. Everywhere the markets of local goods have been encroached upon.”

(USMIR 1, reel 13 frame 109)

[Nowadays, the situation is exactly the opposite. The reason is not the same however. In the 1920s wages in western countries were higher than in China, the price of western products was lower because of the productivity gains of mass-production. In 2011, production techniques in China and in western countries are basically the same; Chinese products are cheaper because of a lower cost of living in China.]

-Dec 15, 1930: The American information network in China.- The US embassy in China receives reports from consuls all over China who in turn are kept informed by various Americans and friendly Chinese. In addition, arrangements have been made so that “Standard Oil” agents from all over China report on political and military affairs to this office.

[signed] Nelson E. Margetts, Military Attaché.

(USMIR 1, reel 13 frame 115)

[Journalists are also likely to be a source of information for the State Department.]
Such links are quite obvious when one reads a newspaper such as the New York Times.]

1931

**Jan 10, 1931:** A portion of the Eighth Division which has been engaged in a Communist suppression campaign in Kiangsi province is facing annihilation being completely surrounded and vastly outnumbered by a great Communist force. Meanwhile President Chiang Kai-shek seeks loans from Tientsin banks. (NYT p. 8)

**Feb 7, 1931:** 23 Communists were executed by the Kuomintang police at Longhua, Shanghai. Among those murdered were 5 writers and poets, including Hu Yeping, lover of Ding Ling and father of her child, later recognized as a martyr by the Party. (Spence (J.D.) 1982: The gate of heavenly peace: the Chinese and their Revolution, 1895-1980. Faber and Faber, London (p. 230-232), cited in the Wikipedia article entitled “Kang Sheng”.)

**Mar 1931:** Most of the 14th and 45th Divisions deserted or went over to the Communists. (CUS 1, reel 16, frame 942)

**Mar 24, 1931:** Chiang Kai-shek ordered that the Communists should no longer be dignified by the title “foi-kung” (Communist rebels) but should be called “Chi-fei” (Red bandits). (Clubb 1932)

[The policy of systematically executing prisoners (see below) may have come as a consequence of this change of attitude.

**Apr 27, 1931:** The Wuhan Nationalist Headquarters reported that Ho Lung’s army had been annihilated with 1,800 Red soldiers “decapitated without delay”. Similarly, on 16 May 1931 7,000 Reds were killed in action; all 287 prisoners including many women soldiers were executed (Clubb 1932, Ta Kung Pao of 27 April 1931)

**May 3, 1931:** 88 suspected Communists were killed by firing squads in Swatow (Shantou), a seaport in Guangdong facing the southern part of the island of Taiwan). (NYT p. 1)

**May 4, 1931:** Coupled with the announcement of Nanking of its intention to end extraterritoriality rights, came news that the British cruiser HMS Vindictive has been ordered to proceed to Nanking at full speed, while the heavy cruisers HMS Berwick and HMS Cumberland were proceeding to WeihaiWei (a seaport on the Chantoung peninsula not far from Tsingtao), a former British settlement and a base of the “China Station” of the Royal Navy which had been recently returned to China. (NYT p. 10)

[Obviously Britain was more concerned by the surrender of extraterritoriality rights
than was the United States. The American attitude is explained in the following terms (NYT 5 May 1931 p. 10).

(i) The announcement of this suppression is made mainly to content the public opinion in China.

(ii) As the decision will not become effective until 1 January 1932, there is still time to negotiate a gradual extinction of these rights.

(iii) Two years ago the Chinese government decided to abolish Japanese extraterritoriality rights but Japan refused to accept this decision and Chinese authorities were unable to implement it.]

**May 18, 1931:** Table of rewards and punishments Excerpt.

- Whoever harbors any Red bandits will be liable to punishment as a Communist bandit.
- Where any person is found guilty of destroying military telegraph wires or posts, the entire inhabitants of the village to which the offender belongs will be held jointly responsible for the offense.

(Clubb 1932)

[Clubb adds that the common punishment for the offenses for which the population is thus given vicarious responsibility is death.]

**May 30, 1931:** Policy of Soviet Russia in Outer Mongolia. In 1920 Russia had supported a separatist uprising in Outer Mongolia. The Chinese army fought hard to put it down but was far out-numbered and eventually defeated. In the Sino-Russian Pact of 1924 Russia formally recognized Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia. However, at the same time the Soviets were encouraging young Mongolians to study in Russia. (China Weekly Review p. 470)

[The policy of Russia in Outer Mongolia appears similar to the US policy with respect to Taiwan after the US recognized Beijing in 1979. As one knows, the independence of Outer Mongolia was eventually recognized by China in 1949 and in the following decades until 1990 the country became a de facto satellite of the USSR. This episode certainly contributed to souring the relations between the two countries in the 1970s.]

**May 30, 1931:** According to an official report presented by General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, who has been in charge of the anti-red drive in recent months and in which 200,000 of the government’s best troops were involved, in Kiangsi province alone 186,000 persons had been massacred by the reds, over 100,000 homes had been burned and 2.1 millions people forced to flee to other provinces. In Hunan province the number of persons massacred by the reds was placed at 72,000 and the number of houses destroyed at 120,000. (China Weekly Review p. 456)
[Given that the Nationalists were conducting a scorched earth policy, it is likely that the houses were rather destroyed by them. Among the civilians who died quite a few were probably executed after being accused of being Communists. This is the standard pattern of anti-guerrilla warfare. Moreover, it is a standard trick to camouflage one’s own massacres behind accusations targeted at others. For instance, a similar episode was reported during the Vietnam war by Philip Jones Griffiths, an English journalist. His observations in the Vietnamese city of Hue during the Tet offensive of 1968 convinced him that thousands of civilians were killed by an “hysterical use of US fire-power”. American rockets and bombs, not Communist assassinations, caused 90% of the civilian death toll. 75% of the houses were either destroyed or seriously damaged. Afterward in Western media the victims were reported as having been slaughtered by the Communist forces (D. Gareth Porter 1974: The Hue massacre. Indochina Chronicle 33, p.11)]

**Jun 1931:** Between January and June 1931, 382 Chinese students went to foreign countries to pursue higher education:
Japan:200, USA:66, France:53, Germany:25, Belgium:19, UK:14
(The China Yearbook 1934, 16th issue)
[It can be recalled that both Chiang Kai-shek and Zhou Enlai went to Japan to pursue their studies.]

**Jun 6, 1931:** Manifesto of Chiang Kai-shek as he joined his troops for a new extermination campaign: “I am confident that complete extermination of the Communist bandits will be effected within the shortest possible time.” (CUS 1, reel 16, frame 1008)

**Jun 11, 1931:** A slaughter took place near Kiangfu, Kiangsi Province when thousands of non-combatant peasants were machine gunned by 3,000 government troops. Subsequently, the Nationalist troops were routed and wiped out by Communist troops. (NYT p. 1)

**Jun 11, 1931:** The American destroyer Pillsbury proceeded to Foochow as a precautionary measure in view of reports that Communists are advancing on Foochow following a sweeping victory over government troops at Taining. (NYT p. 1)
[What was exactly the role of the Pillsbury? It would be of interest to have more details.]

**Jun 11, 1931:** It is well known that “Winning the hearts” is key in civil wars. The following New York Times article describes the strategy of the Nationalists for that
Fig. 9.3 Cover of Time Magazine (26 Oct 1931) General Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. The caption of the photograph says “President of China and wife” although this was not his official title. After 1931, Chiang and his wife made the cover of Time magazine 7 times: 11 Dec 1933, 24 Feb 1936, 1 Jun 1942, 1 Mar 1943, 3 Sep 1945, 6 Dec 1948, 18 Apr 1955. However, it seems that, except of course through his wife, he never personally felt close to the United States as is revealed by the fact that, instead of sending his son to an American University, he sent him to study in Berlin. It also appears that he was never completely trusted by the Department of State. In several instances (e.g. during the Xian crisis of December 1936) some of his competitors like Ho Ying-chin or Wang Chin-wei received positive encouragements from American officials or newspapers.

General Chiang Kai-shek announced the organization of a special committee of leading scholars in political science and economics to accompanying him to Kiangsi province in his drive against Communists. (NYT p. 1) [One may wonder if this was really the best way of winning the hearts of a population of peasants?]

Jun 27, 1931: The following New York Times article is of particular interest because it encapsulates the main characteristics of the confrontation between Nationalists and Communists during the following decades.

The Nationalist government is ready to launch 500,000 men against a Communist force of 120,000 in Kiangsi province. It has ample funds available for this campaign. The original strategy was to surround the Reds, but earlier attempts have resulted in disasters because the Communists were able to identify the weakest point and break
through by inflicting heavy losses on the Nationalists. The present plan is to drive
the bandits [the terms Reds, Communists or bandits are used as synonyms].
The Communist army has rifles and ample munitions mostly from earlier victo-
ries over isolated government divisions. The Reds practice a system of retiring
under pressure, keeping their crack troops intact and attacking tired government
forces. They have achieved unified command under the leadership of Chuteh and
Maochehtung [sic]. The guerrilla warfare strategy that they are conducting is made
possible by the fanatical support of the peasantry. (NYT p. 8)

**Aug 30, 1931:** The American Yangtze Patrol is playing a leading part in the relief
work now being done by the American Asiatic fleet in the regions of China flooded
by the Yangtze River. Homeless people are carried away from flooded areas. (NYT
p. XX5)

**Nov 7, 1931:** The Chinese Soviet Republic (CSR) was established with Ruijin (Juikin)
as its capital. (Mackerras 1982 p. 338)

**Nov 7, 1931:** The “Ta Kung Pao” newspaper reported the bombing of villages in
south east Honan under the impression that they were Red. (Clubb 1932, Ta Kung
Pao 7 November 1931)

**Jan 24, 1932:** Shanghai. Pruynges was murdered in daylight at the hands of the
military. (CUS reel 16)

[Who was the person who was murdered?]

**Feb 7, 1932:** China: The vast arena of world rivalries and US policy in China. The
American capital could find no really workable region in which to build a railroad
because every site had been pre-empted by the Europeans [and Japan], hence the
American policy in favor of the “open door policy”. At the same time US policy was
that the territorial and administrative integrity of China must be preserved. (NYT 7
February 1932 p. XX, Section: Science-Resorts-Travel)
Because the United States was a latecomer in China, the main objective of US policy was to prevent any other country to establish a de facto colony. This had occurred in Tibet after the British invasion and would occur in subsequent years in north-east China in the wake of the Japanese penetration. In short, the open door policy requirement saved the territorial integrity of China. This can be contrasted with US support for the disintegration of a number of countries after 1990 such as Czechoslovakia or Yugoslavia.

Mar 7, 1932  In Jianxi the Communist army of general Peng Dehuai was completely defeated. Some 10,000 troops were killed and 2,600 became prisoners. They were interned in two camps in Hankou. (Bensacq p. 146)

[This is a rare mention of Communist soldiers interned in camps by the Kuomintang. It raises the question of how long they were held and how many survived.]

Apr 29, 1932: At the celebration for the birthday of Emperor Hirohito at Lu Xun Park in Shanghai, a Korean independence activist, Yoon Bong-Gil threw a bomb at a reviewing stand killing General Yoshinori Shirakawa, commander in chief of the Shanghai Expeditionary Army, and wounding several others, including Mamoru Shigemitsu, the Japanese Minister to China. Shigemitsu lost his right leg in the attack, and walked with an artificial leg and cane for the rest of his life. (Wikipedia, articles entitled “Yoshinori Shirakawa” and “Mamoru Shigemitsu”)

May 1932: In May 1932 the 12th Red Army was under the command of General Mao Tse-tung.

Jun 11, 1932: Account of American missionaries who were prisoners of the Communists. Members of a Lutheran mission were released. All were treated with every consideration. The Vikner family told the following story. All of them wore glasses but were ordered to turn them in. Later all glasses were returned with the exception of those of the Reverend Vikner. He was informed that his glasses fitted a comrade who was badly in need of them and was asked how much he had paid for them. To his reply of 8 dollars he was proposed the money in payment. The release was said to have been made because the captives came from a poor mission and had done no harm to the countrymen. (USMIR 1, reel 13)

Jun 20, 1932: Ransom asked by the Communist for the release of a Canadian subject. Excerpt.

Before any negotiation the following must be delivered.

1  Wireless equipment complete. Up to 75 watt.
2  Foreign medicine to the value of $10,000.
3  Cash $20,000.
4 Several vehicles including an ambulance.

(CUS 1, reel 16)

[In a letter to the British Consul General in Nanking Mr. Ferguson, a Canadian missionary, explained that he was accused of opposing the Soviet government in Honan and of helping to organize forces against that government.]

**Jun 29, 1932:** Brigadier General Wang Chen-yun was charged with desertion of post of duty when the Kiangsi Reds attacked Lungyen in Fukien. He was found guilty and executed on 29 June 1932. Other KMT officers were executed.

[Signed] W.S. Drysdale, Lt. Col., Military Attaché

(USMIR 1, reel 12)

**Jul 12, 1932:** On May 15 the Reds had established their Headquarters in Hochiu (Anhui province). The government offensive started on July 12. Airplanes were used which rained bombs on the city defenders: 2,000 were killed. (North China Herald, 27 July 1932)

[On account of the customary poor accuracy of Nationalist bombings it can be expected that among the 2,000 defenders there were also a good number of civilians who were not defenders.]

**Jul 17, 1932:** Shanghai. 93 alleged Communists were arrested in a raid on the Kung Ho Theater during a meeting of radicals. Among them were a number of students. They will have to stand trial. (North China Herald 27 July 1932)

[As the Communist party was illegal it is highly unlikely that it would have organized a meeting in a theater. It is likely that these “radicals” were rather leftists or liberals.]

**Jul 18, 1932:** Collaboration between the American Consulate and the Nationalist security forces. “General Wu Te-chen presented to me a list of various persons suspected of being Soviet agents with the request that we assist him in observing the activities of these persons. (CUS 1, reel 16)


The missionaries held in the Soviet districts have acted as military spies for the Kuomintang to aid in the attacks on the Red Army. The Soviet government has good and sufficient reason for detaining them. Nevertheless it is prepared to free all missionaries now detained in exchange for the release of the Noulins by the Nanking government. (CUS 1, reel 16)

[Mr. and Mrs Hilaire Noulens (whose real names were Paul and Gertrude Ruegg) were arrested by the Shanghai Municipal Police (that is to say the police of the international settlement) on 15 June 1931. They were the representatives of the Far Eastern Bureau of the Comintern. Turned over to the Kuomintang authorities, they
were tried and sentenced, Nrl. Noulens to death and Mrs Noulens to life imprison-
ment.
In his book “An instance of treason” (p. 61), Chalmers Johnson says that they were
released in June 1932. This is obviously in contradiction with the previous declara-
tion.]

**Jul 20, 1932:** An Anti-Communist federation was formed in Peiping by 7 Chinese
organizations. They want to rid Peiping of the red menace. The Chinese Communist
party is still an illegal organization but there are many Communists in the universi-
ties. (North China Herald 27 July 1932)
[The article adds that among the 7 organizations there were several anti-Japanese
societies. This seems highly unlikely for two reasons.

- As will become fairly clear in the following months, by mid-1932 Japan was
  already the leading authority in the North of China and particularly in Peiping.
- As stamping out Communism was one of the main objectives of the Japanese,
  any anti-Communist organization was bound to cooperate with Japan.

**Jul 27, 1932:** Central Committee of the Provisional Government of the Soviet Re-
public whose headquarters are at Juikin, Kiangsi province: Mao Shih Tung (chair-
man), Hong Ying, Chang Koh Tao, Chou Ung Lai, Chu Tuh.
(CUS 1, reel 16)
[The list of the members of the Central Committee was given to the American Con-
sulate General in Shanghai by the police of the International Settlement and sent
to the State Department on 19 October 1932. We have kept the bizarre spelling of
several of the names.]

**Jul 27, 1932:** Tibet. In the previous weeks the war between Tibetan and Chinese
troops at the border of Sikiang and Tibet has turned to the advantage of China.
In a petition the Dalai Lama affirmed his loyalty to the Chinese government saying
that all reports to the contrary were the propaganda of the Panchen Lama. “It will
be recalled, he wrote, that it was the Panchen Lama who invited the British troops to
Lhasa during the last period of the Manchu dynasty [i.e. around 1905].
The Panchen Lama responded with his own petition saying: “From the early days of
the Tsing Dynasty Panchen Lama has remained loyal to the Chinese government and
he was responsible for bringing whole Tibet into the fold of China”.
The article also gives the following explanations regarding the Dalai Lama. (i) In
1911 the present Dalai Lama drove out the Chinese Commissioner from Lhasa. (ii)
Then, on several occasions, he attempted to declare the independence of Tibet. (iii)
He prohibited free trade between China and Tibet and sold mines in Tibet to foreign
companies.
[In short, the Dalai Lama’s loyalty claim is probably due to the fact that he felt an erosion in British support. As Tibetan troops were armed and trained by Britain, their defeat clearly showed a weakened British influence. More details are given in the chapter about Tibet.]

**Aug 3, 1932:** Red situation in Hupeh. A total of 8 million inhabitants of Hupeh, numbering a quarter of the province’s population are living in the area under the influence of Red armies. Owing to the fact that their pay is in arrears, the expeditionary force is dispirited and disposed to rebel. It is rumored that the 88th Division has mutinied. (North China Herald, 3 August 1932)

**Sep 16, 1932:** Excerpts of a letter by C.W. Young to the “Institute of Current World Affairs”.
I was privileged to have several conversations with Mr. T.V. Soong, Minister of Finance of the Nationalist government. It was in one of these conversations that Mr. W.H. Donald and I obtained Mr. Soong’s approval to a plan which would not only develop League of Nations aid programs in China but would in certain eventualities clothe foreign advisers with supervisory and control powers over phases of financial administration when foreign loans were involved.” (ICWA 1)
[This letter suggests how aid programs provided occasions for extending foreign control in China.
In the same letter Young explains that after he returned to the United States he had numerous contacts with faculty, persons working for the Department of State and also with bankers. Thus, in late October 1932 he met with a dozen officials of the National City Bank at a luncheon arranged by Mr. William North, an English manager of the Tientsin branch of the National City with whom he had traveled across the Pacific. The National City Bank had considerable interests in Japan, Manchuria and China. The managers present at the luncheon were in the main attached to the Bank’s Far Eastern Department.]

**Sep 16, 1932:** The Pingdingshan massacre. At a village called Pingdingshan (near Fushun in northwest China’s Liaoning Province) 3,000 villagers (mostly women, children and elderly) were executed by Japanese soldiers. A witness who was able to escape declared: “The Japanese soldiers told us they were going to take our picture and gathered us in a group. But under the black cloth they did not have cameras, they had machine guns”. (Xinhuanet 5 May 2009)
[This article was about the visit that a member of the Japanese Diet, Kumiko Aihara, made in this village to hand over an apology signed by 24 other members of the Diet.]
It can be noted that this massacre occurred about 5 years before the massacre of Nanking.

This article raises two questions:

• The Japanese Army did not kill all villagers in all villages that it came to occupy. Why was this village singled out? Was it because Japanese soldiers had been killed by partisans in this village?

Taking reprisal action after such attacks is a fairly common tactic but usually it is performed through artillery fire or by strafing and bombing the villages in the same area. For instance (for more details see the chronology) in mid-November 1945 US planes strafed the village from where shots were fired at an American military train. In another episode, on 9 December 1945, US Marines fired mortars shells into a village near Tientsin after a Marine was killed by Chinese gunmen.

Similarly, during the invasion of Germany in 1944-1945, when Allied soldiers were killed by partisans in an occupied village, the standard tactic was to withdraw the troops and to shell the village by artillery or to call in the aviation to bomb it.

The same tactic was used during the war that a coalition led by the United States waged in Afghanistan. For instance, on 6 May 2009 more than 100 villagers (mostly women, children and elderly) were killed after an air strike was called in by US troops.

Although such tactics can lead to heavy losses in the civilian population, they are seen in a different light than killings by machine gun. This is a consequence of Milgram’s law according to which the inhibition which prevents a person from harming another in cold blood is all the more stronger when the two persons are closer to one another.

Stanley Milgram’s experiments have shown that from bayoneting to bombing by aircraft (or by unmanned remotely controlled drone aircraft), homicide becomes easier and better accepted. Yet, it is murder all the same and if such actions ever come before a court of justice they would probably be sentenced similarly.

• The second question concerns the account made by the survivor. As it is impossible in practice to take a picture of 3,000 persons (or even to pretend doing so), one must suppose that the villagers were gathered in several small groups and that the account refers to one of these groups.

An article published on 30 November 1932 in the “North China Herald” describes a massacre which is fairly similar: 2,700 villagers were machine gunned and their corpses burned. It refers probably to the same village.

**Oct 17, 1932:** The KMT tried to solve the land problem by the “Land Allotment Ordinance”. However Article 3 of this ordinance shows the deep divide between this project and the population. It says: “Article 3: The magistrate of the Land Allotment
district shall be selected from the Commanders of the Bandit Suppression troops by General Headquarters of the Bandit Suppression Army.” (USMIR 1, reel 12)

[In a general way relations between KMT troops and the population were not good. How then can one imagine that a military commander would be able (or willing) to solve the land problem? As a matter of fact, the main purpose of this ordinance seems to have been the allotment of land to the military.]

1933

1933: A Chinese variant of fascism.

In Italy Mussolini came to power in October 1922 and in Germany Hitler became chancellor in January 1933. The fact that fascism was openly taken as a model by Chiang Kai-shek is attested by his own declarations. For instance in 1935 he declared “Fascism is what China now most needs”.

As in Italy and in Germany an elite organization called the “Blue Shirts” was created. Although its membership was restricted (in 1935 it had only 10,000 members), it permeated many security organizations such as the “Central Military Police”, the “Public Security Office”, the “Peace Preservation Corps”, the “National Military Training Commission”, the “Communist Annihilation Volunteer Militia”. The later organization was in charge of enforcing the blockade of Communist areas.

Tai Li’s “Special Services” was also a component of the “Blue Shirts”. The number of operatives of the so-called “Second Department” of the “Special Services” grew from 145 in 1932 to 50,000 in 1945. Himmler’s SS organization in Germany had a similar exponential growth.

(Eastman 1974, p. 31-84)

[One may wonder what was the common factor in the emergence of fascist regimes in Italy, Germany, China, Spain, Poland, South Korea (after 1948) and a number of other countries. The most obvious common factor seems to be the threat of communism and socialism. All these dictatorships were funded by business organizations as bulkwars against Communism. As an illustration one can recall that in early 1933 the “German Association of Manufacturers” issued a proclamation calling on Hitler as the next chancellor. Shortly after Hitler was in power the first German concentration camps were set up to imprison Communists and leftists.

In the United States there were anti-Roosevelt organizations such as the “American Legion”, the “Sentinels of the Republic”, the “Crusaders”, the “American Liberty League”, the “Southern Committee to Uphold the Constitution”. In the early months of the Roosevelt presidency there was even an attempt to recruit Marine Corps Major General Smedley Butler to organize a coup. The plan was to bring to power a deputy-president and to relegate Roosevelt to a purely honorific position (by invoking his health). The plan failed miserably but in the following years the “National
Association of Manufacturers” waged a relentless war against President Roosevelt, even likening him to Stalin or Mussolini, because he was deemed definitely “too soft on labor”.]

Jan 15, 1933: Fate of the “Chinese League for the Protection of Civil Rights”. The following account comes from a book by Lloyd Eastman (1974). It reveals the dark side of the Kuomintang political system. The League was formed in mid-January 1933 under the chairmanship of Soong Ching-ling, the widow of Sun Yat-sen. In March 1933 it published a letter from prisoners that describes the torture methods to which they were submitted. The activities of the League were soon crushed. On 18 June 1933, its secretary Yang Chuan was ambushed by 5 men and murdered. (Eastman 1974, p. 22)

1933: It is in 1933 that George Hatem, an American medical doctor, arrived in Shanghai. On week ends, along with other foreigners, he used to go to the Longhua Temple where young Communists were executed by firing squad or by being beheaded. (Alley and Burchett 1975, p. 231; Wikipedia article entitled “Longhua Temple”)

[The Longhua pagoda had been used as an execution place especially after the crackdown on the Communists in 1927. This excerpt shows that such executions continued in the 1930s. Today the numerous victims are commemorated by the “Longhua Martyrs Cemetery” behind the temple. The former execution ground can also be seen.]

Jan 15, 1933: Declaration made by the Soviet Provisional Government of China. [Excerpt]
“The Red Army is ready to enter into fighting operative agreements with any army for the struggle against the Japanese invasion under the following conditions:

- Immediate cessation of the advance against the Soviet districts.
- Immediate grant of democratic rights to the people (right of assembly, of free speech, of the press).

We ask the masses of the people and soldiers of China to support this call for a revolutionary struggle for the independence and unity of China.

[Signed] Chairman of the Provisional Soviet Government of China: Mao Tsueh-tung; Chairman of the Military Council: Chu Teh; Vice-Chairman Chang Kwo-tao and Hsiang Ing. (NCH 18 Jan 1933 p. 83)

Apr 3, 1933: Communism outlawed in Thailand. A royal decree was issued according to which the spreading of Communist propaganda was made an offense punishable by imprisonment for 10 years. On 13 November martial law was still in force, arrests continued and military courts were busy. (China Today, Jan. 1935)

Apr 6, 1933: Chiang Kai-shek told all the military commanders that the elimination of the communists was the priority and this should be done before the war against Japan. (The Anti-communist campaigns, Chapter 1, No 38.)

May 1933: At this point the outcome of the Communist suppression campaigns was a great failure. Communist influence was rapidly spreading to a large part of Central China. Three elements will reverse this trend.

- A truce was signed with the Japanese in May 1933.
- The United States agreed to a $50 million loan.
- The KMT adopted the counter-insurgency strategy suggested by German military advisers which was based on building vast lines of block houses around Communist positions. Among the German advisers of Chiang Kai-shek there were 4 experts in gas and chemical warfare: Moltke, Koever, Neuberger and Blume (frame 783)

Moreover, since the resumption of friendly relations between the Nationalist government and Soviet Russia in 1932, there has been no cause of complaint about Russia in regard to the Internal affairs of China [which means that the aid extended by Russia to Chinese Communists had been minimal.] (USMIR 1, reel 12)

May 4, 1933: Chiang Kai-shek finalized the guidelines and the verbal tips for the anti-communist campaign. (The Anti-communist campaigns, Chapter 1, No 40-41.)

May 31, 1933: Through the Tanggu Truce Agreement the Nationalist Government ceded Heilongjiang [northern part of Manchuria], Jehol, Jilin and Fengtian to Japan. (Mackerras 1982 p. 346)

[This agreement confirmed that the first priority of the Nationalist government was the war against the Communists. Following the truce, the 4th Independent Division which was on its way to Northern China to fight the Japanese was diverted to Kiangsi to fight the Reds. (NCH 14 Jun 1933 p. 411)]

Aug 29, 1933: Lo Tuan-hsien, worker and communist organizer (he was Secretary of the seamen union), was arrested by British police in the Shanghai International Settlement on 28 March 1933. Turned over to the KMT authorities he was executed on 29 August 1933. (China Today, Vol. 1, Jan 1934)

[We mentioned this arrest and execution because it describes a course of actions which was repeated many, many times: arrest in the International Settlement, expulsion from the International Settlement into the hands of the KMT and execution. In the months of June to September 1933 “China Today” mentioned 8 cases of this kind. It is likely that this represents only a fraction of the total number of cases. This also below the date of 25 November 1933 and the arrests in universities on 21
October 4, 1933: A report written by a French diplomat in Chengdu (Sichuan province) gives a measure of US economic penetration. He writes: “When I arrived here 8 years ago (i.e. in 1925) there were only a dozen cars. Now there are hundreds of beautiful cars, all of them American. There is only one French car, namely mine. In the same report he foresees very well the future development of China. “There are already factories which make guns and turbines. In the near future, most industrial products which currently are only produced abroad will all be manufactured in China”.

In addition, US companies established joint ventures, for instance the “South West Aviation Corporation” and the “China National Aviation Corporation” created in 1929. (“Béchamp Report” of 4 October 1933 cited in Bensacq p. 263-264)

October 8, 1933: Two US warships, the destroyers Peary and Houston, crashed in the port of Shanghai. The Peary was damaged in the collision. (NYT p. 3)

October 18, 1933: Excerpt from the “North China Herald”. Marshal Tien Sung-yao has some horrible tales of atrocity to tell about the Communists in Szechuen. “All their wounded were killed before they fell into his hands to prevent the leakage of secrets.” (North China Herald p. 89)

[The expression “extermination campaign” used by the Nationalists suggests that they did not wish to make prisoners. Pretending that the prisoners were killed by the Communists themselves was of course an easy way to reject any responsibility in these killings.]

November 25, 1933: White Terror. Martial law was declared in Shanghai, Peiping, Tientsin, Hankow, Chanchow and Ningpo. Liberal book stores, publishers and film producers were raided by Blue Jackets, a Chiang Kai-shek fascist organization similar to the SA in Germany or the black shirts in Italy. (China Today, vol. 2, Feb-Mar 1934)

December 21, 1933: Mass arrests in 7 Shanghai universities were begun on the night of 21 December under the slogan of “bandit suppression in the schools”. (China Today, vol. 2, Feb-Mar 1934)

December 31, 1933: According to incomplete statistics the number of victims of white terror during the year 1933 was 277,000 slain in Central China, 57,000 slain in South China. In addition, 80,000 were imprisoned which in KMT prison is really a death sentence: small, overcrowded, unlighted, and unventilated rooms, no heating in winter, and torture a daily lot of many prisoners. (China Today April 1934)

[The author of this article does not give the source on which these numbers are based.]
In November 1934 the same publication gave an estimate of one million people murdered by Chiang Kai-shek’s rule since 1927, a figure which does not include those who died in war or famine. Again no source is given.

1934

**1934:** In 1934 the Communist underground movement in Qingdao was eliminated after party leaders were arrested and executed by the Nationalists. (Yang 1998, p. 50)

[One would like more precise dates but this source does not give more details.]

**Feb 24, 1934:** Tibet under British rule. It was a well known fact, even though not officially admitted by Downing Street, that the Dalai Lama was a British puppet who kept Tibet closed to everyone except England although the area was historically a part of the old China Empire. (The China Weekly Review vol. 67, no 13, p. 466)

[This review was an American publication which supported Chiang Kai-shek.]

**Mar 1934:** By March 1934, 2,400 kilometer of roads have been built in Kiangsi for the purpose of waging an anti-Communist extermination campaign. (Wei 1978, p. 200)

[The first campaign against the Communists in Kiangsi was launched in May 1928. It ended in disaster for the KMT troops. Three Divisions were ambushed by Chu Teh and attacked on their rear by two regiments under the command of Mao. Several hundred prisoners were captured (Wei 1978).]

**May 13, 1934:** A looming commercial war between Britain and Japan. In 1913 Britain dominated the cotton market of the world with a total export of 6,750 million square meters of cotton fabrics. In 1933 Britain exported only 2,030 million while Japan for the first time surpassed Britain with 2,090 million. In early 1933 the government of India denounced the Indo-Japanese commercial treaty and increased the tariff on foreign goods to 75%. This move was directed mainly against Japan and it was followed by similar measures in other parts of the British Empire. The same article also mentions that the Japanese government opposed the aid programs that the League of Nations provided to China. (NYT Sunday, Special Features Section)

**May 13, 1934:** The growing Activity of western technical experts of the League of Nations in China is a challenge for Japan. (NYT Sunday, Section Special Features)

[The nature of this challenge was commercial and also financial as became clear one month later, on 17 June (see below).]

**June 17, 1934:** Charged by a syndicate of bankers to negotiate a loan for China,
Fig. 9.5a  Blockhouse built by Nationalist forces in their drive against the Red areas in South East China. The picture shows one the blockhouses built by the Nationalist Army during their 6th extermination campaign in 1933-1934. According to the characters on its facade, this blockhouse was called Pinganpao (Peace and Security). The caption of the photograph in “China Today” where it was originally published says that “scores of such forts were built” ; it would be of interest to know how many at least approximately for this would allow us to estimate the cost of the construction program in terms of building time and logistic requirements. Source: China Today (December 1934, p. 45).

Fig. 9.5b  Two blockhouses built by the Nationalist Army on both sides of a bridge over a river. The photograph is taken from an aircraft of the Nationalist Air Force which is why it is fairly unclear. According to articles written by Communist leaders (e.g. Chou En-lai) in early 1935, it seems that they underestimated the effectiveness of this network of blockhouses. Source: China Today (February 1935, p. 45).

Jean Monnet went recently to see General Chiang Kai-shek at Nanchang, the center of his operations against the Reds. (NYT p. E8)

[This loan was proposed to China by a consortium of western banks which did not include Japanese banks. This was in contradiction with the “International Banking Consortium Agreement” (signed on 15 October 1920 by representatives of banks in London, Paris, Tokyo and New York) which assured to Japan the option of participating in loans granted to China. For this reason, Japan considered this initiative as an hostile move.]

Aug 1934:  American and German advisers. Colonel John Jouett is in charge of the Hangchow air school with 14 former US Air Corps pilots. Curtiss-Wright will build an aircraft factory at Hangchow for an amount of $ 5 million.

On 14 September 1934 Senator Gerald Nye declared to the Associated Press: “We have evidence that China used a $ 10 million wheat loan from the United States last
General Von Sekt is chief military adviser to Nanking. There are 70 other German officers in China. From 1926 to 1931 Germany had supplied 37% of China’s imports of arms and munitions. (China Today, August 1934)

**Oct 1934:** Pro- or anti-American attitude of Chinese generals. Observations made by Colonel Joseph Stilwell.

1. General Yu Hsueh-Chung. Has always been decidedly friendly with Americans.
2. General Sung Che-Yuang. Exceptionally friendly to Americans but hostile to Japanese.
3. General Ho Chu-Kuo. Has not manifested any desire to be associated to the Americans. Yet, it is not believed that he is anti-American.
5. General Chen Ming-shu. Anti-foreign.
6. General Wu Tieh Cheng. He speaks English quite well. May be classed as very favorable toward Americans. His wife is studying English. General Wu and his wife represent the most able class of public servants in China today.

(USMIR 1, reel 12, frames 817, 828, 842)

**Nov 1934:** The British ship SS Chiaho was used for the transportation of “Red suppression troops”. The French merchant marine was also busily engaged in the transportation of Chinese troops. (China Today November 1934)

**Nov 1934:** Deflation in China. In spite of the fact that the expenses of the Chinese government exceeded its income, the country experienced deflation rather than inflation. One may wonder why?

It was an indirect consequence of the huge purchases of silver made by the United States. This raised the price of silver and resulted in substantial exports of silver out of China.

In contrast with Mexico whose currency was also based on silver, China was not a silver producing country.

After World War II the fact that government expenses continued to be far in excess of its receipts led to high inflation eventually followed by hyperinflation shortly before the military collapse of the KMT.

(China Today, November 1934)

**Nov 2, 1934:** Some 3,000 communist prisoners are confined in the prison at Chao-hochin near Shanghai. Served with meals mixed with sand and paper, they are starving to death. Political prisoners are bound with heavy handcuffs making it impossible to move or even to sleep. Many prisoners have already died. (CUS 1, reel 16)
Nov 11, 1934: Chi Hung-chang was a KMT general who strongly opposed the Japanese. He was seriously injured in a murder attack by Blue Jackets that occurred in the French concession of Shanghai. At the request of Chinese officials the French authorities handed him over to them along with another general, Jen Ying-chi. They were then moved to Peiping and executed on 24 November by special order of Chiang Kai-shek. Subsequently British and Japanese authorities searched the apartments of the friends of the victims and reported that they found Communist literature in their possession. (China Today, Feb 1935)

Nov 25, 1934: A tide of Communists rolling westward with General Chiang Kai-shek’s soldiers pressing its rear forced missionaries throughout south central China to evacuate their stations. (NYT p. 26)

Jan 4, 1935: Chiang Kai-shek telegrammed Ho Chien and Liu Hsiang, saying that actions should be taken to trace and eliminate Hsiao Ko, Ho Lung, Chu Te and Mao Zedong. (The Anti-communist campaigns, Chapter 1, No 49.)

Jan 30, 1935: Appeal of Ms. Sun Yat-sen to the American People: “To the American friends of the Chinese people”.

“With the aid of foreign arms and ammunition, a foreign General Staff, foreign airplanes and pilots93, the Nanking government has destroyed hundreds of villages and towns, bombing women and children as well as men. The prisons are jammed with political prisoners and the most barbarous methods of torture are used against them. Foreign news agencies and correspondents shamelessly sing the praises of the perpetrators of these atrocities.”

[signed] Soong Ching Ling [widow of president Sun Yat-sen]
(China Today, March 1935, p. 112)

May 1, 1935: The Yunnan-Annam railway line was cut by Reds. Invading Communist forces under the command of Lin Piao advanced as far as a point 50km southwest of Kunming. Scores of blockhouses are being constructed [by the Nationalists] in the northern suburbs of Kunming. (Japan Times and Mail p. 1)

May 4, 1935: The United States is seeking a new treaty of friendship and commerce with Germany. The existing agreement is scheduled to expire on 14 October 1935.

93 The aviators at Hangchow are American, the air force in Nanchang consists of Italians
Fig. 9.6 Prime Minister Wang Ching-wei. Wang Ching-wei made the cover of Time Magazine on 18 March 1935 but he was forced to resign on 9 August 1935 along with three other pro-Japanese Ministers. On 1st November 1935 he was wounded in an assassination attempt. In spite of having favored armed resistance to the Japanese penetration in the 1930s, in 1940 he became the president of the Chinese pro-Japanese government of Nanking. Although never a Communist himself he had favored an alliance with the Communists in the 1920s. Yet, as shown by the KMT flag anti-communism became one of the pillars of the Nanking government.

(Japan Times and Mail p. 1)

**May 4, 1935:** The USS Augusta, flagship of the American Asiatic Fleet arrived at Yokohama for a 2-week visit. (Japan Times and Mail p. 1)

[The two excerpts of the May 4 issue of the Japan Times show that in mid-1935 the United States had still good relations with both Germany and Japan. It can be recalled that Japanese warships visited Honolulu until a few months before Pearl Harbor. Yet, the suspicions raised by a possible support of Japan to pro-independence Filipinos (excerpt of May 5 below) showed some signs of tension.]

**May 5, 1935:** An uprising in Manila killed 60 persons and the troubles are spreading. Heavy casualties were reported as a result of severe fights which took place between the constabulary and the Sakdalistas who oppose the ratification of the Commonwealth constitution (there will be a plebiscite on 14 May 1935) and demand immediate independence.

The Japanese consul in the Philippines denied charges that the insurgents are backed by Japan in spite of the fact that their leader, Benigno Ramos, left Manila in Decem-
Fig. 9.7 Ms. Sun Yat-sen. Soong Ching-ling got married to Sun Yat-sen in October 1915. Her sister Meiling became the wife of General Chiang Kai-shek in December 1927. As shown by her appeal to the American people and in spite of the position of her sister, Soong Ching-ling was very lucid about the Nationalist regime. Source: China Today, March 1935.

December 1934 and took refuge in Tokyo. The US Department of Justice has announced its intention of seeking the extradition of Ramos.
(Japan Times and Mail p. 1)

May 6, 1935: Admiral F.B. Upham, the commander of the American Asiatic Fleet visited the Yasukuni shrine where he paid respect to the memory of Japanese soldiers enshrined there. (Japan Times and Mail p. 1)
[On 9 May there was a baseball match between the team of the Augusta, flagship of the American Asiatic Fleet, and the team of the Tokyo Agricultural College. The team of the Augusta won. (Japan Times and Mail 9 May p. 5).]

May 29, 1935: A “Munich” in the Far East. An ultimatum addressed by the Japanese to the Chinese government demanded that all KMT military forces withdraw from Hebei and that all anti-Japanese organizations, especially the Blue Shirts Society, be disbanded throughout China. On 10 June, Chiang Kai-shek accepted which lead to the secret He-Umezō Agreement of 10 June 1935. (Wikipedia article entitled “He-Umezō Agreement”)

Jun 10, 1935: In a statement to the press General Ho Ying-chin, Minister of War, affirmed the National Government’s policy of friendship with Japan. He added that the measures already taken can be considered to meet the Japanese demands. For instance he agreed to close the “Political Training Department” that the Japanese accused of hostile activities, as well as the Kuomintang branch in Peking. During his stay in Peking, Prince Teh Wang, leader of the autonomy movement in
Chahar (Mongolia), conferred with General Ho and with many Japanese military officers. (Times p. 10)

[In marked contrast with the New York Times, the Times of London is not very happy with the appeasement policy conducted by General Ho. As is said in latter articles the British government feared that its interests would suffer in an autonomous northern China dominated by Japan.]

**Jun 17, 1935:** In the negotiations between China and Japan the Japanese proposals were made in the form of demands and desires, the former being imperative and the latter optional. Apparently, General Ho Ying-Chin conceded everything. (Times p. 14)

**Jun 17, 1935:** The Chahar question has been settled by General Sung Che-yuan’s acceptance of Japan’s demands. He has agreed to suppress anti-Japanese movements and to punish the officials responsible for the incarceration of 4 Japanese on 6 June 1935. (Times p. 14)

**Jul 1935:** How the Chinese economy was strangled by the finance industry. Of the one trillion Chinese dollar issued in bonds by the Nanking government between 1927 and 1931, only 53% reached the government treasury, most of the remainder representing the bankers’ fees for handling the issues along with the interest payments. Nominal interest rates on the bonds ranged from 6% to 8% but owing to the fact that the banks could buy the bonds far below their face value, the rates were actually twice as high. At the same time the banks were charging interest rates from 10% to 16% on loans to Chinese industries. During 1934 the rising price of silver led to a scarcity of credit, a real estate collapse and to many bankruptcies. In May 1935 there was the collapse of the American Oriental Banking Corporation because of loans frozen in depreciated real estate. (China Today, July 1935)

**Aug 1935:** Cooperation between ONI and Dai Li The cooperation between the Office of Naval Intelligence and Dai Li, the chief of the KMT secret police, that took place during the war is well known. Less well-known is the fact that between August 1935 and August 1936 a Major of the US Marine Corp, William A. Worton, already cooperated with Dai Li. The report says that its mission was to observe the movements of the Japanese fleet but that seems a fairly useless task because in peace time that information was hardly secret. Thus, it is possible that Worton’s mission in China was not limited to observing the Japanese fleet. (Noble 2006)

**Aug 7, 1935:** On 7 August 1935 the Central Political Council of the Central Executive Committee, the highest political organ in China, passed a resolution of no-
confidence in the Foreign Minister Wang Ching-wei. The following day Wang re-signed. Chiang Kai-shek, however, was unwilling to accept the decision of the Party. He rushed back from his bandit-suppression activities and assured the members of the Central Political Council that Wang had his complete support. The next day the Council nullified its vote of non-confidence and Wang withdrew his resignation. Satisfied that his policy of appeasement with Japan would not be interrupted, Chiang returned to the front to complete the Fifth extermination campaign. (Boyle 1972)

On 1 November 1935 Wang was seriously injured in an assassination attempt. He left Chungking in December 1939 and 15 months later became the Prime Minister of the pro-Japanese Nanjing government. In China he is known as the traitor.

Aug 25, 1935: China will have a strong and modern air force if the government continues the work started some three years ago by Lieutenant Colonel John H. Jouett in establishing the Central Aviation School at Shienchiao. (NYT Sunday, Second News Section, p. N6)

Another article published in the NYT on 17 January 1937 claims that the Chinese Air Force was mainly built by Americans and that this cooperation is backed by strong popular support. However, during the battle against the Japanese in Shanghai in August 1937 the Chinese Air Force was blamed for several mistakes which cost many civilian lives.

Oct 1935: General Chang Hsueh-liang was ordered to take his army to the northwest to fight the Red forces who had recently arrived in that area after their long trek from Kiangsi. But his 109th and 101th Divisions went over to the Communists. In the following months a practical truce was established between the Reds and his army. (USMIR 1, reel 12)

This episode shows that even before the Sian mutiny there was a strong opposition to further anti-Communist campaigns.

Oct 29, 1935: After a long series of conferences, the Japanese army has decided to offer active aid to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and to the heads of the governments of the five Northern Provinces [subsequently to come under partial Japanese control] for the suppression of the Communist armies that are gaining foothole in Shensi and Kansu provinces. (NYT p. 15)

Nov 2, 1935: Shanghai. The assassination attempt on Prime Minister Wang Ching-wei which occurred the day before dimmed the Chinese official welcome to US Vice President John N. Garner and his party of Congressmen and newspaper executives. (NYT p. 6)

This assassination attempt occurred on the eve of visits by American official delegations. The delegation headed by Vice-President Garner was one of them. It would
stay in Shanghai for three weeks. Another one arrived at Canton by the end of November.]

**Nov 2, 1935:** Nanking. The wounding of Premier Wang Ching-wei by an assassin was ascribed by the police to a “well-organized plot by Chinese Communists” against China’s policy toward Japan. Eleven suspects were arrested including a Communist girl. (NYT p. 1)

**Nov 3, 1935: Introduction of a new currency.** After the inauguration of President Roosevelt in early 1933, gold was so to say nationalized in the sense that all gold had to be turned over to the government. The purpose of this executive order was to stop the outflow of gold. In a similar way, silver was nationalized in China and a new monetary system was introduced. Subsequently, in 1936 and 1937 China sold large quantities of silver to the United States: 249 and 398 millions of Chinese dollars respectively. (SDI, reel 1)

**Nov 24, 1935:** A delegation of 13 US Congressmen are guests of the Chinese government at Canton where they make declaration of unity with Nanking regime. (NYT p. 30)
[In the previous decades the provinces around Canton have largely played their own game. That is what justifies the “declaration of unity with the Nanking regime.”]

**Dec 6, 1935:** General Sung Che-yuan has banned the circulation in Peking of the influential Tientsin newspaper Takungpao for its outspoken comments in opposing autonomy. Following the example of the Chancellor and Dean, the entire student body of the Peking National University has issued a manifesto opposing autonomy. (Times p. 15)

**Dec 6, 1935:** An Asian “Munich”. The Japanese ultimatum demanding the declaration of an autonomous north China regime was made public by desperate Chinese officials. However in a statement to the press in December 1935 Secretary Hull appeared to assure Japan of non-intervention. (Tuchman 1970, p. 151).
[American hands-off policy allowed Japan to transform northern China into a protectorate in the same way as the Munich agreement with Hitler allowed Germany to transform Czechoslovakia into a protectorate.]

**Dec 7, 1935:** Patriotic [anti-Communist] oaths at Harvard University. Officials of Harvard University will have to consider the question of discharging geology Prof. Kirtley Mather from his post on the university faculty as a result of his reservation in taking the teacher’s oath under the new Massachusetts patriotic law. The professor specified that he would refuse to sever his relations with the “American-Russian Institute of Cultural Relations because science recognizes no political boundaries.
Dec 9, 1935: The December 9 Movement. Between June and July 1935, the Qintu Agreement was negotiated between Japan and the KMT as a way for the former to gain control of Chahar Province. A puppet state known as “Eastern Hebei Anti-Communist Autonomous Government” was then set up by a Chinese called Yin Rugeng with the help of the Japanese. On November 18, student representatives from several major universities in Beijing gathered in a meeting and secretly formed the “Beijing Students Union”. Since December 9 was rumored to be the day on which the Qintu agreement would come in effect, the “Students Union” chose that day for a mass demonstration. Like many other Beijing universities, Peking University is located in the north western suburb of Beijing. On the early morning of December 9, police and soldiers closed the Xizhi Gate. Nevertheless, some 6,000 students marched toward the gate and tried to enter. They were attacked by police and soldiers armed with wooden sticks, whips, water pumps and sabers. Hundreds were injured. Protest assemblies were organized in many large cities. As a result of these protests the implementation of the Qintu agreement was shelved. (Wikipedia article about 9 December 1935)

1936-1940

1936

Feb 22, 1936: Statement by Joseph Stilwell about the inevitability of the war between the United States and Japan. G-2 report No 9310: “Since war between America and Japan is inevitable, American policy in the Far East must be formulated at once.”
(USMIR 1, reel 13 frame 492)

Apr 6, 1936: Fliers killed 200 of the 1,000 Chinese Reds who were preparing to attack a town in Shansi. (NYT p. 13)
[We mentioned this event to show that even in 1936 that is to say one year after the Long March the warfare between the Communists and the Nationalists was still ongoing.]

Jul 21, 1936: An American plan to make a loan to China in excess of $30 million
to be devoted to purchase of munitions was reported by Japanese correspondents in China. (NYT p. 4)

**Nov 20 1936:** A report written by Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell finishes on the following words. “... in the event, considered unlikely by this officer, that China ever makes real war with the Japanese.” (USMIR 1, reel 12)

[This sentence shows that Stilwell came very early to the conclusion that the KMT did not want to really fight the Japanese. Later on this conviction led him to a bitter confrontation with General Chiang Kai-shek which he lost.]

**Nov 20 1936:** Important posts were given to perpetrators of the Nanking outrage of 24 March 1924 in which several foreigners were murdered by troops of the Nationalist government and the American Consulate was looted.

General Cheng Chien who was appointed as Chief of Staff on 19 December 1935 and General Ho Yao-tsu who is the present Chinese Minister to Turkey were two of the three generals primarily responsible for the outrage (the third general is now dead). The looting by the troops continued for weeks after 24 March 1924. General Ho was also responsible for the murder and mutilation of Japanese at Tsinan in 1928. (CUS reel 16)

**Fall 1936:** Months before the Xian mutiny, contacts were established and negotiations were started between Chang Hsueh-liang (called the “Young Marshal”) and Yang Hu-cheng on the one hand and the Communist leadership in the other hand. Chang visited the Yenan Headquarters and met Chou En-lai and Mao. An agreement was reached through which the two generals accepted to join forces with the Communists in the war against the Japanese. That agreement infuriated Chiang Kai-shek which means that the main purpose of his visit to Xian was to bring the two generals into line.

Moreover one should keep in mind that Hsueh-liang and Yang Hu-cheng were not the only generals who expressed their opposition to Chiang Kai-shek’s policy. Another high profile opponent was General Xue Yue who had taken part in the offensive against the Communist during the Long March and would become famous as the “Tiger of Changsha (i.e. Long Sands)” after his victory of January 1942. During the Xian incident he offered to personally arrest Chiang Kai-shek and hand him over to the Communists if Chiang refused to fight the Japanese immediately. (Alley and Burchett 1975, p. 147; Wikipedia article entitled “Xue Yue”.)

**The Xian mutiny (13 December 1936)**

*The Xian mutiny was by no means the first nor the last of its kind, but it was the most serious. Among previous rebellions against the authority of Chiang Kai-shek one can mention the following. (i) May 1931: a call to rebellion by the Canton*
province which may have been encouraged by foreign powers in order to block the suppression of extra-territoriality privileges which was planned by the government. (ii) August 1935: Prime Minister Wang Ching-wei and two of his ministers were compelled to resign after public protests against the Ho-Umez agreement which gave Japan virtual control over North China.

Broadly speaking, during the 1930s and indeed until the end of the war two political lines were in permanent conflict. One side favored anti-Communism and cooperation with Japan in spite of the territorial inroads made by Japanese forces; this side included officials such as Ho Ying-Chin, Wang Ching-wei, Sung Che-yuang or Ku Meng-yu. The other side favored an alliance with the Communists and armed resistance against Japan; on this side one finds the main proponents of the Xian mutiny. What complicated the picture is that not all those who were anti-Japanese wanted an alliance with the Communists. This was for instance the case of T.V. Soong; naturally such men were destined to play an important role as soon as the United States took a more more hostile attitude toward Japan that is to say after 1938.

In addition there were financial and economic issues (the currency and silver question, the granting of loans for buying the military equipment necessary for the campaigns against the Communists) for which China largely depended on the support of Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States. Although all these countries favored the suppression of the Communists, their national interests differed in important respects.

Dec 13, 1936: General Chiang Kai-shek was made a prisoner by mutinous troops in Sian on the eve of the 6th extermination campaign. He was seized in midst of preparations to discipline those friendly with the Reds. (NYT p. 1)

Dec 14, 1936: Troops are rushing to rescue General Chiang Kai-shek from the rebels. Some 140,000 men of loyal forces are already within striking distance. General Ho is Nanking chief. (NYT p. 1)

[From the very start of the rebellion the New York Times makes its big titles on a military solution in spite of the fact that it was never really enforced (if one except some raids by Nationalist bombers). Needless to say, such a solution would have endangered Chiang’s life. The fact that one of his aides, General Chen Ta-chun, was killed during the rebellion clearly suggests that such a fatal outcome could not be ruled out. In short, it seems that many in the United States would have seen with favor the replacement of Chiang by General Ho.]

Dec 14, 1936: General Ho Ying-chin praised by the New York Times. General Ho Ying-chin who is now acting commander-in-chief of the Nationalist armies of China in the absence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, is regarded as one of the
Fig. 9.8 General Ho Ying-Chin (1890-1987) Commander in Chief of the Chinese army, December 1945. The fact that General Ho was named Commander in Chief at the climax of the presence in China of the US Army and US Navy suggests that he was well considered in Washington. He was known as a virulent anti-Communist and in the 1930s when confronted to ever increasing Japanese demands in northern China he had played a policy of appeasement which permitted Japan to take the control of the provinces of Jehol (to the north of Beijing), Chahar (currently Mongolia to the north west of Beijing), Hopei (south of Beijing) almost without any armed resistance.

Other fiercely anti-Communist generals were Chang Tso-lin, Chen Chiu-min, Tsai Ting-kai (who murdered thousands of militants in Shanghai), Li Chi-sun (who suppressed the Canton commune) and Feng Yu-hsien (the so-called Christian general who was in the service of the Japanese).

During the Xian mutiny in December 1936 General Ho was highly praised in the New York Times which suggests that he was considered as a possible successor of Chiang Kai-shek by the State Department. After July 1946 he stayed for some time in the United States in a liaison role between US and Kuomintang authorities.

Why did he not play a substantial political role in Taiwan after 1951? Two articles of the New York Times (7 January 1951 p. 12 and 19 January 1951, p. 3) say that he was urging Asian nations to prepare for a war against China and the Soviet Union. So he was perhaps a victim of the fact that the American administration eventually rejected this hard line. General MacArthur was dismissed on 11 April 1951 with President Truman saying that “the cause of world peace is more important than any individual”. After that date the name of General Ho Ying-chin is no more mentioned in the New York Times. Sources: Internet, Chinese website: 360doc.com; New York Times.

ablest men in the republic. He fought in the revolt of 1911. He opposed the move for autonomy of the north. He has given proof of exceptional ability as an administrator during the last six years as Minister of War. As a fighting man General Ho has given ample proof of his bravery and ability [a fairly disputable statement]; as a politician he has given similar proof of astuteness. (NYT p. 16; there is also a photography of General Ho.)

[One may wonder what at this juncture motivated such laudatory comments. Was General Ho Ying-chin seen as a possible successor of Chiang Kai-shek in case the latter would be executed by the rebels?]
In that respect it can be observed that he was one of the most aggressively anti-Communist Nationalist generals and also one of most pro-Japanese. He was a prime mover in bringing about the Nationalist clash with the Communist-led New Fourth Army in January 1941 (Boyle 1972 p. 311).

Ho’s carrier shows that the State Department had him in good favor. He became acquainted with Chiang Kai-shek when both studied at the Tokyo Shinbu Military Academy in Japan. In 1930 he became Minister of War of the Nationalist Government. In 1931 he personally took command of the bandit suppression campaign in Kiangsi, Hunan, Hupeh and Fukien. Between 1933 and 1935, as Chairman of the Peking Military Council, he played a leading role in the policy of appeasement which eventually allowed Japan to take the control of northern China almost without resistance.

In 1935 he negotiated the Ho-Umezu Accord under which all anti-Japanese forces (and in particular the “Blue Shirts Society”) were banned from Beijing.

A supporter of General Stilwell (probably because he wanted to play the American card), he was dismissed from his position as Minister of Defense in November 1944 shortly after Stilwell was replaced by Wedemeyer. However, on 10 February 1945 he was made Commander in Chief of all Chinese forces. He resigned on 14 May 1946 and was named as a representative to the United Nations in the United States. On 2 January 1948, in an address to the “Moral Rearmament Assembly” at Richmond (Virginia) he warned against the spread of Communism in Asia.

He became again Minister of Defense on 1 June 1948. Then, on 13 March 1949 he was named prime minister by president Li Zon-gren who had replaced Chiang Kai-shek. He was excluded from power later on after Chiang had become president.
of Taiwan. It is unclear why.
The compliments and praises showered on General Ho in the previous article are largely misplaced: his bandit suppression campaigns ended in disaster, his policy in northern China allowed Japanese forces to take control almost without any armed Chinese resistance.]

Dec 14, 1936: Comment made by the Japanese spokesman at Nanking: “This would never have happened if General Chiang Kai-shek had accepted Japanese cooperation to suppress communism.” (NYT p. 16)

Dec 16, 1936: Meeting in Geneva, the China committee of the League of Nations adopted its program for Chinese reconstruction during the coming year. The program consists of two parts: (i) the sending of foreign experts to advise Nanking (ii) the bringing of Chinese experts to the West to study. (NYT p. 19)

Dec 16, 1936: A report was circulated in Shanghai according to which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and several of his aides had been put to death. Chiang’s wife collapsed at report of his death. (NYT p. 1, 18)
[It was mainly through the “Associated Press” news agency that the information about Chiang’s death was transmitted.]

Dec 16, 1936: An agreement was signed between Chinese and French banks for the construction of a railroad between Chengdu and Chongqing (530 km). French participation amounted to 185 million francs. A similar agreement was signed on 22 April 1938 for the construction of a line from Lang Son (on the border between Indochina and China) to Nanning, the capital of Guangxi in which French participation was 150 million francs. These agreement involved also prospection rights on 50 km wide strips on each side of the lines. Work on these projects was interrupted by the Japanese threat. (Bensacq p, 404)
[After the establishment of the pro-Japanese government in Nanking, Japan pressured France to cut relations with Chongqing and establish official relations with Nanking. Needless to say, that would have meant the loss of all commercial contracts established with the Nationalist government.]

Dec 17, 1936: The Nanking government followed up their previous decision to concentrate troops around Sian by ordering a punitive expedition under the command of General Ho Ying-chin, the Ministry of War. Several divisions are already within striking distance. (Times p. 15)

Dec 17, 1936: As parleys were abandoned, government troops in considerable force and a Communist army were engaged in a race toward Sian in Shensi Province,
where Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is held captive. (NYT p. 1)

[Just like the previous one, this news does not seem to be supported by any evidence. In fact, high-level negotiations were conducted with the Communist leader Zhou Enlai who came to Sian on 15 December (Mackerras 1982 p. 362).

Edgar Snow who was one of the only western journalists in Shensi at the time of the crisis gives a detailed account in his book “Red star over China”. He underlines that many false news were spread and that his own dispatches were heavily censored. He made several attempts to send out the 8 demands put to Chiang by the rebels but the Nationalist censors did not let out a single word.

The fact that most present-day account fail to list these demands suggests that in a general way the account of an event are mostly shaped by the first accounts. Even in cases when the first accounts can be proved to be blatantly wrong it is very difficult to correct and redress early misrepresentations.]

Dec 17, 1936: A US flier is detained by the rebels in Sian. (NYT p. 18)
[We do not know exactly for what purpose he was there. In Snow (1937, p. 400) one learns that about 100 bombers were ready in Sian (Shensi) and Lanchow (Kansu) for taking part in the 6th extermination campaign against the Communists. In fact, this campaign had already begun in November 1936 when the crack 1st Army entered Kansu and was defeated during a night attack by the Red Army. It can be observed that Sian is located 160 km to the south of Yenan which became subsequently the Communist capital for the duration of the war.]

Dec 20, 1936: Twenty-year old Chiang Wei-ko who is Chiang Kai-shek’s second son and currently a student in Berlin is regarded as his likely heir in case he would meet death in Sian. (NYT p. 31)
[It should be recalled that on 25 November 1936 Berlin and Tokyo signed the Anti Comintern pact. On 29 November, the Italian government recognized the state of Manchukuo. Thus, the fact that Chiang’s son is studying in Berlin (rather than in the United States) provides an interesting indication.]

Dec 22, 1936: A ransom was asked for Chiang Kai-shek. (NYT p. 1, 14)
[This was one of the false news listed in Edgar Snow (1937, p. 411).]

Dec 22, 1936: German companies will build railroads in China. One road will be renovated, another will be built. The contract is worth 40 million Chinese dollars. (NYT p. 17)

Dec 23, 1936: Christian faith softens Chiang’s methods. Converted shortly after his marriage, he prays daily for divine help. (NYT p. 8)
[Whether true or wrong, such a news is an indication of Chiang’s good favor in the United States.]
Dec 26, 1936: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was freed from captivity on Christmas afternoon. Wild celebrations were staged. (NYT p. 1)

1937

1937 Edgar Snow observes: “Women are a commodity in Japan. Their sale and distribution is one of the nation’s big industries. In 1937 there were some 5,600 licensed brokers in prostitutes in Tokyo alone”.

The region of Nigata is a stronghold of the great landlords where tenant conditions are the worst in Japan. Famine is an almost annual occurrence. Licensed dealers in women consider the prefecture a prime source of supply and every year secure from destitute families thousands of young girls to become prostitutes or mill operatives. Not surprisingly, this region was a center of social agitation. (Snow 1940 p. 72,181) [This observation may throw some light on the behavior of Japanese troops in China.]

1937 Through discussions with Chiang Kai-shek and his foreign minister, T.V. Soong, US oil tycoon Michael L. Benedum was offered exclusive drilling rights in all of China.

[It is not clear how much of this project was completed.]

Jan-Jul 1937: In August 1938 the American journalist Edgar Snow was able to interview Han Ying who had been the commander of the Communist force that facilitated the escape of Communist troops as they started on their “Long March”. Subsequently, this force remained in South-east China.

In order to avoid destruction by a Nationalist army of 150,000 troops sent against them, the 15,000 men who composed this force formed many small partisan bands of several hundred men each. It is only through the help of the farmers that they were able to survive. In return, they partially prevented the return of the landlords. Soon, however, the Nationalist forces began wholesale arrests of friendly peasants and burned their villages.

An interesting point is the fact that the situation did not improve after the Xian incident. In April 1937 an anti-Red force encircled them and implemented their standard strategy which consisted in building roads and blockhouses, moving away villagers, burning their villages as well as thousands of trees. It is only in August 1937 after the Japanese attack against Shanghai that the pressure began to diminish.

(Snow 1940 p. 128-130)

Apr 7, 1937: The arrest of 14 men including Prof. Tao Hsin-chih was ordered by the Nationalist government. Their activity in the “National Salvation Federation” was given as the reason of the arrest. (Amerasia, May 1937)
[This information suggests that in spite of the common front against the Japanese that was supposed to follow the Xian incident, the KMT continued its repression against non-KMT organizations.]

**Jul 7, 1937: A “Munich” in the Orient**  The Munich agreement about Czechoslovakia was signed on 29 September 1938. It is usually considered that it left Czechoslovakia at the mercy of Hitler and opened the way for his subsequent invasions. A similar event occurred in China with the occupation of Beijing by Japanese forces in the wake of the Marco Polo Bridge incident (referred to as 7-7 by the Chinese). As this occupation was a breach of the International Treaty concluded after the Boxer Rebellion and of the “Nine-Power Treaty” signed in Washington in February 1922, many Chinese were expecting that western powers, and especially the United States and the United Kingdom, would protest and break off relations with Japan. Edgar Snow observes that his Chinese friends were flabbergasted when he told them that they should not expect any effective help. On the contrary, western companies would continue to sell arms, oil and iron to Japan. (Snow 1940 p.11)

[Not only did western countries not break off relations with Japan but even at a more individual level they provided no help or rescue to anti-Japanese Chinese (see below).]

**Jul 7, 1937 Occupation of Beijing by the Japanese.**  After the Japanese occupied Beijing, they handed the reorganized puppet police a list of patriots and Communists whom they wanted arrested. Some Pei-ta (i.e. Peking University) students visited Edgar Snow to ask whether the British or American authorities would convoy anti-Japanese students out of Beijing on their military trucks. That would have been easy but nothing of the sort was done. In this respect, concludes Snow, “the next few years were to provide a political education for millions of Chinese”. (Snow 1940, p.11)

**Jul 29, 1937 Tungchow (Tongzhou) massacre of Japanese.**  After some 5,000 Chinese troops who were at the service of the Japanese mutinied, there was a massacre of Japanese (both military and civilians) in the city of Tungshow near Beijing. Some 260 Japanese civilians were killed. A more detailed account is given below. (Wikipedia article entitled “Tungchow mutiny”.)

[This massacre was of a much smaller scale than the one in Nanking in December 1937. Yet it is striking that the Tungchow massacre is almost unknown and forgotten by world media and historians 94. For instance, a book about the Nanking massacre which is entitled “L’armée de l’empereur [The Emperor’s Army] (2007)” by the French historian Jean-Louis Margolin does not mention the Tungchow massacre]

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94A key-word search on the Google search engine gives 101,000 websites for “Nanking massacre” and 500 for “Tungchow (or Tongzhou) massacre”, a ratio of 200:1.
in spite of the fact that its proclaimed objective is to better understand Nanking. Similarly, back in 1947 during the Tokyo trial, the Allies were unwilling to allow any mention of the Tongzhou Massacre. William Webb, the presiding justice, rejected the demand made by the defense attorneys without giving any explanation. Of course, this attitude was in line with the policy which discarded all accusations raised against Allied forces.]

**Jul 29, 1937  Tongzhou incident.** In early 1937, Tongzhou was capital of the East Hopei (now Hebei) Government, a Japanese puppet state controlling the eastern district of Beijing.

In July, a detachment of approximately 800 Kuomintang troops camped outside the walls of Tongzhou. On 27 July, the Japanese commander demanded that they disarm. When they refused, fighting erupted on 28 July. Outnumbered but unwilling to surrender, the Chinese troops were soon wiped out. However their annihilation strongly affected the 5,000 Chinese soldiers of the Japanese-trained East Hopei Army, a security guard whose role was to protect Japanese civilians living in China. When they refused to obey orders, Japanese troops bombed their barracks on the evening of 28 July. This lead them to a full scale mutiny, in which they turned against the Japanese garrison of Tongzhou and against the civilian Japanese population.

Much of the city was destroyed and burned in the fighting. Some 250 residents of Tongzhou were killed in the uprising. According to Japanese sources, the majority of women were raped. The massacre shocked public sentiment in Japan, and was used to justify further military intervention for protecting Japanese property.

(Wikipedia article entitled Tungchow Mutiny)

[This episode plays a pivotal role in Pearl Buck’s novel “The Patriot” (1939). The novel’s main character is a former Chinese Communist student from Shanghai named I-Wan who had been living in Nagasaki for 10 years and was married to a Japanese wife. After the Tongzhou incident he felt more and more estranged in Japan. Eventually, he left his family and returned to China to serve his country.

It should be noted that the Tongzhou mutiny was not an isolated event but part of a broader conflict which comprised the Marco Polo (Lugou Bridge) incident on 6 July 1937 and an attack on Beijing by the Japanese 20th Division on 28 July 1937.]

**Jul, 1937**  The battle of Shanghai started in July and ended in November with a Chinese withdrawal. One of the reasons which prompted Chiang Kai-shek’s enduring resistance was because he expected diplomatic help from the international community and particularly of the United States which alone could have put effective pressure on Japan by resorting to economic embargo. A Nine-Power Treaty Conference convened in Brussels in November 1937 but no real support came forth. In a sense, this was the analogue for China of the Munich conference for Czechoslovakia.
battle of Shanghai was a watershed in the relations between between the Nationalists and the Japanese and opened them the road to Nanking. (Wikipedia, article “Battle of Shanghai”)

**Jul 27-29, 1937** The Tungchow (a city east of Beijing) garrison which was composed of Chinese affected to the Japanese East Hopei Army rebelled against the Japanese, killed some Japanese officers and then massacred about 250 Japanese civilians. (Boyle 1972)
[Needless to say, this massacre deepened the rift between the two countries.]

**Jul 28, 1937** At dawn Japanese troops attacked Nanyuan, the airport of Beijing, from four directions. They were supported by airplanes. In early afternoon after suffering heavy losses, Tonglinge, the deputy commander of the 29th Army ordered Nanyuan to be abandoned. He was killed in the retreat. Zhao Dengyu, another Chinese general, was killed the same day. (“Resistance wars” on http://www.republicanchina.org/war.html and Wikipedia article entitled “Zhao Dengyu”.)

**Aug 15, 1937** Six hundred persons, including three Americans were killed when Chinese bombers twice bombed the foreign concessions north of Soochow Creek in Shanghai. The bombed areas were teeming with war refugees. (NYT p. 1)

**Aug 21, 1937** The Nationalist government and the USSR signed a Treaty of Non-aggression as well as agreements on military assistance. As a result, about 30 Russian fighter aircraft were sent to Shanghai and took part in the battle against the Japanese forces. (http://www.j-aircraft.com)

**Aug 21, 1937** Pan American Airways owns 45% of the Chinese National Aviation Corporation. (Amerasia, Oct 1937)

**Aug 27, 1937** Foreign experts said that the bomb that hit a Department Store was from a Nationalist plane. (NYT p. 3)

**Sep 7, 1937** China’s Air Force is considered incompetent because its pilots have been unable (or unwilling) to hit the Japanese ships lying grouped in the Whangpoo River. (NYT p. 10)

**Sep 10, 1937** In Nanking instead of its pre-war population of one million, after the evacuation of women and children there are only about 400,000 persons left. There is a beginning cholera epidemic. (Bensacq p. 289)

**Sep 23, 1937** For several hours 50 Japanese bombers raided Nanking; some 200 persons were killed or wounded. (NYT p. 1)
[These raids explain why many people left the city before the arrival of the Japanese
troops.]

**Sep 23, 1937** Nanking. Edgar Snow provides the following information. “The sordid story of the Nanking massacres is now pretty familiar to the world. According to an estimate given to me by members of the “Nanking International Relief Committee”, the Japanese murdered some 42,000 people in Nanking alone, a large percentage of them women and children. It is estimated that 300,000 civilians were killed by the Japanese on their march between Shanghai and Nanking, a number roughly equal to the casualties suffered by the Chinese armed forces” [during the battle for Shanghai]. (Snow 1940, p. 61) [Snow makes a distinction between the civilians killed during the two-month long march from Shanghai to Nanking and those killed in Nanking. Such a distinction may be useful because it has been emphasized by many historians that a large part of the population of Nanking fled before the arrival of the Japanese forces.]

**Nov 3, 1937: An Asian Munich** On 17 September 1937 Wellington Kou, the Ambassador of China in Paris, asked the help of the League of Nations. A conference of the main powers was called in Brussels on 3 November. However, at that conference, the United States took a very cautious position. The US government wanted to remain outside of the conflict which meant that China would not get any substantial loan to buy American weapons. The other countries adopted the same position. (Bensacq p. 298-299)
[The US position was compared to the attitude of Britain and France toward Germany, the so-called Munich capitulation. However, it was even more surprising for, in contrast with Britain and France, the United States had no Japanese invasion to fear on the continental part of its territory. It can be assumed that it was the vulnerability of the Philippines which explained US caution. Similarly it was the vulnerability of Indochina which compelled France to accept accommodation with Japan, not only in 1937 but in fact during the whole war.]

**Nov 16, 1937:** In Nanking the civilian population was being evacuated from the city in advance of an expected Japanese invasion. Government departments prepare
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December 1937: Incidents between the United States and Japan.
- On 20 August 1937, during the battle for Shanghai, the US flagship “Augusta” in the port of Shanghai was hit by an anti-aircraft shell [which did not explode in the air] killing one American and wounding 18. (Amerasia, Oct 1937)
- During the Japanese invasion of Nanking, American property, mostly hospitals, schools and religious buildings, was repeatedly ransacked and Americans were frequently insulted and struck.
- On January 26, 1938 the American consul, John Allison (who was fluent in Japanese) was hit in the face, with no provocation, by a Japanese officer.
- On 12 December 1937 Japanese planes attacked and sunk the American gun-boat *Panay*. Three persons were killed in the attack. Later on the Japanese government paid an indemnity to the US government.
- Three Standard Oil tankers, *Mei Ping*, *Mei An* and *Mei Hsia*, came under attack from Japanese naval aircraft and were destroyed. The captain of the *Mei An* and many Chinese civilian passengers were killed.

Yet, in spite of all these incidents, as noted by Edgar Snow, “Americans continued selling Japan all the war-making materials she needed”. Whereas the (most probably accidental) sinking of the “Maine” in Cuba led the United States into the Spanish-American War, the previous incidents did not seriously affect the relations between the two governments.
(Snow 1940, p. 63; Wikipedia article entitled “Panay incident”.)

December 1937: At the end of December 1937 some 340 Soviet aircraft were delivered along with 300 pilots. They were located at Hankou, Nanchang, Changcha, and Lanzhou. Six Soviet pilots have already lost their lives. (Bensacq p. 298)
[Although these Russian pilots arrived three years earlier than the US “Flying Tigers” their story is fairly unknown.]

1938

1938: The “Gung Ho” movement of “Chinese Industrial Cooperatives” (CIC), also called INDUSCO. With the progression of Japanese forces, more and more of the industrial production areas fell under Japanese control. The idea of the “Gung Ho” movement was to use the refugees in areas not yet controlled by the Japanese to start small workshops which could produce light weapons and basic products for the population (such as winter blankets). This idea was put forward in a memorandum written by Rewi Alley, a Neo Zealander who had been in China for over a decade and Edgar Snow.
This was certainly a good idea but, as one knows, there are many good ideas which
never get off the ground. The success of the “Gung Ho” movement came from a convergence of interests.

In the 1920s, Henry Ford had funded technical education in his industrial facilities of Detroit for young Chinese. These persons were selected by Joseph Baillie, a Presbyterian missionary, from among Christian Chinese students who were fluent in English. The purpose was to employ these, so-called “Baillie Boys”, in US-owned factories in China, such as the “Shanghai Power Company”. After the destruction of most Shanghai factories during the battle of 1937, many “Baillie Boys” were jobless and welcomed the opportunity to join INDUSCO where they formed the core technical staff of the organization.

However, the left-leaning agenda of the INDUSCO founders was bound to collide with the entrenched political and economic interests of the Nationalist regime. That is why it never got substantial funding from the Nationalist government and remained dependent on US support. In 1940, the organization comprised some 30,000 members.

(Alley and Burchett 1975, Thomas 1996)

Feb 4, 1938: Germany officially recognized Manchukuo. This marked the beginning of a closer alliance with Japan. As a result, the help that Germany had provided to the Nationalists in selling them aircraft and other military equipment and in train-
Fig. 9.13 Five-color flag of the pro-Japanese provisional government of China established in Beijing (1938-1945). Tianjin was invaded by the Japanese in July 1937 and Beijing in August. A puppet government was established in Beijing which was given the name of “Provisional Government of the Republic of China”. After the establishment of a pro-Japanese government in Nanjing lead by Wang Ching-wei, the Beijing government was (at least formally) incorporated in the new government. In practice however, the government of Beijing remained in the hands of the local Japanese military command. It seems that this five-color flag was also used by the so-called Beiyang governments which ruled north-east China (Bei-yang means north ocean) between 1917 and 1927. The colors are supposed to represent different ethnies: red for the Hans, yellow for the Manchus, blue for the Mongols, white for the Hui, black for the Tibetans. Source: http://flagspot.net/flags/cn_jnj1.html

Feb 7, 1938: Divide and conquer strategy. In a clear illustration of the standard “Divide and conquer” strategy, the “All China Muslim League” was created in Peiping under Japanese auspices. The League issued a monthly journal called Hui-chiao (Islam). According to the manifesto published by this journal, the main objectives of the League were to promote close bonds between the three countries of China, Japan, and Manchukuo, to firmly oppose Communism and to preserve Islam, the “eternal religion”. The League also sponsored the Chinese Muslim Youth Corps. Similar organizations were established in the regions of Shanghai and Canton in 1939. In order to inflame the relations between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese, Japan’s policy was to give preferential treatment to the Muslims. In Shantung Province the situation between Muslims and non-Muslims became especially acute as a result of the installation of a Muslim as puppet governor. One should recall that during the 19th century there have been several confrontations between Muslims and non-Muslims particularly in Yunnan in 1834-1840, 1853-1873 and in the Northwest in 1862-1876. The latter two resulted in millions of deaths. (Bodde 1946a, 1946b)

Apr 17, 1938: The Communists in China are now committed to a program which calls for the establishment of a bourgeois-capitalist democracy. Should China win the war with Japan it is doubtful that internal strife [between Communists and Nationalists] would be resumed. (NYT Section Magazine p. 6)

[The assessment made in this article by Tilman Durdin, the correspondent of the New
Chapter 9

York Times in China, is rather defective. Apparently, he failed to make a distinction between tactical goals and long-term policy. In this long article of 2,300 words the name of chairman Mao is not mentioned once. The only Chinese leader mentioned by name is general Chu Teh (Zhu De).

**Jun 13, 1938:** Flood of the Yellow River  The waters of the giant river are sweeping through breached embankments. (NYT 13 June 1938)

**Jun 15, 1938:** 150,000 civilians drowned in the Yellow River area. (NYT 15 June 1938)

[Subsequent estimates ranged between 0.5 and 0.8 million. The titles of the New York Times do not say that the dykes were dynamited by KMT troops to slow the advance of Japanese forces. To achieve full surprise the KMT did not warn the population before destroying the dykes.]

**Jun 16, 1938:** Waters, 1 to 1.5 meter deep, are advancing at a speed of 8 km/h over a 8 km front according to Japanese reports. (NYT 16 June 1938)

**Jun 28, 1938:** Yellow River flood now helps invaders. (NYT 28 June 1938)

**Jul 29, 1938:** The walled city of Ankwo, 230 km south of Peiping, was burned and looted by a retreating Japanese army in a campaign of reprisal against Chinese guerrilla raids. (NYT 29 July 1938)

**Aug 28, 1938:** The Regent of Tibet, through whom the Dalai Lama acted, died. An army uprising was crushed and the rebel leader escaped. (NYT p. 7)

[It seems that there was a power struggle between the “Young Tibetan Party”, the Army, and the heads of the Monasteries at Lhasa.]

**Nov 13, 1938:** Changsha Fire On October 25, 1938, the city of Wuhan fell to Japan. Soon after, a great number of refugees and injured soldiers, in addition to government institutions and factories, were relocated to Changsha. This caused a population boom in the city, and the number of residents jumped from 300,000 to more than 500,000. Chiang Kai-shek decided to burn the entire city so that Japan would gain nothing by taking it. An arson team was immediately organized. The team was dispatched to every corner of the city and was ordered to set the fire once a signal was set off on the top of tall building. Due to an organizational error (it was claimed), the fire was begun at 2 am without any warning to the residents of the city. Some 20,000 civilians were killed. The Nationalists eventually blamed 3 local commanders for the fire and executed them. (Wikipedia, articles entitled “Chiang Kai-shek” and “Fire of Changsha”)

**Dec 16, 1938:** The US government’s Export-Import Bank has been authorized to
issue a loan of $25 million to China to be used in financing the purchase of American agricultural and manufactured products. (NYT p. 1)


[Rather (or perhaps beyond) the military occupation of China by Japan, the main grief of the US business community against Japan was the end of the open door policy.]

Dec 31, 1938: The shares of various countries in Chinese import trade in 1938 were as follows. Japan: 24%, British Commonwealth (Australia, Britain, Canada, India): 19%, United States: 17%, Germany: 13%, France: 2.0%. (Far Eastern Survey, 1 June 1949, p. 122)

1939

1939: In 1939 about 150 Soviet aviators were billeted near Chengtu in Western Szechuan and another 150 planes were based near Lanchow in Western Kansu. (Snow 1940, p. 175)

[Snow also says that in 1940 most of China’s battle-planes were Russian. In this respect, it can be remembered that the well-known American “Flying Tigers” squadrons arrived in China only during the summer of 1941.]

Jan 3, 1939: The remains of a Boeing 10-seater passenger plane of the “China National Aviation Corporation” which disappeared on 27 December 1938 en route from Chungking to Kunming (Yunnan) have been found. The plane was flown by an American accompanied by a Russian copilot and a Chinese wireless operator. There were no passenger aboard the plane. (NCDN p. 2)

Jan 14, 1939: China is given special terms for buying 200 US bombers. Moreover, British supplies to Chiang Kai-shek totaled 60,000 tons during November and December 1938. (NCDN 14 January p. 9-10)

Jan 14, 1939: A Chinese is shot by an Italian sentry in Shanghai; he is in serious condition at the hospital. (NCDN p. 10)

[There was a small Italian concession in Shanghai.]

Feb 7, 1939: A well-known Chinese journalist, Mr. Chien Hua, who was a member of the Japanese sponsored censorship board was assassinated yesterday by a lone assassin who fired several shots at him near Avenue Foch in Shanghai. One of Mr. Chien’s predecessors in the same board, Mr. Tsi Tiao-tu, was beheaded last spring. His head was placed in a street of the French concession as a “warning”.

Feb 8, 1939: Two Chinese employed by the Japanese in Shanghai were shot by
terrorists. Anti-traitorous tracts were found near the victims. (NCDN p. 7)

**Sep 15, 1939:** A 5-year old peasant boy found in a Chinese village is named Dalai Lama of Tibet. He is accepted by a conclave in Lhasa. (NYT p. 21)

**Sep 17, 1939:** The battle for the city of Changsha, the provincial capital of Hunan in Central China, was one of the few occasions where Japanese troops had to retreat without reaching their objective. As it came after their defeat against Russian troops, this event raised hope among Chinese people that Nationalist forces could stop the Japanese invasion. This hope was soon crushed however. (Wikipedia article entitled “Battle of Changsha”)

**Jan 27, 1940:** A message that Chungking regards as significant of Tibetan recognition of Chinese sovereignty was received in the Nationalist capital by President Lin Sen from the “Living Buddha” Jeh-chen Hutuku, Prince Regent of Tibet. (NYT p. 5)

**Jan 31, 1940:** Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is hastening his measures to consolidate Chinese control of Tibet, according to advices from Chungking today, and expects during this year to make that formerly semi-independent State an integral part of Nationalist China. A 6-year old child has been appointed as Dalai Lama. (NYT p. 8)

[This article (and a number of similar articles given below, see in particular the articles about uprisings in 1947 and 1949) shows that the control of the nationalist government over southern China also came to include Tibet. The thirteenth Dalai Lama, political pontiff of Tibet, had died in 1933]

**Feb 3, 1940:** Chungking. Maurice L. Sheahan of Chicago is the leader of the group of three American highway transport experts who have been advising the Chinese. Chungking adopted the proposal of the Chicagoans and will buy US aircraft for that purpose. (NYT p. 5)
Feb 4, 1940: The British keep a close eye on the 15th Dalai Lama, Llamo Dhondup. (NYT The week in review p. 66)

Feb 22, 1940: The Dalai Lama was enthroned. His choice is a victory for China. (NYT p. 11)

May 24, 1940: Mao Tse Tung is reported dead. (NYT p. 3)  
[The news was wrong, of course. It would be interesting to trace its origin.]

Jun 10, 1940: There were daily Japanese bombing raids against Chungking, the war-time Nationalist capital. In 5 successive days there were 99, 160, 160, 55 and 52 planes respectively. The foreign quarter, Chungking University, government buildings and the American Methodist Mission were hit. (Time Magazine, Monday, 10 June 1940)
Jul 26, 1940: The United States proclaimed a limited embargo on exports to Japan consisting of scrap iron, steel and certain grades of aviation fuel, but at that point there was no embargo on oil. (Tuchman 1970, p. 212)

Aug 1940: Up to August 1940, Japanese planes had carried out more than 11,000 raids in China, of which one half were directed against civilian populations far behind the front lines. (Snow 1940 p. 157)
[For instance, Chongqing and Yenan suffered great destructions. Snow describes the raids against Chongqing. The city was of course the war capital of the Nationalist government but the bombings did not single out official buildings.]

Sep 4, 1940: *Military agreement between France and Japan on Indochina.* The main points of the agreement signed by General Martin, the commander of French troops in Indochina, and General Nishihara were as follows:
- The Japanese government accepted to recognize French sovereignty in Indochina.
- France would give Japan the control of three airfields.
- Japan could bring into Indochina 5,000 troops who would take the control of railroads, roads and telegraph.
- Indochina would not sign any agreement with any other nation.
As a show of force, on 22 September 1940, several Japanese battalions invaded Indochina from Guangxi. Although the French troops tried to oppose them (and had 150 killed) it was hopeless. A cease fire was decided a few days later and on 26 September the expected Japanese troops began to land in Haiphong. (Bensacq p. 335, 352)
[In subsequent months, from the three airports conceded to them, the Japanese could bombard the Ledo route in Burma, Yunnan and even Sichuan. On 14 July 1941 Japan would demand 8 more airfields and the disposition of the ports of Saigon and Cam-rah as naval bases. Under the combined pressure of Germany and Japan, the Vichy government gave in. The Darlan-Kato agreement was signed on 29 July 1941.]

Sep 26, 1940: The United States loaned $25 million to China as a means of indicating its continued support to the Chinese government. (NYT p. 1)

Dec 1, 1940: The United States countered Japan’s ratification of a peace treaty with her Nanking puppet regime by arranging to make another $100 million loan available to the government of General Chiang Kai-shek. (NYT p. 1)

Dec 1, 1940: Chinese gunmen assassinated a Japanese officer in Peiping. Chinese guerrilla blew up the Peiping-Suiyuan train; Japanese officials reported 176 casualties. (NYT 1 December 1940)
Symbols such as •(13,11) signal the incidents marked by fatalities. The two numbers within parentheses total (over the decade 1941-1949) the number of fatalities among US troops on the one hand and the number of Chinese civilians killed in incidents with US forces on the other hand. For the US troops all causes of death are taken into consideration. However, it appears that deaths of troops due to illness are not mentioned (except possibly in the event of an epidemic) by news agencies or newspaper correspondents. Thus, because only a fraction of the fatalities are reported the totals that we compute grossly under-estimate the real fatality numbers.

Jan 5, 1941: New Fourth Army Incident. An unequal battle between the 8,000 men of the Communist New Fourth Army and 80,000 Nationalist troops resulted in heavy losses among the Communists. (Zhang 2002 p. 51, Wikipedia) 4,000 Communist soldiers who were not killed or executed were sent to a concentration camp located in Jiangxi.

[There are various accounts and interpretations of this episode which is referred to as the “New Fourth Army Incident” or also the Wannan (South Anhui) incident. However, there is no debate about the respective strength of the two sides: 80,000 nationalist troops against 8,000 or 9,000 Communist troops. This incident clearly shows that even during the war against the Japanese, there were already cracks in the united front that the two forces had agreed to form against their common enemy. The account given in Bensacq is misleading because this source does not give the troop numbers. It says only that the 40th Nationalist Division encircled and defeated the New Fourth Army. Because a standard division has about 15,000 troops and an army comprises two divisions or more, readers will be led to think that the Communist side was largest in size whereas in fact the opposite is true.]

Fe 10, 1941: The usefulness of the Burma Road to China is about ended. The Japanese state that their naval and military bombers have reduced all the bridges across the Mekong River to wrecks. (NYT 10 February 1941) [A further proof of the fact that during most of the war the Burma road was cut is provided by the organization of an airline connection between India and China, the so-called Hump through which most of the aid was channeled.]

Mar, 1941: The Lend-Lease Act opened the faucet of military aid to China. It also made the fortune of the Americans and Chinese who were involved in this procurement operations. (Tuchman 1970, p. 220-221)

Mar 12, 1941: President Roosevelt has asked Chiang Kai-shek to appoint an American director for the Burma Road operations. (NYT 12 March 1941)
Apr, 1941: An Executive order authorized the release of 100 air force pilots, who were allowed to enlist as mercenaries in the service of China. They were paid salaries of $750 a month (approximately 7,500 dollar of 2000) and a bonus of $500 for every Japanese plane shot down. (Tuchman 1970, p. 220)

[Needless to say, this created a strong incentive for inflating the number of planes shot down. No real check was possible when the Japanese aircraft were (allegedly) shot down over territory occupied by the Japanese.]

Jun 7, 1941: During a Japanese air raid on Chungking, insufficient fresh air supply brought about a panic in a tunnel sheltering some 6,500 persons. It is estimated that between 500 and 1,200 people were killed. (North China Herald 1941, July-September)

Jun 29, 1941: Owen Lattimore, widely known American author of several books dealing with affairs of the Far East, has been appointed as a special political adviser to the Chinese Government, and will go to Chungking immediately. (NYT p. 9)

Jul 2, 1941: The US government contemplates the construction of new airfields and two new plane assembly plants in well protected Chinese areas. The Japanese newspaper “Asahi Shimbun” observed that the purpose is to threaten the Japanese army from behind in the event of a Japanese-American crisis. (North China Herald 1941, July-September)

Jul 14, 1941: Further progress in the American program of lease-lend aid to China was manifested by the arrival in Chungking of three American highway transport experts, Daniel Arnstein, Harold Davis and Marco Hellman, to survey Burma highway equipment needs. (NYT p. 6)

Aug 19, 1941: The potential capacity of the Burma Road into China is far beyond the usually estimated 30,000 tons a month, according to Daniel Arnstein who has arrived in Chungking after completion of a survey of the road for the US Government. (NYT 19 August 1941)

[The Burma road was supposed to permit US aid to China to arrive from the port of Rangoon to Kunming in the Chinese province of Yunnan. The word “potential” is important for, as stated previously, Japanese bombers were able to destroy most of the bridges thus making the road almost useless.]

Nov 8, 1941: Washington. According to the latest figures there are about 1,500 American Marines stationed in Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai. President Roosevelt told the press this morning that the United States was considering their withdrawal. (Times p. 4)

Nov 14, 1941: President Roosevelt ordered the North China 4th Marine Legation
Guard stationed in Tientsin, Peking and Chinwangtao (Qinhuangdao), totaling 212 men, to leave for the Philippines on 10 December 1941. (Internet: http://www.combinedfleet.com/Tientsin_t.htm)

[There are claims that President Roosevelt knew about the attack on Pearl Harbor. However, in this case it is difficult to understand why he did not set the departure date prior to the attack of 8 December.]

**Nov 29, 1941:** Telegrams tell of a mass reinforcement of Japanese strength in Indochina and of an alert order issued to American forces in Hawaii. (Times p. 4)

[Thus, the Japanese attack against the Philippines was certainly expected. The threat of an attack on Pearl Harbor (some 6,000 km to the east of the Philippines) was perhaps less clear.]

**Dec 8, 1941:** About 1,500 North China Marines surrendered and were captured by the Japanese at Peking, Tientsin, Chinwangtao. (Website: http://www.northchinamarines.com/id7.htm)

[On account of clear signs of a coming war (see the previous entry), it is really surprising that these Marines were not withdrawn in time. This website shows copies of letters addressed by these prisoners of war to their family. According to one letter, they were allowed to send one letter every three months and to receive three packages a month including foodstuff, toilet articles and tobacco. Punishment for infractions of camp rules consisted in beatings or standing at attention in any kind of weather for several hours.]

**Dec 9, 1941:** Three days after the Japanese attack against the United States, the Chinese government declared war on Japan as well as on Germany and Italy. (NYT 9 December 1941)

[Why did Chiang Kai-shek wait until then for declaring war on Japan?]

**Dec 20, 1941:** First combat mission of the “American Volunteer Group”, also nicknamed as the “Flying Tigers”. The group was composed of some 60 pilots and about 200 ground crew recruited from the US Army Air Force, US Navy and Marine Corps. Their pay was about one and a half to three times what they had been making in the US Forces: $250 a month for a mechanic and $600 for a pilot (i.e. $3,750 and $9,000 respectively in dollars of 2012). The pilots were also orally promised a bounty of $500 for each enemy aircraft shot down.

In July 1942, the Volunteer Group was replaced by an official unit, the US Army 23rd Fighter Group. Although, the Flying Tigers status as volunteers ended in July 1942 the unit retained its former name as well as the shark face painted on their aircraft.
The “Flying Tigers” group was largely the creation of Claire L. Chennault, a retired US Army Air Corps officer who had worked in China since August 1937, first as military aviation adviser to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and then as director of a Chinese Air Force flight school in Kunming, Yunnan Province. After the beginning of the Japanese invasion, the Soviet Union had also supplied fighter and bomber squadrons to China, but these units were mostly withdrawn by the summer of 1940 in the wake of the treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union. (Wikipedia article entitled “Flying Tigers”)

[This volunteer group was similar to the “Yankee Squadron” that had taken part in the Spanish Civil War or the “Normandie-Niemen” fighter group composed of French pilots fighting the Germans in the Soviet Air Force. Their first combat mission was in July 1943 during the Kursk-Orel battle. During this battle German General Wilhelm Keitel decreed that any French pilot captured would immediately be executed.]

1942

Jan 3, 1942: Chinese troops, fully equipped with modern arms, have marched into Burma. (NYT 3 January 1942)

Jan 19, 1942: Memorandum to Colonel Donovan from Pearl Buck. The great danger to the United States is to become identified with England in the minds of the people of Asia [. . .] There ought to be a complete liaison between Wavell [commander of the Anglo-American-Chinese forces in Burma] and Chiang Kai-shek. It is doubtful whether Wavell can do this and therefore he must be supplemented by others who can help him. (SDI, reel 1)

[Colonel Donovan was the head of the OSS, the Office of Strategic Services which was the predecessor of the CIA. The style of this letter strongly suggests that Ms. Pearl Buck knew Colonel Donovan fairly well and that she gave him advice on a regular basis. The Chinese forces in Burma were under the direct command of General Stilwell who was himself under Wavell.]

Feb 10, 1942: British forces were annihilated by Japanese Army planes along the Salween river. (Japan Times p. 2)

[This episode is reported in Pearl Buck’s novel “Promise”]

Feb 16, 1942: Singapore surrendered. 73,000 prisoners were taken. (Japan Times p. 1)

[On the following day, the “Japan Times” had the following strange title: “Singapore victory puts Japanese army among world immortals”]
**Feb 21, 1942:** Excerpt of an article of the German daily newspaper “Völkischer Beobachter” (People’s observer). “While the extension of the British Empire was carried out in cold determination, the system by which the United States establishes air and naval bases on all corners of the Earth is carried out behind a veil of idealistic slogans such as the fight for democracy and against aggressors.” (cited in the “Japan Times” p. 3)

This excerpt is interesting because in February 1942 the establishment of American bases was only just beginning. There were American troops in Greenland, Newfoundland (since January 1941), Iceland (since July 1941), China, India and probably a few other places but the main extension of the network of permanent US bases came only after World War II.

It can also be observed that humanitarian slogans were already used by the British. One bizarre justification of the colonization of Africa was to fight slave trade conducted by the Ottoman empire.

**Mar 7, 1942:** Rangoon, the main port of Burma and a crucial element of the Burma Road (completed in 1938) that allowed US supplies to be delivered to China, was evacuated by the British and occupied by the Japanese. (Wikipedia entitled “Japanese conquest of Burma”.)

In her novel “Promise”, Pearl Buck writes that the coolies who were working at the port were prevented from leaving the port during Japanese bombing raids and that many died as a result.

**Mar 20, 1942:** Lieutenant General Stilwell assumed command of the Fifth and Sixth Chinese armies fighting the Japanese in Burma. (NYT p. 3)

An important landmark in the Japanese invasion was on 3 April 1942 when an amphibious force seized the port of Akyab. Less than 3 weeks later the resistance of the British (mostly Indian) and Chinese armies collapsed. (NYT 3 April p. 1)

The attempt of Chinese troops to check the Japanese occupation of Burma was hampered by 3 factors:

- The Chinese troops were far from their logistic bases.
- The population of Burma was deeply hostile to Britain and by extension to Britain’s allies.
- Because British troops in south Burma were quickly defeated, instead of being able to join force with them the Chinese troops were gained by the spirit of defeat and deprived of any protection against Japanese air force attacks.

**Apr 29, 1942:** Chinese reinforcements are pouring into Northeast Burma in an eleventh-hour effort to meet a situation which has turned from critical to desperate. If they fail all Burma may be lost. (NYT p. 20)
Less than one week earlier another article had mentioned that General Stilwell was the most popular commander of the Chinese forces sent to Burma. (NYT 23 April p. 3)

**May 7, 1942:** Lieutenant General Joseph Stilwell commander of the Chinese forces in Burma and several senior Chinese commanders have safely arrived at an undisclosed base in Burma. (NYT p. 4)

This news refers to the retreat of General Stilwell and his staff by way of a long march through the jungle. About one year later this retreat was described as an outstanding feat through the publication of a book entitled “Retreat with Stilwell” by Jack Belden. (NYT 14 March 1943, section Book Review, p. BR3)

**May 30, 1942** The KMT arrested Liao Chengzhi together with hundreds of other Communist leaders in South China. Liao was an important figure in the Communist party in charge of the Xinghua news agency and more broadly of the foreign relations of the CPC. This wave of arrests brought about the undoing of the CPC’s organisation in southern China.

[These arrests took place despite the common front policy against the Japanese. Although held in harsh conditions, Liao was not executed even after he refused to join the KMT. The CPC leadership pleaded for his release and he was eventually freed at the end of January 1946 as a result of the “Double Ten Agreement” of 10 October 1945 (see below).]

**Jun 27, 1942:** Chiang Kai-shek as seen by General Stilwell. Excerpt of a letter from Stilwell to Henry Stimson, US Secretary of War.

CKS [acronym used in the letter] rules by means of his gang who hold all the key positions in the government. He has no patience with anyone who disagrees with him and flares up angrily at any opposition. (NDL, Papers of Henry Lewis Stimson, reel 106)

[How can there be a fruitful cooperation between two persons when one of them holds such a bad opinion about the other? Incidentally, it would be interesting to also know Chiang Kai-shek’s opinion about Stilwell.]

**Jul 13, 1942:** In a memorandum to the British government the US State Department stated that it recognized the suzerainty of the Chinese government over Tibet in the following terms.

“For its part, the government of the United States has borne in mind the fact that the Chinese government has long claimed suzerainty over Tibet and that the Chinese constitution lists Tibet among areas constituting the territory of the Republic of China. This government has at no time raised a question regarding either of these
claims”.
(Aide-mémoire from US State Department to the British Embassy, 13 July 1942, FO371/35756, British Foreign Office Records, National Archives of the UK. Cited in Goldstein 2006.)

[Melwyn Goldstein writes that this was the first clear statement of US policy toward Tibet. It seems that in parallel with this official position, at a tactical level the US government has been encouraging Tibetans to demand independence. In his visits to Lhasa in 1931, 1934 and 1942, US envoy Ilia Tolstoy had discussions with the young Dalai Lama and with the Tibetan government in which he gave encouragements in this direction. Naturally, after the Communist victory the split between the official position and the tactical policy became even larger. For instance, in 1951 the US government urged the Dalai Lama to reject the so-called “Seventeen-point Agreement” between Tibet and Beijing and to flee into exile. At that time, he did not follow the advice, but his subsequent flight in 1959 fulfilled the program set by the State Department 8 years earlier. (Goldstein 2006)]

Aug 23, 1942: Brigadier General Bissel got a big command in the India, Burma and China theater. (NYT p. 9)

Dec. 1942: On 1 December 1942, British General Sir Archibald Wavell agreed with American General Stilwell to build the Ledo Road. It was intended to be the primary supply route from India to China. It connected the railhead at Ledo (in the Assam province of India) to Mong-Yu where it joined the Burma Road.

The road was built by 15,000 American soldiers mainly from African-American regiments and battalions (45th Engineer General Service Regiment, Battalions no 823,848,849,858,1883) and 35,000 local workers. The work took two years. Some 1,100 Americans died during the construction, as well as many locals. In the 6 months following its opening in January 1945, the road allowed shipment of some 20,000 tons per month from India to China, which was much less than the 70,000 tons that were airlifted over the “Hump”.

(Wikipedia article entitled “Ledo Road”.)

[A clear distinction should be made between the “Ledo Road” and the “Burma Road”. The later which connected China to northern Burma was built by the British in 1937. It was closed after Japanese troops occupied the port of Rangoon in the south of Burma. However, as the Ledo Road joined the northern section of the Burma Road, the whole project required the re-occupation of northern Burma by Allied troops.]

1943
**Jan 4, 1943:** Chungking. In three months the Chungking headquarters of the United States Office of War Information expects to inhabit a new $75,000 building midway between Lieutenant General Stilwell’s house and the American Army headquarters in the uptown section of the city. (NYT p. 4)

[From this excerpt it can be inferred that the US presence in the Chinese war capital of Chungking was materialized by several buildings.]

**Jan 11, 1943:** *End of the British and US privilege of extraterritoriality and concessions in China.* In similar statements issued simultaneously in London and Washington, the US and Britain renounced to these privileges and retroceded the concessions to the Chongqing government. On 14 January, Italy retroceded its concessions to the Nanking government. (Bensacq p. 406).

[These declarations put France in an awkward position.]

**Jan 18, 1943:** Some 140,000 bushwhackers were killed by the Japanese army in North China during 1942. (Japan Times p. 1)

[The term “bushwhackers” (bush=uncleared wild land, to whack= to hit with a noisy blow) mostly refers to guerrillas who operated in the south during the American Civil War. In the context of this article most of these victims were probably Communists or villagers suspected of helping them.

In order to give some significance to this figure one needs to put it in comparative perspective. Ever since Japan took over Manchuria it had to face a guerrilla war. For instance, a Japan Times article of 6 May 1935 says that “a joint campaign against bandits by joint Japanese-Manchoukuo forces resulted in 1,000 marauders killed during the month of March 1935”. The same rate over the whole year would result in 12,000 guerrillas killed. This shows that the intensity of guerrilla warfare in 1942 in the north of China was some 10 times what it was in Manchuria.]

**May 9-11, 1943:** According to an article published in China Daily, in the town of Changjiao (Hunan province) Japanese troops killed about 30,000 local residents and raped 2,000 women. A film entitled “Tears of Reed Catkins” was devoted to this event.

[Japanese troops occupied hundreds of towns in China. One wonders what brought about such a large-scale massacre in Changjiao. The short Wikipedia article (in English) devoted to this event gives no answer.]

**May 31, 1943:** The Chinese and US governments signed an agreement which provided for American military personnel to be tried by US courts. (Yang 1998, p. 76)

**Jul 1943:** A French diplomat in Hankou (that is to say in the part of China occupied by Japan) mentioned that bombing by Nationalist and US aircraft started in July 1943. They made hundreds of victims in the Chinese population. The consulate was
also severely damaged while the lives of the personnel were saved thanks to shelters dug in the garden. (Bensacq p. 500)

**Summer of 1943:** A school of journalism established with the help of three US advisers was inaugurated in Chungking. (SDI, reel 1)

[In any country where the United States wanted to extend its influence the establishment of schools of journalism more or less controlled by US or pro-US personnel was one of the main objectives of the Department of State.]

**Jul 27, 1943:** The accounts of the US training schools for Chinese officers in southwestern China give an indication of the chief current function of Lieutenant General Stilwell in China. (NYT p. 7)

**Oct 5, 1943:** According to an article written for the Yenan newspaper “Liberation Daily” by Chairman Mao Tse-tung, 20 members of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang and 58 KMT generals have deserted to the Japanese side. In the same article Mao points out that about one half of the KMT troops are affected to encircling the so-called Border Region, that is to say the buffer region between the coastal area occupied by the Japanese and the free zone which was controlled either by the Communists or by the Nationalist. As the Communist guerrilla was particularly active in the Border Region there is good reason to believe that this encirclement and economic blockade was in preparation of an “extermination campaign” similar to those which were conducted between 1930 and 1936.

In Chiang Kai-shek’s book “China’s Destiny” which was published in Chinese in March 1943, he claims indeed that he will “finish the Communists” within two years.

Regarding the so-called “New Fourth Army incident”, Mao writes that 9,000 of its soldiers were slain in southern Anhwei.

(Selected works of Mao Tse-tung available on the website http://www.marxists.org/)

**Oct 31, 1943:** Publication of a novel by Pearl Buck about the unsuccessful campaign through which Chinese troops tried to stop the Japanese invasion of the British colony of Burma. Entitled “Promise” this book covers the period from January 1942 when Chinese troops entered Burma to their retreat in April 1942. (A review of the book was published in the New York Times of 31 October 1943)

[The book suggests that Chinese generals opposed this campaign on the side of the British. They obeyed Chiang Kai-shek’s orders with great reluctance.]

**Dec 31, 1943:** According to the US War Department at the end of 1943 the areas controlled by the different forces in China can be decomposed as follows:

- 38% of the population is located in the area (210,000 sq km) occupied by the Japanese or controlled by the pro-Japanese Nanking government.
• 30% of the population is in the area (400,000 sq km) controlled by the Communists.
• 23% of the population is located in a guerrilla area (173,000 sq km) between Japanese and Chinese forces.
• 8.7% of the population is in the area controlled by the Kuomintang.

(Boyle 1972 p. 315)

[Of particular interest is the small percentage of the population under the control of the Kuomintang. The area controlled by the Nationalist became even smaller in the fall of 1944 when the Japanese forces pushed forward to occupy the airports from where American bombers could made raids on Japan. For instance, the American base at Kweilin was captured in November 1944.


1944

Early 1944: The Chengtu plain was chosen by the American Command as the forward base of the 20th Bomber for attacks on Western Japan. The B-29 bombers required a runway nearly 3 kilometer long, plus ground for the approaches, the supply depots and the barracks. Around the B-29 airfields were smaller fields for fighters to guard the place from enemy attacks. For the four planned B-29 airfields thousands of hectares of land had to be requisitioned. The land in this plain was very fertile and valuable. American negotiators agreed on a price which seemed satisfactory for both parties. Much labor was needed to build the bases, so the dispossessed and thousands of additional men and women were employed in labor groups to work on the airfields. Something like half a million Chinese farmers and peasants labored with simple hand tools to create the airfields.

Soon the Americans supervising the work discovered an hostility towards them. A number of Americans were attacked. Investigations revealed that the farmers had not received the agreed price for their land. Large sums had stuck in various hands on the way down to the farmers. The Americans were blamed because they had taken the land and failed to pay the full price for it. There were articles in the newspapers recommending a virtual quarantine on the American forces and urging decent women not to associate with the Americans. If a girl was seen talking to an American on the streets she could be arrested by the Secret Military Police. Slops were thrown form upstairs windows on Americans.

In the account of his stay in Chengtu, Oliver Caldwell says that American vehicles were stoned. “During this period I cannot remember driving into the city [of Chengtu] without having stones thrown at me. One day, I was riding in a jeep on a road on top of a dyke above the plain. We speeded up to pass a bus. The driver of the
bus turned his bus into the jeep to drive us off the road 7 meters down into the fields. This was deliberate. I was watching him and saw his sudden pull of the wheel and watched his eyes as we barely escaped.

The first raid on Japan was made by 77 B-29 bombers on 15 June 1944.
(Caldwell 1972 p. 85-88; http://www.century-of-flight.net)

**Apr 1944:** At this time the region of the Communist Headquarters of Yenan (some 250 km north of Sian) was surrounded by three blockade lines established on its south by the Chungking government. One of the purposes of these fortified blockade lines was to prevent Chinese people to join the Communists. On the east of Yenan was the Japanese front line (see the Fig.).

In his book Gunther Stein, an American journalist who visited the region in April 1944, provides a map of the area. The Kuomintang authorities invited him to visit a labor camp near Sian. The camp was presented as regrouping people who had fled the Communist zone. One girl testified that her parents who were wealthy landowners were beheaded by the Communists. Later on Stein learned from two persons who had escaped from the camp that this was a misrepresentation and that the girl had in fact been arrested when she tried to join the Communist zone. The author says that apart from a few exceptions this was the case of most of the people who were in the camp.
(Stein 1945)

**Apr 1944:** Discussion between KMT Major General Lo Tsei-kai and the American journalist Gunther Stein, excerpt.

General: “During the last 6 months the Communist did no fighting against the Japanese.”
Stein: “Do you really mean this?”
General: He replied sharply his face reddening: “I say they did no fighting.”
Stein: “Why then did the Japanese so often mention offensive and defensive operations against the Communists in their war communiqués?”
General: “Whatever units the Japanese claim to mop up behind their lines are government armies not Communist troops.”
Stein: “But Japanese war communiqués always differentiate clearly between government and Communist forces.”
General: “If you believe in Japanese propaganda what use is it for America to fight in this war? This concerns international affairs and I refuse any further discussion on the subject.
(Stein 1945, p. 35)

[In the summer of 1944 the Japanese carried out an offensive against Nationalist forces which in a few months led them from Hankow to the border of French In-
Fig. 9.16  Kuomintang blockade lines around the Communist center of Yenan. It is often said that after the Sian incident of December 1938 the Kuomintang accepted to form an anti-Japanese front with the Communists. This map shows that even in the middle of the war against Japan, the Communist center of Yenan was surrounded by three blockade lines. Paradoxically, the main openings of the Yenan area were toward the north and east in the direction of the Japanese front line. This map was drawn by Gunther Stein, an American journalist who arrived in Yenan in April 1944, some 3 months before the US Army Observer Section. Source: Stein (1945, p. 32)

dochina. One may wonder why they did not try to launch a major offensive against the Yenan area. Two factors should be kept in mind. The first is that the main objective of the southward offensive was to take the airfields from where American bombers could reach Japan. The second point is that Yenan was of no strategic importance. This was made clear in March 1947 when KMT troops occupied Yenan.
The Communist headquarters moved further north and the occupation did not affect the conduct of the war. On the contrary, the 200,000 KMT troops who occupied Yenan had to be withdrawn from other theaters which increased KMT vulnerability. In short, one may think that the Japanese commanders were wiser than Chiang Kai-shek and refrained from a move without strategic significance.

Fig. 9.17 Japanese offensive in the summer of 1944. It is commonly said that the main purpose of the offensive was to take the airfields from which American B-29 bombers could reach southern Japanese cities. However, this point is not really clear when one looks at the map. Indeed, the northwestern airfields of Hsian and Nancheng were some 1,000km closer to Japan than the airfields taken by the Japanese during their offensive. So, this point remains an open question. There are 3,000km from Chungking to Tokyo whereas the B-29 had a combat range of 5,200km. Sources: left: White and Jacoby (1946, p. 182). Right: Wikipedia article entitled “Operation Ichi-Go” (public domain).

**Jul 4, 1944:** Under Admiral Leahy’s signature the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the following recommendation to President Roosevelt: “The time has come when all the power and resources remaining to China must be entrusted to one individual capable of directing that effort in a fruitful way against the Japanese. That man is General Stilwell”\(^{95}\). In addition the Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the promotion of General Stilwell to the temporary grade of full General (i.e. General of the Army \(^{96}\)) to give him the necessary prestige for the new position proposed for him in China. (Spence 1969, p. 258)

**Jul 22, 1944:** Arrival of the United States Army Observation Group in Yenan. It was the first US attempt to establish official relations with the Communist Party and the People’s Liberation Army. (Wikipedia article entitled “Dixie Mission”)

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\(^95\)A message to this effect was sent to General Chiang Kai-shek on July 8  
\(^96\)The only officers of that rank at the time were Arnold, Eisenhower, MacArthur and Marshall.
Sep 7, 1944: Chiang Kai-shek told Hurley (US Ambassador to China) that he was prepared to give General Stilwell actual command of all Chinese forces. Confronted to a major Japanese offensive, the Chinese armies were falling back on the Salween front. Hurley then drafted the directive that the Generalissimo would give to Stilwell:

“You will proceed at once with the reorganization and relocation of Ground and Air Forces of the Republic of China and with preparation of plans for a counter-offensive (excerpt)”. Simultaneously, Stilwell drafted the text of the telegram that he would send to all Chinese army commanders (excerpt)

“There may be some of you who say: what is this foreigner doing here? I ask you not to think of me that way. I have spent many years in China and I hope that you will believe I am China’s true friend. Now the Generalissimo has honored me by appointing me to command the Field Forces. To accomplish anything I must have the support and cooperation of you all”.

Yet, there was no response from the Generalissimo. Thus, in mid-September Stilwell sent a long report to General Marshall in which he was critical of Chiang Kai-shek. The message was relayed to Roosevelt who on September 16 wrote a tough letter to the Generalissimo (see below Sep 16). (Spence 1969, Van de Ven 2003)

Sep 16, 1944: Letter of President Roosevelt to General Chiang Kai-shek (excerpt).

“I have urged time and again in previous months that you take drastic action.
I am certain that the only thing you can now do is to reinforce your Salween armies while at once placing General Stilwell in unrestricted command of all your forces. The action I am asking you to take will fortify us in the continued efforts the United States proposes to take to maintain and increase our aid to you”.

This was an ultimatum: either Stilwell will be installed or American aid will cease. Stilwell received the message on September 18 and took it to the Generalissimo house to deliver it in person. He wrote in his diary: “Mark this day in red on the calendar of life. At long, at very long last FDR has finally spoken plain words”.

In a return message to Roosevelt, Chiang stated that he would accept any American officer but not Stilwell.

Roosevelt replied: “The situation has so deteriorated since my original message that I now am inclined to feel that the United States should not assume the responsibility involved in placing an American officer in command of your ground forces throughout China. The recall order reached Stilwell on 16 October 1944. (Spence 1969)

Oct 2, 1944: In an address to the Kuomintang Central Executive Committee Chiang Kai-shek insisted that General Stilwell had to go and denounced US attempts to impose him as “imperialism”. (Van de Ven 2003)


[Incidentally, it can be noted that in his memoirs General Wedemeyer (1958) give a fairly truncated and misleading account of the Stilwell episode for he does not mention that the demand for Stilwell’s appointment as commander of all Chinese forces was made by President Roosevelt. He even says that ambassador “Hurley supported Chiang at this critical juncture [by opposing Stilwell’s appointment]”. This was not the case as shown by the meeting of September 797. From the way the chain of command works in the US Army it is obvious that the demand for Stilwell’s appointment could only be made with the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the President; of course, General Wedemeyer was well aware of this.]

Oct 22, 1944: During a banquet hosted by Dai Li, General Miller who had arrived in Chongqing on 18 October 1944 provoked a major crisis by demanding that the Chinese bring them “sing song girls” and by calling China a 12th rank power. (Wakeman 2003 p. 512)

97Interestingly, Wedemeyer also reports (p. 308-309) the text of a note sent (on September 16) by Stilwell to the Foreign Minister of China as follows “if the Generalissimo did not meet the demands concerning his appointment to command all of the Chinese forces, he [Stilwell] would recommend that the United States withdraw from China and set up its Asiatic base in the territory of the Soviet Union”. This was a rather bizarre proposition after so many airports for US bombers had been built in China.
Dec 1944: In December 1944 there was a carefully organized slaughter of the intellectuals, artists, writers and others who were members of the group which was working to replace the Chungking government with a new moderate regime friendly to the United States. Homes were invaded and a number of people were shot. (Caldwell 1972 p. 115)

1945

“Operation Beleaguer” was the name of the US Marine expeditionary force in China from 1945 to 1949. An article entitled “Operation BELEAGUER: The Marine III Amphibious Corps (A-C) in North China, 1945-1949” and posted on the website of the US Marines gives a summary of their fatalities during this operation, namely: 34 killed in action, a figure which comprises: 12 Marines killed (and 42 wounded) in clashes with Communist forces plus 22 Marines aircrew killed in the crashes of 14 aircraft.

It can be observed that as this was not a real war the expression “killed in action” has no clear definition. In the incidents reported below 72 American fatalities were listed.

The article concludes by saying that with operation “Beleaguer”, “America debuted in the first of a series of sometimes frustrating MOOTW (Military Operations Other Than War) missions”.

It may have been the first post-war MOOTW, but certainly not the first in the history of the Marines. Prior to World War II there have been numerous MOOTW particularly in Latin America (e.g. in Nicaragua).

Most of this report is reproduced in the Wikipedia article entitled “Operation Beleaguer”. The article describes a number of clashes between Communists and Marines. In one of them one reads:

“Chinese casualties are unknown, because they typically removed their dead from the battlefield immediately.”

In the account of another clash one reads:

“The bodies of six uniformed Communist soldiers were found.”

So, the question of whether the Communists removed their dead from the battlefield remains an open question.

Jan 1945: US authorities protested against a KMT order that authorized the Shanghai police to “fire at American military vehicles when in the judgment of the Chinese police” the situation was extremely grave. (Guo 1997, p. 253)

98 The name probably comes from the verb “to beleaguer” which means to harass, to surround with troops.
Jan 26, 1945: US Headquarters sent a memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nationalist government which defined the “Principles governing duties of US and Chinese military police”. According to this agreement the sphere of intervention of US military police was limited to the environs of the barracks housing US forces. If investigations outside of this sphere were deemed necessary they had to be conducted in conjunction with Chinese gendarmes. (Guo 1997, p. 253)

[At this time there were only few US troops in China. After the arrival of more troops in the fall of 1945, US Headquarters requested a greater freedom of action for US military police. See below the memorandum of November 20, 1945.]

Mar 9, 1945: In the French colony of Indochina a truce had been negotiated in 1940 between the French government of General Pétain and the Japanese. It was ended on 9 March 1945 when the Japanese asked all French forces (there were about 12,000 French soldiers and sailors in Indochina) to surrender before being put in concentration camps. Some troops who refused were massacred or went into hiding in the jungle. In his memoirs, General Claire Lee Chenault who commanded the 14th US Army Air Force in South China writes that he was ordered by Washington not to provide any help to the French units. He observes:

“I carried out my orders to the letter, but did not relish the idea of leaving Frenchmen to be slaughtered in the jungle while I was forced officially to ignore their plight”.

After the Japanese capitulation the north of Indochina was occupied by Chinese and American forces while the south was occupied by English Forces. It is only on 6 March 1946 that Hanoi was re-occupied by French Forces. (Wikipedia article in French entitled “Histoire de la marine française en Indochine de 1939 à 1945”.)

Mar 26, 1945: “Funny money”. The Comptroller of the United States approved the use of “no-rate currency” by American naval forces in China. No-rate Chinese National Currency, or “Funny money” as some Rice Paddy Navy boys called it, was regular Chinese currency issued by the central government to the Disbursing Officer, China (DOCHINA), for expenditure by their agents without determination of a definite rate of exchange or means of settlement between the two governments. There was no limit as to the amounts which might be drawn from China by these officers. It must be added that, according to SACO rules, most locally manufactured material, facilities or services were being furnished gratis by the Chinese.

On 7 July 1945, an Army courier dropped 20 wooden cases at the Kunming airport. When one of the cases was opened, it appeared to contain 50 million CN (Chinese National) dollars in crisp, new banknotes printed by the American Bank Note Company. Altogether the cases contained one billion CN dollars. At that time this rep-
Fig. 9.19 Chinese currency issued by the Central Bank of China between 1930 and 1948. The English name of this currency (as given on the back of the note) was “Custom Gold Unit”. Dr. Sun Yat-sen is shown on the face and the Shanghai Customs House on the back. In spite of bearing the inscription “Shanghai, 1930” (back, bottom) the note was in fact printed in 1946 in the United States by the American Bank Note Company. Other companies such as Waterlow and Sons or the China Engraving and Printing Works also produced Chinese notes. Source: Wikipedia, English, article “Chinese customs gold unit”.

represented $1000/2900 = 0.34$ million US dollar. In September 1945, this money was carried from Kunming to Shanghai and Tsingtao where it was distributed to agent officers of American warships which were in the port, masters of merchant vessels, news correspondents, American banking institutions and other accredited persons. On 31 August 1946, the Republic of China signed an agreement with the United States in which she acquitted America for all advances of Chinese National currency made to the US Navy, US Army and other Government agencies as one of the conditions under which she purchased America’s surplus property in the Western Pacific. DOCHINA was disestablished on 31 December 1946. During the 3 years it was operative, DOCHINA received CNS 16.5 billions\(^99\) (Stratton 1950, p. 195, 200, 207, 210, 219, 356)

[In short, the “Funny Money” was Chinese money put at the disposal of American forces in China. Why was this currency printed by an American company? According to an agreement negotiated in 1914 the “American Bank Note Company” would print Chinese notes, bonds and stamps (NYT 1 April 1914, p. 4); this agreement remained in force until the end of the Nationalist rule in China.]

\(^{99}\)It is difficult to convert this figure in dollars because at that time the exchange rate of the Chinese dollar was changing very quickly: in June 1944, $1 = 190$ CNS, in July 1945, $1 = 2900$ CNS. To what extent did the issuance of Chinese currency to the American forces contribute to the inflationary spiral is difficult to say; one would need to compare the 16.5 billions to the total issuance of Chinese currency in those years.
May 23, 1945: Chungking. Several hundred Chinese people surrounded a bar frequented by Americans and jeep girls. When some MPs took three girls to a jeep to drive them away, a Chinese slapped the girls and the mob threw rocks and mud at US vehicles in the area. (Guo 1998)

Jun 13, 1945: At the Motor Transport Service station at Toppa a New First Army [force trained and armed by the US forces in China] wanted to get water from a US kitchen for his radiator but was refused by the GI cook. He returned with a hand grenade and got the water. After a complaint was made by a US officer, some Chinese soldiers raided the kitchen and beat the cook. (Guo 1997)

Jun 13, 1945: At Chanyi two New First Army soldiers tried to steal food from a US kitchen. A US mess sergeant stopped them and took one prisoner. The other soldier soon returned with 15 of his friends; they rescued the prisoner and took some food with them. (Guo 1997)

Jul 1945: Two New First Army soldiers pulled a grenade in the American 22nd Field Hospital [the account does not say why]. After they had been arrested by the Chinese military police a New First Army detachment raided the prison and released the prisoners. (Guo 1997)

Jul 14, 1945: Chinese soldiers of the 38th Division at Poseh coerced a US air-crew to fly them to Nanning in spite of bad weather. They lined up the crew near the tail of the plane, disarmed them and forced them to hold their hands in the air for a period of 15 minutes. (Guo 1997)

[All previous incidents are described in the same primary source namely: CTHQ [US China Theater Headquarters] “Memorandum of 2 August 1945”, Record Group 338, Box 2, Folder 8, CSC XI [Chinese Service Command], Office of the CMG GEN. As they are concentrated on a period of only 2 months it is likely that it is just a small sample of a much larger set of incidents.]

Aug 1, 1945: Chihchiang. During the first week of August there were 5 cases of cholera in the 547th Quartermaster Depot Supply Company. One of the soldiers died. (Mosley 1958)

Aug 5, 1945: General Wedemeyer forwarded an extremely strongly worded US report to the Generalissimo. The report described the Chinese conscription system as a “corrupt and vicious human cattle market” and compared the Chinese Army hospitals to the German concentration camp at Buchenwald. (Spence 1969, p. 277)


100 The so-called “jeep girls” were not full-time prostitutes but young Chinese girls who met with American troops.
government signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 14, 1945. The Soviet Union agreed:

- to recognize the Nationalist government as the sole government of China.
- to allow Nationalist troops to occupy the cities and industrial facilities of Manchuria after the withdrawal of Soviet troops and that in a general way it would not support the Communists in the Chinese civil war. In return the Soviet Union obtained:

(i) partnership in the Chinese Eastern Railway for a 30-year period.
(ii) acceptance by the Nationalist government of the independence of Outer Mongolia. A separate agreement on Port Arthur was also signed under which the two countries may use it as a naval base.


[John Melby (Melby 1968, p. 23-24) who was at that time a member of the US embassy in China writes in his personal journal “the bitterness of the Communist reactions was clearly perceived by the members of the American embassy”. It is this treaty which allowed the movement of Nationalist troops from South China to Manchuria. According to Melby, the ratio of soldiers and rifles between the Nationalists and Communists was about 5 to 1. In addition the Nationalists had a complete monopoly of naval and air power and were in the process of taking over most lines of communication with the help of the Americans.

Even though the Sino-Soviet treaty gave a great strategic advantage to the Nationalists, it did not prevent the Communists from overtaking Manchuria between September 1947 and April 1948 (see below).]

Aug 16, 1945: During those eight years [1937-1945: War of Resistance against the Japanese aggression], Chiang Kai-shek launched three large-scale anti-Communist campaigns, in 1940, 1941 and 1943, each time attempting to develop the attack into a country-wide civil war, and only the opposition of the Chinese people and of public figures in the Allied countries prevented its occurrence, much to Chiang’s regret. Thus he was forced to postpone the country-wide civil war until the end of the War of Resistance Against Japan. (Mao Tse-tung, Commentary on a statement by Chiang Kai-shek written on 16 August 1945 for the Hsinhua News Agency)

Aug 19, 1945: The China Theater Headquarters sent a memorandum to the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the Nationalist government protesting the arrest and detention of US personnel by the Yunnan police. In the same month this Headquarters rejected a KMT motion that Nationalist police be authorized to inspect identification papers of US servicemen. (Guo 1997, p. 252)
Aug 28, 1945: Discussions between the Communists and the KMT. Patrick Hurley, then US ambassador to China, came to Yenan on August 27. Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei arrived in Chungking on August 28 and held negotiations with the Kuomintang for 43 days. The negotiations resulted in the publication of the “Summary of conversations between the representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China” also known as the “October 10th Agreement”. Mao Tse-tung returned to Yenan on October 11. Chou En-lai and Wang Jo-fei remained in Chungking to continue the negotiations. (https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-4/mswv4_05.htm)

Sep 9, 1945: US ambassador Patrick Hurley reported that the Communists’ attempt to take over the Shantung-Hopei region had been stymied in the past week because the Nationalist forces received reinforcements from the Japanese army and from the former Nanking pro-Japanese forces. He also noted that the movement of Communist troops were made difficult by the Japanese control of communication lines. (Boyle 1972 p. 328)

Oct 1, 1945: Former Japanese puppet troops [that is to say Chinese troops who had been armed and trained by the Japanese] occupying the town of Chinwangtao were engaged in fighting with Communist regular troops who held most of the surrounding countryside. In a general way after the defeat of Japan, many of the puppet troops transferred their allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek by whom they were given official status in the Nationalist forces. (Shaw 1960, p. 3,4)

Oct 1, 1945: Prices in Shanghai for enforcement in local shops will be fixed jointly by the US Army and Navy in cooperation with Chinese authorities. These prices will be announced in the “Stars and Stripes” newspaper of the American forces and over the GI radio station. (SH p. 1)

Oct 2, 1945: Chengtu. Three Japanese prisoners of war were shot by order of the Generalissimo’s headquarters. They were pilots who were captured soon after the outbreak of the war. (SH p. 1)
[Is the fact of executing enemy fliers not considered as a war crime?]

Oct 6, 1945: Marines had their first clash with the Chinese Communists. Engineers and a rifle platoon attempting to clear roadblocks 35 km outside of Tientsin were fired upon by approximately 50 Communists. Three of the Marines were wounded, but the detachment returned to Tientsin safely. (US Marines website: Operation BELEAGUER: The Marine III amphibious corps in North China, 1945-49 at the following address:
Oct 8, 1945: A Chinese worker was shot by an American soldier on suspicion of being a burglar. The American military authorities rejected a police request for an inquiry. (Shanghai News 4 November 1950, according to the journal this report is based on Kuomintang police files)

Oct 8, 1945: A US convoy en route from Kuiyang to Chanyi was robbed. To the best knowledge of US authorities, the perpetrators were “armed Chinese”. (Guo 1997, p. 251, Guo 1998)
[The expression “armed Chinese” was used in American accounts to designate Kuomintang troops. For Communist troops, American reports use the expression “Communists” or “bandits” or “irregular forces”.

Oct 9, 1945: 3 US Marines were shot (but none seriously) when their engineer company was ambushed on the road between Tientsin and Peiping. A rifle unit with the engineers returned the fire. (NYT p. 10)

Oct 10, 1945: Double Ten Agreement between the KMT and CPC. On 27 October 1945 Mao Zedong and United States Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley flew together to Chungking (now Chongqing) to start the negotiations. The outcome was that the CPC acknowledged the KMT as the legitimate government, while the KMT in return recognised the CPC as a legitimate opposition party. 
In fact the agreement’s formal name, i.e. “Summary of Conversations Between the Representatives of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China” suggests than it was not really an agreement but rather a recognition and summary of the situation prevailing at that time. 
(Wikipedia entitled “Double Ten Agreement” )
[The “double ten” name comes of course from the date of the signature. This was the first step in US attempts to foster an agreement. It would be followed by the missions in China of General Marshall.]

Oct 10, 1945: Lieutenant General Wedemeyer announced at a press conference in Chungking that the US would not transport any KMT troops to Manchuria. In fact between August and late September they had transported 140,000 KMT troops by air and sea to North China, (Korean Independence 13 November 1945)
[The article lists all KMT divisions transported to North China with dates, strength, departure and arrival ports. In this respect see also 18 November 1945.]

Oct 11, 1945: Tsingtao was occupied by Marine forces. American units got welcome by Chinese on landing. (NYT p. 2)

Oct 11, 1945: After an advance party had made arrangements in Tsingtao, Shantung Province, the first transports of the 6th Marine division docked at Tsingtao’s wharf.
Over the following years until the last Marine cleared Tsingtao in the spring of 1949 there will be a steady procession of incidents involving Marine guards and raiding Communists: blown tracks, train derailments, and ambushes. (Shaw 1960, p. 6,9,11)

Oct 11, 1945: A fourth attempt was made against the life of Rear Admiral Milton E. Miles, the American associate of General Tai Li (see below at the date of 31 December 1945) in a village 80 kilometers southwest of Shanghai early in August. (SH p. 1)

Oct 13, 1945: Enthusiastic scenes of hospitality are witnessed whenever the trimly clad Marines appear on the streets. (SH p. 1)

Oct 13, 1945: Five American servicemen have died from poisonous beverages since the occupation began. (SH p. 1)
[The same problem occurred during the occupation of Japan with same deadly consequences.]

Oct 13, 1945: The entire Shanghai area will be sprayed with DDT, a powerful insecticide within two weeks. (SH p. 1)
[A photograph shows a light airplane flying over the roofs of the city to spread DDT]

Oct 17, 1945: Chinese Army units arrived in Peking by air in American planes. They received a vociferous welcome from more than a million people who have lived under Japanese domination for 8 years. The troops are coming from Hankow and Shanghai. At its peak the movement will involve 70 plane loads a day. (SH p. 4)

Oct 18, 1945: The current exchange rate is: 1 US$ = 1,000 CN $. (SH p. 1)

Oct 18, 1945: In Beijing a marine railroad guard killed 6 Chinese Communists who had been firing at a train. (Fredriksen 2011, p. 194)
[How can a single person kill 6 armed opponents? May be only one or two out of the six were armed.]

Oct 19, 1945: US Assistant Secretary of War, John McCloy left Shanghai today for Peiping. (SH p. 2)

Oct 20, 1945: Several cases of assaults on Japanese nationals and looting of Japanese property took place in Peiping during the last few days. The incidents followed large-scale [anti-Japanese] riots in Tientsin which caused many casualties and necessitated the establishment of martial law. (SH p. 1)

Oct 20, 1945: A troop transport plane crashed while attempting to land on Nanyuan airfield near Peiping. The American crew and 50 Chinese soldiers were killed. (NYT p. 6)
Oct 20, 1945: 30 Japanese planes were surrendered to the Nationalist Tenth Air Force. (NYT p. 6)

Oct 20, 1945: Peiping. An angry crowd of Chinese surged through the “Little Tokyo” section of Peiping last night and killed 3 Japanese; others were reported beaten and stoned by the mob. Peiping police quickly restored peace. The attacks were similar to disturbances reported several days ago in Tientsin where Chinese entered homes of Japanese and injured several hundreds. (NYT p. 20)

Oct 20, 1945: Madame Chiang Kai-shek addressed over 400 officers of the 14th Air Force in Chungking before they departed to their new headquarters in Shanghai. The 14th Air Force has been in China since July 1942 under the name of China Air Task Force. This unit was distinct from Chenault’s “Flying Tigers” which was a civilian fighting group. (SN p. 2)

Oct 21, 1945: Chungking. During the war against Japan there has been a provisional government of Korea in Chungking (the Nationalist capital during the war) which was headed by president Kim Koo. Recently, Dr. Syngman Rhee arrived in Seoul coming from Washington via Tokyo. However, an invitation from General John Hodge, Commander of the American occupation in Korea, to Kim Koo for the latter to go to Korea has not yet been received here. (SN p. 1)

Oct 21, 1945: At Hsiakuan, Yunnanyi an American installation was pillaged by “Chinese military personnel and civilians”. (Guo 1997, p. 251, Guo 1998)
[Usually, the expressions “Chinese military personnel” or “Chinese soldiers” designated Nationalist soldiers.]

Nov 12, 1945: There are 25,000 US Marines in Tientsin. The important harbor of Tsingtao is occupied by U.S. marines under Major General Keller E. Rockey. U.S. air forces had just finished transporting Chungking’s Ninety-Fourth Army from Shanghai to Peiping, (Time Magazine)

Nov 4, 1945: At the entrance of the race course in Shanghai 3 Americans were shot (and injured) by a Chinese policeman of the Shanghai Municipal Police. First the policeman, Sung Chi Szan, had a traffic argument with the two Americans. There was even a quick fist fight. Then the two Americans moved toward the entrance of the race course. There a barrier was pulled across the entrance which left the Americans inside and the policeman outside. It is at this point that he started shooting. (Guo 1997, p. 251; Guo 1998, p. 177)
[This incident is fairly unclear.]

Nov 12, 1945: Robberies and assaults by men in American uniforms are running as high as 30 a night in Paris. Moreover, an American Army order barred soldiers from
public places such as bars, restaurants, theaters in Le Havre (200 kilometers west of Paris). (SH p. 5)

[It is likely that the Shanghai Herald devotes such a long article to this news from Paris as a substitute for a similar article about Shanghai that could not be published due to censorship. Later on in 1946 when censorship became less strict there were several articles on robberies by US servicemen.]

Nov 12, 1945: • (9,30) A Chinese boat which was sailing from Lunghua was overturned by an American vessel and 28 Chinese were drowned. The Kuomintang police arrested the owner of the Chinese boat. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

Nov 15, 1945: The first Nationalist troops landed at Tsingtao. The Shantung peninsula was the main stronghold of the Communist Eighth Route Army some units of which were at the outskirts of Tsingtao. After they landed the Nationalist troops moved out through a protective cordon of US Marines; under the orders of American Marine commanders they got clear of the port area quickly. (Times p. 3)

Nov 17, 1945: Major General De Witt Peck, commanding general of the 1st Marine Division, has been under fire aboard a train on the route from Tangshan to Chinwangtao. Peck has requested an air bombing mission in this area. Corsair pilots of the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing provided support that afternoon. Unable to spot any hostile activity in the village, the Corsair pilots made simulated strafing runs over the village with the intent of sending a message to the Communists without endangering villagers. (SH p. 1; US Marines website: Operation BELEAGUER: The Marine III amphibious corps in North China, 1945-49 at the following address: http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/operation-beleaguer-marine-iii-amphibious-corps-north-china-1945-49. According to this last source, the incident took place on 14 November.)

Nov 17, 1945: General Wedemeyer allowed the strafing of villages in Communist hands if small arms fire on US troops in the Tientsin area continues. (SH p. 1)

Nov 18, 1945: During the long voyage in American ships from Haiphong in North Vietnam to Chinwangtao in northern China, 13 soldiers of the 5th and 52th Chinese armies died from cholera; other diseases developed. After use the transport ships needed disinfection. Arms and ammunitions carried by these troops were of numerous types including American, Russian and Japanese. In contrast, the 94th Chinese Army which was transported to Chinwangtao by the US 7th Amphibious Force had standard American equipment, including flame throwers and pack howitzers. (The Field Artillery Journal, January 1946, China and Mongolia 19 October – 18 November, p. 39-43)
Nov 19, 1945: In Britain there are more than 20,000 British and American deserters roaming the country, some of them armed and all of them without legal means of livelihood. As a result, the crime rate is twice as high as in 1939. (SH p. 6) [This information is of interest because it explains why inflated crime rates are observed in the years immediately following World War II. On account of the high numbers of deserters in the Nationalist Armies, there was certainly a similar effect in China.]

Nov 20, 1945: In a memorandum the US Headquarters informed the Nationalist government that US military police may enter “any public area with or without Chinese police; entry into private dwellings will not be forced unless US personnel are in hot pursuit of a criminal.” (Guo 1997, p. 254) [This rule gave US forces much more freedom of action than the agreement of 26 January 1945. It led to US military police developing into a standing police force in Shanghai and in cities of Northern China where there were US troops. A protest against this extension was made by the Nationalist government on 14 April 1946.]

Nov 23, 1945: A US mail truck was hijacked. The incident report identified the hijackers as “Chinese soldiers armed with rifles and bayonets” [i.e. Kuomintang troops.] (Guo 1997, p. 251)

Nov 23, 1945: General Wedemeyer, commander of US troops in China, reported to his chief of staff that disarming of Japanese by Chinese government forces is impossible for at least two reasons. (i) Japanese forces were being employed by the Nationalists to protect their communication lines against Communist attacks. (ii) If the Japanese were disarmed in areas where Communist forces existed in strength they would take over not only the areas vacated by the Japanese but also their arms and equipment. (Boyle 1972 p. 328)

Nov 25, 1945: Several thousands students attended a meeting against civil war and in favor of a coalition government at the University of Kunming (capital city of Yunnan). The authorities tried to interrupt the meeting by cutting off electricity; in addition, troops fired guns outside of the campus. (Pepper 1971, p. 703) [It can be recalled that in October chairman Mao had returned to Yenan after 43 days of fruitless negotiations with the Nationalist government in Chungking.]

Dec 1, 1945: • (9,34) Shortly before noon a large group composed of soldiers and coolies invaded the campus of the university of Kunming. The group was armed with hand grenades and knives. Their attack resulted in 4 fatalities among students and faculty. (Pepper 1971, p. 704)

Dec 1, 1945: A US Marine was shot and wounded by civilians near Tientsin (CSM
Dec 4, 1945: Two Marines were shot by Communists: one was killed, the other wounded. The battalion executive officer ordered the emplacement of a 60 mm mortar within range of the village in which the shooters were hiding and gave the villagers 30 minutes to surrender them. The deadline passed with no results. In response, the mortar’s crew fired 24 white phosphorous rounds outside the village walls. When news of the incident reached the United States, the press criticized the Marines for firing into an unarmed village. (US Marines website: Operation BELEAGUER: The Marine III amphibious corps in North China, 1945-49 at the following address: http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/operation-beleaguer-marine-iii-amphibious-corps-north-china-1945-49) [The expression “outside the village walls” suggests that the shells fell in a field outside of the village. One would understand that as a warning one or two rounds were fired in this way but what was the point in firing 24 rounds in a field? Was the purpose to start a fire?]

Fig. 9.20a Post envelope sent from USS Helena. The letter was sent on 6 December 1945 but, according to the history of the ship given on Wikipedia, it seems that the Helena arrived in China only in June 1946.

Fig. 9.20b USS Helena. The Helena was a heavy cruiser commissioned on 4 September 1945. CA means “Cruiser, Armored”. According to her history, the ship was based at Guantanamo from November 1945 to February 1946. Source: Wikipedia, article entitled USS Helena (CA-75).

Dec 8, 1945: Loss of several bombers of the Sixth Marine Division based in Shantung Peninsula. There are several (sometimes conflicting) accounts of this incident.
A historical report issued by the Department of the Navy (Shaw 1960) says that “10 dive bombers” have been lost.

A New York Times article (15 December 1945, p. 3) says that 6 US Marines Helldivers crashed in North China due to bad weather conditions. Seven fliers were reported killed.

A operations summary (No 216) of the China theater gives the same information and adds that apart from the 7 who are believed dead, one flier is reported alive with a broken leg, one is reported uninjured, the fate of the three others is unknown. All survivors may be in Communist hands.

An account (Stephens 2001) by a member of this division of Marines mentions the loss of 3 aircraft in a reconnaissance mission monitoring the movements of Communist troops in eastern Shantung.

In Fredriksen (2011, p. 196) one reads: “In North China a flight of 6 Marine SB2C Helldivers of Marine Bombing Squadron 343 (VMSB-343) crashed in a snowstorm killing 10 crew members out of 12”.

In “History of the Marine Corps in World War II” written by the Historical Branch of the US Marine Corps, one reads: “A major portion of each MAG-32 squadron flew to Tientsin to take part in an aerial show of strength on the anniversary of Pearl Harbor. On the return flight to Tsingtao the planes ran into a snow storm over Shantung Peninsula. The scout-bombers of VMSB-343, attempting to go under the tempest, were caught up in its blinding snow swirls. Only 6 pilots managed to bring their planes home safely; 6 others crashed into the mountain slopes near Pingtu in the center of the peninsula. It was 3 days before Chinese civilians brought word of the location of the crash. On 15th December the remains of the dead and the uninjured survivors were released by the Communists. Through all the negotiations attending the recovery of these Marines, the Communist villagers had been most cooperative, refusing the proffered rewards, and treating well the men they rescued.”

[The Curtiss SB2C Helldiver was a carrier-based dive bomber whose crew consisted of a pilot and a radio-operator. This means that 12 persons went missing. The most likely reason of the crashes is not the bad weather in itself but rather the fact that they lost their way and ran out of fuel.]

Dec 8, 1945: Edgar Snow, foreign correspondent and associate editor of the “Saturday Evening Post”, has been barred from entering China to report the operations of United States Marines. (NYT p. 7)

Dec 8, 1945: (20,36) Shanghai. An American army truck killed two citizens and injured severely 5 others. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

Dec 9, 1945: The Nationalist government has blacklisted at least 8 American cor-
respondents. Several of them had to wait weeks only to be told that they were unacceptable. The list includes B. Atkinson (New York Times), D. H. Berrigan (New York Post) and Edgar Snow (Saturday Evening Post). (NYT p. 24)

**Dec 9, 1945:** During the war there was a 40-men US Army team in the Communist area of Yenan in order to assist the Chinese forces in their rescue operations of downed American fliers many of whom had to be lead through Japanese lines before arriving to Yenan. The Eight Route Army did not lose one airman taken under their protection. The mission had only one fatality, Captain H.C. Whittelsey who was killed by the Japanese.

Contrary to the opinion of many in the outside world, the Communists of Yenan are not Puritanical nor so hard-working that they do not take time to have fun. They have parties on any excuse and Americans frequently are entertained with excellent meals reinforced with potent samples of local liquor. (NYT p. 24)

[This article illustrates the fact that by the end of 1945 it was still possible to find in the New York Times accounts which presented the Communists in a favorable light. By the end of December 1945 General Marshall would arrive in China in order to work out an agreement between the Communists and the Nationalists; therefore it would not make sense to demonize one of the parties.]

**Dec 9, 1945:** **US reprisal actions.** American Marines fired 24 mortar shells into a village north east of Tientsin on 4 December 1945 after two Chinese gunmen killed one Marine and seriously wounded another. The Marines opened fire after the gunmen fled into the village and the villagers failed to give them up.

In mid November after a train bearing Major General De Witt was fired upon north of Tangshan (about mid-way between Tientsin and Chinzwantao) US planes strafed the village from which the fire had come. (NYT p. 23)

[The article does not say that the mortar shells targeted fields outside of the village; nor does it say that the planes just strafed the fields. What is the truth?]

**Dec 18, 1945:** The Kuomintang armies have a strength of 190 divisions (about 2 million men). Of these, 39 were trained by American officers and equipped with American material including artillery and motor transportation. This constitutes the so-called ALPHA force which was built up in 1944 and 1945. In addition the Nationalists have about one million men in supply services. (The Field Artillery Journal, February 1946, China and Mongolia 19 November – 18 December, p. 114)

**Dec 21, 1945:** General Marshall arrived in Shanghai on a conciliation mission. During a discussion he had with General Wedemeyer the later told him that a “coalition government in China was neither possible nor desirable”, a statement to which Marshall responded angrily “I am going to accomplish my mission and you are going to
Dec 24, 1945: Fire of undetermined origin swept a barracks of the Sixth US Marine Division Headquarters in Tsingtao, China, a big city located 500 kilometers to the south-east of Beijing. None of the 1,000 billeted troops was injured. (NYT p. 1)

Dec 31, 1945: Tai Li, SACO and Happy Valley
Huhsien is a county in Central Shensi (about 1,000 km west of Shanghai) where General Chenault’s 14th Air Force was based. A few miles northeast of the county seat is the Sino-American Training Class which was run jointly by General Tai Li and the Americans. Since 1945, Communists were taken to this place blindfolded or put into gunny sacks\(^{101}\). Peasants can well remember their cries as they were tortured. The place was heavily guarded all the time. After the place was liberated by the Communists they found heaps of mutilated corpses. (Shanghai News 18 November 1950, p. 3)

In an article published by Time Magazine (8 April 1946) after Tai Li’s death, one finds the following description which confirms several aspects of Tai Li’s activity. He was a legend to his enemies, an Oriental Himmler, Plehve and Torquemada combined. In 1934 he organized China’s Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. In time it became one of the world’s biggest undercover agencies. In World War II the US Navy joined with BIS in setting up the SACO (Sino-American Cooperative Organization), with Tai Li as director and Commander (later Vice Admiral) Milton E. Miles representing the US Navy\(^{102}\). The SACO agreement was signed by Tai Li and Miles on 4 July 1943 (http://www.delsjourney.com/saco/saco.htm). US funds and about 2,500 US experts supported Tai Li, taught him new methods and expanded his guerrillas to 70,000 men. For Communists and fellow travelers, he maintained concentration camps.

As an OSS captain in China, Oliver Caldwell (1972, p. 77) spent some time in Tai Li’s Happy Valley center. Among the Americans it was called the Death Valley. In his account Caldwell recalls that during a summer night, the light breeze “carried over the hill from the prison, hour after hour, the terrible screams of a woman being tortured”.

[According to this text, China was probably the first Asian country in which domestic intelligence personnel was taught “new methods” by American intelligence experts. This happened several years before the CIA was founded.]

SACO and the activities of Admiral Miles seem to have been a very sensitive issue as attested by the following episode told by Oliver Caldwell (1972, p. 121-122).

\(^{101}\)“gunny” means a coarse fabric usually made from jute and used for sacks.

\(^{102}\)U.S. Navy Commander Milton Miles, had served in China for many years after World War I. Miles suggested the idea of SACO to his superiors and, eventually, to President Roosevelt who fully supported the idea.
My brother, John Caldwell, was head of the China branch of the Office of War Information. John was invited to address the naval military school at Columbia University sometime in 1944. He used this opportunity to describe the activities of Miles naval group in China. Not long thereafter the FBI descended on him and he had a very unpleasant time. Five times the FBI “grilled” him and he suffered inconvenience and hardship.

After the Japanese surrender the American participation in Saco was officially brought to an end, a decision made by General Marshall. However, an article published in the New York Times at the end of 1946 and entitled “SACO’s residual activities continue” (NYT 13 November 1946 p. 17) shows that this was only the official version. In fact, the cooperation continued.

Rear Admiral Miles was sent back to the United States in September 1945. According to Miles’s account (1967) the Legion of Merit was awarded to General Tai Li; however, the directives given to Miles when he attended the burial of General Tai Li was to present the medal privately rather than officially.

**Dec 31, 1945:** At the end of 1945 it was announced that thus far approximately 32,000 Japanese troops had been repatriated from North China and an estimated 190,000 Japanese troops remained there. (The Field Artillery Journal, March 1946 p. 171)

[As observed in the chapter on military operations, the Japanese troops sided with Nationalist troops against the Communists. The fact that at the end of 1945, only 14% of the Japanese troops had been repatriated clearly shows that this was not the main objective of the American forces. The shipment capacity was available but it was rather used for the transportation of Chinese troops from south China to North China and Manchuria.]

**1946**

**Jan 1946:** A Chinese named Ma Ming was looking for his young son in the vicinity of an US compound at Tsingtao. When the sentry fired two warning shots he misunderstood their meaning and fled, whereupon the sentry fired two more shots hitting him in the leg. Ma Ming died of gangrene at the hospital. (Guo 1997, p. 256-257)

[The precise date of the incident is not given in the source. But it is known that US authorities offered a compensation of 94,000 yuans (about 65 US dollars) on 15 January 1946.]

**Jan 2, 1946:** A boy was shot in the leg by a sentry while removing wheat and rice
Fig. 9.21 American advisers in China. The graph shows the annual number of New York Times articles which include the 3 key-words: China + American + adviser. The curve which is a 3-year centered moving average has a clear peak in 1945. After 1949 the curve went up again probably in relation with the role played by Taiwan during the Korean War. Source: Electronic index of the New York Times.

from a warehouse near Marine post No 34. (Guo 1998, p. 227)

Jan 3, 1946: The American troops in China comprise the following units:
  - III Amphibious Corps (Major Gen. Keller E. Rockey)
  - First Marine Division (Major Gen. De Witt Peck)
  - Sixth Marine Division (Major Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd)
  - First Marine Aircraft Wing (Major Gen. Louis E. Woods)
Lieutenant Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer is the Commanding General of the China Theater. (NCDL p. 1)

Jan 3, 1946: Private Chinese assets frozen by the American government during the war amounted to 300 millions dollars. (NCDL p. 7)

Jan 3, 1946: It is estimated that there are about 3,000 prostitutes in Shanghai. The Girl Guide association has 112 houses and caters specially for foreign nationals, chiefly servicemen. (NCDL 3 January p. 3 and 8 January p. 6)

Jan 4, 1946: Mr. Ha Hsiung, head of the Department of Construction at the Ministry of the Interior and his adviser Lieutenant Norman I. Gordon have arrived in Shanghai on an inspection of the city’s postwar reconstruction project. (NCDL p. 1)

Jan 4, 1946: Soldiers fired shots in fray (i.e. brawl) at cinema. 20 soldiers tried to get free admission tickets by force. They carried revolvers and light machine-guns (NCDL p. 3)
Jan 5, 1946: Fifteen hours after staging the kidnapping of a Chinese merchant in Shanghai, two desesperados were arrested by the police. They claimed to be representatives of a certain military organization in Shanghai. A suspect, a man in foreign dress, confessed to having taken part in the kidnapping. (SH p. 2) [Were the three men American? It can be suspected because of the use of awkward circumlocutions.]

Jan 5, 1946: A US Marine was burned to death and 3 others were injured early on the morning of Saturday December 29 when fire swept through the small barracks of a train guard post on the important Tientsin-Chinwangtao railway line. The victims were members of the First Battalion of the US Seventh Marines. (NCDL p. 6) [It can be noted that the Seventh Marine Division was not mentioned in the list published by the newspaper on 3 January.]

Jan 6, 1946: The US Army Criminal Investigation Division has arrested 25 US military personnel including several officers on charge of theft and sale of government property (penicillin, sulfa drugs, etc.) exceeding 50,000 dollars in value. They are awaiting trial. These items were sold in the black market. (NCDL p. 4) [The same kind of black market trade can be observed in many countries occupied by the US Army after World War II.]

Jan 6, 1946: Peiping. Airlifting of Nationalist troops into Manchuria began this morning with the Second Brigade of General Tu Li-ming’s Pacification Army in transport planes for Changchun. The 94th Army under General Mao Ting-fang was expected to follow within a day or two from the Tientsin area. (SH p. 1) [It can be expected that the 94th Army will be transported by sea for to airlift a whole army (i.e. about 8 brigades) would be a very costly operation.]

Jan 6, 1946: Rear Admiral Thomas S. Combs, US Navy and Chief of Staff to US Seventh Fleet was decorated in the name of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in connection with the movement of the 8th, 13th, and 52nd Chinese Armies from the south to the ports of North China. (NCDL p. 1) [In subsequent days and weeks several other American military commanders received Chinese decorations, for instance Brigadier General Paul W. Cartaway; on 22 February 1946 three American officers of the Sino American Cooperation Organization were decorated by the mayor of Shanghai on behalf of president Chiang Kai-shek. On 1 April 1946, President Chiang Kai-shek was presented by Lieutenant General Wedemeyer with a Distinguished Service Medal, the highest medal a non-
American can receive. On 15 June 1946 Lieutenant-General Hsu Hsi-lin of the Chinese Army was awarded the Legion of Merit by the US War Department. Earlier, on 18 October 1945, the mayor of Shanghai, Chien Ta-chun was awarded the Legion of Merit for meritorious service while an officer of the Combined Chinese-American staff which was set up in the Nationalist capital of Chungking in late 1944 (Shanghai Herald of 18 October, p. 2).

**Jan 6, 1946:** Tientsin. Since the Marines landed here late in September living costs have been multiplied by 20 and are still going up. A previous order prohibited enlisted men to draw more than $25 from their pay. That order has since be rescinded and the men are now able to draw all their pay (that is to say about $60). Lots of American supplies were reported lost off trucks in transit from the docks. In Shanghai, twenty five officers and enlisted men are awaiting trial following apprehension for black market activities over the past two months. (SH p. 1,2)

**Jan 6, 1946:** Three armed robberies by desesperados took place within three hours in the central district of Shanghai last Friday (4 January). (SH p. 2)

**Jan 7, 1946:** The USS Los Angeles arrived in Shanghai to replace USS St Paul as flagship of Admiral C. Turner Joy. (NCDL p. 1)

**Jan 7, 1946:** 2,000 tons of flour, constituting the first batch of UNRRA relief supplies for Kwangsi have arrived in Wuchow. Allocation to each town will depend on the war effort contributed by the town. (NCDL p. 5)

[In other words the towns who have not been loyal to the nationalists will be allowed to starve. This policy is explained by the fact that the distribution of the supplies provided by UNRRA is made through CNRRA, Chinese Nationalist Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, an organ of the Nationalist Government. Quite understandably, this organ favored the cities and groups who were on the side of the Nationalists. (Griggs 1948, p. 3)]

**Jan 7, 1946:** Mr Maverick, chairman of the “Smaller Warplants Corporations” declared that “China is rapidly adopting commercial laws making it difficult for foreign firms to do business there.” (NCDL p. 1)

**Jan 8, 1946:** Eye-witnesses said the Navy 6 × 6 truck swerved into Nanking Road from the Bund and sped down the street. In his winding course it struck several pedicabs and run down pedestrians standing on a traffic island. One of these, a Chinese girl, was killed while others were injured. The driver was using the truck without authorization. (SH p. 2)

**Jan 10, 1946:** Three days after the beginning of the meetings between Nationalist and Communists that took place in Chungking (the capital of the Nationalists during
the war) with the participation of General Marshall there was an agreement on a cease-fire which took effect on 13 January. This truce was of short duration however and in March clashes between Communists and Nationalists resumed. (Shaw 1960, p. 12)

Jan 10, 1946:  Four American sailors have been arrested in Shanghai for attempting to sell an Army truck. (NCDL p. 1)

Jan 10, 1946:  Shanghai police confronted American Military Police with loaded rifles and fixed bayonets while attempting to take GIs into custody who were involved in disorders. (NCDL p. 3)

Jan 10, 1946:  In Shanghai alone, even the Kuomintang statistics show that there were 495 jeep incidents in the 120 days between 12 September 1945 and 10 January 1946. There were 236 casualties which represents a daily average of 2. Moreover, if one includes also the accidents involving US trucks, one arrives at a daily average of 7 accidents. (Shanghai Herald 19 November 1950 p. 3).
[The article does not give the number of fatalities.]

Jan 10, 1946:  Since the return of national authority to Shanghai after the collapse of the Japanese, the newspapers of the city have been subject to censorship. (NCDL p. 5)

Jan 10, 1946:  Chongqing. Opening of the “Political Consultative Conference of the Chinese People” which brought together Communist and KMT leaders. Before closing on 31 January 1946, it passed 5 resolutions to reorganize the national government on the basis of a coalition of political parties. Subsequently, these resolutions were rejected by Chiang Kai-shek. (Mackerras 1982 p. 418; Luo 1982 p. 51)

Jan 11, 1946:  Publication of a new English biography of Sun Yat-sun. A movie is also in preparation. (NCDL p. 2)
[Several biographies of Sun Yat Sun were published in these years mostly by American biographers: one in 1944, two in 1946, one in 1948].

Jan 12, 1946:  Shanghai. A Marine burst into a shoe store, took a pair of shoes and then beat up the protesting shopkeeper. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

Jan 13, 1946:  According to a memorandum prepared by the staff of Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, 39 divisions of the Nationalist Army are so-called Alpha units which are not only trained and armed by the United States but also supervised by US advisers. (Foreign Relations of the US (1, p. 181))

Jan 14, 1946:  ●(21,39)  A 19-year old scavenger was killed by a US truck backing up. In this case no compensation was given by the Americans to the family of the
Jan 15, 1946: US Secretary of War, Robert P. Patterson, arrived in Shanghai where he will stay for two days. He was greeted by 1,000 GIs at the airfield. Moreover, 9 US Congressmen who are members of the Naval Affairs Committee arrived at Tsingtao and will proceed to Shanghai within a few days. (Shanghai Herald 15 January p. 1 and 21 January p. 7)

[The article underlines that the Secretary of War was greeted by American rather than Chinese troops as would be required by standard diplomatic rules.]

Jan 15, 1946: From COMGENCHINA (Commanding General, China).

Present theater plans call for movement to and support of 8 Chinese armies into Manchuria. Of these 4 will be sponsored armies [i.e. trained and equipped by the United States] and the 4 others will be non-sponsored armies. The sponsored armies chosen for the move will have in their possession about 80% of their initial equipment. The non-sponsored armies have mixed and obsolete equipment.

A conference held in Tokyo feels that the first priority of the 7th Fleet should be movement of Chinese armies with repatriation [of Japanese] secondary. (Microfiche TS-00062 of the NDL (reproduction of NARA records).)

[What is interesting in these orders is the date. General Marshall had arrived in China on 20 December 1945 for his peace mission. These orders suggests that at the same time the War Department was preparing a resumption of the war against the Communists. Was this the result of a divergence between the objectives of the State Department and those of the War Department? It is fairly puzzling because one should not forget that Marshall was a 5-star general. Therefore he was probably well informed of the intentions and wishes of the War Department. He became Secretary of State only in 1947 after the failure of his mission in China. Whereas the decision about how to use the 7th Fleet is well known, the first decision is more intriguing. In particular, one would wish to know how the term “support” should be understood.]

Jan 17, 1946: “US troops go home” slogans have been posted in Shanghai. There was also an anti-US demonstration on Sunday, January 13. (NCDL p. 1)

[The article also says that the opponents are a small minority. It can be noted that no article about the Sunday demonstration is to be found in the issues of Sunday, Monday or Tuesday.]

Jan 20, 1946: Two members of the Peace Preservation Corps were shot dead in a shoot out between a dozen members of the Corps and a score of servicemen at the
Fig. General Marshall’s mission in China (20 Dec 1945 – 7 Jan. 1947) Left: General Marshall and Chairman Mao in Yenan. Right: from left to right, Nationalist representative Zhang Qun, General Marshall and Communist representative Zhou Enlai. Marshall’s objective was to set up a non-Communist China which would act as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. The entry of 15 January 1946 shows that at the same time the United States was providing massive military support to the Nationalist forces. Source: Wikipedia article entitled “Marshall mission”.

Nan Fang Theater at Nantao on Friday (18 January night). (NCDL p. 3) [The Peace Preservation Corps was a Chinese armed force set up by the Japanese. One is surprised to see this group still in existence 6 months after the Japanese surrender.]

Jan 21, 1946: • (21,40) In Shanghai a pedicab driver was beaten up fatally by 3 US Marines (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3).

Jan 22, 1946: Shanghai. American soldiers threw beer bottles from a high window on a passing demonstration of unemployed people injuring 5 workers, two of them severely. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

Jan 23, 1946: Nine US Congressmen are in Shanghai to inspect naval activities. (NCDL p. 1)

Jan 23, 1946: Four US Navy enlisted men and a Chinese civilian were injured when a mob of 20,000 unemployed Chinese laborers parading in a demonstration attacked two US Navy trucks in Shanghai. They threw pieces of broken bottles and bamboo sticks at the Navymen. Moreover, the demonstrators turned their anger against a number of American sailors leaving the Glen Line Building. Several were injured and are now under X-ray examination. (NCDL p. 3, SH p. 2)

Jan 26, 1946: • (21,42) Captain Emery S. Smith of the 1st Air Depot in Shanghai surrendered to American MPs 12 hours after he had run down a 63-year old Chinese woman who died 2 hours later. This fatality is the second involving American personnel in 12 hours. (NCDL p. 3)

Jan 30, 1946: In Tientsin students last week had demonstrated against the presence of American troops. They carried banners saying: “Withdraw US forces”, “American soldiers we don’t want you here”. Authorities believe that the demonstrations have been communist inspired. (NCDL p. 4)

Feb-Mar, 1946: During February and March the US Seventh Fleet continued trans-
porting Nationalist troops to Manchuria. The lift of the “New 6th Army” was completed by mid-March. Meanwhile the “New 1st Army” moved from Kowloon [Near Hong Kong] to Chinwangtao [now Qinhuangdao, some 300km north-east of Beijing]. Four other Nationalist armies, the 5th, 60th, 93rd and 99th were still awaiting transport to Manchuria. Moreover, Nationalist forces had been flown into the city of Changchun by American transport aircraft.

The Soviet Red Army withdrew from Mukden [now Shenyang] on 12 March and the following day KMT troops entered the city and began using it as an advance base. The first small scale battles that took place in March-April were mostly to the advantage of Nationalist forces; the American-trained units performed particularly well. This convinced Chiang Kai-shek that his armies could defeat the Communists and made him less willing than ever to accept the kind of compromise that General Marshall was trying to promote after returning to China on 12 April.

(Barlow 2009)

[Apart from the “New 1st Army” (composed of the 22nd, 30th and 38th divisions) and the “New 6th Army”, there were many other Chinese divisions that were trained by US instructors at the Ramgarh Training Camp in north east India, some 400 km to the north of Calcutta near the border between the provinces of Bengal and Bihar. What was the fate of the “New 1st Army”. After some initial successes in 1946 it suffered a crushing defeat in October 1948 near the city of Jinzhou in Liaoning province. The New 6th Army was also defeated in Liaoning by Lin Biao forces in October 1948 and his commander, Lieutenant-General Li Tao was captured. The “New 5th Army” had previously been smashed in the same area in January 1948.]

Feb 1, 1946: The following observations about the Chinese army are excerpted from an article published in the journal “Field Artillery” by Colonel Hubert M. Cole who served in the centers that the United States set up for the training of Chinese troops.

- The Chinese units are greatly understrength. While a division is supposed to be at least 10,000 strong I saw few with more than 5,000 troops. Whereas in western forces an army comprises between 6 to 10 divisions, in China an army comprises only 3 divisions.

- Conscripts for the Chinese army are marched to their units often over distances as great as 1,500 kilometers. A loss of 30%-40% due to desertions, sickness and death en route can be expected. [In this regard it can be observed that most often recruitment is carried out by force and constraint.]

- The difficulty of the Chinese language is certainly a major obstacle to efficient dealing with the Chinese. Interpreters were drafted into the Army from among college students. [Given the growing hostility expressed by students against the Nationalist government it may have been difficult to secure a sufficient number of in-

**Feb 1, 1946:** 470 Chinese airmen were concentrated in Shanghai and sent to the United States for training. Moreover, 2,000 Chinese air cadets have already received exacting training in the best US aviation schools before returning to China. (NCDL 1 February p. 2 and SH 22 January p. 2)

**Feb 2, 1946:** A Chinese scavenger touched a live wire and was electrocuted. The mother of the deceased was awarded $50 as a compassionate allowance. (Guo 1997, p. 226)

**Feb 6, 1946:** South King Hiang Road, Tsingtsao. Three Marines broke the windows of a home with stones and clubs [the account does not say why]. When the owner asked them to stop they assaulted him with the clubs, striking him in the face and shoulders.

**Feb 7, 1946:** An agreement was signed in Ottawa between the governments of Canada and China according to which Canada granted a loan of 60 million Canadian dollars to China for the purpose of importing Canadian products. (United Nations Treaty Collection, available on line)

**Feb 16, 1946:** Excerpt of “Stars and Stripes”. “The writer expressed thanks to an American officer who came to his rescue when he was attacked by a dozen street urchins (i.e. mischievous boys) armed with bamboo sticks.

**Feb 19, 1946:** General Wedemeyer whose headquarters are in Shanghai is scheduled to address 400 Chinese generals in Nanking where he is a guest of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. (NCDL p. 6)

**Feb 21, 1946:** A new US cruiser, the USS Mount Olympus, arrived in Shanghai. It dropped anchor alongside the USS Estes, flagship of Admiral Charles M. Cooke, Commander of the Seventh Fleet. On 25 February another heavy cruiser, the USS Chicago, dropped anchor in Shanghai. (NCDL: 21 February p. 3, 25 February p. 3)

**Feb 21, 1946:** A serious famine is threatening four millions persons in Northern Hunan. (NCDL p. 1)

[At the beginning of 1946 food shortage or even famine was a major problem in many countries, for instance in Germany, Greece, India, Japan, South Africa. Even in Great Britain was the food situation difficult.]

**Feb 23, 1946:** Excerpt of “Stars and Stripes”. “Many of us have been ashamed of sailor behavior like hitting rickshaw men and throwing torpedoes at coolies’ feet. (Stars and Stripes, 23 February 1946)

[It is not clear what is meant by the word “torpedoes”].
Feb 26, 1946: In an interview given in Honolulu, General Keller E. Rockey, Commander of the 45,000 Marines in North China, said that 2 Marines have been killed by civilians and 5 wounded in clashed with Communists. One the main tasks of the Marines is to secure ports for movements of Nationalist troops. (NCDL: p. 4)

[According to the same source, the same kind of incident occurred on 15 March 1946 and on 15 April 1946]

Feb 28, 1946: Wei Cheng Yung, a ricksaw puller was beaten up to unconsciousness by an unknown Marine. (Guo 1998, p. 181)

Mar 1946: • (21,44) In a quarrel over price, an American sailor shot to death a 16-year old boy who was selling him fire crackers. (Guo 1998. p. 181)

Mar 1, 1946: • (21,45) An American driver, Corporal P.S. Ward, killed a pedicab driver (i.e. a cycle rickshaw) and injured the passenger. (NCDL: p. 3)

Mar 8, 1946: Press censorship which was instituted in Shanghai since 1 December 1945 has been lifted on 7 March 1946. (NCD: p. 1)
[However, subsequent indications suggest that it was lifted only partially; see for instance 14 March and 17 March 1946. It must be kept in mind that the Kuomintang government was an authoritarian regime.]

Mar 10, 1946: Informal statement by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to General Marshall prior to his departure. Chiang Kai-shek declared that the US loan has strings attached which are to reach an agreement with the Communists but that he does not believe even for a second in their sincerity. (Foreign Relations of the US (1, p. 528))

Mar 13, 1946: • (22,45) Tientsin. A fighter plane attached to the Third Marine Corps crashed. The plane was of the F-4u type. (NCDL p. 1)

Mar 13, 1946: 4,000 Chinese troops of the 87th Division of the New 71th Army departed from Shanghai bound for Chinwangtao (North China). Henceforth, LSTs (Landing Ships of Tanks) will leave Shanghai in a steady stream until the 71th Army has been completely transported. (NCDL p. 1)

Mar 14, 1946: A group of 13 US officials comprising the Under-Secretary of War and high army officers arrived in Shanghai on inspection. At their arrival they were greeted by Major-General Maddocks, Chief of Staff of General Wedemeyer. (NCDL p. 1)
[The article discreetly emphasizes the fact that on arriving on Chinese soil the Amer-
ican delegation was greeted not by Chinese officials as would have been normal but by an American general.]

**Mar 14, 1946:** The US House of Representative approved a bill authorizing President Truman to sell, lease or give China 271 small warships of the size of destroyer escorts, 193 landing crafts and 24 mine-sweepers. (NCDL p. 1)

**Mar 14, 1946:** Five foreign sailors attacked and severely beat a Chinese newswriter of the Reuters agency. (NCDL p. 3)
[The term “foreign sailors” was probably a diplomatic substitute for “American sailors”; at this time there were hardly any other foreign sailors in Shanghai.]

**Mar 15, 1946:** 5 US sailors attempted to leave a shoe shop in Tsingtao without paying. When a clerk tried to stop them they beat him and then wrecked the shop. (Guo 1998)

**Mar 17, 1946:** There was a running gun battle between armed gangsters and the police near Haining Road in Shanghai. One of the two armed thugs who took a loot of gold rings from the Ching Hwa goldsmith’s shop was shot in the head and died. Although dressed in uniform it could not be ascertained whether or not the man was a serviceman. (NCDL p. 3)
[If the thug had been a Chinese serviceman it is likely that the article would have said so.]

**Mar 17, 1946:** A 14-year old boy was killed by an American sentry at the West Aerodrome in Peking suburbs. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950 p. 3)

**Mar 21, 1946:** Census data showed that the population of Shanghai to stand at 3.3 million. (NCDL p. 1)

**Mar 23, 1946:** Officers and men aboard 8 US Navy ships in Shanghai had their shore leave suspended by Admiral Charles Cooke, Commander of the Seventh Fleet, when he received reports that some of the men from these ships were guilty of flagrant misconduct ashore. (NCDL p. 3)

**Mar 23, 1946:** According to the Chinese press, an agreement has been reached with Russia enabling the government to transport troops by rail to Manchuria for taking over the area. (Seoul Times 23 March 1946 p. 1)
[This move was made possible by the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 14 August 1945. One wonders what objective Stalin had in mind by giving Manchuria over to the Nationalist government.]

**Mar 23, 1946:** The Chinese Nationalist Government has approved an 11-point agreement giving greater self-government to Sinkiang ans ending the so-called “Eastern
Turkestan Republic” set up there. (Seoul Times 23 March 1946 p. 1)

[Had the “Eastern Turkestan Republic” been established with the support of the USSR?

According to the Wikipedia article entitled “Second East Turkestan Republic”, on November 26, 1940, Sheng Shicai [a local warlord] concluded an Agreement granting the USSR additional concessions in the province of Xinjiang for 50 years, including areas bordering India and Tibet. This placed Xinjiang under virtually full political and economic control of the USSR, making it part of China in name only. Sheng Shicai recalled in his memoir, “Red failure in Sinkiang” published by the University of Michigan in 1958, that Joseph Stalin pressured him to sign the secret Agreement.

Following the invasion of Russia by Germany there was an eclipse of Russian influence in Sinkiang which allowed the Kuomintang to retake control of the region. However in the fall of 1944 there was a separatist rebellion supported by the USSR and which lead to a reduction of the Chinese ethnic population by massacre and expulsion. There were also rejection riots directed against the Kazakh population.

In the wake of the Yalta conference a treaty was signed between the Russian and Chinese government through which China granted the USSR a broad range of privileges. De facto Sinkiang remained a separate pro-Soviet state with its own currency and military forces.

Following the victory of the Communists in the Civil War there was a negotiated absorption of Xinjiang into the PRC. However, some Kazakhs led by Osman Batur continued their resistance until 1954.]

**Mar 24, 1946: Death of Tai Li.** General Tai Li, director of the Chinese secret police, died in a plane crash last Sunday 18 March. He has had under his command an estimated 100,000 military secret-service men and an additional 50,000 guerrillas known a the “Loyal Salvation Army”. Tai Li’s organization claimed to have killed unknown numbers of traitors and was credited with arresting tens of thousands who were placed in concentration camps. He was in charge of all camps for political prisoners. After America’s entry into the Pacific War, General Tai became the Chinese director of the Sino-American Cooperative Organization (SACO) which worked with US Naval Intelligence units. The American head of SACO was Admiral Milton E. Miles. (NCDL p. 3)

**Mar 24, 1946: (24,46)** In a Shanghai jewelry store, an American sailor snatched 3 diamond rings and fled. Chased and cornered by two Chinese policemen, the sailor first fired a pistol at them and then shot himself in the head. (Guo 1998, p. 181)

[This is a surprising account. Once arrested by the policemen the sailor would have been transferred to American authorities and most likely would have incurred only a
Mar 25, 1946: Five officers and 23 enlisted men of the ground forces in Okinawa will spend five days in Shanghai on a holiday trip. Each five days another group will make the visit; this represents an annual total of about 2,200 men. (NCDL p. 3)

Mar 26, 1946: Chinese engineers, in preparation for the construction of the world’s largest dam to harness the tempestuous Yangtze River, spent two days inspecting the mighty Boulder dam in Nevada. (NCDL p. 1)

[Although this article falls outside of our topic, we mentioned it to show that the project of a dam on the Yangtze River has already been considered in 1946.]

Mar 26, 1946: An American who attempted to rob a Chinese jewelry on Sunday 24 March in Shanghai was shot by police and died from his wound. (NCDL p. 3)

[It should be noted that this case, although of a similar nature is different from the cases mentioned above on March 17 and March 24.]

Mar 26, 1946: Despite all the measures taken by the United States Naval authorities to improve the conduct of American sailors in Shanghai, cases of hooliganism and holdups continue to occur. The victims of the two last cases were Russians. On Sunday afternoon, a young Russian saw three American sailors molesting an old Russian lady. He tried to intervene but was badly beaten up by the three sailors. Another Russian was robbed by an American sailor of US $ 28. (NCDL p. 3)

Mar 26, 1946: On Nanking Road in Shanghai, a US Military Police stopped and American jeep occupied by some Chinese for identification. It happened that the jeep was a US vehicle stolen by Kuomintang troops on 10 December 1945. In his letter to the mayor of Shanghai General Wedemeyer wrote:

All attempts to determine the ownership of the vehicle were ended by the sudden arrival of a truck carrying 15 to 20 Chinese soldiers armed with Thomson submachine guns. These soldiers dismounted, readied their weapons, threatened the military police and drove them away from the jeep. Thus, with force and arms the jeep was seized and driven away.


[It can be noted that the newspaper published in Shanghai do not mention this incident.]

Mar 28, 1946: Two Marines were killed by Reds in China. The Marines were out on a sightseeing tour in a jeep when they were attacked. (Nippon Times p. 1)

[This event is one of the many which is not mentioned in Shaw (1960). As the table
in Shaw is entitled “Major armed clashes between US Marines and Communists”, it can of course be argued that this was not a “major clash”. This case illustrates the fact that the only statistics which has really an unequivocal meaning is the number of US personnel who died in China from any cause.]

Mar 30, 1946: 350 young Chinese officers of the Army, Navy and Air Force will be sent to the United States for one year of training. All candidate will be carefully screened by US military authorities in China. Following their return they will become instructors in 22 military schools scattered all over China. (NCDL p. 1)

Mar 30, 1946: MAAG Major General Robert B. McLure announced that the American Military Advisory Group (MAAG) in China will have its headquarters in Nangking (where the National government is about to move from Chungking) close to the Chinese National Military Council. He said that the group will remain in China for at least 5 years at the invitation of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek; its presence can be prolonged if it is the wish of the Chinese government. The goal of the group is to help modernize the Chinese Army and to change completely the minds of the Chinese people in regard to maintaining a modern defense force. (NCDL p. 2) [Training the army and the police of another country has always been a good means for gaining some influence over it. The training of Chinese troops by foreign military has been used for that purpose even before the end of the imperial system in 1911. In the case of China this policy did not succeed due to the collapse of the Nationalist government but it succeeded fairly well in a number of other Asian countries such as Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Thailand or Turkey.]

Mar 30, 1946: • (27,48) Two Chinese were shot dead while “trying to escape over a fence” behind a warehouse in Tientsin. (Guo 1997, p. 256)

Mar 31, 1946: • (27,54) Shanghai. At the Sanling Wharf an American landing craft rammed a motorboat killing 6 Chinese. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

Mar 31, 1946: A total of 643 armed robberies occurred in Shanghai in the period of September 1945 to February 1946 which represents an annual average of 1,200 and a rate of 36 per 100,000 inhabitants. (NCDL p. 3) [In order to interpret this figure one would need to know the rate in the pre-war period. In the United States in 2000 the rate of robberies with firearms was about 60 per 100,000 (Statistical Abstract of the United States 2006, p. 201).]

Mar 31, 1946: In the month of March 1946, 170 US jeeps were stolen. (Guo 1997, p. 258)

Apr 1946: In April 1946, six Marines in the First Division who were riding in
rickshaws were stopped by KMT soldiers and “at the point of bayonets were told to get out and walk”. (Guo 1997, p. 251)

[The location of the incident is not given but since the First Marine Division held the railroad between Beijing and Chiwangtao it probably took place in one of these cities.]

**Apr 1946:** • (27,55) A Chinese named Wong Feng Yung was arrested by the US Navy Shore Patrol for having three packages of tax-free American cigarettes. While being escorted he tried to flee and was shot by the sentry. He was killed instantly. (Guo 1997, p. 257)

[The source does not give the exact date of this incident, but it is known that US authorities offered a compensation of 500,000 yuan (about 250 US dollars) on 15 April 1946.]

**Apr 1, 1946:** On Taishan Road, 2 Marines beat and robbed a Chinese. (Guo 1998)

**Apr 2, 1946:** Strength of US forces in China.

General Wedemeyer communicated the following figures (peak strength was around December 1945)

- Army personnel: peak strength 65,000; present: 6,000
- Marines: peak strength 53,000; present: 34,000
- Navy: not known, but in March 1946 there were 240 ships in the Shanghai area alone. An average figure of 100 sailors per ship would lead to a total of 24,000 sailors. If we also take this figure as the peak strength we get the following totals:
  - Total: peak strength 142,000; present: 64,000 (NCDL p. 1)

**Apr 3, 1946:** Some 300,000 sheets of silkworm eggs transported to Shanghai from Japan have been distributed among various silkworm raising districts at CN ¥ 3,000 per sheet. The organization also received 2 million mulberry saplings (small trees) from Japan. (NCDL p. 2)

**Apr 3, 1946:** A Chinese journalist wrote in *The China Weekly Review*: “I was in Chungking throughout the 8 war years [against Japan] and every July 4th I could observe that many Chinese felt just as jubilant as the Americans. *Meikuojen=Meigo ren* (the American people) were most popular even in rural districts”. (Zhang 2002, p. 22)

**Apr 5, 1946:** 41 Communist leaders were arrested in Peiping. (NCDL p. 1)

**Apr 5, 1946:** • (33,55) The body of an American sailor has been recovered from the Yantze. This is the 6th case of drowning of an American sailor since September 1945. (NCDL p. 3)

[It is not likely that this sailor had drowned while swimming for in early April the
weather is not warm enough in Shanghai to encourage this kind of activity. During the occupation of Japan there were also numerous cases of drownings of service-
men.]

**Apr 6, 1946:** Tsingtao. Four Landing Ship for Tanks (LST) and two Landing Craft for Infantry (LCI) are being used in the instruction of 800 enlisted men and 100 officers at the Chinese Naval Training Center. (NCDL p. 1)

**Apr 7, 1946:** Shanghai. A 15-year old girl, Kuei Chu-fang, was killed by a jeep. On the same day, another jeep killed a woman of 59. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

**Apr 9, 1946:** Nationalist and Communist forces are racing to occupy Manchuria after the Red Army left the territory. According to a Sino-Soviet agreement the Nationalist troops were allowed to take over from the Soviets. They have already 7 Armies in Manchuria, that is to say 2 more than authorized by the Chungking agreement. (NCDL p. 2)

**Apr 9, 1946:** An American seaman charged with armed robbery of a Chinese civilian in Shanghai has been sentenced to 2.5 years confinement in prison. Another seaman charged with assaulting a Chinese soldier was sentenced to 2 year in prison. (NSDL p. 6)

**Apr 10, 1946:** In North China a Marine who was hunting was shot and killed in a village located in the vicinity of Chinwantao. Since the Marines came to North China six months ago, three men have been killed under similar circumstances. (NCDL p. 1)

[Shaw (1960) reports only two Marines killed while hunting.]

**Apr 10, 1946:** Death of 14 Communist leaders. An American transport plane which was en route from Yenan [where the Communist headquarters are located] to Chungking carrying 14 important Communists including Wang Jo-fei is feared to have crashed. The bodies of the 14 Communist passengers and 4 American crewmen were found three days later. (NCDL p. 1)

[Another source, Leung (2002), says that the plane was en route from Chungking to Yenan and gives the names of two other victims, namely Ye Ting and Po Ku.]

**Apr 12, 1946:** An American seaman was shot to death near Chingwantao on Monday 8 April. He was riding horseback with three other soldiers when they were fired upon. The rest of the party was able to return to town. It was the second American killed in the area within two days (NCDL p. 1, NYT p. 12)

[This incident is different from the one reported above on 10 April in which a Marine was killed.]
**Apr 13, 1946:** The newspaper for American forces “Stars and Stripes, China theater” ceased publication. The first issue appeared on 28 September 1945. The peak distribution was reached in March 1946 with 30,000 copies. (NCDL p. 2)

**Apr 13, 1946:** During the night a Marine sentry of the First Division on the north side of the French Arsenal fired overhead shots to drove away a group of Chinese. Shortly after this incident he was attacked by five unknown persons. One of the attackers was armed with a short hook and ripped the Marine’s coat and cut his hand. (Guo 1997, p. 255)

**Apr 17, 1946:** A Marine sentry of the First Division on his post at the Arsenal observed two Chinese standing on a trash pile. He challenged them but they made no reply. He fired and killed one of the Chinese. The other Chinese fled. (Guo 1997, p. 256)

**April 20, 1946:** In Manchuria the Communists overcame the last resistance by Nationalist forces in Changchun, the capital of Manchuria (NYT 20 April 1946)

**Apr 24, 1946:** A 19-year old American seaman killed 9 shipmates on LST-172 (LST=Landing Ship for Tanks) moored on the Yangtze River at 3pm [probably not correct, see below] after which he stabbed himself. He was given only a fifty percent chance to survive. They were buried in the US military plot in the Shanghai cemetery on 28 April. (NCDL 24 April p. 1 and 28 April p. 1, Guo 1998 p. 181)

[Another source, namely http://www.navsource.org/archives/10/16/160172.htm, says that the incident occurred before dawn. The seaman William V. Smith of Asheville (North Carolina), took a carbine from the ship’s armory. He fired about 20 shots from this carbine and from a pistol into the bunk where the Navy men were sleeping. He also slashed several of them with a knife.]

**Apr 24, 1946:** According to an article of the Communist newspaper published in Yenan “New China Daily News”, on 17 and 19 April aircraft with US markings strafed Communist troops at Szepingkai (a key-position between Changchun and Mukden in Manchuria). The body of an American airman was found in one of the planes downed by them. According to a report released from General George C. Marshall’s headquarters in China, the planes were in fact Nationalist aircraft and not American. Faulty marking may have caused a confusion. (NYT 22 April p. 1, 24 April p. 17)

**Apr 25, 1946:** Four Chinese were killed during a 6-day period near the Marine barracks in Tientsin. (NCDL p. 1)

[Fatalities due to sentries were also common in other occupation episodes, for instance in Iceland or Japan.]
Apr 29, 1946: Tientsin. Marines have been ordered to travel in groups of three one of them armed. The ruling is due to recent incidents. (NCDL p. 2)

May 4, 1946: 307 Chinese air cadets arrived in the United States for advanced training at Randolph Field, Texas. (NCDL p. 1)

May 4, 1946: The Chinese government turned down a 3-point proposal made by General Marshall whereby a local government would be set up in Manchuria by general elections. (NCDL p. 2)

May 7, 1946: In last March new import regulations were introduced: surtaxes are placed on watches, cigarettes and beer; imports of automobiles, motion pictures, leaf tobacco is permitted only under special license; many luxuries are not imported at all. (NCDL p. 7)

May 8, 1946: The China-American council of Commerce and Industry which was organized in 1944 now has 275 members, of which 50 have joined since 1946. (NCDL p. 7)

May 11, 1946: Shanghai. An American naval officer ran a jeep into a crowd waiting in a tramway station injuring 5 people. One of them died the next day. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

May 14, 1946: Two US Marines were seriously wounded when unidentified riflemen fired on the Tientsin-Chinwangtao express train on 9 May 1946. The shooting occurred about 70 kilometer of Tientsin. The Marines were en route to Tangshan, 150 kilometer from Tientsin where Marines are guarding the Sino-British coal mines. The two wounded men, one of whom was hit in the head by a bullet, were flown back from Tangshan to Tientsin. (NYT p. 2)

May 11, 1946: Li Fu-ren, the editor of a liberal newspaper in Nanking was shot and killed by the secret police. He was arrested, driven outside the city and three bullets were placed in his head. The killing, it is believed, was connected with his publication of the details of the death of another liberal newspaperman in Kiangsu province. (NCDL p. 6)

May 12, 1946: A 19-year old US Navy shore patrolman [Navy analog of the army MPs] was shot and killed by a 16-year old Chinese student. The assassin was immediately shot and killed by Chinese police. (NCDL p. 1)

May 14, 1946: Two US Marines were shot and wounded by unidentified riflemen while on Tientsin Express. (NYT p. 2)

May 17, 1946: China bought US $15 million of US Navy surplus shipyard equip-
May 19, 1946: • (49,80) On the train between Tientsin and Shanhaikwan a group of American Marines who traveled in three special coaches began shooting out of the windows on both sides of the train. When the train was approaching Bridge 21 the Marines on guard at the bridge mistook the shooting for some sort of attack and sprayed the train with machine gun bullets. At least 3 Chinese were killed and 4 others gravely wounded. Two Marines were also wounded. Chinese newspapers demand reparation for the families of the Chinese victims. (NCDL p. 1)

A more detailed account is given in Guo (1998) which is based on an interview of John H. Masters who was commanding the First Battalion of the Fifth Marine stationed along the main railroad line to Tsinhuangtao.

Some 160 Marines of the Seventh Regiment took a train to Tsinhuangtao. All had their weapons with them and in addition they took a case of beer or so. After about an hour, some started shooting out of the window of the train at water buffalos in the fields and, as they went through small stations where the train didn’t stop, they shot into them. When the train closed in upon Master’s troops who were guarding bridges, the men in the train started firing into his detachment and into the quonset hut [a semi-circular shelter used for troops in World War II]. The Marines along the track had the advantage of having machine guns protected by sandbags. Upon receiving fire they opened fire on the train. Some Marines aboard the train were killed. This did not deter the occupants of the train from continuing shooting as they approached Masters’s second bridge detachment.

[No date is given for this event so it is not completely certain that the two incidents are the same.]

May 22, 1946: The 54th Army will be transported from Hong Kong to Manchuria by the US Navy. The US Navy has already transported the 13th, New First, 8th and 93rd Chinese armies from Hong Kong to Manchuria. (NCDL p. 1)

May 23, 1946: • (50,80) A Marine was killed during a reconnaissance patrol 16 kilometers southwest of Tientsin. (NCDL p. 1)

[The article says that the reconnaissance party was attacked by 50 Chinese but it does not give the strength of the reconnaissance party. Another Marine was wounded.]

May 24, 1946: • (57,80) The Tass news agency said that 7 bombers piloted by American pilots have been shot down after bombing Chinese Communist troops in Manchuria. The American War Department declared that it did not know of any recruiting of American pilots by the Chinese forces. There is an offensive of Nationalist forces under way in Manchuria but Communist troops seem to withdraw without much resistance. (NCDL p. 2)
[As a parallel it can be mentioned that during the First Indochina war (1946-1954) about 200 American Air Force technicians and pilots served alongside French forces; for more details see Roehner, 2007, p. 142-143.]

**Jun 1946:** In June 1946, Admiral Cook of the US 7th Fleet announced that US naval forces in China comprised 136 vessels, 15,000 naval personnel and 35,000 Marines. Other US forces in China were the Naval Air Force, the US Army Air Force and Army ground troops. (Korean Independence 13 November 1946)

**Jun 1, 1946:** Tientsin. A Marine was arrested for selling US $10,000 worth of post-exchange supplies to a Tientsin civilian. He will be tried by a general court martial. (NCDL p. 2)

**Jun 5, 1946:** In early June General Marshall was able to convince the two sides to accept a temporary two-week cease-fire. As he explained in a letter dated from 5 June, Chairman Mao wanted Red Army troops in Manchuria to use this time “to test, have logistics taken vare of and improve their morale so that when time comes we can fight again”. [Barlow 2009]

**Jun 6, 1946:** Two American airmen were wounded when Communists fired on two US Army transport planes heading for Changchun from Peiping as they flew over Communist territory. (Facts on File Yearbook, China section)

**Jun 11, 1946:** US Marine vehicles were fired on by unidentified persons near Tsingtao airport. (NYT p.1)

**Jun 11, 1946:** Shanghai. Mr. Antonio A. Carlton, a 41-old employee of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Corporation [a corporation which has often advertise- ment space in the journal] was killed by a hit-and-run driver of a big truck of the type used by the US Army. The truck belonged to the 3rd Army Division. According to the witnesses the victim was thrown about 3 meter in the air and came crashing to the ground. He died before any aid could reach him. This is by no means the first hit-and-run fatal accident. Several months ago four persons were killed Avenue du Roi Albert, a case which has never been cleared up. (NCDL p. 2) [Did the 3rd Army Division really stay in Shanghai at this time? Perhaps 3rd Battalion of the Fourth Marine Division would be more correct?]

**Jun 21, 1946:** Hunan is the worst famine area in the country. (NCDL p. 3)

**Jun 23, 1946:** Shanghai. Professor Ma Hsu-lin and Dr. Lei Chien-chuen were beaten on the streets of Shanghai by agents of the Kuomintang. As representatives of the Democratic League, they were demanding that the United States get its troops out of China. (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10 No 5, p. 154)
Jun 24, 1946: “GIs get the hell out of China”, “How would you like to have a war started in your country?”, these were some of the slogans splashed all over Shanghai. Similar slogans were also chalked on the sides of trams.

Jun 26, 1946: The Chinese newspaper Ta Kung Pao reported that 3 million people have starved to death. (Guo 1997)

Jun 27, 1946: Fighting broke out in Honan [now Henan province] between about one million Kuomintang troops and Communist troops. 3 million people have already starved to death; 5 million have become war refugees and more than 10 million may die of starvation in the coming weeks. (Guo 1998; the original source is the newspaper Ta Kung A (Shanghai) of 27 June 1946 and 5 August 1946).

Jul 11, 1946: Li King-po, a liberal writer and educator was shot and killed while out on a walk with his wife and children. The murderer was a gangster hired by the Kuomintang. (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10 No 5, p. 154)

Jul 15, 1946: Seven US Marines guarding the railroad to Mukden near Chinwang-tao have been kidnapped by unidentified Chinese. (Facts on File Yearbook, China section)

Jul 15, 1946: Wen Yi-duo, a famous and outspoken progressive professor, was assassinated by KMT agents. Born 1899, he had studied and taught for several years in the United States (1922-1925). Li Gong-pu, another progressive professor was also assassinated the same month. (Huang 2002)

Jul 16, 1946: Seven US Marines kidnapped by unidentified Chinese were sought by air and ground forces. (NYT p. 2)

Jul 17, 1946: Professor Wen I-to was shot and killed in front of the office of Kunming’s “Democratic Weekly”. The murderer was a gangster hired by the Kuomintang. (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10 No 5, p. 154)


General Chou: “I would like to ask whether you have heard about the last report from Kunming concerning the assassination of Mr. Li, a figure of the Democratic movement103. On July 15 1946 Professor Wen of Chinghua University was assassinated. He was also a leader of the Democratic League in Kunming. Professor Wen was an American-returned student and an intimate friend of the former Chinese Ambassador to the United States.

103Mr. Li was killed with a noiseless gun apparently turned over to the Chinese at the time when the SACO organization was still in existence.
According to the plan of the secret police that we learned of, many Democratic Leaguers were put on the black list. I have learned that such people as Prof. Teng Chu-Ming, the woman lawyer Miss Shi Liang, Mr. Shen Chun-ju and Prof. Lo Ling Chi in Shanghai were all on the black list.”

General Marshall: “Just as I came to China there were students killed in Kunming.”

General Chou: “I merely want to remind you that a series of incidents happened such as the bloodshed in the mass-rally in Chungking, the destruction of the Shangwan newspaper, the assassinations of Sian and Nantung, and the railroad incident here in Nanking.

Mr. Chen Li Fu, the chief of the secret police is now in Shanghai organizing a group of assassins called the Po Lang unit. This term comes from the Ming Dynasty when a Chinese scholar by the name of Po Lang organized a group to assassinate for him.”

(Foreign Relations of the United States 1, p. 1373)

Jul 29, 1946: A temporary embargo (arranged by General Marshall) on the export of arms and munitions to China became effective. (Mackerras 1982, p. 420)

Jul 29, 1946: •(61,81) A routine patrol comprising one officer and 40 enlisted men that was escorting 6 supply trucks from Tientsin to Peiping was ambushed by a force of uniformed Chinese. The lieutenant was killed in the first burst of fire and a fight which lasted for 4 hours ensued. An air-supported relief column arrived on the scene too late to trap the ambush party. Four Marines were killed (including the death of one wounded Marine who died subsequently) and 14 were injured. (Shaw 1960, p. 17)

[More details are provided in the following article.]

Jul 30, 1946: Four Marines including 2 officers were killed in an ambush. The number of the missing has not yet been determined. Four of the wounded are in critical condition. The convoy consisting of 25 vehicles was attacked at 12:10 pm on the road between Tientsin and Peking. Without warning, armed Chinese ran out from corn fields on both sides of the road and threw several hand grenades. When the Marines’ machine guns forced the Chinese back into the corn fields they retaliated with quick-firing machine guns. The fighting continued until 4:10 pm. After a white flag was raised the combatants negotiated and the Americans were permitted to proceed to Peiping. No one was sure that the attack came from Chinese Communists or from bandits. (NYT p. 1,11)

[At that time it was not the policy of the Communist party to engage into hostilities against US forces. On the contrary the Nationalists who were trying to involve the American forces in their war against the Communists tried to exploit this incident. It is even possible that they provoked it because the US Marine patrol accompa-
nied by KMT troops arrived unexpectedly in a zone which by mutual agreement was under the control of the Communists. In a letter to President Truman, General Marshall wrote: “The incident plays directly into the hands of the KMT faction who are blocking my efforts.” (Guo 1997)

**Jul 30, 1946:** (61,82) On July 29 a Marine officer shot and killed a blue-clad Chinese who was asking him to halt his vehicle. (NYT p. 11)

**Jul 31, 1946:** An official Chinese report claimed 1,500 cases of Chinese injuries and deaths involving the Americans stationed in China during the 11 months from 1 September 1945 to 31 July 1946. (Zhang 1996, p. 99)

[The primary source is the “Wen hui bao” of 24 October 1946. These 1,500 cases represent an average of 136 incidents per month.]

**Jul 31, 1946:** Dean Acheson, Under-Secretary of State, confirmed that 39 Chinese divisions have been supplied with American arms and some 20 of these divisions have received thorough American training. (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10 No 5, p. 154)

[More information on this aspect is given below at the date of 26 September.]

**Aug 2, 1946:** Bombing of Yenan by Nationalist aircraft. Only two places were hit: the airport and the place where Chairman Mao was living. (Foreign Relations of the US (1, p. 1444))

[In other words, this bombing can be seen as an assassination attempt on Chairman Mao.]

**Aug 11, 1946:** A clash between Marines and Communists occurred when a coal train was derailed and attacked 199 kilometer north east of Tientsin. A group of about 50 armed Chinese attacked the train while 4 Marines riding in the train as guards returned the fire. There were no casualties among the Marines. (NYT p. 18)

[The article does not say if the attackers were able to stop the train. If not, one may wonder what was the purpose of the attack.]

**Aug 20, 1946:** (61,84) Shanghai. A US medical truck killed the principal of a Shanghai primary school and his son. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

**Aug 26, 1946:** Two Chinese Army officers were sentenced to death by government court martials for the slaying of Prof. Wen Yi-tu the leader of the Democratic League in Kunming on 15 July 1946. Another Democratic League leader in Kunming, Li Kung-po, was killed on 23 July 1946 but the murderers have not yet been arrested. (NYT p. 2)

**Aug 31, 1946:** (61,89) According to information supplied by the hospital St.
Marie in Shanghai, there were 35 cases in which Chinese people were wounded due to reckless driving of US Army trucks and jeeps during the month of August; 5 of them died. Thus, based on the report of St. Marie’s Hospital alone, there was an average of one Chinese hit and wounded by US trucks and jeeps every day in that month. (Pepper 1971 p. 711)

At about the same time in Korea the Headquarters of the Eight US Army in Korea released the following memorandum (excerpt). “The increasing number of daily accidents in which Koreans are injured by army trucks is becoming a matter of great concern. Some, who feel they have developed great skills, have been observed trying to see how close they can come to pedestrians without hitting them. Others make repeated attempts to chase the Koreans off the roads and into ditches”. (Voorhees 1953, p. 150)

[Similar behavior was observed in Japan, see the chronology of the occupation in Japan at the date of 1 September 1947.]

Aug 31 1946: The Republic of China signed an agreement with the United States in which she acquitted America for all advances of Chinese National currency made to the US Navy, US Army and other Government agencies as one of the conditions under which she purchased America’s surplus property in the Western Pacific. (Stratton 1950, p. 219)

Sep 1946: A rickshaw-puller, Tsang Ta Erh Tsu, was fatally beaten by a US sailor. Thereafter, because rickshaw-pullers and street peddlers were often involved in incidents with American troops the Kuomintang government set up a plan aimed at gradually eliminating rickshaws and street peddlers. In Shanghai alone, these people and their families represented a population of several hundred thousands people. The ban caused a strong anti-government and anti-American backlash (see below). (Guo 2001, p. 227-228)

Sep 6, 1946: A peasant was shot dead near an American barrack in Tientsin. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950 p. 3)

Sep 8, 1946: In Peiping a Chinese student named Tsao Hui-ming was shot and wounded by a US Military Police because he was wearing a pair of US military trousers. According to Tsao’s sister, his brother was watching a chess game on a sidewalk when an American MP jumped from his jeep and kicked Tsao in the back. In shock Tsao started to run away. The MP fired 4 shots. One shot hit Tsao in the leg. After Tsao was sent to the hospital the MP took back the trousers. (Guo 1997, p. 258)

[In those days, it was quite common, though of course illegal, for American soldiers to sell their uniforms, food or other military supplies to the Chinese. When a pair
of trousers was in question, the US MP often forced the Chinese who wore them to take the trousers off on the spot. The previous trouser incident received national coverage in the Chinese press. US authorities in Peiping promised to cover Tsao’s medical expenses. Tsao was a student in a well-known German-American university, the Catholic University.]

**Sep 11, 1946:** First Lieutenant R. W. Clark was wounded when Nationalist planes bombarded and strafed the Communist-held city of Tsining, 140 kilometer north west of Peiping. He was a member of a cease fire team. Moreover, another American from a cease fire team in Kalgan was also seriously injured when strafing Nationalist planes ignited a gasoline drum on the truck he was riding. The offensive of the Nationalist forces against Kalgan had reached major proportions and might end China’s last chance for a negotiated agreement. (NYT p. 8)

**Sep 16, 1946:** Shanghai. Chinese attorneys challenged the right for an US military tribunal to try 23 Germans charged with providing intelligence to Japan arguing that China had not given its consent to such a trial. (Amerasia, November 1946, vol. 10, No 5, p. 170)

**Sep 22, 1946:** On a Shanghai street Julian Larrinaga, a civilian working as a seaman in the US Navy, quarreled with a rickshaw puller, Zang Dayaozi. Larrinaga called upon Edward Roderick, a sailor in the US Navy. After Roderick struck Zang with his fist, Zang fell to the pavement. He died one day later from the injury. Roderick was tried by a court martial and acquitted. Because Larrinaga was a civilian he was tried in the Shanghai District Court and sentenced to one year and nine months imprisonment. (Zhang 2002, p. 35)

**Sep 22, 1946:** A rickshaw puller named Zang Dayaozi, was fatally beaten by a US sailor in Shanghai. He died the next morning. (Guo 1998, Yang 1998)

**Sep 22, 1946:** Shanghai. A American soldier killed a rickshaw driver with his fits and was picked up from the gathering crowd by a US Army patrol car. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

[This is certainly the same incident as the one mentioned above. It shows that the list of crimes given in the “Shanghai News” is indeed reliable.]

**Sep 23, 1946:** In Tientsin, an American soldier threw an 11-year old girl into a river where she was drowned (Shanghai News 19 November 1950 p. 3).

**Sep 23, 1946:** Ten organizations in Shanghai announced the beginning of a “US Forces out of China week”. (Guo 2001, p. 229)

**Sep 25, 1946:** The “MAGIC” group (Military Aid Group in China) which is ex-
expected to train one million Nationalist soldiers is being supported by Army funds until the required funds are allocated by Congress. (Stevens 1946, p. 295)

**Sep 25, 1946: Economic policy of the Nationalist government.** An article published in the “Far Eastern Survey” by a writer employed by a major American oil company after serving in China with the Office of Strategic Services, helps to explain the growing dissatisfaction of American business with the economic policy of the Nationalist government. He makes the following points.

- In recent times several major state controlled corporations have been set up, for instance: (i) The “China Merchants Steam Navigation Company” was set up with the purpose of creating a government monopoly in shipping. It is controlled by the Ministry of Communication which has strong connections with the fraction of the Kuomintang headed by Chiang Kai-shek.
  
  (ii) The Taiwan Provincial Government headed by General Chen Yi set up the “Taiwan Sugar Industries Corporation” which has a monopoly of the production, sale and export of Formosan sugar. Some 40 sugar mills were taken over from the Japanese.
  
  (iii) The “China Petroleum Company” was formed to produce, refine, import and transport petroleum products in China.
  
  (iv) The “China Flour Development Company” is a government combine which will compete with private companies in milling and distribution of flour throughout China.
  
  (v) Japanese industrial assets in electricity power plants, iron and steel works, coal mines, cotton mills, and shipyards were taken over by government agencies. For instance, the giant government textile monopoly, the “China Textile Reconstruction Corporation” was created from former Japanese cotton mills.

As a result of such moves, peace in China will find government capital firmly entrenched in all strategic industries.

- The unvarying report of the American Observers’ Mission which stayed in Yenan [the Communist capital] from July 1944 to the fall of 1945 was to the effect that the Chinese Communists were far more democratic in practice than the Kuomintang.

(Stevens 1946, Chen 1946)

**Sep 26, 1946: Washington.** Testifying before the Senate War Investigating Committee on the transaction whereby US war material originally acquired at a cost of $800 millions was sold to the Chinese Nationalist government for an estimate $175 million, Harold Stein, Deputy-Director of the OWMR (Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion) declared “We were advised such action would lend great support to the foreign policy of the United States.” (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10, No 5, p. 171)
[This excerpt suggests that the committee of the US Senate had the impression that these weapons were sold too cheaply. However, seen from the side of China, a $175 million expense was certainly a heavy burden which contributed to the fact that about 75% of the expenditures of the Nationalist government were absorbed by the military. This led to much dissatisfaction in the population and made the middle-class turn away from the Kuomintang. It is revealing that in spite of the fact that at this point in time such weapons were mostly useless for the United States they were not given away for free.]

**Sep 27, 1946:** Four [American] soldiers pushed a beggar woman into the Chiantse River where she was drowned (Shanghai News 19 November 1950 p. 3).

**Sep 30, 1946:** At about 10 pm in Shanghai a US Naval sailor engaged a woman in lewd [i.e. sexual] deeds on Yuan-ming-yuan road. They were shameless as if the many passers-by did not exist. Trying to stop them, someone shouted “MP” but the soldier charged the passers-by like crazy; he hit them, torn up their clothes and broke their spectacles. (Excerpt from a Chinese newspaper cited in Guo 2001, p. 238).

**Sep 30, 1946:** Harold Stein, deputy director of War Mobilization, declared that most US obligations to China arose from advances of Chinese currency to the US Army paymasters for payment of American troops on duty in China. The cancellation of these obligations will result from the delivery of war surplus goods to China. They represent an amount of $120 million [about 1.2 billion dollar of 2000]. (Seoul Times p. 1)

[For US military equipment delivered to countries fighting Communism the standard rule was that it was not charged by the US. Thus, the war that France waged against the Vietminh in Indochina (1948-1954) was almost entirely paid by the United States. In other words, the cancellation of the US debt to China meant that the deployment of US forces in China was in fact paid by China. At that time, this was the standard US policy.]

**Oct 1946:** A jeep driven by a Marine killed a high school teacher, Xu Zhendong, in Beijing. He was survived by his old parents, his wife and 7 children. (Zhang 2002, p. 41)

**Oct 1946:** In spite of the protests by Chinese business interests Major-General Claire Chennault, war-time leader of the Flying Tigers, was recently authorized to set up an air transport company in China with the aid of a $3 million grant from the UNRRA’s China fund. (Amerasia, November 1946, Vol 10, No 5, p. 152)

**Oct 1946:** In early October under public pressure the Nationalist government and
US authorities worked out an agreement on the duty of US MP and Chinese police in Peiping. It stipulated that:

- It was the duty of the Chinese police to arrest any Chinese who wore US military uniforms but that those already purchased should not be confiscated.
- American vehicles should obey the orders of the Chinese police.
- US vehicles from the Nanyuan Airport should not enter the city after midnight.
- All illegal brothels should cease operation.

(Guo 1997, p. 259)

**Oct 3, 1946:** Two US Marines were killed and 3 were injured when the 37-ton Sherman tank which was protecting a Marine supply on the road from Peking to Tientsin left the road and made a 10-meter plunge into a swamp. Another tank protecting a convoy in the opposite direction accidentally ran off the road. The spokesman of the Fifth Regiment who made the announcement did not say if the accident caused any casualty. The use of tanks in Marine convoys was introduced after the Anping attack of 29 July 1946. However, because the tanks tore up the roads they created bad feelings. (NYT p. 12)

**Oct 3, 1946:** US Marines have been withdrawn from all 35 bridges they were guarding along the Peiping–Mukden railway (known as the life line of Manchuria) between Tientsin and Chinwangtao, Nationalist forces have taken over the guard duty. (North China Daily News p. 2)

**Oct 3, 1946:** *The Nationalist air force has 2,000 aircraft.* Chou En-lai demanded American withdrawal. He said that the 2,000 American aircraft in Nationalist hands could not fly against the Communists unless having American gasoline. He added that 57 American equipped Chinese divisions were now bearing toward the Communist stronghold of Kalgan. (Seoul Times 3 October 1946)

**Oct 4, 1946:** Chiang Kai-shek persists with his plan to hold the national assembly on 12 November as scheduled irrespective of whether the Communists are represented. (Seoul Times 4 October 1946)

[The policy of Chiang Kai-shek in China is similar to the policy of the MG in Korea in the sense that in both countries an assembly will be organized from which leftists will be (de facto) excluded. One may remember that in Japan there were also elections in 1946 which were (in fact if not in name) organized by SCAP.]

**Oct 5, 1946:** An armed band of 200 “unidentified Chinese” attacked the United States Marine Corps ammunition depot near the port of Tangku in the vicinity of Tientsin last night. (NYT p. 1)

**Oct 7, 1946:** The Nationalist “railroad campaign” has not been a success yet. In
mid-July Nationalist officials explained that it was necessary to drive the Communists from the railways and to clear strategic economic areas. Although the Nationalists have regained some stretches of railway they failed to remove the guerrilla threat in the recovered territory. (NYT p. 10)

**Oct 7, 1946:** On 28 September 1946 a Chinese plane of the China National Aviation Corporation piloted by Captain Andrew Lungbotham of Pasadena, California crashed about 100 kilometer south of Sikang. All persons aboard escaped injury but were captured by the Chinese. An American-manned rescue plane was hit by gunfire but was able to return to Chungking. (NYT p. 10)

**Oct 7, 1946:** On 3 October 1946 some 200 armed Chinese attacked an American ammunition dump near the port of Tangku. The dump was guarded by 5 Marines. One of them was injured. The purpose of the attack was to capture arms and ammunition, (NYT p. 3)

[The article does not say if the attackers were able to take away ammunition but due to their overwhelming number this would be expected. As a matter of fact, the response to this question is given in an article published two weeks later on October 22, see below.]

**Oct 8, 1946:** Shanghai. An American soldier shot a Chinese worker whom he had falsely accused of stealing a parcel of sugar. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

**Oct 13, 1946:** Four former US airmen died in a crash near Kiangwan airfield. These ex-army pilots (James McCassrey, John Kernbach, Robert Rockett, Warren Brennan) were testing a C-46 for the Chinese Air Force. The accident occurred shortly after take off. (North China Daily News p. 3)

**Oct 13, 1946:** Peiping. Charges that American servicemen in China have been guilty of “drunkenness, smuggling, illegal sale of government properties, robbery, manhandling, killing through reckless driving, insulting and violating Chinese women” have been made by Dr. Chang Tung-sun, a professor of philosophy in Yenching University [a university founded in 1919 by the Methodist Episcopal Church with the support of Alcoa Aluminum Corporation] and chairman of the North China brand of the Democratic League. General Gillem, newly appointed US commissioner at Executive Headquarters denied the behavior of US forces had been bad. He said he was extremely proud of the men under his command. The percentage of servicemen under military detention has been low for months. During the period immediately after the war the situation in China as well as elsewhere became bad but currently only picked men are being sent to China. (NYT p. 45)
Chapter 9

[Is the claim that “only picked men are being sent to China” really true. Anyway, one year after the beginning of the occupation it was probably too late to change the feelings of the population.]

**Oct 15, 1946:** After the fall of Kalgan and Chengteh, Yenan is the next goal of Nationalist forces. Kalgan, Chengteh and Yenan were three main cities controlled by the Communists. Chengteh fell early in the campaign, Kalgan, the capital of Chahar province, was captured 3 weeks ago. Chiang Kai-shek has thus carried out two parts of his threat to capture the Reds’ chief cities if they do not accept the peace terms.

If the generalissimo decides to order the offensive against Yenan his troops will face the toughest campaign of the civil war.

General Chen Cheng, chief of staff of the Chinese army, told a news conference that the government troops could defeat the Communist forces in a 3-5 month campaign if Yenan fails to agree to the peace conditions.

(Seoul Times 15 October 1946 p. 1, 19 October 1946 p. 1)

[These statements show that at this time the Nationalist leaders were in the belief of being the masters of the game. The future proved this assessment to be completely wrong. As a matter of fact, within 2 years the Nationalist armies were militarily defeated in almost all theaters. What made such a delusion possible? The answer is fairly simple. The occupation of Chengteh and Kalgan had in fact little military significance. Later on, Yenan was also taken without offering any serious resistance. Because of the flexibility of the Communist strategy this fall had very little influence on the whole campaign. After being abandoned by the Communists, Yenan was just an empty shell.]

**Oct 16, 1946:** Under the headline “US soldiers’ atrocities in the past two months”, the newspaper “Jiefang Daily” which was published in the Communist capital of Yenan relayed American wrongdoings in the past two months. (Guo 1997, p. 259)

**Oct 21, 1946:** The Nationalist government ordered Peiping newspapers to stop printing anti-US stories. (Facts on File Yearbook, China section)

**Oct 21, 1946:**  Chinese Communists ambushed two groups of US Marines and sailors on hunting near Tangku. Two Communists were killed and two Marines kidnapped. (Facts on File Yearbook, China section)

**Oct 22, 1946:** A party of 4 Marines and 5 European civilians drove in two jeeps to marshes, 11 kilometer from Tangku where two weeks ago Communists attacked a large Marine ammunition dump wounding one Marine and seizing 40 tons of ammunition. The party was ambushed at 9 am. After a long parley the Chinese offered to release everyone except two Marines each of whom would drive a jeep to an undis-
closed destination and then be set free. 24 hours later, the two Marines are still missing.

In another episode, 3 Navy men were surrounded by 7 Chinese who ordered them to leave their jeep. They decided to flee killing 2 Chinese and wounding 5 others. From nearby bushes 50 more Chinese opened fire but missed. (NYT p. 14)

[The second of these episodes appears particularly implausible. How is it possible that the Chinese missed their target while being in a steady position and able to take aim. Regarding the first episode, how can one explain that in spite of numerous ambushes in recent weeks, the Marines were still allowed to tour the countryside in small groups.]

**Oct 24, 1946:** According to an official Chinese report there were 1,500 cases of Chinese injuries and deaths involving Americans stationed in China during the 11-month period between September 1945 and July 1946; this represents an average of 4.5 daily injuries. (Article published in a Chinese newspaper on 24 October 1946 and cited in Zhang 2002, p. 41)

[The article does not give the number of fatalities.]

**Oct 30, 1946:** There are at present 20 American equipped and trained KMT armies totaling 57 divisions. They are: the New 1st, New 6th, 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, 13th, 18th, 31st, 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 60th, 71st, 73rd, 74th, 94th, 98th. When Japan surrendered only 20 divisions had been trained over the period 1942-1945 (Korean Independence journal, 30 October 1946)

[According to these figures, the rate of training and equipment markedly increased after the war: from 5 divisions per year to 35 divisions per year.]

**Oct 30, 1946:** According to statistics compiled by the Communist headquarters in Yenan, from January to July 1946 the KMT airforce made 731 flights, killing 359 civilians and 45 soldiers. (Korean Independence 30 October 1946)

**Nov 4, 1946:** Chinese and US representatives signed the “Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation”. Many Chinese businessmen denounced the treaty as being detrimental to China economic interests. Because of the difference in the level of economic development reached by China and the United States the manager of the Minsheng Shipping Company, He Shiyan, compared the treaty to an agreement between an adult and a boy in which each is supposed to carry a load of 20 pounds in a supposedly equal race. The “Shanghai News” says that the treaty robbed China of its customs and taxation rights. The Chinese Communist Party designated November 4 as “National Humiliation Day” in the Communist-controlled area. (Mackerras 1982, p. 422, Shanghai News 26 November 1950, p. 2, Zhang 2002, p. 97)

[The inflow of American commodities stimulated the “buy Chinese movement” (Zhang...]}
Nov 15, 1946: Meeting of the National Constituent Assembly. The National Assembly of the Republic of China convened at Nanjing with hopes that a new constitution could be created. The Communists and the “China Democratic League” boycotted the meeting. (Wikipedia, article entitled “November 1946”)

On 16 November 1946, in a meeting with General Marshall, General Chou Enlai declared: “By opening the National Assembly the KMT has ultimately sealed the door to negotiation”. In order to understand Chou Enlai’s judgment one needs to explain how this Assembly came into being.

A “Political Consultative Conference” (PCC) was held in January 1946. There were 38 delegates: 8 from the KMT, 7 Communists and the remaining 23 from the “Democratic League” and other small parties. It comes of course as a surprise that these small parties had more delegates than the two main parties. It can be observed that the recourse to a multitude of small parties and “independent” delegates is a method commonly used by the US State Department. One can see the same feature in South Korea in 1948 and 1950 or in the elections organized in Iraq during the US occupation of April 2003–December 2011. Such a plurality conveys the image of a vibrant democracy and at the same time it dilutes the message of the main opposition party.

The Consultative Conference came to an agreement on a number of points but the most crucial questions were left pending. The objective pursued by the State Department was mostly window dressing; the purpose was to show that discussion was possible. Among those crucial questions was the KMT’s refusal to grant the CCP a veto power in the 40-member State Council which was the main executive body. In addition, in the meanwhile some of the points in the agreement were, so to say, rewritten by the right wing of the KMT. Therefore the Communist Party and the “Democratic League” refused to be bound by the agreement of January 1946 and to take part in the convocation of a National Constituent Assembly. Clearly, for the KMT to move forward despite their opposition meant that it would be a purely KMT affair without any signification as a democratic process. It would be interesting to know how, at grass-root level, the members of the National Assembly were elected; so far we were not able to find that information.

In a sense the policy of the KMT was similar to the process which led to the creation of the South Korean National Assembly in 1948. Not only did North Korea not take part in the election, but all leftist leaders had been arrested and even major leaders of the government party refused to take part. The elections held in 1946-1948 in China, Japan and South Korea under US supervision gave the State Department a unique opportunity to practice “nation building”. These experiments provided a blue print that was used repeatedly in subsequent decades.
In China the constitution adopted within one month by the “National Assembly” was a new version of the KMT draft constitution of 1936.]

**Nov 20, 1946:** The police of the Huangpu district in Shanghai jailed over 300 illegal street peddlers; in the following days there were left with nothing to eat and families were not allowed to bring them food or clothes. (Guo 2001, p. 228)

**Dec, 1946:** A Marine of the Sixth Marine Division, squad leader Walter Seitz, was killed during a rescue mission on the Shantung Peninsula [exact date unknown] (Stephens 2001)

**Dec 1, 1946:** In trying to implement the ban on street peddlers in Shanghai the police clashed with them. On Chinling Road stores were set ablaze. Many people were wounded. On the next day the riot spread to other districts. The police patrolled the streets in armored vehicles. (Guo 2001, p. 228)

**Dec 24 1946:** Rape of a Chinese student girl, Shen Chung, in Beijing by an American Marine, Corporal William G. Pierson. Tried by an American court martial during the week of 17 January 1947, he was found guilty and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. However in mid-August 1947 the Secretary of the Navy declared a reversal of the verdict. Pierson was pronounced innocent and released. During the whole episode there have been numerous anti-American student demonstrations. Subsequently, the incident became a symbol of Chinese weakness and American Imperial behavior (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3, Zhang 2001)

[On account of the fact that Pierson was pronounced innocent by the Secretary of the Navy on 11 August 1947, it is legitimate to wonder if the whole affair was not a fabrication set up for anti-American propaganda purposes. Two elements lead to dismiss this interpretation. First is the fact that the Naval Sentence Review and Clemency Board which deliberated on the case from 1 to 7 July 1947 stated unanimously that “the evidence is sufficient beyond any reasonable doubt to support the findings of the court on the charge of rape”. Secondly, it can be observed that releasing sentenced military personnel is a recurrent practice in the American administration. In this respect, one may recall that Lieutenant William Calley was sentenced to life imprisonment for the massacre of My Lai but was released by president Nixon and put under house arrest until a federal judge ordered him freed three and a half years after his conviction http://www.u-s-history.com]

**Dec 24-25, 1946:** Tangku. A Chinese was beaten to death by several drunken Marines. The Marine Forces Commander expressed deep regret and apolo-
gized for the incident. (Griggs 1948, p. 12)

Dec 31, 1946: During 1946 the Americans have trained and armed some 59 fresh Kuomintang divisions. During the course of the war against Japan only 20 divisions had been trained and armed. (Griggs 1948, p. 21)

1947

1947 An American, Jack Belden, stayed in Anyang County on the Chang River in Honan province. Having already spent 9 years in China from 1933 to 1941, he was able (in his own words) to speak “quite a bit of Chinese”. He describes the return of the landlords along with the Nationalist Army. It was a scenario which happened in many other places as well. During the war, the Communist guerrillas were able to occupy the area and to free the tenants from the debts contracted toward their landlords. When the KMT armies came back after the war, the guerrillas had to go in hiding. As a result, the leaders of the villagers were targeted by the returned landlords. In Anyang county, some 46 were executed. However, the guerrillas remained in the vicinity and came back during the nights. During a two months period in Anyang some 80 landlords and members of the KMT “Home Returning Corps” were kidnapped. (Belden 1949)

Jan 1947: From 31 December through January many student demonstrations took place in relation with the rape of Shen Chung, for instance in the following cities: Beijing, Shanghai, Nanking, Tientsin, Wuhai, Changsha, Nanchang, Chinan Canton, Chungking, Harbin, Mukden. Altogether several hundreds thousands people took part in these demonstrations. (Guo 2001, p. 230)

Jan 2, 1947: Shanghai students attacked Americans. A US Army officer was beaten on the head with bamboo canes and an Associated Press photographer received a black eye from the students. The 5,000 demonstrators carried signs reading: “China is not an American colony”, “Get out or we will throw you out”. The demonstrators were singing patriotic songs and responding vociferously to cheer leaders with anti-American slogans. The demonstrators demanded the withdrawal of all US armed forces and the cessation of US ammunition delivery to the Chinese government. A leaflet said: “They beat and cheat our honest traders and coolies, they violate and abuse our decent women, they attack stores and pound showroom glasses into pieces. Thousands of other cases of infernal deeds have been committed behind the mask of so-called Allied Friendship”. (NYT p. 11)

Jan 7, 1947: Recalled to the United States, General Marshall left China to become
Chronology

Jan 9, 1947: 35 American pilots and 70 Chinese airmen employed by the “China National Aviation Corporation” sent a letter to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with a long list of safety recommendations. For instance no airport in China has adequate night landing facilities. The letter followed 4 plane crashes during the past two weeks in which 114 persons were killed. (NYT p. 2)

Jan 11, 1947: At a mass meeting held at Yenan, the Communist capital, Mme Chou En-lai declared that this [i.e. the rape of Miss Shen Chung] was but one of thousands of atrocities committed by the American troops in Kuomintang-held areas. (News Extracts, New China News Agency, 14 January 1947, cited in Griggs 1948, p. 12) [This assertion once again raises the question of how many incidents really occurred.]

Jan 17, 1947: Beginning of the court martial of William Pierson in the case of the rape of Shen Chung, a student at the university of Beijing. [Apart from the rape itself, a most revealing circumstance which was disclosed during the trial is the fact that the rape took place on a parade ground which was near a heavily traveled street but was not interrupted for about 3 hours. It is true that several people including a patrolman were attracted to the place by the cries of the victim but the two marines chased them away and they did not interfere until eventually an armed policeman joined them. Only then was Pierson arrested and delivered to the Joint Office of the Sino-American Police. This story gives a measure of the degree of immunity and impunity enjoyed by American troops.] (Guo 2001, p. 239)

Feb 3, 1947: US officers are still teaching KMT troops how to use flame throwers against defenseless villagers. (The Shanghai Newsletter, 3 February 1947 in Papers of John F. Melby, microfilm no 3862) [This training took place within the framework of the “Military Advisory Group in China” (MAGIC). Why does the newspaper add the precision “against defenseless villagers”. One can give two reasons. (i) Because of the limited range of flame throwers (some 50m) the weapon was useless against troops armed with machine guns. (ii) This weapon was mainly used against people hiding in houses or caves. From the content of other articles it is fairly clear that the journal was not anti-Communist.]

Feb 9, 1947: Shanghai. A number of Shanghai clerks and bank people held a meeting on the second floor of a large building on Nanking Road. About 500 attended. The purpose was to discuss how to stem the flood of US goods on to the Chinese market. Before any speeches had been made, 100 plain-clothed operatives and a few uniformed persons wearing US Army dress smashed the furniture and cruelly beat up the audience. One person was killed and several severely wounded. Finally, they
departed shouting “Down with the Communists”. The police arrived 45mn later and collected the wounded. (Shanghai Newsletter of 17 February 1947, in Papers of John F. Melby at the NDL)

[Who had sent the mobsters?]

**Feb 15, 1947:** • (68,100)  A Chinese civilian, Li Foo-yu, was shot and killed in a warehouse in Tsingtao in the afternoon. He had been seen walking toward the exit with a pipe wrench in his hand. The sentry fired three shots. The Board of Investigation found that excessive force was used by the sentry. (NARA 1)

**Feb 15, 1947:** • (69,100)  A Marine was shot dead in Peiping alley. The dead Marine arrived from the United States three and a half months ago. (NYT p. 8)

**Feb 17, 1947:** During the night of February 17-18 the Kuomintang secret police arrested more than 2,000 persons. Those arrested included many Peiping residents prominent for their independent political views. Similar arrests were made in Kalgan, Tientsin, Tsingtao and elsewhere. The newspapers presented these arrests as a “census check” arguing that persons who did not have the proper identification papers were taken into custody. These arrests served to unite the liberal elements in Peiping and elsewhere to a degree unknown before. Thirteen well-known professors at Peiping universities released a bold protest against the arrests which was signed by 200 other professors. Those arrested were held incommunicado and without trial. Six weeks later only few of them had been released. (Speer 1947)

**Feb 28, 1947:** **Uprising in Taiwan**  After the Japanese surrender, Kuomintang forces took over Formosa [i.e. Taiwan]. According to observers they exerted an oppressive rule. An uprising started on February 28. Kuomintang police were killed and mainland Chinese were beaten. To gain time before the arrival of fresh troops, governor Chen Yi negotiated with the insurgents and promised to reform his government. Proposals for reforms were submitted to Chen Yi on March 7. On behalf of the Nationalist Government, he denied categorically that there would be any movement of troops into Formosa. Yet, on the next night, the debarkation area of Keelung, the port of the capital city, was cleared by machine-gun fire and thousands of Kuomintang troops swarmed toward the capital. Chen Yi was ready for his revenge and the massacre began. A compilation of foreigners’ reports indicates that approximately 10,000 men and women were slaughtered. On March 8-9 the massacres spread from the capital throughout the island. There was indiscriminate shooting and bayoneting. Leading citizens were seized including lawyers, editors, doctors and businessmen. Many people were slaughtered who had no particular connection with the uprising. Aborigene village leaders who had resisted official depredations during 1946 were butchered. One mainland Chinese who had witnessed the Japanese rape of Nanking said that,
to him, the Formosan slaughter seemed as bad. Many thousands were reported confined to concentration camps under barbarous treatment. Ten days of this treatment squelched the revolt. News from Formosa is now censored and the real situation is uncertain.

Upon hearing of what had happened in their homeland, many of the Formosans who had been drafted into Kuomintang forces deserted. Communist armies in Shantung reported that about a thousand men from Formosa had joined them by the end of March. (Kerr (1947), Field Artillery May-June 1947 p. 193)

Feb 28, 1947: There is complete absence of evidence to show that Russia is aiding the Chinese Communists. (Field Artillery Jan-Feb 1947, p. 51)

[It should be recalled that at Yalta Russia agreed to recognize and support the government of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, Field Artillery May-June 1948, p. 140].

Feb 28, 1947: Between 1 September 1945 and 28 February 1947 more than 75 American military jeeps were “lost” in the area of Tientsin. (Griggs 1948, p. 31)

Feb 28, 1947: Nationalist troops newly arrived from the mainland killed at least 3,000 Taiwanese who were protesting against curbs on civic freedoms. This massacre was followed by a period of White Terror in which an equal, if not greater, number of people were killed, imprisoned or tortured. The aim was to protect the island against Communist infiltration from the mainland. (Far Eastern Economic Review 5 June 1997)

Mar 17, 1947: A GI guard at the West airfield in Peiping shot dead a Chinese boy. He had been waiting for food scraps at the gate of the airfield. (Griggs 1948, p. 28)

Mar 30, 1947: At Tsingtao a rickshaw coolie, Su Ming Cheng, aged 22 was stabbed to death by an American Marine, Petro Abarra, in a dispute over the fare. Tried by an American Military Court, Abarra was sentenced to 10 years in confinement. (Griggs 1948, p. 28, Yang 1998)

[Usually in such cases the prisoner gets conditional liberation fairly early in his term.]

Mar 31, 1947: Three Chinese boys were killed on a firing test range near Peiping. In the first two weeks of April similar accidents cost the lives of 3 more Chinese boys. (Griggs 1948, p. 28)

Apr 5, 1947: On the night of 4-5 April a Communist company broke into an ammunition supply point at Hsin Ho (located between Tianjin and Tanggu on the coast). Five Marine sentries were killed in the initial exchange of fire and 16 were wounded. The Communists took away cart loads of ammunition and blew up
two munitions stockpiles. (Shaw 1960, p. 21)

**Apr 18, 1947:** Between March 18 and April 18 there were 6 incidents in North China between American troops and Chinese people involving rock-throwing, theft, assault, rape, murder, manslaughter and dispossession of villagers. (Griggs 1948, p. 30)

**Apr 25, 1947:** Unexpectedly the Communists concentrated two divisions and attacked the Kuomintang 72nd Division in the East of China at Taian. It made only a token resistance and surrendered the next day. The Communists took the American equipment and paroled [i.e. released] all prisoners. (Field Artillery July-August 1947 p. 261)

[This is one of the earliest examples of a Nationalist division surrendering en bloc instead of fighting. There will be many similar cases in subsequent months.]

**May 1947:** After General Omar T. Pfeiffer took command in China he issued an order which explicitly allowed sentries to fire on suspected thieves (before that date there was no standing order which means that sentries had to make their own decision). In an oral history transcript he observes that “in addition to the almost nightly thefts, we had almost nightly killing because of our high velocity weapons”. (Guo 1997, p. 255)

**May 1, 1947:** Biographic reports of the lesser known members of the State Council and the Kuomintang Political Council. These reports which were issued by the State Department contain information about education, successive positions and whether or not the person is friendly toward the US. Here are a few illustrations:

- Chang Chi: member of the State Council. Strong opposition to Communism.
- Chen Chi-tang: Though considered outwardly friendly toward the US, he is said to have little to do with foreigners.
- Tseng Yang-fu: Tsen has been consistently described as vigorous, ambitious, honest and friendly toward the US.

(SDI, reel 4, Part 3, Office of Intelligence Research, Report No 4376)

**May 12, 1947:** 50 years’ Peiping duty ended by US Marines. Their evacuation will be completed within a few days. (NYT p. 11)

**May 15, 1947:** To drive the enemy out of Shantung the Chinese Air Force was ordered to bomb them and did so with 100 planes which is a large number for China. But instead of bombing the enemy the planes bombed their own 74th division which suffered heavy losses. Two days later it surrendered to the enemy with all its American equipment. (Field Artillery July-August 1947 p. 261)

[It is not clear whether in the impossibility of getting spare parts the American equip-
ment could be of great use.

May 20, 1947: In early May rice riots broke out in many cities including Shanghai, Hangchow and Nanking. Reflecting these problems the students set up a so-called “Anti-hunger, Anti-war Movement”. On 20 May a march by students in Nanking led to clashes with the police in which 50 students were injured. Clubs, leather belts and fire hoses were used against them. During the last ten days of May, the newspapers were filled with reports of incidents in which students were beaten, arrested and abducted by police, troops and plain-clothes men. In Chungking two students from the Central Engineering College were shot and killed. On 1 June during a a night raid of police at Wuhan university (in Hubei province) three students were killed. Abductions and arrest continued in 1948 (Pepper 1971, p. 715-716)

May 24, 1947: Eight Marines raped a Chinese woman within the Shandung University Compound. (Yang 1998)

May 25, 1947: Tientsin. Two hundred United States Marines were reported encircled by Communist forces at Chinwangtiao, North China’s principal coal port, 120 miles northeast of Tientsin. The encircled unit is not believed in peril. [NYT p. 1]

May 26, 1947: 200 US Marines left a battle area which is threatened by the Communists. (NYT p. 1)

May 26, 1947: The United States lifted the embargo on the exports of arms and ammunitions to China which had been decided on 29 July 1946. (Mackerras 1982, p. 424)
[Formally, this embargo had lasted 10 months but it is not clear to what extent it was really respected.]

Jun 17, 1947: In a letter addressed to Pierson’s family, General Vandegrift, Commander of the US Marine Corps, wrote: “The retrial of Pierson [see above at the date of 24 December 1946] by Naval judicial officers has been completed. The court has found it hard to establish rape charges against him. Accordingly Pierson shall be released and reinstated as Corporal. (Griggs 1948, p. 13)
[On 11 August 1947 this decision was confirmed by the Secretary of the Navy.]

Jun 25, 1947: The United States declined to grant a loan of $500 millions to the Nationalist government. (Field Artillery Sep-Oct 1947 p. 320)

Jun 30, 1947: Biographies of Sinkiang officials. Issued by the US State Department, this report distinguishes three categories of officials:
• Native leaders who have been connected with the Ining [or Yining] government [a separatist government supported by the Soviet Union in 1944-1945].
• Leaders who favor complete autonomy from both Russia and China.
• Leaders said to be pro-Chinese.

The report contains about 90 names; for some there is mention of their feeling regarding the United States. For instance, MASUD Sabri is described as sincere, intelligent and pro-American. (SDI, reel 4, part 7, 21 p., Office of Intelligence Research No 4451)

[This report follows report no 4376 cited above (1 May 1947) and precedes report no 4256 (29 Aug 1947, see below) about KMT outsiders and report no 4729 (20 Aug 1948) which gives the biographies of members of the Politbureau and Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.]

Jul 4, 1947: The Nationalist government ordered a general mobilization. New divisions are to be raised and trained in Formosa on American principles with American equipment. The refusal to grant a $500 million loan did not interfere with a prior grant of military supplies left over from World War II and whose value at purchase prices was about $2 billions. It was ceded to China for one fourth of that amount. About one third of this material has been delivered so far. (Field Artillery Sep-Oct 1947 p. 321)

Jul 5, 1947: A Chinese civilian, Shen Lee Yung, was shot and killed by a marine sentry who had been posted to protect US government property stored in a warehouse at Tientsin. The deceased was apparently engaged in the act of stealing. (NARA 1)

Jul 13, 1947: A revolt in Tibet was reported. (NYT p. 3)
[This short article (82 words) does not provide much details. There will be a second uprising in July 1949.]

Jul 14, 1947: Order is being restored in Tibet. (NYT p. 6)

Jul 18, 1947: A Chinese civilian, Chao Hsueh-yao, was killed in Tientsin when he rode his bicycle in front of a large truck driven by a Marine. The opinion expressed in the administrative report was that the accident was the result of carelessness on the part of the deceased. (NARA 1)

Aug 1, 1947: During 1 January 1947 and 1 August 1947 some 12 incidents between American troops and Chinese people ranging from murder to destruction of property were reported in the Peiping press. The writer [i.e. Thurston Griggs] witnessed as many similar undocumented incidents. (Griggs 1948, p. 30)

Aug 19, 1947: Two convalescent Chinese soldiers, Chen Ha-shou and Ou An-kou, were shot and killed during the early morning hours by a Marine who had been posted to protect US government property stored in the lumber yard of the
First Marine Division at Tientsin. The deceased soldiers were apparently engaged in the act of stealing. (NARA 1)

**Aug 27, 1947:**  ●(74,110)  A Chinese boatman, Hsu Ching-fu, was shot by an American sailor named F. Airmer. During the inquiry the sailor insisted that the murdered man “intended to steal his Coca-Cola”. (Shanghai News 4, 14 November 1950, according to the journal this report is based on Kuomintang police files).

**Aug 29, 1947:** Biographies of leading members of minority political groups in China.
The expression “minority groups” means groups which do not belong to the KMT. It seems that in August 1947 the State Department was trying to find leaders who would be acceptable to the Communists for a compromise peace. In this way American influence could have been maintained at least partially. Each person’s description involves an assessment of his (or her) position with respect to the United States. Here are two fairly opposite examples.

- **Chang Tung-sun.** Two sons, both educated in US, one has a PhD from Cornell, the other worked for the OSS during the war. Chang is said to be pro-American though he is not in favor of American support of the present Chinese government. Chang declares that he has always maintained a critical attitude toward Marxism.

- **Kuo Mo-jo.** At the height of the agitation for the withdrawal of American troops from China, Kuo was sponsor of the “Use native products and boycott American goods” campaign (source: Chinese Press Review, 10 Feb 1947). A meeting was called to promote such a boycott and Kuo is reported to have said “We must drive out all the running dogs of American Imperialism. Otherwise China cannot be saved”. After a while the meeting was dispersed by hoodlums [probably the kind of bad guys paid by the KMT] (source: Foreign Broadcasting Information Bureau, 14 February 1947).

(SDI, reel 4, Part 11, Office of Intelligence Research, Report No 4256)

**Sep 11, 1947:** Shanghai. A court martial sentenced an American GI, Thomas Malloy, to life imprisonment for the murder of a Chinese black market dealer. Later this week a Chinese court will try Charles Archer, a British subject for the same murder. Both Malloy and Archer accused the other of firing the shot that killed the dealer. (NYT p. 17)

**Sep 13, 1947:** “Life Magazine” and “Time Magazine” published a “Report on China” written by former Ambassador William C. Bullitt which strongly advocated more US aid to the Nationalist Government. The header of the report in “Time” reads: “The disastrous war news from Manchuria tragically confirm Mr. Bullitt’s plea for US aid to the Nationalist Forces”. In the report itself one reads: “The essence of the problem
is the ejection of every armed Communist from the soil of China.” (Braun 1975, p. 365)

[Henry Luce who owned “Time”, “Life” and “Fortune” was very much on the same wavelength as General MacArthur. It can be recalled that between 1930 and 1949 Chiang Kai-shek and his wife were portrayed on 7 covers of Time Magazine. In contrast, Mao Tse-tung appeared only on one, namely on 7 February 1949.

Needless to say, the main weakness in their position was that there was no obvious way to “eject armed Communists from China”. Air support would have been a possible proposition. It is unclear why it was not tried. If drones (i.e. unmanned aerial vehicles) had been available at that time they would probably have been used against Communist leaders.]

**Sep 19, 1947:** A Chinese girl named Zhang Lihua who was working as a bartender was abducted by three US Marines while walking home and sexually assaulted. (Yang 1998)

**Sep 19, 1947:** General Wedemeyer who had been sent on a fact-finding mission to China, presented his report to president Truman. (Mackerras 1982, p. 426). During his mission to China and Korea, he was accompanied by advisers from the State Department, War and Navy Departments and from Treasury. The report is entitled “Report on China-Korea”. The following excerpt is from the covering letter.

19 September 1947, Memorandum for the President.

My dear Mr. President,

In compliance with your directive to me of 9 July 1947, the attached Report on China-Korea is respectfully submitted. The principal cities and some rural areas in China and Korea were visited. Successful efforts were made to reach all categories of people as measured by economic position, intellectual attainment and divergent political viewpoints. Approximately 1,200 memoranda from individuals and groups were received and considered. The report includes pertinent data in appendices which may be of interest and assistance to appropriate government departments and agencies.

The following excerpt from “Time Magazine” gives an idea of the discussions brought about by the report.

“On this report, presumably, would be based one of the most important lines of US foreign policy, what to do about China. Lieutenant General Wedemeyer has always been anticommmunist. He was anticommmunist during his earlier mission to China as Chief of Staff to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. His report on the Chinese situation could not be anything but anticommmunist, and probably favored US aid to China”. (Time Magazine 6 October 1947).
[General Marshall rejected Wedemeyer’s call for increased assistance and refused to publish his report. In December 1947 General Wedemeyer was called to testify before a Congressional Committee. He stated that he had pledged not to discuss either the details or the general tenor of the report. (Griggs 1948, p. 54)]

Oct 29, 1947: Nationalist agents arrested and executed Yu zì-san, the chairman of the Student Autonomous Society of Zhejiang University. A hundred thousand people demonstrated against intimidation in Hangzhou (where Zhejiang University is located), Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Nanjing, Kunming. (Huang 2002)

Nov 19, 1947: Secretary of State Marshall said that nearly 1,000 American military officers are helping the Nationalist government in its war against Communist armies. (Korean Independence, 19 November 1947)

Nov 26, 1947: China began voting in its first national election in history. (Korean Independence 26 November 1947) [This election was held only in the areas under Kuomintang control. It would be interesting to learn how many people voted.]

Dec 25, 1947: Four Marines who, according to their superiors, were making a hunting trip out of Tsingtao were captured by Communists. The Communist story was that the Marines were actually fighting on the side of the Nationalists. One of the Marines died of wounds. (Griggs 1948, p. 53)

Dec 31, 1947: Shanghai. A pedicab driver was stabbed by two American sailors. The sailors got on the pedicab (intended for two) with a bar girl. The driver, Cheng Yung-han, went as far as he could. When he stopped he was set upon by one of the sailors who stabbed him three times. Under pressure from students of Chiaotung and Futan universities the matter was taken up by the Shanghai High Court. But in the course of the procedure, the American authorities convinced Cheng to withdraw the charge. (Shanghai News 4, 14 November 1950; according to the journal, its report is based on Kuomintang police files)

1948

Jan 7, 1948: Tsingtao. Five US Marines who went on a Christmas holiday hunting trip into Communist territory have not returned. A jeep used by the party has been found abandoned beyond the Nationalist lines. It was undamaged [according to subsequent articles this statement seems incorrect, see below.] (NYT p. 18)

**Jan 21-23, 1948:** An election (organized by the Nationalists) took place in the parts of China controlled by the Nationalists. (Wikipedia article entitled “Republic of China legislative election, 1948”.)

[This election paralleled the election held on 10 May 1948 in South Korea and, despite what is said on Wikipedia in this respect, was probably quite as un-democratic. The idea that there can be a democratic election in a country where a civil war is under way is weird. Clearly, there were be no Communist candidates.]

**Feb 14, 1948:** The Chinese Communist radio broadcast a notice demanding a complete withdrawal of US forces from China as the price of safety for 4 US Marines held prisoner since Christmas Day. The radio said the Marines were made prisoner 55 kilometer from Tsingtao at a place which was on the battle line between Communists and Nationalists. One of the Marines has died in a Communist field hospital of bullet wounds received during the capture. Their burned out jeep was found by a Nationalist patrol the day after Christmas. (NYT p. 6)

[The four Marines were eventually released on 1 April 1948.]

**Mar 10, 1948:** A munitions blast in Tsingtao caused about 200 fatalities. No Americans were reported killed in the blast which occurred 800 m from docked US Navy ships but 10 suffered minor hurts. Fifty of the 1,000 wounded people were taken to the US Navy hospital ship. (NYT p. 14)

**Mar 31, 1948:** Surplus declarations were submitted to FIC [FIC probably stands for ”Fleet Intelligence Center”] in the instance of lethal weapons to be released to the Chinese Air Force. (G-4 report in the Monthly summary No20 of the Information and Historical Service, in General Eichelberger’s Papers, reel 33). [This information suggests that delivery of surplus weapons to Nationalist forces continued well after the end of World War II.]

**Apr 6, 1948:** Four American crewmen (one first lieutenant and 3 sergeants) of a Marine observation plane made a forced landing because of engine failure about 30 kilometer west of Tsingtao. They were on a routine training flight. They were taken into custody by Communist troops. (NYT p. 3)

**May 25, 1948:** On 25-27 May, the American-owned “Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury” published a series of articles denouncing anti-American activities then underway at St John’s University, reminding the students that their university was financed by American funds. (Pepper 1971, p. 723)

**Apr, 1948:** In April 1948 the US Congress passed the “China Aid Act” providing economic and military aid to the Nationalist government in the amount of over $400 million. (Zhang 2002, p. 120)
[Other accounts say that the amount was a loan of only $125 millions.]

**Apr 1, 1948**: According to Chinese Treasury reports, between 15 August 1945 and 1 April 1948, the United States had given China in cash and in supplies the amount of $2,200 millions. (Field Artillery May-Jun 1948 p. 138)

**Apr 7, 1948**: American correspondents visited Mukden (the capital city of Manchuria) at the beginning of April. They reported no real defenses. The opinion was that the general in command had no intention to fight but was likely to surrender. Many people were seeking to leave. General Chennault was operating 3 private planes a day. The waiting list for departure had 60,000 names. (Field Artillery May-June 1948 p. 139)

**Apr 9, 1948**: Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek announced a change of strategy by declaring: “It has been decided to fight the Communists at times and places chosen by the government. In this way the area south of the Yellow River will be cleared of the enemy within 6 months.” (Field Artillery May-Jun 1948, p. 138)

[There can be little doubt that this declaration had the approval of his American advisers, thus leading credence to the plans aimed at a partition of China.]

**Jul 3, 1948**: The “Sino-American Bilateral Agreement” gave the US the right to supervise the use of money lent to Chiang Kai-shek and offered all facilities for the sales of American goods in China. (Shanghai News 26 November 1950, p. 2)

[This is of course a standard policy. US loans most often come with “strings attached”.]

**Jul 6, 1948**: British rights in Tibet would come to an end. (NYT p. 10)

[This rights resulted from the conquest of Tibet by British and Indian troops in the early 20th century.]

**August 1948**: All gold and silver was collected from the people and a new gold currency was issued in exchange. Private ownership of precious metal was outlawed. The plan was a failure. The new currency became worthless in only ten months.

- It should be recalled that confronted to a sudden outflow of gold immediately after taking office on 6 March 1933, President Roosevelt, through Executive Order 6102 of 5 April 1933\(^{105}\), required Americans to turn in their gold coins (except col-

\(^{105}\)Excerpts of this Executive Order read as follows: “I, Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States of America, do hereby prohibit the hoarding of gold coin, gold bullion, and gold certificates within the continental United States by individuals and corporations. All persons are hereby required to deliver on or before May 1, 1933, to a Federal reserve bank all gold coin, gold bullion and gold certificates now owned by them. Upon receipt the Federal reserve bank will pay an equivalent amount of currency issued under the laws of the United States. Whoever willfully violates any provision of this Executive Order, if a natural person, may be imprisoned for not more than ten years. Any officer, director, or agent of any corporation who knowingly participates in any such violation may be punished by a like imprisonment”. http://www.flyingeaglegold.com/fdr.php
lectibles) and gold bullion. Private ownership of gold was prohibited and remained outlawed until 31 December 1974 when President Ford (through Executive Order 11825) repealed Roosevelt’s Executive Order.

- In short, the policy implemented by the Kuomintang was the replication of measures taken a decade and a half earlier in the United States. This was probably due to the role played by US economic advisers in the Kuomintang government. Being heavily dependent on US financial aid, the Kuomintang was not in a position to discuss the plan suggested by its ally.

- Whereas it is clear that prohibiting the holding (and hoarding) of gold was an efficient way to stop the outflow of gold, it is less clear why this should be a good method to fight inflation, the foremost problem of the Chinese economy at that time. The plan which permitted Germany to stop its hyperinflation in 1923 did not comprise such measures. In addition, one should recall that the overall objective of President Roosevelt was to end deflation in order to save indebted farmers from bankruptcy and ruin). In China on the contrary the plan was supposed to curb inflation.


**Aug 5, 1948: Tied US aid on rural reconstruction.** In accordance with the “China Aid Act” of 1948 a Sino-American Joint Commission on rural reconstruction was created which comprised 5 members: 3 Chinese and 2 Americans. The Commission will transmit to the two governments full statements of operations including a statement of the use of funds and supplies received. The government of the United States reserves the right at any time to terminate its assistance. (NDL, John F. Melby papers, Melby 3986)

[US aid to South Korea was organized at about the same time and contained even stricter control clauses, see the Volume “Relations between US Forces and the population of South Korea”. It can also be recalled that an election (organized by the Nationalists) took place in China in January 1948. It paralleled the election held on 10 May 1948 and was probably quite as un-democratic, notwithstanding what is said on Wikipedia in this respect. The idea that there can be a democratic election in a country where a civil war is under way is weird. Clearly, there were be no Communist candidates.]

**Aug 18, 1948:** The Central News Agency of the Nationalist government announced that it had “irrefutable proof of Communist spies instigating innocent students in order to create student unrest” and this information was carried by virtually all Chinese-language newspaper in Shanghai. (Pepper 1971, p. 724)
Aug 19, 1948: It was announced that a system of special criminal tribunals would deal with political offenders. Warrants were issued for the arrest of students suspected of having instigated the most recent wave of protests. (Pepper 1971, p. 724)

Sep, 1948: Near Hsuchov, the three divisions composing the 5th Army deserted to the Communists. (Field Artillery Jan-Feb 1949, p. 36)

Sep 21, 1948: Near the city of Tsinan on the Shantung peninsula, the 84th Nationalist army deserted to the Communists with part of his command. (Field Artillery Nov-Dec 1948, p. 279)

Oct 10, 1948: In northern China the 60th Nationalist Army deserted in mass and joined the Communists. Moreover, after a token resistance the 7th Army surrendered on Oct 18. This army comprised the 38th Division supposedly an elite unit which had fought under General Stilwell in Burma. (Field Artillery Nov-Dec 1948, p. 281)

Oct 21, 1948: In the area of Chenshsien (central China) the 75th Division deserted to the Communists with arms and equipment. (Field Artillery Nov-Dec 1948, p 279)

Nov 16, 1948: Near Suhsein (northern China) the 110th Division deserted to the Communists. (Field Artillery Jan-Feb 1949, p. 36)

Nov 17, 1948: A mountain of American made war material was captured by the People’s Liberation Army in the Manchurian city of Changchun. Preliminary figures from only 7 out of the 73 warehouses reveal 300 artillery pieces, 200,000 artillery shells, 300 motor vehicles. Taking the city and disarming the American equipped New 7th Army and 1st Army Group Headquarters cost the PLA not a single bullet. (NDL, Papers of John F. Melby, New China News Agency.) [The account gives no information about gasoline tanks. Without gasoline the motor vehicles would be useless.]

Nov 22, 1948: Article by a Democratic League leader My strongest impression on first entering the liberated areas was that no shortage of goods is felt although very few foreign goods are in sight. The people are relying on their own labor. Spinning and weaving have become universal occupations in the countryside. I found administrative and army cadres running spinning wheels in their spare time. Factories and mines were quickly restored. The liberated areas have no American commodities except American rifles, guns and jeeps. My strongest impression is simply the might of the Chinese people. In sharp contrast is the country of the four families, Chiang, Soong, Kun, and Chen, colonized and corrupt and about to collapse before our very eyes. (NDL, Papers of John F. Melby, New China News Agency)

Nov 23, 1948: Reports from Canton indicate that the flow of evacuees from the
north is becoming more apparent. (Times p. 4)

**Dec 1948:** The American military attaché in China reported that 75% of US weapons and equipment sent to the Nationalists had been captured by the Communists. (Eastman 1984)

[In the same book (p. 156) it is said that among the Kuomintang troops that were blockading the Communists in North China, the drop-out rate was about 600 from each division ever month. If one considers that Chinese divisions had about 10,000 soldiers, this means a loss of 6% per month. The official KMT figure of 598,107 desertions during the whole war underestimated the phenomenon by a wide margin.]

**Dec 1948:** The testimony of a Marine Corps serviceman who remained in Tsingtao from the end of 1948 to the moment in mid-1949 when US forces departed, contains several interesting episodes which are summarized below. Although the dates of these incidents are not given with precision we know that they occurred between December 1948 and April 1949.

- On entering a dark alley with our rickshaws we were rushed by a group of thugs. Someone slipped my expansion band watch from my wrist and they all took off in different directions. The rickshaw boys played innocence but we suspected they had let us into a trap and refused to pay them. We soon found ourselves surrounded by a howling, rioting mob of Chinese. Shots were fired by Chinese Military Police and trash rained down from the roof tops. I caught a rock on the nose which bled profusely and two Marines tossed me in their jeep for a quick trip to the hospital ship USS Repose. Unknown to me we might have been able to find and buy back our watches at the “Thieves Alley Market” on the following night.

- On a jeep trip to the Marine Corps Air Facility we were stopped by Chinese soldiers who were blocking traffic both ways. Accused “bah loo” (Communist) prisoners were forced to dig their own graves and kneel in position so as to topple into them when shot in the back of the head.

[This episode raises the question of how prisoners were treated on each side. It shows that as often happens in civil wars prisoners were not treated as prisoners of war but as criminals who should be executed. It would be of interest to know how many prisoners have been summarily executed in the conflict between Nationalists and Communists.]

- The Nationalist Army [made] recruiting forays into neighborhoods in which every male old enough to carry a gun became an unwilling conscript. [If Nationalist troops were recruited in such a way it is not surprising that they deserted at the first occasion as attested by many accounts.]

- Salaries of Chinese troops went to the generals and very little trickled down to the soldiers. As a result some of those troops sometimes attempted to rob Marine
store houses located at the outer reaches of the base. These forays sometimes ended up with firefights between Marine sentries and midnight Chinese raiders. Shortly after one such flap I came under sniper fire as I was returning from the base beer hall.

(http://www.ussestes.org/Baillie_Frank)

**Dec 5, 1948:** According to diplomatic sources, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek has offered the United States military base rights in Formosa in exchange for aid in moving the Nationalist government from Nanking to Formosa. (NYT p. 40)

**Dec 5, 1948:** Shanghai. At least 1,100 persons were missing, many of them believed to be dead in the explosion and sinking of a refugee ship south of Shanghai. (NYT p. 41)

[For more detail see below]

**Dec 6, 1948:** The 2,100 ton steamer Kiangya crammed with refugees sank yesterday in the China Sea 80 kilometer south of Shanghai after its stern had been destroyed by an explosion. The Kiangya was carrying 2,150 listed passengers but it had also many stowaway on board. (Times p. 4)

**Dec 6, 1948:** A Chinese merchant ship exploded a month ago killing 6,000 Chinese. Most of the victims were part of the 52nd Nationalist Army evacuated from Yingkow, Manchuria and on their way to the Nanking-Shanghai defense line. (Times p. 4)

**Dec 6, 1948:** Suchow (central China, currently Suzhou, some 100 km north west of Shanghai). Nationalist armies were trapped. The Communist radio declared tonight that Gen. Chen Yi’s Communist columns had clamped an “air-tight” encirclement on 3 Nationalist army groups in a triangular area along the Honan-Kiangsu border southwest of Suchow. (NYT p. 1)

[This battle for Suchow was of strategic importance because it opened the road toward Nanjing. The Nationalists had put in place a defense based on about 1 million troops backed by tanks and aviation. However, Red Army troops were able to find a crack. According to one account of the battle, through fast night marches they targeted a Manchurian division which they (rightly) expected would offer less resistance. Their attack drove a wedge between the divisions which opposed them and eventually dismantled the whole defensive position. Despite Nationalist bombers the Communists were able to wage a war of movements which led to the encirclement of Nationalist army groups. Several Nationalist divisions surrendered and joined the Communists with all their equipment and weapons.]

**Dec 7, 1948:** Suchow (central China). Reds tighten ring on Nationalist forces. After a month of sustained battle action, the longest uninterrupted offensive yet waged by
the Chinese Communists, Red columns under Generals Chen Yi and Liu Po-cheng continued their attempts tonight to eliminate two major Nationalist concentrations encircled south of the Lung-Hai railway and west of the Tientsin-Pukow railway. (NYT p. 1)

**Dec 8, 1948:** Suchow. New US arm supplies were delivered to Chiang forces. Nationalist reinforcements, armed with new US weapons, were rushed to the Suchow front. (NYT 8 December 1948)

[Meanwhile, Ms. Chiang Kai-shek was in the United States on a tour for asking more US help. Yet, both Congress and the president were reluctant to promise more than what had already been planned. See below.]

**Dec 10, 1948:** Mme. Chiang Kai-shek and President Truman finally will meet face to face tomorrow under conditions suggesting that her mission for China’s hard-pressed Nationalist Government thus far must be regarded as a failure. (NYT p. 1)

**Dec 22, 1948:** A long-range aid program of $70 million to China has been suspended because of the critical situation there. (Times p. 4)

**Dec 30, 1948:** The leading US Lutheran denominations with the exception of the Missouri synod have decided to withdraw their missionaries from areas overrun or threatened by the Communists. Most of them have been relocated in South China. The consensus seems to be that the church in Communist controlled areas will do better without the presence of foreigners. However, the Communists in some sections have actually invited the missionaries to return. (Presbyterian Guardian, December 1948 p. 274)

[It should be noted that the American embassy in China has given to all Americans the advice to leave China (same issue p. 280).

In the same issue (p. 282) there is a comment about the “House Committee on Un-American Activities” (HCUAA) which gives an interesting indication of the political climate that prevailed in the United States at the end of 1948. In its booklet entitled “100 things you should know about religion and Communism” the HCUAA refers to the “Methodist Federation for Social Action” as being a tool of the Communist Party, the magazine “The Protestant” is called a Communist propaganda publication and the “People’s Institute for Applied Religion” is termed a “vicious Communist organization. The article ends on the observation that the Committee has probably mistaken a concern for social justice as an infiltration of Communism.]

**Dec 30, 1948:** On 30 December 1948 there were 115 missionaries in Communist controlled areas. The “China Inland Mission” has been urging its missionary personnel to remain at their posts. (The Presbyterian Guardian, January 1949, p. 20)
[Which denominations does this figure of 150 comprise? In the same issue of this monthly publication there is an article entitled “China needs our help” in which the author says that “many of those in the [Kuomintang] government today were students in Christian America two decades ago” and observes that “China is at present in greater peril than it has been in decades.”]

**1949**

_in late 1948 and early 1949 the People’s Liberation Army defeated the Nationalist troops in three decisive battles which marked a turning point in the Civil War. (Huang 2002)_

**Jan 20, 1949:** Excerpts of a letter sent by Mr. Albert Ravenholt to the Institute of Current World Affairs.

“For years the Communists have been bombed by planes turned over to the Nationalists by the United States. Their troops have fought and finally defeated Nationalist armed equipped largely with US material and transferred north after V-J Day [Victory over Japan Day, 15 August 1945] in American planes and ships. The civilian aid given to China through UNRRA and more recent direct American grants went almost exclusively to the Nationalists. Within the Communist ranks all this generated deep hatred of the United States.

The US Information Service maintains offices in 11 of China’s largest cities. These offices have attractive libraries and reading rooms. They distribute periodicals and reports to Chinese publications and selected individuals. Films are lent to Chinese organizations. (ICWA 2)

**Jan 22, 1949:** The Nationalist Air Force abandoned the war and flew to Formosa. (Field Artillery May-Jun 1949, p. 132)

**Jan 27, 1949:** Within the Nanking capital panic is reported. Chinese refugees are seeking by any means to get away. (Times p. 4)

**Jan 28, 1949:** In Nanking there are 30,000 army deserters which make life difficult. Four of them have been shot yesterday for throwing a hand grenade into a theater which had denied them admission. (Times p. 4)

**Jan 28, 1949:** Nationalist troops were searching all refugees among the thousands streaming across the Yangtze River who could be Communist infiltrators. (Times p. 4)

**Jan 31, 1949:** On Chiang Kai-shek’s order the entire National Treasury, roughly $300 million of gold bullion and silver had been shipped in January 1949 to Taiwan.
Most of this reserve was originally provided by a US loan of gold bullion at the end of the war. (ICWA 3)

**Jan 31, 1949:** US testimony in the wake of the occupation of Tientsin by Communist troops.

We were favorably impressed by the conduct of the officers and men of the People’s Liberation Army. They refused gifts of any sort, the only thing they would accept being hot water or tea. In houses they did occupy they frequently offered to share their meager rations with their hosts particularly with the children. They patrolled the city protecting property. Along the business street they placed guards over stores whose windows have been shattered. The “front line” troops have largely moved on and have been replaced by troops which are less “elite”, but even the present troops are behaving admirably.

About one week after the liberation of the city it became possible to send mail to other cities in the liberated area but not to cities in the KMT area. (Records of the US Department of State relating to the Internal Affairs of Korea, reel 8)

[One may wonder why this account about the liberation of Tientsin was in a file about Korea. It is because three members of the “Economic Cooperation Administration” (ECA, a US government agency set up in 1948 to administer the Marshall Plan) in Tientsin arrived in Seoul on 22 March 1949. This is an interesting precision because it shows that when they released their account the men were no longer in China (where there could have been some pressure to say good words about the PLA).]

**Feb 13, 1949:** (75,311) Shanghai. A woman clerk of the US Military Attaché killed a pedicab passenger and injured the driver. (Shanghai News 19 November 1950, p. 3)

**Mar 1949:** In March-April 1949 a kind of world war between communism and western countries led by the United States was already under way.

- In New York, on 14 April, there was the trial of 11 Communist leaders (in fact the whole Politburo of the Communist Party). (NDL, North China Daily News, call number YB-F14)
- In South Korea, a government report of 16 March said that at least 77 Communist-led guerrillas were killed during the previous week in the mountains of South Korea. The offensive against leftist guerrillas on Jeju island was still under way. (NDL, NCDN)
- Mexico, 11 March. A government crackdown on Mexican Communists was imminent (NDL, NCDN)
- Buenos Aires, 23 March. Police jailed 100 delegates to a pro-Communist
organization congress. (NDL, NCDN)

- Sydney, 29 March. The general secretary of the Australian Communist party, Lawrence Louis Sharky, was charged with sedition. (NDL, Pacific Stars and Stripes)
- In Berlin the Anglo-American airlift was still going on.

[The previous cases are by no means a complete list of the anti-communist activities that were going on worldwide.]

**Mar 2, 1949:** China’s largest warship, the former British cruiser Aurora (renamed the “Chungking”) which was given as a gift from Britain in August 1948, deserted to the Communists. The ship left her lower Yantze anchorage several days ago and took refuge in the Communist held port of Chefoo on Shantung peninsula. The Chungking carried a crew of 450 officers and men, the majority of which were British trained. (NCDN p.1)

[About two weeks later the Chungking was sunk by enemy aircraft. Depending on the accounts the bombing occurred in the port of Dairen or in the port of Tako, east of Tiensin. The New York Times stated that the bombing was done by KMT planes. On the contrary, the Chinese Communists said that it was done by American planes. What is the truth? The only clear observations that can be made are the following.

- As officially the United States did not want to take part in the civil war between the KMT and the Communists, it is of course understandable that the State Department did no wish to recognize that the ship was sunk by US planes.
- Both Dairen and Tako are in the North of China and far away from Shanghai or Taiwan. Did the Nationalists have planes with a sufficiently large range? In the following months the Communists were able to salvage the ship with Russian help. (NYT 21 March 1949, 13 February 1950)]

**Mar 4, 1949:** The United States has a consulate in Urumchi, the capital of Sinkiang (western China) which is very active; it distributes American literature and posters, shows American films. (Field Artillery May-Jun 1949, p. 132)

**Mar 18, 1949** Burma. Mandalay fell to Communists. The rebels of the “White Band and People’s Volunteer Organization” now hold most of the larger towns in the Irrawaddy valley and control the waterways to Rangoon. (NDL, Pacific Stars and Stripes, call number: Z92-399)

**Apr 20, 1949:** En route from Shanghai to Nanking on the Yangtze, the British destroyer *Amethyst* was fired upon by Communist artillery using American guns. The ship was disabled and ran ashore. 19 men were killed including the captain. One part of the crew remained aboard and another part was able to return to Shanghai by foot and train. The British destroyers *Consort* and *Black Swan* and the heavy cruiser *London* were sent to its rescue but were driven back by artillery (this time US 105
mm howitzers) with a loss of some 25 killed and over 200 wounded. Altogether, during the whole operation, some 44 seamen were killed.

Amethyst remained under guard by the PLA (People’s Liberation Army) for ten weeks during which negotiations were conducted between the British and the Communists. On July 30, 1949 the ship was able to escape and join the rest of the fleet at Shanghai. (Braun 1975)

[According to statements by the Communist Headquarters, along with Nationalist ships the *Amethyst* took part in the shelling of Communist troops while they were crossing the Yangtze. It can be assumed that the Communists did not wish to retain the ship, otherwise they would not have permitted any fuel to be kept on board. In a letter to the Institute of Current World Affairs cited above (ICWA 3), Mr. Ravenholt observed that the Communist gunners bracketed British ships at almost the same place (on the Yangtze between Shanghai and Nanking) where the British Navy sailed in more than 100 years ago and forced treaty concessions from China.]

**Apr 21, 1949:** Red troops cross the Yangtze at Wuhu. US Marines quit Nanking leaving only 6 as guards at the embassy. (NYT p. 1)

**Apr 23, 1949:** The Nationalist government fled from Nanking to Canton which was announced as the new capital. (Field Artillery May-Jun 1949, p. 132)

**Apr 26, 1949:** Heavy US naval vessels have moved out of Shanghai waters as two Chinese Communist spearheads rolled toward the Shanghai-Hangchow area. (Christian Science Monitor 26 April 1949)

**Apr 28, 1949:** Excerpts of a letter from Alfred Ravenholt to the Institute of Current World Affairs.

At about 3 am the Nanking City government decided to pull out. By 9 am all police was gone from the street and looting was in full swing. The first buildings to be ransacked were the former centers of authority such as the garrison headquarters and the central police station. The looters (coolies, farmers from the country side and tradesmen) were carrying sofas, tables, and kitchen utensils. The looting also spread to food shops.

When we took off on the next to last American plane to leave Nanking we saw the the roads south and east of the city crowded with troops, trucks, pedicabs. The regular Communist troops who entered Nanking the following night met no opposition. They found the Nationalists had dynamited the Nanking railway station, the most modern in China and that looters had set fire to the beautiful Judicial Yuan buildings.

Nationalist troops in Shanghai are being moved out as fast as they can be loaded on ships. Most of them are shipped to Taiwan. The Nationalist garrison has rounded up
several thousand suspected Communist sympathizers but they have been unable to get at the real Communist organization. The Nationalist Commander, General Tang En-po is “milking” the Shanghai merchants for as many gold bars that he can have. (ICWA 3)

[We do not know what happened to these Communist sympathizers. Were they eventually executed? That would be in line with the execution pattern associated with a vacancy of power (see Roehner and Syme (2002, p. 129).]

**Apr 30, 1949:** After the Yangtze incident (see April 20), the Communist demanded that Britain, the United States and France quickly withdraw their armed forces from any parts of China.

**May 31, 1949:** Tsingtao. The American troops occupied Tsingtao on 16 September 1945 and left at the end of May 1949. During this period they turned the houses of the Shantung University into barracks. According to records in the KMT Police Bureau, in the 17 months from 1 January 1948 to 31 May 1949, 46 Chinese people were killed in various ways by the occupation troops: 31 with motorcars, 13 with bullets, 2 with knives. The bodies of 7 women who had been raped and killed were found in the airfield at Tsankow. (Shanghai News 21 November 1950, p. 2)

**Jun 8, 1949:** Indian troops seized Sikkim. Sikkim is a small country located south of Tibet with Nepal on its left and Bhutan on its right. Sikkim has been a British protectorate since 1861. (NYT p. 5)

[After gaining its independence on 15 August 1947, India wished to extend its northern border. This was done with British support and comprised several phases: annexation of Kashmir, securing control over Sikkim and Bhutan (see below at the date of 9 August 1949) and offering some form of association to Tibet. This last action started on 7 July with the expulsion of the Nationalist delegation in Lhasa (see below). This action is sometimes referred to as the “British coup at Lhasa”.]

**Jul 7, 1949:** The Tibetan State Council gave the Nationalist mission at Lhasa two weeks to leave the country. On 7 August 1949 the KMT government appealed to the Tibetan Council to allow the return of its mission. The appeal was made by acting president Li Twung-jen. (NYT 25 July 1949 p. 5 and 7 August 1949 p. 5)

**Jul 20, 1949:** It is estimated that there are more than 400,000 soldiers in uniform in Taiwan and possibly 500,000 civilian refugees. All the soldiers are from the mainland for Taiwanese are not allowed to carry arms. (Times p. 4)

**Jul 23, 1949:** A Tibetan source said that a revolt had broken out in Lhasa against the Chinese Nationalist Government, which claims jurisdiction over Tibet. (NYT p.
1) **Aug 9, 1949:** India and Bhutan signed a perpetual pact which places Bhutan’s foreign affairs under India and granted Bhutan an annual cash subsidy which is in increase of 250% over similar payments made by British India. The treaty was negotiated by the same Indian political officer who also negotiated a similar treaty with Sikkim. He will soon visit Tibet. (NYT p. 3)

**Aug 11, 1949:** London. The twelve-year-old Dalai Lama of Tibet has proclaimed a religious war against Communism. (NYT p. 1)

**Sep 2, 1949:** **Chongqing fire** As the city was about to be taken by Communist forces, Chiang Kai-shek ordered it to be burned down. It can be remembered that a similar scorched earth policy was followed during the Japanese invasion, leading in particular to the flood of the Yellow River and the fire of Changsha (see the date of 23 November 1938). Burning for 18 hours, the fire destroyed the waterfront and banking district and killed between 2,800 and 10,000 civilians depending on the estimates. (Wikipedia, article entitled “List of fires”; Luo 1982 p. 525 (note); 2,800 is the figure given by the first source while the second one gives 10,000.)

**Oct 18, 1949:** The Communists captured the important southeastern port of Amoy after a month-long fight. (NYT p. 1)

**Oct 25-27:** Failed invasion attempt of the island of Quemoy (also called Kinmen. This island is only 2 km distant from the Chinese coast. This defeat may be attributed to two factors:

- The strength of the Nationalist force on the island was underestimated.
- On the ground the PLA troops were confronted with M5A1 tanks and were bombed by B-25 and B-26 aircraft of the Nationalist Air Force.

(Wikipedia article entitled “Battle of Guningtou”)

[A more detailed account can be found in Lai (2016, chapter 2). As the island is located within artillery range of the mainland, an obvious warfare technique was to submit it to a blockade; the identification of arriving ships during the night could possibly be done by sonar. Such a blockade was implemented successfully in September 1958 (see below).]

**Oct 25, 1949:** Recognition of Tibet as a free and independent country is a possibility that the State Department is considering in view of current Asiatic developments [i.e. the imminent defeat of the Nationalists]. (NYT p. 5)

**Nov 1949:** As the city of Chongqing was about to be taken by the Communist forces, one of the characters of “Red crag” (see above) summarized the plan of the American mission in the following terms.
1. A population of several hundred millions will represent a heavy burden. No government will be able to solve the food problem.
2. The scorched earth policy including mass executions and widespread destructions to be implemented during the retreat of the Nationalists will weaken the country.
3. Guerrilla warfare and the infiltration of secret agents will shake the power of the Communist state.

(Luo 1982 p. 582)

[Incidentally, it can be observed that the American position on the Chinese food problem was not new. During the famines that took place in the 1930s US Red Cross officials were already worried by the fact that the growing population represented a time bomb that the government would not be able to control.]

Nov 1949: On the eve of Chungking’s liberation as the People’s Liberation Army was nearing, the prisoners of the SACO camps located in the western suburb of Chungking were executed in batches. This was the so-called Pai’s Mansion massacre. Li Ying-feng who was one of the 16 survivors told the terrible story. Arrested in 1947 as an opponent of the KMT, he underwent 7 different forms of torture. (Shanghai News 21 November 1950, p. 2; Wakeman 2003, p. 304-306)

Nov 17, 1949: A US merchantman, the Flying Cloud, was fired upon and damaged by a Nationalist warship in the mouth of the Yangtze River. With a 15-inch shell hole in her hull patched with steel and cement, the ship was nevertheless able to reach the Korean port of Pusan. Soon after arrival the ship was visited and inspected by a representative of the US Department of State who wanted a first-hand account of the incident. (NYT 17 November 1949 p. 12; NYT 19 November p. 6)

Nov 22, 1949: Establishment of COCOM. The “Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls” or COCOM was started under US leadership. Without any legal status, its objective was to ban almost all exports (the list comprised some 400 prohibited products) to the Communist bloc (Soviet Union and Red China). It had 18 members, basically the NATO nations along with Japan and Australia. It was dissolved only on 31 March 1994. (Wikipedia article in French entitled “Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls”.)

Dec 2, 1949: The Soviet journal “New Times” charged that the United States and Britain were collaborating to detach Tibet from China and establish it as a “colony and military base” directed against the new Chinese Government. (NYT p. 16)

Dec 13, 1949: There is general rejoicing in the United States over the fact that Angus Ward [American Consul General in Mukden] and his staff, detained by the
Chapter 9

Chinese Communists in Mukden, are now safely aboard an American ship. (NYT 13 December 1949)
[Ward was arrested in November 1949 for beating a Chinese employee.]

Dec 31, 1949: Between 1945 and 1949, some 1,900 Hollywood movies flooded China especially in Shanghai. Each American film netted US$30,000. This money would have been sufficient to produce over 2,600 Chinese movies. Moreover, the “Film Board”, an organization formed by Columbia, MGM, Century Fox and Universal controlled all the first-run theaters in Shanghai. As a result Chinese movies or the few progressive Hollywood movies were bared. (Shanghai News 26 November 1950)
[A subsequent article (29 November 1950) in the same journal explains the origin of the expression “to shanghai” which means to kidnap a man after drugging him for compulsory service abroad (especially aboard ships). In the American settlement there was a road lined with a number of bars which was the center of a traffic in human beings. After being drugged by anesthetics the victims would be dumped into ocean liners and brought to foreign countries to be sold.]

After 1949, mainland China

Jan 22, 1950: The Communist People’s Republic of China was reported to have asked Tibet to send representatives to Beijing without delay to “negotiate on a peaceful solution of the question” of the status of Tibet. (NYT p. 11)

Jan 24, 1950: Tibet is holding one phase of talks in Moscow. (NYT p. 12)

Feb 1, 1950: The Tibetan Government, in faintly heard radio broadcasts, appealed today for aid against a threatened Chinese Communist invasion. (NYT p. 10)
[This article marks a sudden change of tone with respect to the relations between Tibet and China.]

Feb 24, 1950: Excerpts of a letter sent by Mr. Albert Ravenholt to the Institute of Current World Affairs in New York City.
In the summer of 1949, the Yangtze River did more damage in its basin than any other flood since 1931. Eighteen years ago the effects of the flood were mitigated by foreign aid. A US government loan enabled the “National Relief Commission” to purchase and import 446,000 tons of wheat.
The Communists have rebuilt the railways with surprising speed, but because the Yangtze River floods coincided with the North China drought no supplies can be shipped to the famine area. The most reliable estimates indicate that 10 million persons may die from starvation in 1950.
**Chronology**

![Chronology Chart](image)

**Fig. 9.21b  Illiteracy rate in France, Japan and China.** There is a time lag of about 40 years between France and Japan and of about 60 years between Japan and China. Sources: France: article in the journal “Population” (1985, no 6); China: Internet article by Sreemati Chakrabarti; Japan: Internet article by Balatchandirane.

**Nov 29, 1950:** An article in the Shanghai News gives a retrospective of American investments in China:

1. In August 1929 the Rockefeller group bought the “Shanghai Municipal Electricity Department” and reorganized it into the “Shanghai Power Corporation”.
2. Together with Chinese associates, the Pan American Airlines organized the “China National Aviation Corporation”.
3. In 1930 the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation bought up the “Shanghai Mutual Telephone Company”.
4. American investment in real estate through the American Oriental Banking Corporation ended in bankruptcy in May 1935 and ruined many Chinese associates. (Shanghai News 29 November 1950, p. 3)

**Dec 24, 1950:** China’s assets in the United States were frozen. (Shanghai News p. 1)

[This move was certainly brought about by the intervention of Chinese volunteers in the Korean conflict.]

**Jan 21, 1951:** “Three months of US rule in Seoul: 28,000 killed”. This is the title of an article in the Shanghai News (21 January 1951, p. 1). It explains that during the occupation of Seoul after the landing of 15 September 1950 a great number of Koreans suspected of sympathies with the Communists were killed in Seoul, especially in working class areas.

[Although the victims were civilians these events are related to the Korean War and for that reason they fall outside of our present field of investigation. We mentioned them only incidentally to suggest that in time of war, occupation can be a more painful process than in time of peace.

The “Shanghai News” was published in Shanghai after the Communist took control
of the city. In a general way, it appears to be a fairly reliable source. More information on this question can be found in MacDonald (1991).

**Apr, 1951:** Three episodes that occurred in April 1951, August 1952 and May 1958 show that the struggle between the Communists and the Kuomintang for the control of China did not end in 1949. While many of the defeated Nationalist troops were evacuated to Taiwan, other remnants of the Kuomintang armies crossed the border into Burma. Once there, the CIA began to regroup them in the Shan states. The first attempt at the reconquest of China’s Yunnan province was launched in April 1951. Some 2,000 troops of the Yunnan Province Anti-Communist National Salvation Army, accompanied by CIA advisers and supplied by regular air drops crossed the border into China. They were driven back by the People’s Liberation Army in less than a week. Casualties were terrible including several dead CIA advisers. Another contingent 2,000 strong was sent across the border in southern Yunnan and was similarly driven back into Burma. (Robbins 1979, p. 84-85)

**May 23, 1951:** “Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet”. On 19 October 1950 there was a skirmish between the People’s Liberation Army and the Tibetan forces when the PLA crossed the border between Sichuan and Chamdo prefecture in eastern Tibet. Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme (also written Ngagpo), the commander-in-chief of the Tibetan forces, surrendered Chamdo to the Chinese for, as he declared, “the Tibetan forces are no match for the PLA who had liberated China by defeating several million Kuomintang soldiers”. Instead of continuing with the military campaign, China asked Tibet to send representatives to Beijing to negotiate an agreement. An agreement was indeed signed in Peking on 23 May 1951 between the Chinese government and the local government of Tibet. The chief of the Tibetan delegation was Ngapoi who was then the governor-general of Chamdo (eastern part of Tibet) and the commander-in-chief of the Tibetan armed forces. Under this agreement the local government pledged to assist the People’s Army of Liberation to enter Tibet. On 24 October 1951 the Dalai Lama cabled Mao Zedong his support for the agreement of 23 May.

The 15th point is as follows.

In order to ensure the implementation of this agreement, the CPG (Central People’s Government) shall set up a “Military and Administrative Committee” and a “Military Area HQ” in Tibet and, apart from the personnel sent there by the CPG, shall absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible to take part in the work. Local Tibetan personnel taking part in the “Military and Administrative Committee” may include patriotic elements from the local government of Tibet. Subsequently Ngapoi held many official positions in relation with Tibet. He died in Beijing in 2009 at the age of 99.
It is probably the failure to “absorb as many local Tibetan personnel as possible” added to the inflow of too many Chinese people that brought about insatisfaction and unrest. (Bensacq p. 642, Mackerras 1982 p. 448, Wikipedia articles entitled “Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet” and “Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme”).

[Naturally, as soon as the United States started to support the independence of Tibet, this agreement was disputed. It was said that pressure had been applied. It is clear that given the difference in size between China and Tibet it was not an agreement between equals (no more, no less than the agreements between Puerto Rico and the United States). However, the fact that it was not repudiated in subsequent years until 1959 suggests that it was accepted freely if not heartily. Incidentally, one may wonder why there was a delay of 5 months between the accord and its approval by the Dalai Lama.]

Fig. 9.x a,b,c  Seventeen point agreement of 23 May 1951 between Lhasa and Beijing. The pictures (a) and (b) show the covers of the agreement in Chinese and Tibetan writing. The text of the agreement can be found on the same website. (c) The chief of the Tibetan delegation gives a traditional ceremonial scarf to Chairman Mao. The signing took place in Beijing and subsequently the agreement was confirmed by messages sent to Beijing by the Dalai Lama, the Tsongdu Assembly (i.e. the national assembly) and the Kashag (i.e. the Tibetan cabinet). On 26 March 1959 immediately after getting under American protection after his flight from Tibet, the Dalai Lama repudiated the agreement. Source: Wikipedia article entitled: “Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet”.

Jul 16, 1951: Lieutenant General Wedemeyer’s request for retirement has been accepted. In the early 1950s Wedemeyer became an anti-Communist hero. Siding with
General MacArthur, on 11 June 1951 he recommended that “the United States pull out of Korea, go into full mobilization and break off relations with the Soviet Union”. (NYT 12 June 1951 p. 1; NYT 3 July 1951 p. 3)

**Jul 21, 1951:** “Reds seize Shanghai properties of three US oil companies”. Communist China lately has been suffering severely from the US and British embargo on oil. (NYT p. 2)

**Jul 21, 1951:** Hong Kong copies of the Peiping People’s Daily available in Hong Kong told of the mass execution in Tientsin on 10 July 1951 of 277 counter-revolutionaries. (NYT p. 2)

[If true, this news is remarkable in the sense that the standard policy of the Communist government was to favor re-education rather than elimination. This execution is not mentioned in Mackerras (1982, p. 446). It is true that Colin Mackerras mentions the execution on 7 March 1951 of “22 ringleaders of a pro-Nationalist and pro-US spy ring, their main crime being arson in Lingling (Hunan)”. From a comparative perspective, it may be enlightening to examine what was the policy of the government of South Korea with respect to “Communists” in the 1940s or the policy of the government of South Vietnam with respect to “Vietcong terrorists” in the 1960s. Although in both cases the death toll of executions is known to run in the thousands, reliable investigations and data are rare.]

**Aug, 1952:** A second invasion from Burma into Yunnan with a force of 12,000 was launched in August 1952. After penetrating some 100 kilometers across the border they were driven back. The CIA was hoping that the peasants would rise up against the Communists and flock to General Chiang Kai-shek’s banner, but this did not happen. Having failed in China the Kuomintang occupation force launched a full-scale invasion of the eastern part of Burma. The Burmese government claimed that the Chinese Nationalists were attempting to take over the entire country and charged them before the United Nations with unprovoked aggression. Despite a vote of censure for Taiwan the Kuomintang forces refused to withdraw to Taiwan. The withdrawal agreement was not enforced and the Kuomintang force remained in Burma where it received US-supplied weapons. It is only in 1960 that Burma made a secret agreement with the Chinese Communists for a combined operation against them. After weeks of heavy fighting 5,000 Burmese troops and 3 divisions of the People’s Liberation Army finally overwhelmed the main Kuomintang base. The Civil Air Transport company, an airline owned and run by the CIA, began to airlift 4,200 Kuomintang troops to Taiwan but 6,000 retreated to northwest Laos. (Robbins 1979, p. 87-88)

[Christopher Robbins does not give any source for this account. His book is mainly]
based on interviews with pilots who had been working for Air America, an airline operated by the CIA.]

**Nov 29, 1952:** With the Korean War in full swing, Richard G. Fecteau and John T. Downey were in a CIA-operated aircraft trying to pick up an anti-communist Chinese agent when they were shot out of the sky over Manchuria on 29 November 1952. China, which fought on North Korea’s side against the US-backed South Koreans, captured the two CIA men and convicted them of spying two years later at a trial that drew strong protests from President Eisenhower’s administration. Downey was 22, Fecteau was 25.

For years, while Fecteau and Downey were in prison in Beijing, the US government stuck to its story that the two were civilian Army employees lost on a routine flight from Seoul to Japan. China’s espionage charge was called “utterly false” by the State Department.

By the early 1970s, as President Nixon made his historic opening to China, the men’s captivity came to an end. Fecteau was released in December 1971 after serving 19 years of his 20-year sentence. Downey, who got a life sentence, was set free in March 1973, the year after Nixon’s visit to Beijing. According to James Lilley, a retired CIA officer and former US ambassador in both Seoul and Beijing, Downey was released after Nixon publicly admitted he had been on a CIA operation.

Downey met and married a Chinese textile designer studying in America. In 1983, on the 10th anniversary of his release, Downey and his family were invited back to China by the Beijing regime. He, his wife and his young son accepted the invitation. On 25 June 1998 the CIA honored Downey and Fecteau at a special ceremony at its Langley headquarters.


**1954-1955: Battle for the Dachen Islands**

*If one believes that “the past prefigures the future”, then this episode may be seen as providing information about a possible conflict between China and Japan in relation with the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands.*

**Aug-Sep 1954:** First Quemoy crisis In August 1954, the Nationalists placed 58,000 troops on Quemoy and 15,000 troops on Matsu. They began building defensive structures and on 3 September the PRC began shelling their installations on Quemoy. On 12 September the US “Joint Chiefs of Staff” recommended the use of nuclear weapons against mainland China. Eisenhower, however, resisted pressure to use nuclear weapons. In February 1955, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill warned the United States against using nuclear weapons.
The situation of Quemoy is very special because it is only two kilometers distant from the mainland coastline. Both the reinforcement and shelling were probably motivated by the fact that a “Sino-American Defense Treaty” between the US and Taiwan was under discussion (it would be signed on 2 December 1954). The Nationalists wanted Quemoy and Matsu to be incorporated into the security zone guaranteed by the US; Washington did not grant it however. Beijing wanted to show to the American government and also to the “Annual General Assembly of the United Nations” (which gathers in mid-September) that it was not willing to accept the dissidence of Taiwan. Although the international community (e.g. Britain, India, Australia) favored the return of Quemoy and Matsu to the PRC, Beijing did not press its demand. It is true that the “Joint Chiefs of Staff” recommended the use of nuclear weapons but the position of the White House was much more moderate. The statement which came closest to this intention was made by President Eisenhower on 17 March 1955: “President says atom bomb would be used like bullet. It was up to Red China’s leaders whether the tactical weapons would be used in the event of a Communist Chinese attack on Quemoy and Matsu Islands” (NYT).

First, it should be observed that the statement mentions the use of tactical nuclear weapons only. Secondly, it is understandable that the president did not wish to say in advance what would be its decision but his previous statements suggest that he did not wish to follow the hardliner advice given by Secretary of State Dulles.

In 1958, with their artillery and torpedo boats, the Chinese military were able to implement an effective blockade of Quemoy (see below). Nothing of that kind was tried in 1954-1955.


Sep 9, 1954: Chinese Nationalist jets and warships struck again China’s mainland at Communist gun emplacements. (NYT 9 September 1954, p. 2)

Nov 2, 1954: The Peiping radio said this morning that Chinese Communist planes heavily bombed the Nationalist-held Tachen Islands. (NYT 2 November 1954 p. 8)

Nov 15, 1954: An 1,800-ton Chinese Nationalist destroyer was sunk by 4 Communist torpedo boats this morning. The attack took place north of the Nationalist-held Tachen Islands off southeast China’s Chekiang coast. (NYT 15 November p. 1)

Nov 21, 1954: The Formosa “Little War” represents a big risk for the United States because patrol activities involve the threat of clashes with Communists. Several American destroyers attached to Task Force 72 got the order to head north [that is to
say away from the war zone]. (NYT 21 November 1954 p. E4)

**Jan 11, 1955:** At least 100 Communist Chinese planes pounded the Tachen Islands from dawn until late afternoon. (NYT 11 January 1955 p. 1) [This raid was clearly in preparation of the pending invasion.]

**Jan 18, 1955:** **Battle for the Dachen Islands.** In the early 1950s, the Nationalist army still held a string of islands off the coast of Zhejiang Province. The Republic of China (ROC) Army launched raids against the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) from the islands, hoping to find an opening through which it could take back the mainland. Though the raids were repelled each time, they were enough of
a thorn in the side of the Communists that Beijing moved to reclaim the islands by force.

The Yijiangshan Islands (also written Ichiangshan or Yikiangshan) consisting of two islands, the Northern Yijiang Island and the Southern Yijiang Island, had become a base for launching guerrilla attacks on mainland China.

The Nationalists had some 1,000 troops on the island and could call up air and naval support when needed. However the fact that Taipei was 350km to the south made the logistics difficult.

The Communist task force had a strength of 5,000. It comprised 70 landing vessels and 40 escort vessels; air cover was provided by 180 aircraft.

On 18 January 1955, the PLA started the battle at 08:00 with an air strike and shelling by 50 long range artillery pieces. Around noon, ground forces landed on 20 landing spots. Most of the casualties suffered by the PLA during the battle were in this initial stage. The battle was over at 18:00 after the PLA had occupied all the hills of the island. There were about 500 killed on each side and 500 Nationalist prisoners. Their commander committed suicide with a hand grenade.

A massive evacuation took place from February 9 to 14 under the escort of the US Seventh Fleet. It brought 10,213 civilians, 4,243 anti-communist guerrilla troops, 264 family members and relatives of Taiwan’s army, and all Nationalist troops on the islands to the port of Keelung in Taiwan along with 2,868 tonnes of military equipment and supplies

(Taipei Times, 18 June 2014)

[This article in the “Taipei Times” was motivated by a photographic exhibition about this event that was organized in Taipei from 18 June to 16 July 2014. One can observe that the figures regarding the evacuation are not the same as those given below.]

Jan 19, 1955: The Chinese Communists announced that they had captured the fortified Nationalist-held Yikiang Island in an amphibious assault. Secretary Dulles discounted the loss but military aides voiced concern. (NYT 19 January p. 1)

Jan 20, 1955: 200 Red planes hit Tachen Islands (NYT 20 January 1955)

Jan 22, 1955: The Chinese Nationalist Air Force blasted Red gunboats and motorized junks along the coast of China yesterday. This was by way of backing up the present official Nationalist intent to defend the Tachen Islands despite the fall of Yikiangi Island. Yet, at the same time President Eisenhower was planning to ask Congress to approve use of the United States Seventh Fleet to evacuate the Nationalist garrison from the Tachen Islands.

However, the Nationalists oppose any move to quit the Tachen Islands with US Navy
Aid. (NYT 22,23 January 1955 p. 1)
[Needless to say, the Nationalists were not in position to contest a decision taken in Washington. Five days later they agreed on the withdrawal.]

Jan 27, 1955: Formosa agreed to Tachen exodus. (NYT 27 January 1955, p. 1)

Jan 28, 1955: Rules for news coverage of a possible Tachen Island evacuation were disclosed. Correspondents were told they must abide by 5 restrictions for eligibility to board US naval vessels. (NYT 28 January 1955 p. 2)

Feb 2, 1955: Nationalist planes in undisclosed strength again dropped bombs on Yikiang Island last night. US Air Force flies supplies from Okinawa to US bases in Formosa. (NYT 2 February 1955 p. 3)

Feb 2, 1955: The Eisenhower Administration believes an uneasy stalemate in the Formosa Strait is more likely than either fighting or a formal cease-fire. Hot pursuit [on the mainland] is planned if attack comes. (NYT 2 February 1955 p. 1)

Feb 3, 1955: [Caption of a photograph] Some of the refugees of the Tachen Islands as they were sprayed with DDT yesterday after their arrival [at Formosa]. (NYT 3 February 1955, p. 6)

Feb 3, 1955: An official American source said today the United States had agreed with the Chinese Nationalists on a formula for announcing a United States-supported evacuation of the Tachen Islands. (NYT 3 February 1955 p. 1)
[On account of the “hot-pursuit plans” of one day earlier one gets the impression that there had been a sudden change in the way the US policy was being presented to the opinion.]

Feb 6, 1955: United States and Nationalist Chinese fleets put to sea today to evacuate the Tachen Islands. The action is on orders from President Eisenhower and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. (NYT p. 1)
[On account of the fact that the ships in charge of the evacuation were ready to sail 3 days after the evacuation was announced, it seems clear that it was in fact decided at least 2 or 3 weeks earlier.]

Feb 7, 1955: A Nationalist Defense Ministry source said today the evacuation of the Tachen Islands began last night. 7th Fleet carrier jets provided cover. There were no reports of Communist interference. (NYT p. 1)

Feb 8, 1955: The Tachen operation is going smoothly. Altogether some 40,000 persons have to be evacuated. Chinese Communist forces were standing back as an armada of 77 ships of the US Seventh Fleet proceeded with the evacuation of the Tachen Islands. (NYT 7,8 February 1955)
Feb 8, 1955: The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved the defense treaty with Nationalist China on Formosa. The vote was 11 to 2. (NYT p. 1)

Feb 10, 1955: The commander of the United States Seventh Fleet said today that the Navy would not retaliate for the shooting down of a plane along the East China coast. It was a Douglas-Skyraider. (NYT p. 1)

Feb 9-14, 1955: Evacuation of the Dachen Islands: Wikipedia article. The Dachen (or Tachen) Islands were controlled by the Republic of China until an evacuation by the United States Navy in February 1955 during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. The U.S. Seventh Fleet used 132 boats and 400 aircraft to move 14,500 civilians, 10,000 Republic of China servicemen, and 4,000 guerrilla fighters, along with 40,000 tons of military equipment and supplies from the island. Three days after the evacuation, the islands were taken by the People’s Liberation Army. (Wikipedia article entitled “Dachen Islands”)

Feb 13, 1955: The evacuation of the Tachen Islands has been completed. (NYT p. 1)

Feb 26, 1955: Abandonment of the Nanki Island group by the Chinese Nationalists this week. (NYT p. E5)

Mar 1955: US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles stated publicly that the United States was seriously considering a nuclear strike. (Wikipedia article entitled “First Taiwan Strait Crisis”)

We did not find such a statement in the NYT. However, an article of the “Washington Post” entitled “Chou laughs at Dulles’ warnings” (14 March 1955 p. 39) suggests that Dulles had indeed made some kind of warning. As shown below, President Eisenhower was opposed to using atomic weapons against China.

Mar 24, 1955: President Eisenhower reiterated today that the United States would not use atomic weapons in case of an attack against Quemoy and Matsu but declined to predict how he would characterize such a fight. (NYT p. 9)

Apr 23, 1955: The PRC government stated on April 23, 1955 that it was willing to negotiate. One week later the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu was stopped. (Wikipedia article entitled “First Taiwan Strait Crisis”)

1957-

1957: Tibet was another target of guerrillas trained and armed by the CIA. In the 1957 the first Tibetans were flown to Camp Hale in Colorado. After completing
their training the men were flown to Taiwan or Thailand before being infiltrated into Tibet. Much of the Tibetan guerrilla’s activity consisted in mining the two major roads between Tibet and China. Occasionally, a small force of Chinese Communists would be ambushed. It was a policy of harassment which, for some Tibetans kept alive the hope of ousting the Communists. (Robbins 1979, p. 95-96)

**April 1958:** The wheat producing province of Hopei is experiencing its worst drought in at least 20 years. (Canberra Times 26 April 1958)

**Second Quemoy crisis: blockade of the island**

The First Quemoy crisis started on 4 September 1954. It seems that by shelling Quemoy the Chinese government had two main objectives:

- To attract the attention of the United Nations and convince the General Assembly to move the seat of China from the ROC to the PRC. However this proposal was barred by a large margin.
- To test the US commitment for coming to the defense of Taiwan. It can be mentioned that several important countries (e.g. Britain, India and Australia) were in favor of restituting Quemoy and Matsu to the PRC. Even within the US government Secretary of State was almost the only hardliner.

Politically the crisis of 1958 was almost a repetition of the crisis of 1954-1955. Yet, militarily it was very different because the PLA was able to establish an effective blockade of the island. The blockade was broken only when the US Navy provided an appropriate escort to the convoys.

The main steps are outlined below based on New York Times articles; the dates refer to the publication of the articles.

**Sep 2, 1958:** The Communists were trying to destroy landing ships used by the Nationalists to transport shells and other supplies to Quemoy. (NYT)

**Sep 3, 1958:** During the night a ROC convoy was ambushed off Quemoy by Communist torpedo boats. (NYT)

**Sep 6, 1958:** The Chinese Communists have thrown an increasingly effective blockade around Quemoy. (NYT)

**Sep 8, 1958:** The US Navy takes Taipei’s vessels in daylight to 3-mile limit. China holds fire. The cruiser “Helena” was one of the escort ships. (NYT)

[Why did the escort ships not come closer than 3 miles? This gave the Chinese artillery an opportunity window that it will use on the following day (see below).]

**Sep 8, 1958:** Jawaharlal Nehru contended today that the islands of Quemoy and Matsu must sooner or later be surrendered to Communist China. (NYT)
Sep 9, 1958: A ROC supply ship loaded with ammunition was blown out of the water by Red artillery at Quemoy under the eyes of crews aboard US Navy convoy ships. (NYT)

Sep 10, 1958: An almost continuous rain of Communist shells on the Quemoys has forced the Nationalists to airlift supplies to the besieged islands. (NYT)

Sep 12, 1958: Chinese Communist batteries subjected beaches on Quemoy Island to a record bombardment forcing a vital Nationalist supply convoy to return to sea without unloading. (NYT)

Sep 14, 1958: Chinese batteries are reported to have driven two more Nationalist supply convoys from the beaches of blockaded Quemoy yesterday. (NYT)

Sep 15, 1958: With a United States military advisory team aboard a Nationalist ship could break the week-long Communist artillery blockade of Quemoy. (NYT) [Clearly there must have been contacts between the US and Chinese sides for otherwise the commander of the Chinese artillery would not have been informed of the presence of the US officers on board.]

Sep 17, 1958: Poised for attack, a US nuclear equipped air-sea force is massed in the Pacific. (NYT)

Sep 17, 1958: The Nationalist Chinese, in conjunction with United States air and sea forces, again pierced the Communist blockade of the Quemoy Islands yesterday. (NYT)

Sep 18, 1958: More than 20 United States service men on Quemoy Island are running short of food supplies and other necessities. (NYT) [This confirms that the blockade was indeed effective. But after this date, thanks to the US involvement, the blockade was no more enforced. At the same time discussions started in Warsaw between the US and Chinese sides; they led nowhere however.]

Sep 19, 1958: The United States has rushed some $90 million worth of military supplies to Taiwan in the three weeks since the Quemoy crisis began. (NYT)

Sep 24, 1958: The United Nations Assembly votes 44 to 28 not to consider any move on Peiping membership. (NYT)

Flight of the Dalai Lama

March 10, 1959: Beginning of a riot in Lhasa which will facilitate the escape of the Dalai Lama to India.

In 2009 for the 50th anniversary of the insurrection the New York Times gave the
following account:
“It was 50 years ago [1959] that 300,000 Tibetans surrounded the Dalai Lamas palace in Lhasa, the start of a failed uprising against Chinese rule that resonates to this day”.

[Is the figure of 300,000 trustworthy?
In the 1950s the population of Lhasa was about 30,000 (Wikipedia article entitled “Lhassa” (in French)). In 2008 it was 120,000. Moreover, it is a common rule that only a small fraction of the adult (and usually male) population takes part in armed insurrections. This rule can be observed in many historical examples as for instance the many uprisings that occurred in Paris during the 19th century or the uprisings against the US Military Government during the occupation of South Korea (1945-1948). In Paris, for a population of close to a million there were no more than 30,000 taking part in the revolutions, that is to say less than 10% of the male adult population. In Lhasa, with a population of 30,000, the male population between 15 and 55 would be of the order of \((30000/2)/1.5 = 10,000\). This leads to an estimate of 1,000 insurgents.
To check if this estimate is correct one should compare it with reliable accounts of the disturbances. However, whether accurate or not, the estimate clearly suggests that the figure of 300,000 is grossly exaggerated. In fact, it is surprising to find such an inflated figure in a respected newspaper as the New York Times?]

Jun 1959: The southern province of Kwangtung is experiencing a major flood: 2,300 sq kilometer are covered by water. In the Futshan area, one million peasants fought the flood to bring in the harvest.
In the British colony of Hong Kong 5,000 people became homeless. (Toledo 16 June 1959 p. 1)

Sep 26, 1959: The extensiveness of drought-stricken areas and the duration of the droughts were unprecedented in the history of the Chinese People’s Republic. Among the provinces which were particularly affected one can mention: Hopei which has had no rain in the last 200 days, Yunnan where the drought was unprecedented in the last 60 years, Szechuan, Kansi and Mongolia. (New China News Agency 26 September, 10 October, also reported in a Taiwanese paper in 1959)
[This drought already started in 1958 and it is said that it brought about “heavy strains on food supply and distribution”.

Nov 1959: The province of Hupeh in central China is suffering from the worst drought in 70 years. (Calgary Herald 24 November 1959)
[On 30 December 1959 the “Milwaukee Sentinel” had the following headline: “Soviet’s harvest worst in 4 years”. During the Summer, both Europe and the URSS experienced a record drought. In northern Germany the grain harvest is 50% below
average. In western countries the prevailing opinion is that it is the “Great Leap Forward” which is the sole cause of the famine of 1960-1961. However, before jumping to that conclusion one should collect data about weather conditions in each province. At provincial level there were great differences in the severity of the crisis some of which may be explained by widespread droughts and floods.

**1960-1961 Famine of 1960-1961** After the floods of 1959 in the South and the drought of 1958-1959 in the plains of central China (see entries above) there was again a major drought in 1961. It reduced the consumption of grain from 203 kg/capita-year to 158 kg/capita-year (Xie and Fu 2004 p. 26) A famine and accompanying diseases brought about an excess mortality of about 12 million deaths with respect to the previous decade. The figure comes from the “People’s Republic of China population statistics data compilation, 1949-1985 (in Chinese, see the reference at “Zhong hua . . .”). The years 1959 and 1960 were marked by major droughts. In addition, at that time China was under an international trade embargo led by the United States. In 1961, the Soviet Union stopped its oil exports to China. However, in 1960, China was able to import (mostly from Russia certainly) 2 million ton of wheat and in 1961 5 million ton (in 1960 the total grain production was about 80 million ton).

[The famine was not general. In some provinces (e.g. Anhui, Sichuan) it was much more severe than in others (e.g. Fujian Heilongjiang, Jiangxi, Jilin, Zhejiang). It is difficult to understand why it was not possible to import more grains and to ensure a more uniform distribution of available supply.

On the other hand, it can be recalled that according to a report of the American Red Cross published in 1929, it was estimated that even in normal years 30 million people had less than the minimum required for subsistence and that about 3 million died annually of starvation. The decade 1950-1959 was marked by a remarkable baby boom and during the five years 1962-1966 the birth rate was even higher than in 1950-1959.

**1960-1970:** The Dalai Lama’s administration acknowledged that it received $ 1.7 million a year in the 1960’s from the Central Intelligence Agency. The money allocated for the resistance movement was spent on training volunteers and paying

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107 The data given in the official statistics (see in the reference section at “Zhong Hua” are probably correct. They can be checked in the following way. The famine resulted in lower birth rates and higher infant mortality rates. This deficit in babies resulted in smaller age groups born in 1959-1961 that moved up to older ages in later censuses. Thus, the combined effect of low birth rate and high infant mortality recorded in 1959-1961 can be checked through many subsequent census data giving the population by age.

108 As always in case of famine it is difficult to distinguish between people who die of starvation and those who die from disease due to their state of weakness.
for guerrilla operations against the Chinese, the Tibetan government-in-exile said in a statement. It added that the subsidy earmarked for the Dalai Lama was spent on setting up offices in Geneva and New York and on international lobbying. The decade-long covert program to support the Tibetan independence movement was part of the CIA’s worldwide effort to undermine Communist governments, particularly in the Soviet Union and China. (NYT 2 October 1998)

[The article refers to support from the CIA during the 1960-1970 decade but it is likely that this support was extended beyond 1970. Tibetans in exile in India were also getting financial support from other sources than the CIA. This is acknowledged in another New York Times article entitled “Foreign governments and admirers donate millions of dollars annually for the support of the 100,000 Tibetan refugees” (NYT 21 March 1996). The “foreign admirers” in particular include Hollywood stars like Richard Gere and Goldie Hawn; Gere and Hawn attended the gathering which took place in Dharmsala (the city in northern India which is the capital of the Tibetans in exile) for the 40th anniversary of the Tibetan uprising of 1959 (NYT 11 March 1999).]

**Jan 27, 1964:** Led by General de Gaulle, France re-established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China at ambassadorial level.

**March 1969:** Rift with the Soviet Union. It started at least 10 years before the first border clashes in March 1969. At a conference in Moscow in 1957 China tried fruitlessly to dissuade Moscow from going too far along the path of cooperation with the United States. One must remember that ever since the Communist victory in 1949, the “United States has fought to keep the PRC ostracized by the world community; by behind-the-scenes wire-pulling it had indeed succeeded in keeping China out of the United Nations organization” (p. 1-2). Thus, one can understand that the flirtation of Mr. Khrushchev with the United States which led to his visit of 1959 was resented bitterly in Beijing.

There was also the grief over the independence of Outer Mongolia. Although this Chinese province had been under Soviet influence for quite some time, it became officially independent only as a result of an American concession to Russia in the Yalta agreement of January 1945. When it came to power in 1949 the Communist government recognized this agreement but probably not without sorrow.

In 1959 Mr. Khrushchev also tore up the agreements with China on atomic energy cooperation. In 1960 Soviet technicians in construction and industry were withdrawn.

In 1962 during the Chinese-Indian border dispute the Soviet Union sided with India. After Mr. Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, Beijing expected a policy change
which did not materialize however.

One can observe that the Soviet Union gained very little through its policy of accommodation with the United States for meanwhile the US continued its unrelenting and insidious undermining work. This took several forms:

- pressure to allow Jewish Soviet citizens to immigrate to the United States or Israel.
- support to dissidence movements particularly in Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States, Poland and East Germany.
- renewal of the threat of NATO with the Pershing episode.

This behind-the-scenes wire-pulling eventually led to the disastrous re-organization of the USSR through a close cooperation between Russia and the United States. This ended the Cold War and was certainly one of the cleverest major victories in world history.

1970: Cultural Revolution. During a visit to China, Edgar Snow wrote in his notes: “This officer speaks as if he really believes it’s only a matter of studying Mao to know the answers”. “It’s like a religious service, over and over again.” (Thomas 1996)

[There were two distinct aspects in the Cultural Revolution: (i) the interaction between people who otherwise would never have met one another, and (ii) the complete reliance on the wisdom of Chairman Mao. Whereas the first aspect can be seen as a step forward in developing the empirical knowledge that Chinese citizens had of their own society, the second aspect seems to have been a big step backward as far as empirical knowledge was concerned. As emphasized by Snow, it had more to do with religious worship. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to understand how and why this cult of personality emerged and took such proportions.]

Feb 21, 1972: Visit of President Nixon to China. However the United States established diplomatic relations at ambassadorial level with the PRC only on 1 January 1979, 7 years after Nixon’s visit. Why was there such a long delay?

Mar 26, 1974: Rallies have been held at graveyards in China as part of an organized effort to remind the Chinese people of atrocities committed by foreigners when weak and pliable governments opened the country to them. Chou En-lai made a pledge. (NYT p. 8).

Mar 9, 1979: The “Tibetan Youth Congress” (TYC) announced a plan to seek arms from the USSR to develop a guerrilla war in Tibet. A spokesman for the Dalai Lama stated that “there is nothing wrong in approaching the Soviet Union for help”. (Sautman 2003)

109Numerous joint committees were set up, such as the Gore-Chernomyrdin committee or the Shleifer-Chubais committee on privatization.
[At first sight this move of the Soviet Union in Tibet may seem surprising but one should recall that before World War II the USSR has had a similar policy in Outer Mongolia and that there are strong links between Mongolia and Tibet.]

**July 22, 1988:** The president of the “Tibetan Youth Congress” (TYC), Lhasang Tsering, declared: “I declare war on China, even on their civilians in Tibet”. (Sautman 2005)

[The TYC repeatedly endorsed armed struggle in Tibet.]

**July 1989:** After the suppression of the Tiananmen demonstrations in June 1989, the US and UK organized “Operation Yellowbird” (also called “Operation Siskin”) through which Chinese dissidents were able to escape arrest by being exfiltrated to Hong Kong and Western embassies. Yellowbird successfully helped more than 400 dissidents who were smuggled out to Western countries; some 15 on a list of 21 top student leaders were rescued. (Wikipedia article entitled “Operation Yellowbird”)


President Bush and his Secretary of State are telling Beijing to face an American political fact: rough-and-tumble [occasion of noisy fighting] times lie ahead if China retains its unfair trade practices, persists in selling dangerous missiles and nuclear technology and continues its human rights abuses.

Americans and others may take extraordinary measures, including kindling separatism. The Bush Administration might actually encourage separatism if China remains an outlaw state. Beijing’s leaders will be making a terrible mistake to think otherwise.

Instead of China eventually absorbing Taiwan and Hong Kong the exact opposite could happen, Taiwan and Hong Kong could absorb the southern tier of China. (NYT 13 November 1991)

[Written in 1991, this article describe conditions that still seem to prevail between the United States and China over two decades later.

It should be noted that Mr. Gelb was not just a journalist but also an influential member of the Department of State.

He was Assistant Secretary of State in the Carter Administration from 1977 to 1979. He served as director of the “Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs” and won the “Distinguished Honor Award”, the highest award of the US State Department. Dr. Gelb became President of the Council on Foreign Relations in 1993. In addition of being an important member of the editorial team of the New York Times, he has also served on the boards of directors of the Carnegie Endowment, the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University and the John F. Kennedy School of Gov-
ernment. (Wikipedia article entitled “Leslie H. Gelb”).
Incidentally, it can be observed that the carrier of Mr. Gelb demonstrates the strong ties that exist between the Department of State, the New York Times and some well-known American universities.
It can be noted that this article was written before Hong Kong became a Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China.
A broad picture of separatist tendencies in China is given in Sautman (2005).

**Jun 9, 1995:** Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan president, received a visa from the State Department to visit Cornell University. Beijing voiced strong opposition. (Wikipedia entitled “Third Strait crisis”)
[The details of this incident illustrate the respective stance of the Congress and of the State Department. In 1994, when President Lee’s plane had stopped in Honolulu to refuel after a trip to South America, the US government refused his request for a visa. Lee remained confined to the military airfield where he landed. One year later the US State Department was still unwilling to grant him a visa. However, many pro-Taiwan figures in the US acted on Lee’s behalf and in May 1995 a resolution asking the State Department to allow Lee to visit the US passed the House 396 to 0 and the Senate 97 to 1.
Beijing was furious and from July 21 to 26 China conducted missile tests in an area only 60 kilometers north of ROC-held Pengjia Islet.
Then, in March 1996 Beijing intended to send a message to the Taiwanese electorate that voting for Lee Teng-hui in the presidential election meant war. The threads proved impor ducive, however, and did not prevent Lee from winning the election.]

**1996:** The United States established Tibetan language broadcasting services within Radio Free Asia.

**Sep 30, 2002:** Tibetan Policy Act. The “Tibetan Policy Act” was passed by Congress. It re-organized and increased US funding for Tibetan exiles in India and appointed a high-ranking US State Department official as “Special Coordinator” for Tibet. (Sautman 2005, Dumbaugh 2009)
[At about the same time, the pro-independence “Democratic Progressive Party” came to power in Taiwan. The entry (below) about the “Tibet-Taiwan Foundation” shows that the Tibetan exiles also received aid from Taiwan.]

**March-August, 2008:** Public relations campaign in the months before the Olympic games.
On 4 July 2008, President Bush announced that he will take part in the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games. In the previous months US medias (followed
by most western media) had waged a massive public relations campaign to derail the Olympic Games. Here are some examples:

- 15 March 2008: Title: Chinese police clash with Tibet protesters. Witnesses told “Radio Free Asia” that 500 monks poured out of their monastery and chanted “We want an independent Tibet” The police fired tear gas to disperse them. (NYT 15 March 2008)

- 3 May 2008: Title: Virus kills 21 children in China. (NYT 3 May 2008) [This was a long article for a fairly minor public health problem. It is clear that an outbreak like the SARS epidemic of 2005 would have compromised the Olympic Games.]

- 24 May 2008: Title: China’s deadly earthquake may have saved the Beijing Olympics.

A few weeks ago, International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Jacques Rogge described the games as “in crisis”. They were battered by pro-Tibet protests, health concerns, and call for boycotts tied to China’s support for Sudan. The May 12 earthquake changed everything. “I’m sorry to say it, but it has turned things around” said Gerhard Heiberg, a member of the IOC’s executive board. After the tragedy in Sichuan province, the games are now riding a wave of good will. Of course, 11 weeks remain before the Olympics begin on August 8 and another unexpected event could change everything. (USA Today, 24 May 2008). [Clearly the author of this article was expecting a cancellation of the games.]

- 30 June 2008: Title: Chinese riot over handling of girl’s killing.

Thousands of people have rioted in a county in Guizhou (southwest China) setting fire to government buildings in angry protest over the official handling of the death of a local teenage girl, according to a human rights group. These demonstrations were less than 6 weeks before Beijing hosts the Olympic Games and security officials are deeply worried about potential outbreaks of unrest across China. (NYT 30 June 2008) [This was again a long article about a minor incident. The article comprises a picture which shows a peaceful crowd of people in a street watching flames and smoke that seems to come from two fires burning on the sidewalk (probably burning tires). Making a lot of smoke is a standard trick used by people who want to convey the impression that there is a serious riot. In the article the human rights group is identified as being the Hong Kong based “Information Center for Human Rights and Democracy”, an organization run by dissident Frank Lu Siqing (Wikipedia article in English). In the more detailed explanations the “thousands of people” mentioned in the first paragraph of the article shrink to 500.]

- 4 July 2008: To the surprise of many, President Bush announced that he will attend the opening ceremony. After this announcement everything changed. French
President Sarkozy who did not know what to do announced that he would attend too. The tone of US (and world) media with respect to the Beijing games shifted from hostility to interest. This change in attitude is illustrated by the following observation.

- On 4 August 2008, 16 Chinese soldiers were killed in Xianjiang. Needless to say, this event was much more serious than the one mentioned on 30 June. Yet, the New York Times gave it only limited coverage.

A comparison can be drawn with the games of 1968 in Mexico. In the weeks before the opening, students had occupied their campus in Mexico-City; eventually, the uprising was suppressed by the authorities with great bloodshed. Yet, there was not any talk in US media in favor of boycotting the games.]

After 1949, Taiwan

**T Oct 25-27 1949:** A landing attempt by Communist forces on the island of Quemoy located off shore between the mainland and Taiwan failed. The island had been heavily fortified in the previous weeks. Many of the soldiers who landed (about 10,000 troops) were killed or surrendered. (Wikipedia article entitled “Battle of Guningtou”)

**T Jan 19, 1951** General Ho Ying-chin, Chairman of the Nationalist Chinese Strategy Advisory Council, said in Tokyo that an invasion of the mainland could be started within 6 months if the United States provides sufficient arms. Mme Chiang Kai-shek made a similar declaration by saying: “I predict that our next New Year Greeting will be from the mainland”. (NYT p. 3)  
[What was considered was not a full-scale invasion but rather encroachments by landed commandos. The idea was that due to popular dissatisfaction with the Communist rule the arrival of Nationalist troops would lead to a widespread uprising. One of the main assumptions of Hitler’s war strategy was also that the Soviet regime would crumble down soon after the German attack in July 1941.]

**T April, 1951** Under the denomination of “MAAG, Republic of China”, a Military Assistance Advisory Group was stationed in Taiwan under the command of Major General William C. Chase. In 1957 the US forces comprised 10,000 Americans, mostly CIA and military personnel and their families. US Forces remained in Taiwan until December 1978 (Wikipedia article entitled “Military Assistance Advisory Group”)

[Similar MAAGs were stationed in most European countries and in many non-European countries.  
The website of NARA gives a long list of records in Record Group 334: MAAG
Belgium-Luxembourg, MAAG Denmark, MAAG France, Military assistance units in Greece, MAAG Italy, MAAG Netherlands, MAAG Norway, MAAG Portugal, Military assistance units in Spain, Military assistance units in Turkey, MAAG United Kingdom.

Other MAAGs were sent to non-European countries: MAAG Brazil, MAAG Cambodia (starting in June 1955), MAAG Laos (starting in 1961), MAAG Vietnam (starting in September 1950), Joint US Military Advisory Group to China (JUSMAG China), MAAG Ethiopia, Military assistance units in Indonesia, Military assistance units in Iran, MAAG Japan, Korea Military Advisory Group (KMA), MAAG Libya, Joint US Military Advisory Group to the Philippines, Joint US Military Advisory Group, Thailand, US Air Force Mission to Uruguay, Military Assistance Staff in Yugoslavia.

**T May 25, 1957** Taipei. The widow of the Chinese who had been slain by an American Sergeant arrived at the US embassy calling Sergeant Reynolds a killer. The crowd around her became bellicose. Someone threw a stone. Others followed his example until every window was smashed. Each hit brought uproarious applause. Police reinforcements in white armored cars rushed up but they took no action while the crowd raided the building. Many people scaled the wall to the embassy compound. They wrecked or burned 7 cars, trucks and jeeps. The US emblem over the front door was torn down. The crowd stormed up the second floor where it began wrecking furniture, tearing up documents and tossing the remnants out the windows. The destruction continued through most of the afternoon. The personnel escaped to the embassy air raid shelter but not before they were beaten and injured. 13 Americans and at least 10 rioters were hurt (1 died later in hospital).

Other rioters moved on the two-story building of the US Information Agency and left it in wreckage. Furniture, books and typewriters were hurled into the street. At an US telecommunication center the doors were slammed down, 6 US military vehicles were wrecked and the siege was left only when troops arrived. The home of Colonel Walter E. Barker, the US military attaché was stoned. Finally, the mob grown to over 20,000 attacked police headquarters demanding the release of the prisoners taken in the earlier rioting. The police opened fire after two policemen were critically wounded. Two people were killed and many seriously injured.

Toward the morning, troops swarmed the streets and Taipei woke up under martial law.

The United States has asked for financial compensation, but the budget of the Nationalist government is plagued by a chronic deficit which is being made up by US aid. Between 1950 and 1956 total US aid amounted to $ 770 million. (NYT 25 May 1957, p. 1; Times 25 May 1957 p. 6)
[American foreign embassies are guarded by units of US Marines; the article does not say what has been their role during the riot. The immediate cause of the riot was resentment against a US court martial verdict that freed the American sergeant who had shot dead a Chinese.]

**T Jun 2, 1957** Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek took full blame for the anti-American riots May 24. He recalled that after the Boxer Rebellion (November 1899 – September 1901) the United States was the only Western power willing to guarantee the national unity of China. (NYT p. 1)

[The so-called open door principle guided American diplomacy toward China; its main purpose was to prevent other powers and in particular Britain and Japan to be granted special privileges.]

**T Jun 9, 1957** According to a map published in the New York Times there are only 3,500 US troops on Taiwan stationed on one base. In contrast there are 80,000 US troops in South Korea stationed on 11 bases and 60,000 in Japan stationed on 19 bases. In West Germany there are 310,000 troops in 25 bases; in France there are 40,000 in 10 bases. (NYT Sunday section E, page E5)

**T Ap 10, 1979** The “Taiwan Relations Act” (TRA) was signed into law by President Jimmy Carter and has remained in effect from this date up to the time of writing (March 2012).

In its sections 2.4-2.6 it says:

“It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States. It is the policy of the United States to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”

In its section 3 it says:

“The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.”

Its section 4 says:

“The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979”.

Its section 6 says:
“The relations conducted by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall be conducted by The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia.”

Its section 10 says:
The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality established by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as were previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.

Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable immunities the President is authorized to extend to Taiwan such immunities as may be necessary in this respect (excerpt).

[In other words, this law basically maintained the relations between Taiwan and the United States in the situation prevailing before the recognition of the People’s Republic of China. The US will maintain a proxy-embassy called the “American Institute in Taiwan” and Taiwan will have a proxy-embassy in Washington.
In western media Chinese protests over the sale of arms to Taiwan are often mentioned but it is rarely said that such sales are planned and in fact required by the TRA.
As the TRA is a major obstacle on the way for re-unification it is surprising that Beijing does not insist with greater energy on its abrogation.]

**T Jul, 1982: The Six assurances to Taiwan.**

They were proposed in 1982 by the Republic of China. The US government agreed to these points and informed the United States Congress of this in July 1982.

The 6 points are the following.

1. The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan.

2. The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act.

3. The United States would not consult with China in advance before making decisions about US arms sales to Taiwan.

4. The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China.

5. The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China.

6. The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.

(http://www.taiwandomuments.org/assurances.htm)

[Surprisingly, on the Internet there are different versions of these 6 points. For instance, the last of the previous 6 points is not mentioned in the version given on]
Wikipedia\textsuperscript{110}. The different versions can be explained by the fact that these points were stated several times and mainly orally (in diplomatic terms, “non-paper” delivery). It can be observed that in 1982 Taiwan was still a one-party, authoritarian state under martial law.]

**T Oct 15, 1984: Jiang Nan Incident in the United States.** Liu Yiliang, pen name Jiang Nan, was a reporter at the “Taiwan Daily” from 1963 to 1967, when he was sent to work as a special correspondent in the US. Once there he started collecting materials on Chiang Chingkuo (Chiang Kai-shek’s son and president of Taiwan from 1978 to 1988) for a PhD thesis he was preparing to write. In 1983, Liu’s book “A Biography of Chiang Chingkuo” was serialized in the California Tribune. Because these pieces contained sensitive information about the Chiang family and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), they inevitably attracted the attention of the ROC (Republic of China) government. In 1984, Liu was preparing to write A Biography of Wu Kuocheng (a former KMT leader who became critical of the KMT dictatorship, he was living in the United States since 1953) when on October 15 he was killed, not far from his home in San Francisco, by Chen Chili, Wu Tun and Tung Kueisan, members acting on instructions from the Bureau of Military Intelligence under the Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense.

It was not long after this incident that President Chiang Chingkuo, during an interview with “Time Magazine” on August 16, 1985, stated for the first time that the future head of state of the ROC would not be a member of the Chiang family, but would be elected in accordance with the Constitution. (http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/en/content?ID=3872)

[This case received a great deal of attention from US media, probably because it came at a time when the State Department wanted to end the the control exercised by the Chiang family. One may remember that a similar democratization process would soon take place in South Korea.]

**T Jan 20, 2003** Creation of a “Taiwan-Tibet Exchange Foundation” by the DPP (Democratic Progressive Party). This foundation served as a channel to transfer aid to exiled Tibetans in India. The operations of the foundation were stopped in 2009. (Wikipedia articles in French entitled “Gouvernement tibtain”, “Fondation des changes Tawan-Tibet”, “Parti Démocratique Progressiste”)

[The DPP was in power in Taiwan from 2000 to 2008.]

**T 2009-2010** Military cooperation between the United States and Taiwan.

Date: 2010 February 25

\textsuperscript{110}At first sight, it may seem that the 6th point is in contradiction with the “One China” policy. Here is a subtle but important point. The United States acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China but it does not state this position as being its own.
Chronology

Original Classification: SECRET

From: Taiwan American Institute Taiwan, Taipei
To: Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Security Council, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State

Summary: The United States has a range of security-related dialogues with Taiwan, including one led by State [US State Department] and 10 led by DoD [US Department of Defense]

Established in 1997, the annual meeting of interagency delegations is the highest level security dialogue between the United States and Taiwan. An Assistant Secretary of Defense traditionally heads the US delegation. These talks last took place July 29-31, 2009 and are scheduled again sometime in July 2010.

Established in 2000, the annual “Defense Review Talks” are the highest level dialogue between DoD and Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND). The DRT last met October 29-30, 2009.

Established in 1995, the annual “Security Cooperation Talks” (SCT) between the DoD and Taiwan MND’s Strategic Planning Department (US Joint Staff-equivalent) review current and future Foreign Military Sales (FMS) programs. The SCT last met June 15-18, 2009.

Additionally, US Army Pacific, US Pacific Fleet, Marine Forces Pacific, and Pacific Air Force maintain very active security cooperation programs with their Taiwan counterparts.

These inter-service meetings include the following.

- Army: Established by charter in 2003, the Army meetings (“Lu Wei”/Powerful Army) occur twice a year. The two sides last met October 14-16, 2009.
- Navy and Marine Corps: Established by charter in 2004, the Navy and Marine Corps meetings (“Bi Hai”/Blue Sea) occur twice a year. The two sides last met October 27-30, 2009.
- Air Force: Established by charter in 2000, the Air Force meetings (“Lan Tien”/Blue Sky) occur twice a year. The two sides last met November 19 - 20, 2009

[WikiLeaks: https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/10TAIPEI195_a.html]

[In the previous enumeration of contacts between US and Taiwan military the key-point is that over the past 15 years the number of these contacts increased steadily. In other words, the actual and practical attitude of the United States with respect to Taiwan is less and less consistent with the “One China policy” which is still officially the US position. This dual attitude is illustrated by the flag-raising incident described below.]
**Dec 2014** US President Obama drew a sharp protest from the Chinese government when he signed the “Naval Vessel Transfer Act” to pave the way for the US government to sell 4 Perry-class guided missile frigates to Taiwan.
(http://www.china.org.cn/world/2015-01/07/content_34495659.htm)

![First flag-raising ceremony at Twin Oaks Estate in Washington since the Republic of China and the US terminated diplomatic relations in 1979.](image)

**Fig. 9.23** First flag-raising ceremony at Twin Oaks Estate in Washington since the Republic of China and the US terminated diplomatic relations in 1979. The fact that the ceremony took place with the approval of the US administration suggests that the relationship between the US and the PRC has become more tense.  
*Source: Website of the “Taipei Times”.*

**T Jan 3, 2015** Did president Obama authorize the raising of the ROC’s flag in the US. The Republic of China national flag was raised at Twin Oaks Estate near Washington which was the former residence of ROC ambassadors to the US. It was the first time since Washington switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing 36 years ago.

In an interview after the event, Representative to the US Shen Lyu-shun said that his office had notified Washington beforehand about the event and received approval provided it remained low-profile and was not televised so Beijing would not complain. He added that the improving bilateral ties helped make the ceremony possible. Since 1978 only cultural and social events had been allowed at Twin Oaks. However, as mutual trust between Taiwan and the US improved, the ROC national day was celebrated again at the venue in 2011, for the first time in 32 years. In January 2014 the national anthem of the ROC was sung at the national day reception but the flag was not raised. (Taipei Times, 3 January 2015)

[A few days after the flag-raising the US administration denied that it had been briefed about it in advance. However, the fact that the ROC representative thought that such a move would be accepted by Washington is in itself quite revealing. It illustrates the fact that over the past 5 years Washington has allowed Taiwan to drift toward independence in spite of the strong (but ineffective) protests of Beijing. The encouragements given by US congressmen to the leaders of the Sunflower movement when they visited the United States in the summer of 2014 was a clear sign in this respect.]
Quantitative evidence does not only bring numerical accuracy, it may also shed new light on well known events.

As an illustration let us consider traffic accidents. It is of course to be expected that the movements of military trucks, jeeps and other vehicles may result in some accidents. However, during the occupation of China, Korea and Japan the rate of accidents resulting in the death of pedestrians was far above the level one would normally expect. As a matter of fact, that high rate was the manifestation of reckless, wild and in some cases criminal driving behavior. Such behavior is also attested by testimonies and proclamations to the troops (see the chronology at the date of 31 August 1946). In other words, quantitative evidence does not come only as a confirmation of what is already well known, it can also suggest completely new interpretations.

Similarly, it is irrelevant to concentrate on one or two cases of assault, rape or hold up committed by occupation troops. After all, assaults, rapes and holdups occur in any population which means that the occurrence of a few cases does not bring any pertinent information about the behavior of occupation troops. It is only by comparing the rates of these incidents to what is observed in non-occupation conditions that interesting conclusions about the behavior of occupation troops will emerge.

- An official Chinese report claimed 1,500 cases of Chinese injuries and deaths involving the Americans stationed in China during the 11 months from 1 September 1945 and 31 July 1946. This represents and average of 136 per month (Zhang 1996, p. 99).
- In the 4-month period between 12 September 1945 and 10 January 1946 some 220 Chinese people were injured in traffic accidents by American vehicles, an average of 2 casualties per day (Zhang 1996, p. 99).

**Activity of the US Air Force in China, 1942-1947**

Chenault’s “American Volunteer Group” (AVG), also known as the Flying Tigers, was under contract with the Chinese government until July 1942. Consequently, it is
possible that the accident data started to be recorded by the US Air Force only after July. For the series represented in the figure the monthly numbers become non-zero after October 1942.

The American Volunteer Group was replaced by the 23rd Fighter Group which included the 74th, 75th and 76th Fighter squadrons. The 11th Medium Bombardment Squadron, consisting of seven B-25s made up the other half of Chennault’s command. In March 1943 the 23rd Fighter Group became part of the 14th Air Force.

![Graph showing monthly accidents of US airplanes in China](http://www.aviationarchaeology.com/src/db.asp)

**Fig. 10.1 Monthly accidents of US airplanes in China.** The curve is a 3-month moving average. If one assumes that the accident rate per flying time was more or less constant the number of accidents reflect the activity of the Air Force. Altogether, there were 1,220 accidents but the source does not say in how many fatalities they resulted. As a matter of comparison, in France in September 1944 that is to say just 2 months after the Normandy landing there were 152 accidents. One year later in September 1945 the number was reduced to only 10. Here, between 1943 and the end of 1946 there were 25 accidents per month. Source: [http://www.aviationarchaeology.com/src/db.asp](http://www.aviationarchaeology.com/src/db.asp)

In addition to the core Fourteenth Air Force (14AF) structure, there was a second group, the Chinese-American Composite Wing with pilots from both the United States and the Republic of China.
Chapter 11

Conclusion

Parallels with “similar” cases

“Similar” can be understood in different ways. In this book we focused our attention on two aspects: (i) the interference of foreign powers in Chinese affairs, (ii) the struggle between a conservative fraction (supported by a coalition of rich Chinese landowners and foreign interests) and a party relying on the peasantry. Are there other countries in which a combination of these factors can be observed in the 20th century?

Several examples come to mind, particularly the cases of Cuba, Mexico, the Philippines or South Korea which are summarized in the table below.

Table 11.1: Peasant revolts in the 20th century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Name of the insurgents</th>
<th>US Involvement</th>
<th>Success (S) or failure (F)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>1926 − 1929</td>
<td>Cristeros</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1926 − 1949</td>
<td>Red Army</td>
<td>2, 4</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1945 − 1949</td>
<td>Korean People’s Republic</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1945 − 1956</td>
<td>Huks</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuba</td>
<td>1956 − 1959</td>
<td>Castrists</td>
<td>1, 5</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: There have been numerous agrarian uprisings in former centuries. In order to estimate the degree of involvement of the United States we have introduced a scale which goes from 1 (small) to 7 (very high). When two numbers are given it means that US involvement changed in the course of time.

A few comments are in order about this table.

- The common force behind these uprisings is well described in the following explanation given by General Douglas MacArthur to some of his officers who in March 1945 suggested that he send a punitive expedition against the Huks who were waging a guerrilla war in Central Luzon against the big landowners (Manchester 1978, p. 420).
Tarlac [located 100 kilometers to the north west of Manila] marks the border between the sugar economy and the rice country. North of them the people grow rice and most of them own small areas of land. Did you notice how many schools there are up there, how the people dressed, looked happy? Do you see the hangdog look they have here, resentful poorly dressed? Most of this land is owned in Madrid or Chicago or some other distant place. This is really absentee ownership. No pride, few schools, little participation in government. This is where organizations like the Hukbalahaps are born and get their strength. They tell me the Huks are socialistic, but I haven’t got the heart to go after them. If I worked in those sugar fields I would probably be a Huk myself.

- In contrast to the other uprisings which were led by left-wing people, the Cristeros uprising was led by Catholics. It is not obvious therefore that it followed the same pattern. In fact, this uprising has two fairly different interpretations. In the first it was a reaction against the anti-clerical policy of the Mexican government. In the second it was a popular uprising of armed peasants against big landlords. The second interpretation is developed in a book written by a Jean Meyer (1975). He shows that the organization of the Cristeros troops had many similarities with the Red Army in China. It relied on a symbiosis between the soldiers and the peasants. (i) When the army was not campaigning, they helped the peasants in the fields. (ii) There was a strong emphasis on education of children as well as adults. (iii) Rich landlords were forced to make contributions. Eventually the uprising was suppressed with the support of the United States. As in China, it provided rifles and planes with American pilots.

- There are only two cases which did not end in defeat, namely China and Cuba. But in contrast to China where the civil war was long and harsh, in Cuba the war against Batista was fairly quick. Why? It should be recalled that New York Times journalist Herbert L. Matthews visited Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra and wrote favorably about the guerrillas and that the United States was one of the first countries who recognized the Castro regime. Why was Batista out of favor? The first reason was probably because he had been in power for over 25 years (since 1933). The standard policy of the State Department seems to be to drop former protégé when it judges that they have been in power for too long.

There are numerous examples: Prime minister Adnan Menderes (10 years), South Korea President Syngman Rhee (15 years), Filipino President Ferdinand Marcos (16 years), Indonesia President Suharto (31 years), Tunisia President Ben Ali (24 years), Egypt President Hosni Mubarak (30 years).
The second reason was probably because Batista was not anti-Communist enough\textsuperscript{111}

American influence in East Asia

\textbf{Influence before World War II}

In May 1882 a treaty of trade and friendship was signed in Incheon between the United States and the kingdom of Korea. This signature occurred a few decades after China and Japan had been compelled to open their borders to western trade. The Treaty authorized the dispatch to Korea of American missionaries and medical personnel.

In the following years, Methodist missions and churches began to sprang up in Korea along with schools and hospitals. Horace H. Allen, Dr. O.R. Avison, Ms. Mary Scranton, Annie E. Bunker, Horace Underwood were some of the Americans who settled in Korea in the late 19th century and were buried in Seoul at the “Foreigners Cemetery”. Created in 1890 this cemetery comprised some 350 graves by 2010.

The late 19th century was marked by an overall expansion of western influence in Eastern Asia. Some landmark events were the colonization of Indochina by France, the colonization of Guam, Hawaii and the Philippines by the United States, the Boxer war and resulting expansion of the concession system in China.

\textbf{Role of the Boxer indemnity}

In 1909 President Theodore Roosevelt obtained congressional approval to reduce the Qing dynasty indemnity payment of $30 million by $10 million, on the condition that these funds would be used as scholarships for Chinese students to study in the United States. Using this fund, the Tsinghua College was established in Beijing, on 29 April 1911 on the site of a former royal garden, to serve as a preparatory school for students to be sent by the government to study in the United States. The faculty members for sciences were recruited by the YMCA (Young Men’s Christian Association) from the United States; its graduates transferred directly to American schools as juniors upon graduation.

This was a very clever organization because having American professors already in China made sure that the students would be fluent in English. This was a recipe for success both for the students and at the same time for US influence in China.

Naturally, other countries also established universities. For instance, France established the “Aurore University” (an alternative name is “Zhendan University’’)

\textsuperscript{111}This aspect is well described in the following excerpt from the New York Times of 31 July 1953. “Charges that President Fulgencio Batista of Cuba had formed an alliance with Communist elements that had restored them to strength in labor unions and in his Government were denied on his behalf.”
Shanghai in 1903. It had 135 students in 1905 and 242 in 1908. Its degrees were officially recognized in China as well as in France. However, the fact that it was a Catholic institutions run by Jesuits greatly limited its integration in China.

In the same line of thought it can be mentioned that after 1924 the Soviet government devoted a part of the Russian Boxer indemnity to the funding of Peking University. However, this funding was outlawed in 1928 when Chiang Kai-shek’s armies took control of Beijing. During the Japanese occupation Peking university relocated first to Changsha (Hunan province) and then to Kunming (Yunnan province).

**Influence after World War II**

Whereas before World War II there was a united front of western powers (which also included Japan), after the war, only the United States kept and indeed strengthened its influence in Eastern Asia. This evolution was marked by the following events.

- Britain left India, Sri Lanka and Burma; the Netherlands left Indonesia; France left Indochina, Cambodia and Laos.
- It is true that the United States granted independence to the Philippines and that its influence was greatly reduced in China after the Communists came to power, but several countries, particularly South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam remained in the American zone of influence.

**US influence in China in the wake of Deng’s opening policy**

At the time of writing (May 2011) there is a paradox regarding US influence in Eastern Asia. In China, American cultural influence is far stronger than at any time in previous decades. Many Chinese students want to study in American universities. American TV series, both entertainment series and history series (such as a history of Wall Street shown in October-November 2010), are shown on CCTV (i.e. state-owned Central Television) channels. Chinese newspapers report the last news in US sport competition whether in basketball, football or baseball. It is said that one half of Chinese exports is produced in foreign companies.

Yet, in neighboring countries there is a hidden rivalry for influence and leadership. This can be seen from several tumultuous episodes in the Caucasian republics, in Thailand, Outer Mongolia and even to some extent in Japan. As an ever larger percentage of the exports of these countries go to China, there is at the same time an inclination for greater political integration and alignment. Needless to say, the State Department tries its best to reverse this trend.

Since its creation, Pakistan (so far) managed to keep good relations with the United States and friendly relations with China. In this sense, it is a test case.

**Is there a pro-US lobby in China?**
In Japan the pro-US lobby is particularly active in three sectors: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Defense and the news media. The reason for this influence goes back to the period of the occupation. During the 7 years of the occupation until the San Francisco Peace Treaty Japan did hardly have a foreign policy of its own, yet the MOFA played an important role because it comprised the Central Liaison Office (CLO) which was the bridge between the SCAP American Headquarters and the Japanese government or National Diet. Naturally, to become a member of the CLO one had to be fluent in English and well accepted by both sides. Even after the Peace Treaty these two conditions continued to condition a successful carrier at the MOFA. One Japanese political analyst observed that a major goal of MOFA civil servants was to become ambassador of Japan in Washington which, needless to say, required strong support from the pro-Washington lobby.

A similar mechanism is at work at the Ministry of Defense and at Japanese news agencies (e.g. Kyodo). The reason is basically the same. During the occupation, these institutions were under tight American control, therefore it was altogether impossible for Japanese who were not favored by Washington to get access to high level positions. This selection mechanism continued to work after the end of the occupation because, especially during the Cold War, there was a broad overlap between Japanese and US political objectives.

At first sight it may seem that none of these mechanisms can work in China. The legacy of the Korean War and of the Vietnam War was a long lasting defiance against US foreign policy. This view can be tested in the Chinese press. Indeed, it can be observed that articles that are critical of US foreign policy are most often written by authors who have some connection with one of these two ministries. In other words, whereas in Japan the “imprinting effect” played in favor of Washington, in China it played against it.

However, there are two other channels for American influence. The first one is related to cultural prestige, the second is brought about by common interest.

**Culture war**

Through its universities, through its TV series, its movies, its novels America has a broad and powerful influence across the world. The fact that Chinese students wish to study in the US is of course not specific to China. The same attraction can be observed elsewhere, whether in Europe, India or Mexico. Until recently, the income gap prevented a large inflow of Chinese students into American universities.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century the number of Chinese students who have the opportunity to study abroad has increased because the Chinese government provided scholarship funding for many of them. In addition it appears that students
who have studied abroad enjoy a clear advantage in the competition for teaching positions at prestigious Chinese universities. Once again, it must be stressed that this trend is shared by many countries. In the case of China it is only somewhat more surprising because of the ideological rift that existed between the two countries not long ago.

In this respect one should keep in mind that one of the major battles of the Cold War was a struggle for cultural influence and leadership. The two sides tried to “recruit” renowned intellectuals. As American leftists were driven into “hiding” (at least as far as their real opinions were concerned) the main battle ground became Europe. For the United States the challenge was to fight the influence of such heavyweights as Louis Aragon, Albert Camus, Pablo Neruda or Jean-Paul Sartre. For that purpose, the CIA, the Ford Foundation or other American organizations sponsored anti-Communist associations (e.g. the “Congress for Cultural Freedom” which was active between 1950 and 1967), meetings (e.g. the West Berlin Conference in June 1950), magazines (e.g. the French magazine “Preuves” or the British magazine “Encounter”). Intellectuals (e.g. Raymond Aron or Arthur Koestler) were encouraged to expose the bad sides of the Soviet Union. This result was achieved by sponsoring broad advertisement campaigns for all works which went in the “right” direction. Needless to say, any author prefers to have 100,000 readers than 1,000.

At the time of writing (2011) is there a similar process at work with respect to China? “China bashing” (also called “Sinophobia”) has become very common not only on the website of “Radio Free Asia” (which is hardly surprising) but also in western newspapers either in the United States or in Europe. While this point does not require further elaboration, the real question concerns similar activity within China.

The “culture war” can take various forms. This can be illustrated by the case of typical American sports such as baseball or American football. The NFL (“National Football League” of the United States) organizes weekends in major Chinese universities which give students an opportunity to discover American football. In the subway of Shanghai the TV screens which are on the platforms or in the cars show short initiations to the basic rules of football. In this respect we must ask the following question. Are there similar campaigns sponsored by other countries? Cricket is a very popular sports in India and many other countries formerly part of the British Empire, yet at our best knowledge there are no campaigns for promoting cricket in China.

It is true that Chinese TV and newspapers report the results of soccer matches that take place in Europe, but this may be due to the fact that soccer is already very popular in China.\(^{112}\)

\(^{112}\)It appears that back in 2007 the Frenchman best known to Chinese people was the soccer player Zinedine Zidan.
One of the most common forms of cultural sponsorship is to invite scholars in American universities. This can take various forms from short stays during summer vacations to one-year fellowships at Harvard. Of course, all countries have similar programs. As no global data seem to be available, it is difficult to make a meaningful comparison.

**Spread of the neoliberal creed in China**

Now that China has adopted the western ideology of neoliberalism, it is natural for the “new millionaires” to favor this ideology. This explains the TV series previously mentioned which described Wall Street in a highly favorable light. It can also explain that these wealthy people wish to band together with their American counterparts and even wish to emigrate to the United States.

In other words, there is a two-fold process.

- There is a growing international competition for influence and resources between the United States and China.
- At the level of the upper classes of wealthy people and of big companies there is a strong bond and common perspective. This partnership is somewhat similar to the one which existed during the era of the concession system. For such an unfair system to be able to maintain itself for more than a century it must have been supported by a substantial fraction of the Chinese ruling elite.

Which one of these two forces will get the upper hand remains an open question.

The only reliable approach would be to study similar cases in world history. This is what we tried in a chapter of Roehner and Syme (2002) entitled “Wars for territorial expansion”. This chapter is not only about wars. In fact, it offers a comparative analysis of several processes of “national activation”, an expression which refers to historical episodes characterized by a strong increase in national resources, substantial population growth and shared national awareness. The territorial expansion which is usually an outcome of such a situation can take several forms and means. War is only one possible means.

Paris, 19 June 2014

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113 According to an American survey made in 2011 this group was estimated to number around 0.1% of the Chinese population.
Appendix A
Geographical names

In what follows we illustrate two different transcription systems, namely Wade-Giles and pinyin. Developed by the Chinese government the pinyin has become by far the most used. The objective of the following examples is to give some rules which show how to go from one system to the other.

* Chinwangtao is a port located east of Beijing
* Kunming: Capital city of Yunnan province (south west of China)
* Kwangsi: east-southern province of China, east of Yunnan
* Tianjin is a city located south-east of Beijing, and not far (80 km) from the port of Taku (or Tanggu).
The names of the provinces indicated on this map follow the pinyin transcription. The correspondence with the Wade-Giles transcription is as follows:

- Anhui=Anhwei, Beijing=Peking, Chongqing=Chungking, Fujian=Fukien, Gansu=Kansu, Guangdong=Kwangtung (Kuantung), Guangxi=Kwansi, Guizhou=Kweichow (Kueichow, Kuangsi), Hebei=Hopeh, Henan=Honan, Heilongjiang=Heilungkiang, Hubei=Hupeh, Hunan=Hunan, Jiangsu=Kiangsu, Jiangxi=Kiangsi, Jilin=Kirin, Liaoning=Fengtien, Ningxia=Ningsia, Qinghai=Tsinghai, Shanxi=Shansi, Shaanxi=Shensi, Shandong=Shantung, Sichuan=Szechuan, Tianjin=Tientsin, Zhejiang=Chekiang. Xinjiang=Sinkiang

*Tsingtao is a port located approximately a mid-distance between Beijing and Shanghai.*

**Various forms of transcriptions**

- Chinwangtao / Qinhuangdao (city)
- Chou En-lai / Zhou Enlai (minister)
- Chunking / Chongqing (city)
- Hangchow / Hangzhou (city)
- Kwangsi / Guangxi (province)
- Mao Zedung / Mao Tse-tung / Mao Tseh-tung / Mo Tseh-tung (chairman) Peiping / Peking / Beiping / Beijing (capital city)
- Shantung / Shandong (province)
- Shensi / Shen-hsi / Shaanxi (province)
- Tangku / Tanggu (district)
- Tientsin / Tianjin (city)
Fig. A.3 Map of south-east China in the 1930s. The map emphasizes the importance of the three great rivers: the Yellow River in the north, the Yantze River in central China and the West River in the south. The floods of these rivers often caused major disasters. According to some estimates the Yangtze valley floods in 1931 caused a loss of one million lives (NCH 12 Sep 1931 p. 71).

[to be completed]
I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who have provided help, advice and encouragements and in particular to: Gilbert Chambon, Christine Hauchecorne, Agnès Kermin of the interlibrary-loan department of the university of Paris; Larry Kaplan, author of a biography of Homer Lea; Eric Van Slander (NARA); Pierre-Etienne Will (Collège de France, Paris).
Abbreviations

IIIAC: Third Amphibious Corps (Marine Corps)
Baohuang Hui: China Empire Reform Association.
BIS: Bureau of Investigation and Statistics [a secret police of the Nationalist govern-
ment; in some sense it was built on the model of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in the United States.]
CBI: China, Burma and India (theater of operations)
CBI HQ: China, Burma and India Headquarters
CERA: China Empire Reform Association (in Chinese Baohuang Hui)
CID: Criminal Investigation Division
CSR: Chinese Soviet Republic
CWR: China Weekly Review (American review published in Shanghai between 1917
and 1949)
CNRRRA: Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration [the organ which
was in charge of distributing the supplies provided under UNRRA programs.]
CSM: Christian Science Monitor (American newspaper)
DPP: Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
FES: Far Eastern Survey [a journal published two times a month during the 1940s;
at that time the authors were mostly American authors with links with the State
Department]
HMS: His (or her) Majesty’s Ship (British warship)
ICWA: The Institute of Current World Affairs
IDPA: Investigation Department of Party Affairs. Created in 1928, it was a kind of
secret police of the Kuomintang. (Huang 2002)
KMT: Kuomintang [Originally, the expression designates the political party which
ruled China between the late 1920s and the late 1940s. Because this was a
one-party rule the expression is also used as a synonym for the Nationalist gov-
ernment.]
Abbreviations

LST: Landing Ship for Tank
LCT: Landing Craft for Tank
LCI: Landing Craft for Infantry

MCBIS: Military Commission’s Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. This was a kind of secret police of the Kuomintang. In 1942 it started a cooperation with the Office of Naval Intelligence of the US Navy. The SACO (Sino-American Cooperation Organization) was created in Chungking in 1943. (Huang 2002)

MP: Military Police

MAAG: Military Assistance Advisory Group (American advisers of the Nationalist government)

MAGIC: Military Advisory Group in China (American Group training Nationalist soldiers)

NCDN: North China Daily News, Shanghai (newspaper published in Shanghai)

NYT: New York Times (American newspaper)

OSS: Organization of Strategic Services [it is often said that it was the predecessor of the CIA, but one should keep in mind that the Army, Navy and Air Force also have had intelligence departments (G-2 for the US Army, Office of Naval Intelligence for the US Navy) that were distinct from the OSS during World War II and are still not part of the CIA nowadays.]

PLA: People’s Liberation Army. It is the name that the Communist Party chose for the Communist troops in 1945. Before that date it was known as the “Red Army”.

SA: Sturm Abteilung (Sturm=storm or assault, Abteilung=detachment, a German paramilitary group.

SACO: Sino-American Cooperative Organization [a joint organization of the military branch of the BIS and US Naval intelligence.]

SH: Shanghai Herald (newspaper published in Shanghai)

TYC: Tibetan Youth Congress (a pro-independence movement)

TGIE: Tibet Government-in-Exile.

UNRRA: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration [an organization, in which the United States played a key role, which provided food and other supplies to countries which were in need of relief after the war. The operation began immediately after the war but in the spring of 1946 there was a great scarcity of food worldwide; in many countries and in particular in several Chinese provinces this brought about famines, which were almost as serious as those of 1928-1930 and the terrible Henan famine of 1943.]

USS: United States Ship (American warship)
Archive records

All the documents used in the “Occupation project” including those listed below (plus a number of others which have not been used yet) are available in the so-called “Fonds Roehner 434 W” belonging to the archive bureau of “University Pierre and Marie Curie” (UPMC), Central Tower, office 810, 4 place Jussieu, 75005 Paris.

In addition to archive records there are also several books, for instance a book with many pictures of the 1941-1946 period in Iceland and two big volumes about the occupation of South Korea published by Hallym University.

Altogether there are 8 boxes which have the reference numbers: 434 W 1-8.

- 434 W1-4: Japan
- 434 W5: Hawaii
- 434 W6: South Korea
- 434 W7: South Korea, China, Iceland.
- 434 W8: Germany

ICWA 1: The Institute of Current World Affairs, electronic archives.

Letter dated 1 August 1933 sent by C. Walter Young to Walter S. Rogers, ICWA, New York.

Founded in 1925, the ICWA awards fellowships to “fellows” who take advantage of this opportunity to visit foreign countries. They observe, they interview people and they send reports to the Institute. The resulting collection of documents is described as follows on the website of the ICWA. “Through the eyes and ears of its fellows, the Institute has collected 83 years of world history, in the form of newsletters submitted as part of the fellowships.” Nowadays, the “fellows” are students or young people, but in the 1930s, they were rather mature professional persons who acted in a semi-official way. ICWA 1 is a long letter sent to the Institute by C. Walter Young. During 1932 Young was associated with the Lytton Commission and had contacts with many important persons ranging from the Chinese Minister of Finance to American bankers.
In essence the kind of exploration done by ICWA fellows is similar to the job performed by journalists or intelligence officers. Because they are not destined to be published, their reports are written in a more open and direct way than articles destined to newspapers.

ICWA 1 describes the world of American (and British) diplomats, advisers to foreign governments and business leaders interested in the Far East. They met on the steamers while crossing the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean or in the international hotels of Beijing, Shanghai or Tokyo. By sharing with their acquaintances their networks of contacts, they contributed to the creation of a kind of meta-network which constituted a little world by itself.

ICWA 2: The Institute of Current World Affairs, electronic archives.
Letter dated 20 January 1949 sent from Shanghai by Mr. Albert Ravenholt to Walter S. Rogers, ICWA, New York.

ICWA 3: The Institute of Current World Affairs, electronic archives.
Letter dated 28 April 1949 sent by Mr. Albert Ravenholt to Walter S. Rogers, ICWA, New York. The letter was sent by Ravenholt while en route from Shanghai to Canton and Hong Kong.

ICWA 4: The Institute of Current World Affairs, electronic archives.
Letter dated 17 June 1949 sent by Mr. Albert Ravenholt to Walter S. Rogers, ICWA, New York.

ICWA 5: The Institute of Current World Affairs, electronic archives.

State Department 1: State Department Intelligence and Research Reports. Part III, China and India, 1940-1949 (6 reels). reel 1, section 4: Memorandum to Colonel Donovan from Pearl Buck, 19 January 1942, 15 pages.

NARA 1: US National Archives at College Park, Title: Request for decision concerning the claims for damages arising from the death or injury of certain Chinese civilians.
Record Group: 313, box: 6125.
This memorandum was written by G.L. Russel, Judge Advocate General, and sent to the Commander of the Naval Port facilities in Tsingtao, China on 30 June 1948.
It does not contain an exhaustive list of incidents and related claims. Rather, it is a general legal discussion of the receivability of various claims which is illustrated by 5 cases. All these cases are incidents which occurred in a 6-month interval between 6 February 1947 and 19 August 1947.

Foreign Relations of the US (1): Foreign relations of the United States, 1946, Vol 9,
References

[Available at the National Library of China.]

USMIR 1: US Military Intelligence Reports, China 1911-1941. 15 reels. [Available at the National Library of China. For instance, the Call Number of reel 12 is 3288.]

[Available at the National Library of China. For instance the call number of reel 16 is 3278.]

SDI: State Department Intelligence and Research Reports, Part III, China and India, 1940-1949, 6 microfilms

Newspapers and periodicals

[This leftist review was published from 1937 to 1947. As indicated by the subtitle, it was first published every fortnight but after 1945 the periodicity became monthly. Its first part consists of mainly political papers about the foreign relations of the United states with Asian countries. The second part gives a chronology of the main facts that occurred during the period covered by the issue in question. Although much shorter than the first part, this 2- or 3-page chronology is of interest.
In early 1945 the editor Philip Jaffe was arrested by the FBI and charged with divulging secret military information. Although the matter was eventually settled by the payment of a fine, the exact terms of the agreement that was struck with the FBI are not known.]

In such cases the standard policy was to allow publication of the magazine to continue but after the journalists have been changed or if they are not changed after they reached a gentlemen agreement with the authorities. A similar episode occurred for the magazine “Korea Independence”.

Some additional information about what was called at the time the “Amerasia case” can be found in an (openly anti-leftist) book published in 1951 (Flynn 1951, ch. 15). In early 1945 (the exact date is not given) the head of the OSS investigating service and several OSS agents entered the offices of Amerasia by picking the lock. There they found a number of government documents bearing the top-secret mark. The case was turned over to the FBI and after working on it for 3 months, its agents swooped down on Amerasia offices on 6 June 1945. As a result of finding top-secret files, the FBI arrested Philip Jaffee, Emmanuel Larsen, Andrew Roth. Mark Gayn, John Service and Kate Mitchell. Gayn,
Service and Mitchell were not indicted, the case against Roth was dismissed. Larsen and Jaffee had to pay a $500 and $2,500 fine respectively. In this story the fines were probably only a marginal aspect.]


China Press: Newspaper published in Shanghai. It was started and supported by American business people in particular the industrialist Charles R. Crane.


This journal which represented US business interests is particularly valuable because it provides insights into the ways foreign powers tried to advance their interests. For instance, because the British and the Japanese were in direct competition with US interests, it gives information on how these powers tried to bribe Chinese generals or political leaders for the purpose of bending Chinese political decisions to their advantage.

Probably the US State Department did the same but the “Weekly Review” is fairly mute in this respect.


NCH: “North-China Herald”, British weekly newspaper published in Shanghai. A daily edition commenced publication on 1 June 1864, as the “North China Daily News”.


SH: “Shanghai Herald”, Chinese newspaper, Shanghai

SN: “Shanghai News”, Chinese newspaper, Shanghai

Books and articles

Alley (R.), Burchett (W.) 1975: La Chine, une autre qualité de vie. François Maspero, Paris. [The English version was published under the title “China, the quality of life”]

[The book contains two chapters providing a biography of Rewi Alley which are probably among the most interesting. They explain that the “Gung Ho” movement of industrial cooperatives initiated by Alley was funded by the Ford Foundation and supported by Mme Chiang and his brother, Mr. T.S. Soong.]
There is also an interesting debate about the future of the revolution in China. First the authors observe that most often (if not always) in the course of history revolutions have produced a class of privileged people whose interests eventually turned out to be incompatible with the objectives of the revolution. Then, they explain that in October 1963 Chairman Mao had already noticed this trend, for instance in the fact that most doctors preferred life in the cities thus leaving the countryside almost totally deprived of medical assistance. This lead to the start of the Cultural Revolution some three years later. Quite surprisingly, however, in their conclusion the authors dismiss the thesis of an Eastern European friend who predicts that the race toward greater material prosperity at the expense of social solidarity will re-emerge as soon as the economic situation will allow it.

[This brochure of 104 pages reports the conclusions of a commission which visited China during June-September 1929. It mentions the role played in relief operations by the “China Advisory Committee” (which comprised managers of the Standard Oil of New York, of the British-American Tobacco Company and other companies as well as representants of Catholic and Methodist missions) but it does not give the percentage of Chinese custom revenue which was affected to foreign debt repayment. It is also surprising that the ongoing conflicts with the Communists and the Japanese are not mentioned.]


[The author visited China in 1947]

[The reviewer writes: “The SACO training camp at Happy Valley outside of Chongqing became notorious for its use of American trained torture techniques on prisoners.” The same point is made repeatedly in “Red Crag” by Guangbin et al. If one agrees that the evidence provided by these authors is indeed convincing enough, one must recognize that over the past 15 years (1997-2012) there has been a systematic and elaborate attempt to suppress most of the evidence. The organization of the museum and memorial at Happy Valley strongly suggests that this was done with the agreement of the Chinese authorities. It would
have been easy to provide testimonies by former prisoners. Yet, the only written testimonies that are shown are in small, compact Chinese handwriting (actually difficult to read even for Chinese people). The English captions (very good fluent English by the way) of the pictures does not give any information on this question. Until 1985 or so “Red Crag” was widely used in schools. No longer so. It seems it has been replaced by “Four generations under the same roof”. Although this celebrated novel covers the years 1938-1945 in Beijing there is no mention whatsoever of SACO or of US policy and almost no mention of the Communist party which is even more surprising.]

Bensacq-Tixier (N.) 2014: La France en Chine de Sun Yat-sen à Mao Zedong, 1918-1953. [French presence in China from Sun Yat-sen to Mao Zedong, 1918-1953.] Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes. [This 750 page study is based on the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to the events which occurred in China, it describes also the life of the French diplomatic personnel in China, their relations with Chinese authorities and with the Department for Chinese affairs back in Paris.]

Beresford (C.) 1899: The break-up of China with an account of its present commerce, currency, waterways, armies, railways, politics and future prospects. Harper and Brother, London and New York. [Lord Charles Beresford conducted this mission on behalf of the “Associated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain”. His report gives detailed city-by-city information in connection with British trading interests. The author takes clearly position in the debate ongoing at that time about “Open Door” versus “Spheres of Influence” policy. He writes: “Investigations on the spot have convinced me that the maintenance of the Chinese Empire is essential to the interests of the Anglo-Saxon race and I hope that when the British and American people are acquainted with the facts they will be similiarly convinced”. The author sees 3 main reasons for maintaining the integrity of China.

• “Nothing would be more materially affected by a spheres of influence policy than the finances of China. Splitting up the Chinese Empire means loss to bondholders and the disappearance of the security mortgaged to them. As an instance, the first Anglo-German loan was partly secured on Formosa; yet, Formosa is no longer part of the Chinese Empire” (following China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895). The loans were mortgaged on the “Imperial Maritime Custom” and on the salt tax. In 1898 the Chinese international debt reached 55 million pounds of which about two-third were owed to British banks. As a matter of comparison, in 1895 the receipts of the British government was about 100 million pounds.

• In most of China and especially in the southern provinces of Kwangsi and
Kwantung [Guangdong] almost all the trade is currently in British hands. Clearly, such a favorable situation would be damaged by the establishment of spheres of influence.

- Included in the book are several accounts of acts of piracy written by British consuls. Security is a major concern for Lord Beresford because obviously trade cannot thrive without secure roads and waterways. That is why his tour also comprised an investigation of Chinese armies. The goal of Great Britain was to strengthen Chinese armed forces to make them able to fight piracy, and at the same time to prevent them from challenging western supremacy. The only Chinese army that Lord Beresford found satisfactory in terms of drilling, discipline and equipment was the army under the command of general Yuan Shi Kai.]

[An English translation (same title) was published in 1998 by Stanford University Press.]

Bodde (D.) 1946a: China’s Muslim minority. Far Eastern Survey 15,18,281-284 (11 September 1946)


[This book is mainly devoted to the activity of the pro-Japanese government established in Nanking under Wang Ching-wei. In a sense it can be regarded as a political biography of Wang Ching-wei. The collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Japanese which would also be an interesting topic is largely left aside.]


Buck (P.) 1943: Promise. In 1945 a French translation was published in Geneva by J.H. Jeheber.
[This novel by Pearl Buck describes in a fairly detailed way the failed campaign through which Chinese troops under the command of US General Joseph Stilwell tried to check the Japanese invasion of Burma. During the war Ms. Buck was in close contact with the State Department as attested by her contacts with General Donovan. She also published several columns in the New York Times, e.g. she authored a long article in the issue of 31 May 1942 (Magazine section, p. SM3).
In a general way she showed much sympathy for the Chinese people, was very critical of the British colonial empire and mildly critical of the role played by
General Stilwell.
The support that her books provided to the policy of the State Department appears most clearly in her unconditional support for General Chiang Kai-shek and his wife. In “Promise” she writes that the Kuomintang soldiers were “free soldiers who required to know why they were fighting” and she states that Kuomintang generals (at least the general which appears in this novel) loved and knew personally their officers and soldiers. Such statements seem to be in contradiction with all known facts. According to many testimonies and as recorded in the Cambridge History of China the desertion rate was as high as 40% and some 20% of the soldiers died from starvation. Ms. Buck’s observation about the close interaction between soldiers and officers may have applied to the Red Army but certainly not to Kuomintang troops. This was also shown by the fact that during the civil war whole Kuomintang units changed side.

As one knows, a protracted competition opposed the two main actors of the US war effort in China namely General Joseph Stilwell and General Claire Chennault, the former being in favor of ground offensive particularly in Burma, and the latter in favor of an airforce war against Japanese forces in China. While Stilwell had the support of General Marshall, Chennault was supported by the wife of General Chiang Kai-shek.

Several episodes of the novel show that Ms. Buck clearly sided with the Chennault camp.

(i) As the Chinese troops were approaching the border between China and Burma they were attacked by a squadron of 17 Japanese fighter aircraft. However, at that very moment four “Flying Tigers” appeared and within 10 minutes they shot down 6 Japanese planes while the 11 others turned back.\footnote{Such a dashing success may have been in line with the kill numbers reported by the three squadrons of “Flying Tigers” during the war, but post-war cross-referencing revealed that such kill numbers were actually inflated (for each enemy aircraft downed the pilots got an extra bonus pay). The “Flying Tigers” totaled some 60 pilots and claimed having shot down some 300 Japanese planes with a loss of only 14 pilots on their side during the 9 months they were in existence, namely from December 1941 to July 1942. (Wikipedia article entitled “Flying Tigers”)}

(ii) In contrast, Ms. Buck’s portrait of General Stilwell is far from flattering. Chinese officers commented that at his age he should be enjoying his retirement back home. “Does America not have enough young people” says one of them. Yet, Stilwell was only 61 at that time, a fairly normal age for a 4-star general. The fact that he was able to speak Chinese is recognized, but it is said that he was speaking in the way of lower class people.]


[Caldwell was a OSS agent who worked for S ACO. The book was written 27 years after the events but it seems the author tries to keep a degree of secrecy
for he gives very little information about dates of events. For instance, at one point he describes an attempt by southern KMT generals allied to progressive civilians to remove Chiang Kai-shek. That was probably in early 1945 but the author gives no precision about dates. Surprisingly, he says that the conspirators had some support from US authorities and that he himself participated in this plot for some months. This is a rare case where one sees the State Department supporting opponents while at the same time still officially supporting Chiang Kai-shek.

It can be noted that the book does not give a reliable account of General Stilwell’s attempt to become the commander of Chinese forces. In particular it does not say that this attempt was in fact backed by President Roosevelt.

The most interesting (and most reliable) part of the book is the account of the author’s own experience in “Happy Valley” in Chongqing where the headquarters of SACO were located. According to Luo (1983), these headquarters were located in a place called the “Plum Garden”.

Finally, it can be noted that, as Michael Schaller’s book, Caldwell’s account ends in 1945.


[The book is mainly devoted to the cooperation between Sun Yat-sen and his American backers namely William Allen, Charles B. Boothe, James Deitrick and Homer Lea. It is based on the Charles B. Boothe papers, the Joshua B. Powers Collection (Powers was the name of the first husband of Ethel Lea the wife of Homer Lea) and the James Deitrick Papers.]


[This 125-page study was written by Vice-Consul Clubb for the State Department (see CUS 1, reel 16). It does not seem that it was ever published. The author used newspaper sources in particular the “Peking and Tientsin Times” (in English) and the “Ta Kung Pao” and also Communist documents which could not be found at that time in Chinese libraries because of the official anti-]
Communist policy.
It is a lucid analysis which correctly forecasts the evolution that would occur in the following decades, in particular the collaboration between the KMT and the Japanese in their common fight against the Communists and the ability of the Communists to attract wide popular support. However, his prediction that Chiang Kai-shek would soon lose its power did not materialize because of the strong foreign support that he received.
As annex B the book provides a list of some 100 names of revolutionaries many of whom had been executed. The list may contain some inaccuracies. For instance, Chou En-lai, chairman of the Organization Committee, is described as having been executed in June 1931.
On page 124 there is a map which shows the location of the regions controlled by the Communists in April 1932 (mostly in Kiangsi, Anhui, Hupeh) and of the areas in which the Red Army was active.]

[The authors suggest that they have some links with the CIA. It is written in recognition of the action over several decades of CIA case officers and Tibetan agents. Many of them are telling their story for the first time. Of course, what they say has been previously approved by the CIA as is the rule when case officers or agents go public.]
[Written by a member of the American mission in Yenan (Communist capital during the war) the book covers the period 1912-1949. However, it was not published until 1972, in the wake of President Nixon’s trip to China.]
[Foster Rhea Dulles was a cousin of Allen Welsh Dulles, head of the CIA from 1953 to 1961.]
[In the presentation on the book’s back cover one reads that the author draws “extensively on original Chinese sources”. In fact, a close examination of the reference section shows that the author used almost mostly (secondary) English sources as well as a few French sources.]

[Available online. In the period 1945-1949 each issue contained an article written by Colonel Conrad H. Lanza giving the military situation in China (and also in other areas).]


[The author spent several months in Yenan and in other areas under Communist control. This book was published in mid-1945 at a time when the United States and the USSR were still allies. It gives interesting insight into how villagers fought the Japanese. For instance, in central Hopei it describes the system of underground tunnels. In a first stage they connected only different houses within the border of one village. This did not work well because it was easy for Japanese troops to encircle an entire village. That is why the tunnels were made to connect several villages. In that way, it became impossible for Japanese forces to seal off the whole network.

It can be noted that a book bearing the same title was published by New York Times journalists in 1971 (see below at “New York Times”) which gives an account of their visit to China.

Fredriksen (J.C.) 2011: The United States Marine Corps. A Chronology, 1775 to the present. ABC-Clio.

French (P.) 2005: Tibet, Tibet. Albin Michel, Paris [In French]
[The author was the director of the “Free Tibet” campaign in Britain. He was able to examine the archives of the Tibetan movement in India.]

[Available on the Internet]


[The paper contains original State Department documents about the US position on Tibet. They show that it has been the long-held US position not to accept the proclamation of Tibet independence by Tibetans in exile even though the CIA
provided them funds, military training and arms.\]
the dark side of the KMT and in this sense was playing into the hands of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party. The DPP came to power in 2000 and remained in power until 2008.
In 2003 a park commemorating the victims of the KMT white terror, particularly during 1947-1953, was established on Chongde Street in Taipei’s Xinyi District. There are about 200 brick-sized tombstones on which the names of the victims and the dates of their deaths are inscribed. According to the “Taipei Times” of 18 August 2014 “tens of thousands of Taiwanese were killed during the White Terror era”.

[The book is available on line at the following website: http://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/isaacs/1938/tcr/index.htm
The edition of 1938 had 501 pages. A revised edition (382 pages) was published in 1951 by Stanford University Press. This account covers mainly the period 1925-1927.]


[This book is the translation into French of “Twilight in the Forbidden City”. Johnston was an officer of the Foreign Office who became one of the preceptors of Emperor Pu-Yi in 1919. At that time, the Emperor had no longer any power but the Imperial Court was still in existence. According to the Articles of “Favourable Treatment” conceded by the Republic in 1912 in exchange of the abdication, Emperor Puyi was to retain his imperial title and be treated by the government of the Republic with the protocol attached to a foreign monarch. Although the book was written in 1934, the account stops in 1928. Because of the strong influence Johnston had on Puyi, it can be said that the British were certainly not opposed to the fact that after Puyi had to leave the Forbidden city (on 5 November 1924) he was hosted by the Japanese.]

[Although it is supposed to be a historical study, the book reads more like a novel in the sense that it has supposedly verbatim accounts of discussions for which one cannot imagine any possible sources. In addition, such discussions (e.g. those in the chapter entitled “Falkenberg comedy”) add little to the reader’s understanding. One has the feeling that many pages are devoted to trifling details but that major issues are not addressed. For instance, there is only one
chapter (out of ten) about the collaboration between Sun and Lea. Despite numerous historical examples of interference the assumption that government or business circles in the United States might wish to influence the outcome of political struggles in China does not seem to be seriously discussed. However, it must be recognized that the author did a wonderful job in identifying many primary sources which provide solid landmarks in Lea’s life.

[This dictionary of dates is a chronology of world events. It has the same title as Haydn’s Dictionary of dates published in 1898 and also the same organization. As is usually the case with chronologies, it is more detailed for recent years than for more distant years.]


[An ebook which provides a presentation of the PLA by an author from mainland China.]


[Lao She (meaning professor) is the pen name of the Chinese writer Shu Qing-chun (1899-1966). His father was killed in 1900 during the Boxer Rebellion. After graduating from Beijing Normal University in 1918, he spent several years in London (1924 to 1929). During the war he was in Chungqing not in Beijing. After the war he also spent several years in the United States (1945-1949). The first Chinese edition of the book was published in Shanghai in 1946.
Although this book is a novel rather than a history book, it gives a detailed account of the life in Beijing between July 1937 and August 1945 that is to say during the time when the city was occupied and ruled by a pro-Japanese puppet government.
Many Chinese or American accounts give the impression that the puppet governments set up by the Japanese were merely cosmetic and received no support from the population. Lao She’s book clearly suggests that this is a simplistic
view. In fact, as in all countries under foreign occupation, a substantial fraction of the people accepted to collaborate with the occupation army. Through the life of several families living in the same neighborhood, the book gives to understand how their personal lives were affected by the occupation. It shows that even those who did not wish to collaborate little by little had to come to terms with the Japanese. It was impossible to remain neutral.

There is one puzzling omission in the novel. As many of the characters wish to take part in the resistance it is clearly suggested that the only way to do so was leave Beijing in order to join the Nationalist forces. However, we know that at this time there were strong underground Communist resistance networks in Northern China both in the countryside and in the cities (especially in the universities). Yet in the book, not a single word is devoted to their role. In the few instances where the Communists are mentioned, it is always in a negative way (e.g. “I will denounce you as a Communist to the Japanese”). From the book’s main perspective as an account of anti-Japanese resistance such an omission is really surprising.

Many other points remain unclear.

- When and where was the book written?  
  Some accounts say that it was written between 1940 and 1943 which obviously cannot be true because the third volume describes the Japanese capitulation in August 1945.

- An abridged English translation was published in 1951 but why was it entitled “Yellow storm”?  
  The “translation” was a unique case in the history of translation. In fact it was more an adaptation made by the author himself rather than a translation. The author dictated the English version to Ida Pruitt (who could not read Chinese). Then the publishing house (Harcourt, Brace) introduced omissions before getting the book published. The book has 533 pages compared to 1,880 for the French edition.

- Why, after having strongly expected the defeat of the Japanese for so long, did Lao She leave China in 1945 just after his wish had been fulfilled?  

- Given the little sympathy the author had for the Communists (along with his admiration for the Nationalists), why did he decide to come back to continental China rather than to go to Taiwan when he left the United States in 1949?  

- According to the catalog of Harvard Library, it would seem that the abridged translation of 1951 mentioned above was the only English translation ever published.


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[This novel was published in Chinese in 1961 under the title “Hong Yan”. The present French translation was published in Beijing in 1983. The expression “Red crag” refers to a place near Chongqing where Communists used to have meetings; it has also a symbolic meaning with reference to the inflexible commitment of individual Communists to their cause. The novel was written by two ex-Kuomintang generals who were former inmates in the KMT prisons described in the novel. Located near Chongqing, these prisons were called the Wanglongmen House of Detention, the Zhazidong Prison and the Baigong-guan Prison. Around 27 November 1949 as the Red Army was about to take Chongqing, several hundred prisoners were executed by the KMT. In the novel, it is said that these executions were requested and planned by the American Mission. Is it true? Did the American Mission remain in Chongqing until the very last moment? So far, we do not have the answers to these questions.]

Mackerras (C.) 1982: Modern China, a chronology from 1842 to the present [i.e. 1980]. Thames and Hudson, London.
[This chronology is very detailed with respect to military, political, economic and cultural events which occurred in China but it gives almost no information about the number, location and role played by the US troops present in China between 1945 and 1949.]


Mao (Tse-tung) 1945: On a statement by Chiang Kai-shek’s spokesman. [written for the Hsinhua News Agency on 16 August 1945]


McWilliams (C.) 1974: California, an island on the land. Gibbs Smith.
[The book says (p. 94) that Homer Lea died in May 1912, which is certainly not correct (unless one assumes that the obituary which was published in the “Times” appeared 6 months after his death).]


[This book is a biography of Cixi, the Empress Dowager of China. The term “dowager” means that she was one of the wives of the previous emperor. She was also the mother of its successor which gave her pre-eminence over the other wives of the former emperor. Although the book is an historical novel, the author says very clearly in his postface that only the dialogues have been invented. All the facts follow historical truth to the extent that it can be known. In partic-
ular, the author points out that most accounts written by historians were based on documents written by George E. Morrison and Backhouse, two highly questionable sources.]


[Milton Miles died in 1961 before the book was finished. It was put in final form by his wife and Hawthorne Daniel, a rewriter and old friend of Miles.]


[In early 1971, Chairman Mao invited a team of American table tennis players to visit China and play against top Chinese players. President Nixon followed up by sending Henry Kissinger to China for clandestine meetings with Chinese officials. Then, on 15 July 1971, it was simultaneously announced by Beijing and Washington that President Nixon would visit China in February 1972. This account (taken from the Wikipedia article entitled “Richard Nixon”) of early contacts between China and the United States omits an important facet, namely the visit of a team of well-known journalists from the New York Times which took place between 15 April and late August 1971. Politically, this visit was certainly more important than the visit of the table tennis players because (i) Columnist and editor James Reston had a long interview with Premier Zhou Enlai (at that time the name was still spelled Chou En-lai according to the Wade system) (ii) The articles written by these journalists during their visit (and which gave mostly a favorable view) were published in the New York Times and helped to change the opinion of the American public about China.

The book (p. 59-60) gives an interesting information which proves that Nixon intended to change the relations with China very early in his term as president. Indeed, “early in the Nixon Administration” (probably in 1969) Zhou Enlai re-
ceived a secret message from President de Gaulle in behalf of President Nixon telling him about the American intention to re-establish diplomatic relations with China. Having established diplomatic relations with China since 1964, France was in position to transmit such a message through its ambassador in Beijing.

In the same line of thought it can be recalled that under Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Canada also established diplomatic relations with the PRC that started on 13 October 1970.

The book is also interesting because it gives a view of China toward the end of the Cultural Revolution. Nowadays this episode is decried not only in western countries but also (and perhaps even more) in China. The descriptions given in the book provide a more balanced account. One should remember that between 1966 and 1975 the Chinese infant mortality rate (whose fall is a broad indicator of social welfare improvement) decreased by 3% annually, about twice as fast as from 1991 to 2006. As a matter of fact, from the 1970s to the 2000s the decrease slowed down even on a graph in which one represents the rate on a logarithmic scale as is indeed required by the fact that the rate is bounded by zero.

In its first chapter (p. 25-29) the book reproduces an historical account given by Premier Zhou Enlai of the rift with the Soviet Union. It started at least 10 years before the first border clashes in March 1969. At a conference in Moscow in 1957 China tried fruitlessly to dissuade Moscow from going too far along the path of cooperation with the United States. One must remember that ever since the Communist victory in 1949, the “United States has fought to keep the PRC ostracized by the world community; by behind-the-scenes wire-pulling it had indeed succeeded in keeping China out of the United Nations organization” (p. 1-2). Thus, one can understand that the flirtation of Mr. Khrushchev with the United States which led to his visit of 1959 was resented bitterly in Beijing.

There was also the grief over the independence of Outer Mongolia. Although this Chinese province had been under Soviet influence for quite some time, it became officially independent only as a result of an American concession to Russia in the Yalta agreement of January 1945. When it came to power in 1949 the Communist government recognized this agreement but probably not without sorrow. In 1959 Mr. Khrushchev also tore up the agreements with China on atomic energy cooperation. In 1960 Soviet technicians in construction and industry were withdrawn. In 1962 during the Chinese-Indian border dispute the Soviet Union sided with India. After Mr. Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, Beijing expected a policy change which did not materialize however.

One can observe that the Soviet Union gained very little through its policy of
accommodation with the United States for meanwhile the US continued its un-
relenting, insidious undermining work. This took several forms: pressure to
allow Jewish Soviet citizens to immigrate to the United States or Israel; sup-
port to dissidence movements particularly in Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States,
Poland and East Germany; renewal of the threat of NATO with the Pershing ep-
isode. This behind-the-scenes wire-pulling eventually led to the disintegration
of the USSR.
Currently (in mid-2013) do we not see a replay of this scenario? Replace the
Jewish Soviet citizens by newly enriched Chinese citizens whom the US tries
to attract. Replace the Soviet Republics outside Russia by several Autonomous
Regions or Special Administrative Regions. Replace the threat of NATO by the
containment policy developed in relation with US allies in Asia such as Japan,
South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand with recurrent military ma-
neuvers organized on the doorsteps of China\textsuperscript{118}. Meanwhile, at least until 2014,
Beijing was courting the United States. It tried to develop a “special rela-
tionship” with the US, continued to buy huge amounts of US Treasury bonds and to
send its best students to US universities.
On account of the Soviet episode, what outcome should one expect?

in Intelligence 50,2,27-32.
[Report about early cooperation between Dai Li, the Chief of the KMT secret
service, and the Office of Naval Intelligence. It took place between August 1935
and August 1936.]

Journal 6 November 2012. [This long article based on an investigation by
journalist Jeremy Page provides convincing evidence that Heywood was indeed
transmitting information about the Bo family to MI6, the British secret service.
The same claim had already been made in a previous article of the Wall Street
Journal published on 27 March 2012. The statement released in April 2012 by
the British Foreign Office according to which “Mr.Heywood was not an em-
ployee of the British government in any capacity” is irrelevant because most
MI6 informants are not considered as employees. Independently, it can be ob-
served that the “New York Times” used to publish laudatory comments on Mr.

\textsuperscript{118}From 7 to 8 June 2013 there was an apparently friendly and relaxed meeting between the Chinese and US presidents
in California. During the Xi-Obama discussions the American side expressed its concern regarding cyber-security and the
alleged spying activities of China. It turns out that Edward Snowden’s revelations about US spying activities began to be
published by the Guardian on 6 June 2013.
Then, on 10 June 2013, US Forces in cooperation with Japanese forces started a military exercise off the coast of California
whose purpose was to retake an island seized by an opponent. This exercise was suggested and initiated by the US after a
similar one planned three months earlier on a Japanese island was canceled following Chinese protests and probably also
a reluctance on the part of Japan.
Bo. At first sight, this may seem surprising with respect to someone willing to re-introduce Maoist ways. However, the fact that both sons of Mr. Bo were educated in expensive private British schools clearly suggests that Mr. Bo’s Maoist claims were nothing but window dressing.]


[An edited translation into English was published in 1967 under the title: “The awakening of China, 1793-1949”. The book is a compilation of accounts and descriptions given by various persons who visited China or wrote reports on Chinese historical events.]


[The reliability of the figures given in this book is discussed in Appendix B.]

Rundell (W. Jr.) 1961: Currency control by the United States Army in World War II. The Pacific Historical Review 30, 4, 381-399.


Sautman (B.) 2003: “Cultural genocide” and Tibet, in Texas International Law Journal, April 1, 2003. [The expression “Cultural genocide” is often used in pro-Tibetan circles. In this paper, Prof. Sautman tries to give a fairly objective perspective.]

[A social science professor at the University of Science and Technology of Hong Kong, Dr. Sautman has studied minority issues in China. In contrast to many
western scholars he tries to keep a balanced attitude and perspective.]


[Most of the book is about the political discussions that took place in Washington. Events occurring in China represent only about 10% of the book’s content. The 1938-1945 time interval shows that the main purpose of the book is to analyze the help provided by the United States to China in its conflict with Japan. However, the “US crusade in China” did not end in 1945. It should be emphasized that the author was able to find interesting sources, particularly: (i) Report on Naval Unit No 9, 1 August 1945, Ch. 27; (ii) John Service and Raymond Ludden to Wedemeyer, 19 February 1945, Box 11, Wedemeyer files. It would be useful to have them available on the Internet.


[available on the website of the Marine Corps History Readings]


[In the United States the book was published by Random House in 1938. In 1937-1938 the role of the Communists in China was fairly marginal; in other words, this account was remarkably in advance of its time.]


[This is a personal account of the period from May 1937 to August 1940. It has the advantage of showing both the Kuomintang and Communist sides. Snow witnessed several of the major events which marked this period: the occupation of Beijing by the Japanese, the battle for Shanghai, the bombing of Chongqing by Japanese planes.]


[The author visited China in April 1944. He was one of the first Americans to visit the Communist capital of Yenan. Yenan was 240km north of Sian which was controlled by the Kuomintang.]


[This is a semi-official history of SACO (Sino-American Cooperative Organization) in the sense that the accomplishments of the 15 units which composed the organization are dutifully described. One of the most interesting chapters is the one about the DOCHINA unit in which the author has served himself because it provides some insight into the financial arrangements between the US government and the government of Chiang Kai-shek. DOCHINA stands for: Disbursing Office, China. In particular it explains how the American Disbursing officers could draw on a fairly unlimited supply of Chinese currency, the so-called no-rate currency (also called “Funny Money”).
In the introduction (p. v,vii) the author writes that all but 5 of the 3,000 members of the Navy, Army, Marine Corps and Coast Guard returned to their American communities. The names of the 5 Americans who died in China are given at the end of the book in a “In Memoriam” section. As the service of SACO covered three years, from mid-1942 to mid-1945, this would mean an annual death rate of $\frac{5}{(3 \times 3)} = 0.56 \text{ per 1,000}$; such a rate would be about 5 times smaller than the death rate of 3 per 1,000 experienced by American men aged 20-24 living in the United States in 1940 (Vital Statistics of the United States 1940, part 1, p. 210-211, 244-245), a fairly unlikely proposition.]

[This KMT propaganda publication says that in 1930-1931 2,513 Communists were arrested in the main cities of China.]

Taniguchi (M.) 2002: Without an independent and multilateral foreign policy, there is no future for Japan: some proposals for Japan’s foreign policy. Translated from Japanese into English from the July 2002 issue of “Sekai”; available on the following website:
http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/ForeignPolicy01.html

[Despite its title the book gives only a limited view of the influence of western powers. The financial and commercial aspects are completely overlooked.]

The Anti-communist campaigns and the Sian Incident (1927- 1936), 2 chapters, Academia Historica, Digital Archives Program, Taiwan,


[The book contains some information about the links between Chinese and American secret services. However, on such issues it is rather less informative than Michael Schaller’s book (1974), which is surprising because one would expect that in this interval of 30 years more sources have become available.

Here are two excerpts regarding this point:

• (p. 303) Some 50 former FBI and secret service agents were assigned the mission of training Dai Li’s agents in the latest techniques and devices (lie detectors, police dogs, shackle, truth serum) for interrogation. This class was called “Unit Nine’s secret training program”.

• (Note 89, p. 506) Admiral Miles became commander of the Panama Canal Zone instruction center when the program was launched in the mid 1950s. It is well known that interrogation techniques bordering on torture were taught in this instruction center.

[This book contains excerpts of reports and documents written by General Wedemeyer during World War II. The version of his report of September 1947 on China and Korea which is given at the end of the book does not comprise the extensive appendices contained in the original report.]

[From its title one expects this thesis to provide enlightening information on the question of anti-Communist extermination campaigns that we raise in our study. Unfortunately, the author describes the campaigns as they were planned rather than how they were actually carried out. It contains very little data about fatalities among the military or civilian population.

It explains that the 5th campaign was successful because it used a “blockade-blockhouse strategy”, but it does not explain what suddenly made the KMT
capable of waging such a campaign which is obviously much more demanding (in terms of logistics, leadership, means of transportation, building material and manpower requirements) than the four campaigns it had conducted previously. In contrast, the previous campaigns were marked by poor logistics, inadequate means of transportation and second-rate leadership. On page 200 one reads that by March 1934, 2,400 kilometer of roads had been built in Kiangsi. This is almost twice the distance from Beijing to Shanghai. What made such an investment possible? How long did the construction take and what was its human cost?

[Theodore White visited Honan in March 1943 and Yenan in 1944. The book was reedited in 1980.]
[Two organizations provided financial assistance for this research (i) The US Marines Corps Historical Foundation. (ii) The Sun Yat-sen Scholarship Foundation of Taiwan. One may wonder if, for such a sensitive topic, it is really the best way to favor an objective account to get financial support from two organizations which are closely connected with two main protagonists of this historical episode.]
[The book provides a very detailed description of the Shen Chung rape case.]
[This is the official Chinese demographic abstract for the period 1949-1985. The volume has 1,010 pages. It gives birth and death rates in each province and each year; it gives also the population by sex and age in each province in census years, i.e. 1953, 1964 and 1982.]
It is possible to check the accuracy of the age-group data by analyzing the population pyramids in each province. A high birth rate in year $y$ should give rise to a large group of age $A$ in the data of year $y + A$. Thus, if the year $y + A$ is a census year it is possible to compare the prevision with the actual age-group sizes. Such consistency tests appear to be fairly satisfactory.

Curiously, it seems that this important publication has not been translated in English. It is true that it can be used fairly easily with a list of the names of the provinces and a lexikon of basic words used in demography.]

Occupation episodes and analytical history

By education the present author is a physicist, so it may not be surprising that he tried to transform history into a testable science. How to do that was explained in a book he co-authored with Pr. Tony Syme and which was published by Harvard University Press in 2002.

The main step in transforming history into a testable science is to study not just one case but several similar cases. Indeed, a physicist does not just study the fall of one kind of bodies (e.g. apples), he wants to describe and understand the fall of all kinds of falling objects (e.g. iron balls, drops of water, hailstones, and so on). Actually this requirement is not specific to physics, it is common to all testable sciences. Thus, in medicine one does not wish to describe solely the influenza of Mr. Martin; one wants to understand all cases of influenza whether they occur in China, Europe or the United States.

That is why the present study is part of a series of several books devoted to various occupation episodes.

Studies of “occupation” episodes by the same author
1 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Japan
2 Relations between Allied forces and the populations of Germany and Austria.
3 Relations between Allied forces and the population of Iceland
4 Relations between US forces and the population of Hawaii
5 Relations between American forces and the population of China
6 Relations between American forces and the population of South Korea
7 Relations between American forces and the population of Australia

All these studies are available on the author’s website at:
http://www.lpthe.jussieu.fr/roehner/occupation.html

**Modules and submodules**

What we call modules of a major historical episode are simpler elements. Occupation episodes are modules of the Second World War, but these modules have themselves several aspects that can be called submodules. It turns out that many of these submodules are common to several occupation episodes.

As examples of such submodules one can mention:
- Military tribunals
- Clashes between soldiers and the population
- Looting of art items
- Purge of undesirable elements in education and the medias
- Control of political activity
- Introduction of a special currency
- Creation of new universities
- Establishment of exchange programs for teachers or officers in the police and armed forces

For each submodule the various occupation episodes will provide several realizations. These realizations parallel the repeated experiments conducted by a physicist who wants to study a specific phenomenon.

Of course, defining the submodules and collecting all information about them is only the first step. Once this has been done, the historian is in the same situation as a physicist who has finished a first round of experiments.
The next challenge is to make sense of the data. This means asking the right questions in order to find some hidden order behind them. Once a regularity has emerged, a new set of observations can be planned which will permit to improve its accuracy.